Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
AND LULLISM
I N S T R V M E N TA PAT R I S T I C A E T M E D I A E VA L I A
67
S v b s i di a L v ll i a n a 5
KNOWLEDGE, CONTEMPLATION
AND LULLISM
Contributions to the Lullian Session
at the SIEPM Congress Freising, August 20-25, 2012
Edited by
Jos H iguera R ubio
2015
I N S T R V M E N TA PAT R I S T I C A E T M E D I A E VA L I A
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abbreviations .
vii
Vorwort .
ix
xi
Presentation .
.
.
1. Knowledge
Coralba Colomba, Lulls Art: The brevitas as a Way to
General Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Carla Compagno, La scienza geometrica nellArs lulliana:
linterpretazione di Ivo Salzinger . . . . . . . 17
Celia Lpez Alcalde, The Foundations of Analogical
Thinking in Llulls Epistemology . . . . . . . 41
Guilherme Wyllie, Ramon Llull on the Theoretical
Unification of Fallacies . . . . . . . . . . 53
2. Contemplation
Antoni Bordoy, Ramon Llull and the Question of the
Knowledge of God in the Parisian Condemnation of
1277 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Francesco Fiorentino, La critica lulliana alla teoria
averroista della felicit speculativa . . . . . . . 89
Jos Higuera Rubio, From Metaphors to Categories:
The Contemplative and Semantic Cycle of the Divine
Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
AnnemarieC.Mayer, Contemplatio in Deum or the
Pleasure of Knowing God via his Attributes . . . 135
3. Lullism
Josep Batalla, Regards sur Raymond Lulle .
. 153
table of contents
VI
245
ABBREVIATIONS
AHDLMA
CCCM
CUP
EL
MOG
NEORL
ORL
ROL
SL
VORWORT
Dieser fnfte Band der vom Raimundus-Lullus-Institut initiier
ten Reihe Subsidia Lulliana enthlt die Vortrge, die im Rahmen
der Special Session Lulliana (SSL) whrend des 13. Kongresses
der Societ Internationale pour ltude de la Philosophie Mdi
vale (SIEPM) vom 20. bis 25. August 2012 in Freising gehalten
wurden.
Schon auf der 12. Konferenz der SIEPM in Palermo im Sep
tember 2007 hatte sich erstmals eine eigene Abteilung mit Ramon
Lull und seinem Werk beschftigt. Als Jos Higuera fr den
Freisinger Kongress unter dem Titel Pleasures of Knowledge
erneut zu einer entsprechenden Session einlud, folgte eine beacht
liche Anzahl von Lull-Spezialistinnen und -Spezialisten seinem
Ruf. Ihre hier gesammelten und von Jos Higuera herausgege
benen Beitrge lassen sich drei groen Themenkreisen zuordnen:
dem Wissen bzw. der Erkenntnistheorie, der Kontemplation und
der historischen Rezeption von Lulls Werk vom 14. Jahrhundert
bis heute. So spiegelt der vorliegende Band ein breites Spektrum
gegenwrtiger Lull-Forschung.
Raimundus-Lullus-Institut der Universitt Freiburg,
im April 2015
Peter Walter
Viola Tenge-Wolf
PRESENTATION
Fernando Domnguez stated in his postfacium1 to the publica
tion of the contributions of the first SSL (Special Session Lulli
ana) held in Palermo (2007) that, until then, the figure of Ramon
Llull had not received the attention it deserved in scholarship on
medieval philosophy. This fact can be explained by the tension
between Llulls originality on the one hand and the rigour of
the Scholastic method on the other which seems to impose restric
tions on the aims of Llulls thought. Domnguez proposed over
coming this apparent clash by dealing with the issues and prob
lems with which Ramon Llull was confronted in his time, as well
as with the corresponding solutions that he presented to the mem
bers of the medieval studium.
During the second SSL held in Freising at the Congress Plea
sures of Knowledge, SIEPM 2012 2225 August the contribu
tors took up this suggestion and addressed relevant issues within
the philosophical tradition of the thirteenth century. Thus they
showed how Ramon Llull gave his own responses by developing
a philosophical Opus that is still relevant to current research on
the Middle Ages. In particular, the contributions deal with three
main areas: theory of knowledge, contemplative life and divine
delectatio, and the reception of Llulls work from the fourteenth to
the twentieth centuries.
The first area opens with a contribution by Coralba Colomba
(SISMEL-Florence) which focuses on the classical notion of brevitas
in order to highlight three important aspects of Llulls work: the
encyclopedic compilation of knowledge, the collection of the prin
ciples of different disciplines, and the synthetic function of Llulls
Art from a methodological perspective. Ramon Llull assumed a
critical stance with regard to the philosophical works of his age,
namely the voluminous scholastic commentaries and disputed
questions, and he promoted instead his own compendiosa version
1 F.Dominguez, Postfazione, Universality of Reason. Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle Ages: XII International Congress of the Society for the Study
of Medieval Philosophy, eds A. Musco et al., Palermo, 2012, v. II. 2, p.xxxv.
XII
presentation
presentation
XIII
these issues, he did not deal so much with the text of the con
demnation itself, but preferred to discuss its main questions. To
a large degree, current historiography seems to follow this same
method of interpretation of the syllabus.
Francesco Fiorentino (UdS, Bari) focuses on the problem of
speculative happiness and refers to the philosophical activity in
Llulls works pointing out how the delectatio of human knowledge
is central to Llulls thought: intellectual happiness validates many
of his metaphysical positions.
Jos Higuera (UCM, Madrid) starts with a discussion of the
ambiguity of common language and the application of the sermocinal arts to theology. Higuera shows that Llull explored the
semantic interpretation of the divine names in two ways: one con
cerning the logical predication of the divine names in relation to
intellectual concepts, and another concerning the construction of
the fallacies in dictione. These two ways lead to a contemplative
and joyful mystic activity, since this production of meanings, as
it is called by Llull, exalts the intellect and provides access to the
divine virtues.
Annemarie Mayer (Faculty of Theology, Louvain) presents a
classification of the divine names, whose diversity shows the dif
ferent stages which, according to Llull, belong to the contempla
tive life. In this sense, there are divine attributes closer to nature
and to the human being, which are therefore more achievable, and
there are other attributes that require more effort and a deeper
approach to the divine essence. This distinction appears through
out the Liber contemplationis, and Mayer suggests observation of
the development of Llulls Art and of the theological dispute in
this perspective.
The third part of the volume is devoted to several cases of the
reception of Llulls work: three of them date from between the
fifteenth and seventeenth century, and two in our time. First,
Francisco Daz (IEM-Lisboa) draws a map of peninsular Lullism
in which one can clearly distinguish a courtly reception of Llulls
work in Seville, related in part to the Portuguese court, and a
monastic reception in the centre of the Iberian Peninsula (Lon).
Daz focuses on the pious aspects of Llulls work as well as on his
methods of preaching.
Rafael Ramis (UIB, Palma de Mallorca) examines Llulls pres
ence in the Parisian Faculty of Law during the first half of the
XIV
presentation
presentation
XV
1. Knowledge
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107304
coralba colomba
coralba colomba
Cum igitur intellectus ad maximam altitudinem suae intelligibi
litatis attingere non ualeat sine iuuamine principiorum genera
lium et etiam regularum, ideo in hoc libro siue Arte compendiosa
ipsum intellectum tractare et nutrire uolumus cum principiis et
regulis Artis generalis.11
coralba colomba
10
coralba colomba
11
fundamental for the use itself of the via artistica28 . The Art must
not remain confined within a book, but it has to become forma
mentis. Therefore the discourse is reduced, the word becomes sign
and the sign imprints on the human heart (impectorabilis), 29 the
room of Lulls memory:
Finiuit Raimundus istam Lecturam, et est breuis, ut sit impec
torabilis, ratione cuius impectorabilitatis artista sciens Artem
habeat in promptu sine libro suae solutionem quaestionis. 30
Lull keeps repeating his invitation to memorize the Arts basic com
ponents (alphabet, rules and so on) in several of his Artistic works by using
approximately the same words: oportet scire cordetenus.
29 C. Du cange, Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis, Graz, 1945 (repr.
ed. 18831887), vol. 4 p.303: impectorare, pectori recondere.
30 Raimundus
Lullus, Lectura compendiosa Tabulae generalis, ed.
C. Colomba, Turnhout, 2014 (ROL, 35; CCCM, 248), p. 57.
28
12
coralba colomba
magistro, dum praesens fuerit, in faciendis et soluendis quaestion
ibus omnimodis ualeant esse prompti. 31
Once one has read the Tabula generalis, and memorised the con
stitutive principles of the Art (alphabet, principles, rules), the
Lectura compendiosa becomes an exercise book to keep in mind
(impectorabilis), to train the aspiring Artist to solve every kind of
question from the Artistic method.
At other times the abbreviatio works as an introduction to the
main text which it refers to; as in the Ars brevis, which could be
read before the Ars generalis ultima, according to the indications
given by the author himself. 32 The practice of abbreviating works
was part of intellectual life in the Middle Ages, where reference
to previous authors, to the auctoritates, acts as a guarantee for the
new arguments. Paraphrases, compendia, anthologies and tables
proliferate both in scholastic and university circles, aimed at the
passing on and understanding of the texts. 33 The compendium,
in particular, allows for access to and the spreading of the overly
large, and thus also the overly expensive, works. It was a kind
of pocketbook of that time, to recall an efficacious expression by
Cf. ibid.
Raimundus Lullus, Ars generalis ultima, op. cit., p.526: Verumtamen ad
addiscendum hanc Artem citius, consulo, quod primo addiscatur Ars breuis.
The Tabula generalis also satisfies the same intention: Et intentio, quare
istam tabulam compilamus, haec est, quia in illa breuiter demonstrabimus
modum Artis inuentiuae et Artis amatiuae et etiam modum, per quem fieri
poterit Ars memoratiua, quae multum ad sciendum est necessaria. Item ut in
breui tempore habeatur cognitio necessariarum scientiarum in hoc mundo,
et ut intellectus in illis gradibus ascendere possit, in quibus naturae secreta
existunt, attingendo ea secundum terminos naturales. Raimundus Lullus,
Tabula generalis, ed. V.Tenge-Wolf, Turnhout, 2003 (ROL, 27; CCCM, 181),
prol., pp.12.
33 The practice of abbreviating and summarising the texts developed in
a complementary way with the spreading of universities, offering different
methods of approach to a wide range of philosophical and theological liter
ature. Besides compendia, paraphrases, anthologies and tables, there is evi
dence of abbreviationes, glossae, propositiones notabiles or notabilia, conclusions,
summae. All these instruments of work expressed in many prologues
aimed at offering the students quicker access to an increasing understanding
of a subject. See J. Hamesse, Parafrasi, florilegi e compendi, in Lo spazio letterario nel Medioevo I. II, ed. G.Cavallo, C. Leonard & E. Menest,
Roma, 1995, vol. 3, pp.197220, at 197198, 217.
31
32
13
14
coralba colomba
15
16
coralba colomba
Coralba Colomba
coralbacolomba@gmail.com
Universit del Salento - Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici
Palazzo Parlangeli - Via Stampacchia
73100 Lecce
Italy
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107305
18
carla compagno
19
d.
C.
2.
gradus
ren
Concordantia
per medium
Minoritas Aequalitas
D.
1.
gradus
E.
Scala
Aequationis.
tia
rietas
medio
Minoritas
F.
1.
gradus
f.
G.
2.
gradus
Maioritas
fg.
H.
3.
gradus
20
carla compagno
21
22
carla compagno
Esse
Privatio
Necessitas
Contingentia
Actus
f
g
h
i
k
Potentia
Possibilitas
Impossibilitas
Perfectio
Defectus
23
Bonitas
Magnitudo
Duratio
Potestas
Sapientia
Voluntas
Virtus
Veritas
Gloria
Perfectio
l
m
n
o
p
q
r
s
t
u
Actio
Passio
Virtus
Materia
Magnitudo
Quantitas
Punctum
Linea
Superficies
Corpus
24
carla compagno
etc., incipiat in r.; quia si non, sequeretur, quod a. b. c. d. etc. non essent r.,
vel quod non essent principia ipsius l.; et hoc est impossibile: unde cum r. per
l. producat s., et s. producat t., et t. producat u. multiplicando, et e converso
dividendo [].
20 Sul concetto di punto nelle opere mediche e geometriche di Raimondo
Lullo cfr. C. Compagno, Einleitung, in: Raimundus Lullus, Liber de leuitate et ponderositate elementorum, ed. C.Compagno, Turnhout, 2011 (ROL, 34),
pp.153182.
21 I. Salzinger, Revelatio secretorum artis, op. cit., p. 359: Disc. Quare,
Pater, posuisti r. s. t. u. in Arithmetica, cum sint principia Geometriae? Mag.
quia una non potest esse sine altera, nec operari sine altera [].
22 Su questo personaggio cfr. S. Trias Mercant, Diccionari descriptors
lullistes, Collecci Blaquerna 6 (2009), pp.299300. Sullastronomia e la
matematica di Vincenzo Mut cfr. V. Navarro Brotons, Fisica y Astrono
mia Modernas en la obra de Vicente Mut, in Llull, Vol. 2 (1979), pp.4362.
In particolare egli scrisse una Historia del Reyno de Mallorca (1650) in dodici
libri; il secondo che tratta la vita e le opere Raimondo Lullo, viene traman
dato col titolo Vida del venerable mrtir Raymundo Lulio.
25
26
carla compagno
27
28
carla compagno
29
virtus
magnitudo
bonitas
nihil
prima
creatura
39 Ibid., p.378: Proportio in genere nihil est aliud, quam Principium pro
portionandi, sicut bonitas est principium bonificandi, seu est habitudo ordi
nata unius ad alterum [] specificata tamen per rationem Supremi, et quia
est suprema proportio, est supremum Principium proportionandi, sicut []
et est supreme necessaria in mea Arte, quia cum omnes demonstrationes in
omni scibili possint et debeant reduci ad aliquam proportionem.
