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Confesor
BILL OF RIGHTS
The study of Constitutional Law primarily hinges on the Bill of Rights, and
there are only a few provisions thereunder. So lets start with the
Fundamental Powers of the State. There are three of them. And by concept
and application they are supposed to be inherent. It means that once the
State comes into being, these can be exercised by the State. It does not
need any Constitutional or Statutory conferment for the State to exercise
them. And precisely as we understand the reason why specific provisions
in the Constitution apply to specific powers or inherent powers of the State
is because they are more of limitations rather than grants. Largely the Bill
of Rights are limitations on the power of the State but there are still
specific provisions in the Constitution like Article III Section 9 on Eminent
Domain which is a specific provision affecting Eminent Domain as an
inherent power of the State. Most of these powers are largely exercised
through legislation. And of course, by reason of legislation, their execution
or implementation maybe extended or granted to the Executive branch or
other entities if there is allowable delegation.
The first of which, in our outline, would be the discussion on the
applicability of the Bill of Rights in the study of Constitutional Law. The
basic principle is that the Bill of Rights is a limitation on State authority. It
does not apply strictly to conflict involving private rights. Perhaps the only
exceptions based on your readings would be (1) with respect to privacy of
communication and correspondence that has been applied by the
Supreme Court in the case of Zulueta, where the private matter involving
the couple who had marital problems, where the wife forcibly took
documents, pictures to prove the extra marital affair of the husband,
where these documentary evidence where presented in court, the
Supreme Court, in that lone case, which is still good law today, applied the
limitation under the Bill of Rights on privacy of communication and
correspondence saying that because of the violation of the private right of
the husband, the evidence so obtained are considered inadmissible. The
application or the ruling of the Supreme Court, well, it will largely be
questionable, but simply because it is still the decision of the Supreme
Court, it remains to be good law today. To that extent, the Bill of Rights has
been applied involving conflict of private persons involving their private
rights because again the Bill of Rights is supposed to be a limitation on the
powers of the State.
(2) To some extent, it has also been applied to schools disciplinary
tribunals. When the school exercises its authority to impose the schools
rules on discipline in the tertiary level, there have been so several cases
already stating that there is supposed to be procedural due process to be
observed and extended to the students in the tertiary level before these
students can be sanctioned, much more if they are supposed to be
expelled by reason of violation of the schools disciplinary tribunal. We
have been made to understand that with respect to academic rules,
theres not much difficulty because the due process there is always
extended when there are examinations or recitations given. You are given
the opportunity to be heard every time you are called for recitation or
every time there is an examination or a test administered on the students.
But with respect to the schools rules on discipline, starting with the case
of Ateneo de Manila, the Supreme Court has made a rule that students in
the tertiary level enjoy procedural due process. So, is that an act of the
areas, the remainder of the agricultural land are distributed. Now is this in
its strict sense a regulatory measure? The answer is no. And it is not also
in its strict sense the eminent domain exercise as allowed in the
Constitution.
Now the usual test to determine a valid regulatory measure would be the
lawfulness of the subject and the lawfulness of the means. Regardless of
the further discussions with respect to ordinances, because in ordinances
we have the case of White Light Corp v. City of Manila which establishes
certain requirements for validity when it comes to ordinances; but when it
comes to general statutes, what we follow would be the two test: the
lawfulness of the subject test and the lawfulness of the means.
Theres not much difficulty in understanding what a lawful subject is
because police power being in relation to general welfare, any public
interest matter is always considered as a lawful subject for purposes of
regulation. The only discussion here is whether regulation affords only
protection to a few and not the general welfare of the many. So its not so
difficult to understand. So you talk about public health, public safety,
public morality, and all those public interest matters. The discussion is
mostly on whether the means are lawful. The rule being that the end,
which is the intention to promote the interest of the general welfare,
should not justify the means used. There must have to be reasonable
necessity to the means used to accomplish the desired end. So if the
means imposed by the law is reasonably necessary to accomplish the
intention of the law, then the means would be considered as lawful.
Eminent domain on the other hand is the highest and most exact idea of
property right remaining in the State. This is a reflection of the Regalian
Doctrine that all property belongs to the State. That if the State would
want to get back its property, what it used to own which was given up for
private ownership, it would exercise through eminent domain. But just like
in the exercise of eminent domain by a local government unit, the Local
Government Code has provided for some other conditions or
requirements. But generally, the Constitution under Section 9 Article III,
simply requires that there must have to be taking of private property for
public use upon payment of just compensation. The concepts of taking
have not changed. Well, it has changed from the old traditional
understanding but it has changed somehow to include any substantial
effect on the usual and reasonable uses of the property. Taking in eminent
domain is not physical dispossession alone. If there is substantial effect on
the usual uses of the property by the property owner, then there may be
considered as taking. Also the concept of public use has changed from the
old traditional concept of direct benefit to the many. It has changed to
include now the indirect benefit to the many. Even if those directly
benefited are only a few, but if the public is indirectly benefited as well,
then there is also taking for public use.
The property to be taken must have to be private property. So any kind of
private property (?), of course except money, will have to be exempted
from the private property requirement. Just compensation is usually made
by giving money.
Just compensation as a condition for a valid exercise of eminent domain
has not also changed. It still refers to the full and fair equivalence of the
loss of the property owner. The value is based on the loss and not on the
Kristine
Confesor
gain. For which reason if there is consequential benefit or consequential
damage, if not the entire land is expropriated, the consequential benefit
shall be deducted from the value of the just compensation, while the
consequential damage shall be added to the value of the property for
purposes of computing the just compensation.
it
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must
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In almost all cases though, the offer will not be accepted or is rejected
because the offer actually is very very low. Its not the same as in the
open market. Just compensation in some cases has been described as the
amount of the property which a buyer, who is not willing to buy a property,
is willing to pay and the amount a seller, who is not willing to sell a
property, is willing to part with. So thats the sole difficult to determine.
Thats why there are factors to consider to determine just compensation.
Even if you go through our Rules of Court on expropriation or eminent
domain, the court is even tasked to assign commissioners if theres a
problem with the issue of just compensation. So firm offer first, it must
have to be rejected and not accepted, before expropriation can be
exercised. In the LGU, the Local Government Code requires that firm offer
first, and if not accepted or is rejected, then the local legislative council
must have to pass an ordinance authorizing the mayor to exercise
eminent domain. And the rest of the provisions in the Local Government
Code is reflective of the constitutional requirement that there must have
to be payment of just compensation before there could be taking in
eminent domain. The only difference in the Local Government Code is that
the Constitution provides for public purpose or public use. In the Local
Government Code, the public uses are specified. So, housing, and some
other specific public purposes. Thats the only difference with respect to
public use in relation to the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Still with due process. The concept of relativity of due process. The
relativity of due process as a concept simply means that while due process
is required under Section 1 of Article III that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, the requirement of due
process is not strictly applied to all persons under all circumstances
absolutely. In different types of cases, the requirement of due process may
be different. Although due process is really required, more so in procedural
due process, it is not the same as it is in all cases, in all persons, in all
parties.
A good example would be your due process in judicial proceedings and
due process in administrative proceedings. While there may have been 4
in judicial procedural due process, there are 7 in administrative procedural
due process, your so called 7 cardinal primary rights in administrative due
process. Administrative cases do not require the strict presentation of
evidence, as it is required in the judicial proceedings. There are even
situations where there is no right to cross examine because there is no
presentation of witness. So the question is how do you dispute the claims
of the other party or the witnesses of the other party? By presenting you
own witnesses as well and more in documentary form. In the Rules of
Evidence, generally applied in court cases, affidavits are hearsay. They do
not have any evidentiary value unless they are generally testified to by
the affiant or the one who executed them. That is in judicial proceedings.
But if it is in administrative proceedings, like in labor cases, affidavits are
good as testimonies. Because the quantum of proof required is different in
judicial cases as it is in administrative cases. So, is there denial of due
process if there is no right to cross examine or if affidavits are accepted as
testimonies of witnesses to a case in administrative cases? The answer is
no, again because the principle in due process is that due process though
required is applied differently in different types of cases, in different
situations of persons affected by or in a particular case.
Even if you go through the Bill of Rights, starting with Section 14, the first
paragraph reiterate the due process in Section 1 with respect to an
accused in a criminal case. And there is a listing, in the second paragraph
of Section 14, of all the rights of the accused, and there are no rights of
the private complainant. Why is that so is because due process is more,
shall we say, necessary with respect to an accused in a criminal case
because he is up against the entire machinery of the State in a criminal
prosecution. In civil cases, no matter how big the claim is or how many
hectares of land is involved, nobodys liberty is affected, nobody goes to
jail in a civil case. So, while it is so it does not mean that the parties do not
have rights to due process, of course they have. But again, it is applied
differently in different situations. But largely, because the constitutional
grant of due process or limitation of due process is against State authority
for which reason that largely explains why the accuseds right to due
process is reemphasized in Section 14 of Article III.
