Philosophy Compass 5/2 (2010): 147163, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00277.

Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference

Gideon Makin*
University of Birmingham, England.

Abstract

The article presents Freges distinction between Sense and Reference. After a short introduction,
it explains the puzzle which gave rise to the distinction; Freges earlier solution, and his reasons
for its later repudiation. The distinction, which embodies Freges second solution, is then discussed
in two phases. The first, which is restricted to proper names, sets out its most basic features. The
second discusses empty names; indirect speech, and the distinction for predicates and for
complete sentences. Finally, two criticisms, by Russell and by Kripke, are briefly set out.

Freges distinction between Sense and Reference comes as a corrective to a simpler, more
nave, conception of a words meaning.1 On the nave view, a words meaning consists in
its standing for an object; but the reasoning underlying the distinction maintains that even
in what seems to be the simplest type of case, i.e., that of proper names (e.g., John,
London, the capital of France), assuming such standing for (referring in the new theorys vocabulary) exhausts a names meaning has untenable consequences. The remedy is
to recognize an additional theoretical notion of a names sense: roughly, the way in which
its referent is presented, identified, or picket out.2 Yuri Gagarin and The first human in
space both regarded by Frege as proper names designate one and the same individual;
they have the same reference. But how each picks out that individual, their senses, differ.
We are thus led to distinguish within the formerly unitary notion of meaning, two
ingredients: sense and reference. Frege conceived of this dual conception as extending to
all types of expressions, including complete sentences (for the sense of a complete declarative sentence Frege used the term thought, maintaining that its truth value, i.e., the true,
or the false, was its reference). Russells theory of definite descriptions (with regard to
complex names), and the Millian (after J. S. Mill) direct reference view (for simple
proper names), which is close to the nave view, are the principal theoretical alternatives
to this view. To begin with, we shall focus on proper names, which is where Freges
principal case for drawing the distinction lies.
Frege put forth the distinction (in his 1892 essay On Sense and Reference) as a solution to a particular puzzle; one to which he had proposed a very different solution some
years earlier (in his Concept-Script of 1879). After explaining the puzzle (Section 1); Freges
first solution, and its later repudiation (Section 2); we will discuss some of the principal
theses regarding sense and reference and provide a glimpse of issues they give rise to (Sections 3 and 4). Finally, we will briefly discuss two criticisms of the distinction (Section 5).
1. The Puzzle
The puzzle arose from Freges reflecting upon identity statements where two different
names serve to assert a strict and literal identity (e.g., 2 + 2 = 4; the author of Waverley
is Scott).3 On the nave view, according to which a names meaning consists in its
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148 Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference

standing for a definite object, substituting a name for another standing for the same object
ought to leave the sentences meaning unchanged. And indeed, in some cases this will be
so. But in other cases, and it is only these that give rise to the puzzle, such a substitution
seems to change the meaning.
In Freges best-known example Hesperus names a heavenly body observed at a certain position in the sky in the morning, and Phosphorus a heavenly body observed in
some other position in the sky in the evening. Consider first:
(1) Hesperus = Hesperus
This identity is trivial, and establishing its truth requires no special investigation. But now
consider that, following astronomical investigations, it transpires that Hesperus is Phosphorus. So,
(2) Hesperus = Phosphorus,
which results from substituting the names of the same object in (1), is true. But unlike
(1), (2) expresses a substantial astronomical discovery, namely, that the two are one and the
same heavenly body. (2) is informative while (1) is not.4 But if, following the nave view,
we take a names meaning to consist in nothing more than its standing for the named
object, (2) should have meant exactly the same as (1). We will return for a second, closer,
look at the puzzle later. This provisional statement will do for now.
Before turning to solutions to this puzzle, it will be useful to introduce a concept and
highlight an assumption which underlie it although not because either is particularly
controversial. What we loosely spoke of above as the meaning of a sentence might be
called its content. A declarative sentences content may be characterized as what is said,
what one strives to preserve in translation. Thus, two people who believe or know the
same thing (but, let us suppose, having no common language cannot be said to relate to
the same sentence) are said to believe or know the same content.5 Content enables us to
express an assumption underlying the puzzle in a slightly more neutral way. The identity
of a sentences content is fixed (as a rule; there may be exceptions) by the contributions
of its constituent words. A words content may thus be identified with the contribution
it makes to the content of sentences in which it occurs. (The mode in which these words
are combined is of course important too, but we can leave this to one side in the present
context.) This thesis is known as compositionality, and in its simplest form, which Frege
happened to subscribe to, the words contents are considered to be parts of the sentence
content. As we saw, the nave view identifies the contribution, or content, of a proper
name with its reference.
2. Freges First Solution
In the last paragraphs but one we tried to capture the informativeness of (2) with the
phrase that the two are one and the same (heavenly body), but this was plainly incoherent: what could the two here mean when, as we are assuming, only one object is in
question? Two what are one and the same? How can the content of the discovery that
Hesperus is Phosphorus be coherently described?
One answer which suggests itself focuses on the situation involving two distinct names.
What one knows, i.e., the content of such an informative identity statement, is that the
two names designate one and the same object. Such was Freges solution to the puzzle in his
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Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference 149

