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KamalaDevivsKeralaStateFinancial...on19October,2001
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Cites7docs[ViewAll]
Article14inTheConstitutionOfIndia1949
StateOfJammu&KashmirvsTrilokiNathKhosa&Orson26September,1973
TheStateOfGujaratAndAnothervsShriAmbicaMillsLtd.,...on26March,1974
CalcuttaMunicipalCorporation&...vsSujitBaranMukherjee&Ors.Etcon14February,1997
MohammadShujat,Ali&Ors.EtcvsUnionOfIndia&Ors.Etcon3May,1974
Citedby11docs[ViewAll]
K.HamzavsStateOfKeralaon11August,2009
P.P.PrabhakaranvsKeralaStateRoadTransport...
M.P.KhaskaranvsStateOfKeralaon27February,2009
O.JanardhananvsTheDistrictEducationalOfficeron30November,2009
Wa.No.1316Of2vsUnknownon9June,2011

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KeralaHighCourt
KamalaDevivsKeralaStateFinancial...on19October,2001
Author:KBNair
Bench:KRadhakrishnan,KBNair
JUDGMENTK.BalakrishnanNair,J.

UserQueries
higherpay
similarlysituated
increment
termsofsettlement
longtermsettlement
equalitybeforelaw

1.ThepointthatarisesforconsiderationintheisWritAppealiswhetherthedrawalbythejunior
of higher pay than his admitted senior is arbitrary and is in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitutioninthefactsandcircumstancesofthecase.Therecannotbeanyuniversalrulethata
juniorcaninnocircumstancedrawhigherpaythanhissenior.Wherethejuniorisapromotee
andtheseniorisadirectrecruittoaparticularcadre,thejuniorwillbedrawinghigherpay.There
may be a variety of similar circumstances justifying the drawal of higher pay by a junior.
Therefore,thedecisiononthepointraisedbytheappellantwilllargelydependuponthefactsof
thiscase.Theminimumfactsnecessaryforthedecisionofthecasearethefollowing:

equalitybeforelaw,equalprotection
oflaws
equalprotectionoflaw
reasonableclassification
juniordrawingmorepay

TheappellantjoinedtheserviceofthefirstrespondentKeralaStateFinancialEnterprisesLtd.as
Junior Assistant on 12.3.1973. She was promoted as Senior Assistant in July, 1978 and further
promoted as Executive Assistant (now designated as Junior Executive) on 6.5.1982 by Ext. P1
order.Later,shewaspromotedasManageron29.8.1994.OneMr.KasimPillaiwhojoinedthe
serviceofthefirstrespondentasJuniorAssistantsubsequenttotheappellantwaspromotedto
the post of Senior Assistant and Junior Executive only subsequent to the promotion of the
appellant.HispromotionasJuniorExecutive(formerlyExecutiveAssistant)wason8.5.1984as
evidentfromExt.P2,butthesaidjuniorstarteddrawinghigherbasicpaythantheappellantfrom
1.7.1992.
2. The reason for this disparity is explained in the following manner: There was a long term
settlement between the management and the employees concluded on 12.9.1985. One of the
termsofthesettlementwasthecreationofthepostofspecialgradeAssistantbetweentheposts
ofSeniorAssistantandJuniorExecutive.Asaresult,theemployeeswhogotpromotionasJunior
Executive, after the implementation of the settlement, came through the post of Special Grade
Assistant.So,theygotafixationofpayonpromotiontothenewlycreatedpostandgotanother
fixation on promotion to the post of Junior Executive. So, the promotees to the post of Junior
Executive after the implementation of Ext. P1 agreement began to draw higher pay than those
whowerepromotedtothatpostearlier.Theseniorstookupcudgelsagainstthisdiscrimination.
Butthemanagementresistedtheprotestcontendingthatitwastheresultofimplementationofa
long term settlement which is binding on all employees including the seniors. Few of the
aggrieved employees approached this Court against this discrimination by filing O.P. No.
