The

Security
Change

Policies of Small NATO Countries: Factors of

NIKOLAJ PETERSEN

Petersen, N. The Security Policies of Small NATO Countries: Factors of Change.

, 1988, 145-162.
Cooperation and Conflict, XXIII

During the 1980s the traditional security policies of the smaller NATO countries in
Northwest Europe have been under considerable stress. Policy changes have been
most profound in Denmark, but similar trends have been evidenced in Norway,
Holland and Belgium. Based on a simple analytical framework the article analyses the
nature of these trends, mostly in the Danish case, and their background in domestic,
transnational as well as systemic factors.

Security policy values have changed, especially

with respect to nuclear weapons; the policy process has become more complex and
conflictual, and resulting policies have deviated from the old alliance loyalty of these
countries. Among explanatory factors the article focuses on the breakdown of detente
and increasing pressures on the European NATO members which were especially
onerous for the small countries, changes in public opinion, transnational cooperation
between political parties and social movements, and developments in Social Democratic perceptions. Even though some of these factors have been eclipsed by the
present era of renewed detente, the adaptation of the small NATO countries to it is
likely to be conditioned by the significant changes in perceptions, processes and policies
which occurred in the 1980s.
1. INTRODUCTION

trends to be generalized across

national borders. In a broader sense the
aim will be to analyse the factors which
shape the foreign and defence policies of
small aligned countries in Europe. A fullfledged comparative analysis of aligned
and non-aligned countries would probably
demonstrate that alignment/non-alignment is a fundamental policy dimension
which affects almost all aspects of foreign
and security policy, and especially those
of a minor power. As a working hypothesis we may therefore argue that the small
aligned country is in a category of its own.
Over the years there have been several
efforts to compare the foreign and defence
policies of the smaller European NATO
members, but these efforts have rarely
been comparative in the strict sense, e.g.
through the use of a joint analytical
framework. The accent of these efforts
has rather been on separate case studies,

major

From being considered in the past as loyal

members of the alliance, the small NATO
countries of northwestern Europe have
come to be seen, in the 1980s, as not-soloyal adherents of the alliance &dquo;mainstream&dquo;, i.e. the policy line taken by its
larger and more influential members. In
the same period their domestic security
policy processes have become highly controversial and conflictual.
The aim of this article is twofold. It is
aimed first to describe the salient changes
in the security policies of these countries,
i.e. Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands
and Norway, and secondly, to sketch an
analytical framework to account for them.
The empirical referents will largely be
taken from the evolution of Danish security policy since the late 1970s, but it can
be argued that developments in all four
countries are comparable enough for

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146

loosely tied together by some introductory

and concluding remarks by the editor.
This format was used by O. de Raeymaker
in Small Powers in Alignment (1974),
which covers all small European NATO
members, i.e. Portugal, Turkey, Greece,
as well as the three Benelux countries
and the three Scandinavian members. A
similar approach was adopted in a major
analysis of the NATO policies of the
Scandinavian and Benelux countries
sponsored by the Atlantic Institute,
NATOs Northern Allies: The National
Security Policies of Belgium, Denmark,
the Netherlands and Norway (Flynn 1985)
and in a recent Canadian contribution,
Semialignment and Western Security
(0rvik 1985), which analyses the alliance
policies of Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Canada and Norway. In all cases
the comparative aspect is weak, and the
contribution to a systematic understanding of the alliance behaviour of smaller
countries of these volumes is therefore
fairly limited.
To get beyond case studies and into a
truly comparative analysis of the subject,
two decisions must be made. One concerns the choice of cases to be compared,
another the choice of a suitable analytic
framework.

2. WHICH COUNTRIES TO
COMPARE?

Looking

at the nine small countries of

NATO, i.e. Belgium, Denmark, Greece,

Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
and Turkey, the most
salient characteristic of the group, besides
their policy of alignment and their relative
smallness, seems to be significant variation on almost every other dimension.
They are situated in different regional settings and vary greatly in economic development and political traditions, etc., the
major dividing line separating the South
European member countries from those

Norway, Portugal

in North and Northwest Europe. The former group is economically less developed,
has weak democratic traditions and traditional threat perceptions which are not
necessarily focused exclusively on the
East-West conflict in Europe. The Benelux and Scandinavian members, on the
contrary, are all economically developed,
modern welfare states, have firmly entrenched democratic ground rules, and tend
to view their security problematique in an
East-West perspective. These countries
have also been considerably more affected
by doubts and divisions concerning the
policies of the NATO mainstream since
the late 1970s than the South European
members.
To limit the span of variation it seems
reasonable
to
at least for a start
concentrate upon the latter group of
countries and also to exclude Luxembourg
and Iceland, which because of their limited size and negligible defence capabilities belong in a separate category. The
Benelux and Scandinavian countries are
approximately in the same league as far
as economic and military capabilities are
concerned; they are all multi-party parliamentary systems with well-functioning
influence channels for public interest
groups, and, not least, they share important historical lessons as well as more
recent policy attitudes. All four countries
have a historical tradition of neutrality
and of its ineffectiveness in 1940. Having
chosen, after World War II, to pursue a
policy of alignment in NATO, they have
followed, at least until the late 1970s, an
alliance policy of &dquo;loyalty&dquo; in their acceptance of the American leadership and the
prevailing strategic concepts of the
alliance. There have been differences as
well, in that the Nordic members have
followed somewhat more independent
policies in questions such as the stationing
of Allied forces or nuclear weapons on
their territories, but by and large, they
were until recently comparatively coop-

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147

erative and constructive members of the

NATO alliance (Petersen 1979).
The comparability of the four countries
is further suggested by the fact that historically they have tended to seek joint
solutions to common problems. In the
inter-war years they all belonged to the
so-called Oslo group of small European
countries; and in the 1970s they went
together with other Nordic countries to
form the group of &dquo;like-minded&dquo; nations,
i.e. countries in basic support of the
demand for a new economic world order
(Dolman 1979). In security policy they
have mainly cooperated in pairs, the
Netherlands and Belgium on the one
hand, and Norway and Denmark on the
other. Such formal and informal cooperation and coordination has been
especially prevalent among the Nordic
NATO members - with Norway calling
the tune more often than vice versa. But
at least on one occasion have the four
small countries acted together to further

interests, namely in the &dquo;arms

deal of the century&dquo; in 1975, when they
worked together to procure the F-16. In
the 1980s, formal and especially informal
policy coordination between the four
countries has been stepped up
especially at the political party level.