In civil cases involving private rights, the State has nothing to do with it
generally. But because we all understand in judicial proceedings whether
criminal or civil cases, parties must have a right to due process in relation
to the actuations of a judge. You talk about jurisdiction. The impartiality of
a judge. If these are violated, then there may be a violation of due
process. Because here is a state agent, a judge, exercising authority over
a case which he has no right to do so. So, if that civil case decided by a
judge without jurisdiction, has taken the property of another in favor of the
other party of the case, then there may be taking of his property without
due process of law in that context. Relativity of due process simply means
that it is not absolute in all the cases, it is not the same nor hard and fast
applicable to all in any and all circumstance. There is difference in
application and it refers to certain cases and to certain parties.
[Atty.Montejo lecture]
Kristine
Confesor
1.
FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the outstanding shares of Manila Hotel. Only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% shares at P41.58/share, and
a Malaysian firm, at P44.00/share. Pending the declaration of the winning
bidder, petitioner matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
the Malaysian Firm which respondent GSIS refused to accept. The
petitioner posits that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony,
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm invoking Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a selfexecuting provision
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, WON Manila Hotel falls
under the term national patrimony.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony,
WON selling mere 51% shares and not the land itself can be considered
part of national patrimony.
4. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
1. Yes. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is selfexecuting which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. It is per se judicially enforceable The Constitution
mandates that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances
an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
3. Yes. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands.
4. Yes. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by the
foreign firm, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the shares of MHC in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner
after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Kristine
Confesor
3. WON the petitioner can invoke the equal protection clause guaranty
RULING:
1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the exclusion
proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not
of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be
sustained. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion
proceeding, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another
municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is
limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters
or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the
precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's
disqualification.
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing.For the
decision to be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is
essential that there must be between the first and the second action
identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of
action.
2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law
prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means
the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside
in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will
not be deemed lost until a new one is established. 25 To successfully
effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. 26 In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The fact of
obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not
automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. 41 A candidate
must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can
be considered a member of the House of Representatives. Considering
that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a
member of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and
not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his
ineligibility as a candidate.
4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes
may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
FACTS:
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance
candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign. Petitioner seeks
to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his
right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section
26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
WON the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities
for public office" grants a constitutional right to run for or hold public office
RULING:
No. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed
by law. Also, the "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of
the Constitution. The provisions under the Article are generally considered
not self-executing.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public
office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically
on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the
Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and outlined instances
wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or
cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody
discrimination, the equal access clause is not violated.
equally
without
RULING:
1. Yes. It would fall under Article 282 of the Labor Code. A reading of the
weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they
constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the
job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable
to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards.
2. Yes. Though generally, employment in particular jobs may not be
limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin. However,
if the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual
qualification for performing the job, the qualification is then considered
valid and referred to as bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).
Applying the Meiorin Test in determining whether an employment policy
is justified, the following must concur: (1) the employer must show that it
adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the
performance of the job;64 (2) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary65 to the accomplishment of that workrelated purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the standard is
reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related
purpose.
The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. The most important activity
of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the
evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety
goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin
attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors,
the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the
stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules among other reasons.
3. No. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked.87 Put differently, the
Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.
Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal
protection guarantee.91
FACTS:
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency"
extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost five
(5) years," his services were considered terminated "effective
immediately."11
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under the Labor
Code.
2. WON the dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
occupational disqualification defense.
Kristine
Confesor
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various
regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. In
these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153
ISSUE: Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of
elections with the ARMM?
HELD:
YES. While the Constitution does not expressly state that
Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent
towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the
terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as
patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized
national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and
for all the following elections. In this case, the ARMM elections, although
called regional elections, should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure
of the Constitution. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987
Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including the
ARMM elections. The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD
the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
Due Process
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[Art. III, Sec. 1]
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments. [Art. XIII, Sec. 1]
IN GENERAL
Due process of law simply states that [i]t is part of the sporting idea of
fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision
is made by those who sit in judgment. [Ynot v. IAC (1987)]
2)
3)
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
Due process of law guarantees:
(1) Notice and
(2) Opportunity to be heard
(3) To persons who would be affected by the order or act contemplated.
NOTED EXCEPTIONS TO DUE PROCESS
(1) The conclusive presumption, bars the admission of contrary evidence
as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a
rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately
presumed therefrom.
(2) There are instances when the need for expeditious action will justify
omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance
per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because
of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people.
(3) Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are
inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed.
(4) The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be
cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled.
(5) Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the
public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. [Ynot v. IAC
(1987)]
In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of:
1) the nature of the property involved; or
2) the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and
present danger.
RELATIVITY OF DUE PROCESS
The concept of due process is flexible for not all situations calling for
procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure. [Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion (2000)]
Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved as well as of the private
interest that has been affected by governmental action. [Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy (1961].
To say that the concept of due process is flexible does not mean that
judges are at large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexibility is
in its scope once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a
recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for
the same kind of procedure. [Morrissey v. Brewer (1972)]
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DUE PROCESS
CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS [AGABON V. NLRC (2004)]
Kristine
Confesor
Basis: Constitution
Requirements: Procedural and Substantive
Purpose.
(1) protects individual against government; and
(2) assures him of his rights in criminal, civil and administrative
proceedings
Effect of breach: govt action void
heard
accorded the
it is deemed
constitutional
Kristine
Confesor
Governmental functions are classified into:
(1) Constituent constitute the very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature (i.e. public order, administration of justice
and foreign relations)
(2) Ministrant undertaken only by way of advancing the general
interests of society, and are merely optional on the part of the
State (i.e. public education, public charity and regulations of
trade and industry) [Concurring Opinion of Justice Fernando in
ACCFA v. CUGCO (1969)]
Facial invalidation
Overbreadth doctrine
As applied application
When a statute is vague and declared therefore to be void, most of the
question on cases on this will be placed as a form of facial invalidation.
Meaning, the law which on its face is vague should be declared
unconstitutional.
The FACIAL INVALIDATION THEORY to declare the law as
unconstitutional is generally allowed when it refers to cases or laws free
speech rights and not to criminal or penal statutes. The reason given is
that it will prevent the state from prosecuting lawful offenders if the
statute is declared void on its face because it is vague. So this only applies
when it involves free speech rights or expression. [People v. Siton,
2009]
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE is the reverse of facial invalidation because
Overbreadth would require that the law is not really vague on its face. The
law is clear as to what acts are covered or penalized, although the law
also penalizes what is also supposed to be protected rights. So the law has
been applied to cover acts even if these acts are protected. Thats why
they use the term Overbreadth.
Can the law be declared unconstitutional because it tends to
cover acts which are supposed to be declared protected? Again,
this is allowed if it involves FREE SPPECH RIGHTS AND FREE SPEECH
REGULATIONS. The reason for this is, even if the person is not charged
before the courts in a case, but because it affects protected rights, the
court may actually declare that law to be unconstitutional so that the
protected rights will not be impaired.
Kristine
Confesor
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents, not a
valid publication.
PLACIDO V. NLRC (2009) Were the petitioners denied due process when
PLDT refused to furnish them a copy of the Investigation Report/grant
them a formal hearing in which they could be represented by counsel of
their choice? HELD: THE ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS IS SIMPLY AN
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD or, as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law
prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a
party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the
opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of
which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.
MENDOZA V. COMELEC (2009) Did the COMELEC violate due process by
conducting proceedings without giving due notice to the petitioner? HELD:
The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party of the
steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the
provincial election contest. In the context of our standard of review for the
petition, we see no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction committed by the COMELEC in its deliberation on the
Bulacan election contest and the appreciation of ballots this deliberation
entailed.
SURNECO V. ERC (2010) WON SURNECO was deprived of the
opportunity to be heard in ordering it to refund alleged over-recoveries
arrived at by the ERC. HELD: . Administrative due process simply requires
an opportunity to explain ones side or to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. It means being given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment, and for this purpose, a formal trial-type hearing is
not even essential. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and
reasonable chance to demonstrate their respective positions and to
present evidence in support thereof. the PPA confirmation necessitated a
review of the electric cooperatives monthly documentary submissions to
substantiate their PPA charges. The cooperatives were duly informed of
the need for other required supporting documents and were allowed to
submit them accordingly. In fact, hearings were conducted. Moreover, the
ERC conducted exit conferences with the electric cooperatives
representatives, SURNECO included, to discuss preliminary figures and to
double-check these figures for inaccuracies, if there were any. In addition,
after the issuance of the ERC Orders, the electric cooperatives were
allowed to file their respective motions for reconsideration. It cannot
claimed, therefore, that SURNECO was denied due process
Note: in this case, the court distinguished Quasi-Legislative v. QuasiJudicial Power of Administrative Agencies.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INCvs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL petitioners assail for being intrinsically
vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism
under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an
Kristine
Confesor
whose revenue collection fall short of the target. They now allege that it
violates their right to due process ad right to security of tenure since their
tenure is subject to a condition of reaching a quota. HELD: there is no
violation of due process. The concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is
not simply given a target revenue collection and capriciously left without
any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all
relevant factors that may affect the level of collection. In the same
manner, exemptions were set, contravening BOCEAs claim that its
members may be removed for unattained target collection even due to
causes which are beyond their control. Moreover, an employees right to
be heard is not at all prevented and his right to appeal is not deprived of
him. In fine, a BIR or BOC official or employee in this case cannot be
arbitrarily removed from the service without according him his
constitutional right to due process. No less than R.A. No. 9335 in
accordance with the 1987 Constitution guarantees this.
