Civil Procedure

Rule 7

Defendant-petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. In the

meantime, plaintiffs-respondents moved for the issuance of an order for
the immediate execution of the City Court decision of 16 January 1969.
On 29 July 1969, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss of 5 July
1969 for lack of merit, and at the same time granted the immediate
execution of the City Court judgment.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, and his appeal
dismissed, defendant filed the herein petition, claiming that the lower
court
Did not acquire jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry, the
verification of the corresponding complaint being void;
It is pointed out in the first assigned error that since the verification in
the complaint for forcible entry does not comply with Section 6,
Rule 7, of the Revised Rules of Court, the complaint is void; hence,
the City Court, and subsequently the court a quo, did not acquire
jurisdiction over the said case.
Issue:
Whether or not error in the verification is jurisdictional
Held:
No. Section 6, Rule 7, Revised Rules of Court provides:
Verification. A pleading is verified only by an affidavit stating that
the person verifying has read the pleading and that the allegations
thereof are true of his own knowledge.
Moreover, even if We should find the verification insufficient, that
insufficiency would not render the complaint for forcible entry, or the
whole proceedings in the court below, void. This Court already held in

ASG Guillen SY 2015-2016

JOSE SALCEDO QUIMPO, petitioner, vs.CATALINO DELA

VICTORIA and FRANCISCA O. DELA VICTORIA, respondents.
Topic: Parts of Pleadings
Facts:
On 2 May 1968, plaintiffs-respondents filed a complaint against
defendant-petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch
I, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 6005, for quieting of title and
recovery of possession with damages.
On 28 June 1968, plaintiffs-respondents filed another case against
defendant-petitioner with the City Court of Davao City (Civil Case No.
1299-B) for forcible entry over the same parcel of land Plaintiffsrespondents.
In a motion to dismiss dated 13 July 1968, 6 defendant-petitioner
sought the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry alleging the
pendency of Civil Case No. 6005; but the City Court, in its order of 29
November 1968, denied the said motion "for the reason that there is
no identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for and for the
further reason that it does not appear that any judgment which
would be rendered on the other action will amount to res
adjudicata in the herein case."
On 12 December 1968, defendant-petitioner was declared in default for
failure to file his answer and on 16 January 1969 the same court
rendered its decision in favor of plaintiff-respondent.
Defendant-petitioner then moved for the reconsideration of the
aforesaid order of 29 November 1968 denying his motion to dismiss the
complaint for forcible entry, and also the decision of 16 January 1969.
However, his motion was denied in the City Court order of 4 March
1969. 8
Page 1 of 13

Civil Procedure

Rule 7

It will also be noted that defendant-petitioner raises the question of

jurisdiction for the first time in this appeal, hence, he is now barred
by laches. This Court ruled in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy 11 that
... a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136
Or. 694, 86 A. L. R. 79).
In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said
that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject-matter of the action or of the parties is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice
can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a
cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late
for the loser to question the jurisdiction power of the court ... And in
Littleton vs. Burgos, 16 Wyo, 58, the Court said that it is not right for a
party who has affirm and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. 12

Defendant-petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the City Court when it

sought to dismiss the complaint for forcible entry on the ground that the
cause of action in this case is the same as in Civil Case No. 6005, supra.
After defendant-petitioner was declared in default, and the decision
rendered against him, said party again submitted to said jurisdiction by
filing a motion for reconsideration of said decision. His motion having
been denied, he appealed the case to the court a quo where he also filed
a motion, dismiss the forcible entry case on the same grounds stated in

ASG Guillen SY 2015-2016

several decisions that the requirement regarding verification is not

jurisdictional, but merely formal. Thus, in Villasanta vs. Bautista,
"a pleading which lacks the required verification is fatal and does not
confer jurisdiction." Respondents' contention that petitioner Villasanta's
(the corporation's) verification of the petition "that the allegations
therein contained are true and correct" is "insufficient" for noncompliance with the Rule's requirement that affiant state the allegations
are "true of his own knowledge" is untenable. The Court has
consistently held that the reglementary phrase "true of his own
knowledge" is not a talismanic formula, the use of which would insure
the granting of a petition and non-use whereof would result in a decree
of dismissal. It has ruled absence of verification not to be fatally
defective in meritorious cases'. What is important is that the object of
the Rule, to insure good faith and veracity in the material averments of
the petition, be complied with, so that the court may properly act on the
case. Here, the petition has complied with the requirement in form and
in substance. Villasanta in effect certified of his own knowledge to the
truth of the petition as a whole, but with reference to the averments in
paragraph 8 of the petition as to respondents' acts of intrusion and
coercion at the concession area on 15 August 1969, specifically
submitted with the petition the affidavits of on-scene witnesses Cone
and two other company officials attesting thereto of their own
knowledge.
Thus, while it is true that Section 1, Rule 70, of the Revised Rules of
Court requires the verification of the complaint for forcible entry, the
insufficiency of the same, or its being defective, is not fatal to the
jurisdiction of the City Court or that of the court a quo to which
the case was later appealed.