14745/93.Thesamewasdismissedupholdingthestandofthemanagementthatthedisparityis
the result of a binding long term settlement. But, later, the management themselves came
forward and attempted to rectify the anomaly by giving one additional increment to those
personswhowerepromotedasJuniorExecutivesbetween1.4.1983and1.7.1984.Itappears,the
agreementwasimplementedwitheffectfrom1.7.1984.Thepleadingofthemanagementinthis
regardiscontainedinparagraph3ofitscounteraffidavitwhichisextractedbelow:
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"AttheveryoutsetitissubmittedthataspertheLongTermSettlementdated12.9.1985entered
intobetweenthemanagementandthetradeunions,anewpostofSpecialGradeAssistantwas
createdbetweenthepostsofSeniorAssistantandJuniorExecutive.Asaresult,thoseemployees
whowerepromotedasJuniorExecutivesaftertheimplementationoftheLongTermSettlement,
becameentitledtomorebenefitsbyvirtueofthefactthatpromotionasJuniorExecutiveswere
onlyfromamongSpecialGradeAssistant.ItwasinresponsetotheprotestraisedbysomeJunior
Executiveswhowerepromotedearlierandwereunabletoavailofthebenefitsofthecreationof
thenewpostthattheBoardofDirectorsdecidedtograntthebenefitsofonespecialincrementfor
allthosewhowerepromotedasJuniorExecutivesbetween1.4.83and1.7.84.Thisdecisionofthe
Board of Directors, was a special consideration to ameliorate the disparities in pay that had
occurredonaccountoftheimplementationofLongTermSettlementdated12.9.85."
3.ThedecisiontograntonincrementforthosewhowerepromotedasJuniorExecutivebetween
1.4.1983and1.7.1984wasnotpursuanttoanybindingsettlement.Itwasbasedonthedecisionof
theBoardofDirectorstakingintoaccounttheanomalyoftheseniordrawinglesserpaywithout
anyrelevantreason.Asaresultofthisgrantofoneadditionalincrement,theabovesaidKasim
Pillai started drawing higher pay than the appellant. This prompted the appellant to file
representationsbeforetherespondentswhichwererejectedbyExts.P5andP7communications.
Challenging those communications and seeking consequential benefits, the appellants filed
O.P.No.16391/94.Thesamewasdismissedbythejudgmentunderappeal.
4.Headbothsides.TheappellantcontendedthatsheandMr.KhasimPillaiaresimilarlyplaced
ineveryrespect.Sheisseniortohimineverypost.Therefore,thehigherpaygrantedtohimis
plainlydiscriminatoryandmilitatesagainsttheguaranteeofequalitycontainedinArticle14.The
decisionwastakensuomotubythemanagementtoremovetheanomalyofjuniordrawinghigher
pay. Consequently, Mr. Kasim Pillai and a few others were given the benefit of one additional
increment. The appellant also started suffering the very same disability suffered by Mr. Kasim
Pillai.But,shewasnotconsideredforbeingincludedinthegroupofbeneficiariesofthedecision
ofthemanagement.
5.Themanagementdidnotdisputethefactthattheappellantisseniorinallcadresandthatshe
isdrawinglesserpaythanherjuniorMr.KhasimPillai.Butthesameissoughttobejustifiedby
submitting that Mr. Kasim Pillai got one additional increment as part of rectification of the
anomalyofthejuniorsofhimdrawinghigherpaywhowerepromotedaftertheimplementation
ofthesettlement.itissubmittedthatifthepayoftheappellantalsoissteppedup,thatmayresult
infurtherclaimswhichmaycauseprejudicetothemanagement.
6.Article14guaranteesequalitybeforelawandequalprotectionoflaws,butthesamedoesnot
prohibitclassification.AclassificationwillnotbehitbyArticle14,ifthesamesatisfiesthetwin
tests:
(1) there is an intelligible differentia between those included in one group and those excluded
fromit
(2)ithasarationalnexuswiththeobjectofthelaw.
TheSupremeCourthasheldthatiftheclassificationsuffersfromtheviceofunderinclusiveness,
thesamewillbehitbyArticle14.TheSupremeCourthasexplainedthesaidprinciplepithilyinIn
ReSpecialCourtsBill,1978,inthefollowingwords:(AIR1979(1)SC478):
"120.TheCourtinMohammadShujatAliv.UnionofIndia,(1975)1SCR449atp.477:(AIR1974
SC 1631 at p. 1653) has explained the constitutional facet of classification: This doctrine
recognises that the legislature may classify for the purpose of legislation but requires that the
classificationmustbereasonable.Itshouldensurethatpersonsorthingssimilarlysituatedareall
similarlytreated.Themeasureofreasonablenessofaclassificationisthedegreeofitssuccessin
treatingsimilarlythosesimilarlysituated.
