Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
RANILO DE LA CRUZ Y
LIZING, appellant. G.R. No. 177222
October 29, 2008
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
specimen and had made the markings on the same without the presence of
appellant. 15
exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in his Brief filed before the Court of
Appeals and thus, he is adopting it as Supplemental Brief. 22
For the defense, appellant testified that on 12 September 2002, at around 1:00
to 2:00 p.m., he was in his house watching television with his wife when he
heard a knock at the door. Outside, he came upon two men looking for "Boy
Tigre." After admitting that it was he they were looking for, he was told that the
barangay captain needed him. He went with the two men to see the barangay
captain. Thereat, the barangay captain asked whether he knew of anyone
engaged in large-scale drug pushing. Appellant replied in the negative and in
response, the barangay captain stated that there was nothing more he (the
barangay captain) can do. Appellant was then told to go to the City Hall. At first,
his wife accompanied him there but he later asked her to go home and raise the
money Bismonte had allegedly demanded from him in exchange for his
freedom. When appellants wife failed to return as she had given birth, a case
for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was filed against him. 16
Appellant added that he used to be involved in "video-karera" and surmised that
this involvement could have provoked the barangay captains wrath. 17
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that it was dispensing with
the admission of a supplemental brief. 23 Earlier,
in its Appellees Brief, the OSG maintained that despite the non-compliance with
the requirements of R.A. No. 9165, the seized drugs are admissible in evidence
because their integrity and evidentiary value were properly preserved in
accordance with the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165. 24
At the outset, it is well to restate the constitutional mandate that an accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum evidence required. In so doing, the
prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of
the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of
evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own
behalf. In which case the presumption prevails and the accused should
necessarily be acquitted. 25
In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven:
(1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug
was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. 26
The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the offense. 27
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 states that:
Finding that the prosecution had proven appellants guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against him, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and ordering him to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the challenged decision was affirmed in toto by
the appellate court, after it ruled that the trial court did not commit any
reversible error in finding appellant guilty of the offense charged.
Before the Court, appellant reiterates his contention that the apprehending
police officers failure to comply with Sections 21 19 and 86 20 of R.A. No. 9165
and that failure casts doubt on the validity of his arrest and the admissibility of
the evidence allegedly seized from him. 21 Through his Manifestation (In Lieu of
Supplemental Brief) dated 4 September 2007, appellant stated that he had
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof;
The IRR of the same provision adds a proviso, to wit:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items;
Q Before you brought this item to the crime laboratory[,] what other markings
you placed on the sachet?
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the arresting officers failed to strictly
comply with the guidelines prescribed by the law regarding the custody and
control of the seized drugs despite its mandatory terms. While there was
testimony regarding the marking of the seized items at the police station, there
was no mention whether the same had been done in the presence of appellant
or his representatives. There was likewise no mention that any representative
from the media, DOJ or any elected official had been present during the
inventory or that any of these people had been required to sign the copies of the
inventory. Neither does it appear on record that the team photographed the
contraband in accordance with law. Peregrino testified as follows:
Following the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the
government, and liberally in favor of the accused, 30 the apprehending teams
omission to observe the procedure outlined by R.A. 9165 in the custody and
disposition of the seized drugs significantly impairs the prosecutions case.
Q While you were at the office, what did you do with the physical evidence,
subject of the buy-bust operation?
A When we were at the office[,] we marked the subject physical evidence and
requested for physical examination[,] Maam.
ACP Indunan:
What were the markings placed on the physical evidence?
A What we put is initial "BP"
Q What does this BP means [sic]?
A My initial Maam, Braulio Perigrino [sic].
Resuello likewise testified in this wise:
ACP Indunan:
28
29
Now, the prosecution cannot seek refuge in the proviso of the IRR in the absence
of proof of entitlement to such leniency. The prosecution rationalizes its
oversight by merely stating that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items were properly preserved in accordance with law. The allegation hardly
sways the Court save when it is accompanied by proof. According to the proviso
of the IRR of Section 21(a) of R.A. No. 9165, non-compliance with the procedure
shall not render void and invalid the seizure of and custody of the drugs only
when: (1) such non-compliance was under justifiable grounds; and (2) the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending team. Clearly, there must be proof that these two (2)
requirements were met before any such non-compliance may be said to fall
within the scope of the proviso. Significantly, not only does the present case lack
the most basic or elementary attempt at compliance with the law and its
implementing rules; it fails as well to provide any justificatory ground showing
that the integrity of the evidence had all along been preserved. 31
Failing to prove entitlement to the application of the proviso, the arresting
officers non-compliance with the procedure laid down by R.A No. 9156 is not
excused. This inexcusable non-compliance effectively invalidates their seizure of
and custody over the seized drugs, thus, compromising the identity and integrity
of the same. We resolve the doubt in the integrity and identity of the corpus
delicti in favor of appellant 32 as every fact necessary to constitute the crime
must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 33 Considering that the
prosecution failed to present the required quantum of evidence, appellants
acquittal is in order.
