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1. CEASE v.

CA, 93 SCRA 483


2. PEREIRA v. CA, 174 SCRA 154
3. PORTUGAL v. PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, G.R. No. 155555, Aug 16, 2005
4. AVELINO v. CA, G.R. No. 115181, Mar 31, 2000
5. GARCI-FULE v. CA, 74 SCRA 189
6. FIGURACION-GERILLA v. FIGURACION, G.R. No. 154322, Aug 22, 2006
7. FIGURACION-GERILLA v. FIGURACION, G.R. No. 151334, Feb 13, 2013
8. ARBOLARIO v. CA, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003
9.AZUELA v. CA, G.R. No. 122880, April 22, 2006
10. ALABAN v. CA, G.R. No. 156021, Sept 23, 2005

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33172 October 18, 1979
ERNESTO CEASE, CECILIA CEASE, MARION CEASE, TERESA CEASE-LACEBAL and the F.L.
CEASE PLANTATION CO., INC. as Trustee of properties of the defunct TIAONG MILLING &
PLANTATION CO.,petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Special Seventh Division), HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA,
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Quezon, BENJAMIN CEASE and FLORENCE
CEASE, respondents.

GUERRERO, J:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 45474, entitled "Ernesto Cease, et
al. vs. Hon. Manolo L. Maddela, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, et al." 1 which dismissed the
petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition instituted by the petitioners against the respondent judge and
the private respondents.
The antecedents of the case, as found by the appellate court, are as follows:
IT RESULTING: That the antecedents are not difficult to understand; sometime in June 1908, one
Forrest L. Cease common predecessor in interest of the parties together with five (5) other
American citizens organized the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company and in the course of its
corporate existence the company acquired various properties but at the same time all the other
original incorporators were bought out by Forrest L. Cease together with his children namely
Ernest, Cecilia, Teresita, Benjamin, Florence and one Bonifacia Tirante also considered a member
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of the family; the charter of the company lapsed in June 1958; but whether there were steps to
liquidate it, the record is silent; on 13 August 1959, Forrest L. Cease died and by extrajudicial
partition of his shares, among the children, this was disposed of on 19 October 1959; it was here
where the trouble among them came to arise because it would appear that Benjamin and Florence
wanted an actual division while the other children wanted reincorporation; and proceeding on
that, these other children Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia and aforementioned other stockholder
Bonifacia Tirante proceeded to incorporate themselves into the F.L. Cease Plantation Company
and registered it with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 9 December, 1959; apparently
in view of that, Benjamin and Florence for their part initiated a Special Proceeding No. 3893 of
the Court of First Instance of Tayabas for the settlement of the estate of Forest L. Cease on 21
April, 1960 and one month afterwards on 19 May 1960 they filed Civil Case No. 6326 against
Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia Cease together with Bonifacia Tirante asking that the Tiaong Milling
and Plantation Corporation be declared Identical to F.L. Cease and that its properties be divided
among his children as his intestate heirs; this Civil Case was resisted by aforestated defendants
and notwithstanding efforts of the plaintiffs to have the properties placed under receivership, they
were not able to succeed because defendants filed a bond to remain as they have remained in
possession; after that and already, during the pendency of Civil Case No. 6326 specifically on 21
May, 1961 apparently on the eve of the expiry of the three (3) year period provided by the law for
the liquidation of corporations, the board of liquidators of Tiaong Milling executed an assignment
and conveyance of properties and trust agreement in favor of F.L. Cease Plantation Co. Inc. as
trustee of the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Co. so Chat upon motion of the plaintiffs trial Judge
ordered that this alleged trustee be also included as party defendant; now this being the situation,
it will be remembered that there were thus two (2) proceedings pending in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon namely Civil Case No. 6326 and Special Proceeding No. 3893 but both of
these were assigned to the Honorable Respondent Judge Manolo L. Maddela p. 43 and the case
was finally heard and submitted upon stipulation of facts pp, 34-110, rollo; and trial Judge by
decision dated 27 December 1969 held for the plaintiffs Benjamin and Florence, the decision
containing the following dispositive part:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants declaring that:
1) The assets or properties of the defunct Tiaong Milling and Plantation
Company now appearing under the name of F.L. Cease Plantation Company as
Trustee, is the estate also of the deceased Forrest L. Cease and ordered divided,
share and share alike, among his six children the plaintiffs and the defendants in
accordance with Rule 69, Rules of Court;
2) The Resolution to Sell dated October 12, 1959 and the Transfer and
Conveyance with Trust Agreement is hereby set aside as improper and illegal for
the purposes and effect that it was intended and, therefore, null and void;
3) That F.L. Cease Plantation Company is removed as 'Trustee for interest against
the estate and essential to the protection of plaintiffs' rights and is hereby ordered
to deliver and convey all the properties and assets of the defunct Tiaong Milling
now under its name, custody and control to whomsoever be appointed as
Receiver - disqualifying and of the parties herein - the latter to act accordingly
upon proper assumption of office; and
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4) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for administration is terminated and dismissed;


the instant case to proceed but on issues of damages only and for such action
inherently essential for partition.
SO ORDERED.
Lucena City, December 27, 1969., pp. 122-a-123, rollo.
upon receipt of that, defendants there filled a notice of appeal p. 129, rollo together with an
appeal bond and a record on appeal but the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that the judgment was in fact interlocutory and not appealable p. 168 rollo and this position of
defendants was sustained by trial Judge, His Honor ruling that
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal interposed by plaintiffs is hereby
dismissed as premature and the Record on Appeal is necessarily disapproved as
improper at this stage of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Lucena City, April 27, 1970.
and so it was said defendants brought the matter first to the Supreme Court, on mandamus on 20
May, 1970 to compel the appeal and certiorari and prohibition to annul the order of 27 April,
1970 on the ground that the decision was "patently erroneous" p. 16, rollo; but the Supreme Court
remanded the case to this Court of Appeals by resolution of 27 May 1970, p. 173, and this Court
of Appeals on 1 July 1970 p. 175 dismissed the petition so far as the mandamus was concerned
taking the view that the decision sought to be appealed dated 27 December, 1969 was
interlocutory and not appealable but on motion for reconsideration of petitioners and since there
was possible merit so far as its prayer for certiorari and prohibition was concerned, by resolution
of the Court on 19 August, 1970, p. 232, the petition was permitted to go ahead in that capacity;
and it is the position of petitioners that the decision of 27 December, 1969 as well as the order of
27 April, 1970 suffered of certain fatal defects, which respondents deny and on their part raise the
preliminary point that this Court of Appeals has no authority to give relief to petitioners because
not
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
and that the questions presented cannot be raised for the first time before this Court of Appeals;
Respondent Court of Appeals in its decision promulgated December 9, 1970 dismissed the petition with costs
against petitioners, hence the present petition to this Court on the following assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED I. IN SANCTIONING THE WRONGFUL EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION BEYOND THE LIMITS OF
AUTHORITY CONFERRED BY LAW UPON THE LOWER COURT, WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO HEAR,
ADJUDGE AND ADJUDICATE 3