internal independent variables as well as

transnational
interactions
between
national and sub-national actors. It should
perhaps be mentioned at the outset that
this latter part of the framework is less
developed at the present moment.
The salient changes in the security policies of the four countries may be identified

by conceiving security policy broadly as a

political issue-area, i.e. as a complex of
political problems which are normally
considered as belonging together and
which tend to be processed together in
the political system. James N. Rosenau,
in his well-known pre-theory article
(1971:133), defines an issue-area as consisting of
(1)

cluster of values, the allocation of

(2) leads the potentially affected
actors to differ so greatly over (a) the way
in which the values should be allocated
or (b) the horizontal levels at which the
allocation should be authorized that (3)
they engage in distinctive behavior designed to mobilize support for the attainment of their particular values.

common

3. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR COMPARISON

Comparison presupposes the construction

of an analytical framework. In the following a framework which has been developed in the course of a project focused
upon recent changes in Danish security
policy will be presented (Faurby et al.
1986). First, the dependent variable
(&dquo;security policy&dquo;) will be defined and
operationalized by being decomposed
into four major variables: security policy
values, actors, processes and policies. Secondly, an explanatory framework is presented

which

includes

external

and

which

This definition points to four critical variables to watch when trying to identify
relevant changes in the security policies
of the four countries: these are (1) changes
in security policy values, (2) changes in
the groups of affected and participating
actors, (3) changes in the security policy-

making process, and (4) as a resultant,

changes in official security policy. Strictu
sensu, the fourth variable is the real
dependent one, while the first three may

be

considered

intervening

variables.

However, changes in the four variables in

the 1980s seem to have been so closely
interrelated that it seems reasonable to
base the analysis on Rosenaus issue-area
concept. As mentioned, most examples
will be taken from the evolution of Danish
security policy. This, of course, reflects
the parochialism of the author, but the
Danish case is also interesting in a more
general sense because changes which can

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148

be

in all four countries have

for
special reasons been most pronounced
in Denmark. Similar changes to those in
Denmark can be found in the other three
countries, however.
seen

3.1

Changes in Security Policy Values

Changes in security policy values have
taken place at two different levels: (1) in
the understanding of the security policy
concept, and (2) with respect to specific
values.
The &dquo;classical&dquo; security policy concept
of political realists (both scholars and
practitioners) focuses on the security of
the nation-state and on the frustration or
deterrence of military threats to its vital
interests, such as territorial integrity or
political autonomy. In recent years this
concept has been challenged from both
theoretical (Buzan 1983) and political
points of view. While politicians to the
right-of-centre still tend to stick to the
old definition, left-of-centre politicians,
including Social Democrats, increasingly
favour a broader concept which is less
nation-state focused and military threatoriented. The physical and social security
of the individual is stressed, but at the
same time it is argued that the concept of
security policy must be expanded to look
beyond the nation-state to larger entities.
The increasing interest in the concept of
&dquo;common security&dquo; among Social Democrats, not only in Denmark, but in Western Europe as a whole, points in this
direction. Another trend is the increasingly popular notion that military means
is only part of a broader security policy
repertoire which also includes diplomatic
(detente) and economic means (e.g.

development aid).
The politically most important of these
changes seems to be the notion of &dquo;common security&dquo;, which implies that security
can no longer be found in a confrontation
of the opposing side, i.e. the Warsaw Pact

some kind of cooperation with it. This notion, which originates in the German SPD with Egon Bahr
as the principal spokesman (Palme Commission 1982, Bahr 1982), has had a
significant impact on security policy thinking in the lesser sister parties, i.e. the
Labour parties of Norway and the Netherlands, the Danish Social Democrats and
the Belgian (esp. the Flemish) Socialists.
This is important because it is to some
extent incompatible with the Harmel Formula of 1967, which defines NATOs
policy towards the Warsaw Pact as a dual
one of deterrence and defence on the one
hand and detente on the other.
Conceptually &dquo;common security&dquo; is
related with another salient change,
namely in threat perceptions. Where
threat perceptions used to be actororiented (which they still are on the right
side of the political spectrum), they now
tend to become &dquo;structural&dquo;. The main
threat is no longer seen so much as the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
countries, but rather as the East-West
confrontation per se and the bifurcated
structure of the European security system,
in which the risk of nuclear war becomes
the main threat to peace.
Apart from such changes in basic security policy concepts a number of more
specific value changes have also
occurred
again mainly among Social
Democrats. These changes are most pronounced with respect to nuclear weapons
policy and defence policy.
Danish policy with respect to nuclear
weapons has always had a low profile.
Since 1957 a ban on nuclear weapons on
Danish territory &dquo;under prevailing circumstances&dquo;, i.e. in peacetime, has been
upheld; on the other hand, Denmark has
accepted NATOs Flexible Response
strategy and its inherent dependence on
the (early) use of nuclear weapons. Since
the late 1960s Denmark has also participated, though again in a very low-key

countries, but only in

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149
manner, in NATOs nuclear planning process

in

the

NPG

(Nuclear Planning

Group).
This basic low-key, but acquiescent attitude to nuclear weapons is no longer
characteristic of the Danish Social
Democrats. Without explicitly rejecting
Flexible Response, their doubts and concerns with respect to the role of nuclear
weapons in NATO strategy have multiplied to a point where they are, in effect,
no longer adherents of NATOs strategy
on this important issue. Both the public
and the political left have been tainted
with nuclear &dquo;allergy&dquo;, and the willingness to contemplate the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons in the
defence of Western Europe has diminished significantly. In the Spring of 1988
this sensitivity led to an effort on the part
of the opposition parties to tighten up on
Denmarks policy concerning port calls of
nuclear weapons certified warships
through a parliamentary resolution
requesting the government to notify visiting warships of Denmarks non-nuclear

policy.
Another change concerns the fundamental approach to defence thinking.
Again, the traditional Danish attitude to
defence has been a cautious one. Over
the years the Danish defence contribution
has been rather modest compared to other
NATO countries, including Norway and
the Netherlands. On the other hand, apart
from bans on nuclear weapons and on
permanent stationing of Allied forces in
Denmark, the structure and tactical doctrines of the Danish defence forces have
largely been modelled on the prevailing

