Ynot vs IAC - A case Digest

RESTITUTO YNOT -petitioner; an owner of carabaos

Station Commander, Integrated National Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo & the Regional
Director, Bureau of Animal Industry, Region IV- respondents
Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ISSUE:
Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The
petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
Petitioner raised the issue of EOs constitutionality and filed case in the lower court.
However, the court sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on
the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner
appealed the decsion to IAC with the following contentions:
1. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright
2. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court.
3. Measure should have not been presumed
4. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
President.
HELD:
Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications:
1. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as theres no exigency
showing to justify the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President
2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction

3. Case involved roving commission and invalid delegation of powers and invalid exercise of
police power
4. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his defence
and was immediately condemned and punish

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

J. Fernando
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del
Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable
in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to
regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00
license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there
was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal
information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be
violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,
restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for
being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels
that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:

"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights
under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in
the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation
of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance
set aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution.
Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of
the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the
income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in
each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist
both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal
infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are
not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to
meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power
and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in
fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known
legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or
tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg.
Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed
purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24
hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not

license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of
the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the
sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities
about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No.
7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission
Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension
Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance
sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room
rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa
Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and
motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-inintervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as
operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of
police power.

RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution. Reference was made to
the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to
needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could
nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on
cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that
under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances
it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right
to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that
admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power
is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful
objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect
on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as
such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr
ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association,

Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions
and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the
respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public
morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be
described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but
the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this
is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives
of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of
Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely
wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently
sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local
Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right
to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous
and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves,
are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet
the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be
analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the
only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to
property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the
petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who
would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental
rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm
to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude.

The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has
been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the
common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of
it should be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to
the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product
and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in
fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as
curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would
be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws
and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day
rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers
a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is
a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical

intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting
the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates
wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.

CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO

MARCH 30, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON.
JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and
Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S.
LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a

corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City
of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City
Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is
entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION

THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors
were committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows
operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in
declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an
enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is
found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated
power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the
rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty
and property.
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the
Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of
the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights

a violation of the due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social
and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives
of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means
employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys social ills
can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and
transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance
have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the
prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social
and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of
prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the
moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual
activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of illrepute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social
ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may
exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may
even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably
accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its
purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of
a persons fundamental right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used
for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of
the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private
property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking occurs
when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A regulatory taking
occurs when the governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of
the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation
is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that
interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good,
that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three (3)
months from its approval within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to

any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of
business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business operations
amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is
practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an
allowed business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty
and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options

to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area

or to convert into allowed businesses

are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent

closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also

equivalent to a taking of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning
ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a wholesome property to
a use which cannot reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property
without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious
purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no
support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government
units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to
cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close
down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its
execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the
unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to
be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by
which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify
the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to disturb the community, annoy
the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible
standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. Petitioners cannot
therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due
process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are
commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the
public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is
invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a
just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels
in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not
become any less noxious if located outside the area.
The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as
prostitution

one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish

is not a profession

exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in
prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1
thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to
legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still
withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet
applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and

property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be
said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community.
It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions
of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential
Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage
depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any
machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to
have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the
same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and
impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be
forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is
therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. v. CA 260 SCRA 319 August 5, 1996 (CASE
DIGEST)

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL INC.,

petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in
his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and
HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, respondents.

G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996

KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity)
filed a class suit on January 27, 1995 assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which
establishes various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a
new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former and other
related issuance, principally contending that the said orders, 1.)violated the constitutional
right to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.) deprived individual
artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the issuance
of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the
constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction against the orders.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary
for brevity) filed a motion for intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial
court on February 15, 1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an
order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the
compliant. An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also
however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was issed. The Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the said issuance constituted a valid
exercise of Police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.
RULING:
Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were
issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State.
The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as
a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state particularly when their
conduct afffects either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion so as to not
disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define
the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose
injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or
accreditation requirements violates due process clause is to ignore the settled practice,
under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or

profession. Professional leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical
exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed that these
requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process
clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards
no such deprivation exists.

Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was
to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the
peoples economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the
capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in
the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their
business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or
voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or
until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the
laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws
relating to trade, commerce and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff:
reasons:
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their
liberty and property without due process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations

the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal
protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences
between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated
alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the
retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in the
enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the
national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm
for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance
or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or
emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the
country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on
whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices,
the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the
national security in times of crisis and emergency.

Espina vs. Zamora, Jr. Digest

G.R. No. 143855: September 21, 2010
REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO
AMATONG, ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, RAUL M. GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY,
JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI AND FRANKLIN BAUTISTA, Petitioners, v. HON. RONALDO
ZAMORA, JR. (EXECUTIVE SECRETARY), HON. MAR ROXAS (SECRETARY OF TRADE
AND INDUSTRY), HON. FELIPE MEDALLA (SECRETARY OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY), GOV. RAFAEL BUENAVENTURA (BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS) AND HON. LILIA BAUTISTA (CHAIRMAN, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION), Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
On March 7, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762,
also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180,
which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business.
R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories.
R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now
reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as
Filipino citizens.
On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members of the House of Representatives, filed the
present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:
The law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins
the State to place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal
distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full employment, and protect
Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies.
The implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken
together with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of
effective Filipino control of the economy.
Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store

vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment.

The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage of R.A.
8762 on the government as a condition for the release of certain loans.
There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or
combinations in restraint of trade.
Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary Mar
Roxas, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe Medalla,
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura, and Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:
Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they
are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public funds.
The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.
Petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762.
Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that
are judicially demandable.
The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It
directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of investments upon the
recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest so dictates. But the
Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such
reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of
foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762
Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional
POLITICAL LAW: Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come
to a court of justice and make such a challenge.

HELD:
Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of justice and
make such a challenge. More particularly, standing refers to his personal and substantial
interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of the passage of that
law.
Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization
Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators.
Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since the rule on standing can be relaxed
for nontraditional plaintiffs when the public interest so requires or the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
POLITICAL LAW: The declarations of principles and state policies in the Constitution
are not self-executing.
As the Court explained in Tanada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987
Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing.
Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
Furthermore, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development
of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino
entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic
environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from
maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all
areas of development.
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the
discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of
the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what
policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws
allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to
Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade
business to foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The NEDA has not opposed such policy.

Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762
save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no
showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not
convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of
the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong argument
to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation
in that business. Thus First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories aboveenumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in
countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail trade
business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain
retailing activities outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores
or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari
stores and such other similar retailing activities.
15 Phil 85 THE UNITED STATES vs LUIS TORIBIO, G.R. NO. L-5060, January 26, 1910
Facts:
Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No.
1147, an Act
regulating the registration,branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in
the trial court
found that appellant slaughtered or caused to beslaughtered for human consumption, the
carabao described
in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of themunicipality where
it was
slaughtered. Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal but
was not given
one because the carabao was not found to be unfit for agricultural work which resulted to
appellant to
slaughter said carabao in a
place other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the validity of a
provision under Act
No. 1147 which statesthat only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered.

Held:
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of
discussion in the
appellate courts of nearlyevery State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include
everything essential
to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by
summary
proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this powerit has
been held that the
State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise e
ndangering the lives of passers
by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased
cattle; the
destruction of decayed orunwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities;
the regulation
of railways and other means of public conveyance,and of interments in burial grounds; the
restriction of
objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the
confinement of the
insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and
habitualdrunkards;
the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of
gambling houses and
places whereintoxicating liquors are sold.
Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and
in this particular
a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the
interests of the
public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests
. (Barbier
vs.
Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd
vs.

Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.)To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the
public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the publicgenerally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class,
require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonablynecessary for the
accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under
theguise of
protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and
unnecessary restrictionsupon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to
what is a proper
exercise of its police powers is not final orconclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the
court.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the
statute under
consideration was requiredby "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a
particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughterof carabaos for human
consumption, so long as
these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonablynecessary"
limitation on
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals
by their
slaughterby improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire
to enjoy the
luxury of animal food, even when byso doing the productive power of the community may
be measurably
and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorp

Velasco vs Villegas
G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983
Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the
City of Manila, petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of
the City of Manila, which prohibited the business of massaging customers of a barber shop.
They contend that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood
without due process of law.
Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise of
police power
Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of
respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment
are: (1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of
massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely
different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in
order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate
rooms for massage of customers.
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare
clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice
Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which delegates in
statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been
given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular
circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is
the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.

