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PEOPLE v.

ROMERO
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of COLLATERAL FATCS and circumstances
from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common
experience.
Collateral matters those matters or evidence which have no connection with the
fact in issue.
Circumstantial evidence:
a. There is more than one circumstance;
b. The facts from which the inferences are deried have been established; and
c. The combination of all the circumstances unavoidably leads to a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
TOWNE and CITY DEVELOPMENT CORP v. CA
In PNB v. CA, court ruled that while a receipt of payment is the best evidence of the
fact of payment, it is, however, not conclusive but merely presumptive; fact of
payment may also be established by PAROLE EVIDENCE.
According to PNB, the issue was not what appears on the receipt (best evidence
rule) but rather how much money did respondent paid to PNB. This will allow
presentation of evidence aliunde.
In the PNB case, although a receipt is not conclusive evidence, the respondents
failed to disclose any other evidence sufficient and strong enough to overturn the
acknowledgment embodied in petitioners receipt (as to the amount of money it
actually received.) Kumbaga PNB failed to present any other evidence saying that it
did not receive the amount stated in the receipt.
SALAMERA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Sandiganbayan did not base the penalty on the minimum value of the gun in the
absensce of evidence of its true worth. It took judicial notice of its MARKET VALUE
and its estimated REASONABLE VALUE.
Sandiganbayan could not take judicial notice of the valur of the gun. It must be duly
proved in evidence as a fact. The court can not take judicial notice of a DISPUTED
FACT.

PAROL EViDENCE
THE SUCCEEDING TWO CASES REFER TO THE EXCEPTION OF PAROLE
EVIDENCE RULE WITH RESPECT TO THE FAILURE OF THE WRITTEN
AGREEMENT TO REVEAL TRUE INTENT. (NOT SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENTS
ENTERED AFTER THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT)
ORTANES v. CA, OSCAR INNOCENTES
In this case, the defendant-former judge testified that there exist a condition
precedent between the parties before the titles to the land could be delivered.
But such condition was not referred to or even included in the deeds of sale.
(THEREFORE THE CONTRACT IS ALREADY EXISTING, ANY PAROL EVIDENCE WILL
HAVE THE EFFECT OF MODIFYING THE TERMS OF AGREEMENT)
The general rule is that the contents of the writing are the only repository of the
terms of the agreement.
Parol evidence rule forbids any addition to the TERMS of a written agreement by
testimony purporting to show that, AT OR BEFORE the signing of the document,
OTHER TERMS WERE ORALLY AGREED UPON by the parties.
LAND SETTLEMENT DEVELOPMENT CO v. GARCIA PLANTATION.
FACTS:
A sued B for recovery of sum of money.
B admitted the existence of the promissory notes but argued that the same has
been novated by a SUBSEQUENT agreement in writing (Letter L).
Said agreement gave the respondents an extension up to May 31, 1957 to pay.
Since the suit was filed February 20, 1957, respondent argues that it is premature.
Plaintiff in its answer admitted the due execution of Letter L, but argues that the
same DID NOT EXPRESS THE TRUE INTENT AND AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES, and
placing such fact in issue in the pleadings.
According to the plaintiff, LETTER L is subject to a condition precedent that they
will pay a substantial down payment immediately, with the understanding that
upon non-payment of the substantial amount, the extension shall be deemed as
NOT GRANTED, and plaintiff can seek redress in court

THIS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE LETTER L THAT IS WHY THEY ARE PROVING
IT BY PAROL EVIDENCE
On trial, plaintiff presented X, the one who drafted and prepared Letter L. But the
respondents opposed. The trial court ruled out the testimony under parole evidence
rule.
RTC dismissed the case as prematurely filed. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING PAROL EVIDENCE TENDING TO
PROVE THE TRUE INTENTION AND AGREEMENT OF PARTIES AND THE EXISTENCE OF
A CONDITION PRECEDENT, BEFORE THE EXTENSION GRANTED THE DEFENDANT.
HELD: YES, THE COURT ERRRRRRRRRRRRED!
That there was such condition precedent is manifested by the second paragraph of
the letter Exhibit L, quoted hereunder:
November 20, 1956
Mrs. Salud de Garcia Tacurong, Cotabato
Dear Madam;
Please be advised that the Board has granted you an extension up to May 31,
1957, within which to pay your account.

This matter has been the subject of agreement between your


husband and this office.
(SO THE CONDITION PRECEDENT IS NOT IN WRITTEN IN THE
LETTER. THE LETTER MADE REFERENCE ONLY TO THE
CONDITION. )
(THIS IS NOT PRESENT IN THE ORTANES CASE WHERE THE
FORMER JUDGE TESTIFIED THAT THERE EXIST A CONDITION
PRECEDENT BEFORE THE DELIVERY OF THE TITLES OF LAND
BUT SUCH CONDITION WAS NOT REFERRED OR EVEN INCLUDED
ON THE DEEDS OF SALE.)
When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an event, which, for that reason is a
condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence.

This is not varying the terms of the written contract by extrinsic agreement, for
the simple reason that there is no contract in existence; there is nothing to which
to apply the excluding rule (Heitman vs. Commercial Bank of Savannah, 6 Ga. App. 584, 65 SE 590, cited
in Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., 200), "...

This rule does not prevent the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show that a
supposed contract never became effective by reason of the failure of some
collateral condition or stipulation, pre-requisite to liability" (Peabody & Co. v. Bromfield &
Ross, 38 Phil. 841).
The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing, does not extend so far as to preclude the admission
of extrinsic evidence, to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such
evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains reference to such collateral
agreement (Robles v. Lizarraga Hnos., 50 Phil. 387).

In the case at bar, reference is made of a previous agreement, in the second


paragraph of letter Exhibit L, and although a document is usually to be
interpreted in the precise terms in which it is couched, Courts, in the exercise of
sound discretion, may admit evidence of surrounding circumstances, in order to
arrive at the true intention of the parties.

RAYMUNDO v. LUNARIA

First, the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms
of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that,
"at or before" the execution of the parties written agreement, other or different
terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written
contract.10 Notably, the claimed verbal agreement was agreed upon not prior to
but "subsequent to" the written agreement.
Second,

the validity of the written agreement is not the matter which is being put in
issue here. What is questioned is the validity of the claim that a subsequent verbal agreement was
agreed upon by the parties after the execution of the written agreement which substantially modified their
earlier written agreement.
Nonetheless, even if we apply the (EXCEPTION TO PAROL, Letter (d)) parol evidence rule in this case,

the evidence presented by the petitioners fell short in proving that a subsequent
verbal agreement was in fact entered into by the parties . We subscribe to the findings of
both the trial court and the appellate court that the evidence presented by petitioners did not establish the
existence of the alleged subsequent verbal agreement. As pointed out by the trial court

WILLEX PLASTIC INDUSTRIES CORP.


Vs.
CA, and INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK.

MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY


VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, RTC

PAROL CONTEMPORANEOUS AGREEMENT EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT


PRIOR PAROL AGREEMENT MUST BE REFERRED OR INCLUDED IN THE
WRITTEN AGREEMENT
Where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the moving cause of the written
contract, or where the parol agreement forms part of the consideration of the
written contract, and it appears that the written contract was executed on the faith
of the parol contract or representation, such evidence is admissible
It is recognized that proof is admissible of any collateral parol agreement that is not inconsistent with the terms of
the written contract though it may relate to the same subject matter.
The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude the admission
of existing evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties, but
such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference
to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity. 9