NATO pattern,

so

to secure comNATO forces, not

as

with other
least the German forces in SchleswigHolstein. One aspect of this has been
adherence to the doctrine of forward
defence. During the last few years a rival
defence concept has entered the Danish
debate, e.g. the concept of &dquo;non-offens-

patibility

ive&dquo; or &dquo;defensive&dquo; defence. This notion,

which originates with German peace
researchers, has been adopted by Danish
peace researchers, but the most important
inspiration has undoubtedly been discussions in the SPD (von Bulow 1984). In
Denmark, the idea has become very popular on the left wing (which is searching for
a realistic alternative to their old demand
for Danish disarmament) and has also
affected the Social Democratic party. In
1986 the party presented a proposal for a
so-called &dquo;non-threatening&dquo; defence posture which at least conceptually was
inspired by the notion of &dquo;non-offensive&dquo;
defence (Socialdemokratiet 1986). In
practical terms this was translated into
demands for a less forward and hence
presumably less &dquo;provocative&dquo; posture
both in the Baltic and in SchleswigHolstein. Since then, these proposals have
been toned down somewhat, however.
3.2.

Changes

The

narrowness

in

Security Policy Actors

of the classical security

policy concept is also reflected in the

character of the traditional decisionmaking circle in security policy. In Denmark, as in most countries, security
policy at least if defence policy proper
is excluded
has traditionally been the
preserve of a very small and limited group
of actors, mostly at the government and
bureaucratic level. Parliament (the Folketing) and the political parties have normally only been involved in a consultative
role, e.g. via the parliamentary foreign
affairs
committee
(Udenrigspolitisk
-

Nievn). Correspondingly, security policy

received only limited attention by the political parties and in public opinion.
This description is no longer valid.
Other levels than the governmentalbureaucratic one are increasingly involved
in the formulation of security policy. First,
transnational influences are more evident
than they used to be. Political parties,

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150

interest

organizations

and social

move-

ments are increasingly establishing contacts with counterparts in other countries

which

much faster than before to

new ideas,
policies and
In
the
field
of
strategies.
security policy
the transnational contacts of the Social
Democratic parties and of the peace
serves

disseminate

have had

significant impact on
policy, making foreign political
parties (such as the SPD) and foreign
movement

official

movements, e.g. the END, indirect actors

in the domestic policy process.
Another, rather quixotic trend is for
local governments, especially municipal
councils, to assert a residual security
policy role, e.g. by declaring their municipalities nuclear-free zones or adopting
zoning regulations which interfere with
military uses. This is likely to remain a
rather unproductive tendency, but it
reflects changing attitudes towards the
old-time &dquo;Establishment&dquo; monopoly on

security policy-making.
In practical political terms another
trend is more important, namely the
increasing interest of the Greenland
Home Rule government (since 1979) to
have a say in security policy questions
which affect Greenland directly. Recently
the role of the American bases in Greenland and especially the new phased-array
radar installed at Thule has been
questioned, both in the international and
the Danish domestic debate, and this
question has given rise to much concern
both in the Danish government and in the
Home Rule government in Greenland. In
the event, the Home Rule government
chose to keep a low profile on the issue.
In the future, however, it is most likely
that the Greenlanders will increasingly
demand and be accorded formal or informal co-determination on issues which
directly affect Greenland, irrespective of
the legal position, according to which all
foreign policy questions will be the preserve of the Danish government (Petersen

forthcoming).

But also the level of national policymaking has been affected by significant
changes. After the government change
in 1982, when a bourgeois government
under Poul Schluter (Cons.) was installed,
the Folketing and the political parties
appeared as a decisive factor through the
creation of a firm (and unprecedented)
&dquo;alternative&dquo; security policy majority
against the government and its constituent
parties, consisting of the Social Democratic party plus three other opposition
parties, one of which, the Radicals, supported the government in most domestic
issues, however. This meant a partial collapse of the traditional broad consensus
between Social Democrats and bourgeois
parties on matters of defence and security
policy, and that the parties to the left of
the Social Democrats, i.e. the Socialist
Peoples Party and the Left Socialists
acquired for the first time ever at least
some influence on official security policy.
In the summer of 1988 a Folketing
election, called by the government in
response to the passing of the parliamentary resolution on Allied port calls
referred to above, led to the dissolution
of the alternative majority when the Radicals joined a new government with the
Conservatives and Liberals, led once
more by Poul Schlfter. After this security

policy-making promised
mal in

far

to revert to nor-

the government has now

reconquered the parliamentary majority
after five years of &dquo;government by opposition&dquo; in security policy.
Changes have also affected the internal
policy process in the political parties and
especially the Social Democratic party.
Since the 1970s old authority structures
have been breaking up, resulting in the
almost total eclipse of the partys traditional security policy elite. As a result,
so

as

back-benchers

are

increasingly voicing
security policy

their views concerning

questions, and an active

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left-wing

group

151

change the party

significant degree.
Conspicuous changes have

has been able to

a

line to
also

active and in

particular has
greater mobilizing capabilities than before
ized, is

more

the 1980s.
_

Another salient development has been

appeared in the societal environment of
the political system. Generally, a marked that groups and organizations set up for
increased interest in security policy ques- quite different purposes have included
tions has occurred among the public, and security policy issues on their agenda. The
this is reflected in increased media cover- Danish Church, though, has been very
age and in a sizable growth in literature, inactive compared with churches in almost
both academic and political. One salient all other Western countries. On the other
development is the to some extent pol- hand, the trade union movement, and
establishment of a especially its left wing around the General
itically promoted
&dquo;counter-expertise&dquo; of peace researchers, Workers Union, has taken up the nuclear
-

e.g. around the new Centre of Peace and

Conflict Research, created by the Folketing in 1985. Another example is the
establishment in 1981 of the so-called
Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament Affairs (Det sikkerheds- og

issue and collaborates with peace groups

both locally and nationally.

nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg (SNU)),

which is charged with doing research and
promoting the public debate in the field.
The most important trend, however, is
the growth in organized public opinion.