Page 2 of 13

Civil Procedure

Rule 7

had the better right. In the Municipal court, the issue was, in effect,
whether an owner can take the law in his own hands. That he can not do
so seems incontestable: it is not so much a question of possession as it
is one of law and order. To require appellees de la Victoria to acquiesce
to the high-handed conduct of appellant Quimpo, and to submit to his
tour de force, until the superiority of their Torrens Title is finally
adjudged, after God knows how many years, is undoubtedly against all
justice and equity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders appealed from,
the same are hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-petitioner.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENTAGENCY, INC.,Petitioner,

vs. MILDRED R. SANTOS, in her official capacity as President of,
and/or ASBT INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICE,
INC., LORD NELSON SANTOS, DANILO BALCITA, NICSON
CRUZ, PEPITO MANGLICMOT, and ALLAN ARANES,
Respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
On December 5, 1995, private respondents Lord Nelson Santos, Danilo
Balcita, Nicson Cruz, Pepito Manglicmot, and Allan Aranes (Santos, et
al.) were recruited by petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency,
Inc.
Santos, et al. were deployed and were able to work for Ensure.
However, they were repatriated even prior to the expiration of their
contracts. Consequently, in July and August 1996, Santos, et al. filed
complaints against Sameer before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries,
and unauthorized salary deductions.

ASG Guillen SY 2015-2016

a similar motion before the City Court. Thus, defendant petitioner

voluntarily invoked and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of both
courts. Having failed to obtain the relief sought from these courts, he
can not now question the jurisdiction invoked.
With respect to the second assignment of error, one the grounds for a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
While there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible
entry case and Civil Case No. 6005, for quieting of title, the rights
asserted and the relief prayed for in the said cases are not the same.
In the former case, to the legal right claimed is possession, while in
the latter case, the legal right asserted is ownership.
We can not assent to the proposition that the motion to dismiss should
have been granted by the Municipal Court of origin, and sustained on
appeal by the Court of First Instance, for the reason that the question of
ownership was necessarily involved in the action for forcible entry (not
for unlawful detainer), as is proved by the admitted pendency of the
prior suit for quieting of title in the Court of First Instance. While the
fact that triggered both actions was appellant Quimpo's forcible
invasion of respondent's titled property in March of 1968, on the
pretext that the part of respondent's land forcibly entered and occupied
by him was part of the area covered by his pasture permit from the
Bureau of Forestry, still the causes of action in the two cases are
distinct from each other. In the action to quiet title the question
involved is whether the pasture permit could include property for which
O.C.T. No. P-2385 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao province had
been previously issued to appellees de la Victoria. But in the forcible
entry case, the issue is whether, assuming that Quimpo's pasture permit
were valid, he had the right to forcibly eject the prior occupants, who
were appellees de la Victoria, even destroying their improvements. In
other words, in the quieting of title case, the Court must decide who
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Civil Procedure
In its December 10, 2001 Decision, the Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of ASBT.
In ruling against Sameer, the Court of Appeals considered the following
factual circumstances: (1) Sameer admitted that it hired and deployed
Santos, et al. for and in behalf of Ensure for work in Taiwan; (2)
Sameer received the placement fees for the processing of the
documents of Santos, et al., without any showing that said fees inured
to the benefit of ASBT in any way; (3) Santos, et al. were repatriated in
1996, prior to the supposed transfer of Sameers accreditation to ASBT
on June 9, 1997; (4) the August 1, 1997 letter from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) presented by Sameer
pronouncing the transfer of accreditation of Yuan Fu Co. Ltd. to ASBT,
upon Sameers representation that Yuan Fu Co. Ltd. and Ensure were
one and the same entity, indicated that such accreditation of ASBT had
been cancelled; and (5) Sameer failed to present substantial proof that
Ensure changed its business name to Yuan Fu.
Sameer, thus, moved to reconsider the December 10, 2001 Decision;
but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its March 12, 2002
Resolution. Hence, this petition.
The petition should be denied for utter want of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not Motion for Reconsideration filed by ASBT before the
Court of Appeals were signed by Mildred Santos hence, should be
considered unsigned pleadings which produce no legal effect,
Held:
No. SEC. 3. Signature and address. Every pleading must be signed by
the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his
address which should not be a post office box.

