1. G.R. No.

157943

September 4, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
GILBERT REYES WAGAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to overcome the
presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce
against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such
proof is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but also in
relation to the identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to
discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused
to be freed, it becomes the Courts constitutional duty to acquit him.
The Case
Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision
rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in
Cebu City (RTC), meting on him the indeterminate penalty of 12 years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 30 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum.
Antecedents
Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:
That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime prior
and subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent, with intent to gain and by means of false pretenses
or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, to wit: knowing that he did not have sufficient
funds deposited with the Bank of Philippine Islands, and without
informing Alberto Ligaray of that circumstance, with intent to defraud

the latter, did then and there issue Bank of the Philippine Islands
Check No. 0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in the amount
ofP200,000.00, which check was issued in payment of an obligation,
but which check when presented for encashment with the bank, was
dishonored for the reason "drawn against insufficient funds" and
inspite of notice and several demands made upon said accused to
make good said check or replace the same with cash, he had failed
and refused and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so,
to the damage and prejudice of Alberto Ligaray in the amount
aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty,2 the pre-trial was held, during
which the Defense admitted that the check alleged in the information
had been dishonored due to insufficient funds.3 On its part, the
Prosecution made no admission.4
At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto Ligaray as
its lone witness. Ligaray testified that on April 30, 1997, Wagas placed
an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone; that he and his wife
would not agree at first to the proposed payment of the order by
postdated check, but because of Wagas assurance that he would not
disappoint them and that he had the means to pay them because he
had a lending business and money in the bank, they relented and
accepted the order; that he released the goods to Wagas on April 30,
1997 and at the same time received Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) Check No. 0011003 for P200,000.00 payable to cash and
postdated May 8, 1997; that he later deposited the check with Solid
Bank, his depository bank, but the check was dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds;5 that he called Wagas about the matter, and the
latter told him that he would pay upon his return to Cebu; and that
despite repeated demands, Wagas did not pay him.6
On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally
meet Wagas because they transacted through telephone only; that he
released the 200 bags of rice directly to Robert Caada, the brotherin-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the
rice.7

After Ligaray testified, the Prosecution formally offered the following:

(a) BPI Check No. 0011003 in the amount ofP200,000.00 payable to
"cash;" (b) the return slip dated May 13, 1997 issued by Solid Bank;
(c) Ligarays affidavit; and (d) the delivery receipt signed by Caada.
After the RTC admitted the exhibits, the Prosecution then rested its
case.8

In view of the foregoing, it is my sincere request and promise to settle

said obligation on or before August 15, 1997.
Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention to shy away
from any financial obligation.
xxxx

In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having issued

BPI Check No. 0011003 to Caada, his brother-in-law, not to Ligaray.
He denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings with
Ligaray. He explained that the check was intended as payment for a
portion of Caadas property that he wanted to buy, but when the sale
did not push through, he did not anymore fund the check.9
On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter
dated July 3, 1997 apparently signed by him and addressed to
Ligarays counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray P200,000.00
for goods received, to wit:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 23, 1997
which is self-explanatory. It is worthy also to discuss with you the
environmental facts of the case for your consideration, to wit:
It is true that I obtained goods from your client worth P200,000.00 and
I promised to settle the same last May 10, 1997, but to no avail. On
this point, let me inform you that I sold my real property to a buyer in
Manila, and promised to pay the consideration on the same date as I
promised with your client. Unfortunately, said buyer likewise failed to
make good with such obligation. Hence, I failed to fulfill my promise
resultant thereof. (sic)

Respectfully yours,
(SGD.)
GILBERT R. WAGAS10
Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Caada who had
transacted with Ligaray, and that he had signed the letter only
because his sister and her husband (Caada) had begged him to
assume the responsibility.11 On redirect examination, Wagas declared
that Caada, a seafarer, was then out of the country; that he signed
the letter only to accommodate the pleas of his sister and Caada,
and to avoid jeopardizing Caadas application for overseas
employment.12 The Prosecution subsequently offered and the RTC
admitted the letter as rebuttal evidence.13
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged and he is hereby
sentenced as follows:

Again, I made another promise to settle said obligation on or before

June 15, 1997, but still to no avail attributable to the same reason as
aforementioned. (sic)

To suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve (12) years of

pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua
as maximum;

To arrest this problem, we decided to source some funds using the

subject property as collateral. This other means is resorted to for the
purpose of settling the herein obligation. And as to its status, said
funds will be rele[a]sed within thirty (30) days from today.