(a) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for the settlement of the Estate of Forrest L. Cease,
simultaneously and concurrently with (b) Civil Case No. 6326, wherein the lower Court ordered Partition under Rule 69, Rules of Court
THE ISSUE OF LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES COMMONLY INVOLVED IN BOTH
ACTIONS HAVING BEEN RAISED AT THE OUTSET BY THE TIAONG MILLING AND PLANTATION
COMPANY, AS THE REGISTERED OWNER OF SUCH PROPERTIES UNDER ACT 496.
II. IN AFFIRMING - UNSUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER NOR CITATION OF ANY LAW
TO JUSTIFY - THE UNWARRANTED CONCLUSION THAT SUBJECT PROPERTIES, FOUND BY THE
LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS AS ACTUALLY REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF
PETITIONER CORPORATION AND/OR ITS PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST, THE TIAONG MILLING AND
PLANTATION COMPANY, DURING ALL THE 50 YEARS OF ITS CORPORATE EXISTENCE "ARE ALSO
PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE OF FOREST L. CEASE."
III. IN AFFIRMING THE ARBITRARY CONCLUSION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT ITS DECISION OF
DECEMBER 27,1969 IS AN "INTERLUCUTORY DECISION." IN DISMISSED NG THE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDAMUS, AND IN AFFIRMING THE MANIFESTLY UNJUST JUDGMENT RENDERED
WHICH CONTRADICTS THE FINDINGS OF ULTIMATE FACTS THEREIN CONTAINED.
During the period that ensued after the filing in this Court of the respective briefs and the subsequent submission
of the case for decision, some incidents had transpired, the summary of which may be stated as follows:
1. Separate from this present appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. L-35629 (Ernesto Cease, et al. vs. Hon. Manolo L. Maddela, et al.) which challenged the
order of respondent judge dated September 27, 1972 appointing his Branch Clerk of Court, Mr. Eleno M. Joyas,
as receiver of the properties subject of the appealed civil case, which order, petitioners saw as a virtual execution
of the lower court's judgment (p. 92, rollo). In Our resolution of November 13, 1972, issued in G.R. No. L-35629,
the petition was denied since respondent judge merely appointed an auxilliary receiver for the preservation of the
properties as well as for the protection of the interests of all parties in Civil Case No. 6326; but at the same time,
We expressed Our displeasure in the appointment of the branch clerk of court or any other court personnel for that
matter as receiver. (p. 102, rollo).
2. Meanwhile, sensing that the appointed receiver was making some attempts to take possession of the properties,
petitioners filed in this present appeal an urgent petition to restrain proceedings in the lower court. We resolved
the petition on January 29, 1975 by issuing a corresponding temporary restraining order enjoining the court a quo
from implementing its decision of December 27, 1969, more particularly, the taking over by a receiver of the
properties subject of the litigation, and private respondents Benjamin and Florence Cease from proceeding or
taking any action on the matter until further orders from this Court (pp. 99-100, rollo). Private respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration of Our resolution of January 29, 1975. After weighing the arguments of the parties and
taking note of Our resolution in G.R. No. L-35629 which upheld the appointment of a receiver, We issued another
resolution dated April 11, 1975 lifting effective immediately Our previous temporary restraining order which
enforced the earlier resolution of January 29, 1975 (pp. 140-141, rollo).
3. On February 6, 1976, private respondents filed an urgent petition to restrain proceedings below in view of the
precipitate replacement of the court appointed receiver Mayor Francisco Escueta (vice Mr. Eleno M. Joyas) and
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the appointment of Mr. Guillermo Lagrosa on the eve of respondent Judge Maddela's retirement (p. 166, rollo).
The urgent petition was denied in Our resolution of February 18, 1976 (p. 176, rollo).
4. Several attempts at a compromise agreement failed to materialize. A Tentative Compromise Agreement dated
July 30, 1975 was presented to the Court on August 6, 1976 for the signature of the parties, but respondents
"unceremoniously" repudiated the same by leaving the courtroom without the permission of the court (Court of
First Instance of Quezon, Branch 11) as a result of which respondents and their counsel were cited for contempt
(p. 195, 197, rollo) that respondents' reason for the repudiation appears to be petitioners' failure to render an
audited account of their administration covering the period from May 31, 1961 up to January 29, 1974, plus the
inclusion of a provision on waiver and relinquishment by respondents of whatever rights that may have accrued to
their favor by virtue of the lower court's decision and the affirmative decision of the appellate court.
We go now to the alleged errors committed by the respondent Court of Appeals.
As can be gleaned from petitioners' brief and the petition itself, two contentions underlie the first assigned error.
First, petitioners argue that there was an irregular and arbitrarte termination and dismissal of the special
proceedings for judicial administration simultaneously ordered in the lower court . s decision in Civil Case No.
6326 adjudicating the partition of the estate, without categorically, reasoning the opposition to the petition for
administration Second, that the issue of ownership had been raised in the lower court when Tiaong Milling
asserted title over the properties registered in its corporate name adverse to Forrest L. Cease or his estate, and that
the said issue was erroneously disposed of by the trial court in the partition proceedings when it concluded that
the assets or properties of the defunct company is also the estate of the deceased proprietor.
The propriety of the dismissal and termination of the special proceedings for judicial administration must be
affirmed in spite of its rendition in another related case in view of the established jurisprudence which favors
partition when judicial administration become, unnecessary. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the dismissal at
first glance is wrong, for the reason that what was actually heard was Civil Case No. 6326. The technical
consistency, however, it is far less importance than the reason behind the doctrinal rule against placing an estate
under administration. Judicial rulings consistently hold the view that where partition is possible, either judicial or
extrajudicial, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reason. When the estate has no creditors or pending obligations to be paid, the beneficiaries in interest are not
bound to submit the property to judicial administration which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court, especially when judicial administration is unnecessary and
superfluous. Thus When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or
not, are bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and
costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly held
that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan
vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil, 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil.,
367; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317). Syllabus, Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. Pablo G.
Utulo vs. Leona Pasion Viuda de Garcia, 66 Phil. 302.
Where the estate has no debts, recourse may be had to an administration proceeding only if the
heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible,
either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding
without good and compelling reasons. (Intestate Estate of Mercado vs. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383)
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In the records of this case, We find no indication of any indebtedness of the estate. No creditor has come up to
charge the estate within the two-year period after the death of Forrest L. Cease, hence, the presumption under
Section 1, Rule 74 that the estate is free from creditors must apply. Neither has the status of the parties as legal
heirs, much less that of respondents, been raised as an issue. Besides, extant in the records is the stipulation of the
parties to submit the pleadings and contents of the administration proceedings for the cognizance of the trial judge
in adjudicating the civil case for partition (Respondents' Brief, p, 20, rollo). As respondents observe, the parties in
both cases are the same, so are the properties involved; that actual division is the primary objective in both
actions; the theory and defense of the respective parties are likewise common; and that both cases have been
assigned to the same respondent judge. We feel that the unifying effect of the foregoing circumstances invites the
wholesome exception to the structures of procedural rule, thus allowing, instead, room for judicial flexibility.
Respondent judge's dismissal of the administration proceedings then, is a judicious move, appreciable in today's
need for effective and speedy administration of justice. There being ample reason to support the dismissal of the
special proceedings in this appealed case, We cannot see in the records any compelling reason why it may not be
dismissed just the same even if considered in a separate action. This is inevitably certain specially when the
subject property has already been found appropriate for partition, thus reducing the petition for administration to a
mere unnecessary solicitation.
The second point raised by petitioners in their first assigned error is equally untenable. In effect, petitioners argue
that the action for partition should not have prospered in view of the repudiation of the co-ownership by Tiaong
Milling and Plantation Company when, as early in the trial court, it already asserted ownership and corporate title
over the properties adverse to the right of ownership of Forrest L. Cease or his estate. We are not unmindful of the
doctrine relied upon by petitioners in Rodriguez vs. Ravilan, 17 Phil. 63 wherein this Court held that in an action
for partition, it is assumed that the parties by whom it is prosecuted are all co-owners or co-proprietors of the
property to be divided, and that the question of common ownership is not to be argued, not the fact as to whether
the intended parties are or are not the owners of the property in question, but only as to how and in what manner
and proportion the said property of common ownership shall be distributed among the interested parties by order
of the Court. Consistent with this dictum, it has been field that if any party to a suit for partition denies theproindiviso character of the estate whose partition is sought, and claims instead, exclusive title thereto the action
becomes one for recovery of property cognizable in the courts of ordinary jurisdiction. 2
Petitioners' argument has only theoretical persuasion, to say the least, rather apparent than real. It must be
remembered that when Tiaong Milling adduced its defense and raised the issue of ownership, its corporate
existence already terminated through the expiration of its charter. It is clear in Section 77 of Act No. 1459
(Corporation Law) that upon the expiration of the charter period, the corporation ceases to exist and is
dissolvedipso facto except for purposes connected with the winding up and liquidation. The provision allows a
three year, period from expiration of the charter within which the entity gradually settles and closes its affairs,
disposes and convey its property and to divide its capital stock, but not for the purpose of continuing the business
for which it was established. At this terminal stage of its existence, Tiaong Milling may no longer persist to
maintain adverse title and ownership of the corporate assets as against the prospective distributees when at this
time it merely holds the property in trust, its assertion of ownership is not only a legal contradiction, but more so,
to allow it to maintain adverse interest would certainly thwart the very purpose of liquidation and the final
distribute loll of the assets to the proper, parties.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in its reasoning that substance is more important than form when it sustained
the dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 3893, thus a) As to the dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 3893, of course, at first glance, this was wrong,
for the reason that the case trial had been heard was Civil Case No. 6326; but what should not be
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overlooked either is Chat respondent Judge was the same Judge that had before him in his own
sala, said Special Proceedings No. 3893, p. 43 rollo, and the parties to the present Civil Case No.
6326 had themselves asked respondent Judge to take judicial notice of the same and its contents
page 34, rollo; it is not difficult to see that when respondent Judge in par. 4 of the dispositive part
of his decision complained of, ordered that,
4) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for administration is terminated and dismissed;
the instant case to proceed but on issues of damages only and for such action
inherently essential or partition. p. 123, rollo,
in truth and in fact, His Honor was issuing that order also within Civil Case No. 632 but in
connection with Special Proceedings No. 389:3: for substance is more important Chan form, the
contending par ties in both proceedings being exactly the same, but not only this, let it not be
forgotten that when His Honor dismissed Special Proceedings No. 3893, that dismissal precisely
was a dismissal that petitioners herein had themselves sought and solicited from respondent Judge
as petitioners themselves are in their present petition pp. 5-6, rollo; this Court must find difficulty
in reconciling petitioners' attack with the fact that it was they themselves that had insisted on that
dismissal; on the principle that not he who is favored but he who is hurt by a judicial order is he
only who should be heard to complain and especially since extraordinary legal remedies are
remedies in extermies granted to parties ' who have been the victims not merely of errors but of
grave wrongs, and it cannot be seen how one who got what he had asked could be heard to claim
that he had been the victim of a wrong, petitioners should not now complain of an order they had
themselves asked in order to attack such an order afterwards; if at all, perhaps, third parties,
creditors, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, might have been prejudiced, and could have had the
personality to attack that dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 3893, but not petitioners herein,
and it is not now for this Court of Appeals to protect said third persons who have not come to the
Court below or sought to intervene herein;
On the second assigned error, petitioners argue that no evidence has been found to support the conclusion that the
registered properties of Tiaong Milling are also properties of the estate of Forrest L. Cease; that on the contrary,
said properties are registered under Act No. 496 in the name of Tiaong Milling as lawful owner and possessor for
the last 50 years of its corporate existence.
We do not agree. In reposing ownership to the estate of Forrest L. Cease, the trial court indeed found strong
support, one that is based on a well-entrenched principle of law. In sustaining respondents' theory of "merger of
Forrest L. Cease and The Tiaong Milling as one personality", or that "the company is only the business conduit
and alter ego of the deceased Forrest L. Cease and the registered properties of Tiaong Milling are actually
properties of Forrest L. Cease and should be divided equally, share and share alike among his six children, ... ",
the trial court did aptly apply the familiar exception to the general rule by disregarding the legal fiction of distinct
and separate corporate personality and regarding the corporation and the individual member one and the same. In
shredding the fictitious corporate veil, the trial judge narrated the undisputed factual premise, thus:
While the records showed that originally its incorporators were aliens, friends or third-parties in
relation of one to another, in the course of its existence, it developed into a close family
corporation. The Board of Directors and stockholders belong to one family the head of which
Forrest L. Cease always retained the majority stocks and hence the control and management of its
affairs. In fact, during the reconstruction of its records in 1947 before the Security and Exchange
Commission only 9 nominal shares out of 300 appears in the name of his 3 eldest children then
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and another person close to them. It is likewise noteworthy to observe that as his children
increase or perhaps become of age, he continued distributing his shares among them adding
Florence, Teresa and Marion until at the time of his death only 190 were left to his name.
Definitely, only the members of his family benefited from the Corporation.
The accounts of the corporation and therefore its operation, as well as that of the family appears
to be indistinguishable and apparently joined together. As admitted by the defendants
(Manifestation of Compliance with Order of March 7, 1963 [Exhibit "21"] the corporation 'never'
had any account with any banking institution or if any account was carried in a bank on its behalf,
it was in the name of Mr. Forrest L. Cease. In brief, the operation of the Corporation is merged
with those of the majority stockholders, the latter using the former as his instrumentality and for
the exclusive benefits of all his family. From the foregoing indication, therefore, there is truth in
plaintiff's allegation that the corporation is only a business conduit of his father and an extension
of his personality, they are one and the same thing. Thus, the assets of the corporation are also the
estate of Forrest L. Cease, the father of the parties herein who are all legitimate children of full
blood.
A rich store of jurisprudence has established the rule known as the doctrine of disregarding or piercing the veil of
corporate fiction. Generally, a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of
the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. By virtue of this
attribute, a corporation may not, generally, be made to answer for acts or liabilities of its stockholders or those of
the legal entities to which it may be connected, and vice versa. This separate and distinct personality is, however,
merely a fiction created by law for convenience and to promote the ends of justice (Laguna Transportation
Company vs. Social Security System, L-14606, April 28, 1960; La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. vs. Kaisahan ng
mga Manggagawa sa La Campana, L-5677, May 25, 1953). For this reason, it may not be used or invoked for
ends subversive of the policy and purpose behind its creation (Emiliano Cano Enterprises, Inc. vs. CIR, L-20502,
Feb. 26, 1965) or which could not have been intended by law to which it owes its being McConnel vs. Court of
Appeals, L- 10510, March 17, 1961, 1 SCRA 722). This is particularly true where the fiction is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime (Yutivo Sons Hardware Company vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, L-13203, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 160), confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues (R. F. Sugay & Co. vs.
Reyes, L-20451, Dec. 28, 1964), perpetrate deception or otherwise circumvent the law (Gregorio Araneta, Inc. vs.
reason de Paterno, L-2886, Aug. 22, 1952, 49 O.G. 721). This is likewise true where the corporate entity is being
used as an alter ego, adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of another corporate
entity (McConnel vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Norton Harrison Co., L7618, Aug. 31, 1964).
In any of these cases, the notion of corporate entity will be pierced or disregarded, and the corporation will be
treated merely as an association of persons or, where there are two corporations, they will be merged as one, the
one being merely regarded as part or the instrumentality of the otter (Koppel [Phil.] Inc. vs. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496,
Yutivo Sons Hardware Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals, supra).
So must the case at bar add to this jurisprudence. An indubitable deduction from the findings of the trial court
cannot but lead to the conclusion that the business of the corporation is largely, if not wholly, the personal venture
of Forrest L. Cease. There is not even a shadow of a showing that his children were subscribers or purchasers of
the stocks they own. Their participation as nominal shareholders emanated solely from Forrest L. Cease's
gratuitous dole out of his own shares to the benefit of his children and ultimately his family.