With important changes in security policy

values on the part of important actors and
with the general proliferation and activisation of actors on the security policy
scene, the resulting process must necessarily change in character. At least two
significant changes have occurred: The
process has become much more complicated, and it has become much more
conflictual; a result is that it has become
much more difficult for the old security
policy &dquo;Establishment&dquo; to control the
process. These trends are perceptible in
most countries, but have progressed
further in Denmark than elsewhere. In
fact, the government for a long time lost
control over the process. The main reason
for this was the establishment of the
above-mentioned &dquo;alternative&dquo; security
policy majority in Parliament, which from
late 1982 to the spring of 1988 voted

The Danish peace movement has a more

than century-long history, but it was never
stronger nor more vocal than in the first
half of the 1980s, when peace groups proliferated and when activities were at an
all-time high (Krasner & Petersen 1986).
In this period the peace movement
became organized around three large
groups, the Cooperation Committee for
Peace and Security (a more traditional
umbrella organization with a certain
fellow-travelling image, due to its links
to the World Peace Council), the No to
Nuclear Weapons group (a grassroots
group linked to the END movement), and
the Women for Peace group. In addition,
a large number of local, professional and
other groups sprang up. During the last
few years the peace movement has been
on the wane, as in most of Western
Europe; especially the Women for Peace
group has had difficulties in keeping up
continuous activities. Despite this, the
Danish peace movement is better organ-

3.3. Changes in the

Process

Security Policy

through some twenty parliamentary resolutions against the wishes of the government parties, each of them changing the
official policy line to a greater or less
degree.
Contrary to normal parliamentary practice, the Government chose during this
long period &dquo;to live with&dquo; this situation,

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152
to save its
economic programme, and
partly to blunt the external consequences
of the policies of the alternative majority.
Even though the Parliamentary resolutions became eo ipso official policy, and
even though the government was forced
on several occasions to &dquo;footnote&dquo; NATO
communiques and to take other
unsavoury policy initiatives, it did retain
some freedom of manoeuvre because the
Radical party, though part of the alternative majority, still wanted it to stay in
power. As long as the government refrained from openly flaunting the policies
of the parliamentary majority, it had at
least some leeway in interpreting it
according to its own wishes.
The resulting situation was unsatisfactory for all parties except perhaps
the left-wing
and tended to give the
official Danish policy line a rather undignified appearance. It was also increasingly
recognized that parliamentary resolutions, very often formulated in the heat
of the debate itself, are poor steering instruments. The problem, however, was
how to get out of this ambivalent
situation. In 1985 an ad hoc committee of
Parliament was entrusted with the task
of finding a possible compromise which
could recreate the old consensus of the
period before 1979. However, by 1988
the committee had still not produced any
results. The impasse was instead resolved
by the governments refusal to accept and
act upon the last parliamentary resolution
in April and, subsequent to the general
election, the inclusion of the Radical party
in the new Schlfter government. Eliminating the old alternative majority, this
move is likely to entail a reduction in the
high level of tension which has characterized the Danish security process in
the 1980s, but not abating it altogether.
The establishment in the summer of 1988
of a broad defence commission charged
with charting the evolution of defence

partly

to

stay in power and

domestic

policy in the next decade may also

improve the general climate of discussion.
On the other hand, conflict may now have
become internalized in the new government between the Conservatives and Liberals on the one hand and the Radicals on
the other.
3.4.

Changes

in

Policy

The processes of change in Danish security policy can be summarized in two concepts : politicization and polarization,
both of which have been high in the 1980s.
Politicization means that security policy
has become a central element in the political struggle for power as well as in the
way the public relates to the political
system. Politicization does not necessarily
lead to policy changes (it may occur on the
basis of &dquo;old&dquo; positions which for some
reason increase their political saliency),
but in this case it has been intertwined
with a strong trend towards polarization,
i.e. for the policy positions of the main
actors to diverge. In Denmark this development has led to significant policy
changes during the 1980s.
These changes have been most pronounced in the field of nuclear weapons
policy. One case in point has been policies
with respect to the dual-track decision of
December 1979 to install 572 mediumrange missiles in Western Europe,
depending on arms control negotiations
with the Soviet Union. Initially the Danish
government, then a Social Democratic
minority government, proposed a 6month delay of the decision in order to
probe the Soviet willingness to negotiate,
but it went along with the decision when
it proved impossible to get support for its
proposal in the NATO Council. (This was
an occasion when coordination between
the four small countries was less than perfect ; the Danish government later felt
some resentment towards Norway and the
Netherlands that it had not been possible

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153
to arrive at an agreed joint position). During the next few years a reluctant support

for the dual-track decision was maintained, though with almost exclusive focus
on its negotiation track and accompanied
by a deep scepticism as to the sincerity of
the Reagan Administration to use this
track. From late 1982 and coinciding with
the formation of a new bourgeois (and
strongly pro-NATO) government the
official Danish attitude
spurred by the
formation of the alternative security
policy majority, expressing itself through
parliamentary resolutions
grew
increasingly negative (Holm & Petersen
-

1983).
In December 1983 Denmark officially
opposed the beginning deployment of INF
missiles in Europe; this was expressed in a

footnote

to the relevant NATO decision.

and until external develthe official

opments made it irrelevant
policy line was a freeze on further deployments in order to increase the chances for
a
negotiated settlement expressed
through more or less ritual footnotes to
various NATO communiquds.
Doubts concerning other aspects of
NATO strategy were also expressed in
parliamentary resolutions, such as opposition to the possible first-use by NATO
of nuclear weapons, to the deployment
of new and modernized tactical nuclear
weapons (the Montebello decision of
1983), to the introduction of new chemical
weapons (binary weapons) in Western
Europe, and to the American SDI
programme.
At the same time, attitudes towards
the idea of a Nordic nuclear-free zone
changed. Until the early 1980s the Danish
attitude to the zone was one of polite
rejection: The zone was seen as neither
necessary (in view of the de facto nuclearfree status of the Nordic countries) nor
desirable (because it would bind these
countries for an unforeseeable future).
This remains the view of the right-of-