It is well to recall that in several cases that came before us, we have repeatedly
emphasized the importance of compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
custody and disposition of the seized drugs. We have over and over declared
that the deviation from the standard procedure dismally compromises the
integrity of the evidence. 34
Anent the argument that the buy-bust operation was conducted without the
assistance or consent of PDEA, in violation of Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165, it
must be pointed out that the second paragraph of the same provision states
that the transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices into PDEA
shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of the law
which was on 4 July 2002. 35 In view of the fact that the buy-bust operation was
conducted on 12 September 2002, it is excusable that the same was not done in
coordination with PDEA.
All told, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case does not
support appellants conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165,
since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
of the offense. Following the constitutional mandate, when the guilt of the
appellant has not been proven with moral certainty, as in this case, the
presumption of innocence prevails and his exoneration should be granted as a
matter of right.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 14 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 211 in Criminal Case No. MC02-5912-D is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant RANILO DELA CRUZ y LIZING is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt and ordered immediately
RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful case.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this
Decision forthwith and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt
hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement. Costs de
oficio. SO ORDERED.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02070 dated 28 May 2007 which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, in Criminal Case No.
3437-M-02, finding accused-appellant Norberto del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, guilty of
violation of Section 5,3 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
On 11 December 2002, accused-appellant was charged with Violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December 2002, in the municipality of Baliuag,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law and legal justification,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give
away, dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
weighing 0.290 gram.4
The case was raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan and docketed
as Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02.
When arraigned on 20 January 2003, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge.5 On 17 February 2003, the pre-trial
conference was concluded.6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as its lone witness PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr.,
the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation conducted against appellant, and a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office 3/Special Enforcement Unit (SEU)
stationed at the Field Office, Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan.
The version of the prosecution is as follows:
On 10 December 2002, at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, a confidential
informant went to the office of the PDEA SEU in Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag,
Bulacan and reported that appellant was selling shabu. Upon receipt of said
information, a briefing on a buy-bust operation against appellant was conducted.
The team was composed of SPO2 Hashim S. Maung, as team leader, PO1
Gaudencio Tolentino, Jr. as the poseur-buyer, and PO1 Antonio Barreras as backup operative. After the briefing, the team, together with the confidential
informant, proceeded to Poblacion Dike for the execution of the buy-bust
operation.
When the team arrived at appellants place, they saw the appellant standing
alone in front of the gate. The informant and PO1 Tolentino approached
appellant. The informant introduced PO1 Tolentino to appellant as his friend,
saying "Barkada ko, user." PO1 Tolentino gave appellant P300.00 consisting of
three marked P100 bills.7 The bills were marked with "GT JR," PO1 Tolentinos
initials. Upon receiving the P300.00, appellant took out a plastic sachet from his
pocket and handed it over to PO1 Tolentino. As a pre-arranged signal, PO1
Tolentino lit a cigarette signifying that the sale had been consummated. PO1
Barreras arrived, arrested appellant and recovered from the latter the marked
money.
The white crystalline substance8 in the plastic sachet which was sold to PO1
Tolentino was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos,
Bulacan, for laboratory examination to determine the presence of the any
dangerous drug. The request for laboratory examination was signed by SPO2
Maung.9 Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002, 10 the substance bought from
appellant was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The testimony of Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical Officer who
examined the substance bought from appellant, was dispensed after both
prosecution and defense stipulated that the witness will merely testify on the
fact that the drugs subject matter of this case was forwarded to their office for
laboratory examination and that laboratory examination was indeed conducted
and the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.11
For the defense, the appellant took the witness stand, together with his
common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza; and nephew, Alejandro Lim.
From their collective testimonies, the defense version goes like this:
On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sisters house in Poblacion
Dike when a commotion woke him up. His nephew, Alejandro Lim, was shouting
because the latter, together with appellants common-law wife, Amelia
Mendoza, and a niece, was being punched and kicked by several police officers.
When appellant tried to pacify the policemen and ask them why they were
beating up his common-law wife and other relatives, the policemen arrested
him, mauled him, punched him on the chest, slapped him and hit him with a
palo-palo. He sustained swollen face, lips and tooth. His common-law wife was
likewise hit on the chest with the palo-palo.