CABALIT V. COA Upon the investigation of the COA, they found out that
the LTO employees tampered the official receipts to make it appear that
they collected lesser amounts than they actually collected from year 19982001. WON there was a violation of the right to due process when the
hearing officer at the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas adopted the
procedure under A.O. No. 17 notwithstanding the fact that the said
amendatory order took effect after the hearings had started. HELD: NO.
Petitioners were not denied due process of law when the investigating
lawyer proceeded to resolve the case based on the affidavits and other
evidence on record. Petitioners were not denied due process of law when
the investigating lawyer proceeded to resolve the case based on the
affidavits and other evidence on record. There is no merit in the
contention that the new procedures under A.O. No. 17, which took effect
while the case was already undergoing trial before the hearing officer,
should not have been applied. The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does
not have a vested right in procedural rules.
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment,
it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. The complainant in disbarment cases is
not a direct party to the case but a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court. Flowing from its sui generis character, it is not
mandatory to have a formal hearing in which the complainant
must adduce evidence. From all these, we find it clear that the
complainant is not indispensable to the disciplinary proceedings and her
failure to appear for cross-examination or to provide corroborative
evidence of her allegations is of no merit. What is important is whether,
upon due investigation, the IBP Board of Governors finds sufficient
evidence of the respondents misconduct to warrant the exercise of its
disciplinary powers.
Specific Coverage
(1) Public Health
(2) Public Morals
(3) Public Safety
(4) Public Welfare
Test of Reasonability
(1) Lawful subject
(2) Lawful means
(3) Least restrictions of individual right
The limit to police power is reasonability. The Court looks at the test of
reasonability to decide whether it encroaches on the right of an individual.
So long as legitimate means can reasonably lead to create that end, it is
reasonable. [Morfe v. Mutuc (1968)]
The legislative determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the
court.[US v. Toribio (1910) citing Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the
case of Lawton v. Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136)]
The SC upheld the validity of Administrative Orders which converted
existing mine leases and other mining agreements into production-sharing
agreements within one year from effectivity. The subject sought to be
governed by the AOs are germane to the object and purpose of E.O. 279
and that mining leases or agreements granted by the State are subject to
alterations through a reasonable exercise of police power of the State.
[Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran (1995)]
Illustrations on the Exercise of Police Power
General Welfare v. Property rights. RA 9257, the Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003, is a legitimate exercise of police power.
Administrative Order No. 177 issued by the Department of Health,
providing that the 20% discount privilege of senior citizens shall not be
limited to the purchase of unbranded generic medicine but shall extend to
both prescription and non-prescription medicine, whether branded or
generic, is valid. [Carlos Superdrug Corporation v. DSWC et al. (2007)]
National Security v. Property Rights. Police power and national
security: SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 1180 (An Act to Regulate
the Retail Business) which sought to nationalize the retail trade business
by prohibiting aliens in general from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade.
The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger
to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business; the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power
of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and
insures its security and future. [Ichong v. Hernandez (1957)]
Scope of the police power: Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs
and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit
beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through
which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare.
Kristine
Confesor
Public Safety. Agustin questions President Marcos Letter of Instruction
No. 229 compelling owners of motor vehicles to install specific early
warning devices to reduce road accidents.
Police power, public safety: The Court identified police power as a
dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in
the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably
the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare. According to the Court, a heavy burden
lies in the hands of the petitioner who questions the states police power if
it was clearly intended to promote public safety. [Agustin v. Edu, (1979)]
Public Morals v. Property rights and Right to privacy.
Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Assoc. assails the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4760. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically
aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of
nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance There is no question that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.
[Ermita-Malate Motel and Motel Operators Assn. v. City Mayor of Manila
(1967)]
TEST OF
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
This case
1.
2.
3.
4.
3)
VALID ORDINANCE
It must not contravene the Constitution or any Statute -C
It must not be Unfair or Oppressive U
It must not be partial or discriminatory - P
It must not prohibit but may regulate trade - T
It must be general and consistent with public policy - CPP
It must be reasonable. -R
the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. SC also said that
it was prohibiting what is already prohibited. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
MAY BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT MAY
FAIRLY BE REQUIRED BY THE LEGITIMATE DEMANDS OF PUBLIC
INTEREST OR WELFARE. It rashly equates wash rates and renting out a
room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating
innocuous intentions.
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR VS. AYALA STATE WOULD BE ACTING
BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF POLICE POWER IN PROHIBITING THE
COLLECTION OF PARKING FEES. Police power is the power of promoting
the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however,
does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate
does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve
the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to
destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting
the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed
article, such as opium and firearms.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use,
the State is no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent
powers, namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to
forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner. Normally, of course, the power of eminent
domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said
power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title and possession. 36 It is a settled
rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is
essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the
private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the
impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a
compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person of the
profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to
compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the
regulation to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police
regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use business property
for business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the
owner may recover therefor.
BSP MB VS. ANTONIO-VALENZUELA W/N BSP violated the right of
the Banks to due process? No. RESPONDENT BANKS CANNOT CLAIM
VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY ARE
NOT FURNISHED WITH COPIES OF THE ROEs. The banks are already aware
of the contents of the ROEs, they cannot say that fairness and
transparency are not present. If sanctions are to be imposed upon the
Kristine
Confesor
respondent banks, they are already well aware of the reasons for the
sanctions, having been informed via the lists of findings/exceptions,
demolishing that particular argument. The ROEs would then be
superfluities to the respondent banks, and should not be the basis for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
RTC DECISION WHICH ALLOWED THE RESPONDENT BANKS TO
VIEW THE ROE AND ACT UPON THEM TO FORESTALL ANY
SANCTIONS THE MONETARY BOARD MIGHT IMPOSE VIOLATES THE
CLOSE NOW, HEAR LATER DOCTRINE It is well-settled that the
closure of a bank may be considered as an exercise of police power. The
action of the MB on this matter is final and executory. Such exercise may
nonetheless be subject to judicial inquiry and can be set aside if found to
be in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Judicial review enters the picture
only after the MB has taken action; it cannot prevent such action by the
MB. The threat of the imposition of sanctions, even that of closure, does
not violate their right to due process, and cannot be the basis for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a
measure for the protection of the public interest. Swift action is called for
on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless
adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against
distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is
certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not
to mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and
stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the government.
ROXAS & CO. VS. DAMBA-NFSW AGRARIAN REFORM IS AN
EXERCISE OF BOTH POLICE POWER AND EMINENT DOMAIN. Police
power because it prescribed retention limits for landowners. Eminent
domain because it provides for the compulsory acquisition of private
agricultural lands for redistribution. Private rights must yield to the
irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored
justification. . . that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
CHEVRON VS. BCDA TAX VS. REGULATION AS A FORM OF POLICE
POWER. In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power,
the determining factor is the purpose of the implemented measure. If the
purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even
though the measure results in some form of regulation. On the other hand,
if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a regulation and
an exercise of the police power of the state, even though incidentally,
revenue is generated.
THE ROYALTY FEE WAS IMPOSED PRIMARILY FOR REGULATORY
PURPOSES AND NOT FOR THE GENERATION OF INCOME OR
PROFITS. The questioned royalty fees form part of the regulatory
framework to ensure free flow or movement of petroleum fuel to and
from the CSEZ. The fact that respondents have the exclusive right to
distribute and market petroleum products within CSEZ pursuant to its JVA
with SBMA and CSBTI does not diminish the regulatory purpose of the
royalty fee for fuel products supplied by petitioner to its client at the CSEZ.
ESPINA VS. ZAMORA President Erap enacted RA 8762 (Retail Trade
Liberalization Act of 2000.) It expressly repealed RA 1180 which prohibited
Application
When is there taking in the constitutional case?
When the owner is deprived of his proprietary rights there is taking of
private property. It may include
1)
diminution in value;
2)
prevention of ordinary use;
3)
deprivation of beneficial use.
In Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association (DESAMA) v. Gozun
(2006),
examples
1)
trespass without actual eviction;
2)
material impairment of the value
3)
prevention of the ordinary uses (e.g. easement).
But anything taken by virtue of police power is not compensable (e.g.
abatement of a nuisance), as usually property condemned under police
power is noxious [DESAMA v. Gozun (2006)]
Examples from Jurisprudence:
(1) The imposition of an aerial easement of right-of-way was held to be
taking. The exercise of the power of eminent domain does not always
result in the taking or appropriation of title to the expropriated property; it
may also result in the imposition of a burden upon the owner of the
condemned property, without loss of title or possession. [NPC v. Gutierrez
(1991)]
taken
for
(2) May include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material
impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses
for which the property was intended. [Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila
(1907)]
just
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
EMINENT DOMAIN
Requisites
Private property
Genuine necessity - inherent/presumed in legislation, but when the power
is delegated (e.g. local government units), necessity must be proven.