Were we sustain the theory of petitioners that the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in deciding Civil Case No. 6326 as a case for partition when the defendant
therein, Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company, Inc. as registered owner asserted ownership of the assets and
properties involved in the litigation, which theory must necessarily be based on the assumption that said assets
and properties of Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company, Inc. now appearing under the name of F. L. Cease
Plantation Company as Trustee are distinct and separate from the estate of Forrest L. Cease to which petitioners
and respondents as legal heirs of said Forrest L. Cease are equally entitled share and share alike, then that legal
fiction of separate corporate personality shall have been used to delay and ultimately deprive and defraud the
respondents of their successional rights to the estate of their deceased father. For Tiaong Milling and Plantation
Company shall have been able to extend its corporate existence beyond the period of its charter which lapsed in
June, 1958 under the guise and cover of F. L, Cease Plantation Company, Inc. as Trustee which would be against
the law, and as Trustee shall have been able to use the assets and properties for the benefit of the petitioners, to the
great prejudice and defraudation. of private respondents. Hence, it becomes necessary and imperative to pierce
that corporate veil.
Under the third assigned error, petitioners claim that the decision of the lower court in the partition case is not
interlocutory but rather final for it consists of final and determinative dispositions of the contentions of the parties.
We find no merit in petitioners' stand.
Under the 1961 pronouncement and ruling of the Supreme Court in Vda. de Zaldarriaga vs. Enriquez, 1 SCRA
1188 (and the sequel case of Vda. de Zaldarriaga vs. Zaldarriaga, 2 SCRA 356), the lower court's dismissal of
petitioners' proposed appeal from its December 27, 1969 judgment as affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the
ground of prematurity in that the judgment was not final but interlocutory was in order. As was said in said case:
It is true that in Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 934 and other cases it was held - contrary to the rule
laid down in Ron vs. Mojica, 8 Phil. 328; Rodriguez vs. Ravilan, 17 Phil. 63 - that in a partition
case where defendant relies on the defense of exclusive ownership, the action becomes one for
title and the decision or order directing partition is final, but the ruling to this effect has been
expressly reversed in the Fuentebella case which, in our opinion, expresses the correct view,
considering that a decision or order directing partition is not final because it leaves something
more to be done in the trial court for the complete disposition of the case, namely, the
appointment of commissioners, the proceedings to be had before them, the submission of their
report which, according to law, must be set for hearing. In fact, it is only after said hearing that
the court may render a final judgment finally disposing of the action (Rule 71, section 7, Rules of
Court). (1 SCRA at page 1193).
It should be noted, however, that the said ruling in Zaldarriaga as based on Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, XIV
Lawyers Journal 305 (May 27, 1942), has been expressly abandoned by the Court in Miranda vs. Court of
Appeals, 71 SCRA 295; 331-333 (June 18, 1976) wherein Mr. Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court, laid
down the following doctrine:
The Court, however, deems it proper for the guidance of the bench and bar to now declare as is
clearly indicated from the compelling reasons and considerations hereinabove stated:
- that the Court considers the better rule to be that stated in H. E. Heacock Co. vs. American
Trading Co., to wit, that where the primary purpose of a case is to ascertain and determine who
between plaintiff and defendant is the true owner and entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed
property, "the judgment . . . rendered by the lower court [is] a judgment on the merits as to those
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questions, and [that] the order of the court for an accounting was based upon, and is incidental to
the judgment on the merits. That is to say, that the judgment . . . [is] a final judgment ... that in
this kind of a case an accounting is a mere incident to the judgment; that an appeal lies from the
rendition of the judgment as rendered ... "(as is widely held by a great number of judges and
members of the bar, as shown by the cases so decided and filed and still pending with the Court)
for the fundamental reasons therein stated that "this is more in harmony with the administration
of justice and the spirit and intent of the [Rules]. If on appeal the judgment of the lower court is
affirmed, it would not in the least work an injustice to any of the legal rights of [appellee]. On the
other hand, if for any reason this court should reverse the judgment of the lower court, the
accounting would be a waste of time and money, and might work a material injury to the
[appellant]; and
- that accordingly, the contrary ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso which expressly reversed the
Heacock case and a line of similar decisions and ruled that such a decision for recovery of
property with accounting "is not final but merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable" and
subsequent cases adhering to the same must be now in turn abandoned and set aside.
Fuentebella adopted instead the opposite line of conflicting decisions mostly in partition
proceedings and exemplified by Ron vs. Mojica 8 Phil. 928 (under the old Code of Civil
Procedure) that an order for partition of real property is not final and appealable until after
the actual partition of the property as reported by the court appointed commissioners and
approved by the court in its judgmentaccepting the report. lt must be especially noted that such
rule governing partitions is now so expressly provided and spelled out in Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court, with special reference to Sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 11, to wit, that there must first be a
preliminar, order for partition of the real estate (section 2) and where the parties-co-owners
cannot agree, the court appointed commissioners make a plan of actual partition which must first
be passed upon and accepted by the trial court and embodied in a judgment to be rendered by it
(sections 6 and 11). In partition cases, it must be further borne in mind that Rule 69, section 1
refers to "a person having the right to compel the partition of real estate," so that the general rule
of partition that an appeal will not lie until the partition or distribution proceedings are terminated
will not apply where appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole property and denies the
adverse party's right to any partition, as was the ruling in Villanueva vs. Capistrano and Africa
vs .Africa, supra, Fuentebellas express rehearsal of these cases must likewise be deemed now also
abandoned in view of the Court's expressed preference for the rationale of the Heacock case.
The Court's considered opinion is that imperative considerations of public policy and of sound
practice in the courts and adherence to the constitutional mandate of simplified, just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action call for considering such judgments for recovery of
property with accounting as final judgments which are duly appealable (and would therefore
become final and executory if not appealed within the reglementary period) with
the accounting as a mere incident of the judgment to be rendered during the course of the appeal
as provided in Rule 39, section 4 or to be implemented at the execution stage upon final
affirmance on appeal of the judgment (as in Court of Industrial Relations unfair labor practice
cases ordering the reinstatement of the worker with accounting, computation and payment of his
backwages less earnings elsewhere during his layoff) and that the only reason given in
Fuentebelia for the contrary ruling, viz, "the general harm that would follow from throwing the
door open to multiplicity of appeals in a single case" of lesser import and consequence.
(Emphasis copied).
10

The miranda ruling has since then been applied as the new rule by a unanimous Court in Valdez vs. Bagasao, 82
SCRA 22 (March 8, 1978).
If there were a valid genuine claim of Exclusive ownership of the inherited properties on the part of petitioners to
respondents' action for partition, then under the Miranda ruling, petitioners would be sustained, for as expressly
held therein " the general rule of partition that an appeal will not lie until the partition or distribution proceedings
are terminated will not apply where appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole property and denies the
adverse party's right to any partition."
But this question has now been rendered moot and academic for the very issue of exclusive ownership claimed by
petitioners to deny and defeat respondents' right to partition - which is the very core of their rejected appeal - has
been squarely resolved herein against them, as if the appeal had been given due course. The Court has herein
expressly sustained the trial court's findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the assets or properties of
the defunct company constitute the estate of the deceased proprietor (supra at page 7) and the defunct company's
assertion of ownership of the properties is a legal contradiction and would but thwart the liquidation and final
distribution and partition of the properties among the parties hereof as children of their deceased father Forrest L.
Cease. There is therefore no further hindrance to effect the partition of the properties among the parties in
implementation of the appealed judgment.
One last consideration. Parties are brothers and sisters, legal heirs of their deceased father, Forrest L. Cease. By
all rights in law and jurisprudence, each is entitled to share and share alike in the estate, which the trial court
correctly ordained and sustained by the appellate court. Almost 20 years have lapsed since the filing of Special
Proceedings No. 3893 for the administration of the Estate of Forrest L. Cease and Civil Case No. 6326 for
liquidation and partition of the assets of the defunct Tiaong Milling and Plantation Co., Inc. A succession of
receivers were appointed by the court to take, keep in possession, preserve and manage properties of the
corporation which at one time showed an income of P386,152.90 and expenses of P308,405.01 for the period
covering January 1, 1960 to August 31, 1967 as per Summary of Operations of Commissioner for Finance
appointed by the Court (Brief for Respondents, p. 38). In the meantime, ejectment cases were filed by and against
the heirs in connection with the properties involved, aggravating the already strained relations of the parties. A
prudent and practical realization of these circumstances ought and must constrain the parties to give each one his
due in law and with fairness and dispatch that their basic rights be enjoyed. And by remanding this case to the
court a quo for the actual partition of the properties, the substantial rights of everyone of the heirs have not been
impaired, for in fact, they have been preserved and maintained.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

11

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989
VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.
Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.
Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts? May
the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased
instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main questions which need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor,
Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria
Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite,
Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the
estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1 In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the
following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left
no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits
from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and
Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square
meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein
petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the
estate of the deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private
respondent 2alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the
alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor
as the surviving spouse.

12

In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac
administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of
Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to
file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix in its decision dated December
15, 1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues: (1) Whether or not there
exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not a
judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the
better right to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas
Pereira or the surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration
for the following reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively
to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these institutions
showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the name of
her deceased husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported by
several receipts; and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled between the
petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what properties form part of the
estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She points out that this function is vested in the court in
charge of the intestate proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the deceased on the
basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of
facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the
estate of the deceased. 5
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration proceedings are
pending. The trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to
the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if
any. 6 The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court.
However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties. 7
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of
administration, We nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by private respondent to be
unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below discussed.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case
the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception to
this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and
13

there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the
judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves
as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do
so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to an
administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not
resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. 11
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and
costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such
case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings . 12
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a deceased when the
heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.
In one case, 13 We said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the
hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate
because respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is
unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what property
belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition
proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir.
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a
multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of
property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in
issuing letters of administration. 14 In still another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the
appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary
in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since
he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter. 15
We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten
months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at
once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private respondent
seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for
her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them
fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not
appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an
administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or
14

squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the
deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are
protected in any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are pending was not justified
in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de
Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as between the surviving spouse
Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.
WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac
are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private
respondent to commence a new action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., Petitioners,
vs.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 2002 1 Decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124 2 which
dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations claims of the parties which they
sought to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. 3
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta. 4
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her
herein co-petitioner.5
15

On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,6 later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein
respondent.7
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of
Rights8 over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964. 9 In the deed,
Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in
Caloocan in his favor.10
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292
covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo."11
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased
Person"12 adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172 13 in Portugals name was
subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 15981314 was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City
on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, "Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to
the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a
complaint15 against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer
certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence,
not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false
representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared
void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondents name and to issue
in its stead a new one in their (petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other
things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased
Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint. 16 (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, 17 after giving an account of the testimonies of the
parties and their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre16

trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners status and right as putative
heirs had not been established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.18
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and
testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status
and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the establishment of a
status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of
Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the former is "to establish", while in the latter,
it is "to enforce", a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as
yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to establish their
status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1
and 2, Rule 2, supra).19 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial courts ratio decedendi in dismissing
the case as diametrically opposed to this Courts following ruling in Cario v. Cario,20 viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378,
March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was the validity of the two
marriagescontracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of contention
between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario) both of whom he
married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cario contracted two marriages with said two women during
17

his lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the
death benefits of the deceased Cario was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages
was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is
the annulment oftitle to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during
his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here
come two contending parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, both now insisting to be
the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been
definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be
properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an
ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law
prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or
the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an
appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x x 21 (Emphasis in
the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002, 22 thus affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,23 faulting the appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and
contrary ruling in Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based
on the evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .24 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA decision
bereversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the
above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements in Cario apply, a
decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is
valid, and the determination of "heirship" and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination
of the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.25 (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in
effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cario shows;
that Carioallows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so
18

long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate courts ruling, they had
established their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit of
Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,26 the therein petitioners executed on March 17,
1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, "owners-claimants" of
the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots
had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in
turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a
complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein
petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion
to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any
proof or even a semblance of itexcept the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned
Yaptinchaysthat they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who
are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .
27
(Italics in the original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper recourse, found
that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v.
Rivera28and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,29 this Court held that "the declaration of heirship can be made only in a
special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right."
In the above-cited case of Litam,30 Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of letters of
administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of
Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein named seven (7)
siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the
decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left
neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, "the
surviving spouse of the decedent." The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on
Marcosas request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil case before the same
court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed
guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the
allegations made in his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly
acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the special proceeding,
both were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it,
declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent whose only surviving
heir is Marcosa.
19

