G.R. No.

173473 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus BETH

TEMPORADA.
Promulgated: ________________
x------------------------------------------x

CORONA, J.:

SEPARATE OPINION

A man cannot suffer more punishment than the

law assigns, but he may suffer less. William
Blackstone[1]
For when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom,
the gentler gamester is the soonest winner.
William Shakespeare[2]

The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is one of

the more complicated and confusing topics in criminal law. It
befuddles not a few students of law, legal scholars and members of
the bench and of the bar.[3] Fortunately, this case presents a great
opportunity for the Court to resolve with finality a controversial
aspect of the application and interpretation of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. It is an occasion for the Court to perform its duty to
formulate guiding and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines or
rules.[4] In the process, the matter can be clarified, the public may
be educated and the Court can exercise its symbolic function of
instructing bench and bar on the extent of protection given by
statutory and constitutional guarantees.[5]
The fundamental principle in applying and interpreting
criminal laws, including the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is to

resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in
doubt, rule for the accused. This is in consonance with the
constitutional guarantee that the accused ought to be presumed
innocent until and unless his guilt is established beyond reasonable
doubt.[6]
Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the
rule of lenity. It is the doctrine that a court, in construing an
ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent
punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more
lenient punishment.[7]
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is
viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and
prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty
and economic usefulness.[8] Since the goal of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is to look kindly on the accused, the Court should
adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the
accused.
It is on the basis of this basic principle of criminal law that I
respectfully submit this opinion.

THE BONE OF CONTENTION

The members of the Court are unanimous that accusedappellant Beth Temporada was correctly found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa by

the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33 and the Court of
Appeals. However, opinions differ sharply on the penalty that
should be imposed on accused-appellant for estafa. In particular,
there is a debate on how the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be
applied in a case like this where there is an incremental penalty
when the amount embezzled exceedsP22,000 (by at least P10,000).
In this connection, the relevant portion of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud
another by any means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no
case exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor to reclusion temporal, as
the case may be.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On the other hand, the relevant portion of the Indeterminate

Sentence Law provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an
offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x

Jurisprudence shows that there are two schools of thought on

the incremental penalty in estafa vis--vis the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. Under the first school of thought, the minimum

term is fixed at prision correccional while the maximum term

can reach up toreclusion temporal. This is the general interpretation.
It was resorted to in People v. Pabalan,[9] People v. Benemerito,
[10]
People v. Gabres[11]and in a string of cases.[12]
On the other hand, under the second school of thought, the
minimum term is one degree away from the maximum term
and therefore varies as the amount of the thing stolen or
embezzled rises or falls. It is the line of jurisprudence that
follows People v. De la Cruz.[13] Among the cases of this genre
are People v. Romero,[14] People v. Dinglasan[15] and Salazar v. People.
[16]

The Court is urged in this case to adopt a consistent position

by categorically discarding one school of thought. Hence, our
dilemma: which of the two schools of thought should we affirm?

THE FIRST SCHOOL OF THOUGHT IS

MORE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in imposing a

sentence, the court must determine two penalties composed of the
maximum and minimum terms, instead of imposing a single
fixed penalty.[17] Hence, the indeterminate sentence is composed of a
maximum term taken from the penalty imposable under the

Revised Penal Code and a minimum term taken from the penalty
next lower to that fixed in the said Code.
The maximum term corresponds to that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the [Revised Penal] Code. Thus, attending circumstances
(such as mitigating, aggravating and other relevant circumstances)
that may modify the imposable penalty applying the rules of the
Revised Penal Code is considered in determining the maximum
term. Stated otherwise, the maximum term is arrived at after
taking into consideration the effects of attendant modifying
circumstances.
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the [Revised
Penal] Code for the offense. It is based on the penalty prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code for the offense without considering in
the meantime the modifying circumstances.[18]
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code for the felony of estafa (except estafa under Article 315(2)(d))
[19]

isprision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in

its minimum period if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000 but
does not exceed P22,000. If it exceeds P22,000, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period.

Moreover,

where

the

amount

embezzled

is

more

than P22,000, an incremental penalty of one year shall be added for

every additional P10,000.
Thus, the Revised Penal Code imposes prision correccional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period (or a
period of four years, two months and one day to eight years) if the
amount of the fraud is more than P12,000 but not more
than P22,000. If it exceedsP22,000, the penalty is imposed in its
maximum period (or a period of six years, 8 months and 21 days to
eight years) with an incremental penalty of one year for each
additional P10,000 subject to the limitation that the total penalty
which may be imposed shall in no case exceed 20 years.
Strictly

speaking,

misappropriated

by

the

the

circumstance

offender

is more

that

the

amount

than P22,000 is

qualifying circumstance. In People v. Bayot,[20] this Court defined a

qualifying circumstance as a circumstance the effect of which is
not only to give the crime committed its proper and exclusive name
but also to place the author thereof in such a situation as to
deserve no other penalty than that especially prescribed for said
crime. Applying
embezzled