For public use - Court has adopted a broad definition of public use,
following the U.S. trend
Payment of just compensation
Due process [Manapat v. CA (2007)]
Kristine
Confesor
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN
(1) LAWFUL TAKING
a.
Entry under color of authority
b.
Period of entry is more or less permanent
c.
There may be actual expropriation by expediency, if
momentarily
d.
If permanent, there must be a proper exercise of eminent
domain
e.
There is taking when
i. The expropriator must enter a private property
ii. The entrance must be for a momentary period
iii. The entry into the property should be under warrant or
color of legal authority
iv. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
v. The utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property
LBP v. Rufino W/N RTC can resort to any other means of determining just
compensation aside from Sec. 17 of RA 6557 9or CARL and formula
prescribed by DAR AO 6-92, as amended. HELD: Generally, no. But, it can.
These laws however are mandatory and not mere guides that the RTC may
disregard. In determining just compensation due owners of lands taken for
CARP coverage, the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, should
take into account the factors enumerated under Sec. 17, RA 6557.
-
LBP v. Jocson What law governs in the determination of the value of the
property? HELD: R.A. No. 6657 is the relevant law for determining just
compensation after noting several decided cases where the Court found it
more equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the
propertyat the time of payment. This was a clear departure from the
Courts earlier stance in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines where it
declared that the reckoning period for the determination of just
compensation is the time when the land was takenapplying P.D. No. 27
and E.O. No. 228.
Eusebio v. Luis. W/N respondents are entitled to regain possession of
their property taken by the city government in the 1980s and, in the event
that said property can no longer be returned, how should just
compensation to respondents be determined ? HELD: even if there are no
expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the
trial court is still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure
provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
requiring the appointment of not more than three competent and
disinterested commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the subject property.
Controlling factor: the value of the property at the time of the
taking. With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be
fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where property was taken without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for
recovery of possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is
controlling.
Kristine
Confesor
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure,
under which the complaint for expropriation was filed, just compensation
is to be determined "as of the date of the filing of the complaint." Here,
there is no reason to depart from the general rule that the point of
reference for assessing the value of the Subject Property is the time of the
filing of the complaint for expropriation.
Republic v. Mangorata Proper Parties in the Expropriation Proceedings:
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of
the property condemned. They include all other persons owning,
occupying or claiming to own the property. When [property] is taken by
eminent domain, the owner x x x is not necessarily the only person who is
entitled to compensation.
Republic v. Mendoza(2010) the failure for a long time of the owner to
question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that
the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back
possession. The Mendozas remedy is an action for the payment of just
compensation, not ejectment. The Court affirmed the RTCs power to
award just compensation even in the absence of a proper expropriation
proceeding. It held that the RTC can determine just compensation based
on the evidence presented before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery
of possession of property or its value and damages. As to the time when
just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was
taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed
an action for recovery of possession before the commencement of
expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of
taking that is controlling.
LBP v LIVIOCO (2010) VALUE OF EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY. For
purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking.
There are three important concepts in this definition:
1) the character of the property,
2) its price, and
3) the time of actual taking.
APO FRUITS v LBP ( 2010 ) JUST COMPENSATION:CONCEPT. The concept
of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the
land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered just inasmuch as the property
owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed
by this Court that the measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss.
The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word
EQUAL PROTECTION
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws. [Art. III, sec.1]
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things should be
treated alike both as to rights conferred and as to responsibilities imposed.
It does not require absolute equality but only SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
based on a valid classification. And for there to be a valid classification,
Persons or things are similar in some particulars of which they are not
similar to the rest. It is not required that they are similar in all these
particulars but only that in some particulars, they are similar which in
others do not hold any similarity.
The requisites for valid classification would be:
1.
Classification must be based on a substantial distinction
2.
It must be germane to the purpose of the law
3.
must not be limited to existing or present conditions
4.
it must be applied equally to all those who belong to the same
class
Kristine
Confesor
The law does not require absolute equality to all provided there must be
absolute equality to all those who belong to the same class.
Article II, Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.
Article XIII, Sec. 1-2 The Congress shall give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good.To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments.
The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative
and self-reliance.
LABOR
Kristine
Confesor
assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated,
a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribed is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. There is
reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run for
office because there is the need for new blood to assume relevance.
When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work.
The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid.
Quinto v. Comelec Facts: R.A. 8676 provides that all elective officials are
not deemed resigned upon filing of their certificate of candidacy, however,
appointive officials are considered deemed resigned upon filing of the
COCs. HELD:
2009 Decision
Yes. Persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned upon filing
of CoCs, but not considering resigned all other civil servants, specifically
elective ones, the law duly discriminates against the first class (appointive
officials). Applying the four requisites of valid classification, the Court finds
that treatment of persons holding appointive officers as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of law (Requisite No.
2). There is no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently
from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that
it should be germane to the purposes of law.
2010 Decision
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is not violative of the equal
protection clause.
There is substantial distinction. Elective officials are elected by his
constituents, if they are deemed resigned, the constituents will be
affected. On the other hand, in the case of appointive officials, they do not
have ordinary succession, thus, there will be vacancy during resignation.
Ang Ladlad v. Comelec Whether or not denying the application of Ang
Ladlad is violative of the equal protection clause. HELD: Yes. COMELEC
made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the
circumstances of the case. According to COMELEC, the majority of Filipinos
considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable. Such reason
is sufficient to disqualify the petitioner. Homosexuals are a class in
themselves for the purposes of equal protection clause. Moral disapproval
of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient
to satisfy the rational basis review under the equal protection clause. LGBT
has the same interest in participating in the party-list system. Laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs.
The latter is the same with SOCIAL EQUALITY provision except that in
addition to those, we have free access to courts and legal aid.
Article XIII, Sec. 1
Trillanes vs. Pimentel Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to
attend the Senate sessions.HELD: No. The distinctions cited by petitioner
gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a
deprivation of the equal protection guarantee.
Kristine
Confesor
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material
difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement. Pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at
the time of passage of RA 9009therefore violating the requirement that a
valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only
(pendency of the cityhood bills adverted to can no longer be repeated).
Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
2011 Ruling
There was valid classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate
the equal protection clause. The purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009
was merely to stop the "mad rush of municipalities wanting to be
converted into cities" and the apprehension that before long the country
will be a country of cities and without municipalities. Substantial
distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondents to become
component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the
Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of the respondents to
become the States partners in accelerating economic growth and
development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC,
manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th
Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. Truly,
the urgent need to become a component city arose way back in the 11th
Congress, and such condition continues to exist.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local
government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the
coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of
PhP100 million for the creation of cities.
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The previous
administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be
gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the
assailed executive order. The Arroyo administration is but just a member
of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification.
BOCEA v. TEVES EQUAL PROTECTION simply provides that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the
states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may
not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
Not violative of Equal Protection; The equal protection clause
recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to
RA [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since
the subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the
law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law
concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common
distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and
charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally
perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which
the State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation.
Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related
to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection.
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE
Pursuant to a confidential
information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers
headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and
test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant
from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13,
1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City
to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Commissioner of Customs vs Hypermix Feeds Corporation ISSUE:
Whether or not CMO 27-2003 should be declared unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause RULING: The equal
protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the
Kristine
Confesor
This confirmation and declaration of validity shall in all respects be entitled
to like effect and credit as a decree of registration, binding the land and
quieting the title thereto and shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the national government and al1 branches thereof;
except when, in a given case involving a certificate of title or are
constituted certificate of title, there is clear evidence that such certificate
of title or reconstituted certificate of title was obtained through fraud, in
which case the solicitor general or his duly designated representative shall
institute the necessary judicial proceeding to cancel the certificate of title
or reconstituted certificate of title as the case may be, obtained through
such fraud.(Emphasis supplied.)
Without ruling on the issue of violation of equal protection guarantee if the
curative effect of RA 9443 is not made applicable to all titled lands of the
Piedad Estate, it is clear that the Manotoks cannot invoke this law to
"confirm" and validate their alleged title over Lot 823. It must be stressed
that the existence and due issuance of TCT No. 22813 in the name of
Severino Manotok was not established by the evidence on record. There is
likewise no copy of a "duly executed certificate of sale" "on file" with the
DENR regional office. In the absence of an existing certificate of title in the
name of the predecessor-in-interest of the Manotoks and certificate of sale
on file with the DENR/CENRO, there is nothing to confirm and validate
through the application of RA 9443.
Moreover, RA 9443 expressly excludes from its coverage those cases
involving certificates of title which were shown to have been fraudulently
or irregularly issued. As the reconstitution and remand proceedings in
these cases revealed, the Manotoks title to the subject friar land, just like
the Barques and Manahans, is seriously flawed. The Court cannot allow
them now to invoke the benefit of confirmation and validation of
ownership of friar lands under duly executed documents, which they never
had in the first place. Strict application by the courts of the mandatory
provisions of the Friar Lands Act is justified by the laudable policy behind
its enactment -- to ensure that the lands acquired by the government
would go to the actual occupants and settlers who were given preference
in their distribution.