Rule 7

ASG Guillen SY 2015-2016

On November 3, 1997, Sameer filed a third party complaint against

private respondent ASBT International Management Service, Inc.
(ASBT). It claimed that the latter should be liable for all the contractual
obligations of Ensure since Sameers accreditation was transferred to
ASBT on June 9, 1997.
On December 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered against SAMEER.
Dissatisfied, Sameer appealed to the NLRC alleging, among others, that
the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to
decide the third-party complaint, to its damage and prejudice, insisting
that it should have been absolved of any and all liabilities pertaining to
the claims of Santos, et al. On January 24, 2001, the NLRC
promulgated its Decision.
NLRC ruled in favor of SAMEER and against ASBT, hence absolving
SAMEER in the process.
Aggrieved, ASBT moved for reconsideration. The NLRC denied the
motion for lack of merit.
ASBT elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, in a
Resolution dated June 19, 2001, the Court of Appeals denied due
course and dismissed ASBTs petition on the ground that the
attached Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
was signed by Mildred R. Santos as President of ASBT without any
proof of authority to sign for and bind ASBT in the proceedings.
ASBT filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 19, 2001
Resolution, submitting therewith the necessary board resolution
authorizing corporate president Mildred R. Santos to represent ASBT
before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted the motion and
reinstated the petition.
Page 4 of 13

Civil Procedure

Rule 7

questioned Decision and Resolution in favor of ASBT, can be

considered as different fora within the ambit of the prohibition. They
are mere divisions of one and the same Court of Appeals

Docena vs Lapesura
Civil Procedure Substantial Compliance on the Rule of Non-Forum
Shopping
FACTS: Spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena were allegedly lessees
of Casiano Hombria of a parcel of land located in Eastern Samar.
Hombria filed a complaint for the recovery of the said land by reason of
the spouses failure to pay rent. The spouses however argue that they
own the land since time immemorial.
In November 1989, Judge Ricardo Lapesura issued an order in favor of
the spouses Docena. The decision was later reversed by the Court of
Appeals and the latter court ordered the spouses to vacate the premises.
When the order of the Court of Appeals became final and executory,
Hombria filed a Motion for Execution which Judge Lapesura granted
and a Writ of Execution was issued. The court sheriff, Rufino Garado,
after some other clarification by the trial court, issued a Writ of
Demolition against the spouses. The spouses then filed a Motion to Set
Aside the Writ of Demolition which was denied by Lapesura. The
spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied
too.
Undeterred, the spouses filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
before the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion against
Lapesura in issuing his orders denying the spouses motions.

ASG Guillen SY 2015-2016

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has

read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court
may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it
shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not
intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges
scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report to the
court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied.)
Obviously, the rule allows the pleadings to be signed by either the party
to the case or the counsel representing that party. In this case, ASBT, as
petitioner, opted to sign its petition and its motion for reconsideration in
its own behalf, through its corporate president, Mildred R. Santos,
who was duly authorized by ASBTs Board of Directors to represent
the company in prosecuting this case. Therefore, the said pleadings
cannot be considered unsigned and without any legal effect.
In this case, there is clearly no forum shopping committed by ASBT.
The July 5, 2001 motion it filed praying for reconsideration of the June
19, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petition on
the technical ground of lack of proof of the authority of ASBT
President Mildred R. Santos to bind the corporation in its appeal, is
simply what it is, a motion for reconsideration. Sameer cannot insist
that it be treated as a new petition just to make it fit the definition of
forum shopping in an attempt to evade liability to pay the amounts
awarded to Santos, et al. Nor was Sameer correct when it asseverated
that the Seventh Division, that initially dismissed then reinstated
ASBTs petition, and the Former Fourth Division, that rendered the
Page 5 of 13