is

the

more

definition

to

than P22,000,

estafa where the

the

amount

amount

involved ipso

jure places the offender in such a situation as to deserve no other

penalty than the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period
plus incremental penalty, if warranted.[21] In other words, if the
amount involved is more than P22,000, then the offender shall be

sentenced to suffer the maximum period of the prescribed penalty

with an incremental penalty of one year per additional P10,000.
However, People v. Gabres considered the circumstance that
more

than P22,000

was

involved

as

generic

modifying

circumstance which is material only in the determination of the

maximum term, not of the minimum term:
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
penalty shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for
the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which into
which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.
The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case
exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination
of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as
analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation
of the law accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed
in favor of the accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the
estafa
charged
against
accused-appellant
is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower
would then be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within
six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two months while the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6)
years and one (1) day because the amounts involved
exceeded P22,000.00, plus an additional one (1) year for each
additional P10,000.00. (emphasis supplied)

If the circumstance that more than P22,000 was involved is

considered as a qualifying circumstance, the penalty prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for it will be the maximum period of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period. This has a duration of six years, 8 months and 21 days to
eight years. The penalty next lower (which will correspond to the
minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence) is the medium
period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, which has a duration of five years,
five months and 11 days to six years, eight months and 20 days. [22]
If the circumstance is considered simply as a modifying
circumstance (as in Gabres), it will be disregarded in determining
the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence. The starting
point

will

be prision

correccional maximum

to prision

mayor minimum and the penalty next lower will then be prision
correccional in its minimum to medium periods, which has a
duration of six months and one day to four years and two months.
From the foregoing, it is more favorable to the accused if the
circumstance (that more than P22,000 was involved) is to be
considered as a modifying circumstance, not as a qualifying
circumstance. Hence, I submit that the Gabres rule is preferable.
On the contrary, the second school of thought is invariably
prejudicial to the accused. By fixing the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence to one degree away from the maximum

term, the minimum term will always be longer than prision

correccional in its minimum to medium periods.
Worse, the

circumstance

(that

more

than P22,000

was

embezzled) is not a modifying circumstance but a part of the

penalty, if adopted, will mean that the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence will never be lower than the medium period
of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, the penalty next lower to the maximum period
of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period.
THE SECOND SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS

The primary defect of the so-called second school of thought is

that it contradicts the in dubio pro reo principle. It also violates the
lenity rule. Instead, it advocates a stricter interpretation with
harsher effects on the accused. In particular, compared to the first
school of thought, it lengthens rather than shortens the penalty
that may be imposed on the accused. Seen in its proper context,
the second school of thought is contrary to the avowed purpose of
the law that it purportedly seeks to promote, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
The second school of thought limits the concept of modifying
circumstance to either a mitigating or aggravating circumstance
listed under Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. It

contends

that

the

respective

enumerations

under

the

said

provisions are exclusive and all other circumstances not included

therein were intentionally omitted by the legislature. It further
asserts that, even assuming that the circumstance that more
than P22,000 was embezzled may be deemed as analogous to
aggravating circumstances under Article 14, the said circumstance
cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance because it is
only in mitigating circumstances that analogous circumstances are
allowed and recognized.[23] The second school of thought then
insists that, since the circumstance that more thanP22,000 was
involved is not among those listed under Article 14, the said
circumstance is not a modifying circumstance for purposes of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The second school of thought therefore strictly construes the
term attending circumstances against the accused. It refuses to
recognize anything that is not expressed, takes the language used
in its exact meaning and admits no equitable consideration.
To the point of being repetitive, however, where the accused is
concerned, penal statutes should be interpreted liberally, not
strictly.
The fact that there are two schools of thought on the matter
by itself shows that there is uncertainty as to the concept of
attending or modifying circumstances. Pursuant to the in dubio
pro reo principle, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused
and not against him.

Moreover, laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote

the ends for which they are enacted. [24] The meaning of a word or
phrase used in a statute may be qualified by the purpose which
induced the legislature to enact the statute. The purpose may
indicate whether to give a word or phrase a restricted or expansive
meaning.[25] In construing a word or phrase, the court should adopt
the interpretation that best serves the manifest purpose of the
statute or promotes or realizes its object. [26] Where the language of
the statute is fairly susceptible to two or more constructions, that
which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted
should be adopted.[27] Taken in conjunction with the lenity rule, a
doubtful provision of a law that seeks to alleviate the effects of
incarceration ought to be given an interpretation that affords
lenient treatment to the accused.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is intended to favor the
accused, particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment. [28] The
reduction of his period of incarceration reasonably helps uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and
excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness.
The law, being penal in character, must receive an interpretation
that benefits the accused.[29] This Court already ruled that in cases
where the application of the law on indeterminate sentence would
be unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the lengthening of his
prison sentence, said law on indeterminate sentence should not be