PRE-ARREST
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
Kristine
Confesor
or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant.
Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where
to file. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence
obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where
the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted,
the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued search
warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal
case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved
by the latter court.
(3)
POST-ARREST
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the
(1)
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
(2)
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture
or similar practices, and their families.
[Art III, Sec. 12]
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
[Art III, Sec. 13]
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
[Art III, Sec. 17]
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
DURING TRIAL
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process
of
law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable. [Art. III, Sec. 14]
Right to appeal in criminal cases
Not part of constitutional due process
The only reason why it is part of it is that the Rules allow it
AFTER TRIAL
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. [Art. III, Sec. 16]
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua. [Art. III, sec. 19]
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment
against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate
penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act. [Art. III, sec. 21]
*Probable cause
Which would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that the
things subject to crime are in the possession of the person to be
searched on in the place sought to be searched
*Warrant
Order issued by a judge of competent jurisdiction directing an
officer or agent to search a place or seize things described in
the warrant
*Valid consent or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches
Right exists
That the person involved had knowledge either actual or
constructive of the existence of a right
Said person had an intention to relinquish such right
Cases
In re Morales Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's personal
computer admissible in the present administrative case against him? NO.
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in
order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. The burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and
voluntarily given lies with the State.
ACQUIESCENCE IN THE LOSS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IS NOT TO
BE PRESUMED AND COURTS INDULGE EVERY REASONABLE
PRESUMPTION
AGAINST
WAIVER
OF
FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. To constitute a valid consent or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that
(1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either
actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
In this case, what is missing is a showing that Atty. Morales had an actual
intention to relinquish his right. While he may have agreed to the opening
of his personal computer and the printing of files therefrom, in the
presence of DCA Dela Cruz, his staff and some NBI agents during the
March 16, 2005 spot investigation, it is also of record that Atty. Morales
immediately filed an administrative case against said persons questioning
the validity of the investigation, specifically invoking his constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
While Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards
required of every court employee, unfortunately, the Court cannot use the
evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated
his constitutional right.
People v. Nunez The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the
articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit
the things to be taken to those, and only those particularly
described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the law with
no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is
not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a
fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to a crime. Accordingly, the objects taken which were not
specified in the search warrant should be restored to appellant.
Kristine
Confesor
Del Rosario V. Donato A JUDICIALLY ORDERED SEARCH THAT FAILS TO
YIELD THE DESCRIBED ILLICIT ARTICLE DOES NOT OF ITSELF RENDER THE
COURTS ORDER UNLAWFUL. The Del Rosarios did not allege that
respondents NBI agents violated their right by fabricating testimonies to
convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue the search warrant. Their
allegation that the NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant
is a mere conclusion of law. Allegations of bad faith, malice, and other
related words without ultimate facts to support the same are mere
conclusions of law. As such, it exposes the complaint to a motion to
dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action.
People v. Tuan CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF DEFINITENESS.A
description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving
the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A
designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers
to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at
bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search
Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located at the
stated address, which was accused-appellants residence, consisting of a
structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.
People v. Mamaril W/N there is a probable cause in issuing the search
warrant? Yes.PROBABLE CAUSE means such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
Based on the records, the Court is convinced that the questioned search
warrant was based on a probable cause. A portion of the direct testimony
of SPO4 Gotidoc where he said that there were many persons who were
going to her place and theyve been hearing news that she is selling
prohibited drugs and some of them were even identified. Furthermore, the
authorities already conducted surveillance prior to the application for
search warrant.
THERE IS NO GENERAL FORMULA OR FIXED RULE FOR THE
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE since the same must be decided in
light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence
depends to a large degree upon the findings or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination.
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY It is presumed that a
judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the
contrary. A magistrates determination of a probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant is paid with great deference by a reviewing court, as
long as there was substantial basis for that determination
TAN vs SY TIONG GUE Whether or not the items seized in the previously
conducted search warrant issued by the court for robbery be included and
used for the filing of for an information for qualified theft. HELD: NO! Thus,
a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in
connection with only one specific offense alleged in an application on the
TWO PRECONDITIONS
(1) Lack of reasonable opportunity to secure a warrant
(2) Minimum requirement that they must have probable cause to
effect warrantless search and seizure
a.
The probable cause is determined by the seizing and
searching officer
By reason of Jurisprudence
1. Search of moving vehicles
o
Allowed by reason of the nature moving vehicles that
it can be easily moved away from its present location
o
Besides, it would be difficult to describe moving
vehicles. Mostly, it is via rough information
o
There must be a Reasonable Suspicion on the
part of the searching officer that an offense has just
been committed.
CASES:
Kristine
Confesor
PEOPLE VS MARIACOS THE SEARCH IN THIS CASE IS VALID. The vehicle
that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2
Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be
unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the
search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The
searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had
enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
1.
2.
(b)
(c)
Kristine
Confesor
113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was valid, therefore, and the
arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with the authority to validly
search his person and effects for weapons or any other article he might
use in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or
might be used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from him
and the area within his reach or under his control, like the jeep, such
weapon or other article. The evident purpose of the incidental search
was to protect the arresting policemen from being harmed by him
with the use of a concealed weapon.
3.
Requirements:
(1) Justification for the prior intrusion
(2) Discovery of the evidence in advertent
(3) Evidence is open to the eye and hand of the police
(4) Evident illegality or that the evidence of illegality is immediately
apparent
CASES:
Abenes v. CA The production of a mission order is not necessary in view
of the fact that the checkpoint was established three days before the May
11, 1998 elections; and the circumstances under which the policemen
found the gun warranted its seizure without a warrant (plainview). The law
enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the
enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from which
they particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion,
the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
Abenes where they saw the gun tucked into his waist. The gun was in
plain view and discovered inadvertently when Abenes alighted from the
vehicle. However, there is insufficient evidence that the firearm Abenes
carried had no license. Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Abenes was carrying a firearm without prior
authority, license or permit, the latter must be exculpated from criminal
liability under the illegal possession of firearms law. However, Abenes is
still convicted for violation of the Comelec Gun Ban. Under the plain view
doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.
Esquillo v. People the circumstances under which petitioner was
arrested indeed engender the belief that a search on her was warranted.
Recall that the police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of
their law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner
placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as
a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to
curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to
flee after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the
contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
Kristine
Confesor
the police officer approached the men and asked them for their names,
they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun
him around and frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did
the same to the other two and found another weapon. In the prosecution
for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal
search and seizure was put up. The United States Supreme Court held that
"a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible
criminal behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than
simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or maintain
the status quo while obtaining more information.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the
exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.
People v. Mengote At the time of the arrest in question, the accusedappellant was MERELY "LOOKING FROM SIDE TO SIDE" AND
"HOLDING HIS ABDOMEN," ACCORDING TO THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS THEMSELVES. There was apparently no offense that had just
been committed or was being actually committed or at least being
attempted by Mengote in their presence. What offense? What offense
could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to
side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made
them less so, if at all. It might have been different if Mengote bad been
apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason to
be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested
at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting
from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the
shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing
clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of
the noonday sun.
Manilili v. CA The questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid
stop-and-frisk operation. the search was valid, being akin to a stop-andfrisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a STOP-AND-FRISK WAS
DEFINED AS THE VERNACULAR DESIGNATION OF THE RIGHT OF A
POLICE OFFICER TO STOP A CITIZEN ON THE STREET,
INTERROGATE HIM, AND PAT HIM FOR WEAPON(S): x (W)here a
police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized
may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom
they were taken. In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his
companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes
and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts.
From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug
addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to
stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such
investigation, they found marijuana in petitioners possession.
ESQUILLO V. PEOPLE Dual Purpose of stop-and-frisk. What is,
therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has
weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk"
practice serves a dual purpose:
5.
Express Waiver
CASES:
Veroy v. Layague The reason for searching the house of herein
petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and
recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter
the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not have a
search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he
himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not
persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek
permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa
Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel
soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers
had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.
In a number of cases decided by this Court, warrantless searches were
declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every
opportunity to secure a search Warrant. The objects seized, being products
of illegal searches, were inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions
subsequently instituted against the accused-appellants.
People v. Nuevas the arrest must precede the search; the process
cannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded the arrest.
Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at
the outset of the search.
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling
did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons
to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches conducted on the
plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest.
Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest
under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the
accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags
that Nuevas and Din were carrying and were not readily apparent or
transparent to the police officers. In Nuevass case, the dried marijuana
leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue cloth. In
Dins case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was
"packed in newspaper and wrapped therein."It cannot be therefore said
the items were in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the
articles without further search.
On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevass
case was made with his consent. In Dins case, there was none.
VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO THE SEARCH. Indeed, the constitutional
immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the
search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention
and search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. THE
CONSENT TO A SEARCH IS NOT TO BE LIGHTLY INFERRED, BUT
MUST BE SHOWN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. The
question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
People v. Dequina The evidence in this case shows that at the time of
their
arrest,
accused-appellants
were
caught
in
flagrante
carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3
Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not even open Dequinas traveling bag
to determine its content because when the latter noticed the police
officers presence, she walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally
dropped her traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and exposed the
dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then actually being
committed by the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally
justified, and the following warrantless search of their traveling bags was
allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest.