Subsequently

but beginning in the

Social Democratic party
warmed towards the idea, which has now
been promoted in several parliamentary
resolutions. Support for the zone is still
coupled with a formal demand that it
should only be established in a wider
European context, but adherence to this
premise is paper-thin in the party; the
other parties in the old alternative
majority reject this linkage as an
unnecessary obstacle (Boel 1987).
Compared to the other small countries,
changes in official policies have gone far
in Denmark, even accounting for the fact
that because of the governments opposition to the line dictated by the parliamentary majority it has at times been
quite difficult to establish what is really
the official policy. However, the basic problematique in Danish policy can be discerned in other countries as well. Most
parallels are found in Norway especially after the Labour party returned
to power in mid-1986 after being in opposition since 1981. The former Conservative-led
had
acute
government
difficulties because of dissension in the
government coalition in keeping Norway
within the NATO dual-track decision in
1983 and had, in 1984, to acquiesce in a
positive compromise formula on the
Nordic nuclear weapons free zone,
which
however - was firmly predicated on the European context (Stortingsmelding 225, 1984). The present
Norwegian Labour government continues
to support the zone concept, but only if
tied to a wider European arrangement.
At present, this attitude seems to be the
major stumbling block to the progress
towards a joint Nordic policy which their
Danish colleagues are pressuring for.
The Danish and Norwegian positions
have not been far apart with respect to
SDI either. In may 1986 the Norwegian
defence minister felt compelled to attach
a footnote to a NATO communiqu6 men-

parties,
early 1980s the
center

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154

tioning SDI - much against the preferred affair. The fact that comparable changes
policy of the government, which is to occur simultaneously in several countries
influence NATO policy from within rather suggests that powerful and broadly
than to register dissent. The government impacting factors are at work. Such fachas also announced its intention to take tors may be of a systemic nature, i.e.
up the question of no-first-use in NATO depend on significant changes in the exterwith a view towards influencing official nal environments of these countries. But
NATO strategy in that direction.
they may also be of an internal character,
Compared to the Scandinavian NATO such as broad societal developments commembers, official policies in the Nether- mon to all four countries. At the same
lands and (especially) Belgium have time, the conspicuous similarities in policy
remained fairly stable. Both countries responses in the four countries suggest
have
with some hesitation
adhered that important cross-national influences
to the dual-track decision, and opposition
(between governments as well as transto central aspects of NATOs nuclear national actors) have played a role as well.
policy has remained limited to Labour On the other hand there are also difand Socialist parties in opposition. On the ferences between the countries, e.g. in
other hand, the Netherlands has reduced the pace and character of change, which
its nuclear role by limiting its number of indicate that more particularistic, dom-

nuclear missions, and in both countries

criticism of official NATO policy has been
rising among opposition parties. The fact
that the Labour and Socialist parties have
been in opposition since 1982 accounts
to a considerable degree for the relative
stability of official policy. In both
countries politicization and polarization
have occurred, though not as strongly as
in the Scandinavian member countries.

estic variables should be included in the

analysis,

too.

The overall explanatory framework of

the present analysis can therefore be illustrated like this:

4. EXPLAINING POLICY CHANGES

We have argued above that important
changes have taken place in the security
policies of four small Northwest European
NATO members with respect to basic political values, relevant actors, policymaking processes and resultant policies.
The changes have been most pronounced
in Denmark and Norway, but similar
phenomena have left a significant impact
on Dutch and Belgian policy as well.
Changes in the domestic balance in these
countries might conceivably have led to
similar policy changes as in the Scandinavian countries.
To explain such comprehensive processes is necessarily quite a complicated

Fig.

1.

Explanatory framework.

4.1. The

Systemic Factors
The systemic, i.e. external, factors have
never
been easily conceptualized in
foreign policy studies. Most analytic
frameworks have been rather ad hoc, and
the present one is no different. As a starting-point, we may take Michael Brecher
(1972), who argues that the external
&dquo;operational environment&dquo; of states can
be divided into three levels: the global

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155

level, comprising among others relations

1980s which led

between the superpowers and between

North and South, the subordinate level,
which covers predominantly interactions
in a regional setting, and the bilateral
level, especially relations with superpowers or other pre-eminent actors in the
salient environment.
The global level.
In a very broad and
not clearly understood way the changes in
security policy which we are discussing can
be associated with some major structural
changes in international politics over the
last twenty years. Changing relationships
between North and South and the shift of
political focus from problems of military
to problems of economic survival in the
1970s served to broaden the basic security
concept in many Western countries to
include other than purely military threats
and to look beyond the nation-state as
the sole source of individual and national
security. How such global megatrends
transform themselves into attitudinal
changes at the level of mass and elite
opinion is a complicated subject which
will not be taken up here, however.
Moving to major trends in the superpower relationship makes it somewhat
easier to establish causal linkages to the
actual policies of small NATO countries.
One underlying factor is presumably the
broad changes in the strategic relationship
between the United States and the Soviet
Union which took place in the 1970s and
which created a situation of perceived
rough strategic parity. With this came
renewed apprehensions in Western
Europe as to the credibility of the American so-called extended deterrence of the
Soviet Union and various initiatives to reestablish the coupling effect of nuclear
weapons in the alliance, especially the
dual-track decision of December 1979.
These problems were exacerbated by
developments in the political relationship
between the United States and the Soviet
Union from the mid-1970s to the mid-

temporary demise of detente. During the

to

the

weakening

and

1970s in Western

Europe there was a

genuine appreciation of the benefits of
detente, not least in the military security
field, where the concerns of the 1950s and
1960s

replaced by a new feeling of

and
even complacency. When the
security
superpower detente broke down in the
late 1970s there was, first, a general aversion to the prospect of a return to another
&dquo;cold war&dquo;, especially in a situation where
the nuclear balance had been questioned,
and secondly a wish to shield the regional
European detente from breaking down,
too. In some circles a genuine fear of a
nuclear war arose for the first time since
the early 1960s.
The regional level.
The effects of
in
the
changes
superpower relationship
coalesced with developments in the
American-European relationship to produce an acute crisis within NATO. Disagreements over detente and the Western
reaction to Afghanistan and Poland were
only a few facets of a generally deteriowere

rating American-European relationship

in the early 1980s. Other aspects were
disagreement over policies in the Third
World, the growth of American unilateralism, and the concomitant expansion of foreign policy cooperation
between the European NATO countries
in
the
EPC
(European Political