Civil Procedure

Rule 7

FACTS: Spouses Surla filed a complaint for damages against STU

Hospital with the RTC alleging that their son, while confined in the said
hospital for having been born prematurely, had accidentally fallen from
his incubator possibly causing serious harm on the child. STU Hospital
filed an Answer with "Compulsory Counterclaim" asserting that the
spouses Surla still owed to it P82,632.10 for their son's confinement
there, and for damages by reason of the supposed unfounded and
malicious suit filed against it. Spouses Surla sought, inter alia, the
dismissal of the STU's counterclaim for its non-compliance with SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring that a complaint and other
initiatory pleadings, such as a counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth,
etc.) party complaint, be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum
shopping.
STU filed a Rejoinder upon receipt of the spouses Surla's Reply to
Counterclaim, contending that the subject circular should be held to
refer only to a permissive counterclaim, an initiatory pleading not
arising out of, nor necessarily connected with, the subject matter of the
plaintiffs claim but not to a compulsory counterclaim spawned by the
filing of a complaint and so intertwined therewith and logically related
thereto that it verily could not stand for independent adjudication. So, it
concluded that, since its counterclaim as compulsory in nature, the
subject circular did not perforce apply to it.
RTC dismissed STU's counterclaim. It ruled that the subject SC
Circular does not distinguish whether the counterclaim it refers to
should be permissive or compulsory. STU filed before the same court
an Omnibus Motion seeking a clarification of the courts Order denying
respondents Reply to Counterclaim and reconsideration of the Order
dismissing the compulsory counterclaim.
RTC denied STU's motion. STU elevated the matter to the CA by way
of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 asserting that the

ASG Guillen SY 2015-2016

The Court of Appeals however denied the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition as it turned out that only the husband (Antonio Docena)
signed the attached Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition filed by the spouses should
prosper.
HELD: Yes. There is substantial compliance in the case at bar which
warrant the allowance of the Petition. The signing of the husband alone
is sufficient compliance with the requirements of Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 65 (Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition) in relation to Section 3
of Rule 46 (Original Cases Filed in the Court of Appeals). Since the
spouses are with joint or indivisible interest over the alleged conjugal
property subject of the original action which gave rise to the petition for
certiorari and prohibition, the signing of the certificate of non-forum
shopping by only one of them would suffice, especially considering the
long distance they had to travel just to sign the said certificate.
Moreover, it should be noted that husband is the statutory administrator
of the conjugal property. (But of course, the determination of whether
or not the property is really conjugal is not upon the Supreme Court in
the case at bar).
Note also that suits to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may
be filed by the husband alone, with more reason, he may sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to the petition.
SANTO TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, petitioner vs. CESAR
ANTONIO Y. SURLA and EVANGELINE SURLA, respondents.
DOCTRINE: A certificate of non-forum shopping is required in
permissive counterclaims.
Page 6 of 13

Civil Procedure

Rule 7

It bears stressing, once again, that the real office of Administrative

Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 01 April 1994, is to curb the
malpractice commonly referred to also as forum-shopping. It is an act
of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another
forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or
the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. The language of the circular distinctly suggests
that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an
incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief. It should not
be too difficult, the foregoing rationale of the circular aptly taken, to
sustain the view that the circular in question has not, in fact, been
contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by its very nature as
being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving its
substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be
appropriately pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for
independent resolution except by the court where the main case pends.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the provision in the second paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, i.e., that the
violation of the anti-forum shopping rule shall not be curable by mere
amendment x x x but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, being predicated on the applicability of the need for
a certification against forum shopping, obviously does not include a
claim which cannot be independently set up.
Petitioner, nevertheless, is entitled to a mere partial relief. The so called
counterclaim of petitioner really consists of two segregative parts: (1)
for unpaid hospital bills of respondents son, Emmanuel Surla, in the
total amount of P82,632.10; and (2) for damages, moral and exemplary,
plus attorneys fees by reason of the alleged malicious and unfounded
suit filed against it. It is the second, not the first, claim that the Court
here refers to as not being initiatory in character and thereby not
covered by the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The

ASG Guillen SY 2015-2016

trial court erred in its decision as the subject SC circular does not apply
to compulsory counterclaims. CA affirmed the trial court's ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an
Answer be dismissed on the ground of a failure to accompany it with a
certificate of non-forum shopping.
HELD: The pertinent provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94
provide:
1 The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in
the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall
certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the
following facts and undertakings:
(a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or any other tribunal or agency;
(b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is
pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency;
(c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or
may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and
(d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has
been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the
original pleading and sworn certification contemplated here have been
filed.
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of
this Circular are the original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim
third (fourth, etc.) complaint or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or
application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.
Page 7 of 13