People v. Uybuco
The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 5. Arrest without
Kristine
Confesor
warrant; when lawful and Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The
police officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to
witness the pay-off which effectively consummates the crime of
kidnapping. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers
stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting officers to personally
witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. It is sufficient
for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number
of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant,
who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on
probable cause. Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of
appellant was legal because the latter consented to such.
Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to
search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to
a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126. In lawful arrest, it becomes
both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it is only but
expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it
when he was arrested.
6. Search of Warehouse in violation of the Customs and Tariff Code
BUCOR V. OGARIO RTCs are devoid of any competence to pass upon the
validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by
the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these
proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions
touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Regional Trial
Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even
through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The actions of
the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs,
whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of Appeals.
The rule that RTCs have no review powers over such proceedings is
anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the
government's drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon
Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the
collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the
government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform.
Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which has yet
to be proven, we have said that such act does not deprive the Bureau of
Customs of jurisdiction thereon.
Under the law, the question of whether probable cause exists for the
seizure of the subject sacks of rice is not for the RTC to determine. The
customs authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the court
that the articles on board a vessel were imported from abroad or are
intended to be shipped abroad before they may exercise the power to
effect customs' searches, seizures, or arrests provided by law and
7.
Kristine
Confesor
9. Airport Security
MARTINEZ V. PEOPLE
10. Jail Safety
PEOPLE V. CONDE On the other hand, we find in order the search of the
bag of Felicidad Macabare, at the time she was visiting her husband who
was a detainee. PO3 Sevillano testified, this search is part of police
standard operating procedure, and is recognized as part of precautionary
measures by the police to safeguard the safety of the detainees as well as
the over-all security of the jail premises. However, the weapons
confiscated from Felicidad Maccabare, were not formally offered as
evidence by the prosecution, hence probatively valueless.
3.
military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out
and catch criminal elements, such drives must be consistent with the
constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by such
actions. According to the court, Saturation drives and other police
measures are not illegal, the problem only arises in the manner on which
the police action is executed.
ABENES V. CA - This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal.
Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For,
admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorists right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be
denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during
which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or
two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to
a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an
individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine
checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban
enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement
the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of
pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was
instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know
that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious
designs.
4. WIRE TAPPING
RA 4200
GAANAN V. IAC The petitioner was acquitted of the crime of violation of
Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act. The law
refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement"
for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order
to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA
No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or
cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose
5.
Kristine
Confesor
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending.
6.
Kristine
Confesor
b.
a)
Strict enforcement rule
ESQUILLO V. PEOPLE The circumstances under which petitioner was
arrested indeed engender the belief that a search on her was warranted.
Recall that the police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of
their law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette
case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement
officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to
approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he
introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of
the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of
a valid search warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of
exceptions, viz:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches
of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug
laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at
borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in
"plain view;" (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire,
sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search
or seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into
account, among other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured.
LUMANOG V. PEOPLE The police arrested Joel, without any warrant, on
19 June 1996 or six days after the killing. Six days is definitely more than
enough to secure an arrest warrant, and yet the police opted to arrest Joel
and the other accused, without any warrant, claiming that it was
conducted in "hot pursuit." In law enforcement, "hot pursuit" can refer to
an immediate pursuit by the police such as a car chase. Certainly, the
warrantless arrest of Joel, made six days after the murder, does not fall
within the ambit of "hot pursuit." The question now is whether the
successive warrantless arrests of the accused are legal. The police
investigation work in this case, which led to the unlawful warrantless
arrest of the accused, is nothing but sloppy: (1) they chose to rely solely
on the sworn statement of one eyewitness (Alejo); (2) they failed to obtain
any description of the suspects from other eyewitnesses, including the
owner of the Kia Pride which was forcefully obtained by the suspects as a
get-away car; (3) they showed Alejo a picture of Joel to assist him in
identifying the "suspect"; and (4) they arrested the other accused based
entirely on the illegally extracted extrajudicial confession of Joel.
PEOPLE V. ARANETA. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this
jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proven to be an effective
method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
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PEOPLE V. UYBOCO The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section
5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court [ When an offense has in
fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it] In this section, two
stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected:
(1) an offense has just been committed; and
(2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Records show that both requirements are present in the instant
case.
A search incident to a lawful arrest is also valid under Section 13, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court which states: SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful
arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 does not require the arresting officers to personally
witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. It is sufficient
for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number
of hours long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant,
who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on
probable cause. Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant
was legal because the latter consented to such.
Even assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to
search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search incident to
a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126. In lawful arrest, it becomes
both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter's reach. Therefore, it is only but
expected and legally so for the police to search his car as he was driving it
when he was arrested.
b)
Exceptions to Strict Enforcement
PEOPLE V. PENAFLORIDA The police was tipped off at around 1:00pm
that appellant was transporting marijuana to Huyon-huyon. Certainly, they
had no time to secure an arrest warrant as appellant was already in transit
and already committing a crime. The arrest as effected after appellant as
caught in flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his bicycle and carrying
with him the contraband, hence, demonstrating that a crime was then
already being committed. Under the circumstances, the police had
probable cause to believe that appellant was committing a crime. Thus,
the warrantless arrest is justified
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the
police officers in the act of using shabu and, thus, can be lawfully arrested
without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively identified Ambre sniffing
suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro.17 Ambre,
however, made much of the fact that there was no prior valid intrusion in
the residence of Sultan. The argument is specious.
c)
Waiver of Illegality of Arrest
PEOPLE V. RACHO appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have
attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot,
in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us
to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful. The 1987 Constitution states that a search and
consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise,
it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Obviously, this is an
instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III,
Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation
of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding." Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction
cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal
is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the
illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the
trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an
illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
d)
Effects of Declaration of Illegal Arrest
PEOPLE V. BIYOC TC ruled that appellant is guilty for the crime of rape. In
his brief, appellant raised the issue that the trial court failed to consider
the fact that the accuseds arrest was legally objectionable. He claims that
his arrest was illegal because a warrantless arrest was effected even
before the statement of the private complainant was taken. Objections to
the legality of arrests must, however, be made prior to the entry of plea at
arraignment; otherwise, they are considered waived. an accused may be
stopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the
quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. And since
the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the accused, any defect in his arrest may be deemed cured
when he voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court as what
was done by the appellants in the instant case. Not only did they enter
their pleas during arraignment, but they also actively participated during
the trial which constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in their arrest. In the
present case, appellant failed to question the illegality of his arrest before
entering his please, hence, he is deemed to waive the same.
VALDEZ V. PEOPLE He argues, albeit for the first time on appeal, that the
warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod was
unlawful and that the warrantless search of his bag that followed was
likewise contrary to law.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any
objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the
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case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person. Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the
basis of his acquittal.
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest
notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search
cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a
warrantless search which was not lawful.29 As we pronounced in People v.
Bacla-an
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
The following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by
jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3)
customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally
valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped
prisoners.30
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in
flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot
pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the
warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest.
.
PEOPLE V. SANTOS The claim of appellants that their warrantless arrests
were illegal lacks merit. The Court notes that nowhere in the records did
we find any objection by appellants to the irregularity of their arrests prior
to their arraignment. We have held in a number of cases that the illegal
arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error;
such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. It
is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after
a valid information ha been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced
and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.
9. IMMUNITY FROM ARREST OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Art. VI, sec. 11, 1987 Constitution
cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the directors and officers of
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable expectation; and
second, did the government violate such expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senates
public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly on the
anomalous
losses
incurred
by
the
Philippines
Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippines Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations
(PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operation by their respective
board of directors. Obviously, the inquiry focuses on petitioners acts
committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the
said corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation.
Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over
matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has
interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which the
people have the right to information.This goes to show that THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY IS NOT ABSOLUTE WHERE THERE IS AN OVERRIDING
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST. The right of the people to access
information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy
of financial transactions.
SJS V. DDBTo the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize
illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individuals privacy
interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug
menace cuts across gender, age group, and social economic lines Taking
into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy
on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be
met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold
that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of
the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged
before the public prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with
six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.
Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
LEE V. CA Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the
subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it was
unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be
badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh childrens theory
that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee
children.
But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable and
oppressiveare proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production
of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that
has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section
4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:
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SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. The court may quash a subpoena
duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before
the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the
relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the
person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the
reasonable cost of the production thereof.
MANILA ELECTRIC V. LIM Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas
data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of
judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce
ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security
against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to
the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those
provided under prevailing Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario
that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support
of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a
property right under the context of the due process clause of the
Constitution. It is evident that respondents reservations on the real
reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and
conditions of ones employment - are what prompted her to adopt the
extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is
inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To
argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly
received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of
her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes
these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlierquoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or
are just mere jokes if they existed at all." And she even suspects that her
transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of
management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor-related.