The policemen then took appellant and his common-law wife to a house located
in the middle of a field where the former demanded P15,000.00 for their liberty.
The next day, appellant was brought to the police station.
Amelia Mendoza identified PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Barreras as the police officers
who manhandled them and who demanded P15,000.00 so that she and
appellant could go home. The following day at 6:00 a.m., she said her child and
cousin arrived with the P15,000.00. She was released but appellant was
detained. She does not know why the police officers filed this case against
appellant. What she knows is that they were asking money from them.
In our Resolution19 dated 10 December 2007, the parties were notified that they
may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days
from notice. Both appellant and appellee opted not to file a supplemental brief
on the ground they had exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in their
respective briefs and the filing of a supplemental brief would only contain a
repetition of the arguments already discussed therein.
Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE
AGAINST HIM FOR FAILURE OF THE ARRESTING OFFICERS TO COMPLY WITH
SECTION 21 OF R.A. 9165.20
Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemens failure to strictly
comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. He claims that pictures of him
together with the alleged confiscated shabu were not taken immediately upon
his arrest as shown by the testimony of the lone prosecution witness. He adds
that PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Antonio Barreras, the police officers who had initial
custody of the drug allegedly seized and confiscated, did not conduct a physical
inventory of the same in his presence as shown by their joint affidavit of arrest.
Their failure to abide by said section casts doubt on both his arrest and the
admissibility of the evidence adduced against him.
At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police officers alleged
non-compliance with Section 2121 of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first time on
appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day for him to do so. In People v.
Sta. Maria22 in which the very same issue was raised, we ruled:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever
justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust
operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown,
because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items
seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of Sections
21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court
but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did
appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the
safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and
evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
(Emphases supplied.)
In People v. Pringas,23 we explained that non-compliance with Section 21 will not
render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case at bar,
appellant never questioned the custody and disposition of the drug that was
taken from him. In fact, he stipulated that the drug subject matter of this case
was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan for
laboratory examination which examination gave positive result for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. We thus find the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the drug seized from appellant not to have been
compromised.
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law,
particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs
confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence.
Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it
is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For
evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its
reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject
only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the courts. One example is
that provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court wherein a party
producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to be
altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must
account for the alteration. His failure to do so shall make the document
inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly provided for in the rules.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will
bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to
non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if
there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight
evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the evidence. The weight to
be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances
obtaining in each case.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 24 What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
corpus delicti.25
All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The prosecution clearly
showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject
of the sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur buyer positively
identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per Chemistry Report No. D-7282002 of Forensic Chemical Officer Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, the substance,
weighing 0.290 gram, which was bought by PO1 Tolentino from appellant in
consideration of P300.00, was examined and found to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu).
In the case before us, we find the testimony of the poseur-buyer, together with
the dangerous drug taken from appellant, more than sufficient to prove the
crime charged. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold and
impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment
of the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses during trial. It is a fundamental rule that findings of
the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are
accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and
speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such
findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide
the credibility of witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.26
The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are
sustained by the Court of Appeals.27 Finding no compelling reason to depart from
the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we affirm their
findings.
Appellant denies selling shabu to the poseur-buyer insisting that he was framed,
the evidence against him being "planted," and that the police officers were
exacting P15,000.00 from him.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was the subject of
a buy-bust operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as
seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, appellants plain denial of the offenses charged,
unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail. 28
Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is
easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard
line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 29 For
this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their
duties in a regular and proper manner.30 This, appellant failed to do. The
presumption remained unrebutted because the defense failed to present clear
and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their
duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive.
The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and his nephew,
Alejandro Lim, to support his claims fails to sway. We find both witnesses not to
be credible. Their testimonies are suspect and cannot be given credence without
clear and convincing evidence. Their claims, as well as that of appellant, that
they were maltreated and suffered injuries remain unsubstantiated. As found by
the trial court:
The accused, on the other hand, in an effort to exculpate himself from liability
raised the defense of frame-up. He alleged that at the time of the alleged buy
bust he was merely sleeping at the house of his sister. That he was awakened by
the yells and screams of his relatives as they were being mauled by the police
officers. However, this Court is not convinced. Accused failed to substantiate
these claims of maltreatment even in the face of his wifes and nephews
testimony. No evidence was presented to prove the same other than their selfserving claims.31
Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General
that the witnesses for the defense cannot even agree on what time the arresting
policemen allegedly arrived in their house. It explained:
To elaborate, appellant testified that it was 3 oclock in the afternoon of
December 10, 2002 when he was roused from his sleep by the policemen who
barged into the house of his sister (TSN, July 7, 2003, p. 2). His common-law
wife, however, testified that it was 10-11 oclock in the morning when the
policemen came to the house (TSN, Oct. 13, 2003, p. 6). On the other hand,
Alejandro Lim testified that he went to sleep at 11 oclock in the morning and it
was 10 oclock in the morning when the policemen arrived (TSN, Feb.2, 2004, p.