30
carla compagno
31
Geometrice discrete
Arithmetice continue Sicut se habet 1.a. ad 1.b., sic 1.b. ad 1.c.,&c., vel
Sicut se habet 2.a. ad 2.b., sic 2.b. ad 2.c. &c.
Arithmetice discrete
32
carla compagno
3. Praecursor
Il Praecursor introductoriae in Algebram Speciosam Universalem
viene pubblicato da Salzinger nel terzo volume della Editio moguntina. Lopera si apre con una similitudine molto bella ispirata al
Liber Ecclesiae:
come gradevole agli occhi sensibili, dopo aver tollerato le tenebre
della notte, guardare il sole che sorge, cos agli occhi intellettuali
gradevole, dopo aver tollerato le tenebre dellignoranza, contem
plare il sorgere del sole della scienza e della sapienza.45
33
34
carla compagno
35
36
carla compagno
56
37
38
carla compagno
39
40
carla compagno
they encapsulate the three simple forms which the intellect needs.
to operate rationally.
Carla Compagno
carla.compagno@theol.uni-freiburg.de
Raimundus-Lullus-Institut
Werthmannplatz 3
D-79098 Freiburg im Brsg.
Germany
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107306
42
43
44
10
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
Abstract
The Foundations of Analogical Thinking in Llulls Epistemology
Ramon Llull, in his work Liber novus de anima rationali (1296),
explains how the intellect proceeds in order to reach knowledge
of intellectual objects that cannot be obtained through the ascen
ding process of abstraction from sense data. From Llulls point of
view, there is one privileged way to overcome the gap between the
res sensuales and the res intellectuales, namely, the knowledge that
results from the intellectual process of analogy. On this account,
analogy provides us with an understanding not only of intellec
tual realities but, particularly, of the relations between them, such
as the relations between the constitutive principles and the facul
ties of the soul. By means of this intellectual device, Llull tries
to reconcile Aristotles empirical approach to knowledge with the
Neo-Platonist idea of an autonomous realm of knowledge, focusing
especially on how to understand relations between concepts.
Celia Lpez Alcalde
uranias.celia@gmail.com
Instituto de Filosofia
http://ifilosofia.up.pt
Faculdade de Letras
Universidade do Porto
Via Panormica, S/N
4150-564 Porto, Portugal
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107307
54
guilherme wyllie
55
56
guilherme wyllie
57
In the Middle Ages, most thinkers embraced two causes for any
fallacy.9 According to them, the cause of appearance (causa appa
rentie) of a fallacy is what gives it the ability to simulate being
that which, in effect, it is not. Whereas the cause of non-existence
(causa non existentie) of a fallacy is that through which an argu
ment where the fallacy emerges is not what it appears to be. By
using this differentiation, Llull establishes in the extract below
not only the motivating principle or cause of the appearance of the
Fallacy of Contradiction, but also the cause of its non-existence or
principle of its deficiency:
As the intellect has two acts, namely, believing and understand
ing, and in generating knowledge so that it is finally successive
rather believes than understands, so fallacies have their origin
9 See, for example, Peter of Spain, op. cit., p. 98 Quia fallacia dicitur
uno modo deceptio causata in nobis, alio autem modo fallacia dicitur causa
sive principium illius deceptionis. Et isto secundo modo intendimus hic de
fallaciis. Unde sciendum est quod in qualibet fallacia isto secundo modo
sumpta duplex est principium sive duplex causa, scilicet principium motivum
sive causa movens sive causa apparentie et per hoc omnia idem principium
nominatur; aliud autem principium sive alia causa est principium defectus
sive causa non existentie, quod idem est, sive causa falsitatis. Principium
autem motivum sive causa apparentie in qualibet fallacia est quod movet ad
credendum quod non est. Principium vero defectus sive causa falsitatis est
quod facit creditum esse falsum.
58
guilherme wyllie
and, consequently, opinions in the first act. Thus, is revealed in
the major proposition the apparent cause of its paralogism and in
the minor the cause of its deficiency.10
59
tion one can immediately conclude that there are two phases that
distinguish such a fallacy. Firstly, it simulates the derivation of a
contradiction from an inconsistent pair of premises. Subsequently,
the identification and suppression of the ambiguity responsible
for the inconsistency prevents a contradiction from occurring as a
result of inconsistent premises.
Although the considerations mentioned so far reveal that many
characteristics of the new fallacy coincide with the basic prop
erties of ignorantia elenchi, at least one crucial difference can be
identified between them. During the thirteenth century when
many influential thinkers such as William of Sherwood defended
the idea that ignorantia elenchi would affect any argument that
seemed to involve a contradiction, but did not actually do so,13
without exception, they were indeed declaring that such an argu
ment would appear to be a genuine refutation.14 However, used
in an entirely differentiated way by Llull, this affirmation was
employed to point out that the Fallacy of Contradiction would
consist of the above-mentioned phases, as well as to distinguish
it from the Aristotelian fallacies. According to him, as it would
appear to involve a contradiction, without actually doing so, his
fallacy would make a true conclusion seem false, whereas the other
fallacies would make a false conclusion seem true.15
apellamus, eo quia uidetur contradicere, et nihil realiter contradicit;
Ramon Llull, Liber de refugio intellectus, op. cit., p.232: Fallacia ista uidetur
concludere contradictorie; et tamen non concludit.
13 William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam ed. Ch. Lohr et
al., Traditio, 39 (1983), p. 286: In his quattuor paralogismis est ignorantia
elenchi, quia videtur concludi contradictio et non concluditur.
14 See, for example, Albert the Great, Liber Elenchorum III, 9, in Opera
omnia, ed. A. Borgnet, v. II, Paris, 1890; Simon of Faversham, Quaestiones
novae super libro Elenchorum, ed. S.Ebbesen et al., Toronto, 1984, q. 27; and
John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super librum Elenchorum Aristotelis q. 55., in
Opera philosophica, ed. G.Etzkorn et al., v. II, 255566, New York, 2004.
15 Ramon Llull, Liber de nouis fallaciis, op. cit., p. 12: Quam fallaciam
apparentem contradictionem appellamus, eo quia uidetur contradicere, et
nihil realiter contradicit. Et per hoc ab aliis antiquis fallaciis est diuersa, qua
antiquae uerum significant, et uerum tamen non concludunt; Ramon Llull,
De fallaciis, quas non credunt facere aliqui, qui credunt esse philosophantes, contra
purissimum actum Dei verissimum et perfectissimum, ed. H.Riedlinger,
Turnhout, 1967 (ROL, 6), p. 485: aliae fallaciae significant, quod hoc, quod
est falsum, sit uerum, et ista fallacia significat, quod hoc, quod est uerum, sit
60
guilherme wyllie
61
62
guilherme wyllie
2. Contemplation
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107308
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antoni bordoy
67
68
antoni bordoy
69
reason that there appears in the syllabus the expression error quia.
So, for example, article 18 talks about the impossibility for a phi
losopher to accept the resurrection, because it cannot be investi
gated by the intellect;17 and the censor writes, error, because the
philosopher must keep his intellect captive in submission to the
faith.18 The point is that not all affirmations that are currently
ambiguous have this kind of clarification and it is not always pos
sible to use the context of the time. Thus arises the impossibility
of determining the exact meaning and source of certain articles,
which leads R. Hissettes study of 1977 to consider some articles
as clearly contrary to the Christian doctrine, but others as sim
ply heretical in the sense that it is understood by the censor
(art. 151) and others to have contents that are not at all hetero
dox (art. 110).
The concatenation of causes leading to this situation is exac
erbated by two facts: first, the doctrinal precision and accuracy
of the articles, reflected in the number of theses condemned; sec
ond, the absence of a structure in the presentation of the arti
cles, mixing for example affirmations about the eternity of the
world with others on the substantiality of the intelligences. The
result is a text made up of very precise ideas, but lacking in struc
ture, which is far from the condemnation of only a few days later,
March 18, 1277, promulgated by R. Kilwardby: this other text
has only thirty articles, but these are divided into three groups,
grammar, logic and nature, and ordered hierarchically.19 For this
reason, in the late nineteenth century, the inquiry regarding the
internal order of the Syllabus became a methodology researching
the meaning of the articles.
17 In the centum formis (81) of the Ars brevis, Llull defines philosophy as
the subjectum in quo intellectus se contrahit ad omnes artes et scientias.
In opposition, proverb 276 of the Liber proverbiorum defines theology as
sermo ordinatum ad loquendum deo. The difference between philosophy
and theology is the object: philosophy uses the intellect to understand the
world and the sciences; theology uses the intellect to contemplate God. In
both cases, faith is necessary to reach the truth.
18 Art. 18 (ed. D.Pich, p. 84), CUP, p. 544: Error, quia etiam
philosophus debet captiuare intellectum in obsequium fidei. As in other
cases the clarifying sentence is not mentioned (DR, c.18, p.286).
19 CUP, pp.558560.
70
antoni bordoy
There are three different structures for the 219 articles included
in the Syllabus. The first of these appears in the Universitatis Chartularium Parisiensis,20 in which it is not possible to find a clear
order. The second was proposed by Charles du Plessis dArgentr
in the eighteenth century, under the title Collectio judicorum de
novis erroribus.21 The structure of the Collectio has one advantage:
the author not only looks for the internal coherence, but also for
the connection the articles have with other condemnations, pro
viding a context for its meaning. The third structure was pro
posed by P.Mandonnet in his Siger de Brabant et laverrosme latin
au XIIIe sicle.22 This is a new structure, completely different from
the others, in which the errors are divided into two groups: phil
osophical and theological. The articles included in the philosoph
ical group are 179, and they are subdivided into 15 categories:
the nature of philosophy, the cognoscibility of God, divine science,
divine will and power, the creation of the world, the nature and
function of the intelligences, cycles and generation, the eternity
of the world, necessity and contingency in causes, the principles
of material beings, man and intellect, the activity of the human
intellect, human will and ethics. The articles included in the theol
ogy group are only 39, and they are subdivided into 4 categories:
Christian law, Christian dogma, Christian virtue and the finality
of the human being.
P. Mandonnets classification is important to clarify the mean
ing of the articles. However, this classification raises two ques
tions: first, even if it is based on medieval parameters, the classi
fication goes still further and is artificial, so not all affirmations
fit into one category; second, sometimes the exact meaning of the
articles is unknown, but they are included in one category, and
this inclusion becomes the interpretive point of the article. As a
result of these questions, many of the studies that use P. Mandon
nets classification have been forced to modify the order, and even
the latest publications tend to return to the order that appears in
the Chartularium. This is important for our proposals, because it
CUP, pp.543558.
Ch. du Plessis dArgentr, Collectio judicorum de novis erroribus,
Paris, 1724.
22 Complete reference can be found in note 8.
20
21
71
Art. 211 (ed. D.Pich, p. 144): Quod intellectus noster per sua
naturalia potest pertingere ad cognoscendum essentiam prime cause. Hoc
male sonat et est error, si intelligatur de cognitiones inmediata. DR, c. 211,
p. 211: changes pertingere for attingere and does not mention the expression
hoc male sonat [] inmediata.
24 Art. 36 (ed. D.Pich, p.90): Quod deum in hac uita mortali possumus
intelligere per essentiam (DR, c. 35, p. 302). The question concerning this
sentence is the possibility for a mixed being (constituted by soul and body)
to know a pure being (constituted only by a non-material substance). This
sentence cannot be considered heterodox without this specification, because
it is possible always according to Llulls interpretation to know God after
death; that is, if we have a vita beata.
25 Art. 215 (ed. D.Pich, p. 144): Quod de deo non potest cognosci, nisi
quia <ipse> est, siue ipsum esse (DR, c. 215, p.397).
26 Art. 216 (Ibid.) Quod deum esse ens per se positiue non est intelligibile,
set privative est ens per se DR, c. 216, p.398).
23
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73
For this reason, Llull writes (DR, De secunda positione p. 258, l. 2022):
Vt uitemus prolixitatem inutilem, oportet nos tenere communes opiniones
omnium maiorum philosophorum. For an analysis of the method of the
Declaratio Raimundi, vid. C.Bonmariage, Lulle et la condemnation, pp.xixxxiv.
28
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75
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ing the materialist claim that the creation of the world never
took place.
This article allows us to observe how close Ramon Llull was
to the Syllabus and the general characters attributed to the text.
The Declaratio Raimundi was composed in the ternary phase of
the Art, before the Lullian discussions with Parisian Averroists.
This book shows, more than a fight against Averroism, the process
called by M.-M.Gorce: the combat between Christian thought and
the Gentiles. 34 At this point, Tempiers and Llulls interpretations
are in parallel. Indeed, the letter of the sentence makes it clear
that, first, it is directed against some men studying the arts who,
beyond the limits of their faculty, dared to expose and contest
in schools [] certain evident and execrable errors, [] up to
the point of supporting those mistakes [] through the writings
of the pagans. 35 Something that is not only outrageous for the
church, but also places the philosophers between Scylla and Cha
rybdis: unaware, or rather pretending, not to fall into the error of
double truth in a claim that certain truths are correct according
to philosophy but not according to theology.
The main objective of the Declaratio Raimundi is therefore to
reconcile philosophy and theology or, as the author says, to find
[] how it is possible that theology and philosophy agree in the
concordance which is required between the cause and its effect. 36
Llulls defense of the condemnation is based on the idea that it is
possible to reconcile both sciences, although it is necessary to fol
low the ontological hierarchy of the reality, it means, to subsume
34 M.-M.Gorce, La lutte contra gentiles Paris au XIIIe sicle, in tudes
dHistoire Littraire et Doctrinale du Moyen ge, vol. 1 (Mlanges Mandonnet),
Paris, 1930, pp. 223243. M.-M. Gorce is one of the first authors to interpret
the Parisian condemnation of 1277 as a discussion between Christian and
Pagan philosophy. However, M.-M.Gorce does not criticize P.Mandonnets
position, only adds some information on the historic discussion against the
Pagan philosophers and its use by medieval thinkers.