CONCEPT OF PRIVACY- ZONES OF PRIVACY
11. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS
rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to
persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those
detainees is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations
inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy rights.
KMU V. DIRECTOR All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and
other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance
of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from
citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to
privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by these
government entities in the collection and recording of personal
identification data.
In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of
government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since
petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to complain
against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and stored
for the unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific
data, and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data. The data
collection, recording and ID card system under EO 420 will even require
less data collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate systems
prior to EO 420.
IN RE SABIO In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion. Applying this
determination to these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a
reasonable expectation; and second, did the government violate such
expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senates
public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly on the
anomalous
losses
incurred
by
the
Philippines
Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippines Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations
(PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operation by their respective
board of directors. Obviously, the inquiry focuses on petitioners acts
committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the
said corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation.
Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over
matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has
interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which the
people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is
an overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v Mutuc, the Court, in line
with Whalen v Roe, employed the rational basis relationship test when it
held
that there was no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail
and minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard
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of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public administration.
In Valmonte v Belmonte, the Court remarked that as public figures, the
Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject
to closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the
right of the people to access information on matters of public concern
prevails over the right to privacy of financial transaction
III.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Art. III, sec. 4
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances.
Id., sec. 18 (1)
A.
Philosophic Basic of Guarantee
1)
For the discovery of political truth
2)
For self-government
3)
For individual perfection
B.
burden against its constitutionality, not all prior restraints on speech are
invalid.
The actions taken by respondents are colored with legal authority, under
the powers of local governments vested in the Local Government Code,or
more generally, the police powers of the State. We do not doubt that LGUs
are capacitated to enact ordinances requiring the obtention of licenses or
permits by businesses, a term defined elsewhere in the LGC as trade or
commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a
view to profit.
The circumstances of this case dictate that respondents closure of
petitioners radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives. It
must be pointed out that in the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo
was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities
in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members
of the Dy political dynasty. Bombo Radyo is a rival station of DWDY who is
also owned by the family DY. Also, in an article found in the Philippine Daily
inquirer dated February 2004, respondent Dy was quoted as saying
that he will "disenfranchise the radio station." Such statement
manifests and confirms that respondents denial of petitioners renewal
applications on the ground that the Property is commercial is merely a
pretext and that their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan
City and suppress the latters voice. This is a blatant violation of the
petitioners constitutional right to press freedom.
SORIANO V. LAGUARDIA The MTRCB gave a 20-day preventive
suspension to Sorianos And Dating Daan TV program for defamatory
utterances against an INC minister. Soriano was later imposed with a
three-month suspension from his TV program. The three months
suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to
continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already
issued to him by MTRCB for such broadcast. Rather, the suspension is in
the form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment
for the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered. It is a sanction that the
MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the
free speech clause.
ANG LADLAD V. COMELEC Freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies
not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state
interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere
with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual
conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions
concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political
association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Kristine
Confesor
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor
subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have
not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has
been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG
fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to
participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the
moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by
law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded,
because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a
political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process
with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has,
indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.
GARCIA V. MANRIQUE The clear and present danger rule means that
the evil consequence of the comment must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before an utterance can be
punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance
will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be
impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless
there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an
imminent, not merely a likely, threat..
As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents comments
reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their
petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate
amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any action
from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity of the
Court either.A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the
constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it
concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory
that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and
fair administration of justice. By no stretch of the imagination could the
respondents comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the comments
of the respondents.
Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily
against a possible tendency to influence pending cases.13 The power to
punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should
not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. 14 In the
present case, such necessity is wanting.
D. Consent-based Restrictions
1)
Some Tests of Validity of Content-based restrictions
Dangerous Tendency: When the legislative body has determined
generally that the utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of
substantive evil that may be punished, the question whether any specific
utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to
bring about the substantive evil is not open to consideration. In such
cases the general provision of the statute may be constitutionally applied
to the specific utterance if its natural and probable effect was to bring
about the substantive evil that the legislative body might prohibit.
Clear and Present Danger: The question in every case is w/n the words
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evil
that the state has a right to prevent.
Balancing of Interest: the court must undertake the delicate and
difficult task of weighing the circumstances and appraising the
substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the
free enjoyment of rights.
Direct Incitement: the guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a state to forbid or prescribe the advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.
Grave but improbable Danger whether the gravity of the evil,
discounted by its improbability justifies such an invasion of speech as its
necessary to avoid the danger.
2)
Application of tests in various contexts
Freedom of Expression and National security
Freedom of expression and criticism of official conduct: Test of Actual
Malice
SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR If one can claim to announce the judgment of
legal history on any subject, it is that criminal libel laws are consistent
with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards
evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression.
a)
b)
BELTRAN V. MAKASIAR
BORJAL V. CA we stated that the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an
exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair
commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. We
stated that the doctrine of fair commentaries means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his
public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition
VASQUEZ V. CA Do the accused has the burden of showing the truth of
allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends
for making such allegations?
No. Under Art. 361 of the RPC, if the defamatory statement is made
against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties
and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be
entitled to acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation
was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.
Kristine
Confesor
public. Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of error in the
exercise of their profession, but this margin does not expand to cover
every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in the
furtherance of their profession, nor does this margin cover total
abandonment of responsibility.
Borjal may have expanded the protection of qualified privileged
communication beyond the instances given in Art. 354 of the RPC, but this
expansion does not cover Tulfo. The addition to the instances of qualified
privileged communications is reproduced as follows:
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged
and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine
of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is
not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be
a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. [
The expansion speaks of fair commentaries on matters of public
interest. While Borjal places fair commentaries within the scope of
qualified privileged communication, the mere fact that the subject of the
article is a public figure or a matter of public interest does not
automatically exclude the author from liability. Borjal allows that for a
discreditable imputation to a public official to be actionable, it must be a
false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. As
previously mentioned, the trial court found that the allegations against
Atty. So were false and that Tulfo did not exert effort to verify the
information before publishing his articles.
c)
Freedom of Expression and the right of privacy
AYER PRODUCTIONS V. CAPULONG This freedom is available in our
country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture
companies. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion
picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is
not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
In our community as in many other countries, media facilities are owned
either by the government or the private sector but the private sectorowned media facilities commonly require to be sustained by being
devoted in whole or in pailt to revenue producing activities. Indeed,
commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our
country and hence to exclude commercially owned and operated media
from the exerciseof constitutionally protected om of speech and of
expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional
liberties in our country.
Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger
test" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that
a different conclusion must here be reached:
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Confesor
communication, it lost its character as such when the matter was
published in the newspaper and circulated among the general population.
A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as
privileged when it is published and circulated in public,[27] which was what
the petitioners did in this case. Neither is the news item a fair and true
report without any comments or remarks of any judicial, legislative or
other official proceedings; there is in fact no proceeding to speak of. Nor is
the article related to any act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions, for it concerns only false imputations against Thoenen, a
private individual seeking a quiet life. in a case where a newspaper or
broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is
neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional
privilege against liability, for injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in
a discussion of public interest
d)
Freedom of Expression and the Administration of Justice
Supreme Court: Fair criticism may be hurled at the courts. If the following
are present:
1.
It must be made in good faith
2.
It must be couched in respectful language
3.
Directed at the merits
4.
Must not downgrade the courts or insult the members
Reason: The court has inherent powers to insure that the proceeding are
conducted in a manner free from obstruction
that the Highest Court has a soiled reputation, and that the Supreme
Court has a sagging reputation.
To reiterate the words of the Committee, this case is not just another
event that should pass unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the
allocated ramparts of free speech. [79] To allow respondent to use press
freedom as an excuse to capriciously disparage the reputation of the Court
and that of innocent private individuals would be to make a mockery of
this liberty. Respondent has absolutely no basis to call the Supreme
Court a court of thieves and a basket of rotten apples. These
publications directly undermine the integrity of the justices and render
suspect the Supreme Court as an institution.Without bases for his
publications, purely resorting to speculation and fishing expeditions in the
hope of striking or creating a story, with utter disregard for the
institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, he has committed acts that
degrade and impede the orderly administration of justice.
We cannot close our eyes to the comprehensive Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Committee. It enumerated the
inconsistencies and assumptions of respondent which lacked veracity and
showed the reckless disregard of whether the alleged bribery was false or
not.[80]
Indeed, the confidential information allegedly received by respondent by
which he swears with his heart and soul [81]was found by the Investigating
Committee unbelievable. It was a story that reeked of urban legend, as it
generated more questions than answers.[82]
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simply gives the citizens the right to speech, not the right to unrestricted
publicized speech. 17 If the speech tends to undermine the confidence of
the people in the honesty and integrity of the court and its members, and
lowers or degrades the administration of justice, then the speech
constitutes contempt.18 "Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts
cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot
be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public
respect therefore and confidence therein."19 Without the sub judice rule
and the contempt power, the courts will be powerless to protect their
integrity and independence that are essential in the orderly and effective
dispensation and administration of justice.