But the question is: what does this ambiguous and crucial phrase similarly situated means?
Wherearewetolookforthetestofsimilarityofsituationwhichdeterminesthereasonablenessof
a classification? The inescapable answer is that we must look beyond the classification to the
purpose of the law. A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons or things
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similarlysituatedwithrespecttothepurposeofthelaw."
121.Afterhavingstatedthegeneralproposition,theCourtstruckanoteofwarningwhichisthe
maincruxofthepresentcontroversy:Ibidatp.478:(atpp.1653,1654ofAIR):"Thefundamental
guaranteeisofequalprotectionofthelawsandthedoctrineofclassificationisonlyasubsidiary
ruleevolvedbyCourtstogiveapracticalcontenttothatguaranteebyaccommodatingitwiththe
practicalneedsofthesocietyanditshouldnotbeallowedtosubmergeanddrowntheprecious
guaranteeofequality.Thedoctrineofclassificationshouldnotbecarriedtoapointwhereinstead
of being a useful servant, it becomes a dangerous master, for otherwise, as pointed out by
Chandrachud,J.inStateofJammu&Kashmirv.TrilokiNathKhosa,(1974)1SCC19:(AIR1974
SC 1), "the guarantee of equality will be submerged in class legislation masquerading as laws
meant to govern wellmarked classes characterised by different and distinct attainments.
".....That process would inevitably end in substitution the doctrine of classification for the
doctrineofequalitythefundamentalrighttoequalitybeforethelawandequalprotectionofthe
lawsmaybereplacedbytheoverworkedmethodologyofclassification.Ourapproachtotheequal
protectionclausemust,therefore,beguidedbythewordsofcautionutteredbyKrishnaIyer,I.in
State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa. "Miniclassifications based on micro
distinctions are false to our egalitarian faith and only substantial and straightforward
classification plainly promoting relevant goals can have constitutional validity. To overdo
classificationistoundoequality".
122.Mathew,J.inStateofGujaratv.ShriAmbicaMills,Ahmedabad,(1974)3SCR760atp.782:
(AIR1974SC1300atpp1312,1313)placedthesameaccentfromtheangleofunderinclusion:
"The equal protection of the laws is pledge of the protection of equal laws. But laws may
classify..... A reasonable classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated and
nonewhoarenot.Thequestioniswhatdoesthephrase'similarlysituated'means?Theanswerto
thequestionisthatwemustlookbeyondtheclassificationtothepurposeofthelaw.Thepurpose
ofalawmaybeeithertheeliminationofapublicmischiefortheachievementofsomepositive
publicgood.
A classification is underinclusive when all who are included in the class are tainted with the
mischief but there are others also tainted whom the classification does not include. In other
words, a classification is bad as underinclusive when a State benefits or burdens persons in a
mannerthatfurtheralegitimatepurposebutdoesnotconferthesamebenefitorplacethesame
burdenonotherswhoaresimilarlysituated.Aclassificationisoverinclusivewhenitincludesnot
only those whoa re similarly situated with respect to the purpose but others who are not so
situatedaswell."
7.Inthelightoftheaboveprinciples,itcanbeseenthattheappellantaswellasMr.KasimPillai
wassufferingfromthedisabilityoftheirjuniorsdrawinghigherpay.Buttheappellantwasnot
included int he group of beneficiaries of one special increment. Therefore, the classification
attemptedbythefirstrespondentinthematterofrectificationofanomalysufferedfromthevice
ofunderinclusiveness.Thereforethesameisliabletobedeclaredasunconstitutional.