Cooperation).
The most immediate and conspicuous
determinant of changing security policy
attitudes in Western Europe has, of
course, been NATOs dual-track decision
of 1979. In all four countries, this decision
triggered an almost uncontrollable
development. To understand this, several
preceding trends in NATO should be
included, especially the tendency of the
US government during the 1970s to
demand a greater European participation
in crucial NATO decisions and also a
greater European share of the defence

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156

burden. The so-called three percent

decision of 1977-78 (taken at a time when
many NATO countries were still acting
on the basis of detente) and especially the
abortive decision on the neutron bomb in
1978 were cases where the ability of small
European countries to &dquo;live up to&dquo; their
alliance responsibilities came under considerable strain; and the neutron bomb
affair also served to politicize the nuclear
issue in an unfavorable way. Against this
background, the dual-track decision in
which the European NATO countries
were asked to take up a larger share of
responsibility for the alliances nuclear
policy than they were used to, strained
the capacity to participate towards the
breaking point, especially for smaller
countries in the alliance.
In the years following the dual-track
decision the general conservative trend in
most NATO countries and in NATOs
own policies with respect to arms control
further alienated those groups (especially
Social Democrats) who had been sceptical
towards the dual-track decision in the first

place.
Bilateral relations.
Among divisive
influences at the bilateral level the advent
of the Reagan Administration was of
special importance. In the case of
Denmark, relations with the United
States had already become somewhat
strained in the late Carter period, over
the INF issue, but most significantly over
defence. But mutual alienation rose with
-

the Reagan Administration, which was

received with deep scepticism on the left
half of the political spectrum, because of
the ultra-conservative character of its
domestic programmes and its hawkish
armaments and arms control policies.
From the beginning there was little faith
in the sincerity of the new administration
as far as arms control, including the negotiation part of the dual-track decision, was
concerned.
To conclude, from the late 1970s a num-

ber of interrelated developments in the

external environment of the European
NATO members changed the context in
which their security policies had been formulated in the previous period. These
were, of course, more or less common to
all NATO members. And the changes
we are discussing can be found in other
countries as well, most clearly in the Federal Republic. It is also evident that these
changes are at least as much related with
&dquo;Social Democratism&dquo; as with national
size. However, it can also be argued that
these changes were especially difficult to
handle for small countries with limited
experience in and capacity for taking part
in and responsibility for major alliance
decisions on nuclear strategy. But to
understand why some states reacted in this
particular way to external stimuli, their
internal environment has to be taken into
account, too.
4.2 The Domestic Factors

Like the external factors, domestic determinants of policy changes can be conceptualized in a number of ways. For a
start these could be divided into a broad
cluster of societal factors, which may very
well be common to most countries, and a
cluster of more specific political factors,
which may vary from one country to
another.
Societal factors.
It might be tempting
to relate the recent changes in security
policy conceptions to the value revolution
which took place in the late 1960s all over
the Western community. The &dquo;long march
through the institutions&dquo; of the 1968 generation may have resulted in the replacement of traditional mainstream attitudes
with new radical or post-modernist attitudes in the political and bureaucratic elite
simply as an effect of generational change.
It may also be hypothesized that these
attitudes trickled down during the 1970s
to be widely accepted by the public at
large. It might furthermore be argued that

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157

this shift in traditional values was accelerated by the general societal crisis phenomena of the 1970s and early 1980s, i.e.
the economic crisis which has reduced the
modern states capability to provide
material security for its citizens, and the
political crisis which in many countries has
led to increasing levels of political distrust.
In a situation where societal values and
political norms are changing, it is plausible
to assume that both general and specific
security policy values change as well

segments of it. The rise of peace

move-

striking illustration of the fact

that security policy values and
perhaps
even more the saliency of security policy
matters
have changed among ordinary
people. The peace movement has not
been equally strong in the four countries
(it has been considerably stronger in the
Netherlands than elsewhere), but in all
of them it signifies an important change
within a significant segment of the
population.
ments is a

Similar effects have been noticeable in

(Szabo 1983, Flynn 1985a).
There are other problems with this kind the political parties. There are indications
of explanation apart from its vagueness. that party activists, e.g. in the Social
Public opinion polls in Denmark and Democratic parties, have become more
other small NATO countries certainly &dquo;leftist&dquo; in their security policy attitudes,
show important attitudinal changes, and that there has been some pressure
especially with respect to nuclear from below, from the basis, on party leadweapons, and there has also been a sig- erships to change their policies. Again,
nificantly growing saliency of security the effects may differ from one country to
policy matters. But these changes are another, depending, inter alia, on the rate
hardly of an order which might by itself of policy change among political elites.
An alternative hypothesis to the demoexplain changes in policy. This is perhaps
evidenced most clearly in the outcomes of cratic hypothesis of pressures from below,
parliamentary elections in the 1980s. By to which responsible politicians react, is
and large, and with the exception of Brit- the elitist hypothesis, according to which
ain, where the radical policy posture of the the political elites on the left have actually
Labour party has repeatedly backfired, spearheaded political changes on their
security policy issues have not been able to own initiative rather than been induced to
make much impact on European election them by their voters and activists, or
results despite a heavy politicization. The alternatively
as a pre-emption of
most conspicuous counter-example, perexpected changes in popular moods
haps, is the Danish election of January (Flynn 1985a). In the Danish case, this
1984, less than one month after the hypothesis has at least some plausibility.
government had been severely defeated Chronologically, changes at the political
in the Folketing over the beginning INF party level preceded, rather than trailed,
deployment, which returned the govern- changes in the public. For example, in
ment to power with a slightly augmented
1979 the left-wing parties and the Social
base.
indications
Democratic
However,
parliamentary
party were alerted to the INF
are that pro-NATO and pro-defence attiissue, before there was significant public
tudes made a certain impact in the Danish awareness of the issue. When the Danish
general election of May 1988, the first peace movement arose in the winter of
election since 1929 to be called on a sec- 1980, the left-wing parties had already
formulated their basic position on the
urity-related issue.
If broad attitudinal changes do not seem issue, and the main contours of the later
to have mobilized the public as a whole,
Social Democratic position (in favour of
have
affected
they
certainly
important negotiations, sceptical towards deploy-