earlier work Concept-Script (8). And indeed, knowing this (unlike knowing that Hesperus
is Hesperus) does not appear to be trivial.
But a few years later (in On Sense and Reference) Frege came to recognize that this
solution was fatally flawed. The problem is not that it is not true as far as it goes, but
rather that its account of the content known in such cases cannot be right. Precisely, why
Frege found this answer objectionable deserves careful attention not merely from an antiquarians interest, but because it is a valuable guide to the solution he ultimately arrived
at. Because the first solution suffers from a number of rather glaring faults it is easy to get
distracted, as many commentators have, and focus on those which seem to the writer the
most damaging. But since our current interest in the first solution is as a guide to the
sense reference distinction, we focus on the only fault which Frege found need to discuss
even if he might have justifiably picked others.
What dawned upon Frege only years after proposing this solution was that since anything we please can serve as the name of any given object (e.g., that the word Paris
names the particular city it does is, at least in principle, purely a matter of convention),
giving this naming relation a constitutive role in what is known, i.e., the content, renders
the putative item of knowledge one which depends upon arbitrary convention. But when
we know that Hesperus is Phosphorus, or that 2 + 2 = 4, what we know, the content, is
entirely objective; and it does not depend in any way upon convention, linguistic or other
(to think otherwise is to confuse what is known, the content of our knowledge, with the
means of expressing it). Many commentators take Freges point against his former solution to be that it mistakes one item of knowledge for another (i.e., an astronomical one
for a linguistic one); but close examination of his wording in On Sense and Reference
suggests that the problem for him was not the conflation of items of knowledge. It was,
rather, that he thought the proposed content could not count as an item of knowledge at
all a label which he reserves for what is objective. We will see later that there is more
to Freges first solution than has been related here, but this gives the gist both of the first
solution and of his grounds for repudiating it.
3. The New Solution The Basics
The most salient feature of the new solution Frege put in its place is the distinction
between two ingredients in the notion of meaning: Sense and Reference. The reference of a name is, by and large, the notion familiar from the nave view; but the
notion of sense is an innovation (or, rather, as we shall see shortly, almost so). Distinguishing two ingredients in a names meaning it is names generally, not only in identity statements, that are at stake makes it possible to maintain that two names share
the one, but not the other; and thus that the content of an identity sentence involving
such a pair can be both true (on account of the identity of reference) and informative
(on account of the diversity of senses). The move from (1) to (2) above keeps the reference constant, but changes the sense. The possibility of distinct names having the
same sense is not ruled out, it is only maintained that this is not the case when a true
identity is informative. What is ruled out, although, is the possibility of names having
the same sense but different references. Having distinct senses is necessary, not sufficient, for names to have distinct references. But what then is a sense? After some comments introducing this notion at the intuitive level, our answer will come in two
installments. The first focuses on its two most essential features: its determining the referent; and its objectivity. Once these are in place, the following section will expand
our view beyond the most basic cases.
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150 Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference

3.1

SENSE DETERMINES REFERENCE

Since Frege grouped complex and simple names together, what a particular names
sense might be is easy enough to tell when the name is a complex expression (as with
the first human in space). But Frege maintained that simple names, too, have a sense.
His examples invite one to think of the sense as a particular mode in which the names
referent is presented; and this is most naturally cashed out by some definite description
(a phrase of the form the so and so in the singular) which only the referent fits. For
example, for a name like Aristotle this might be the teacher of Alexander the Great
and pupil of Plato or The teacher of Alexander who was born in Stagira. The
description must contain sufficient information to determine a unique referent, i.e., distinguish it from anything else whatsoever. But which, then, of the myriad of senses
which determine Aristotle, is the sense of Aristotle? Frege acknowledges the answer
may vary from speakers to speaker. The sense I associate with the name, the information that would enable me, if challenged, to single him out, may well differ from that
available to you. The sense one associates with a name thus reflects ones knowledge,
experience, and conceptual resources. Such diversity is tolerable, and does not hinder
communication, so long as the reference (what we speak about) is the same, but in a
formal language of a demonstrative science it is unacceptable: each name must always
express the same sense. A names sense may be thought of as the content of a descriptive
phrase in a manner analogous to that in which we spoke earlier of the content of a
complete declarative sentence.
Freges novelty was to conceive of a names meaning as involving two, rather than a
single, entity, but it would be a mistake to picture this to oneself in a diagram where two
arrows point from the name, one to the sense, the other to the reference. The correct
image would rather be of one arrow pointing from the name to its sense, and another
from that sense to the referent. The names relation to its referent breaks down into its relation to the sense, and that senses relation to the referent. The notion of sense may thus
also be regarded as Freges answer to what does the relation between a name and its referent consist in? About the first of these two relations Frege speaks of a name expressing
its sense and referring to its referent he has precious little to say; but the senses relation
to the referent is a vital part of the theory, and it is commonly captured by the dictum
sense determines reference.
Having characterized sense as a mode of presentation of the referent, the dictum may
seem rather obvious. And yet, there are possible misunderstandings we need to guard
against. The president of the U.S., it might be thought, determines different individuals
at different times. But saying this is to confuse the phrase, a linguistic entity, and a sense,
which is not. Once a sense has been selected, the identity of the referent is thereby fixed.
There is no room for maneuver. It is of the very essence of each sense to determine the
particular referent it does, and its determining any other is an outright impossibility. Thus
the president of the U.S. must be regarded as an incomplete expressions of a sense in
this instance, the completion would specify a time and not the expression of a definite
sense which requires supplementation to determine a referent. The sense, which is an
abstract entity, determines the reference (as we shall see shortly, if any) by and of itself.
Many expositions append sense determines reference with given the facts, as if which
referent a given sense determines depended on some additional factor. But as commonsense and natural as this addition might seem, there is no evidence for the need for it in
Freges writings and, as we shall see when we expand our view to include complete sentences, rather conclusive evidence to the contrary.
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Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference 151

As with sentence-contents (about which more below), the chief role of sense, as can
be seen from reflecting on the puzzle, is as an epistemic object. What ones mind directly
engages with when thinking of an object, or understanding a sentence about it. We relate
to a sense by grasping it, which is what understanding the attached name consists in. But
being grasped leaves no trace on the sense itself, which is an abstract and immutable
entity. Since sense determines reference, by grasping a sense one enters into a relation
with the referent as well; and this is the closest, epistemically, one can get to the referent.
There is no more direct epistemic route leading from ones words (or thoughts) to it.
3.2

