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Encinada
G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997, 280 SCRA 72
FACTS: Appeal from a decision of the RTC convicting appellant
Roel Encinada of Illegal Transpotation of prohibited drugs from
Surigao City to Cebu, under Sec. 4 of R.A. 6425 as amended
by BP 179.
SPO4 Bolonia received a tip from an informant
(4:00pm) that the appellant Encinada would be arriving in the
morning of May 21, 1992 on board the M/V Sweet Pearl
bringing with him marijuana. They were not able to secure
warrant of arrest because the office was already closed.
However, they still decided to pursue the apprehension of the
appellant.
Morning of May 21,1992, when M/V Sweet Pearl
docked SPO4 Bolonia with his team followed the appellant
carrying two small colored plastic chairs and boarded a
tricycle. The appellant was chased and ordered the driver to
stop, they inspect the plastic chairs and discovered that a
package was place between; tearing the package they were
convinced that it is marijuana because of the smell. They
apprehended the appellant brought him to the police station
and in the presence of a member of the local media, they
opened the package and saw that indeed it contains dried
leaves of marijuana.
ISSUE: a) WON the evidence sufficiently shows the possession
of marijuana by appellant.
b) WON the search on the person and belongings of
the appellant valid.
HOLDING: SC ruled that proof of ownership of the marijuana is
not necessary in the prosecution of Illegal drug case; it is
sufficient that such drug is found in appellants possession.
The court ruled acquitting the appellant; it reiterates the
constitutional proscription that evidence seized without a valid
search warrant is inadmissible in any proceeding. A guild of
incriminating evidence will not legitimize an illegal search.
Indeed, the end never justifies the means.
In this case, appellant was not committing a crime in the
had rested, the trial was not yet terminated and the cause was
still under the control and jurisdiction of the court and the
latter, in the exercise of its discretion, may receive additional
evidence. Sec. 3(c), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court clearly
provides that, in the furtherance of justice, the court may
grant either of the parties the right and opportunity to adduce
new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in
question.
Saunars testimony was admitted in evidence before the
trial court rendered its Decision. Undoubtedly then, the
court a quo retained its jurisdiction even though the
prosecution had rested its case. As to appellants, Saunar was
an additional prosecution witness, not a rebuttal witness,
because the defense waived presentation of evidence after
the prosecution had rested its case. Saunar was, therefore, a
rebuttal witness with respect to accused Cid.
2) Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial
investigation of appellants is, however, not a guarantee that
appellants' respective confessions had been taken in
accordance with Article III, Section 12 (1) of the
Constitution. This constitutional provision requires that a
person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have no less than "competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice."
A lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial
investigation if the latter could not afford one should be
engaged by the accused himself, or by the latter's relative or
person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the
court, upon proper petition of the accused or person
authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers
engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as
proof of their probity and supposed independence, are
generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between
lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic."
Saunar was not the choice of appellant Januario as his
custodial investigation counsel. Under the circumstances
described by the prosecution however, he could not have been
the independent counsel solemnly spoken of by our
Constitution. He was an applicant for a position in the NBI and
therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the
confessants. In fact, he was actually employed by the NBI a
few months after. As regards appellant Januario, Saunar might
Facts:
Gomez and Immaculata were implicated in the crime
of transporting heroin estimated to be worth $40,000,000.
On Feb 27, 1990, David, Immaculatas employer,
sent the latter to Thailand to canvass ready to wear clothes. A
week later, David and Gomez followed Immaculata to
Thailand.
Om March 14, 1990, the three of them boarded a
flight bound for Manila. In Manila, Gomez deposited two golf
bags with the interline baggage room for his connecting flight
to San Francisco. Well before flight time, Dumag, a customs
policeman at NAIA, was requested to help facilitate the
checking in of Gomez. Dumag proceeded to the baggage room
and retrieved the baggages, to acknowledge the release, he
signed to the unclaimed baggage/transit list.
Dumag then proceeded to Patio, Manila, a restaurant
in NAIA, where he turned over to Customs Collector, De Leon
the travel papers of Gomez. However, Gomez failed to board
the flight to San Francisco. The two golf bags were off loaded
from the aircraft. At 4pm that same day, PAL staff, Mendoza,
brough the bags to the check in counter for check up. Aviation
Security Squadron of the Philippine Air Force Security
Command (PAFSECOM) opened the bags and found 31 single
Ruling:
No. The court ruled that Section 12(1), Article III, of
the Constitution requires that any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, even if the
appellant allowed himself to be investigated without a
counsel, this does not signify that he has waived his right of
having one. Such right is for any Filipino citizen to exercise
even when abroad. Therefore, his sworn statement remains an
inadmissible evidence in court.Moreover, conspiracy to be the
basis for a conviction, should be proved in the same manner
as the criminal act itself. It is also essential that a conscious
design to commit an offense must be established . Conspiracy
is not the product of negligence but of intentionality on the
part of the cohorts. Under our laws, the onus probandi in
establishing the guilt of an accused for a criminal offense lies
with the prosecution. There is no clear proof that appellant
Immaculata was together with the other accused in designing
the commission of the crime charge.
People vs Mahinay
[G.R. No. 122485. February 1, 1999.]
FACTS:
Larry, the responded herein is an employee of Elvira Chan, the
mother of the Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, who is the
court.
[G.R. No. 118904. April 20, 1998] ARTURIO
TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX
TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD,
respondents.
Prior Proceedings: The CFI considered that since the plaintiff is
the legitimate son of Inocentes and entitled to inherit the
property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4
parcels of land subject matter of this case. The CA reversed
the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally
married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against
him had set in. SC- petition for review on certiorari; Reversed
CA and reinstated CFIs decision.
Facts of the Case: Petitioner filed a complaint for partition and
damages against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad, before the CFI of Aklan. Petitioner claimed that he
was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of the children
of Patricio Trinidad, who died in 1940, leaving the four (4)
parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes
and Felix. Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of
Inocentes. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single
when he died in 1941, before plaintiffs birth.
Issue (In relation to Evidence): Did petitioner present sufficient
evidence of his parents marriage and of his filiation?
Held and Ratio: YES. The plaintiff was able to prove the
existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his
mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes).
In Pugeda vs. Trias, the SC ruled that when the question of
whether a marriage has been contracted arises in
litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would
constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to
the matrimony, the couples public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the
baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and
the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
Although the marriage contract is considered the primary
evidence of the marital union, petitioners failure to present it
is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of
relevant evidence may take its place.