applied.[30] In

the

same

vein,

if

an

interpretation

of

the

Indeterminate Sentence Law is unfavorable to the accused and will

work to increase the term of his imprisonment, that interpretation
should not be adopted. It is also for this reason that the claim that
the power of this Court to lighten the penalty of lesser crimes
carries with it the responsibility to impose a greater penalty for
grave penalties is not only wrong but also dangerous.
Nowhere does the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribe that
the minimum term of the penalty be no farther than one degree
away from the maximum term. Thus, while it may be true that the
minimum term of the penalty in an indeterminate sentence is
generally one degree away from the maximum term, the law does
not mandate that its application be rigorously and narrowly limited
to that situation.
THE PROPER INDETERMINATE
PENALTIES IN THESE CASES

From the above disquisition, I respectfully submit that the

prevailing rule, the so-called first school of thought, be followed.
With respect to the indeterminate sentence that may be imposed on
the accused, I agree with the position taken by Madame Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.
Accordingly, I vote that the decision of the Court of Appeals
be AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

(1)

in Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused be

sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional as minimum, to 9 years, 8
months and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum;

(2)

in Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02208376, the accused be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as
minimum, to 10 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision
mayor as maximum for each of the aforesaid three estafa
cases and

(3)

in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused be

sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional as minimum, to 12 years,
8 months and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

[1]
[2]
[3]

[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]

Commentaries on the Laws of England 92.

King Henry The Fifth, Act 3, Scene 6, Line 11.
A survey of criminal law jurisprudence will show that among the portions of the ruling of trial courts and
the appellate court that are most commonly corrected by this Court is the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. In fact, even this Court has grappled with the matter. (See People v. Moises, [160 Phil. 845
(1975)] overruling People v. Colman [103 Phil. 6 (1958)]; People v. Gonzales [73 Phil. 549 (1942)]
overturning People v. Co Pao [58 Phil. 545 (1933)] and People v. Gayrama (60 Phil. 796 (1934)]
and People v. Mape [77 Phil. 809 (1947)] reversing People v. Haloot [64 Phil. 739 (1937)] which followed
the Co Pao ruling.)
See Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 219 Phil. 402 (1985).
Id.
See Section 14 (2), Constitution.
Blacks Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition (2004), p. 1359.
People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933).
331 Phil. 64 (1996).

[10]
[11]
[12]

[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]

[20]
[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]

332 Phil. 710 (1996).

335 Phil. 242 (1997).
These cases include People v. Hernando, 375 Phil. 1078 (1999), People v. Menil, 394 Phil. 433
(2000), People v. Logan, 414 Phil. 113 (2001), People v. Gallardo, 436 Phil. 698 (2002), Garcia v.
People, 457 Phil. 713 (2003) and Vasquez v. People, G.R. No. 159255, 28 January 2008, 542 SCRA 520.
383 Phil. 213 (2000).
365 Phil. 531 (1999).
437 Phil. 621 (2002).
439 Phil. 762 (2002).
People v. Ducosin, supra.
People v. Gonzales, supra note 3.
The penalty for estafa under Article 315(2)(d) is provided under PD 818 (Amending Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code by Increasing the Penalties for Estafa Committed by Means of Bouncing Checks).
64 Phil. 269 (1937).
This is similar to the effect of the circumstance that the offender intended to aid the enemy by giving
notice or information that is useful to the enemy in the crime of correspondence with hostile country under
Article 120(3) of the Revised Penal Code (which necessitates the imposition of reclusion perpetua to
death) or of the circumstance that the offender be a public officer or employee in the crime of espionage
under Article 117 of the Revised Penal Code (which requires the imposition of the penalty next higher in
degree than that generally imposed for the crime).
See Article 61(5) of the Revised Penal Code. If the penalty is any one of the three periods of a divisible
penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that period next following the given penalty. Thus, the
penalty immediately inferior toprision mayor in its maximum period is prision mayor in its medium period
(People v. Co Pao, supra note 3). If the penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, the penalty
next lower in degree is reclusion temporal in its minimum period (People v. Gayrama, supra note 3). The
penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for a felony is a degree. If the penalty prescribed for a
felony is one of the three periods of a divisible penalty, that period becomes a degree, and the period
immediately below is the penalty next lower in degree (Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, Book
Two, Fifteenth Edition [2001], p. 700).
In particular, Article 13(10) expressly provides that any other circumstances of a similar nature and
analogous to those above mentioned are treated as mitigating. Article 14, however, does not have a similar
provision.
Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 (1946).
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
Muoz & Co. v. Hord, 12 Phil. 624 (1909).
Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. 485 (1909).
People v. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515 (1951).
Id.
Id.