This, of course, is not meant to stifle all forms of criticism against the
court. As the third branch of the government, the courts remain
accountable to the people. The peoples freedom to criticize the
government includes the right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and
decisions. This is the principle of open justice, which is fundamental
to our democratic society and ensures that
i. there is a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or
idiosyncrasy, and that
ii. the publics confidence in the administration of justice is
maintained.
The criticism must, however,
1)
be fair,
2)
made in good faith, and
3)
"not spill over the walls of decency and propriety."
4)
BASED ON fair and accurate reports (without comment) of what
have actually taken place in open court.
RE: LETTER OF THE UP FACULTY The Show Cause Resolution does not
deny respondents their freedom of expression.To reiterate, it was not the
circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo
was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not
only as an established fact, but a truth" when it was "[o]f public knowledge
[that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth
of such allegations. It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution
that there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision.
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents
submissions, this Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and
judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern
that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members
of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this
Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and
fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits
of fair comment and common decency.
e)
Symbolic Expression- Flag burning Case
TEXAS V. JOHNSON The majority of the Court, according to Justice
William Brennan, agreed with Johnson and held that flag burning
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The main purpose of 11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on
speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to
achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the
use of mass media for political advertising. The restriction on
speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope.
What makes the regulation reasonable is that it is only enforced during
election period.
TEST FOR CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS. In Adiong vs. COMELEC, this
Court quoted the following from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
a case sustaining a Los Angeles City ordinance which prohibited the
posting of campaign signs on public property:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
This test was actually formulated in United States v. OBrien. It is an
appropriate test for restrictions on speech which, like 11(b), are contentneutral. Unlike content-based restrictions, they are not imposed because
of the content of the speech. For this reason, content-neutral restrictions
are tests demanding standards. Like in Sanidad v. COMELEC, a rule
prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning
either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have a compelling
reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These
restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy
presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for
possible overbreadth and vagueness.
It is apparent that these doctrines have no application to content-neutral
regulations which, like 11(b), are not concerned with the content of the
speech. These regulations need only a substantial governmental interest
to support them. A deferential standard of review will suffice to test their
validity.
CLEAR AND DANGER TEST NOT APPLICABLE. Justice Panganibans
dissent invokes the clear-and-present-danger test and argues that media
ads do not partake of the real substantive evil that the state has a right
to prevent and that justifies the curtailment of the peoples cardinal right
to choose their means of expression and of access to information. The
clear-and-present-danger test is not, however, a sovereign remedy for all
free speech problems. As has been pointed out by a thoughtful student of
constitutional law, it was originally formulated for the criminal law and
only later appropriated for free speech cases. For the criminal law is
necessarily concerned with the line at which innocent preparation ends
and a guilty conspiracy or attempt begins. Clearly, it is inappropriate as a
test for determining the constitutional validity of laws which, like 11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646, are not concerned with the content of political ads but only
with their incidents. To apply the clear-and-present-danger test to such
regulatory measures would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail
when a regular hammer is all that is needed.
The reason for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction
of speech is that content-based restrictions distort public debate, have
improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of how
people will react to a particular speech. No such reasons underlie contentneutral regulations, like regulations of time, place and manner of holding
public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
Applying the OBrien test in this case, we find that 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646
is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of
communication or information for the purpose of ensuring equal
opportunity, time and space for political campaigns; that the regulation is
unrelated to the suppression of speech; that any restriction on freedom of
expression is only incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve the
purpose of promoting equality.
ABS-CBN V. COMELEC Main Issue: Validity of Conducting Exit Polls: May
the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls? In
answering this question, we need to review quickly our jurisprudence on
the freedoms of speech and of the press?
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect
of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does
not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec
Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to
whether the polling is disruptive or not. Concededly, the Omnibus Election
Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers. There is no
showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause
chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving
that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to
create disorder or confuse the voters.
(1)
(2)
(3)
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2.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
B.P. 880 (PUBLIC ASSEMBLY ACT OF 1985) - regulates the use of public
street or place. Public assembly excludes those which are for religious
purposes, those for the rights of labor in the labor code, those which are
for political meetings or rallies during campaigns. Outside of that, all are
considered as public assemblies.
Reason: is not to curtail the right of expression, but to allow of the public
to avail of the public spaces. That is why there is a requirement of permits.
It shall be the duty of the local executive to determine what time, or what
streets may be used.
Permits
1)
2)
3)
when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one,
the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary
consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the
police an application duly filed on a given date can, after two days from
said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to
show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the
law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has
been a denial of the application, in which case the rally may be peacefully
dispersed following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by
the law.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid
a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has
the right to prevent. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since
the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
The Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P.
No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as
maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly,
what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself,
namely, maximum tolerance.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in
our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds
freedom. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as
unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely
regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of
assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the
benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of
the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding
liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to
designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after
that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15
of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned
shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind
shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be
written notices to the police and the mayors office to allow proper
coordination and orderly activities.
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may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific
public place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held
there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice
Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be
"abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place."17 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or
explanation for his action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to
just impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a
specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not
to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory
provision, not to have modified the permit "in terms satisfactory to the
applicant."
3.
4. MOVIE CENSORSHIP
On the state regulation regaring TV, Radio, & in newspapers & in other
forms of print media. Here, freedom of expression is guaranteed. However,
the limitations for them are the same, i.e. clear and present danger.
This requires further the ability to read and it requires you the
ability to analyze
For TV, there is the MTRCB that rates and re-rates TV shows.
GONZALEZ v. KALAW KATIGBAK Motion pictures are important both as
a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of the
artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues
and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits
is considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson is the "importance
of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that
they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. There is no clear
dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure.
If such a distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right
to free expression.
Press freedom may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment.
This is not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of speech,
absolute. It can be limited if there be a 'clear and present danger of a
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Confesor
substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. The test to
determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and
present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a
right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the
expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also,
there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time
element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only
probable.
The basic postulate is that where the movies, theatrical
productions radio scripts, television programs, and other such media of
expression are concerned included as they are in freedom of expression
censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable
only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil to public morals, public health or any other legitimate
public interest.
The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion
pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is
concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because
unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television
reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will likely will be
among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. It is hardly the
concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult
population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is
called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. CA INC has a television program entitled "Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 and Channel 13. The program
presents and propagates INCs religious beliefs, doctrines and practices
often times in comparative studies with other religions. The Board of
Review for Moving Pictures classified INCs submitted VTR tapes as "X" or
not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an
attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."
Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior
restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that
restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be
greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the Board to overthrow
this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship
will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar. Second. The evidence
shows that the Board x-rated INCs TV series for "attacking" either
religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence
will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the
deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions.
The Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by INC but
that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they
may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to
favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.
Third. The Board cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against another
religion" in x-rating the religious program of INC. Even a side glance at
section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to
justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television
program.
It is opined that the board can still utilize "attack against any religion" as a
ground allegedly ". . . because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the
showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials
which are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the RPC punishes
anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or religion. We
respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not
synonymous with the word "offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of
the RPC should be invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show
which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship
of speech. It must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986,
included "attack against any religion" as a ground for censorship. The
ground was not, however, carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a
decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent. Indeed, even the
Executive Department espouses this view.
Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the INC, the board failed to apply the
clear and present danger rule. The records show that the decision of the
Board is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that
the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another
religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will
bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm.
Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent
evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
5.
-
RADIO BROADCAST
The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat
lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and
print media.
THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST, therefore, must take the
particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision
of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the
industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which
incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not
be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread
uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio
and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are
limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since
they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying
views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.
g)
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ART. III, SEC. 7 The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
government research data used as basis for policy
developments, shall be afforded to the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
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Confesor
have discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by executive
privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of
such information is a recognized principle in other democratic States.
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT. Indeed,
the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not
espouse an absolute right to information. By their wording, the intention of
the Framers to subject such right to the regulation of the law is
unmistakable. The highlighted portions of the following provisions show
the obvious limitations on the right to information, thus:
Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,40 it was stated
that there are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within
which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be
obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to such
rights, among them: (1) national security matters, (2) trade secrets and
banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential
information. National security matters include state secrets regarding
military and diplomatic matters, as well as information on intergovernment exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements. It was further held that even where there is no need
to protect such state secrets, they must be "examined in strict
confidence and given scrupulous protection."
Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent
Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of legislation, not the
peoples right to public information. This is the reason why we stressed in
the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid
down in Senate v. Ermita, "the demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress" and
"neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact
testimony from government officials." As pointed out, these rights belong
to Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this
juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner
Neri and that there was no prior request for information on the part of any
individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the
distinctions between the Legislature's right to information in a legitimate
legislative inquiry and the public's right to information.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did
not enjoin respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN
Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters that
are covered by executive privilege. WHEREFORE, SENATES MR
DENIED.
diplomatic correspondence,
Kristine
Confesor
right to enroll and re-enroll in the school until
conclusion.
***Common denominators of the rights of the student
Must not
Academically deficient or