On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was whether they are the
legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and
whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found "substantially correct" the trial courts
findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. "do not establish
the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the
said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof"; and
that "[t]he other documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to
prove the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as
children of said decedent."
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the lower court should not have declared, in the decision
appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it
being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding."
In Solivio,31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch
23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-half sister of his mother.
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the courts
order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court
denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed
a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On
appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues, "whether Branch 26
of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia
Villanuevas share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in
Branch 23 of the same court," this Court held that "[i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid
confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a court should not interfere with [estate]
proceedingspending in a co-equal court," citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.32
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless
[therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said
proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice," and declared her an
heir of the decedent.
In Guilas33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita
Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the testate
estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate court directed that the records of the case be
archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of partition on the ground
of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots
allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate proceedings for
her adoptive father to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
20

After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties agreement to suspend action or
resolution on Juanitas motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her
until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground that in the
amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of
partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She thus posited in her
motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial
question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two
lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case be sent to the
archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not been "legally terminated" as
Juanitas share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot
be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive
period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has
not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already
been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which
may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate court already final and executedand reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs.
Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710,
March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case for hearing,
butallowed the civil case to continue because it "involves no longer" the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a
decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if
there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where
special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir
has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its reopening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment
of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed
on February 15, 198835 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1
of the Revised Rules of Court.36 Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a
property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in
the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an
executor therein.37
21

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
parcel of land,38 to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be
long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in
light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals
estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the
civil case filed by petitioners,39 the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties
during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to
wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose
Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint. 40
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated issues
defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

22

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 115181

March 31, 2000

MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR.,
TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1994 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78,
in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441 converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters of administration to an
action for judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first
wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are
likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino Sr. The other private
respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the
estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the
administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said
judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order which reads:
Acting on the "Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition", considering that the
petitioner is the only heir not amenable to a simple partition, and all the other compulsory heirs
manifested their desire for an expeditious settlement of the estate of the deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr.,
the same is granted.
23

WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate of deceased Antonio Avelino,
Sr. The parties are directed to submit a complete inventory of all the real and personal properties left by
the deceased. Set the hearing of the judicial partition on APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Notify all the parties and their counsel of this assignment.
SO ORDERED.1
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated June 16,
1993.
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
andmandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court, in granting private respondents' motion to convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration to an action for judicial partition. Her petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31574.
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the assailed decision, stating that the "petition is
DENIED DUE COURSE" and accordingly dismissed. 2
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was denied on April 28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
PARTITION IS PROPER UNDER THE PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF
THE CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE.3
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole issue here is whether respondent
appellate court committed an error of law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding
that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as no determination has yet
been made of the character and extent of the decedent's estate. She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles
v.Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held that when the existence of other properties of the decedent is a
matter still to be reckoned with, administration proceedings are the proper mode of resolving the same. 4 In
addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of being depleted for want of an administrator to manage
and attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance of
letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally
inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is
incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's
estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order
established in Section 6 of Rule 78.5 The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74 6 which
provide:
24

Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts
and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. . .
Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. Whenever the gross value of the estate of a
deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if
made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested
person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months
from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such other notice to
interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of
an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be,
to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it
among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such
persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees
legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the
possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order
as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in
the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it
involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office.1awp++i1
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the latter's
death.7 Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need
of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not
required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an administrator by
the court.8
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are
all of age."9 With this finding, it is our view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing to partition yet,
as the nature and character of the estate have yet to be determined. We find, however, that a complete inventory of
the estate may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Hence, the Court
of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the lower court did not err in converting petitioner's
action for letters of administration into an action for judicial partition.
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting an action for letters of
administration to one for judicial partition has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis
for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs
disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for
partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is
available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration
proceedings. 10 The trial court appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit
for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the Court of
Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in order.
25

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.

MARTIN, J.:

26

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means.
Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided
over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C,
alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in
other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge
Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the
petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has
been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the
surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia,
therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and
as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on
May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the
jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was
obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has
adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as
officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule
with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in
theBayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular
Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four
aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as
Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G.
Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the
surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the
administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the
regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for
the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for
letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the
estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
27

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take
possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash
advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia
opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special
administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the
deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only
on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973,
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May
18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the
petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid;
and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado
G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is
a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased
Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special
administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been
determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting
outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor
Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the
motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court, 1 subject only to the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the
properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been authorized
in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title
and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying
words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar
ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa
B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental
petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the
place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that
Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by
praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the
foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special
28

administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion
to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia.
Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power
allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the
estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28,
1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal
standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and
removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and
effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion
for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned
orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts
and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate;
another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably
belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title
in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or "married
to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G.
Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death
was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for
1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also
testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari
and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one
dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three
others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix,
Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge
Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of
jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the
matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
29

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B.
Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate
estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment
as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa
B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed
the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the
proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness
to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings
before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the
subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa
B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This
notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay
Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction"
reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention
that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been
appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still
pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting
Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were
for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with
temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge
Ernani Cruz Pao from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the
reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides
at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
30

want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2,
Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as
death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy,
where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or
otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if
the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no
jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of
venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and
Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such
legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one
thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject
matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not
altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be
fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it
legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that
the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered
defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural
law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate
cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts
of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where
each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate
of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court
properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term
"resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue
statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed
as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
31

requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration
before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April
26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila,
leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in
Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as
appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in
other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G.
Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to
prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G.
Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows
that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this,
the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two
parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of
Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show
in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the
conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration
was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule
is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case
before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue
assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule
fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another
issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1
of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the
delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special
administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new
Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate
32

court. 15That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and
dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on
reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal
principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the
appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of
preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all,
the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the
estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she
would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of
kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of
a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G.
Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever
with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional
rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special
administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary
and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who
are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of
heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the
relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of
Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G.
Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to
Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of
Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa
B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court
under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case
was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and
avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's
estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from
continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition
for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject
matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special
administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and
in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
33

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154322 August 22, 2006
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION,* ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA,* HILARIA A.
FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and MARY
FIGURACION-GINEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari,1 petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla challenges the decision 2 and
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta
City, Pangasinan, Branch 49, which dismissed her complaint for partition. The properties involved are two parcels
of land which belonged to her late father, Leandro Figuracion.
The facts of the case follow.4
Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now both deceased) had six children: petitioner and
respondents Elena Figuracion-Ancheta (now deceased), Hilaria Figuracion, Felipa Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin
Figuracion and Mary Figuracion-Ginez.
On August 23, 1955, Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of his six children.
When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land: (1) Lot 2299 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta
consisting of 7,547 square meters with Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4221-P in the name of "Leandro
Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento" and (2) Lot 705 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta with an area of
2,900 sq. m. with TCT No. 4220-P also in the name of "Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento."
Leandro had inherited both lots from his deceased parents, 5 as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
Nos. 16731 and 16610, respectively, issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Pangasinan.
Leandro sold a portion of Lot 2299 to Lazaro Adviento, as a result of which TCT No. 4221-P was cancelled and
TCT No. 101331 was issued to "Lazaro Adviento, married to Rosenda Sagueped" as owner of the 162 sq. m. and
"Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento" as owner of 7,385 sq. m. This lot continued to be in the name
of Leandro in Tax Declaration No. 616 for the year 1985.
34

What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between petitioner and her sister, respondent
Mary, over the eastern half of Lot 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta with an area of 3,164 sq. m.
Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento, as evidenced by OCT No. 15867 issued on February 9, 1916. When
Adviento died, his two daughters, Agripina Adviento (his daughter by his first wife) and respondent Carolina (his
daughter by his second wife), succeeded him to it. On November 28, 1961, Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor
of petitioner over the one-half eastern portion of Lot 707. Agripina died on July 28, 1963, single and without any
issue. Before her half-sisters death, however, respondent Carolina adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the entire Lot 707 which she later sold to respondents Felipa and Hilaria. The latter
two immediately had OCT No. 15867 cancelled, on December 11, 1962. A new title, TCT No. 42244, was then
issued in the names of Felipa and Hilaria for Lot 707.
In February 1971, petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed for ten years. Returning
in 1981,6 she built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707. She continued paying
her share of the realty taxes thereon.
It was sometime later that this dispute erupted. Petitioner sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held in
common by her and respondents. On May 23, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint in the RTC of Urdaneta City,
Branch 49, for partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against
respondents, praying, among others, for: (1) the partition of Lots 2299 and 705; (2) the nullification of the
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by respondent Carolina over Lot 707, the deed of absolute sale in favor of
respondents Felipa and Hilaria, and TCT No. 42244; (3) a declaration that petitioner was the owner of one-half of
Lot 707 and (4) damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. U-5826.
On the other hand, respondents took the position that Leandros estate should first undergo settlement proceedings
before partition among the heirs could take place. And they claimed that an accounting of expenses chargeable to
the estate was necessary for such settlement.
On June 26, 1997,7 the RTC8 rendered judgment nullifying Carolinas affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of
absolute sale of Lot 707. It also declared Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties of Leandro Figuracion and
therefore part of his estate. The RTC, however, dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages
on the ground that it could not grant the reliefs prayed for by petitioner without any (prior) settlement proceedings
wherein the transfer of title of the properties should first be effected.
On appeal, the CA upheld the dismissal of petitioners action for partition for being premature. The CA reversed
the decision, however, with respect to the nullification of the self-adjudication and the deed of sale. Upholding the
validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of sale as to Carolinas one-half pro-indiviso share, it instead
partitioned Lot 707. Dissatisfied, respondents elevated the CA decision to this Court in G.R. No. 151334,
entitledCarolina vda. de Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla.9
The issue for our consideration is whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate
(that is, an accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus
compliance with other legal requirements, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed.
Respondents claim that: (1) the properties constituting Leandros estate cannot be partitioned before his estate is
settled and (2) there should be an accounting before anything else, considering that they (respondents) had to
spend for the maintenance of the deceased Leandro Figuracion and his wife in their final years, which support was
supposed to come from the income of the properties. Among other things, respondents apparently wanted
35

petitioner to share in the expenses incurred for the care of their parents during the ten years she stayed in the
United States, before she could get her part of the estate while petitioner apparently wanted her gross share,
without first contributing to the expenses.
In any event, there appears to be a complication with respect to the partition of Lot 705. The records refer to a
case entitled Figuracion, et al. v. Alejo currently pending in the CA. The records, however, give no clue or
information regarding what exactly this case is all about. Whatever the issues may be, suffice it to say that
partition is premature when ownership of the lot is still in dispute. 10
Petitioner faces a different problem with respect to Lot 2299. Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to compel the partition
of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title
and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other
persons interested in the property.
The right to an inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by operation of law, at the moment of death of
the decedent. There is no doubt that, as one of the heirs of Leandro Figuracion, petitioner has a legal interest in
Lot 2299. But can she compel partition at this stage?
There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2 11 and through
commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6. 12
Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedents estate. While Section
8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real propertys income (rentals and profits) in the
course of an action for partition,13 there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property
belonging to the decedents estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar
expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate.
While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro
Figuracions only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses" including those
related to her fathers final illness and burial have not been properly settled. 14 Thus, the heirs (petitioner and
respondents) have to submit their fathers estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot
be done in an action for partition.
In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which the
estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may take
possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the
payment of the estates obligations.15
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision and resolution in CA-G.R. CV
No. 58290 are AFFIRMED in so far as the issue of the partition of Lots 2299 and 705 is concerned.
But with respect to Lot 707, we make no ruling on the validity of Carolina vda. de Figuracions affidavit of selfadjudication and deed of sale in favor of Felipa and Hilaria Figuracion in view of the fact that Carolina vda. de
Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla (G.R. No. 151334) is still pending in this Division.
36

Costs against petitioner.


SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 151334

February 13, 2013

CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA,


namely: LEONCIO ANCHETA, JR., and ROMULO ANCHETA, HEIRS OF HILARIA A. FIGURACION,
namely: FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ, and EMILIA
FIGURACION-GERILLA, AND HEIRS OF QUINTIN FIGURACION, namely: LINDA M.
FIGURACION, LEANDRO M. FIGURACION, II, and ALLAN M. FIGURACION, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision2 dated
December 11, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58290, which reversed and set aside the
Decision3 dated June 26, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49. The RTC
decision (1) dismissed respondent Emilia Figuracion-Gerillas (Emilia) complaint for partition, annulment of
documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages, and (2) annulled the Affidavit of SelfAdjudicationexecuted by petitioner Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion (Carolina).
The Facts
37

The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate in May 1958. Petitioner Carolina is
the surviving spouse. The other petitioners Elena Figuracion-Ancheta, Hilaria A. Figuracion (Hilaria), Felipa
Figuracion-Manuel (Felipa), Quintin Figuracion, and Mary Figuracion-Ginez and respondent Emilia were
Carolina and Leandros children.4
Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land both situated in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which were acquired by
Leandro during his lifetime. These properties were: (1) Lot No. 2299 with a land area of 7,547 square meters
originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4221-P; 5 and (2) Lot No. 705 measuring 2,900
square meters and covered by TCT No. 4220-P. Both lands were registered in the name of "Leandro Figuracion
married to Carolina Adviento". Leandro executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the above real properties in favor of
his six (6) children on August 23, 1955. Their shares, however, were not delineated with particularity because
spouses Leandro and Carolina reserved the lots and its fruits for their expenses.
Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with an area of
3,164 square meters originally owned by Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio), covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 15867 issued in his name on August 21, 1917. Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento (Agripina) with his
first wife Marcela Estioko (Marcela), whom Eulalio survived. When he remarried, Eulalio had another daughter,
herein petitioner Carolina, with his second wife, Faustina Escabesa (Faustina). 6
On November 28, 1961, Agripina7 executed a Deed of Quitclaim8 over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 in favor of
her niece, herein respondent Emilia.
Soon thereafter or on December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication9adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her deceased
parents, Eulalio and Faustina.10 On the same date, Carolina also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale11 over Lot No.
707 in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa, who in turn immediately caused the cancellation of OCT No. 15867
and the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in their names.12
In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned to the Philippines only in 1981. Upon her
return and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707. 13
The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish the house
of Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705.
The matter was initially brought before the Katarungang Pambarangay, but no amicable settlement was reached
by the parties.14 On May 23, 1994, respondent Emilia instituted the herein Complaint 15 for the partition of Lot
Nos. 2299, 705 and 707, annulment of the Affidavit of Self- Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No.
42244, reconveyance of eastern half portion of Lot No. 707, quieting of title and damages.
In opposition, the petitioners averred the following special and affirmative defenses: (1) the respondents cause of
action had long prescribed and that she is guilty of laches hence, now estopped from bringing the suit; (2) TCT
No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilaria have already attained indefeasibility and conclusiveness as to the true
owners of Lot No. 707; and (3) an action for partition is no longer tenable because Felipa and Hilaria have already
acquired rights adverse to that claimed by respondent Emilia and the same amount to a repudiation of the alleged
co-ownership.16
During pre-trial conference, the issues were simplified into: (1) whether or not Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 are the
exclusive properties of Leandro; and (2) whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half of Lot
No. 707.17
38

On the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, the RTC rendered its Decision dated June 26, 1997 disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for partition, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages is
hereby ordered dismissed whereas the affidavit of self-adjudication[,] deed of sale and the transfer certificate of
title involving Lot 707 are hereby declared null and void.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.18
The RTC ruled that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be premature since their ownership is yet to be
transmitted from Leandro to his heirs whose respective shares thereto must still be determined in estate settlement
proceedings. Anent Lot No. 707, the RTC held that petitioner Carolina transferred only her one-half () share to
Felipa and Hilaria and any conveyance of the other half pertaining to Agripina was void. While the RTC nullified
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, it refused to adjudicate the
ownership of the lots eastern half portion in favor of respondent Emilia since a settlement of the estate of Eulalio
is yet to be undertaken.19
Respondent Emilia appealed to the CA, which, in its Decision dated December 11, 2001, ruled that the RTC erred
in refusing to partition Lot No. 707. The CA explained that there is no necessity for placing Lot No. 707 under
judicial administration since Carolina had long sold her pro indiviso share to Felipa and Hilaria. Thus, when
Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 as her own, the sale affected only her share and not
that belonging to her co-owner, Agripina. The proper action in such case is not the nullification of the sale, or for
the recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the third person, but for a division or partition
of the entire lot. Such partition should result in segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to
the buyer.
The CA, however, agreed with the RTC that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 is indeed premature considering
that there is a pending legal controversy with respect to Lot No. 705 and the accounting of the income from Lot
No. 2299 and of the expenses for the last illness and burial of Leandro and Carolina, for which the lots appear to
have been intended.
Accordingly, the decretal portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision appealed from in
Civil Case No. U-5826 is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Lot
No. 707 covered by TCT No. 42244 to be owned by appellant Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla [herein respondent],
pro indiviso share, appellee Felipa Figuracion [herein petitioner], pro indiviso share, and appellee Hilaria
Figuracion [herein petitioner], pro indiviso share, who are hereby directed to partition the same and if they
could not agree on a partition, they may petition the trial court for the appointment of a commissioner to prepare a
project of partition, in accordance with the procedure as provided in Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.20
39

Respondent Emilia appealed the CAs decision to the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 154322. In a Decision
promulgated on August 22, 2006, the Court denied the appeal, concurring with the CAs ruling that a partition of
Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 would be inappropriate considering that: (1) the ownership of Lot No. 705 is still in
dispute; and (2) there are still unresolved issues as to the expenses chargeable to the estate of Leandro.
The present petition involves the appeal of the petitioners who attribute this sole error committed by the CA:
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
EXISTING JURISPRUDENTIAL DICTA LAID DOWN BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.21
In view of the Courts ruling in G.R. No. 154322, the ensuing discussion shall concern only Lot No. 707.
The Arguments of the Parties
The petitioners argue that respondent Emilia has no valid basis for her claim of ownership because the Deed of
Quitclaim executed in her favor by Agripina was in fact a deed of donation that contained no acceptance and thus,
void. The petitioners attached a copy of the Deed of Quitclaim and stressed on the following portions, viz:
I, AGRIPINA ESTIOKO ADVIENTO, of le[ga]l age, Filipino citizen, single and a resident [of] San Vicenter
(sic), Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, for and in consideration of the sum of ONE PESO ([P]1.00), Philippine
Currency and the services rendered by my niece EMILIA FIGURACION, 20 years old, single, Filipino citizen
and a resident of San Vicente, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, do hereby by these presentsw (sic) RENOUNCE,
RELEASE and forever QUITCLAIM in favor of EMILIA FIGURACION, her heirs, and assigns the
ONE[-]HALF (1/2) eastern portion of the following parcel of land more particularly described and bounded as
follows to wit[.]22
They further aver that the Deed of Quitclaim is riddled with defects that evoke questions of law, because: (a) it
has not been registered with the Register of Deeds, albeit, allegedly executed as early as 1961; (b) a certification
dated June 3, 2003 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, shows
that it does not have a copy of the Deed of Quitclaim; (c) the Office of the National Archives which is the
depository of old and new notarized documents has no record of the Deed of Quitclaim as evidenced by a
certification dated May 19, 2003;23 and (d) Atty. Felipe V. Abenojar, who supposedly notarized the Deed of
Quitclaim was not commissioned to notarize in 1961 per the certification dated June 9, 2003 from the OCC of the
RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan.24
Respondent Emilia, on the other hand, contends that the Deed of Quitclaim should be considered an onerous
donation that requires no acceptance as it is governed by the rules on contracts and not by the formalities for a
simple donation.25
The Courts Ruling
Issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be raised for the first time in a petition filed under Rule 45
Records show that there is a palpable shift in the defense raised by the petitioners before the RTC and the CA.
In the Pre-Trial Order26 of the RTC dated April 4, 1995, the parties agreed to limit the issue with regard to Lot No.
707 as follows: whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half portion of Lot No. 707. The
petitioners supporting theory for this issue was that "the Deed of Quitclaim dated November 28, 1961 was
40

rendered ineffective by the issuance of [TCT No. 42244] in the name of Felipa and Hilaria." 27 On appeal to the
CA, however, the petitioners raised a new theory by questioning the execution and enforceability of the Deed
ofQuitclaim. They claimed that it is actually a donation that was not accepted in the manner required by law. 28
The inconsistent postures taken by the petitioners breach the basic procedural tenet that a party cannot change his
theory on appeal as expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in
the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the
court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.
Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be
raised for the first time on appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon
that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do
so would be unfair to the adverse party.29 The Court had likewise, in numerous times, affirmed that points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not
be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic
considerations of due process underlie this rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no
opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of
it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. 30
While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of
any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new
theory,31 this exception does not, however, obtain in the case at hand.
Contrary to the petitioners assertion, the Court finds that the issues on the supposed defects and actual nature of
the Deed of Quitclaim are questions of fact that require not only a review or re-evaluation of the evidence already
adduced by the parties but also the reception of new evidence as the petitioners themselves have acknowledged
when they attached in the petition several certifications 32 in support of their new argument. It is settled that
questions of fact are beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition since the Court is not a trier of facts. 33
Accordingly, the Court will not give due course to the new issues raised by the petitioners involving the nature
and execution of the Deed of Quitclaim. For their failure to advance these questions during trial, the petitioners
are now barred by estoppel34 from imploring an examination of the same.
The respondent can compel the
partition of Lot No. 707
The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Such an action will not lie if
the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the
Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would be
premature to effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved. 35
Here, the respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 from the Deed of
Quitclaimexecuted by Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof being one of the legitimate heirs of
Eulalio. It is well to recall that the petitioners failed to categorically dispute the existence of the Deed of
Quitclaim. Instead, they averred that it has been rendered ineffective by TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and
Hilariathis contention is, of course, flawed.
41

Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under coownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a
trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title.36 Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not
mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive
evidence of ownership.37 In this case, co-ownership of Lot No. 707 was precisely what respondent Emilia was
able to successfully establish, as correctly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is an undisputed fact. As such heirs, they
became co-owners of Lot No. 707 upon the death of Eulalio on July 20, 1930. Since Faustina was predeceased by
Eulalio, she likewise became a co-owner of the lot upon Eulalios death. Faustinas share, however, passed on to
her daughter Carolina when the former died on October 18, 1949. The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by
Carolina did not prejudice the share of Agripina because it is not legally possible for one to adjudicate unto
himself an entire property he was not the sole owner of. A co-owner cannot alienate the shares of her other coowners nemo dat qui non habet.38
Hence, Lot No. 707 was a co-owned property of Agripina and Carolina. As co-owners, each of them had full
ownership of her part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. Each of them also had the right to alienate
the lot but only in so far as the extent of her portion was affected. 39
Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 to Hilaria and Felipa without the consent
of her co-owner Agripina, the disposition affected only Carolinas pro indiviso share, and the vendees, Hilaria and
Felipa, acquired only what corresponds to Carolinas share. A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share;
hence, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and
void and only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.40
Accordingly, the deed of sale executed by Carolina in favor of Hilaria and Felipa was a valid conveyance but only
insofar as the share of Carolina in the co-ownership is concerned. As Carolinas successors-in-interest to the
property, Hilaria and Felipa could not acquire any superior right in the property than what Carolina is entitled to
or could transfer or alienate after partition.
In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as
the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner. 41 Hilaria and
Felipa did not acquire the undivided portion pertaining to Agripina, which has already been effectively
bequeathed to respondent Emilia as early as November 28, 1961 thru the Deed of Quitclaim. In turn, being the
successor-in-interest of Agripinas share in Lot No. 707, respondent Emilia took the formers place in the coownership and as such co-owner, has the right to compel partition at any time. 42
The respondents right to demand
for partition is not barred by
acquisitive prescription or laches
The petitioners posit that the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in the name of Hilaria and Felipa over Lot No. 707 on
December 11, 1962 was an express repudiation of the co-ownership with respondent Emilia. Considering the
period of time that has already lapsed since then, acquisitive prescription has already set in and the respondent is
now barred by laches from seeking a partition of the subject lot.
42

The contention is specious.


Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of the co ownership. 43 The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-ownership, is
subject to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is
clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been
in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period
required by law.44
The petitioners failed to comply with these conditions. The act of Hilaria and Felipa in effecting the registration of
the entire Lot No. 707 in their names thru TCT No. 42244 did not serve to effectively repudiate the co-ownership.
The respondent built her house on the eastern portion of the lot in 1981 without any opposition from the
petitioners. Hilaria also paid realty taxes on the lot, in behalf of the respondent, for the years 1983-1987. 45 These
events indubitably show that Hilaria and Felipa failed to assert exclusive title in themselves adversely to Emilia.
Their acts clearly manifest that they recognized the subsistence of their co-ownership with respondent Emilia
despite the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in 1962. Their acts constitute an implied recognition of the co-ownership
which in turn negates the presence of a clear notice of repudiation to the respondent. To sustain a plea of
prescription, it must always clearly appear that one who was originally a joint owner has repudiated the claims of
his co-owners, and that his co-owners were apprised or should have been apprised of his claim of adverse and
exclusive ownership before the alleged prescriptive period began to run. 46
In addition, when Hilaria and Felipa registered the lot in their names to the exclusion of Emilia, an implied trust
was created by force of law and the two of them were considered a trustee of the respondents undivided
share.47 As trustees, they cannot be permitted to repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. In Ringor v.
Ringor,48 the Court had the occasion to explain the reason for this rule:
A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another cannot repudiate the
trust by relying on the registration. A Torrens Certificate of Title in Joses name did not vest ownership of the
land upon him. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records title already existing
and vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. The Torrens system was not intended to foment
betrayal in the performance of a trust. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. Where
one does not have a rightful claim to the property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or record
nothing. Petitioners cannot rely on the registration of the lands in Joses name nor in the name of the Heirs of Jose
M. Ringor, Inc., for the wrong result they seek. For Jose could not repudiate a trust by relying on a Torrens title he
held in trust for his co-heirs.1wphi1 The beneficiaries are entitled to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the
irrevocability of the Torrens title. The intended trust must be sustained. 49 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Further, records do not reflect conclusive evidence showing the manner of occupation and possession exercised
by Hilaria and Felipa over the lot from the time it was registered in their names. The only evidence of possession
extant in the records dates back only to 1985 when Hilaria and Felipa declared the lot in their names for taxation
purposes.50 Prescription can only produce all its effects when acts of ownership, or in this case, possession, do not
evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. Hence, prescription among co-owners
cannot take place when acts of ownership exercised are vague or uncertain. 51
Moreover, the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be
clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any shadow of doubt; and when
upon trial it is not shown that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the
43

rights of the others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition will lie. 52 The petitioners failed to muster
adequate evidence of possession essential for the reckoning of the 10-year period for acquisitive prescription.
The express disavowal of the co-ownership did not happen on December 11, 1962 when TCT No. 42244 was
issued but in 1994 when Hilaria attempted to demolish Emilias house thus explicitly excluding her from the coownership. It was the only time that Hilaria and Felipa made known their denial of the co-ownership. On the same
year, the respondent instituted the present complaint for partition; hence, the period required by law for
acquisitive period to set in was not met.
Anent laches, the Court finds it unavailing in this case in view of the proximity of the period when the coownership was expressly repudiated and when the herein complaint was filed. Laches is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.53 More so, laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Neither should its
application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently
registered in the name of another.54
Partition of Lot No. 707
Under the Old Civil Code55 which was then in force at the time of Eulalio and Marcelas marriage, Lot No. 707
was their conjugal property.56 When Marcela died, one-half of the lot was automatically reserved to Eulalio, the
surviving spouse, as his share in the conjugal partnership. 57 Marcelas rights to the other half, in turn, were
transmitted to her legitimate child, Agripina and surviving spouse Eulalio. 58 Under Article 834 of the Old Civil
Code, Eulalio was entitled only to the usufruct of the lot while the naked ownership belonged to Agripina. When
he remarried, Eulalios one half portion of the lot representing his share in the conjugal partnership and his
usufructuary right over the other half were brought into his second marriage with Faustina. 59
When Eulalio died on July 20, 1930, portion of the lot was reserved for Faustina as her share in the conjugal
partnership.60 The remaining were transmitted equally to the widow Faustina and Eulalios children, Carolina
and Agripina.61 However, Faustina is only entitled to the usufruct of the third available for betterment. 62
The usufructuary of Eulalio over the portion inherited by Agripina earlier was merged with her naked
ownership.63 Upon the death of Faustina, the shares in Lot No. 707 which represents her share in the conjugal
partnership and her inheritance from Eulalio were in turn inherited by Carolina 64 including Faustinas usufructuary
rights which were merged with Carolinas naked ownership. 65
Consequently, Agripina is entitled to 5/8 portion of Lot No. 707 while the remaining 3/8 pertains to Carolina.
Thus, when Carolina sold Lot No. 707 to Hilaria and Felipa, the sale affected only 3/8 portion of the subject lot.
Since theDeed of Quitclaim, bequeathed only the eastern portion of Lot No. 707 in favor of Emilia instead of
Agripinas entire 5/8 share thereof, the remaining 1/8 portion shall be inherited by Agripinas nearest collateral
relative,66who, records show, is her sister Carolina.
In sum, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that the respondent is entitled to have Lot No. 707
partitioned. The CA judgment must, however, be modified to conform to the above-discussed apportionment of
the lot among Carolina, Hilaria, Felipa and Emilia.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58290 dated
December 11, 2001, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows: (1) 3/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall
44

pertain in equal shares to Hilaria Figuracion and Felipa Figuracion-Manuel; (2) portion of Lot. No. 707 shall
pertain to Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla; and (3) 1/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall pertain to the estate of Carolina
(Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
Branch 49, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual physical
partition of the subject property, as well as the improvements that lie therein, in the foregoing manner. The trial
court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons, who should
determine the technical metes and bounds of the property and the proper share appertaining to each co-owner,
including the improvements, in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. When it is made to appear to the
commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of
the parties, the court a quomay order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to
the other parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties
interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the
commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly, and
thereafter distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the just share of each co-owner. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 129163

April 22, 2003

VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO, LUCENA ARBOLARIO TA-ALA, FE ARBOLARIO, EXALTACION


ARBOLARIO, CARLOS ARBOLARIO, and Spouses ROSALITA RODRIGUEZ and CARLITO
SALHAY, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, IRENE COLINCO, RUTH COLINCO, ORPHA COLINCO and GOLDELINA
COLINCO,respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Once a valid marriage is established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it has been legally ended is
presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the husband with another woman will not give rise to a presumption of
legitimacy in favor of the children born of the second union, until and unless there be convincing proof that the
first marriage had been lawfully terminated; and the second, lawfully entered into.
The Case

45

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the February 28, 1995
Decision2 and the March 5, 1997 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR No. 38583. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and a new one
is accordingly entered
"(a) in Civil Case No. 385, DISMISSING the complaint and [counter-claim];
"(b) in Civil Case No. 367, ORDERING the defendant spouses to vacate the premises occupied within
Lot 323, Ilog Cadastre, registered under T.C.T. No. 140081 in favor of Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco,
Orpha Colinco and Goldelina Colinco."4
On the other hand, the assailed Resolution denied reconsideration: 5
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA as follows:
"The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan had five (5)
children, namely: (1) Agueda Colinco, (2) Catalina Baloyo, (3) Eduardo Baloyo, Gaudencia Baloyo, and
(5) Julian Baloyo. All of the above-named persons are now dead.
"The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by her two children, namely, Antonio Colinco and
[respondent] Irene Colinco. Antonio Colinco predeceased his three daughters, herein [respondents], Ruth,
Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco.
"The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario. Their union was blessed with the
birth of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a spinster and without issue.
"Records disclose moreover that decedent Purificacions father, Juan Arbolario, consorted with another
woman by the name of Francisca Malvas. From this cohabitation was born the [petitioners], viz, Voltaire
Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (refered to
hereinafter as Arbolarios). It is significant to note, at this juncture, that all the foregoing [petitioners]
were born well before the year 1951.
"In 1946, it appears that the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire interest in Lot 323 to his sister,
Agueda Baloyo Colinco, by virtue of a notarized document acknowledged before Notary Public
Deogracias Riego.
"In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was executed by and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia,
and their brothers Eduardo and Julian, who extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs of the
late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. The fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her
interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion
Arbolario to the other half.
"And as far as Julian Baloyo -- the fifth and last child --was concerned, records could only show that he
was married to a certain Margarita Palma; and that he died, presumably after 1951 without any issue.
46

"Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to take possession of a portion of the disputed parcel until her
death sometime in 1984 or 1985.
"It was under the foregoing set of facts that [respondents] Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco,
and Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to be the only surviving heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and
Macaria Lirazan, executed a Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement, dated May 8, 1987 where
they adjudicated upon themselves their proportionate or ideal shares in O.C.T. No. 16361, viz: Irene
Colinco, to one-half (1/2); while the surviving daughters of her (Irenes) late brother Antonio, namely
Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to share in equal, ideal proportions to the remaining half (1/2). This
forthwith brought about the cancellation of O.C.T. No. 16361, and the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-140018 in
their names and conformably with the aforesaid distribution.
"On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed Civil Case No. 367 against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay
and Carlito Salhay, seeking to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by
[respondent] spouses (Salhays hereinafter) since 1970.
"The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful lessees of the late Purificacion
Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses allegedly purchased the disputed portion of Lot
No. 323 from the deceased lessor sometime in [September] 1978.
"Meanwhile, or on May 9, 1988 -- before Civil Case No. 367 was heard and tried on the merits -- Voltaire
M. Arbolario, Fe Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Ta-ala, Exaltacion Arbolario, Carlos Arbolario
(Arbolarios, collectively) and spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay (the same
defendants in Civil Case No. 367), filed Civil Case No. 385 [f]or Cancellation of Title with Damages,
against the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 367. The Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend that the
Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement executed by he Colincos was defective and thus
voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to
the inheritance of their alleged half-sister, Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be
included in the distribution of the aforesaid lot."6
Ruling of the Trial Court
After a full-blown trial on the consolidated cases, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental (Branch 61)7 rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [Arbolarios] and
against the [Colincos] in Civil Case No. 385 -1) Declaring that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement, dated May 8, 1987,
executed by Irene, Ruth, Orpha and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco, as null and void and of no
effect insofar as the share of Purificacion Arbolario in Lot No. 323 is concerned[;]
2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-140018 and issue a new one in the names of Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Ta-ala,
Carlos Arbolario, Fe Arbolario and Exaltacion Arbolario, 3/8 share or One thousand Six Hundred
Forty Three Point Five (643.5) square meters, and the remaining 5/8 share or One Thousand
Seventy Two Point Five (1,072.5) square meters in the names of Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco,
Orpha Colinco and Goldelina Corlingco or other heirs, if any[;]
47