Civil Procedure
Petitioner alleged that in 1995, it granted 20% sales discounts to
qualified senior citizens on purchases of medicine pursuant to
Republic Act No. (RA) 7432[3] and its implementing rules and
regulations.
In compliance with Revenue Regulation No. (RR) 2-94,
petitioner treated the 20% sales discounts granted to qualified
senior citizens in 1995 as deductions from the gross sales in
order to arrive at the net sales, instead of treating them as tax
credit as provided by Section 4 of RA 7432.
On December 27, 1996, however, petitioner filed with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) a claim for tax refund/tax
credit of the full amount of the 20% sales discount it granted to
senior citizens for the year 1995, allegedly totaling to PhP
123,083 in accordance with Sec. 4 of RA 7432.
The BIRs inaction on petitioners claim for refund/tax credit
compelled petitioner to file on March 18, 1998 a petition for
review before the CTA docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 5581 in
order to forestall the two-year prescriptive period provided
under Sec. 230[4] of the 1977 Tax Code, as amended. Thereafter,
on March 31, 2000, petitioner amended its petition for review.
Court of tax Appeals dismissed petition for review for lack of
merit.

Rule 7

ASG Guillen SY 2015-2016

claim for the unpaid hospital bills is a permissive counterclaim in an

initiatory pleading which requires a certification of non forum
shopping; while the second for damages being in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim is not covered by the requirement.
PETITION PARTIALLY GRANTED.

CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG

CORPORATION
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

vs.

The Case
- petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
- seeks the recall of the August 31, 2000 Resolution [1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59778, which
dismissed petitioner Cagayan Valley Drug Corporations petition
for review of the April 26, 2000 Decision [2] of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) in C.T.A. Case No. 5581 on the ground of
defective verification and certification against forum shopping.
Facts:
Petitioner, a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws, is a duly licensed retailer of medicine and other
pharmaceutical products. It operates two drugstores, one in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and the other in Roxas, Isabela, under the
name and style of Mercury Drug.
Page 8 of 13

Civil Procedure
submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatorys authority.
[14]
We believe that appending the board resolution to the
complaint or petition is the better procedure to obviate any
question on the authority of the signatory to the verification and
certification. The required submission of the board resolution is
grounded on the basic precept that corporate powers are
exercised by the board of directors,[15] and not solely by an
officer of the corporation. Hence, the power to sue and be sued
in any court or quasi-judicial tribunal is necessarily lodged with
the said board.
In the case at bar, we so hold that petitioner substantially
complied with Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules
on Civil Procedure. First, the requisite board resolution has
been submitted albeit belatedly by petitioner. Second, we apply
our ruling in Lepanto with the rationale that the President of
petitioner is in a position to verify the truthfulness and
correctness of the allegations in the petition. Third, the President
of petitioner has signed the complaint before the CTA at the
inception of this judicial claim for refund or tax credit.
FIDEL O. CHUA and FILIDEN REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, v. METROPOLITAN
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, ATTY. ROMUALDO
CELESTRA, ATTY. ANTONIO V. VIRAY, ATTY. RAMON
MIRANDA and ATTY. POMPEYO MAYNIGO
Facts:

Rule 7

ASG Guillen SY 2015-2016

CA: held that the person who signed the verification and
certification of absence of forum shopping, a certain Jacinto J.
Concepcion, President of petitioner, failed to adduce proof that
he was duly authorized by the board of directors to do so.
As far as the CA was concerned, the main issue was
whether or not the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping signed by the President of petitioner is sufficient
compliance with Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The Issues
Whether petitioners president can sign the subject
verification and certification sans the approval of its Board
of Directors.
Held: Yes.
With respect to a juridical person, Sec. 4, Rule 7 on verification
and Sec. 5, Rule 7 on certification against forum shopping are
silent as to who the authorized signatory should be. Said rules
do not indicate if the submission of a board resolution
authorizing the officer or representative is necessary.
In Philippine Airlines v. Flight Attendants and Stewards
Association of the Philippines, we ruled that only individuals
vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of a
corporation. The action can be dismissed if the certification was
Page 9 of 13