35 Tempier, Ep. II-III, CUP, p.543 (ed. D.Pich, p. 72): [] nonnulli
parisius studentes in artibus proprie facultatis limites excedentes quosdam
manifestos et execrabiles errores [], presertim dum errores predictos
gentilium scripturis muniant [].
36 Ramon Llull, DR, Prologus, p. 254, l. 2224: [] quomodo concordare
posset theologiam et philosophiam secundum illam concordantiam, quae
requiritur esse inter causam et suum effectum.
77
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79
in which he argues that the human will is free and is not lim
ited by bodily appetites. Furthermore, the response to article 164
is based on two other chapters: chapter 158, about the freedom
of the will, and chapter 118, which also refers to chapter 158, in
which is established the absence of a division of understanding
between active and passive, that is, the individuality of the human
intellect against the existence of a universal agent intellect. Arti
cle 36 corresponding to chapter 35 of the Declaratio refers to
the definition of God as the most intelligible to thereby assert
that the full knowledge of God implies also an essential contact,
and that this knowledge is necessary to fully love God who is the
most loving. According to Llull it is not necessary to reach this
knowledge during our lifetimes, and that is why we have a future
life in which God can reward us with bliss. Article 215 refers,
first, to chapter 87, which speaks of the eternity of the world, and
secondly to chapter 174, which reveals the absence of falsehoods in
the Christian law. The last article (216) gets a response by offer
ing a positive knowledge of God from the demonstration of divine
dignities, which permits a positive science-based understanding.
The structure of the Declaratio implies that the answer to the
four articles is based on the application of the three initial posi
tions. However, in all cases, including the chapters quoted as
complementing the arguments, the discourse turns on the same
principle: the contact between God and man on different levels
(ontological, ethical). In this sense, the response that Llull gives
to the four articles takes as its starting point the classic medieval
conception, this is, that the epistemology is only a derivation of the
ontology, and the question about what we can know is posterior to
the question of what exists. The knowledge of God is determined,
therefore, by the place of each of the elements that are suscepti
ble to be placed in the ontological scale of reality: the possibil
ity of contact is therefore what allows knowledge. This scale is,
in turn, interpreted from two different perspectives: the descent,
which corresponds to the action that God performs on man; and
the ascent, from which we can see how a human being can get
to the superior truths. This perspective makes clearer Llulls aim
which seems to be more appropriate to the human condition, since
original sin indicates the situation of man as a creature that par
ticipates in matter and, consequently, it eliminates any possibil
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ity of contact between divine essences and human beings. So, the
possibility of achieving individual happiness is a discussion that
refers to Gods capacity to operate in the universe.
It should be noted that the Lullian conception of reality is sup
ported by the medieval Platonic-Aristotelian synthesis: based on
the metaphor of a pyramid whose highest point is occupied by
God. Reality is divided into two, Creator and creation, including
a set of relations of analogy as causeeffect relation. The reality
of the Creator remains unique, but creation is divided into two
sub-realities: spiritual and material, each of which has its own
levels, hierarchically ordered.41 The result of this conception is the
scale of being: a graded classification of things from inanimate
objects up to God.42 However, there is a point of rupture between
these two realities, defined by Ch. Lohr as the distinction between
the two movements of God43: the reflexive action, intrinsic, that
the Divinity takes upon itself; and the extrinsic action, the activ
ity that comes from God but goes outside. This is an activity
which is founded upon nothing and, for this reason, it is a creative
operation. As a consequence of this division there is a difference
between the two kinds of beings:44 the necessary and the possible.
The problem of this model of the scale of being comes from the
ascent, not from the descent. Indeed, the rational human soul,
which is what produces knowledge, is the result of creation and
therefore it is limited by its condition and faces the task of under
standing something that completely exceeds it. The problem that
unifies the four condemned articles is, according to Llull, the fact
that they defend a continuity between the two levels of being,
41 Vid. R. Pring-Mill, The Trinitarian World Picture of Ramon Llull,
in Romanistisches Jahrbuch 7, 195556, pp.229256; El microcosmos lulli,
Palma, 1961.
42 Ch. Lohr, Ramon Lull and Thirteenth-Century Religious Dialogue,
in Dilogo filosfico-religioso entre cristianismo, judasmo e islamismo durante
la Edad Media en la Pennsula Ibrica, Turnhout, 1994, pp.117129, p.120.
43 Ch. Lohr, Arbor scientiae: The Tree of the Elements, in Arbor Scientiae:
der Baum des Wissens von Ramon Lull. Akten des Internationalen Kongresses aus
Anlass des 40-jhrigen Jubilums des Raimundus-Lullus-Instituts der Universitt
Freiburg i. Br., ed. F.Domnguez, P. Villalba & P. Walter, Turnhout,
2002, pp.7984.
44 The development of this idea can be found in E. Antn, Plenitud
metafsica de la filosofa luliana, in EL 7, pp.131151.
81
45 Cf. Art. 154, CUP, p.552, (ed. D. Pich, p. 125): Quod sapientes
mundi sunt philosophi tantum.
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83
84
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85
world and the contemplation of God, Llull also refers to two medi
eval concepts: vision and rapture. Following the ancient tradition,
medieval philosophy endows vision with an importance higher
than that of the other senses, up to the point that it becomes
a principle of cognition; it takes the place formerly occupied by
intuition and speculation. Vision acquires the connotation of an
apprehension of the object, so that the vision of God entails con
templation, not knowledge. In fact, like St. Bonaventure and Duns
Scotus, Llull maintains in his commentary on articles 211 and 36
the idea of a life based on the beatific vision of God, so that the
knowledge of the first cause will not be problematic since man
is a pilgrim in hac vita. The complete rapture, meanwhile, the
path of vision imbued with the desire of the higher, allows the
rational soul to be separated for a moment from the body, so that
even while alive, a man may rise to the level of the blessed life.
Although this is a process associated with medieval mysticism,
Llull uses rapture as an epistemological process, and this claim
is recognised as such: the imaginary Socrates discusses the exis
tence or viability of rapture and vision regarding their natural or
unnatural origin (art. 33).
The suppression of the agent intellect
The acceptance of the mode of knowledge proposed by Llull
is only possible in the case of the unaccepted Aristotelian world
view based on the existence of a universal intellect always in
act. Indeed, articles 7 and 8 show an ontological model opposed
to the Lullian conception: the suppression of the intellect as the
ultimate perfection of man, and the consequent acceptance of
an intellect that penetrates and leaves the human body, depends
upon the actuality of the process of cognition. These notions stem
from the belief that there is a universal intellect that, as agent,
is always present in cognition and represents cognoscibility in its
pure state. The act of knowledge would be a simple appropriation
of something that is higher, which is endowed with the power to
absorb the intellect by means of a potential or possible intellect.
According to Llull, this scheme has two problems: the first is the
existence of a pure act of knowledge, different from God, which
is separated from Him, which means that when one thinks about
God, one thinks about Him as a kind of transcendent entity, like
the Neoplatonic One, which one can never get by way of science;
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87
Abstract
Ramon Llull and the Question of the Knowledge of God in the Parisian Condemnation of 1277
I attempt to define the epistemological background of the Declaratio Raimundi in order to analyse Ramon Llulls interpretation of
the human possibility of knowing God. The Declaratio is a com
mentary on the 1277 condemnation by Tempier. Many studies
have emphasised some aspects concerning the knowledge of God
in the syllabus articles. A general tendency reflects two opposed
doctrinal positions: firstly, there is a group of articles, 211 and 36,
which refer to an ontological position, that is, to the idea that
the human intellect can know God because it is capable of produ
cing an essential contact with the First Cause; secondly, another
group of articles (215216) corresponds to the opposite position,
that it is impossible to know anything about God because the
divine and the human are separated spheres. Llulls defense of the
condemnation is based on the idea that it is possible to reconcile
faith and reason, although it is necessary to follow the ontological
hierarchy of reality, that is, to subsume philosophy in theology.
Antoni Bordoy
antoni.bordoy@uib.es
University of the Balearic Islands
Department of Philosophy
Crta. de Valldemossa, km 7,5
07122 Palma de Mallorca (Islas Baleares)
Spain
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107309
90
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91
92
francesco fiorentino
93
Data di ultimazione
22 febbraio 1298
maggio 1310
luglio 1310
luglio 1310
luglio 1310
agosto 1310
ottobre 1310
dopo settembre 1310
ottobre
25 dicembre 1310
25 dicembre 1310
gennaio 1311
febbraio 1311
febbraio 1311
febbraio 1311
marzo 1311
aprile 1311
maggio 1311
94
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95
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
pp.256257.
p.401.
pp.280281.
p.282.
p.281.
p.286.
p.281.
96
francesco fiorentino
Ibid., pp.284286.
Ibid., p.285.
32 Ibid., p.286. Nella geometria lulliana, mentre il cerchio rappresenta
la perfezione divina ed il triangolo simboleggia le tre facolt dellanima
razionale, il quadrato denota il mondo imperfetto; cf. J.J.Hofmann, Ramon
Lulls Kreisquadratur, Heidelberg, 1942, pp.112; A. Llinars, Version
franaise de la premire partie de la Quadrature et triangulature du cercle,
SL 30 (1990), pp.121138; E. Pistolesi, Ramon Llull, la geometria i les
quadratures del cercle, in Actes de les Jornades Internacionals Lullianes. Ramon
Llull al s. XXI.Palma, 1, 2 i 3 dabril de 2004, ed. M. I. Ripoll Perell,
Barcelona, 2005, pp.107144.
30
31
97
33 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Declaratio Raimundi per modum dialogi, op. cit.,
p.181.
34 Ibid., p.292.
35 Ibid., p.302.
36 Ibid., p.303.
37 Ibid., p.366.
38 Ibid., pp.366367.
39 Ibid., p.372.
40 Ibid., p.382.
41 Ibid., pp.290291.
42 Ibid., p.291.
43 Ibid., pp.281282, 302.
44 Ibid., p.292.
98
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Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
p.366.
p.282.
p.282.
p.282.
p.367.
p.282.
99
questultimo, il viandante deve conoscere Dio tramite una similitudo, ossia in modo indiretto e mediato da una specie, che rappre
senta in qualche modo lessenza divina.51 Ne esce ridimensionata
la stessa autonomia del filosofo:
Idcirco dicit quidam sapiens, quod ingrediens ad scientiam philo
sophiae per habitum fidei potest in breuiori tempore esse philoso
phus et habere magnum intellectum quam ille, qui ingreditur ad
ipsam sine habitu fidei. 52
51
52
53
54
Ibid., p.302.
Ibid., p.283.
Ibid, pp.290291.
Ibid., p.291.
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102
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72
103
Vale a dire che sia Averro sia gli averroisti sono infideles, ossia
non-credenti, ma per ragioni differenti: Averro per la completa
mancanza della fede cristiana, gli averroisti per il primato della
ragione naturale, con cui escludono il piano soprannaturale e mira
coloso dellagire divino. Mentre Lullo molto comprensivo verso
Averro, non riesce a scusare gli averroisti in quanto cristiani.
Perci, nel Liber Natalis parvuli Christi gli averroisti e non Aver
ro sono tacciati di eresia, perch sono essi a distruggere dallin
terno la fede cattolica.77 Nei Sermones contra errores Averrois gli
averroisti sono ritenuti solo devoti sul piano religioso ed ignoranti
in filosofia, perch sono abituati sulla scorta di Averro ad usare
solo le facolt inferiori, ossia il senso e limmaginazione, con una
compromissione dellintelletto, che risulta offuscato e deviato.78
Nel Liber de possibili et impossibili il disprezzo di Lullo risuona
Raimundus Lullus, Liber lamentationis philosophiae , op. cit., p.104.
Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Liber Natalis pueri parvuli Christi Jesus, ed.
H. Harada, Turnhout, 1975 (ROL, 7; CCCM, 32), pp.6970.
78 Cf. Raimundus Lullus, Sermones contra errores Averrois, op. cit.,
pp.246248.
76
77
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105
106
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107
Abstract
La critica lulliana alla teoria averroista della felicit speculativa
Aquinas believes that natural desire is ordered towards the goal
of the beatific vision, which is both natural and supernatural, but
human nature cannot achieve this through its natural resources
alone, and it requires the help of supernatural grace. This the
ory diverges from Averroism, whereby man is naturally ordered
to achieve full happiness through philosophical knowledge. For
Aquinas, the human being in via is inevitably linked to per
ception and objects, and knows clearly that these are effects that
lead back to the supreme cause. However, the question about the
quid est of all causes is an impenetrable field for rationality. Henry
of Ghent demonstrates in the Summa (art. 4) that natural desire
is a property of the intellect, whose perfection must seek good of
its own free will; this improvement aims at the movement from a
less perfect knowledge to a more perfect one. But, as Henry main
tained, that movement cannot be confined to the natural level, a
view that the Averroist philosophers and Dante in the Convivio
defended: the natural desire is not capable of reaching out bey
ond what is possible because it is a property of natural reason.
This contribution aims to show how Llull reacted to this Aver
roist thesis, after the Paris condemnation of 1277, particularly in
the Declaratio Raymundi per modum dialogi edita (1298) and other
works against the Averroists (13091311).
Francesco Fiorentino
fiorentino12@libero.it
Via Ponte Don Melillo
I-84084 Fisciano (SA)
Italy
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107310
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
20 [] haec enim unitatum iteratio potius est, non numerario, velut si ita
dicamus: ensis mucro gladius, repetitio quaedam est eiusdem, non numerario
diuersorum, uelut si dicam: sol sol sol, non tres soles effecerim, sed de uno
totiens praedicaverim, Boethius, op. cit., p.172.
21 Boethius, op. cit., p.173.
22 [] cum uero iustus, qualitatem quidem sed non accidentem, sed eam
quae sit substantia sed ultra substantiam: neque enim aliud est quod est,
aliud est quod iustus est, sed idem est esse Deo quod iusto, Boethius, op.
cit., p.174.
23 Iohannis Scotti seu Eriugenae, Periphyseon I, ed. E. Jeauneau,
Turnhout, 1996 (CCCM, 161).