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158

ment) were already visible. In the Danish

(as in the other countries, too) the
really important question to explain is attitude changes in the Social Democratic
party, and to explain these changes other
case

than broad societal influences must be

considered as well.
The elitist
Parliamentary factors.
hypothesis is confirmed in the case of the
Danish Social Democratic party insofar as
the first indications of a changing attitude
towards nuclear weapons came as early
as 1978 in comments by the sitting party
leader Anker Jorgensen and foreign
policy spokesman Lasse Budtz. And in
the autumn of 1979 the first significant
policy departure was more or less forced
upon the party leadership by a group of
new and radical MPs who had just been
elected to the Parliament in the October
1979 elections. Internal factors in the parliamentary group are obviously of some
importance, including the balance
between young and old, establishmentoriented and more radical MPs, etc. In
the Danish case, the party leadership has
also had considerable influence, e.g. the
fact that Anker Jorgensen, party leader
from 1972 to 1987, emotionally sided with
the nuclear pacifists.
The fact that the Social Democratic parties of Northwest Europe went into opposition at crucial moments in NATOs
nuclear discussions probably had an
important impact at least on the rate of
policy change in these parties. In the Danish case the passage into opposition (September 1982) coincided with a marked
radicalization of the partys attitudes
towards INF and a Nordic nuclear-free
zone, even though these changes had been
foreshadowed in the preceding year or so.
Here the special parliamentary situation,
most notably the possibility of creating an
alternative security policy majority
against the government, should be noted.
On the one hand, it gave the Social Democratic opposition a certain incentive to
-

adopt policy positions which might cause

the government diplomatic problems, at
the same time as it freed the party from
the domestic and external restraints which
normally dominate the policies of a
government party. On the other hand, it
also gave the left-wing parties, who until
then had never had any influence on Danish security policy, a chance to influence
the Social Democratic policy process. As
a matter of fact, in the 1982-88 period the
left-wing parties had an important
agenda-setting power through their
skilled use of motion debates in the
Folketing. Quite a number of the resolutions which have been carried in the
Folketing since 1982 are revised, i.e.
diluted, versions of drafts originally presented by the left-wing parties. A final
element in the change of Danish security
policy over the last few years is, of course,
the attitude of the Schlilter four-party
government from 1982 to 1988. Politically
and ideologically this government was
thoroughly opposed to the policies of the
parliamentary majority. The resolutions
passed were in total conflict with the basic
attitudes of the government parties even
though they usually elected to abstain
rather than vote against them for politicaltactical reasons. In fact, it may be argued
that the four coalition parties were more
&dquo;conservative&dquo; and NATO-oriented in
their security policy postures during this
period than they used to be before the
politicization of Danish security policy
set in.
Nevertheless, the government chose for
a long period to accept repeated parliamentary defeats and to represent the
parliamentary resolutions externally, e.g.
by affixing footnotes to pertinent NATO
documents. As mentioned, it did so for
several reasons. One is that it preferred
to remain in power rather than resign
(which would have been the normal parliamentary reaction) in order to save its
economic programme and in the expec-

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159

tation that the conflict over security policy

would not be a suitable election theme.
Another reason was that by staying in
power the government might be able to
control the implementation of the new
security policy line. If, therefore, it
became quite difficult at times to precisely
define the official Danish policy line, it
was due as much to the highly pragmatic
attitudes of the government and the Radical party as to the influence of the left-ofcenter parties of the alternative majority.
4.3. Transnational Factors

Finally, a cluster of factors which are of

increasing importance in the formulation
of national security policies should be
mentioned, namely transnational relations. Security policy-making does not
take place in a vacuum where each
national decision unit or other actor reacts

independently to external and internal

policy stimuli, some of which may be common to

several units. Such reactions

are

increasingly influenced by or coordinated

with the reaction of corresponding
decision units and actors in other
countries. Governments seek to coordinate their responses, and sub-national
actors, such as political parties and social
movements, do likewise.
The most conspicuous development has
probably been the evolution of transnational links at the sub-national level.
Since 1981, Social Democratic parties of
the four countries and Luxembourg have
met regularly with their sister parties of
Britain, France and, most importantly,
the Federal Republic, in the so-called
Scandilux group to coordinate their
nuclear policies, especially with respect to
INF and SDI. The influence of this group
upon the individual parties has varied, but
in the case of INF and the Danish Social
Democrats it was certainly high (Petersen

1985).
For the Danish and Norwegian Social
consultation with other

Democrats,

Nordic sister

parties has also played an

important role, e.g. with respect to the
proposed Nordic nuclear weapons-free
zone. Broader cooperation fora are the
Socialist International, the Confederation
of the Socialist Parties of the European
Community, and the recently established
forum for the Social Democratic parties in
NATO Europe as a whole. Other political
parties have also developed their transnational contacts, but not to the same
degree as the Social Democratic parties.
The peace movements transnational
network is another example of the increasing role of transnationalism. In the case of
the Danish peace movements, the prime
contacts have been with Nordic sister
movements (primarily the No to Nuclear
Weapons group), with the END (also No
to Nuclear Weapons), and with the Sovietdominated World Peace Congress (the
Co-operation Committee for Peace and
Security). These contacts serve as important inputs of ideas and proposals into the
national debates.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The

empirical referents of this analysis of

security policy changes in small NATO
countries have largely been to Danish
developments. This, of course, raises the
question to what extent its empirical findings can be generalized to the other three
countries discussed here. If so, are they
also generalizable to other small NATO
countries, or even to small non-aligned
countries in Europe?
As far as our analytical &dquo;nucleus&dquo; is
concerned, it is felt that the level of gener-

