Yu v.

Philippine Commercial International Bank

Facts:
Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and participation
over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of
the Philippine Commercial International Bank as security for the payment of a
loan.
As the Yus failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due PCI Bank filed
petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the Dagupan
City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued notice of extra-judicial sale
on August 3, 1998 scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998.
Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of PCI Bank, the
highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan
City on October 1, 1998. After two months before the expiration of the
redemption period, PCI Bank filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession
before RTC of Dagupan. The Yus complaint on annulment of certificate of sale
and motion to dismiss and to strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was denied
by said RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then filed on February 14, 2000
arguing that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial
issue to the filed ex-parte petition for writ of possession, the resolution of which
is determinative of propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Possession.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a real estate located in different places and can be separately
foreclosed in different places
Held:
Yes, real estate located in different places can be separately foreclosed in
different places.
Article 2089 presupposes several heirs of the debtor or creditor and is not
applicable to the case. What the law proscribes is the foreclosure of only a
portion of the property or a number of several properties mortgaged
corresponding to the unpaid portion of the debt where, before foreclosure
proceedings, partial payment was made by the debtor on his total outstanding
loan or obligation. The debtor also cannot ask for the release of any portion of
the mortgaged property or of one or some of the several lots mortgaged unless
and until the loan secured has been fully paid, notwithstanding the fact that
there has been partial fulfilment of the obligation.

Escano v. Ortigas, Jr.

Facts:

PDCP entered into a loan agreement with Falcon. Ortigas and the Scholeys
agreed to be solidarily liable with Falcon to ensure payment of loan with PDCP.
This agreement was made in 1980. Escano executed a contract for one guaranty,
and another was executed by Silos, et. al.
The 1982 Undertaking was an agreement to cede control of Falcon to Escano,
Silos,and Matti. This was in accordance with Ortigas and companys desire to
relieve themselves of the liability arising from undertakings with Falcon. In this
agreement, the sureties are: Escano, Silos, and Matti, and the obligors are:
Ortigas, Inductivo, and the Scholeys.
However, Falcon defaulted in his payment of the loan, so PDCP filed a complaint.
Each of the parties, who were sureties in the 1982 Undertaking, paid a certain
amount to PDCP, and the first to come to terms with PDCP was Escano in 1993,
who entered into a compromise agreement to pay PDCP 1 million pesos. PDCP
waived or assigned in favour of Escano 1/3 of its entire claim in the complaint
against the other defendants.
In 1994, Ortigas entered into his own compromise agreement, without the
knowledge of Escano, Matti and Silos, agreeing to pay 1.3 million pesos in
exchange for being released from liability arising from the Falcon loan agreement
and renunciation of claims against Ortigas.
Silos and PDCP entered into a partial compromise agreement where he agreed to
pay 500 thousand pesos in exchange for PDCPs waiver against its claims against
him.
Ortigas pursued claims against Escano, Silos and Matti on the basis of the 1982
Undertaking. The RTC issued a summary judgement ordering Escano, Silos and
Matti to pay Ortigas jointly and severally the amount of 1.3 million pesos
Issue/s:
Whether or not Escano, Silos and Matti are liable under the 1982 Undertaking
Whether or not they are solidarily liable to Ortigas
Held:
Yes, they are liable under the 1982 Undertaking.
It was a surety agreement, covered by Article 2047. A surety is anancillary
contract as it presupposes the existence of a principal contract. A surety may
seek reimbursement for amount paid. A surety does in fact become subrogated
to all rights and remedies of the creditor.
No, they are not solidarily liable.
The Undertaking does not contain any express stipulation that Escano, Silos and
Matti agreed to bind themselves jointly and severally in their obligations to the

Ortigas group, or any such term to that effect. Such obligation is thus only
presumed joint.
Industrial Management International Development Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission
Facts:
In September 1984, Enrique Sulit et al. filed a complaint against INIMACO et al
for payment of separation pay and unpaid wages. The labor arbiter ruled in favor
of Sulit et al. The decision became final and executor and a writ of execution was
issued but returned unsatisfied. Labor arbiter the issued an Alias Writ of
Execution. INIMACO filed a motion to quash and set aside the decision, arguing
that the writ of execution changed the tenor of the decision. The labor arbiter
denied the appeal. INIMACO appealed to NLRC, but was dismissed.
INIMACO then filed a motion to compel the sheriff to accept payment as full and
final satisfaction of judgement, the labor arbiter denied the motion. The same
was appealed to the NLRC, which was dismissed.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the liability of INIMACO is solidary
Held:
No, the obligation is merely joint.
Solidary liability only arises when the obligation expressly so states. In the
dispositive portion of the labor arbiters decision, the word solidary does not
appear.

Heirs of Servando Franco v. Gonzales

Facts:
Defendants Servando Franco and Leticia Mendel obtained loans from Veronica
Gonzales for the latter was engaged in the business of financing under the
company Gonzales Credit Enterprises. There were three loans which the
Servando and Leticia secured with the respondent, which was not paid on
maturity. The third loan was secured by a property was owned by one Leticia
Makalintal Yapintchay, who issued a special power of attorney in favor of Leticia
Medel, authorizing her to execute the mortgage. The fourth loan was engaged
with Dr. Rafael Mendel, the husband of Leticia Mendel of 60 thousand by
executing a promissory note which consolidates the other previous loans which
totals to 500 thousand pesos
Upon maturity of the new promissory note, the defendants failed to pay their
obligation. So, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for the collection of the full amount
of the loan, plus interest sand other charges. Servando contended that he did not

obtain any loan from the respondents, he was not benefited from its proceed and
he signed the promissory note as a witness. With the various appeals and motion
for reconsideration with the RTC and CA, it was decided that the parties should
be liable for the loans. Servando opposed that he and the respondents had
agreed to fix the entire obligation at 775 thousand pesos. According to Servando,
their agreement, which was allegedly embodied in a receipt dated February 5,
1992, whereby he madean initial payment of 400 thousand pesos and promised
to pay the balance of 375 thousand pesos on February 29, 1992, superseded the
July 23, 1986 promissory note. But the RTC ruled over Servandos opposition and
moved to the execution of the judgment for it is final and executory. Then,
Servandos heirs, on account of his intervening death, appealed that there was
novation is the judgment that transpired upon the decision of the court on
December 9, 1991 and February 5, 1992.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there is novation between judgements rendered by the courts
Held:
No, novation did not take place.
Novation did not take place because no irreconcilable incompatibility existed
between the promissory note and the receipt. There is incompatibility when the
two obligations cannot stand together, each one having its independent
existence.
The February 5, 1992 receipt was only proof of Servandos payment of his
obligation, it is a mere acknowledgement of the old contract.