118
119
120
121
33
122
123
124
The falsity of examples and beautiful words generates decebiment and discordi between the intellectual, sensible and essential
meanings, which is shown in language by way of the perologismes:
[] les sensualitats no son enderssades per les intellecttuals, els
intellectuals son trobades per les sensuals.
The meanings that the metge teolec or demonstration similitudinaria provide to knowledge correct this deception of the intellect.
This type of paradoxical intellectual state defines the paralogisms
that express fallacies. These are a deceptio due to the multiplicity
of meanings and the incorrect use of the expressions that contain
them. Llull is interested in the demonstration and signification of
the simple divine essence that influences with its operations in ele
mental compositions, and as a result must resolve this discordance
the deception of the paralogisms and fallacies that weaken the
demonstratio similitudinaria created with metaphors and similitudes.
3. Similitudes and metaphors
Albert the Great points out how the probable arguments have
equivocal relations between the simple terms of syllogisms, some
40
125
126
1. Canis latrabile.45
2. Flos ridet.46
3. Liber Aristoteles.47
4. Litus aratur.48
In the Compendium logice algazelis and in its Catalan transla
tion, Logica de Gatzell, these examples appear together with others
such as (1a) Quicumque surgebat, stat. Sedens surgebat; ergo sedens
stat, (2a) Omne expediens est bonum. Sed quaedam mala sunt expedientia; ergo quaedam mala sunt bona. in the fallacia aequivocatione
and (3a) Quidquid scit, pomerium scit. Sed hoc scit pomerium; ergo
pomerium scit. in the amphiboliae.49 In later works such as the Liber
de fallaciis and in the De novis fallaciis expressions 1 and 3 occur,
while in the Logica nova 1 through 4 appear. The examples given
in the Compendium disappear, and there is no clear explanation as
to why; we also dont know why the species of the fallacies change
in certain treatises.
With regard to the examples in Llulls last works there is a long
prior tradition that uses them as cases of equivocal expressions,
45 [] dictio principaliter plura significat: ut hoc nomen canis
principaliter significat latrabile animal et marinam belluam et caeleste
sidus [] omnis canis est latrabilis. Caeleste sidus est canis. Igitur caeleste
sidus est latrabile, Ars generalis ultima, op. cit., p.108; Compendium Logicae
Algazelis, op. cit., p.105.
46 [] unum nomen principaliter unum significat, et aliud metaphorice
siue transumptiue: sicut hoc uerbum ridere principaliter significat actum
hominis proprium; metaphorice autem siue transumptiue significat prati
floritionem [], Logica noua, op. cit., p.115.
47 []
una oratio principaliter plura significat manente eadem
constructione, propter diversam habitudinem constructorum: sicut haec
oratio liber Aristotelis plura significat [] quidquid est Aristotelis, possidetur
ab Aristotele. Iste liber est Aristotelis. Ergo possidetur ab Aristotele. op.
cit., p.116.
48 [] una oratio principaliter significat unum, et aliud metaphorice
sive transumptiue, sicut haec oratio: littus aratur, principaliter significat
littoris scissuram, transumptiue uero operis amissionem. Et formatur sic
paralogismus: quandocumque littus aratur, tunc terra scinditur. Sed quando
indocibilis docetur, littus aratur: ergo quando indocibilis docetur, terra
scinditur, Ibid.
49 Compendium logicae Algazelis, op. cit., p. 105; Ramon Llull, Logica
del Gatzel, ed. M. Obrador, M. Ferr & S. Galms, Palma de Mallorca,
19061914 (ORL, 19), p.44.
127
with the most common being canis latrabile and flos ridet. These
expressions show the attribution of a property that a species or
individual lacks. The problem highlighted by the interpreters of
fallacies of the twelfth century, such as Peter Abelard and William
of Conches, is the change of referent in the term canis: star, fish or
animal. The same thing occurs with the verb ridere with respect
to the subject to which the property of laughing is attributed: a
man or a flower. Finally, it also occurs with the habit owner of
in the example of the book of Aristotle: i.e. the owner is a sub
ject that could either be the philosopher or the current possessor
of the book.
The treatment of semantic differences in accordance with con
text, the anterior or posterior signification of the terms, as well as
the relation between them, is similar to the demonstratio similitudinaria in Llull: a tool for detecting the metaphorical use of lan
guage in a paralogism that has a demonstrative function, such as
the new fallacy. In this way, just as one can analyse the seman
tic context of the term canis, of the verb ridere and of the habit
possidere, one can also study the meaning that the divine attri
butes acquire in a syllogism in order to infer a necessary proof of
their existence by similarity, difference and contradiction. In the
case of the fallacy by equivocation, canis latrabile, Llull opposes
another type of syllogism:
Omne aeternum est infinitum. Deus est aeternus. Ergo Deus est
infinitus.
Omnis canis est latrabilis. Caeleste sidus est canis. Igitur caeleste
sidus est latrabile.
128
129
is, nor what relation it has with universe B, nor does it even assert
the possibility of the existence of a subject A.
For Llull the universe of attributions B is that of the divine vir
tues defined by theology, the empty set is the created nature Ax,
while the subject A is the necessary entity independent of Ax that
possesses all the attributions of B.This explains the necessity that
Llulls theological perspective has for the universe of equivocal
and metaphorical attributions B, in order to derive necessary con
clusions from the contradictory propositions present in this kind
of syllogism. In contrast, the masters of arts (philosophantes/artistae) that followed the Peripatetic tradition of the Sophistici elenchi
depend on an equivocal, ambiguous, and metaphorical universe
of attributions in which there are propositions that signify contradictory arguments, but which only have a probable meaning.
The purpose of the demonstration/fallacy in Llull reminds us
of the response to the question Deus sit genus? in his commen
tary on the Sentences. Llull holds that no genus is said of the Cre
ator, because he is extra genus. Nevertheless, it is by means of the
genera that we can reach in nature an indirect knowledge of the
Creator. Just as we see in the Liber contemplationis, God does not
suffer accidents, is simple and lacks limitations; nevertheless the
subjects that suffer accidents signify him in a contradictory way,
since they do not share his nature. God is not a genus, although
the genera permit us to know him, because they are predicated of
the operations of his virtues.
The Llullian response can be formalised by following the fallacia that he invented. In this new paralogism the universe of attri
bution B is predicated of the universe of attribution P, i.e. that
of the categories. This universe of attributions is contradictory
to the divine nature, but conserves an equivocal or metaphorical
signification with respect to universe B. With this, one obtains
a new fallacy that is the inverse of Llulls, since the universe of
attribution P is not attributed to the subject A but rather to the
universe of attributions B. In addition we begin from the suppo
sition that A=B:
Postulate: A=B
Nullum B est P
Quoddam Bx est P
ergo aliquid Bx est P et non-P
130
According to Llulls argument in his commentary on the Sentences, A is extra genus, although the genera depend on its exis
tence, and therefore A in some metaphorical sense is a genus
(P). As a result, the final proposition of the syllogism tells us that
there is a B that is extra genus and that also is not, since the genera
are predicated in an equivocal, or metaphorical, form of B and of
A (by A=B). This formula shows the equivocity of the categories,
which possess a metaphorical meaning when they are predicated
of God. The language of the sacra pagina, as well as that of the
linguistic arts, maintains this semantic behavior, and the proofs
elaborated with it are probable, not necessary. They depend on
the conuenientia between a universe of semantic interpretation and
the univocal, essential, and simple divine nature that sustains the
multiplicity of senses by means of the simple and immobile unity
of its existence.
Llull recommends that this form of conuenientia, extracted by
contradiction via the fallacia Raimundi, be applied to natural
philosophy in the question regarding the efficient action of the
primary cause in nature.50 In the Declaratio, Ramon Llulls com
mentary on the syllabus of 1277,51 he discusses whether in a meta
phorical sense the first cause, which is an intelligence and a sub
stance separated from nature, can be an efficient and eternal cause
of movement. The text that formulates this question, in chapter
70 of the Declaratio,52 alludes to two other propositions of the syllabus (3738) in which it is asked whether God can be both eternal
and at the same time an efficient cause in a metaphorical sense.
The negative response to this question is attributed to Aver
roes,53 who says that the first cause is not the cause of movement,
50 Per istam fallaciam credunt euadere illi, qui dicunt, quod mundus non
est inceptus [] quod motus, mutatio et principium extrinsecum sint per
ipsum simpliciter creata, De fallaciis, op. cit., p.487.
51 R. Hissette, Enquete sur les 219 articles condamnes a Paris le 7 mars
1277, Louvain, 1977, pp.7677; D. Piche, C. Lafleur, La condamnation
parisienne de 1277, Paris, 1999, pp.100101.
52 R.Llull, Declaratio Raimundi per modum dialogi edita contra aliquorum
philosophorum et eorum sequacium opiniones, ed. M. Pereira & T. PindlBchel, Turnhout, 1989 (ROL, 17), pp.320321.
53 Propter quod dicit Commentator Super librum de caelo et mundo, quod
in separatis a materia non est efficiens, nisi secundum transsumptionem:
loquimur enim de efficiente secundum quod ei primo imponitur nomen, et
131
With this fallacy he argues with those who affirm (illi, qui
dicunt) that the world is not created and that movement was not
initiated in an external manner. According to Llull, the interpre
tation of this kind of fallacy must eliminate the secondary sense
(secundum sensum) of the final proposition, i.e. the contradiction,
and affirm its principal sense.54 This principal meaning represents
the existence outside of nature of a subject to which correspond
all the attributions, despite these being metaphorical or equivocal.
This divergence of senses is explained in the Llibre de contemplaci
by the ambiguous nature of language:
En so, Snyer, que enteniment ha ms d acabament a saber veri
tat de la cosa, que paraula no ha poder a revelar veritat de la
cosa, per ass s engenra descordansa e contrast enfre enteniment
e paraula; car moltes vegades se esdev que enteniment entn una
cosa, e paraula ne significa altra contraria a la veritat quel ente
niment entn. 55
hoc est unde principium motus, Siger of Brabant, Questions sur la Physique
dAristote, ed. P. Delhaye, Louvain, 1941, p.100; this is a Commentary
attributed to Siger of Brabant, although it is anonymous: W.B. Dunphy, The
Similarity between Certain Questions of Peter of Auvergnes Commentary on
the Metaphysics and the Anonymous Commentary on the Physics Attributed
to Siger of Brabant, Mediaeval Studies, 15 (1953), pp.159168.
54 De fallaciis, op. cit., p.487.
55 Llibre de contemplaci en Du, op. cit., (ORL, 4), p.329.
132
the very equivocity that he will later use in order to invent his
own fallacy:
Con paraula e enteniment se concorden es convenen, adoncs,
Snyer, sengenra en lur concordansa argument silogisme; e con
nos concorden es desconvenen, adoncs sengenra en lur descordansa
argument perologisme per lo qual esdev hom en contrast e en
esputacio. 56
133
134
Abstract
From Metaphors to Categories: The Contemplative and Semantic Cycle
of the Divine Names
The legend of Ramon Lulls revelation (Dominus illustrauit mentem
suam, Vita, 16) tells us that he received from God the principles
of divine and natural knowledge (generalia principia ad magis specifica, Vita, 16). That account may simply be the happy recollec
tion of one medieval master, but the story serves to illustrate the
different senses of the principia divina or dignitates dei. The result
is a defense of the univocal sense of divine names, and also of the
divine names as metaphors that work as intellectual rules of their
equivocal meanings. The different uses of the terms which are
designated in Llulls thought as divine attributes are derived
from the metaphorical and logical contents. God transcends cate
gories. The identification of the divine being with the unity of his
attributes and his creative production is a heritage of the medie
val tradition, which Llull assimilated in a logical and semantic
way, in applying the ambiguity of metaphors in the context of
fallacies to achieve the contemplative life.
Jos Higuera
higuejose@gmail.com
Complutense University of Madrid
Facultad de Filosofa Campus Moncloa
Ciudad Universitaria 28040 Madrid, Spain
Instituto de Filosofia
Faculdade de Letras
Universidade do Porto
Via Panormica, S/N
4150-564 Porto, Portugal
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107311
136
annemarie c. mayer
ments for perceiving the outward reality (ch. 103168), while the
second part reflects on the function of the spiritual senses and
the mental activity (ch. 169226). The third volume summing up
insights for Christian life gained by contemplating God and man,
formulates in its first part principles which can be deduced from
the first two volumes and which are visualised in Llulls trees,
figures which depict the logical dependencies and serve as a mne
motechnic device (ch. 226268). The second part of the third vol
ume consists of a description of the practical application of these
methodological principles (ch. 269366). Thus The Book of Contemplation already contains the major basic views on which Llulls Art
is based: the fundamental function of the divine attributes, the
capability of the human intellect to explain articles of faith by
way of necessary reasons, and the use of figures, forms and letters
for explaining an argument.
1. Stocktaking of the Liber contemplationis
In The Book of Contemplation Llull wrote at some length about
divine attributes in chapters 4 to 102 and, in a very condensed
way, in chapter 178. In this chapter 178 he explains that divine
attributes are by no means arbitrarily ascribed, using infinitas
as his example. The attributes of God can be deduced per qua
litates finitas,2 by way of finite qualities in creation. This is true
for all attributes of God. Moreover, they characterise him in such
a way that he cannot be imagined without them. Gods being,
for instance, is so great as Llull explains in chapter 4 that
one could never imagine that God was finite. 3 Llull understands
infinity at the same time as eternity, where God is both with
out beginning and without end.4 Llull comes back to this when
Ramon Llull, Liber contemplationis in Deum, ch. 178, 4, ed. I.Salzinger
et al., Mainz, 1742 (MOG, 9), p. 423: certificate invenerimus te esse in esse
et hanc certificationem habuerimus per tuam infinitatem, quam percepimus
per qualitates finitas, quae sunt in creaturis, per hoc certo cognoscimus tuam
infinitatem esse in te qualitatem essentialem.