alizability is fairly high, even though it has

been demonstrated in any comas such. For particular
domestic reasons the impact of security
policy changes has been stronger in Denmark than elsewhere, but the general
direction and content of change has been
very similar in the four countries: Policy
not

parative analysis

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160

values have changed in the same direction

and at approximately the same pace; the
group of actors has expanded in about the
same way, etc. With respect to changes in
the policy process, different patterns have
occurred with the Danish alternative par-

liamentary majority as a unique phenomwhich is now defunct and unlikely

to be reproduced in other countries. On
enon

the other

hand, all four countries have

experienced the breakdown of traditional

consensus patterns, and politicization and
polarization have complicated the policy
process substantially. The actual impact
of these changes on official policy differs
also with Denmark and Belgium at either
end of the spectrum. However, such difare largely due to electoral and

ferences

parliamentary coincidences; relatively

small changes in election outcomes might
conceivably have produced major security
policy changes in Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium.
If our results are fairly generalizable to
these three countries, how about the small
NATO countries in Southern Europe, i.e.
Portugal, Greece and Turkey? As a matter of fact, Greece has taken positions in
NATO which are akin to, but more radical
than those of the Danish alternative
majority. Turkey and Portugal, on the
other hand, have stayed within the
alliance mainstream with few signs of
dissent. A comparative analysis of Greece
and the Northwestern NATO countries
would certainly be needed in order to
establish whether, for instance, the joint
Danish and Greek footnotes to NATO

communiquds are generically comparable

phenomena or not. But the immediate
impression is that Greeces NATO policy
under Papandreou is rooted in factors
other than those discussed above: domestic conflicts, party (PASOK) ideology,
the traditional enmity towards Turkey,
and an ambiguous historical relationship
with the United States. If this is correct,
the changes which have been discussed

be concentrated among though

the
exclusively represented by
more politically and economically mature
countries of Northern Europe, i.e. postseem to

not

industrial welfare states.

These are also countries with a sizable
Social Democratic influence. It might
therefore be suggested that it is not so
much the comparative smallness of
Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and
Belgium which makes the difference, but
rather their modernity, which is reflected
in a heavy Social Democratic imprint on
society. There is evidently much support
for this hypothesis, as security policy
changes which are very similar to those of
the four countries have occurred in the
in a somewhat
Federal Republic and
different form-in Britain. Furthermore,
developments in Western Germany (in
the SPD and the peace movement) have
had a demonstrably significant effect on
the smaller neighbour states. Any analysis
of policy changes in these countries should
include not only the Social Democratic
factor and to a larger degree than has
been the case in this article, but also a
dissemination factor. Still, it is felt that the
Social Democratic factor cannot explain
everything, and that the small state background of the four is an important contributing factor which explains how these
countries reacted to external stimuli.
If this is correct, how have these stimuli
affected small modem countries which are
non-aligned, such as Sweden, Finland or
Austria? Again, there is a lack of comparative analyses, but it is probably safe
to state that even though comparable
developments have occurred, they have
been much weaker in the neutral than in
the NATO-aligned countries. This should
cause no wonder as many or most of the
developments which have caused changes
in the NATO countries have their origin
either in the alliance itself or in the
alliance-to-alliance relationship. The neutral countries have not been involved in

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161

the dual-track decision or policy-making

in the nuclear field and have not experienced the stress which participation in
these decisions produced in the small
member countries. Alignment-non-alignment obviously makes a significant difference in the security policy-making of a
small country.
To sum up, four main factors have been
isolated which between them have significantly influenced the way four
countries in Northwest Europe have
reacted to the changing security policy
in no
climate of the 1980s. They are
NATO-alignment,
particular order
smallness, economic and political modernity, and a significant Social Democratic
influence. Further comparative analysis,
e.g. on the model suggested in this paper,
would obviously be needed to assign relative potencies to these and other factors
which have influenced the security policy
scene in the four countries.
These determining factors are likely to
remain fairly stable in the foreseeable
future. Even though the trend towards
the &dquo;Europeanization&dquo; of defence is likely
to continue, it does not seem very plausible in 1988 that the basic EuropeanAmerican relationship will wither away.
And the Social Democratic factor, which
has been the most dynamic one in the
1980s, will also remain strong, even
though its particular impact may fluctuate
with shifting election successes and changing parliamentary coalitions.
On the other hand, the external
environment of the late 1980s has changed
dramatically compared to the early 1980s.
The politicization/polarization process
described above was basically a response
to the deteriorating international climate
created by the interplay of harsh and
unimaginative policies on the part of the
late Brezhnev regime and the rash and
unpredictable policies of the incoming
Reagan Administration. In the Soviet
Union the staleness of Brezhnevs &dquo;stag-

period&dquo; has now given way to the

imagination, dynamism and &dquo;new thinking&dquo; of the Gorbachev era, while the
outgoing Reagan Administration has
reformed itself considerably during its
nation

second term. As a result the new cold war

of the early 1980s has been transformed
into a new, more cooperative superpower
relationship whose landmark so far is the
elimination of the formerly divisive INF
issue. In this atmosphere demands on the
smaller European allies are likely to diminish and also to change in a direction
which makes adaptation easier. The exact
challenges of the new situation on the
small NATO countries cannot yet be predicted exactly, but it seems to be a fair
assumption that their responses will be
conditioned by the changes which took
place in the 1980s. Changes in security
policy values, especially with respect to
nuclear weapons and the principles of
defence, are likely to influence their
responses, just as the way these responses
are formulated will be predicated on the
high level of politicization and participation reached in the early 1980s. In
this respect, developments in the 1980s
have presumably left a permanent imprint
on the security policy process. On the
other hand, its polarization may very well
diminish, as the Danish &dquo;test case&dquo;
already seems to indicate.

NOTE
This is a revised and updated version of a
paper originally prepared for a workshop on
"The Foreign Policies of Small European
States: The Comparative Perspective", ECPR
Joint Sessions of Workshops, Amsterdam, 1015 April 1987.

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