3) Ordering the [Respondents] Irene, Ruth, Orpha and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco, to pay
jointly and severally to [Petitioners] Voltaire M. Arbolario, et al., the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as moral damages, Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorneys fees and the x x x
sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,500.00) as appearance fees; and
in Civil Case No. 367 -1) Ordering the dismissal of [respondents] complaint and the [petitioners] counter-claim for lack
of legal basis.
In both cases -1) Ordering the Colincos to pay costs."8
The trial court held that the Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the deceased Purificacion Arbolario,
while the Colincos were her cousins and nieces. Pursuant to Article 1009 of the Civil Code, the Colincos could
not inherit from her, because she had half-brothers and half-sisters. Their 1987 Declaration of Heirship and
Partition Agreement was made in bad faith, because they knew all along the existence of, and their relationship
with, the Arbolarios. The Salhays, on the other hand, had no document to prove their acquisition and possession of
a portion of the disputed lot.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA rejected the contention of petitioners that "the cohabitation of their father with their natural
mother, Francisca Malvas, was by virtue of a valid marriage." The appellate court observed that the Arbolarios
had all been born before the death of Catalina Baloyo, as shown by the Deed of Declaration of Heirship, which
she had executed in 1951. No evidence was ever presented showing that her conjugal union with Juan Arbolario
had been judicially annulled or lawfully ended before that year. Because it was also in 1951 when Juan Arbolario
cohabited with Francisca Malvas, their union was presumably extramarital. Consequently, their children are
illegitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion, the daughter of Juan and Catalina.
Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting intestate from the legitimate
children and relatives of their father or mother. As the illegitimate siblings of the late Purificacion Arbolario,
petitioners cannot conveniently undermine the legal limitations by insisting that they were treated as half-brothers
and half-sisters by the deceased.
On the other hand, there is no impediment for respondents to declare themselves as the sole and forced heirs of
Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. Moreover, there is no clear and reliable evidence to support the allegation
of the Salhays that they purchased from the decedent, Purificacion Arbolario, the lot that they have been
occupying since 1970.
Hence, this Petition.9
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
I
48

"The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in considering the Arbolarios
illegitimate children and not entitled to inherit from their half-sister Purificacion Arbolario.
II
"The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in considering the purchase of the
property by Rosela Rodriguez and subsequent acquisition by Petitioners Rosalita Rodriguez and Carlito
Salhay improper.
III
"The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in deciding that the court a quo had
no right to distribute the said property." 10
In other words, petitioners are questioning the CA pronouncements on (1) the illegitimacy of their relationship
with Purificacion; (2) the validity of the Salhays purchase of a portion of the disputed lot; and (3) the impropriety
of the RTC Order partitioning that lot.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Illegitimacy of Petitioners
Petitioners contend that their illegitimacy is a "far-fetched and scurrilous claim" that is not supported by the
evidence on record. They maintain that the CA declared them illegitimate on the unproven allegation that Catalina
Baloyo had signed the Declaration of Heirship in 1951. They aver that this 1951 Declaration does not contain her
signature, and that she died in 1903:
"Que Agueda Baloyo, Catalina Baloyo y Eduardo Baloyo murieron ab intestate en Ilog, Negros Occ.; la
primera fallecio en 11 de Noviembre de 1940, la segunda murio el ano 1903 y el ultimo en 28 de Marzo
de 1947 x x x."11
We are not persuaded.
We begin our ruling with the general principle that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 12 However, where the
trial court and the CA arrived at different factual findings, a review of the evidence on record may become
necessary.13
Petitioners, in effect, are asking us to evaluate the 1951 Declaration of Heirship, deduce that Catalina Baloyo had
long been dead before it was ever executed, and conclude that the Arbolarios are legitimate half-brothers and halfsisters of Juan and Catalinas only daughter, Purificacion. What we see, on the other hand, is a series of non
sequiturs.
First, a review of the 1951 Declaration reveals that the year of Catalinas death was intercalated. The first two
numbers (1 and 9) and the last digit (3) are legible; but the third digit has been written over to make it look like a
"0." Further, the paragraph quoted by petitioners should show a chronological progression in the heirs years of
49

death: Agueda died in 1940 and Eduardo in 1947. Hence, if Catalina had indeed died in 1903, why then was her
name written after Aguedas and not before it? Moreover, the document, being in Spanish, requires an official
translation. We cannot readily accept the English translation proffered by petitioners, since respondents did not
agree to its correctness. Besides, it consisted of only a paragraph of the whole document.
Second, there is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolarios marriage to Francisca Malvas
was valid, supposedly because Catalina Baloyo was already dead when they were born. It does not follow that just
because his first wife has died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman who bore his children. A
marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable
fact.
Third, clear and substantial evidence is required to support the claim of petitioners that they were preterited from
the 1951 Declaration of Heirship. The RTC Decision merely declared that they were half-brothers and half-sisters
of Purificacion, while respondents were her cousins and nieces (collateral relatives). It made no pronouncement as
to whether they were her legitimate or illegitimate siblings. We quote the appellate court:
"x x x. Therefore, in the absence of any fact that would show that conjugal union of Juan Arbolario and
Catalina Baloyo had been judicially annulled before 1951, or before Juan Arbolario cohabited with
Francisca Malvas, it would only be reasonable to conclude that the foregoing union which resulted in the
birth of the [Arbolarios] was extra-marital. And consequently, x x x Voltaire Arbolario, et al., are
illegitimate children of Juan Albolario.
"There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy in this jurisdiction (Article 261, New Civil Code);
and whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after the dissolution of a prior marriage
or the separation of the spouses must introduce such evidence to prove his or her allegation (Ibid.; Sec. 4,
Rule 131, New Rules on Evidence). It is the x x x Arbolarios, claiming to be born under a validly
contracted subsequent marriage, who must show proof of their legitimacy. But this, they have miserably
failed to do."14
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established. 15 It stands to reason that
children born within wedlock are legitimate. 16 Petitioners, however, failed to prove the fact (or even the
presumption) of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke
a presumption of legitimacy in their favor.
As it is, we have to follow the settled rule that the CAs factual findings cannot be set aside, because they are
supported by the evidence on record.17 As held by the appellate court, without proof that Catalina died in 1903,
her marriage to Juan is presumed to have continued. Even where there is actual severance of the filial
companionship between spouses, their marriage subsists, and either spouses cohabitation with any third party
cannot be presumed to be between "husband and wife."18
Second Issue:
Evidence of Purchase
Petitioners contend that the CA committed a serious error when it disregarded the testimony that the Salhays had
purchased the portion of the lot they had been occupying since 1970. This issue, according to them, was not even
raised by respondents in the latters appeal to the CA.

50

We disagree. Although the sale was not expressly assigned as an error in their Brief, respondents (as petitioners in
the CA) still assailed the existence of the sale when they argued thus:
"As to the spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita R. Salhay, they could not present any written contract to
support their claim to having purchased a portion of Lot 323 where their house stands. Rosalita R. Salhay
on the witness stand testified under oath that she has no contract of sale in her favor because it was her
mother, Rosela Rodriguez who had purchased the land, but she was not able to produce any evidence of
such sale in favor of her mother. She declared that she has never paid land taxes for the land." 19
Hence, they prayed for the reversal of the appealed RTC Decision in toto. The CA, on the other hand,
categorically ruled that "no clear and reliable evidence had been introduced to prove such bare [allegation]" that a
portion of the disputed lot had ever been purchased by the Salhays. Besides, no favorable supporting evidence
was cited by petitioners in their Memorandum. Thus, we find no reason to overturn the CAs factual finding on
this point.
Third Issue:
Partition
Petitioners also contend that the Court of Appeals overstepped its bounds when it ruled that since respondents did
not raise the issue of partition on appeal, the RTC had no jurisdiction to divide the disputed lot. The CA held,
however, that the partition of the property had not been contemplated by the parties, because respondents merely
sought recovery of possession of the parcel held by the Salhays, while petitioners sought the annulment of the
Deed of Partition respondents had entered into.
We agree with the appellate court. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance
of the individual interests of co-owners, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and a right to
enjoy the allotted estate without supervision or interference. 20
Petitioners in this case were unable to establish any right to partition, because they had failed to establish that they
were legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of the deceased Purificacion. Questions as to the determination of
the heirs of a decedent, the proof of filiation, and the determination of the estate of a decedent and claims thereto
should be brought up before the proper probate court or in special proceedings instituted for the purpose. Such
issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of ownership and possession. 21
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 122880

April 12, 2006

FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner,


vs.
51

COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G.


CASTILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent),
who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give legal recognition to the due execution of this
document, the Court is provided the opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of
notarial wills, all self-evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally
defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And
perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a merejurat, is fatally
defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just
aching for judicial rejection.
There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive catalog of imperatives for
the proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful compliance with all the detailed requisites under Article
805 of the Code leave little room for doubt as to the validity in the due execution of the notarial will. Article 806
likewise imposes another safeguard to the validity of notarial wills that they be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. A notarial will executed with indifference to these two codal provisions
opens itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy.
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo,
which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent.
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in full:
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na
gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin at
testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento:
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-ayong sa kaugalian at patakaran
ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing
ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;
Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na
siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon, yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block 24 at
nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa
inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo
52

ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24, Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix
Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang pasubalit at kondiciones;
Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at kagustuhan
ko rin na hindi na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya.
Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.
(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
(Tagapagmana)
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E.
Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing
tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon, sa harap ng lahat at
bawat sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at
bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito.
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: 500 San Diego St.
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
QUIRINO AGRAVA
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981
LAMBERTO C. LEAO
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981
JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.
(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
53

Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila


Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will,
but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.
The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner
himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be
allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the attorney-infact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. 2 Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the
true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by oppositor
against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioners right
to occupy the properties of the decedent. 3 It also asserted that contrary to the representations of petitioner, the
decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad.
Per records, it was subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965, 4 and
the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by three (3) months. 5
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She
pointed out that decedents signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly
acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition.
After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992. 6 The RTC favorably took
into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito
Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will x
x x with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes;" 7 and from this
perspective, rebutted oppositors arguments that the will was not properly executed and attested to in accordance
with law.
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the subscribing and attesting
witnesses, and having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will, i.e., the
liberalization of the interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a will with the end in view of giving
the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, this Court is persuaded to rule that the will in question is
authentic and had been executed by the testatrix in accordance with law.
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end of the will after the signature of the
testatrix, the following statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi":
"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia N.
Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing
tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon, sa harap ng lahat at
bawat sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at
bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan
ito."
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgement and is considered by this
Court as a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
54

On the oppositors contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing witnesses at the bottom
thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second
page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof,
substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and attestation of the will.
With regard to the oppositors argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper
part of each page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it is worthy to note that the
will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions, and
the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the
defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix
her signature on the left margin of the second page, which contains only the last portion of the attestation clause
and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
As regards the oppositors assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery, the testimonies of
the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish the genuineness of the signature of
the testatrix and the due execution of the will. 8
The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his since deceased
mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court
and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. 9 The Court of Appeals noted that the attestation clause failed
to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate. 10
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the number of pages used in a
notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to
what he termed as "the substantial compliance rule." 11
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, which we replicate in
full.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or
by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also
sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary
public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
55

The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation clause to state the
number of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals several more deficiencies.
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the will. 12 There was
an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the number
of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left uncomplied with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the process Uy Coque v. Navas
L. Sioca13 and In re: Will of Andrada.14 In Uy Coque, the Court noted that among the defects of the will in
question was the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the will. 15 In ruling that
the will could not be admitted to probate, the Court made the following consideration which remains highly
relevant to this day: "The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is
obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the
testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such
removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following
sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification
of the document will involve the inserting of new pages and the forging of the signatures of the testator and
witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with much greater difficulty." 16
The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to state the number of
sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to declare "unanim[ity] upon the point
that the defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal." 17 It was further observed that "it cannot be denied that
the x x x requirement affords additional security against the danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the
Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material." 18
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino19 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,20 wherein the Court
allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact that the attestation clause did not state the number
of pages of the will. Yet the appellate court itself considered the import of these two cases, and made the
following distinction which petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we adopt with approval:
Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show that the attestation does not state the
number of pages used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of probate.
We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al.,
92 Phil. 161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195," to the effect that a will
may still be valid even if the attestation does not contain the number of pages used upon which the Will is written.
However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable in the aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so
because, in the case of "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra," although the attestation in the
subject Will did not state the number of pages used in the will, however, the same was found in the last part of the
body of the Will:
"x x x
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires
that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which
requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or
omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be
bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs.
56

Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio
decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of sheets or
pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if
the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will
itself. But here the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages
upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is
composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction
and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent
the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations." (page 165-165, supra)
(Underscoring supplied)
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the notarial acknowledgement in the Will states
the number of pages used in the:
"x x x
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages
used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is
discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the
testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses
signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "this Last Will and Testament consists of two pages
including this page" (pages 200-201, supra) (Underscoring supplied).
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated in any part of the Will. The will
does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of pages of the will should be stated. 21
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a time when the
statutory provision governing the formal requirement of wills was Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.22 Reliance on these cases remains apropos, considering that the requirement
that the attestation state the number of pages of the will is extant from Section 618. 23 However, the enactment of
the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the
attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of
the Civil Code states: "In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the
will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of article 805."
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which stated that "the underlying and
fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this project consists in the
[liberalization] of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more [freedom] in
[expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord with the [modern tendency] in respect to the formalities in
the execution of wills."24 However, petitioner conveniently omits the qualification offered by the Code
Commission in the very same paragraph he cites from their report, that such liberalization be "but with sufficient
safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure
and influence upon the testator."25
57

Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an extensive discussion made by Justice Regalado, speaking for the Court
on the conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal formalities required in the execution of the
attestation clause in wills.27 Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with several other cases, as examples
of the application of the rule of strict construction. 28 However, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more
liberal construction through the "substantial compliance rule" under Article 809. A cautionary note was struck
though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should be applied:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will
itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page;
whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can
reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the
total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate
proceedings.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed decision, considering that the
failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause is one of the defects which cannot be
simply disregarded. In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow the probate of a will whose attestation clause
failed to state that the witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator
and of each other,30 the other omission cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation cannot be lightly
disregarded.
Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be supplied
by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and,
correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions
which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and
ultimately, of the will itself."31 Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed every page
can be liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the
attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one anothers presence should be considered a fatal flaw
since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance. 32
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal
flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the
will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent
any increase or decrease in the pages. 33 The failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an
averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of
which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance
with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation
inSingson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with the
requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as
to the number of pages which comprise the will.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal requirements as
enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of the Code Commission in
incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal requisites as
enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, convinced that these remained effective safeguards
against the forgery or intercalation of notarial wills. 34 Compliance with these requirements, however picayune in
impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that the testator himself or herself had decided to convey
58

property post mortem in the manner established in the will.35 The transcendent legislative intent, even as
expressed in the cited comments of the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the testators incontestable
desires, and not for the indulgent admission of wills to probate.
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an examination of the will itself reveals
a couple of even more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection.
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the
attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary public.
Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on
the left-hand margin."37 While three (3) Justices38 considered the signature requirement had been substantially
complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not
been duly signed, rendering the will fatally defective.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the
attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is "a memorandum
of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must
necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses,
since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform
substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because
said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its
pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it
would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or
all of the witnesses.39
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement
that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be "attested and
subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]." The respective intents behind these two classes of signature are
distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the
witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the
attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause
itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation
clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page
containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses undertakings in
the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the attestation clause itself, but
not the left-hand margin of the page containing such clause. Without diminishing the value of the instrumental
witnesses signatures on each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the attestation clause which contains
the utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the
testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the
59

fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses
have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they
failed to sign the attestation clause.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge. The requirement
under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses"
has also not been complied with. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been
segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The
non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with Article
805, and should be treated as of equivalent import.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko
ngayong10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no manner of contemplation can those
words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in
going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. 41 It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the
notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language thereof.
A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and
sworn to by the executor.42 Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the document was subscribed
and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the notary public averred that he himself "signed and
notarized" the document. Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of and
swearing in of the executors of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the instrumental
witnesses.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain
invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely subscribed
and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a
will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free
consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act. 43 The acknowledgment coerces the
testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and
subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus
allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those
executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is
of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article 806. A notarial will
that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if
it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.
There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by the will in question. We
need not discuss them at length, as they are no longer material to the
60

disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign each and every
page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and that all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of
the will on the left margin, her only signature appearing at the so-called "logical end" 44 of the will on its first page.
Also, the will itself is not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic
numerals. There is a line of thought that has disabused the notion that these two requirements be construed as
mandatory.45 Taken in isolation, these omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny probate to a will.
Yet even as these omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on, though
indicative as they may be of a general lack of due regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever
executed the will.
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate denial inexorable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 156021 September 23, 2005
CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE P. COLLADO, JUDITH PROVIDO, CLARITA
PROVIDO, ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL PROVIDO, JR., LORNA DINA E. PROVIDO, SEVERO
ARENGA, JR., SERGIO ARENGA, EDUARDO ARENGA, CAROL ARENGA, RUTH BABASA,
NORMA HIJASTRO, DOLORES M. FLORES, ANTONIO MARIN, JR., JOSE MARIN, SR., and
MATHILDE MARIN, Petitioners,
61

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Resolutions1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69221,2 dismissing petitioners petition for annulment of judgment.
On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition, docketed as SP Proc. No. 00135, for the probate of the Last Will and Testament3 of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado ("decedent"), who
died on 26 October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo.4 Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the
executor of her will. On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in P.D. Monfort North,
Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision,5 allowing the probate of the will of the decedent and directing the
issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. 6
More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the
probate proceedings.7 Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as
the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, 8 claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent.
Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct
docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could
not have been probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in
accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked
testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under duress and
improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6)
she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included in the will properties which no longer belonged
to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the
decedent disposed of under intestate succession. 9
On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order10 denying petitioners motion for being unmeritorious. Resolving
the issue of jurisdiction, the RTC held that petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that
the deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. It merely
required respondent to pay the deficiency.11 Moreover, the RTCs Decision was already final and executory even
before petitioners filing of the motion to reopen.12
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition13 with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA, seeking the
annulment of the RTCs Decision dated 30 May 2001 and Order dated 11 January 2002. They claimed that after
the death of the decedent, petitioners, together with respondent, held several conferences to discuss the matter of
dividing the estate of the decedent, with respondent agreeing to a one-sixth (1/6) portion as his share. Petitioners
allegedly drafted a compromise agreement to implement the division of the estate. Despite receipt of the
agreement, respondent refused to sign and return the same. Petitioners opined that respondent feigned interest in
participating in the compromise agreement so that they would not suspect his intention to secure the probate of
the will.14 They claimed that they learnt of the probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result of which they
filed their motion to reopen the proceedings and admit their opposition to the probate of the will only on 4
October 2001. They argued that the RTC Decision should be annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. 15
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In its Resolution16 promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no
showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own. 17 Moreover, the CA declared as
baseless petitioners claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any
showing that they availed of this ground in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment in the RTC,
the CA added.18 Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was denied by the CA for lack
of merit.19
Petitioners now come to this Court, asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition for the alleged failure to show that they have not availed of or
resorted to the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other remedies through no fault
of their own, and held that petitioners were not denied their day in court during the proceedings before the
RTC.20 In addition, they assert that this Court has yet to decide a case involving Rule 47 of the Rules of Court and,
therefore, the instant petition should be given due course for the guidance of the bench and bar. 21
For his part, respondent claims that petitioners were in a position to avail of the remedies provided in Rules 37
and 38, as they in fact did when they filed a motion for new trial. 22 Moreover, they could have resorted to a
petition for relief from judgment since they learned of the RTCs judgment only three and a half months after its
promulgation.23 Respondent likewise maintains that no extrinsic fraud exists to warrant the annulment of the
RTCs Decision, since there was no showing that they were denied their day in court. Petitioners were not made
parties to the probate proceedings because the decedent did not institute them as her heirs. 24 Besides,
assumingarguendo that petitioners are heirs of the decedent, lack of notice to them is not a fatal defect since
personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. 25 Finally,
respondent charges petitioners of forumshopping, since the latter have a pending suit involving the same issues
as those in SP No. 00-135, that is SP No. 118126 filed before Branch 23, RTC of General Santos City and
subsequently pending on appeal before the CA in CA-G.R. No.74924. 27
It appears that one of the petitioners herein, Dolores M. Flores ("Flores"), who is a niece of the decedent, filed a
petition for letters of administration with the RTC of General Santos City, claiming that the decedent died
intestate without any issue, survived by five groups of collateral heirs. Flores, armed with a Special Power of
Attorney from most of the other petitioners, prayed for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the
decedent. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, stating that the probate court in
Janiuay, Iloilo has jurisdiction since the venue for a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is the
place where the decedent died. This is also in accordance with the rule that the first court acquiring jurisdiction
shall continue hearing the case to the exclusion of other courts, the RTC added. 28 On 9 January 2002, Flores filed
a Notice of Appeal 29 and on 28 January 2002, the case was ordered forwarded to the CA. 30
Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be annulled was
rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. They aver that respondents offer
of a false compromise and his failure to notify them of the probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud that
necessitates the annulment of the RTCs judgment.31
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same
63

Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award of damages,
insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to
law.32Both motions should be filed within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a judgment or final
order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence. Said party may file a petition in the same court and in the same case to set aside
the judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment and within six (6) months after entry thereof. 33
A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available only to
parties in the proceedings where the assailed
judgment is rendered.34 In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even
summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment. 35
However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the
probate proceedings.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the
estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed.36 Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province, 37 as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator.38 Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is onein
rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons
interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. 39
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such
notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it.40 Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties
thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new
trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is
essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further
proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became
final and executory.
Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final, they could have still filed a
petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of
theDecision only on 4 October 2001, or almost four (4) months from the time the Decision had attained finality.
But they failed to avail of the remedy.
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them, petitioners could no
longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or
negligence.41
64

Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to
comply with the substantive requisites, as the appellate court ruled.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered.42 The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that
there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner,43 and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. 44A
person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his
allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected
thereby.45
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in
character.46 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his
entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner
in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme
of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. 47
To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of respondents deliberate omission
or concealment of their names, ages and residences as the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance
of the will, they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus they were denied their day in court. In addition,
they claim that respondents offer of a false compromise even before the filing of the petition prevented them
from appearing and opposing the petition for probate.
The Court is not convinced.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator.48 A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as
nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs 49 who are entitled to be notified of
the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition
for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the
publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a
jurisdictional requisite.50
The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the
proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not
prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.
One other vital point is the issue of forum-shopping against petitioners. Forum-shopping consists of filing
multiple suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, involving the same parties, to ask the
courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially same reliefs, 51 on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. 52 Obviously, the parties in the instant
case, as well as in the appealed case before the CA, are the same. Both cases deal with the existence and validity
of the alleged will of the decedent, with petitioners anchoring their cause on the state of intestacy. In the probate
proceedings, petitioners position has always been that the decedent left no will and if she did, the will does not
comply with the requisites of a valid will. Indeed, that position is the bedrock of their present petition. Of course,
65

respondent maintains the contrary stance. On the other hand, in the petition for letters of administration, petitioner
Flores prayed for her appointment as administratrix of the
estate on the theory that the decedent died intestate. The petition was dismissed on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and it is this order of dismissal which is the subject of review in CA-G.R. No. 74924. Clearly,
therefore, there is forum-shopping.
Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the Court of the said pending case in their certification against forumshopping. Neither have they done so at any time thereafter. The Court notes that even in the petition for
annulment of judgment, petitioners failed to inform the CA of the pendency of their appeal in CA-G.R. No.
74924, even though the notice of appeal was filed way before the petition for annulment of judgment was
instituted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

66

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