THE OBJECTIVITY OF SENSE

The chief misunderstanding Frege was concerned to eradicate was thinking of a sense
along the lines of an idea. He never tired of insisting that this is not what he had in mind,
and exploited every opportunity to stress the difference between senses and ideas. The
most crucial difference he points out is that ideas are numerically distinct for different
persons. The idea I attach to Aristotle may or may not resemble (perhaps even perfectly
so) the idea you attach to the same word, but it cannot possibly be strictly and literally
the same idea, since the one is in my mind (or some would say, head) and the other in
yours. We cannot perceive or have each others ideas there can be no question of literally sharing them. By contrast, we may well grasp one and the same sense, which is
objective and not in anyones mind. Just how vital the objectivity of sense was for Frege
becomes even clearer by reflecting on this notions ancestry in his thinking which
brings us to taking another, closer, look at his first solution to the puzzle.
When sketching that solution (in Section 2), we followed Freges own retrospective
account of it in On Sense and Reference. But Concept-Script 8 contains a rather important
addition, which the retrospective account omits to mention. If, as explained earlier, the content of an identity statement is that the two names refer to the same object, then it would seem to
follow that all cases where different names flank the identity sign ought to be equally informative. But Frege was well aware that this is not the case, e.g., most clearly when a name is introduced as an abbreviation of another expression. How then are we to distinguish between the
cases? Having stated the solution explained earlier, Frege illustrates how to each of the two
names of a single point in a geometrical construction there corresponds a different way of
determining it. It is when the different names go along with distinct ways of determining,
that the identity is informative (thus implying that when the associated ways of determining
do not differ, there is no informativeness to account for). It is the possibility of such differences
that justifies the need for a symbol for identity of content in the concept-script language.
The Concept-Script notion of way of determining is clearly a precursor of the later
notion of sense for proper names. When considering 8 as a whole, it appears that this
notion, rather than the special content it assigns to names, carries the burden of explaining why (some) identities are informative. And yet, Frege does not count the ways of
determining as part of a names content. Instead, he speaks of it as merely going along
with the name a rather loose and vague phrase.
The question thus naturally arises: if Frege recognized, in Concept-Script, a notion
which is effectively the same as the later notion of sense for proper names, and used it to
explain the informativeness of identity statements, why were a dozen more years required
before he gave it its due status by admitting it into a names content? What feature of
any substance (as opposed to the label) had changed about this notion between ConceptScript and On Sense and Reference? What might have prevented him from admitting it
into the content in Concept-Script?
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Since in On Sense and Reference, Frege ignored this whole strand of his former solution,
no direct answer is to be found in his writings. And yet, one difference between the ConceptScripts notion of way of determining and the later notion of sense suggests itself, at least to
the present writer, as the key to the most plausible explanation. In On Sense and Reference,
Frege came to recognize ways of determining (or rather modes of presentation) as objective.6
It thus seems plausible to suppose that in Concept-Script, reluctance to commit himself on their
objectivity, and thus to include them in the contents of names, forced Frege to make names
difference between which are unquestionably objective their own content. His later recognition that this position was untenable, led him to recognize ways of determining as objective, i.e., as embodied in mind- and language-independent entities (which, as On Sense and
Reference makes plain, renders his earlier appeal to names superfluous).7
4. The Distinction The Broader Picture
Our discussion so far was confined to the simplest kind of case, i.e., proper names with
familiar, concrete, objects as referents. This helped simplify the task of laying down the
distinctions foundations, but to gain a full picture we must expand our gaze on three different fronts which open before us by raising the following three questions: First, can a
sense (or sense-expressing name) fail to determine a referent? Second, having characterized the referent as what using a name results in speaking about, is it possible to speak
about a sense? Third, does the distinction apply to expressions other than proper names?
Freges short answers would have been Yes to all three. Let us take up each in turn.
4.1

EMPTY NAMES

When one regards the so and so phrases, as Frege did, as proper names, it is easy to
think of names which seem intelligible but have no reference at least not in any
straightforward sense. Frege himself gave the examples the celestial body most distant
from the earth and the least rapidly converging series, and admitted that some simple
names too, e.g., of fictional characters like Odysseus, lack reference. For a monolithic
conception of meaning, like the nave theorys, such names present a stark dilemma: one
must either find some special ontological status for their putative referents (Meinong is
known for having taken such a course), or deny outright their very intelligibility, dismissing them as empty sounds (earlier Frege seems to have taken that course8). But a dual
conception of meaning opens the way, which Frege indeed took, to account for the
intelligibility by admitting such a name has a sense, while denying that it has reference. A
language containing such names is in a sense defective, and Frege makes it clear that in a
language designed for scientific use no such names are to be allowed. And yet, one can
hardly deny that he admitted the possibility of such empty names.9 An important effect
such names have on sentence containing them will surface later when we come to the
senses of complete sentences; but another, more immediate one, seems to be this: since if
there is no referent there can hardly be a way in which the referent is presented, a mode
of presentation of a referent cannot be regarded as defining the notion of sense in general
there are senses to which this characterization does not apply.
4.2

SENSE AND INDIRECT SPEECH

The second of our three questions stems from the characterization of a names referent,
as opposed to its sense, as what its use effects speech about. Does this leave room for
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Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference 153