3 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 4, 2, ed. I.Salzinger et al., Mainz,
1740 (MOG, 9), p.8: quod tuum esse sit tam magnum quod non possit cadere
in intellectum hominis, quod tu sis finitus.
4 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 7, 9 (MOG, 9), p.14: Cum nos miremur,
quomodo tu non habeas finem; multo magis deberemus mirari, si tu haberes
finem; nam est impossibile, quod id, quod non habuit principium, possit habere
finem. The other option, to have a beginning but no end, is true of angels.
2
137
contemplatio in deum
arguing for the unitas of God: to predicate unity of God does not
only mean that he is one and unique and that he does not have his
equal, but since God existed before space and time, there can be
neither spacial nor chronological division nor composition in him. 5
To God corruptio as well as compositio are alien6 and, although God
has many attributes, he is one substantia.
The Trinity as one of the attributes of God is fairly unusual.
Llull deduced it from our insight into the inner-divine processions.
On Llulls list the Trinity follows the divine unity, and it follows
from it, it does not constitute an opposition to it.
T h e B o o k o f th e C o n te m p la tio n o f G o d
c h . 4 -1 0 2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
a ttrib u te s o f G o d q u o a d D e u m
in fin ita s
a e te rn ita s
u n ita s
trin ita s
p o te sta s
s c ie n tia
v e rita s
b o n ita s
fundamental attributes
d ist.
II
I II
IV
V
VI
V II
V III
IX
a ttrib u te s o f G o d q u o a d n o s
- -- - -
a ttr ib u te s o f re fe re n c e
v o lu n ta s /p o te s ta s
s a p ie n tia /p o te s ta s
b o n ita s
b o n ita s
in fin ita s /a e te r n ita s
b o n ita s
p o te s ta s
s c ie n tia /s a p ie n tia
a e q u ita s /iu s titia
s a p ie n tia
v o lu n ta s /p o te s ta s
iu s titia
b o n ita s
la rg i t a s
b o n ita s /p e r fe c tio
a d iu to riu m m a g n a b o n ita s
h u m ilita s
a e te r n ita s /in fin ita s
p e r fe c tio p o te s ta tis / s a p ie n tia e
m a g n a b o n ita s
m is e ric o r- b o n ita s
d ia
X
XI
X II
X III
X IV
9 c re a tio
1 0 o rd in a tio
1 1 re c re a tio
1 2 v o lu n ta s
1 3 d o m in iu m
XV
XVI
X V II
X V III
X IX
14
15
16
17
18
XX
19
- -- - XXI
g lo ria p a ra d is i
- -- - X X I I 2 0 p e r fe c t i o
ch. 178
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
-- - - -
i n fi n i t a s
a e te rn ita s
v ita
s a p ie n tia
p o te s ta s
am or
b o n ita s
s im p lic ita s
p e rfe c tio
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
c re a tio
g ra tia
iu s titia
m is e ric o rd ia
d o m in iu m
h u m i li t a s
la rg ita s
m a g n itu d o
h o n o r a tio /n o b ilita s
See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 8, 13 (MOG, 9), p.19: Tua substantia
est vere una in simplicitate [] quia fuit prius, est impossibile, quod ipsa sit
composita substantia.
6 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 8, 14 (MOG, 9), p.19.
5
138
annemarie c. mayer
contemplatio in deum
139
10 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 66, 9 (MOG, 9), p. 145: Igitur tu,
Domine Deus, sis adeo perfectus in bonitate et in omnibus virtutibus, quod
intellectus non sufficiat ad intelligendum, nec aures ad audiendum, nec os ad
loquendum, nec oculi ad videndum tuam magnam bonitatem et tuas magnas
virtutes, dignum est te esse dominum omnium rerum quia es supremus in
virtutibus et in bonitate.
11 See figure 1 above.
140
annemarie c. mayer
contemplatio in deum
141
142
annemarie c. mayer
the miseri infideles who believe contra veritatem. For his argumen
tation also has an inter-religious orientation, for example against
the Muctazilite thinking or against Maimonides, who with his neg
ative theology of attributes vehemently supports in the Guide of
the Perplexed a position which is diametrically opposed to Llulls
point of view.
3. The common characteristics of divine attributes
In order to create his image of God, Llull is constrained to a
tightrope walk between the need of speaking of God on the one
hand and the inadequacy of the human categories in naming God
on the other. Llulls attributes of God must meet certain charac
teristics; they themselves must possess certain attributes so that
they can be attributes of God. What are the provisions allowing
Llull to undertake in all human inadequacy the adventure of
thinking God? Or put in other words: What makes an attribute a
divine attribute? Llull started from the finite attributes by which
the divine qualities become immediately knowable to us, since
they are the very attributes of man created by God. To deduce
the divine attributes per qualitates finitas18 from finite created
qualities is legitimate, according to Llull, because God has cre
ated everything. In his creation God operates in an analogous way
when causing things, i.e. the created reflects Gods characteristic
traits. It contains similarities of the primary cause,19 for to
put it more colloquially God does not lie. If he expresses him
self in his creation, this expression mirrors the way he really is.
It must contain the reflection of his divine attributes. This was
Llulls criterion for distinguishing between attributes quoad nos
and quoad Deum: Does God intentionally express himself in them
in such a way that we may recognise him or is our knowledge of
him not his primary intention?
contemplatio in deum
143
144
annemarie c. mayer
25 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 14, 28 (MOG, 9), p. 30: Tua potestas
tam fortiter est una in tua essentia, quod ubicunque est tua potestas, ibi sit
tua essentia, et ubicunque est tua essentia, ibi sit tua potestas.
26 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 16, 12 (MOG, 9), p.33: quia ipsa reddet
unicuique, secundum quod fecerit, sive sit iustus, sive sit peccator.
27 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 17, 17 (MOG, 9), p.36.
28 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 14, 21 (MOG, 9), p.29.
29 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 17, 3 (MOG, 9), p. 35: Tua potestas
et voluntas tam fortiter conveniunt et concordant in natura, quod non sit
contrarietas inter unam et alteram; nam omne id, quod tua voluntas vult,
potest tua potestas, et omne id quod tua potestas potest, vult tua voluntas.
30 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 15, 22 (MOG, 9), p.32: Valde magnus est
error hominum confidentium in astronomia, qui naturae attribuunt omnem
potestatem et nihil reservant tibi, quia non credunt te cogere et constringere
cursum ipsius.
contemplatio in deum
145
146
annemarie c. mayer
36 See for instance for the divine attribute of unity: Ramon Llull, Liber de
ente absoluto, ed. J.Sthr, Palma de Mallorca, 1959 (ROL, 1), pp.149154;
p. 154: Non potest esse unitas absoluta sine distincta relatione absoluta per
absolutum unissimantem, absolutum unissimatum, absolutum unissimare.
Sine quibus non haberet naturam absolutam, et esset vacua et intrinsece
otiosa, ligata et imperfecta; quod est falsum et impossibile. Ostensa est ergo
divina trinitas et cum ea divina unitas absoluta.
37 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 178, 28 (MOG, 9), p. 426: Omnes res,
quae dicuntur in te qualitates, sunt una et eadem res, quia tua iustitia est tua
misericordia, et tua misericordia est tua iustitia, et hoc idem est de omnibus
aliis tuis virtutibus; quia, quidquid est in te, est tua substantia divina.
38 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 180, 1 (MOG, 9), p.431: omnes tuas
qualitates sint una res in te, licet quoad nos demonstrentur multae.
39 E.-W. Platzeck, Raimund Lull Sein Leben Seine Werke. Die
Grundlagen seines Denkens, vol. 1, DsseldorfRome, 1962, p. 155: Identitt
besagt hier die quivalenz aller Grundwrden im Sinne einer vollen
Reflexivitt sowohl untereinander als auch jeder einzelnen mit der gttlichen
Wesenheit. Die Grundwrden, wiewohl zunchst transzendental gemeint,
werden hier ausschlielich auf Gottes Wesen an sich angewandt. In dieser
ausschlielichen Anwendung fallen sie vllig mit Gottes Wesen zusammen.
contemplatio in deum
147
148
annemarie c. mayer
46
contemplatio in deum
149
is even more perfect than one can think and see.53 Our lack in
recognising and praising God is due to ourselves, to our own inad
equacy and imperfection.54 On the other hand Gods perfection is
not surprising. It is closely related to his essence.55 But Gods per
fection for Llull is not without problems because it means immu
tability: Your great perfection, Lord, has the result that your
divine being cannot accept any change or mutation; for nothing
that has infinite perfection can produce in its state any change or
any mutation.56 Is God therefore damned to keeping still and to
absolute inaction? No, that would run entirely counter to Llulls
approach. But there are certain things which would contradict
Gods perfection and which God therefore cannot do. God cannot
create a God equal to himself. But because of this God is more
perfect than if he could do so.57 Even God can have no beginning.
Otherwise he would not be perfect.58 Similarly, there is a question
which comes up once again today in the analytic philosophy of
religion: Has God the power to want his own non-being? Gods
54
150
annemarie c. mayer
59 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 18, 2 (MOG, 9), p. 37: imo, si tu,
Domine, posses sine ratione aliquid facere, sequeretur, quod esses defectuosus
in potestate, quia posses errare.
60 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 18, 21 (MOG, 9), p.38.
61 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 18, 3 (MOG, 9), p.37: Unde, quando
nos intelligimus, Domine, quod tua potestas non possit facere aliquid sine
ratione, intelligimus eam magis perfectam et virtuosam et nobilem et altam;
quia non possumus intelligere secundum rationem in tua potestate defectum
sapientiae nec bonitatis nec ullius virtutis [] quia omne id, quod vis, potes,
et omne id, quod potes, vis.
62 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 18, 21 (MOG, 9), p. 38: Si nos,
Domine, attribuamus tuae perfectae potestati impossibilitatem dicendo: quod
non possis facere aliquid contra rationem et sine causa, non est nobis vitium
nec tuae potestati; quia hoc secundum veritatem non est impossibilitas, sed
est perfectio potestatis et sapientiae et virtutum.
63 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 23 (MOG, 9), p. 220: est
proprium tuae perfectioni dare nobis perfectionem et complementum
approximando nos ad se ipsam.
64 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 100, 22 (MOG, 9), p. 220: omnia,
quaecunque sunt creata et facta, indigeant te in omnibus rebus et in toto
tempore, in quo sunt, et [], quam parum tu indigeas omnibus rebus creatis
et factis.
contemplatio in deum
151
65 See Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 101, 2 (MOG, 9), p.221: Unde, cum
tua gloriosa essentia Domine Deus, sit perfecta in omnibus rebus, necessario
convenit, quod omnia tua opera sint perfecta in omnibus bonis, quia non est
ulla res illarum, quae facis ex qua posset devenire defectus et diminutio tuae
sanctae essentiae.
66 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 101, 29 (MOG, 9), p. 223: Quia tua
opera, Domine, sunt omnia in perfectione, propterea quo plus homo ea laudat,
eo plus accedit ad perfectionem et recedit a defectu.
67 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 102, 27 (MOG, 9), p. 225: beati sunt
omnes, qui suam plenitudinem et perfectionem inquirunt in te et petunt a te;
quia ibi eas inquirunt, ubi possunt eas invenire.
68 Llull, Liber contemplationis, ch. 102, 15 (MOG, 9), p. 225: perfectio et
complementum omnium nostrum; see also ibidem 102, 19 (MOG, 9), p.225.
152
annemarie c. mayer
3. Lullism
1. Limage dconcertante
Ablard, Bonaventure, Thomas dAquin, Duns Scot, Ockham
tous ces thologiens et philosophes mdivaux peuvent susciter le
dsaccord dun lecteur critique sans pour autant le dconcerter.
Pour peu quil soit inform, le lecteur peut les situer assez facile
ment dans lhistoire de la pense car il peut connatre les matres
auprs de qui ils se formrent, les contemporains avec qui ils
conversrent et les disciples qui dvelopprent leurs ides. Par ail
leurs, tous partagent les approches et la terminologie en vigueur
dans les coles de lpoque.
Lulle, en revanche, incommode le lecteur critique. Nous ne
savons quasiment rien de sa formation intellectuelle; les dbats
avec ses contemporains furent apparemment des dialogues infruc
tueux1 et tout laisse penser que les multiples lullismes ayant
exist ont, tout au plus, pris comme point de dpart une ide de
Lulle interprte de faon unilatrale.
Seuls les lullistes se sentent laise en lisant Lulle. Les non-lul
listes se mfient de lArt. On leur a assur que la conversion des
1 R. Imbach, Laien in der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Amsterdam, 1989,
pp. 102130: Der unmgliche Dialog. Llull und die Pariser Universittsphi
losophie (13091311).
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107312
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157
158
josep batalla
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160
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162
josep batalla
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164
josep batalla
1. Pequea introduccin
Quisiera empezar esta introduccin con una pregunta muy clara
y que tratar de responder a lo largo de este trabajo: qu moti
vaciones han tenido los diferentes lectores de Ramon Llull de la
Castilla del siglo XV, tanto laicos como religiosos, para interesarse
por un pensamiento tan complejo como el del pensador mallorqun
y, adems, tratar de evidenciarlo en su produccin escrita cuando
la acometen?
Para responder a esta cuestin, debemos, en primer lugar, iden
tificar quines han sido esos lectores. Podemos empezar diciendo
que la lnea que separa a religiosos de laicos, a medida que la
posicin social se hace ms relevante, se va volviendo mucho ms
sutil, encontrndonos varios casos de altos prelados que han sido
anteriormente nobles casados y con hijos. Esto va a ser crucial
cuando veamos ms adelante el rol cultural del noble.