Civil Procedure
properties. Upon a verified Petition for Foreclosure filed
by respondent Metrobank on 25 April 2001, respondent
Atty. Romualdo Celestra (Atty. Celestra) issued a Notice
of Sale dated 26 April 2001, wherein the mortgage debt
was set at P88,101,093.98, excluding unpaid interest and
penalties (to be computed from 14 September 1999),
attorneys fees, legal fees, and other expenses for the
foreclosure and sale. The auction sale was scheduled
on 31 May 2001.[10] On 4 May 2001, petitioners received
a copy of the Notice of Sale.[11]
On 28 May 2001, petitioner Chua, in his personal
capacity and acting on behalf of petitioner Filiden, filed before
Branch 257 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque (RTCBranch 257), a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Preliminary
Injunction and Damages,[12] against respondents Atty. Celestra,
docketed as Civil Case No. CV-01-0207. Upon the motion of
petitioners, RTC-Branch 257 issued a TRO enjoining
respondents Metrobank and Atty. Celestra from conducting the
auction sale of the mortgaged properties on 31 May 2001.[13]
After the expiration of the TRO on 18 June 2001, and no
injunction having been issued by RTC-Branch 257, respondent
Atty. Celestra reset the auction sale on 8 November 2001.On 8
November 2001, the rescheduled date of the auction sale, RTCBranch 257 issued an Order directing that the said sale be reset
anew after 8 November 2001.

Rule 7

ASG Guillen SY 2015-2016

Petitioner Chua is president of co-petitioner Filiden, a

domestic corporation, engaged in the realty business.
[4]
Respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (respondent
Metrobank) is a domestic corporation and a duly licensed
banking institution.[5]
Sometime in 1988, petitioners obtained from respondent
Metrobank a loan of P4m; secured by a real estate mortgage
(REM) on parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title; registered in petitioner Chuas name (subject properties).[6]
Having failed to fully pay their obligations, petitioners
entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement[8] with respondent
Metrobank on 13 January 2000, whereby the loan obligations of
the former were restructured. The debt consisted of a total
principal amount of P79,650,000.00, plus unpaid interest
of P7,898,309.02, and penalty charges of P552,784.96.
Amortization payments were to be made in accordance with the
schedule attached to the agreement.
- Metrobank demanded that petitioners fully pay and
settle their liabilities, including interest and penalties, in
the total amount: P103,450,391 as of 16 January 2001,
as well as the stipulated attorneys fees, within three days
from receipt of said letter.
- when petitioners still failed to pay their loans,
respondent Metrobank sought to extra-judicially
foreclose the REM constituted on the subject
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initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in
a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of
his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report
that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements
shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint
or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission
of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of
court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party
or his counsel clearly constitutes willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

Forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails

himself of several judicial remedies in different courts,

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ASG Guillen SY 2015-2016

On 28 October 2005, petitioners filed with Branch 195

of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque (RTC-Branch 195) a
Verified Complaint for Damages against respondents
Metrobank, Atty. Celestra, and three Metrobank lawyers,
namely, Atty. Antonio Viray, Atty. Ramon Miranda and Atty.
Pompeyo Maynigo. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. CV-05-0402. Petitioners sought in their Complaint the
award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages against the
respondents for making it appear that an auction sale of the
subject properties took place, as a result of which, the
prospective buyers of the said properties lost their interest and
petitioner Chua was prevented from realizing a profit
ofP70,000,000.00 from the intended sale

ISSUE: Whether or not successively filing Civil Case No.

CV-01-0207 and Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 amounts to
forum shopping.
HELD: Yes.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
The proscription against forum shopping is found in Section 5,
Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides that:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum
shopping.The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other
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In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioners
failed to state in the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping,
attached to their Verified Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-050402 before RTC-Branch 195, the existence of Civil Case No.
CV-01-0207 pending before RTC-Branch 258. Nevertheless,
petitioners insist that they are not guilty of forum shopping,
since (1) the two cases do not have the same ultimate
objective Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 seeks the annulment of
the 8 November 2001 public auction and certificate of sale
issued therein, while Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 prays for the
award of actual and compensatory damages for respondents
tortuous act of making it appear that an auction sale actually
took place on 8 November 2001; and (2) the judgment in Civil
Case No. CV-01-0207, on the annulment of the foreclosure sale,
would not affect the outcome of Civil Case No. CV-05-0402, on
the entitlement of petitioners to damages. The Court, however,
finds these arguments refuted by the allegations made by
petitioners themselves in their Complaints in both cases.
Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action, although with different
prayers.

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ASG Guillen SY 2015-2016

simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the

same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues
either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other
court.[32]
Ultimately, what is truly important in determining
whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the
courts and party-litigant by a party who asks different courts to
rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the
possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issue.[33]
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1)
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with
the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet
(where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same
prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where
the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for
dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).[34]

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