Agustin vs Edu 88 SCRA 195

Facts
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No.
229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to
procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is
disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land
Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are
unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the
law and undue delegation of police power.

Issue
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued is
unconstitutional

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are deemed not
unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established to
promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the
constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of
the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the
United Nations - that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents
due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways.

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation, 117 SCRA 597
Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011
(Administrative Law, reasonableness, quasi-judicial power)
Facts: Board of Transportation issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 providing for the phasing
out and replacement of old and dilapidated taxis beyond 6 years old.
Pursuant to the BOT circular, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing Circular No.
52 instructing the implementation of said circular and formulating a schedule of phase-out of
vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.
Petitioners seek to declare the nullity of the circulars on the ground that fixing the ceiling at 6 years
is arbitrarily and oppressive because the road worthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of
maintenance and the use to which they are subjected and therefore their actual physical condition
should be taken into consideration at the time of the registration.
Issue: WON a circular phasing out taxicabs more than 6 years old is unreasonable and arbitrary.
Held: No. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles uniformly, fairly and justly.
The span of 6 yearsw supplies that reaonable standard. By the time taxis have fully depreciated,
theircost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. Thyey are also generally dilapidated
and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public.
Taxicabs in Manila, compared to those in other places are subject to heavier traffic pressure and
constant use.

BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011
GR # L-50908 January 31, 1984 (Constitutional Law Police Power, LOI, No Violation of
Equal Protection Clause)
FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted
oil crisis, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy)
plates on week-ends and holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due
process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.
Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents
imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners
of the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for
being violative of the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power.
Respondents denied the above allegations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular
No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights.
HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that
presses urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus
due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into
the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely
affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation
for its invalidity.
Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the
imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth
is valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle.

G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933 Case Digest

G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933, October 11, 2011
Emilio Gancayco
vs City Government of Quezon City and MMDA
Ponente: Sereno

Facts:
In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of land located in EDSA. Then on
March 1956, Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of
arcades for commercial buildings to be constructed. At the outset, it bears emphasis that
at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building
code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of
buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this particular
ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the
wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus,
the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line,
thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners
relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for
their own purposes.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965,
Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his
property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing
an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request and
issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, subject to the condition that upon notice by the City
Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at
his own expense when public interest so demands.
Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along
EDSA, in consequence, they sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a
portion of his building violated the National Building Code.
Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a petition for TRO with the RTC Quezon
City to prohibit the MMDA from demolishing his property. The RTC rendered its Decision
on 30 September 2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco. It held that the questioned ordinance
was unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice
Gancaycos 375 square meters of property were being taken without compensation for the
publics benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that the
ordinance violated owners right to equal protection of laws.
MMDA appealed with the CA. CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it
demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to
sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila,
thus excluding Justice Gancaycos private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is
not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances.
Issues:

(1) WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904. (2) WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS
CONSTITUTIONAL.(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCOS
BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE. (4) WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY
DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.
Ruling:
(1) We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to
comply with all issuances of the BIR, which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner
did not commit any false misrepresentation or misleading act.
(2) Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection
when he also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco
himself requested for an exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was
eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the
demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the
ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different treatment of properties that appears
to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do so.
(3) The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from
constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not
nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety
of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not
necessarily make that structure a nuisance. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a
permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the
building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property.
This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the
structure.

Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its
condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a
nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is
not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY OF DAR, G.R. No. 78742 (175

SCRA 343), July 14, 1989

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D.

GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE,
CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J.
SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO
B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C.
ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE &
NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA,
HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE,
INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO
AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and
229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and
the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without
just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the
Congress and not to the President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No.
229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation,
due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous
with payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of
the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued
by the President and that the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that
no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation which was
denied to the petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so
far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the Honorable
Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of
Eminent Domain.
RULING:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction
between the police power and the power of eminent domain, property condemned under
police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of
such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent

Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to
the owner of the property expropriated.
VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAEDA, JR., ET. AL.
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 (damnun absque injuria)
Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question, being public in
nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private
occupancy.
CRUZ, J.:
Facts:
In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands on a strip of
land, a conglomeration of vendors stalls together. The petitioners claim they have a right to
remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization
(Resolution no. 28) granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny
this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per
municipal council Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking
place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No.
218.
Issue:
WON petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land.
Ruling:
Petition Dismissed.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of
market stalls, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement
according to law. The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed
premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease
contracts. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have
effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be
surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. Hence, the loss or
damage caused to petitioners, in the case at bar, does not constitute a violation of a legal
right or amount to a legal wrong - damnum absque injuria.

RC vs. De Guzman, G. R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004Constitutional Law: Police PowerFacts:
The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro
Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by
the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then
released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.Shortly
thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees
from Fatima Collegein the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam,
Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and
exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100%
in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne.
The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or
better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the
performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that
strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a
record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination.For its
part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993]
Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early
access to the test questions.The Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993,
charging respondents with "immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection
with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results of the
Fatima examinees be nullified. Trial courts judgment is rendered ordering the respondents
to allow the petitioners and intervenors to take the physicians oath and to register them as
physicians without prejudice to any administrative disciplinary action which may be taken
against any of the petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided by law and
consistent with the requirements of the Constitution as any other professionals.Issue:
Whether or not the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 known as The Medical Act of 1959 a valid
exercise of police power.Held:Yes. It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional
right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable,
and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power
of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare
of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring
scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite
to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field
of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance among thosewho would practice medicine.It must be stressed, nevertheless, that
the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be
exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A
political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both

forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may
not, however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the
license.

Didipio v Gozun (Natural resources)

DIDIPIO v GOZUN
GR No. 157882
March 30, 2006
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of
1995, together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 9640, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
entered into on 20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining
Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under the laws of Australia and owned by its
nationals.
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that
now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the
controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.
on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of
37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this
area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration
Contract Area, the full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same. It also
bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into private lands by surface
owners or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein.
Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an organization of farmers and
indigenous peoples organized under Philippine laws, representing a community actually

affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other residents of areas affected by the
mining activities of CAMC.
ISSUES & RULINGS:
I
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA ARE VOID BECAUSE
THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST AND UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT PAYMENT
OF JUST COMPENSATION , IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
NO.
The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the foreignowned contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface
areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine infrastructure. The
government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on behalf of the contractor,
through a voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to fully implement
the FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet called for at this stage since there are still various
avenues by which surface rights can be acquired other than expropriation. The FTAA
provision under attack merely facilitates the implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC
and shields it from violating the Anti-Dummy Law.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and
regulations do not provide for just compensation in expropriating private properties.
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of
just compensation.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE MINING ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE VOID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR SANCTIONING AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS OF DETERMINING JUST
COMPENSATION.
NO.
there is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and its implementing rules and
regulations that exclude the courts from their jurisdiction to determine just compensation
in expropriation proceedings involving mining operations.
Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of Arbitrators the authority to decide cases
where surface owners, occupants, concessionaires refuse permit holders entry, thus,

necessitating involuntary taking, this does not mean that the determination of the just
compensation by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board is final and
conclusive. The determination is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned.
There is nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or
the Mines Adjudication Board to determine in a preliminary matter the reasonable
compensation due the affected landowners or occupants. The original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts to decide determination of just compensation remains intact
despite the preliminary determination made by the administrative agency.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE, THROUGH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC
FTAA, ABDICATED ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FULL CONTROL AND
SUPERVISION OVER NATURAL RESOURCES.
RA 7942 provides for the state's control and supervision over mining operations. The
following provisions thereof establish the mechanism of inspection and visitorial rights over
mining operations and institute reportorial requirements.
The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 hardly relegates the State to the role of a passive
regulator dependent on submitted plans and reports. On the contrary, the government
agencies concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct
and change -- the various work programs and the corresponding minimum expenditure
commitments for each of the exploration, development and utilization phases of the mining
enterprise.

IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE ROLE OF WHOLLY
FOREIGN AND FOREIGN-OWNED CORPORATIONS IN THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN MINING
ENTERPRISES, VIOLATES PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 2, ARTICLE XII OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
the use of the word involving signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of
assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial
or technical assistance.

Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there was a conscious and deliberate
decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the
expression agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance in an
exclusionary and limiting manner.
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS SERVICE CONTRACTS
NO. The mere fact that the term service contracts found in the 1973 Constitution was not
carried over to the present constitution, sans any categorical statement banning service
contracts in mining activities, does not mean that service contracts as understood in the
1973 Constitution was eradicated in the 1987 Constitution.

The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State; this time, however,
safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime.
the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in
paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new
ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the
other, the government as principal or owner of the works. In the new service contracts,
the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial
expertise in the creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the
government, through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision
over the entire operation.
OBITER DICTA: ! justiciable controversy: definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law
through the application of a law. ! to exercise the power of judicial review, the following
must be extant (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.
In the instant case, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights as Rep.
Act No. 7942 has been enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs have been
entered into. The FTAA holders have already been operating in various provinces of the
country.

(2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and - A question is considered ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. (3) the person challenging must have the standing" - personal or
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a
generalized grievance.
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.
Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.
! taking under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private property for more
than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to
a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way
as to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
(5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
! Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation in Police Power
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to
which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use
upon payment of just compensation.On the other hand, police power is the power of the
state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property.
Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for
their object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as an
implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions between the two.

Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose; hence, no compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police power,
property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. Thus, an ordinance
prohibiting theaters from selling tickets in excess of their seating capacity (which would
result in the diminution of profits of the theater-owners) was upheld valid as this would
promote the comfort, convenience and safety of the customers.
where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be
injurious to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued existence
would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking. However, when a
property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is compensable
taking.

! On different roles and responsibilities:

* DENR Secretary : accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with
the foreign proponent. (Executive Order No. 279, 1987)
! in re: easements and taking
In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, it was held that the imposition of burden over a private
property through easement was considered taking; hence, payment of just compensation is
required. The Court declared: And, considering that the easement intended to be
established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not merely a real right that will
encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the
same, by expropriating it for public use which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished
unless the owner of the property condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified,
it is proper to protect the appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is
only adequate remedy when no other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent
which is nothing short of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the
coercive power with which the same is invested.
! in order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must be
inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act.

G.R. No. L-3491 June 24, 1983

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.

Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death.
As such, the Quezon City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop
any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the
owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance
No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondents property is a valid and reasonable
exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the
burial ground of paupers. They further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized
under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, to make such further ordinances
and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for
the protection of property therein.
On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or
confiscation of property was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently
restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
Held:

No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law (Art. Ill, Section 1
subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of
government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power,
(2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution
as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any
provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police
power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to
tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be
established or practised in the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit or confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the
operation of a memorial park cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to
merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his
property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the
general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury
sustained in consequence thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses,
a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health,
morals and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle,
growing out of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however
absolute and may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of
their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. A property in the state is held
subject to its general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general
welfare. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and
to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under
the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think
necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed with plenary
power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of the
people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and

providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of
the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.
However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at
least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by
Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the
city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and
to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law
regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may
provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law
or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and
practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment
of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds,
and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The
necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements
which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and
wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by
the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent
court is affirmed.

CRUZ v. PARAS
Facts: Being the principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of their other
adverse effects on the community, the respondents passed Ordinance No. 84 which may be
cited as the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan which says that
operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses
to operate within the jurisdiction of the municipality and no license/permit shall be issued

to any professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer for employment in
any of the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition in the issuance of
licenses/permits to said persons and operators of said establishments shall include
prohibition in the renewal thereof. Petitioners allege that their rights to due process and
equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in
effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. The lower court dismissed the cases of
prohibition with preliminary injunction and upheld the constitutionality of the
Ordinance in question. Hence, the petition for certiorari by way of appeal.Issue: Whether
or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents,
canprohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a
lawful occupation
Held:
No Ratio: Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows:
"General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations. - The municipal
council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon
it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. "It
is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. If night clubs were
merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the
test of validity. The case is different from Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators v. City
Mayor because what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power
but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. The writ of certiorari is granted and the
decision of the lower court reversed, set aside, and nullified. Ordinance No. 84,
Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and
unconstitutional