speaking about senses? Frege not only admitted this is possible in principle, but he elaborated upon it in detail. Although he also made a passing remark suggesting that the
expression the sense of x (where x is replaced with some particular name) refers to a
sense, the more substantial discussion of this possibility is his discussion of indirect speech.
He maintained that when a name occurs in the context of indirect speech, i.e., in a
clause preceded by said that; believes that and the like (to be clearly distinguished
from a direct quotation, which typically employs inverted commas and whose referents are
words), it has not its ordinary, or in Freges words direct, reference (which implies it
cannot have its ordinary sense either). Rather, it has a special or indirect reference. The
indirect reference is no other than the words ordinary sense. So, when a word occurs in
such a context what is ordinarily its sense becomes its referent. These are the bare bones
of Freges position, which is fairly straightforward. Less straightforward is explaining why
such a theory is called for, and what relation it bears, if any, to the puzzle which provoked the distinction in the first place.
Let us begin by asking why does indirect speech, which is one of a range of contexts
created by verbs known as propositional attitudes and Freges discussion should be
taken as addressing the whole range call for a special account of a words sense or reference. If Tom says:
(3) Aristotle was a philosopher,
then according to Freges theory, in using the name Aristotle Tom expresses a sense
(such as one of those illustrated above) and refers to the man Aristotle. If we substitute
some other name for Aristotle in (3), then as long as it has the same reference as Aristotle,
the resulting sentence will have the same truth-value as (3). If (3) is true, the result of
such a substitution will be true as well, and if false, it will be false. This is the general
rule. But in reported speech, this rule appears to break down. Reporting what Tom said,
we say, truly:
(4) Tom said that Aristotle was a philosopher.
But if we substitute Aristotle with some co-referential name (e.g., Nicomachuss
son) in this context, it may well result in a false statement. This gives reason to
believe that something unusual happens when a name occurs in the scope of a propositional attitude. Freges theory provides a precise answer to what the change from
plain sentences like (3) to one like (4) consists in, and it does so in a way that preserves the principle that keeping the reference of the part constant guarantees the
same for the wholes truth-value. Only substitutions of names having the same (ordinary) sense as Aristotle had in (3), which is its reference in (4), will guarantee that
the truth-value remains unchanged. Frege theory thus regards names as ambiguous:
they have one reference in normal contexts, another in reported speech contexts
although unlike ordinary ambiguities, the two are systematically, and moreover, logically, related. This is how the distinction serves in the account of indirect speech, but
why should it?
Most accounts of Freges treatment of indirect speech, including some of the most
influential, give the impression that his course was first to establish the need for a notion
of sense in general this having been done in resolving the puzzle and only then apply
it to the problem of indirect speech.10 I propose that the two are inseparable: the core
problem presented by the puzzle just is the failure of substitutions of co-referential names
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154 Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference

in the scope of propositional attitudes to preserve truth-value. To see why this is so, we
need to take a second and closer look at the puzzle.
First, it is worth noting something Frege realized only after Concept-Script that it is
not essential that the puzzle deal with an identity statement.11 The fundamental problem
is the same with a pair like:
(5) Hesperus is bright
and
(6) Phosphorus is bright,
neither of which is known a priori. The nave theory is at loss to explain how, as seems
to be the case, a subject may believe or know the one but not the other if, as it maintains, the two have the exact same content. But what does noting that a subject knows
(5) but not (6) amount to? It is, I suggest, to contrast in effect another pair of contents,
namely (e.g.):
(7) Tom knows that Hesperus is bright
and
(8) Tom knows that Phosphorus is bright.
(We might just as well have used believes, says, etc.). The puzzle concerns not Toms
consistency, but the nave theorists: How can the one be true and the other false, if
substituting co-referring names (in this context) leaves the content unchanged? Surely, the
same content cannot be both true and false. This is the essence of the puzzle, and it is
concerned with indirect speech. If the distinction is not a means to account for indirect
speech, it will not resolve the puzzle either.
Spelling this out for Freges examples in On Sense and Reference requires
an additional step. We are told that a = a is trivial, uninformative, and known a priori, while a = b is a surprise, informative, and a substantial discovery. But what are
these contrasts getting at? Why can we not just respond to these contrasts with So
what?
Noting that a = b is a surprise or a discovery is, again, to implicitly contrast the two
broader contents S knows that a = a and S knows that a = b. Since a discovery is
something one had not known formerly, it implies that at some earlier point in time
(i.e., before the discovery was made), it was not known, and since a = a can be assumed
to have been known even then, the two broader contents must have then had contrasting
truth-values. As the only difference between the two is the result of substituting co-referring names, the reference cannot be, at least not exclusively, what determines the embedded contents identity (what is known) and thus, by parity, not a names sole
contribution to content generally.
The puzzles direct moral is a negative one: it tells us what a names content is not,
not what it is. However, indirectly it strongly suggests that whatever the alternative content might be, it should (unless we wish to drop the reference completely, which would
be absurd) determine the referent, which implies, in turn, that relating (directly) to it, is
relating (indirectly) to the referent as well.
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4.3

THE DISTINCTION FOR EXPRESSIONS OTHER THAN PROPER NAMES

4.3.1 The Sense and Reference of Complete Sentences

Coming now to the last of the three questions listed earlier. Frege held that (properly
functioning) linguistic expressions of all kinds have both sense and reference. Now that
the distinction has been laid down for proper names, it remains to see how it applies to
the other two categories of expressions Frege recognized, namely function-names, a category comprising of all concept- and relation-words (adjectives, verbs, adverbs, prepositions, and logical constants); and complete sentences. Applying the distinction to
sentences is by far the more interesting case, and we will begin with it.
In On Sense and Reference, Freges case for taking a sentences truth-value (its being
true, or false, as the case may be) as its referent is as follows. Having establishes the distinction for proper names in the narrow sense the qualification is called for because ultimately, he regards complete declarative sentences as proper names too he raises the
question whether the distinction might apply to complete sentences as well. He reasons
that if sentences have both sense and reference, what we have called the sentences content
which from this point on he labels a Thought (henceforth invariably capitalized to
indicate the Fregean sense) cannot be the reference. The reasoning tacitly appeals to a
version of a principle encountered earlier, namely compositionality, confined to the references of expressions. Substituting co-referring parts for each other, should not affect the
reference of the whole.12 Since substituting names which have the same reference can
change the Thought expressed (this, as we now know, happens when they have different
senses), the Thought cannot be the sentences referent. If either, it must be its sense.
Next, Frege poses the following question: Assuming that complete declarative
sentences have senses, do they (in general) have references too? Might they fail to have a
reference? He replies that they have no reference when a constituent name has no reference. If one assumes the name Odysseus has no reference, then one does not inquire
after the truth of sentences in which it occurs. This suggests that the parts having a reference, and the whole being either true or false, go hand in hand. When the first is missing, we have no interest in proceeding beyond the Thought (which, we now assume, is
the sense) to the reference. Sentences in fiction contain empty names, and thus lack a
truth-value. We seek a sentences truth-value only if we assume that its constituent names
have references.
This leads to taking a sentences truth-value to be its reference. Frege maintained that
truth and falsity are not, as one is inclines to think, predicates of sentences citing that prefixing it is true that to a sentence does not alter the content expressed but rather objects
sentences refer to. Thus, while proper names in the narrow sense have all kinds of objects
as referents, with complete declarative sentences there are only two objects they can possibly refer to: the true or the false. He reasons that because sentences (like proper names in
the narrow sense) are complete or saturated expressions (as opposed to predicates, which
are unsaturated), they are proper names, not predicates; and their referents are therefore
objects. (Ultimately, denying they are properties is all Freges classifying them as objects
amounts to, there is no implication that you can pick them up in your hand, or see them
through a telescope. He considers them to be logical objects, as numbers are too.)
This argumentation leaves much to be desired. Frege seems to have established, at
most, that if sentences have both sense and reference, then the Thought or content, and
the truth-value are, respectively, the most plausible candidates for these roles among the
notions we are already familiar with. (Note that, unlike the distinction for proper names,
for sentences the theory introduces no new element which was not familiar beforehand.)
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156 Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference

Fortunately, one can find in Freges writings yet another route leading to the admission
of truth-values as the referents of sentence. In Function and Concept, a paper Frege
delivered shortly before On Sense and Reference was published, the chief topic is not
sense and reference. Nonetheless, the distinction gets its first mention in that earlier
paper, and although it does not discuss the distinction for proper names, it does contain
an argument for regarding truth-values as referents of complete sentences. This argument
flows from Freges conceiving concepts as a special case of functions.
We are all familiar with functional expressions such as 2 + x. We say, e.g., that the
functions value for the argument 3 (i.e., the result of plugging 3 in the variables place) is
5, and that it is 4 for the argument 2; and since 2 + 3 = 5, the expressions 2 + 3 and
5 have the exact same referent. But functions, as Frege used the term, are not confined
to mathematics, and the mother of x is a function in precisely the same sense (e.g., for
the argument Isaac it has the value Sarah; for the argument Ishmael the value Hagar).
Frege extended the notion of a function to include concepts. While functions of the
familiar kind, like those above, have ordinary objects, or numbers, as their values; when
an argument expression is plugged into a concept expression, such as x is wise, the
resultant expression is a complete declarative sentence. Regarding it as a function gives
rise to the question: What might its value be? What does the completed expression stand
for? Surely there is something about the resultant expression which is sensitive to which
argument we plug in - just as the values of the functions considered above were sensitive
to which individual name we plugged into the argument place. Frege observes that
among the arguments a concept like x is wise can take, for some the result will be a
true sentence, for others a false one. It is significant, too, to note what the resulting
truth-value is not sensitive to: as long as the arguments inserted have the same reference,
the truth-value of the resulting sentence will remain unchanged (mere changes of sense,
are irrelevant). He thus proposed taking the truth-values as the values of concepts
(regarded as a special case of functions). Just as 2 + 3 stands for the number 5, so does
Socrates is wise stand for, or refer to, the true. This route depends on taking the names
bearer as its referent, but not on recognizing name senses.
When all the relevant evidence is considered, there is a case to be made for regarding
the distinction for complete sentences as preceding the distinction for proper names in
the proper logical, as opposed to expository, order of things. Truth, for Frege, is the most
important logical notion, and it is its role in determining a sentences truth that confers
the status of referent on a name bearer, rather than this identification being ones starting
point.13 Before moving on to the distinction for predicates, two remarks need to be
made. One regarding the application of sense determines reference to Thoughts and
truth-values; the other on Thoughts objectivity.
Since complete sentences are ultimately, on Freges view, a species of proper names,
sense determines reference requires no additional invocation. The Thought (expressed
by a declarative sentence) determines the (sentences) truth-value just as a names sense
determines its referent. When discussing proper names (in the narrow sense), we said that
a sense determines the referent it does by and of itself. No additional conditions are
required; and when there seem to be, this is only because the sense in question has not
been expressed fully. In the case of complete sentences, this has consequence which may
strike one as a rather surprising. The Thought expressed by a sentence, its sense, determines it reference, i.e., its truth-value, regardless of anything else. It is natural to suppose
that a Thoughts truth or falsity depend not only on the Thought itself, but also on the
facts; but nothing Frege says warrants such supplementation. On the contrary, in a discussion of the notion of truth (in the posthumously published Logic of 1897) he insists
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Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference 157

that a Thought is true or otherwise not, as one might think, relative to this or that being
the case - a conception of truth known as correspondence - but is so in itself. He
completely rejects the correspondence conception of truth for Thoughts, and it is only
Thoughts, on Freges view, which are true or false in the primary sense whatever else is
said to be true or false (e.g., a sentence) derives this title from the associated Thought
being so.
One reason why the truth of a Thought is not to be conceived as relative to the facts
is there being (so far as it can be judged from his writings) no such category in Freges
ontology. At one point he remarks that facts are nothing other than true Thoughts,14 but
this does not provide anything a Thought might fit or fail to fit. Another feature of the
ontology of sense and reference which is easily overlooked is that what was said earlier
about the objectivity of senses of proper names, applies to Thoughts too; and it applies to
false Thoughts just as it does to true ones. False Thoughts are just as objective as are true
ones. The difference lies in their respective referents, not in the objectivity or reality of
the Thought, or of its referent.
In arguing for taking truth-values as the referents of complete sentences (and mathematical equations) Frege appeals to a fundamental principle we mentioned earlier, namely
compositionality. The principle asserts that the reference of the complete sentence is
determined by the references of its parts leaving aside how those parts are combined15
and similarly, the sense of the complete sentence, a Thought, is determined by the
senses of its parts. It is a complex made up exclusively of senses. A sentence containing a
name which has no reference a possibility mentioned earlier will itself have no reference, i.e., be neither true nor false. In such cases although there is a Thought, there is no
truth-value. A sentences relation to the Thought it expresses and, in turn, to the truthvalue is not, on Freges view, merely analogous with a proper names relation to its sense
and reference. The two are instances of the very same relation.
The most relevant theoretical alternative to a Fregean Thought is Russells notion of a
proposition. The two share the roles of being what is involved in inference, primary
bearer of truth and falsity, the object of belief and knowledge, and the meaning of sentences. But unlike Frege, Russell admitted both objects (which for Frege can only be referents) and sense-like entities (denoting concepts in his terminology) which determine
referents, as constituents of propositions (the latter were dropped with the advent of the
Theory of Descriptions).
4.3.2 The Sense and Reference of Predicates
Finally, we come to predicates, that is, concept- and functions-words (for brevity I will
use concepts for both). Frege maintained that they too, have both sense and reference,
but with hardly any discussion or argument as we have seen with regard to proper names
and complete sentences. Explaining the distinctions application to their case is complicated by two facts. First, before Frege and the distinction ever enter the scene, the traditional conception of concepts already distinguishes between the concept itself (also
referred to as an intension), and the things (if any) the concept applies to, namely, the
concepts extension; and concepts are taken to be related many-one to their extensions.
(To borrow a famous illustration, creatures with a heart and creatures with kidneys
express distinct concepts, or different intensions, but have the same extension.) On this
view, too, concepts, like senses, are invariably abstract, and determine their extension in
just the way a sense is said to determine its reference16 So in the case of concept-words,
we seem to recognize something at least very similar to the sense reference distinction
even before that distinction is made. The other complicating fact is that once Frege
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158 Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference

adopts the distinction he shifts to a non-standard use of the term concept. This may or
may not be justified in the light of his views on other aspects of this subject something
we will not go into here but it can easily breed confusion. On Freges modified use of
the term concept (to avoid confusion I will mark it conceptF) creatures with a heart
and creatures with kidneys express one and the same conceptF (not two, as on the more
common terminology). ConceptsF and their extensions17 are related oneone, not (as in
normal use, and Freges earlier writings), manyone. It is conceptsF that Frege regards as
the references of concept-words. This fits in with what he takes to be the references of other
expressions since, as he notes (and in conformity with the principle already appealed to
above), so long as we substitute a concept-word with another with the same extension, the
sentences truth-value will not change. What then is a concept-words sense?
Not surprisingly, Freges maintains that conceptsF, too, have modes of presentation.
The earlier example of creatures with a heart and creatures with kidneys might serve
to illustrate this. Both express one and the same conceptF, but each presents it in a different way. We thus end up with a distinction between sense and reference for conceptwords as well. But it seems questionable whether this distinction, unlike those for proper
names and complete sentences, adds anything theoretically substantial to the pre-Fregean
conception, or whether it is a mere re-labeling of elements of a familiar distinction in an
attempt to produce a neat uniformity with the distinction for names and sentences.
The distinction for concept-words completes the picture and enables the invocation of
two parallel principles of compositionality: A sentences reference, its truth-value, is
determined by the references of its constituents parts. A sentences sense, the Thought, is
determined by the senses of its constituent parts.
5. Two Criticisms of the Distinction
5.1

RUSSELLS CRITICISM IN ON DENOTING

In Section 4.2, we mentioned that in reported speech our words refer to what is ordinarily their sense. The reference of the whole subordinate clause (what follows that) is
the Thought that clause (ordinarily) expresses, not its truth-value, and the referents of individual names within that clause refer to (what are ordinarily) their senses, not their referents. Since no expression refers unless it has a sense, such names must also express some
sense.
Let us consider a particular instance mentioned earlier. Imagine yourself hearing Tom
say, in normal circumstances Aristotle was a philosopher and that you understand
perfectly what he said. You then report this event by saying:
(9) Tom said that Aristotle was a philosopher.
You have no reason to doubt that you fully understand what you are saying. There is
nothing particularly tricky involved in saying (9). (We are not concerned here with its
truth, but only with what understanding it entails.) Now let us examine (9) from the
standpoint of Freges theory. The reference of Aristotle here is its ordinary sense. Ignoring the difficulty arising from the fact that you may not know (or indeed, need to know)
which sense Tom associated with his utterance of Aristotle (which may, as noted earlier,
differ from the one you normally do); we can still ask, since your use of Aristotle must
express some sense, which sense, according to Freges theory, is it? We know this senses
reference is the sense of Toms expression, and let us suppose that you somehow know
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Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference 159

this to be the Teacher of Alexander born in Stagira which is thus your utterances reference. But it is the sense you expressed we are now asking about. Imagine yourself saying
(9), and simply ask yourself Which sense was I associating with my utterance of Aristotle?
You might think it is
(10) The sense of the teacher of Alexander who was born in Stagira,
but this will not do. As a moments reflection will reveal, since the teacher of Alexander
the Great born in Stagira is Aristotle, and since Aristotle was a human being, not a linguistic expression, he does not have a sense. Modifying the example so that the embedded phrases referent will be of a kind that does have a sense (e.g., the sense of the first
line of Grays Elegy) will still not give us the sense we are after. (10) gives us the sense of
the reference of those words, not those words own sense.
Alternatively, we might try:
(11) The sense of Alexanders Teacher who was born in Stagira.
Unlike (10), here the embedded phrase is mentioned, not used. It refers to the enclosed
words, not their meaning. But (11) involves a mistake which at root is the same as the
one recognition of which, as we saw earlier, led Frege to abandon his former theory.
The mistake, namely, of appealing to a relation which is merely conventional, to individuate something which is supposed to be objective. The relation between sense and reference (including where the referent is itself a sense) is an intrinsic, logical one. Specifying
a sense by appeal to a sound pattern, makes our specification relative to, and thus dependent upon, a particular arbitrary convention (the same is not true, e.g., of (10), although
any specification will, of course, use language).
Moreover, even if we ignore this problem, (11)s appearing to specify a definite sense
is illusory. The sense we are trying to capture is one whose reference is the sense of the
mentioned phrase. But like any referent there are infinitely many senses which determine
it; which of those does (11) specify? There is no route leading back from the reference to
the sense; so we cannot tell, from having identified the reference, what sense is involved.
The appeal of the distinction, when it was initially made for names as we ordinarily
use them, was crucially dependent on our experience, as speakers. The thesis that names
have senses is appealing partly because we can usually think of a specific sense (or several)
which might be a plausible candidate for the one we express or grasp in a particular
instance. This linked the theoretical notion which would otherwise remain merely programmatic with our experience as speakers. But this link disappears into thin air when
we follow the theory to the next step. We are still supposed to grasp a specific sense, but
we are at loss to say which one it is. And if for all we know, it could be any one of an
infinite set of theoretically possible candidates, what plausibility is there to our maintaining that we grasp it?
The difficulty is not over the being of a sense of the kind we are after any sense has
infinitely many senses determining it, and there is no problem in admitting second- or
higher-level senses. It is, rather, that despite supposing, with Frege, that we had expressed
and therefore grasped a particular sense, we have no idea which sense it is. Russell is not
arguing that the distinction is inconsistent or leads to contradiction but, more simply, that
the consequence just revealed shows that it had not been properly thought through. The
burden of proof lies, Russell seems to have thought, squarely with the theorys proponent: he must explain which sense has been expressed. The critic, on the other hand, is
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160 Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference

not even trying to establish that no such an explanation is possible. It is damaging enough
that no explanation is forthcoming; and such appears to have remained the case ever since
Russell struck upon the problem in 1905. This difficulty persuaded Russell that Freges
distinction, as well as his own, similar, view (which he endorsed up until he struck upon
the Theory of Descriptions) were untenable, saying it involved certain rather curious difficulties, which seem in themselves to prove that the theory which leads to such difficulties must be wrong (1956, 48).
The above gives the gist of Russells criticism of the distinction in On Denoting,
although the specific context in which Russell raised it was an attempt to devise a (logically conspicuous) symbol for talking about a sense (or as he calls them meanings or
denoting complexes), and his discovering that no coherent interpretation of such a symbol effected speech about the desired sense.18 Despite being by far the oldest criticism of
the distinction, and appearing in what is arguably the most influential paper ever written
in the analytic tradition of philosophy, this criticism has had virtually no influence. The
simple reason for this is that it had not been understood and this, in turn, may be
explained, at least partly, by the obscurity of the passage in which Russell articulated it,
and by the fact that the relevant (posthumous Russellian) manuscripts which assist one in
conquering that obscurity were only published in 1994.19
5.2

KRIPKES CRITICISM AND THE DIRECT REFERENCE VIEW

From the mid-1960s and early 1970s on, a number of writers, most prominently Saul
Kripke in Naming and Necessity, advanced the merits of a view akin to what we earlier
called the nave view, i.e., that a names meaning, or contribution to the meaning of sentences in which it occurs, is exhausted by its picking out a referent, without the mediation
of anything conceptual. The case is largely an attack on the view that names have senses.
The criticism first sets up what it calls the descriptive theory of names in a version
which, although certainly not Freges, makes it fair to count him as subscribing to its fundamental thesis, namely, that a names meaning is given by (the content of) some definite
description which the speaker associates with it, and which determines its referent.
Although Frege never explicitly commits himself to this thesis, the illustrations he provides strongly suggest such an understanding and, more importantly, no viable alternative
understanding, which has any bearing on our experience as speakers, is on offer. (A mere
programmatic notion, whereby something which determines the referent is associated with
names we use, does not get us anywhere.)
The criticism spells out a number of consequences which would follow if the
descriptive theory of names were true, and argues that they are plainly false. (I simplify them to avoid issues which are not relevant to the criticism of Frege.) Since, as
we already know, different speakers may associate different senses with the same
name, the discussion is relativized to a speaker S, who associates description D with
the proper name N (which is thus meaningful in Ss idiolect). The descriptive theory
is committed to the following:
(I) S believes that exactly one thing satisfies D.
(II) If Ss belief is true, then N refers to that thing, otherwise N does not refer.
(III) If N exists, it is necessarily true that it satisfies D.
This is a somewhat simplified and truncated version, but it will do to give the gist of the
criticism. Kripke tests these theses on names of famous persons, taking D to be what a
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Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference 161

normal speaker, who uses and understands the name, might come up with if asked Who
is N? (the nature of the criticism drives us to consider cases where the speaker knows
least about the name-bearer while still succeeding to refer. Of course he may well know
a lot more).
Let us take as an example the name Godel, and the person who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic as the sense S associates with it (let us further assume, S knows
nothing more about him). The criticism then argues that:
Contrary to (I), Ss use of Godel may still refer to Godel even if S does not believe
that the description is satisfied by exactly one thing.
Contrary to (II), Ss use of Godel would not fail to refer even if it turned out that
the alleged proof was somehow faulty (and thus that no one satisfies D). Nor is it the case
that if, unknown to S, the proof was actually the work of someone else, say, a little
known figure called Schmidt, this would make Schmidt the referent of Ss use of
Godel.
Contrary to (III), Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic is not a necessary
truth. It is at least plausible to say that Godel might not have proved the incompleteness
of arithmetic (e.g., had he died as an infant); and certainly does not have to mean the
same as the person who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic might not have proved
the incompleteness of arithmetic.
The descriptive views commitment to the theses under attack flows from its regarding the description (that the speaker associates with a name as its sense) as giving the
names meaning, serving (for that speaker) like a definition. But underlying the specific
points above is also a broader and more fundamental issue. Freges notion of sense is
intended as an answer to what, Kripke maintains, are two distinct questions. One is
What is a names contribution to the meaning of sentences in which it occurs?; the
other What makes it the case that this (i.e., our reply to the first question) is the
names meaning?. Once the two questions are separated, and thus the possibility of giving quite a different answer to each, is recognized, the direct reference view no longer
appears untenable. To illustrate: Kripkes answer to the first question is: the names referent, and nothing more. In reply to the second, he puts forward what he describes as
a mere picture. A causal-historical chain links the referents baptism, when it was first
given the name (however, far in the past this may have been), to the speaker. Each link
of this chain involves the passing of the name (the sound) and its association with its
referent from one speaker to another. In this way, ones use of a name can refer to the
object at the root of the chain even though he may not have sufficient descriptive
information to single it out.
But it is fair to ask how does the direct reference view handle the puzzle which gave
rise to the distinction in the first place? Kripke does not offer an answer to this, but other
advocates of the view do. A pair of sentences differing only in Hesperus having been
replaced by Phosphorus express the same proposition, have the exact same content, not
(as Frege would have it) two different ones. To account for the possibility of a subject
believing the one but not the other, Nathan Salmon20 proposes that (again, contrary to
Freges view) a subject may misidentify a proposition he grasps. In special circumstances, a
subject may grasp a proposition and believe it, encounter it again in a different context
and, failing to recognize it is the same proposition, not believe it. This happens if on each
occasion the subject takes the names referent (which, on this view, is literally a constituent of the proposition) in a different way. Belief, accordingly, is not a two-place relation
between subject and proposition, but rather a three-place relation involving also the way
in which the proposition is taken by the subject. The way in which the proposition is
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162 Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference

taken by the believer any of Freges illustrations of names with different senses determining the same referent would fit the phenomenon described by Salmon is directly
inherited from the way in which the referent is taken by him (the other constituent are
irrelevant to this third element of the belief relation). So, after all the twists and turns, it
seems that we have ended up with something surprisingly similar to Freges notion of
sense for proper names, alas, without it being part of the content of the sentence expressing that belief, and yet, it is part of that belief.
Short Biography
Gideon Makin obtained his DPhil from Oxford in 1995. Since then, he has held posts
and taught at the Universities of Oxford, Stirling, and Birmingham. His book The Metaphysicians of Meaning Russell and Frege on Sense and Denotation appeared in 2000 in
Routledges International Studies in Philosophy Series. He is currently an honorary
Research Fellow at the University of Birmingham, England.
Notes
* Email: g.makin@bham.ac.uk.
1

The original German Sinn and Bedeutung have also been translated Sense and Meaning and, less frequently,
Meaning and Denotation. Since Frege was consciously introducing these as novel technical terms, appeals to
common usage in either language are immaterial.
2
Strictly speaking, one should distinguish the referent, the object spoken about, and reference, the words property of
singling out that object. However, it is fairly common to use the latter for both, without this breeding any confusion.
3
The broader context was Freges exploring the prospect of proving a thesis in the philosophy of mathematics
known as logicism. On this view, all mathematical truths, and all the fundamental concepts mathematics requires,
can ultimately be derived from, and defined in terms of, a small number of truths and concepts of general logic.
Having found natural language to be inadequate for this task, Frege set out to devise an artificial logical language, a
concept-script, in which such a proof was to be carried out. When he came to introduce the symbol for identity
in that language, he noticed that the very need for such a symbol called for special justification.
4
Frege speaks of such pairs as differing in cognitive value.
5
Freges principal characterization of what is essentially the same notion is somewhat different. In Concept-Script
3, he says that two sentences have the same conceptual content if everything that logically follows from the one
(together with other sentences), also follows from the other (together with those same sentences). Freges notion of
conceptual content is designed, first and foremost, to capture all and only what is relevant to logical inference.
6
That Frege held sense to be objective is, of course, beyond doubt; but while in Concept-Script he neither asserts
nor denies the objectivity of ways of determining, his avoiding a commitment to their objectivity seems likely,
first, in view of his highly selective attitude, as evidenced in 3, to admit anything into conceptual content; and second, because one of the two ways of determining used to illustrate this notion in Concept-Script 8 (directly in
experience) seems both not to be objective, and is (unlike the other way in the same illustration) of a kind which is
never found in Freges numerous illustrations of the notion of sense (nor does he ever regard any sense as being
more direct than another). When considering this proposal one needs to bear in mind, first, that the question of the
objectivity of a mode of determining is distinct from that of the objectivity of what is determined; and second, that if
modes of determining are to be objective, then all must be; it will not do if only some are.
7
For alternative views and a spirited exchange on Freges positions in, Concept-Script 8 and the transition to On
Sense and Reference see May; Thau and Caplan; Heck; Bar-Elli.
8
See Dialogue with Punjer 60 [99] and Seventeen Key Sentences on Logic 174 (proposition 10) for simple
names; and a footnote in 74 of The Foundations of Arithmetic for complex names.
9
For diverse views on this, see Evans 2232; Dummett (1981) 4546, and Makin 112116.
10
See, e.g., Dummett (1973) 109.
11
Thus On Sense and Reference addresses a more general form of the puzzle than Concept-Script did, and accordingly drops the limitation to identity statements, which are merely a special case.
12
This principle, it might be thought, is rather ad hoc; but reflecting upon the substitution, in complex names, of
co-referential constituent names (e.g., the occurrence of Tom in Toms father), shows this is not so.

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Freges Distinction Between Sense and Reference 163

13

See Sluga 157161.

See Thought 342. This view is closely linked with Freges view of truth as absolute, ultimate and irreducible, for
which see Thought 326327; also, (more extensively) Logic of 1897 in Posthumous Writings 128133.
15
We can do this because we confine ourselves to the effects of substituting a single expression, or word, in a sentence while leaving the remainder, and thus the effect of the combination, unchanged.
16
It may argued that this is in fact the true home of the determines relation in our discussion. Concepts (both in
Freges pre-Sense Reference terminology, and in the new sense this term acquired with the distinction) are
regarded as objective, and depend on neither mind nor language.
17
To be precise, Frege replaces the notion of an extension with that of a value-range, but this does not affect the
point at stake.
18
For an extensive discussion of Russells argument see Makin 2244 and 208222. In a recently published paper
Kripke (2008, especially 190191) articulates what strikes the present writer as essentially the same problem, even
though Kripke does not relate it to Russells criticism.
19
Primarily On Fundamentals 3539.
20
Chapter 8.
14

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