6). He thus tried to depict an absurd situation that the policemen arrived first
before he went to sleep with appellant.32
Having established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting the
illegal sale of drugs, we are constrained to uphold appellants conviction.
The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. Said section reads:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or
shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity and
purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00. For selling 0.290 gram of shabu to PO1 Tolentino, and there
being no modifying circumstance alleged in the information, the trial court, as
sustained by the Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life
imprisonment in accordance with Article 63(2)33 of the Revised Penal Code.
As regards the fine to be imposed on appellant, the trial court pegged the fine at
P5,000,000.00 which the Court of Appeals reduced to P500,000.00. Both
amounts are within the range provided for by law but the amount imposed by
the Court of Appeals, considering the quantity of the drugs involved, is more
appropriate.
"Ephemeral
electronic
communication"
refers
to
telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which
is not recorded or retained."
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral
electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ."
In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore
had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import.
Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in
complainants cellphone from which the messages originated was hers.
Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the
text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and
attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is
also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative
value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof
of respondent in this case.
Complainants testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on
the latters demand for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by
the testimony of a disinterested witness, Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador
who was present when the parties met in person. Siringan was privy to the
parties actual conversation since she accompanied complainant on both
meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.
Respondents evidence was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and
sister as well as an acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and
complainant first met. Respondents own testimony consisted of bare denials
and self-serving claims that she did not remember either the statements she
herself made or the contents of the messages she sent. Respondent had a very
selective memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were propounded
by the Committee.
When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in
complainants cellphone and which reflected her cellphone number, respondent
admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she did not remember
those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant.
4. EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner, vs. CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines),
Respondent.
G.R. No. 164273; March 28, 2007
Facts: Petitioner is a holder of a credit card and claims that when he presented
his credit card in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the
same was not honored. And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and
Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it
was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by the
respondent bank.
To prove that respondent blacklisted his credit card, Petitioner presented a
computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN
ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency with the signature
of one Victrina Elnado Nubi which shows that his card in question was
DECL OVERLIMIT or declared over the limit.
The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision dismissing petitioners complaint
for lack of merit. It held that as between the computer print-out presented by
petitioner and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins presented by respondent, the
latter had more weight as their due execution and authenticity was duly
established by respondent.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the decision was reversed. Judge De la
Pea ruled that the computer print-out was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary
or regular course of business in the modern credit card industry and Nubi was
not able to testify as she was in a foreign country and cannot be reached by
subpoena. The same took judicial notice of the practice of automated teller
machines (ATMs) and credit card facilities which readily print out bank account
status, therefore the print-out can be received as prima facie evidence of the
dishonor of petitioners credit card.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the computer print-out is an
electronic document which must be authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence or under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court by anyone who saw the document executed or written; Petitioner,
however, failed to prove its authenticity, thus it must be excluded.
Issues:
i.
Whether or not the On Line Authorization Report is an electronic
document?
ii.
Whether or not the On Line Authorization Report constitutes
electronic evidence?
Held: The petition was denied by the Supreme Court for lack of merit.
Petitioner puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN
ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to petitioner by
Ingtan Agency, to prove that his credit card was dishonored for being
blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words DECL OVERLIMIT.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be
considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently
established by petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section
20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Petitioner, who testified on the authenticity did not actually see the document
executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said
computer print-out.
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on
August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by petitioner in this case, the
authentication of the computer print-out would still be found wanting.
Petitioner claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the
other evidence showing integrity and reliability of Exh. G to the satisfaction
of the judge. The Court is not convinced. Petitioners testimony that the person
from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer print-out and that he
thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient
to show said print-outs integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge
Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. G does not show on its face that it
was issued by Ingtan Agency as petitioner merely mentioned in passing how he
was able to secure the print-out from the agency. Petitioner also failed to show
the specific business address of the source of the computer print-out because
while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by petitioner, its business
address was not reflected in the print-out.
Indeed, petitioner failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the
print-out was generated and how the said information could be relied upon as
true.