A diferencia de lo sealado hasta ahora,1 soy de la opinin de
que los lectores de las obras de Llull pueden agruparse en torno
1 T. y J.Carreras i Artau, Historia de la Filosofa espaola. Filosofa cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV, II, Madrid, 1943, pp.499522, y en especial,
pp.517522; J.Carreras i Artau, Los comienzos del lulismo en Castilla,
in Mlanges Altamira. Homenaje a D.Rafael Altamira, ed. AA. VV., Madrid,
1936, pp.6572; J.Perarnau, El dileg entre religions en el lullisme
castell medieval, EL, 22 (1978), pp.241259; J.Perarnau, El lullisme
de Mallorca a Castella a travs de Valncia. Edici de lArt Abreujada de
Confessi, Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics, 4 (1985), pp.6193; F.J. Daz
Marcilla, I lullismi: ambiti tematici dinteresse a confronto, in Ramon
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107313
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Llull und Nikolaus von Kues: Eine Begegnung im Zeichen der Toleranz, ed.
E.Bidese, A.Fidora & P.Renner, Turnhout, 2005 (IPM, 46), pp.227245.
2 Los estudios que se han hecho al respecto son: F. de Paula Canale
jas, Raimundo Lulio y Don Juan Manuel, Revista de Espaa, 2 (1868),
pp.116137, y 4 (1870), pp.408431; J.M. Castro y Calvo, El arte de gobernar en las obras de Don Juan Manuel, Barcelona, 1945, pp.6365; R.-M.Lida
de Malkiel, Tres notas sobre don Juan Manuel, Romance Philology, 4
(195051), pp.155194; M. Ruffini, Les sources de Don Juan Manuel, Les
Lettres Romances, 7 (1953), pp.2749.
3 R. dAlos, Documenti per la storia della biblioteca dAlfonso il Magna
nimo, in Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle. Scritti di Storia e Paleografia pubblicati
sotto gli auspici di S.S. Pio XI in occasione dellottantesimo natalicio dellEmmo.
Cardinale Francesco Ehrle, ed. AA. VV., V, Roma, 1924, pp.390422.
4 M. Batllori, Ramon Llull i el lullisme, ed. E. Duran, Valencia, 1993
(Obres Completes, 2), pp.289, 296 y 374.
167
168
169
170
171
Ibid., p.473.
Ibid., p.473, n. 273, comentan los editores que los dos ltimos versos les
resultan oscuros. Si se tiene en cuenta que ellos interpretan eviles como
crueles, cuando a lo largo y ancho de todo el cancionero el significado es
el de civiles, la interpretacin podra ser en el sentido que Lope del Monte,
religioso, no tiene por qu hacer caso de los comentarios de un civil en el
sentido de laico como Ramon Llull, aadiendo que no se debe vanagloriar de
conocerlo el que no tiene capacidad de entender las cosas divinas, en referen
cia al de Lando.
26 Ibid., p.474.
27 Ibid., p.449, en la Rbrica al poema 567.
28 Para todos estos datos: S. lvarez Ledo, Aproximacin a la vida y
a la obra de Ferrn Manuel de Lando, Cancionero General, 7 (2009), p.10.
29 Baena, Cancionero, op. cit., p.382387.
24
25
172
173
174
175
dral uno de Llull que empieza Deus cum tua gracia. 38 El vnculo
con algn foco lulista, en realidad, vendra dado por un posible
contacto con otro cannigo de la catedral, Antn Ruiz de Morales,
que estudi y represent a los andaluces en el Colegio Mayor de
San Bartolom de Salamanca en los aos 60 y 70 del siglo XV. 39
Y uso el condicional, porque es la nica referencia plausible a falta
de otros datos que lo puedan vincular con el lulismo castellano
-leons ms que con el foco andaluz.
b.) Foco castellano-leons
Si fue antes el foco andaluz o el castellano-leons es algo dif
cil de definir con precisin, aunque se tiene certeza de estos tres
hechos: 1) que ambos se gestan casi a la par (en torno al ltimo
cuarto del siglo XIV); 2) que ambos tienen sus orgenes por con
tactos con Valencia y, supuestamente, con los grupos lulistas que
all tuvieron su actividad; y 3) que ambos difieren en los fines
para los que fueron creados pues el andaluz surge al calor de un
ambiente cultural laico mientras que el castellano-leons lo hace
al calor de un ambiente cultural eclesistico y, para ms seas, de
enseanza.
Los primeros datos se refieren precisamente a esa valenciani
dad de este foco pues, en el ms. VIII. b. 13 de Innichen,40 en
el colofn de la copia de la obra luliana del grupo valenciano De
decem praeceptis, quatuordecim articulis et septem sacramentis ecclesiae se lee que se termin in urbe Salamantina anno ab incarna
tione domini 1314. Es el mismo texto que se conserva en el ms.
2311 de la Biblioteca Universitaria de Salamanca,41 junto a otros
38 Archivo de la Catedral de Crdoba, Secretara, Testamentos, legajo 1, de
fecha 31 de mayo de 1505.
39 F. Cerrato Mateos, El monasterio de la Encarnacin de Crdoba.
Universalidad y originalidad de una fundacin cisterciense, in La clausura
femenina en el Mundo Hispnico, ed. F.J. Campos y Fernndez de Sevilla,
II, San Lorenzo de El Escorial, 2011, pp.725740.
40 J.Rubi i Balaguer, Los cdices lulianos de la biblioteca de Innichen
(Tirol), Revista de Filologa Espaola, 4 (1917), p.323; o tambin, J. Rubi
i Balaguer, Ramon Llull i el lullisme, ed. L.Badia Barcelona, 1985 (Obres
de Jordi Rubi i Balaguer, 2), p.408.
41 Esta Biblioteca, junto con otras ms de la zona, han sido tratadas en
dos estudios claves: F. Marcos Rodrguez, Los manuscritos pretriden
tinos hispanos de ciencias sagradas en la Biblioteca Universitaria de Sala
176
177
amparo del abad porque era buscado para ser juzgado; al final un
dudoso milagro lo libr de prisin en 1403.44 Posibles conexiones
ms all del comn inters por la conversin de los infieles no
parece que haya entre este personaje y el Colegio.
Llegamos as a uno de los manuscritos que ms ros de tinta
han provocado y ms informacin ofrece sobre este foco: el ms.
1022 de la Biblioteca Casanatense de Roma que perteneci al
Colegio de San Bartolom. El ncleo de todas las interpretaciones
formuladas sobre este cdice y, por extensin, sobre el lulismo cas
tellano en su conjunto, emanan de las dos inscripciones que apare
cen en el f. 132v: una que dice Conventus Zamorensis; y la otra
que dice Este libro pertenese [al con, tachado] a la provincia
de Santiago, a la casa de amora. Est al uso de fray Juhan de
Robles. Me voy a permitir una tercera interpretacin que difiere
de la franciscana observante de Isaac Vzquez Janeiro45 y de
la benedictina de Josep Perarnau:46 Juan de Robles sera un
fraile jernimo del Monasterio de Nuestra Seora de Guadalupe,
que aparece firmando como testigo el documento fundacional del
Hospital para pobres de San Esteban y el Estudio de Gramtica,
ambos en la localidad segoviana de Cullar en 1424, por obra y
voluntad del arcediano de esa villa, Gmez Gonzlez, que tam
bin se hizo jernimo en 1431 y sobre el que volveremos despus.
El convento de Zamora o casa, como le llaman en ocasiones
los Jernimos,47 bien pudiera ser el Monasterio de Montamarta,
J.L. Senra Gabriel y Galn, Sahagn, en Enciclopedia del Romnico
en Len, ed. AA. VV., Aguilar de Campoo, 2002, p.684.
45 I. Vzquez Janeiro, Un lector de Raimundo Lulio y de Arnaldo de
Vilanova entre los Evangelizadores de la Amrica Colombina? En torno al
cdice Casanatense 1022, Antonianum, 54 (1979), pp.108115; I. Vzquez
Janeiro, Tratados castellanos sobre la Predestinacin y sobre la Trinidad y la
Encarnacin, del maestro fray Diego de Valencia OFM (siglo XV). Identificacin
de su autora y edicin crtica, (Bibliotheca Theologica Hispana, serie 2, Tex
tos Tomo 2), Madrid, 1984.
46 J. Perarnau, Dos tratados espirituales de Arnau de Vilanova en
traduccin castellana medieval: Dyalogus de elementis catholice fidei y
De helemosyna et sacrificio, Anthologica Annua, 2223 (19751976 [1978]),
pp.479480.
47 As la define el mismsimo cronista oficial de la orden jernima en el
siglo XVI: Fray Jos de Sigenza, La fundacin del Monasterio de El Escorial, Valencia, 2010, p.15.
44
178
179
180
58
181
62
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
UN LULISTA RESPONDE A
PAOLO FLORES DARCAIS
Esteve Jaulent
(So Paulo)
El trabajo que ahora presentar, sin ningn afn de polmica,
fue extrado de un libro que ahora est en proceso de revisin,
donde en dilogo con Paolo Flores dArcais, paso a paso, estudio
su visin del mundo.1 Pretendo analizar el texto de Paolo Flores
dArcais, Atesmo y Verdad a la luz del pensamiento de Ramon
Llull que, adems de practicar una lgica muy actual -hac ms
de 700 aos- muestra una visin cristiana del mundo muy simi
lar a la expuesta en el trabajo La pretensin de verdad puesta en
duda, de Joseph Ratzinger. Esta puede ser una manera de mos
trar como Ramon Llull es actual y puede servir para solucionar
muchas de las dificuldades con las que hoy nos deparamos en el
campo del pensamiento. Es muy instructivo poner estos tres auto
res en contacto, sobre todo porque Ratzinger es acusado por el
ateo militante Flores dArcais de afiliarse a Sren Kierkegaard,
quien pensaba que la fe comienza donde termina el pensamiento,
y por esta razn Flores dArcais afirma que la Iglesia ya no est
ms interesada en la verdad. A la luz del pensamiento de Llull,
que trabaj durante toda su vida para demostrar la convergencia
entre la razn y la fe, y la culminacin de esta ltima, queda claro
el error que implica esta acusacin. Debido al poco tiempo dispo
nible, har un resumen del pensamiento de Paolo Flores dArcais
implcito en su texto Atesmo y Verdad, y luego simplemente
1 En el ao 2000, el entonces cardenal Joseph Ratzinger y el ateo mili
tante Paolo Flores dArcais en pblico en un largo debate sobre la existencia
de Dios. La editorial Espasa public el texto en 2008: dos artculos escritos
por cada uno de los panelistas. El texto de Paolo Flores dArcais, el ltimo
del volumen, se ocupa de dos temas que hoy cautivan la atencin: Atesmo y
verdad, y lleva como subttulo la conocida frase de Sren Kierkegaard: La
fe comienza precisamente donde termina el pensamiento. En este trabajo se
usar la traduccin: J. Ratzinger, P. Flores dArcais, Deus existe?, Sao
Paulo, 2009.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107314
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esteve jaulent
un lulista responde
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esteve jaulent
un lulista responde
195
10
196
esteve jaulent
un lulista responde
197
198
esteve jaulent
o puede y no quiere,
o quiere y puede,
o no quiere y no puede.15
un lulista responde
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un lulista responde
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un lulista responde
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BERNARD DE LAVINHETA Y SU
INTERPRETACIN DE LAS IDEAS JURDICAS
DE RAMON LLULL
Rafael Ramis Barcel
(Universitat de les Illes Balears)
El franciscano Bernard de Lavinheta (1462- 1530?) es una
figura capital en la historia del lulismo. Podra decirse que con su
obra se concluye la interpretacin medieval de la obra luliana1 y
que empieza la propiamente moderna. Como figura de transicin,
con un pie en la Edad Media y otro en la Modernidad, Lavinheta
asimil el bagaje agustiniano-franciscano tardomedieval y lo puso
al servicio de una visin aristotlica renacentista y pre-racionalista,
que tuvo gran aceptacin y circulacin en buena parte de Europa.
En este escrito se pretende conocer con mayor profundidad la
interpretacin que hizo de las ideas jurdicas de Llull. Han sido ya
comentadas anteriormente las ideas alqumicas, cientficas y mdi
cas de Lavinheta y se ha subrayado la apertura del autor hacia las
corrientes doctrinales de su momento. Sin embargo, frente a otros
campos del saber, fue en el campo jurdico en el que Lavinheta
se mostr mucho ms fiel a Llull que a los autores lulianos del
siglo XV y de comienzos del XVI.Por esa razn, en la sntesis de
este autor se percibe la lectura directa de las obras lulianas, cuya
argumentacin Lavinheta reforz con el pensamiento de Arist
teles y los recursos de autoridad de la Patrstica latina. Antes de
pasar al estudio de la sntesis jurdica, cabe detenerse en las fuen
tes que manej el autor.
1. Las fuentes filosficas de Bernard de Lavinheta
Los focos del lulismo ms importantes del siglo XV eran el de la
Escuela de Barcelona y el parisino de Lefvre dtaples. El ncleo
1 B. Lavinheta, Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia: quibus tradidit artis
Raymundi Lullii compendiosam explicationem Coloniae, Sumptibus Lazari
Zetzneri Bibliopolae, 1612.
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107315
208
209
210
tesis completa del Arte de Llull que sirviese para encontrar prin
cipios generales para todas las ciencias.12
Con Josse Bade y otros editores particip activamente en la
publicacin de varias obras lulianas. No sabemos a ciencia cierta
cul fue el papel de Lavinheta en todas ellas, pero parece ser que
estuvo detrs de la publicacin de siete obras lulianas desde 1514 a
1518, un perodo de febril actividad impresora. Edit el Ars brevis13
y segn Carreras Artau estuvo tambin vinculado al proceso
de edicin del Arbor scientiae,14 que tanta influencia tuvo en su sn
tesis de la obra de Llull. En Colonia edit la Ianua artis de Pere
Dagu,15 y en Pars y Lyon particip en la edicin de las obras
ms destacadas de Llull.
El lulismo durante los siglos XIV y XV, a falta de estudios
ms detallados que puedan precisarlo mejor, estuvo en un difcil
equilibrio entre el platonismo y el aristotelismo, alimentando el
sincretismo propio de la poca. El neoplatonismo, por ejemplo, de
un Sibiuda, contrastaba con el aristotelismo de Heymericus de
Campo.16 La obra de Llull, al ser realmente compleja e incluir una
reforma de la lgica y de la metafsica, al tiempo que consagraba
toda una vena mstica, tena una armonizacin igualmente fcil y
difcil con las otras doctrinas.