8. Even without going into the nuances of law relating to classification, it is apparent that the
presentcaseisaclearcaseofplaindiscrimination,inasmuchastheappellant'sjuniorisdrawing
highersalarythanherwithoutanyreasonablereasonswhatsover.So,theappellantisentitledto
havehersalarysteppedupwitheffectfromthedateherjuniorstartedtodrawhigherpaythan
her. This view taken by us finds support from two decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of
India and Ors. v. P. Jagdish and Ors. (1973) 3 SCC 176) and in Calcutta Municipal Corpn. and
Anr. v. Sujit Baran Mukherjee and Ors. ((1997) 11 SCC 463). In the first decision, the Supreme
Courthasheldasfollows:
"This principle becomes applicable when the junior officer and the senior officer belong to the
samecategoryandthepostfromwhichtheyhavebeenpromotedandinthepromotedcadrethe
junior officer on being promoted later than the senior officer gets a higher pay. This being the
principle of stepping up contained in the Fundamental Rules and admittedly the respondents
being senior to several other Senior Clerks and the respondents having been promoted earlier
than many of their junior who have promoted later to the post of Head Clerks, the principle of
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stepping up should be made applicable to the respondents with effect from the date of their
juniorsintheerstwhilecadreofSeniorClerksgetpromotedtothecadreofheadClerksandtheir
paywasfixedatahigherslabthanthatoftherespondents.Thesteppingupshouldbedonein
such a way that the anomaly of juniors getting higher salary than the seniors in the promoted
categoryofHeadClerkwouldberemovedandthepayoftheseniorsliketherespondentswould
be stepped up to a figure equal to the pay as fixed for their junior officer in the higher post of
Head Clerk. In fact the Tribunal by the impugned order has directed to apply the principle of
stepping up and we see no infirmity with the same direction subject to the aforesaid
clarification.....".
9. Counsel for the first respondent attempted to suggest that if the appellant is granted relief,
there may be others suffering from the same disability and they may also come forward with
similar demands. He suggests that it may have serious adverse consequences on the first
respondent. The said submission has been made without placing sufficient data before us.
Therefore, we are not inclined to examine it. Further, when a citizen comes to this Court
complainingthatherrightsunderArticle14arebeingviolated,thisCourtisboundtohearand
decide the question on merits uninfluenced by the suggestion of unspecified consequences. In
thisconnection,itisonlyappropriatetoquotethewordsofLordDenningM.R.inBradburyand
Ors.v.LondonBoroughofEnfield((1967)3All.ER434)whichreadasfollows:
"Icomenowtothelastpoint.Oughtaninjunctiontobegrantedagainstthecounsel?Ithasbeen
suggestedbythechiefeducationofficerthat,ifaninjunctionisgranted,chaoswillsupervene.All
the arrangements have been made for the next term, the teachers appointed to the new
comprehensive schools, the pupils allotted their places, and so forth. It would be next to
impossible, he says, to reserve all these arrangements without complete chaos and damage to
teachers, pupils and the public. I must say this: if a local authority does not fulfil the
requirements of the law, this court will see that it does fulfil them. It will not listen readily to
suggestionsof"chaos".Thedepartmentofeducationandthecouncilaresubjecttotheruleoflaw
andmustcomplywithit,justlikeeveryoneelse.Evenifchaosshouldresult,stillthelawmustbe
obeyedbutIdonotthinkthatchaoswillresult.Theevidenceconvincesmethatthe"chaos"is
much overstated.....I see no reason why the position should not be restored, so that the eight
schoolsretaintheirpreviouscharacteruntilthestatutoryrequirementsarefulfilled.Icanwellsee
thattheremaybeaconsiderableupsetforanumberofpeople,butIthinkitfarmoreimportant
toupholdtheruleoflaw.Parliamenthaslaiddowntheserequirementssoastoensurethatthe
electors can make their objections and have them properly considered. We must see that their
rightsareupheld".
ThesaidobservationoftheMasterofRollshasbeenquotedwithapprovalbytheSupremeCourt
inB.PrabhakarRaov.StateofAndhraPradesh(1985(Supp)SCC432).
10. Therefore, we are inclined to allow this Appeal. The impugned orders are quashed. The
appellantisentitledtohavehersalarysteppeduptothatofherjuniorMr.KasimPillaiwitheffect
fromthedatehestarteddrawinghighersalarythanher.Shewillbeentitledtoallconsequential
benefits notionally without arrears. The refixation of pay shall be made within a period of one
monthfromthedateofreceiptofacopyofthisjudgmentNocosts.

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