En efecto, repasando con atencin la obra de Lavinheta, si se
dejan de lado las citas de la Biblia, es Aristteles el autor ms
citado. Su eclecticismo le permita aglutinar varias fuentes: sigui
con fidelidad la tendencia aristotlica del lulismo parisino, conju
gndola con la tradicin agustiniana.17 Platzeck elabor un elenco
de autores citados en la Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio que
12 S.Trias Mercant, Histria del pensament a Mallorca. Palma, 1985, vol.
I, pp.104105.
13 Ars brevis Illuminati Doctoris Magistri Raymundi Lulli, ed. Bernardus de
Lavinheta, Lyon, tienne Baland, 1514.
14 Arbor scientiae venerabilis et celitus Illuminati Patris Raymundi Lullii
Maioricensis. Ed. Josse Bade, Lyon, Gilbert de Villiers, 1515.
15 P.Dagu, Ianua artis Lulli. Introductorium ad modum breue et succintum
ad omnes scientias quod Janua artis illuminati doctoris magistri Raymundi Lulli
nuncupatur. Ed. Bernardus de Lavinheta, Colonia, Quentell, 1516.
16 E. Colomer, De la Edad Media al Renacimiento. Ramon Llull. Nicols de
Cusa. Pico della Mirandola, Barcelona, 1975, pp.78118.
17 E.W. Platzeck, op. cit., Einleitung, pp.1823.
211
212
213
slo una historia de las ideas jurdicas lulianas, sino tambin para
establecer una historia de la transmisin del lulismo.
Como es sabido, Ramon Llull escribi cuatro obras en las que
aplic su Arte al derecho:23 Liber principiorum juris,24 Ars juris,25
Ars juris naturalis26 y Ars brevis quae est de inventione juris.27 A
ellas debe aadirse el Arbre de cincia o Arbor scientiae28 (1296),
verdadero compendio del saber filosfico-teolgico y social de
Llull. Las partes sptima (Arbre imperial) y octava (Arbre apostolical) trataban, respectivamente, del derecho poltico y del derecho
cannico. Su idea principal era dar una explicacin completa de
cul deba ser el modelo de la vida y de la organizacin poltica
de los prncipes y de la Iglesia. Su disposicin, siguiendo la met
fora del rbol, permita una estratificacin social muy plstica, de
acuerdo con lo que Llull pensaba de cada uno de los miembros de
una sociedad bien organizada.29
El primero de estos libros, escrito entre 1273 y 1275, debe enten
derse en el marco general de la voluntad luliana de escribir sobre
los principios generales de los nacientes saberes universitarios. Esta
obra presentaba algo ilusamente la posibilidad de aprehender
dichos saberes de forma sencilla. 30 En realidad, no se trataba sino
de especulaciones de carcter ontolgico que, bajo una aparente
Sobre las obras jurdicas lulianas, vase R. Ramis Barcel, Estudio
Preliminar en R.Llull, Arte de derecho, Madrid, 2011, pp.22 y ss.
24 Ed. M. A. Sanchz Manzano, 2007 (ROL, 31), pp.323412.
25 Ars iuris illuminati doctoris Raymundi Lulii: que breuissima est et artificio
quodam intellectuali clauditur, Roma, apud Iacobum Mazochium, 1516. Se cita
por la reimpresin en Omnium scientiarum Magistri Beati Raymundi Lulli Doctoris Illuminati et Martyris Tertii Ordinis Seraphici Patris Sancti Francisci. Ars
iuris et Arbor imperialis, Palma de Mallorca, Miquel Cerd Miquel Amors,
1745, pp.186.
26 Ed. J. Gay, 1995 (ROL, 20), pp.119177.
27 Ed. A. Madre, 1984 (ROL, 12), pp.257389.
28 Se citar aqu por la edicin Arbor scientiae venerabilis et caelitus Illuminati Patris Raymundi Lullii Maioricensis, opus nuperrime recognitum revisum et
correctum, Lyon, Jean Pillehotte, 1635, que es una reedicin de la ya mencio
nada edicin de 1515.
29 Una descripcin general de todas estas obras puede verse en A.Mon
serrat Quintana, La visin luliana del mundo del Derecho, Mallorca, 1987,
pp.7092 y en J.L. Muoz de Baena y Simn, Llull, un ensayo de epistemologa jurdica, Madrid, 1988, tesis doctoral indita.
30 VaseA.Monserrat Quintana, La visin luliana, op. cit., pp.7071.
23
214
32
215
216
217
218
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
p.525.
p.525.
p.528.
p.532.
219
220
rorum unus est in culpa: alter vero caret ipsa, alii autem qui omnino
culpa carent.60
En el primer caso, Lavinheta puso el ejemplo clsico de Ticio y
Sempronio respecto de un prstamo con usura: este caso resultaba
muy grfico para ver que Ticio acusaba a Sempronio de usura, y
ste a aqul de lujuria61. Era necesario acudir a la ponderacin
en los tringulos para ver cul era la dignidad ms afectada.62
En el segundo caso, se estudiaba el caso de un paterfamilias que
haba instituido heredero universal al primognito. Tiempo des
pus ste se haba ordenado sacerdote y tena un beneficio, por lo
que el menor entenda que qui altari servit, de altari vivere debet.63
Era necesaria tambin una ponderacin entre ambos conten
dientes y de la voluntad del padre. El tercer modo de practicar
la figura estudiaba los casos fortuitos, o en el que nadie tena la
culpa directamente: el ejemplo era un asno que, habindolo dejado
su amo en un prado, entraba en una barca atada en la orilla de
un ro y se hunda.64 Tanto el amo del asno como el de la barca se
daban la culpa. Despus de haber examinado el alma (la intencin
de ambos) se decretaba que el caso era fortuito.65
El captulo sexto estudiaba, siguiendo la relacin detallada en
el Arbor scientiae, el modo de reducir todos los derechos positivos
y particulares a la verdadera ciencia del arte aplicada al derecho,
estableca cuarenta rbricas de temas jurdicos (Emptio, Venditio,
Commodatum, Redditio, Depositum, Promissio, Probatio, Confessio,
Negatio, Dubitatio, Statutum, Procuratio, Ablatum, Legatum, Accusatio, Excusatio, Permutatio, Perditio, Inventio, Datio, Conditio, Tormentum, Vituperium, Deceptio, Diffamatio, Furtum, Luxuria, Proditio, Homicidium, Blasphemia, Inobedientia, Mendacium, Indigentia,
Fortuna, Voluntarium, Ignorantia, Oblivio, Libertas, Servitus, PraeBernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia, p.533.
Tpico ejemplo que se repite en todas las obras lulianas, vase, por
ejemplo, rbol de la ciencia, p.365. Vase tambin Ars iuris illuminati, ff.
23v24.
62 Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia, p.533.
63 Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia, p. 534. Recurdese San Pablo, 1
Ad Corinthios, 9, 13.
64 Arbor scientiae, p.575; rbol de la ciencia, p.481. Tambin Ars de iure,
p.166.
65 Bernhardi de Lavinheta Opera omnia, p.535536.
60
61
221
222
223
4. Conclusiones y eplogo
Bernard de Lavinheta es una piedra angular en la historia del
lulismo. Al recoger la herencia de las diferentes tendencias lulia
nas en Europa, estableci una sntesis unitaria que sirvi para
difundir el lulismo metafsico de la poca cuaternaria y prepar
las bases para la eclosin luliana del XVI y del XVII.Su obra,
metafsica y teolgica, fue interpretada en la poca racionalista
como una presentacin casi nominalista de la combinatoria de
Llull. Con todo, su acabada sntesis permiti un conocimiento del
Arte en todas sus dimensiones.
Las fuentes jurdicas que Lavinheta tom fueron el Liber Principiorum iuris, el Ars iuris y, sobre todo, el Arbor Scientiae. Consi
dero improbable que consultase el Ars de iure, pero puede ser que
llegara a manejar el Ars brevis quae est de inventione iuris. Por el
hecho de que Lavinheta fuese lego en materias jurdicas, la cerca
na expositiva a los textos lulianos incluyendo los ejemplos fue
muy superior a la de otros textos filosficos y teolgicos, en los que
se senta ms seguro y poda revisar y aadir reflexiones persona
les. Sin embargo, conviene recalcar la figura de Lavinheta tanto
por su propia sntesis del derecho luliano, cuanto por la influencia
que tuvo en el mundo de los juristas y de los enciclopedistas.
Puede decirse que su influencia se proyect en tres dimensiones:
la primera es que en Lavinheta se dio la transicin interpretativa
del pensamiento jurdico luliano desde la teologa y la metafsica
hasta el derecho; la segunda, es que su obra puso las bases para
la concepcin enciclopdica de las ciencias de los siglos posterio
res,81 y finalmente, hay que destacar que fue capaz de presentar
de forma organizada (y de reformular) el pensamiento jurdico de
Llull, situndolo en un preludio del iusnaturalismo racionalista y
en el contexto de la emergencia de la scientia iuris.82
En un primer momento, a lo largo del siglo XVI, los comenta
rios y ediciones de Lavinheta sirvieron, sin duda, como base para
el humanismo jurdico francs, con figuras como Andreas Tira
224
225
Alessandro Tessari
(Padova)
For a long time all of those who have dealt with Ramon Llull
have ended up stumbling into the vexata quaestio of the relation
ship with Ren Descartes.1 Likewise, those who have dealt with
Descartes could do no more than stumble into the same ques
tion. In the three centuries that separate the life of the Major
can from that of the father of modern rationalism many things
happened that made it increasingly difficult to recognise the role
of the great thinker from Palma de Mallorca in the formation
and birth of modern science. His life and his work were in them
selves both complex and difficult to read, not just for the quan
tity of manuscripts left by Llull after his death. What has made
the reconstruction of Llulls identity both ambiguous and plural
is the amount of pseudo-Lullian works that multiplied following
his death and above all in the centuries of neo-Platonic cultural
dominance in Europe. The pseudo-Lullism and the neo-Platonic
tradition would pile up next to the already numerous registers of
authentic Lullian production. The power of neo-Platonic culture
minimised the authentic character of Lullian peculiarity, his phil
osophical combinatory art, and his computationalism.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Descartes, generally, but per
haps somewhat questionably, considered to be the father of mod
ern scientific rationality, even in the discordant company of Fran
cis Bacon and Galileo Galilei, was fascinated by a pseudo-Llull
founding text viewed through the glasses of Cornelius Agrippa von
DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.5.107316
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229
230
Middle Ages, one may glimpse elements of thought that are not
inappropriately defined as proto-scientific. Thirteenth-century
empiricism and computation stand in balanced opposition to the
magic and alchemy of Francis Bacon and Newton in the seven
teenth and eighteenth centuries.
From Descartes harsh criticism of Llull in Discours de la mthode in 1637,5 we can recognise that he shows essentially the same
arrogance witnessed by his letter of 26th March 1619 to Beeck
man: here he says that he is working on a scientiam penitus novam,
in Discours he says that Llulls art serves a parler sans iugement,
de celles <choses> quon ignore, qua les apprendre6.
The critical force that Descartes uses against a philosopher
who had died three centuries earlier may seem strange, while it
is quite clear that the controversy leads to attacks on Galileo and
Pascal, his contemporaries. In relation to them, the controversy
could be explained by the need to emphasise his own role as cen
tral to the spirit of the time. Above all, Galileo would tarnish
his prestige through the extraordinary and spectacular affair of
two papal condemnations, the burning of his books, imprisonment
and finally his retraction. Galileo had, after Copernicus, placed
his name alongside the birth of the new scientific method. To Des
cartes it seemed that only a marginal place for him remained.
This is the only way to explain the livid tone of his anti-Galilean
criticism.
After the acknowledgement made to Mersenne that without
Galileo there would be no Cartesian philosophy,7 with great ease
he put down Galileo as a bumbling scientist and certain plagia
rist, as evidenced in the shameful letter, again to Mersenne, in
1638.8 In the case of Galileo his fear that the Inquisition would
AT, VI, 17.
Ibid.
7 In the 1633 letter Descartes writes to Mersenne, after having learnt of
the conviction of Galileo, that sil est faux (le mouvement de la Terre) tous
les fondements de ma Philosophie le sont aussi. AT, I, 270273.
8 Descartes letter to Mersenne, 11 October 1638: after an analytical criti
que of Galileos work Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche intorno a due nuove
scienze, Descartes concludes: Et premierement, touchant Galile, ie vous
diray que ie ne lay iamais v, ny nay eu aucune communication avec luy, et
que par consequent ie ne saurois en avoir emprunt aucune chose. Aussy ne
5
6
231
232
233
234
235
236
J. H. ALSTED
1609
Methodus est
instrumentum
dianoeticum, quo
uno vel plura
axiomata ex alio,
sine vi[a] syllogistica
colliguntur, ad rerum
cognitionem in suo
genere pecfectam
adipiscendam
P. J. SNCHEZ DE
LIZARAZO
1613
[...]in scholis agitantur
quaestiones, per
methodum artis quae
in talibus partibus
relucebat, ea qua potui
breuitate tractaui,
ut quilibet artifex et
professor scientiarum
quid sibi faciendum
esset in suo proposito,
posset cernere et [...]
ultra comunes artes
extendere hanc nostra
aperui.
23
237
Generalis et
admirabilis methodus
ad omnes scientias
facilius et scitius
addiscendas, ed. C. a
Lauayen Turiasonae,
1619, f. xxxix
Generalis et admirabilis methodus [], Ren Descartes, Regulae ad directioop. cit., pp. xxxix; 4.
nem ingenii, AT, X, p. 371; 378.
238
Quam diversitatem
in addiscenda arte
[Lullij] confiteor mihi
aliquando nimis
obfuisse, qui quasi in
bivio positus quo me
verterem nesciebam:
obidque et quia Docto
res gravissimi de arte
hac male sentiebant
insipienter (sicut alij
qui artem ignorant et
eam despiciunt) ego
quoque persequebar
inuiste[sic] authorem
ipsium et eius doc
trinam et professores
illius taxando
Generalis et admirabilis
methodus, op. cit., p.
xxxix.
239
demonstrare, utilia
docet, magna detegit
eterna, euiterna, et
temporalia collimat,
potestatem ad ratio
cinandum in omnibus
scientijs et obiectis sci
bilibus habet; intellec
tum dirigit, memoriam
componit, voluntatem
sua doctrina ad bonum
inclinat; virtutes
quodam admirabili et
maximo lumine mani
festat; rerum veritates
artificiose penetrat
et utilissime compre
hendit, et ad gloriam
Dei innumera et altis
sima mysteria, tam in
naturalibus quam in
supernaturalibus ani
madvertit.
ou nuisibles ou super
flus, quil est presque
aussi malais de les en
sparer, que de tirer
une Diane ou une Min
erve hors dun bloc de
marbre qui nest point
encore bauch.
Generalis et admirabilis
methodus, op. cit.,
pp. xli-xlii..
Discours de la mthode,
op. cit., p. 17.
240
241
242
Generalis et admirabilis
methodus, op. cit.,
p. 165.
Discours de la mthode,
op. cit., p. 19.
Abstract
Ramon Llull, Ren Descartes: from Analytics to Heuristics
Sanchez de Lizarazos edition of Generalis et admirabilis methodus
artis lullianae (1613), twenty-four years before the publication of
Descartes Discours de la mthode, was an intellectual fact that
gave visibility to Llulls Art in the Early Modern period. The
combinatory of simple principles as the basic structure of wisdom,
and the concentric wheels system, taken from Bruno, were not
understood by Descartes. The modern ars combinatoria was more
than mnemotechnics: it was a vision of new heuristic signification.
The meaning of this fact can be found in the words of Llull, who
said that the Art was received through divine illumination, and
that that revelation pushed him to write unum librum meliorem
de mundo. What kind of book is it? It might answer all ques
tions: subiectum huius artis est respondere de omnibus quaestionibus.
243
INDICES
Index personarum
INDEX PERSONARVM
A
Abelln Prez, J. 168n
Aersten, J. 66, 74n, 89n
Agrippa, C. 211, 227-228
Albertus Magnus 59n, 114n, 124, 231
Alfonso V (The Magnanimous) 166
Alfonso de Medina 173
Alos, R. de 66n
Alonso de San Cebrin 183
Alsted, J. 219, 231, 236-239
lvarez de Villasandino, Alfonso 169,
Alvarz Ledo, S. 171n
lvaro de Luna 171, 178, 188
Ambrosius 211
Anaya y Maldonado, D. de 173, 176,
178, 181, 187-188
Andreas Capellanus 65
Angelini, A. 212n, 223n
Anselmus 7
Anselmus de Turmeda 179
Antn, E. 80n
Antonio de Parma 91
Arcais Flores, P.d 191-195, 197,
199-203
Arezzo, A. 89n
Aristoteles 46n, 55, 92, 111, 113n,
115n, 125, 210-211, 217
Arnaldus de Villanova 181, 231
Augustinus 112n, 135, 200, 211, 217
Averroes 13, 92, 111n, 115
B
Bacon, F. 227
Bade, J. 210
Badia, L. 156n
Batllori, M. 166n
Beajouan, G. 170n
Beatus Rhenanus 209
Beceiro Pita, I. 184n
Beeckman, I. 228-229, 240
Beltrn de Heredia, B. 178n
Bernat Gar 174
Basilius Bessarion 166
Bertini, G. M. 184n
Bianchi, L. 8, 89n
Blanch, R. 157
Bochenski, M. 157
Boehner, Ph. 157
Boethius 13, 116, 211
Bonafede, G. 74n, 90
Bonaventura 85, 155, 211
Bonilla y San Martn, A. 167n
Bonmariage, C. 73n, 92n, 106
Bonner, A. 68, 91, 92n., 156
Bovelles, Ch. de 209, 211
Bruno, G. 235-240, 242
Butterworth, C. 13n
C
Caelius Aurelianus 232
Campos y Fernndez de Sevilla, F. J.
175n
Carreras y Artau, T. u. J. 32, 37n,
165n, 169n, 184n, 210
Castro y Calvo, J. M. 166n
Cavallero, P. A. 173n
Cazorla Len, S. 174n
Chenu, M.D. 109
Cerrato Mateos, F. 175n
Cicero 4n, 211
Clark, D. 232
Clichtoveus, J. 209
Colomer y Pous, E. 145n, 147n, 208n,
210n
Curtius, R. 7
D
Dee, J. 231
Descartes, R. 227-234, 237-242
Diego de Alcal (san) 173
Diego Lobejn, M. W. de 184n
Domnguez Reboiras, F. XI, 14n,
17n, 80n, 112n, 167n-168n
Donatus 111n
Du Cange, C. 11n,
Dunphy, W. 131n
Dutton, B. 180
Dionysius Areopagita (pseudo)140
E
Eco, U. 10n
Elas de Tejada, F. 212n
248
index personarvm
Elsdon, J. H. 184n
Emery, K. 74n
Enrique II (Trastamara) 169
F
Fernndez, A. 168
Fernndez Gmez, M. 169n
Fernando de Cordoba 166
Fernando Enrquez de Ribera 186
Ferrn Manuel de Lando 170-171,
173, 180n
Ferrndes, A. 168
Ferrndes de Crdenas, Elvira 170
Ficino, M. 209
Fidora, A. 10n, 14n, 20n, 25n, 114, 194n
Finochiaro, M. 53n
Fraker, Ch. 173n
Francesco Petrarca 105
Francisco Imperial 173
Francisco Ximenez 184
Franciscus 211
Franciscus Gracianus 216
Friedlein, R. 93
G
Galilei, G. 227, 230-231, 240
Gmez Montalbo, F. 168n
Gandillac, M. de 157n
Garca Fernndez de Gerena 172-173,
180n
Grcia Oro, J. 189n
Garca Santos, J. 174n
Garibaldi A. 34,
Garin, E. 235n
Gaya, J. 14n, 19n
Gianfranco, L. 72n
Glorieux, P. 8n
Gmez de Luna 224
Gmez Gonzles (archdeacon) 177
Gonalo Morante 173, 179, 182
Gonzlez Cueva 180
Gonzalo Martnez de Medina, 180n
Gonzalo Snchez de Ueda 167-168
Gorce, M. 76
Gorini, G. 31
Gottron, A. 18n
Gualterus Burlaeus 91
Guillelmus de Conches 127
Guillelmus de Ockham 211, 221
Guillelmus de Shyreswood 59
index personarvm
Juan Rogel, 179
K
Keicher, O. 89, 90n
Kierkegaard, S. 191
Kircher, A. 224
Kneale, M. and W. 157
Kontarbinski, T. 157
Kuhn, T. S. 155
N
Nahmer, D. von der 159
Navarro Brotons V. 24n
Nicols de Cusa 208-209, 234
Nicolaus Copernicus 230
Nieto Cumplido 167n, 169n-170n
Nieva Ocampo, G. 183
Newton, I. 39, 229-230
L
Lafleur, C. 77n
Lambertus Altissiodorensis 55n
Lavinheta, B. de 207, 210-212, 217,
221-223
Lawrence J. N. 169n
Lefvre dtaples, J. 207-209, 211
Leibiniz, G. W. 38, 224, 229
Len Florido, F. 65
Libera, A. de 46n, 66, 77n
Lida de Malkiel, R.-M. 166n
Llinars, A. 208n
Lohr, Ch. 10n, 80n, 123n
Lope de Olmedo 181
Lpez, N. 183
Lus de Acua 183
Luzn Daz, R. 8n
M
Mahomat el Xartosse de Guadalajara
173
Mandonnet, P. 66, 70, 73, 86
Marcos Rodrguez, F. 175n, 182n
Margarita Poreta 7
Marsilius Patavinus 91
Massey, G. 53n
Mateolli, M. 235n
Mendoza Negrillo, J de 179n
Merle, H. 140n
Merssene, M. 230
Mestre Llobet 211
Minio-Paluello, L. 111n, 113n
Monfasani, J. 167n
Mordohay de Sahagn 176
Moreno Rodriguez F. 91n, 106
Morgan, A. de 53
Monserrat Quintana, A. 213n
Moss, R. von 8n
Musco, A. XIn
Mussoto, G. 92
249
P
Pace, G. 224
Paracelsus 211
Pareja Fernndez, E. M. 174n
Paula de Canalejas, F. de 166n
Pedro Lpez de Ayala (el Viejo) 173
Perarnau, J. 165n, 176n, 177, 179180, 181n, 183n, 186n
Pere Dagu, 210-211
Pereira, M. 209n
Prez Martnez, L. 183n
Perron, R. du (Descartes) 227, 233
Petrus Abaelardus 115n, 127, 155
Petrus Hispanus 55n, 57n, 114, 123n
Petrus Iohannis Olivi 221
Petrus Lombardus 113n, 211
Petrus Pictavensis 110
Piche, D. 65-66, 69n, 71n, 74n, 81
Pico della Mirandola 209, 234
Pierre de Gregoire 224
Pimentel, A. 184
Pinto de la Rosa, J. 173n
Pistolesi, E. 96n
Pizzorni, R. M. 216n
Platero Fernndez, C. 178n
Platon 211
Platzeck, E. 28, 146, 209n, 210, 211n
Plessis dArgent, Ch. du 70
Portocarrero y Crdenas, I. 186
Prantl, C. 156n
Pring-Mill, R. 50n
Ptolomaeus 211
Puig i Oliver, J. 178n
Q
Quintilianus 4n
R
Raimundus Lullus passim
250
index personarvm
Stegmller, F. 185n
Stephanus Tempier 65-66, 76n
Stone, H. R. 167n
Sturlesse, R. 235n
T
Tavard, J. 94
Taylor, B. 167n
Tenge-Wolf, V. 13n
Tirinnanzi, N. 235n
Thomas de Aquino 43, (ps-) 54, 84,
113n, 114, 115n, 155, 211, 217, 231
Thomas Migerii 111n
Thomas de Wylton, 91
Trias Merant, S 24, 210n
U
Ulpianus 216
Urbina, A. 185
V
Valencia de Len, D. de 173, 179
Valla, L. 166
Vauchez, A. 162
Vzquez Janeiro, I. 177, 179
Velasco, B. 182n
Victor, J. M. 209n
Vite, F. 34
Villalba, P. 80n
Vitruvius 232
Vivero, G. de 182
W
Walter, P. 80n
Weber, M. 161
Wohlhaupter, E. 217n
Y
Yates, F. 38, 235n
Z
Zambelli, P. 234n
Zetzner, L. 219, 224, 228n, 231, 233,
235
252
RAIMVNDI LVLLI
Opera latina
CONCORDANTIAE
Raimundi Lulli Opera latina
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
Corpus Christianorum,
Continuatio Mediaeualis
[Palmae Maioric. 1959]
254
XIII
XIV
XV
XVI
XVII
XVIII
XIX
XX
XXI
XXII
XXIII
concordantiae
XXIV- op. 65: Arbor scientiae, ed.
XXVI Pere Villalba Varneda
XXVII op. 53: Tabula generalis, ed.
Viola Tenge-Wolf
XXVIII op. 49-52: Liber de sancta Maria
et Liber de passagio, ed. Blanca
Gar et Fernando Domnguez
Reboiras
XXIX op. 46-48: Ars amatiua boni et
Quaestiones quas quaesiuit quidam frater minor, ed. Marta
M.M. Romano et Francesco
Santi
XXX
op. 97-100: In proximo Oriente
annis 1301-1302 conscripta ed.
Jaume Medina
XXXI op. 12-15: Quattuor libri principiorum, ed. Mara Asuncin
Snchez Manzano
XXXII op. 27: Ars demonstratiua, ed.
Josep Enric Rubio Albarracn
XXXIII op. 7-9: Annis 1274-1276 com
posita, ed. Jaume Medina
XXXIV op. 61-63: Annis 1294-1295
composita, ed. Ulli Roth et
Carla Compagno
XXXV op. 54-60: Annis 1294-1296 com
posita, ed. Coralba Colomba et
Viola Tenge-Wolf
XXXVI op. 1011: Liber contra Anti
christum et Liber de gentili et
tribus sapientibus, ed. Pamela
M. Beattie et scar de la
Cruz Palma
XXXVII op. 44: Ars inuentiua ueritatis,
ed. Jorge Uscatescu Barrn
XXXVIII op. 142-153: Montepessulano
anno 1309 conscripta, quibus
epistolae tres loco et tempore
incerto adnectuntur, ed. Fer
nando Domnguez Reboiras
Supplementum Lullianum
I
Breuiculum seu Electorium paruum Thomae Migerii (Le Mysier), ed. Charles Lohr, Wal
burga Bchel et Theodor Pin
dl-Bchel
255
256
II
III
RAIMVNDI LVLLI
Opera latina
CONCORDANTIAE
ROL
CCCM
7-9
XXXIII 215
10-11 XXXVI 264
12-15 XXXI 185
27
XXXII 213
44
XXXVII 265
46-48 XXIX 183
49-52 XXVIII 182
53
XXVII 181
54-60 XXXV 248
61-63 XXXIV 246
65
XXIV-XXVI 180A-C
76-81 XVII 79
86-91 XIX 111
92-96 XXI 112
97-100 XXX 184
101-105 XXIII 115
106-113 XX
113
114-117 X
36
118 III-IV
119
X
36
120-122 IX
35
123-127 XII
38
128 XIV 75
130-133 XXII
114
134 XIII 39
135-141 XI
37
142-153 XXXVIII 266
154-155 V
156-167 VI
33
168-177 VII
32
178-189 VIII
34
190-200 XVI
78
201-207 XV
76
208-212 XVIII 80
213-239 I
240-280 II
SVBSIDIA LVLLIANA
1
IPM 42
2002
IPM 46
2005
IPM 49
2008
IPM 59
2011
2015