To indemnify the complainant, Albert[o] Ligaray in the sum

of P200,000.00;

To pay said complainant the sum of P30,000.00 by way of attorneys

fees; and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements constituting the crime of estafa, namely: (a)
that Wagas issued the postdated check as payment for an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued; (b) that he failed to
deposit an amount sufficient to cover the check despite having been
informed that the check had been dishonored; and (c) that Ligaray
released the goods upon receipt of the postdated check and upon
Wagas assurance that the check would be funded on its date.
Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration,15 arguing
that the Prosecution did not establish that it was he who had
transacted with Ligaray and who had negotiated the check to the
latter; that the records showed that Ligaray did not meet him at any
time; and that Ligarays testimony on their alleged telephone
conversation was not reliable because it was not shown that Ligaray
had been familiar with his voice. Wagas also sought the reopening of
the case based on newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a) the
testimony of Caada who could not testify during the trial because he
was then out of the country, and (b) Ligarays testimony given against
Wagas in another criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22.
On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, opining that the evidence Wagas desired to present
at a new trial did not qualify as newly discovered, and that there was
no compelling ground to reverse its decision.16
Wagas appealed directly to this Court by notice of appeal.17
Prior to the elevation of the records to the Court, Wagas filed a
petition for admission to bail pending appeal. The RTC granted the
petition and fixed Wagas bond at P40,000.00.18 Wagas then posted
bail for his provisional liberty pending appeal.19

The resolution of this appeal was delayed by incidents bearing on the

grant of Wagas application for bail. On November 17, 2003, the Court
required the RTC Judge to explain why Wagas was out on bail.20 On
January 15, 2004, the RTC Judge submitted to the Court a so-called
manifestation and compliance which the Court referred to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and
recommendation.21 On July 5, 2005, the Court, upon the OCAs
recommendation, directed the filing of an administrative complaint for
simple ignorance of the law against the RTC Judge.22 On September
12, 2006, the Court directed the OCA to comply with its July 5, 2005
directive, and to cause the filing of the administrative complaint
against the RTC Judge. The Court also directed Wagas to explain
why his bail should not be cancelled for having been erroneously
granted.23 Finally, in its memorandum dated September 27, 2006, the
OCA manifested to the Court that it had meanwhile filed the
administrative complaint against the RTC Judge.24
Issues
In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither friends
nor personally known to one other; that it was highly incredible that
Ligaray, a businessman, would have entered into a transaction with
him involving a huge amount of money only over the telephone; that
on the contrary, the evidence pointed to Caada as the person with
whom Ligaray had transacted, considering that the delivery receipt,
which had been signed by Caada, indicated that the goods had been
"Ordered by ROBERT CAADA," that the goods had been received
by Caada in good order and condition, and that there was no
showing that Caada had been acting on behalf of Wagas; that he
had issued the check to Caada upon a different transaction; that
Caada had negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that the element of
deceit had not been established because it had not been proved with
certainty that it was him who had transacted with Ligaray over the
telephone.
The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution establish
beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the elements of the
crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of
the crime?

Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:

check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof.26 It is the criminal fraud
or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the nonpayment of a debt.27 Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon
proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the
notice of dishonor.
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to
Caada because of the postdated check the latter had given to him;
and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment
because of the insufficiency of funds.

xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has
been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender,

like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.28 In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by
issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the
person with whom he was transacting over the telephone, thus:
Q:
On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a transaction with the
accused in this case?
A:

In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of

postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the
efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must
be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason
of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other
words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check
was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were
it not for the issuance of the check by the offender.25
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is
postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time
the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the

Yes, sir. He purchased two hundred bags of rice from me.

Q:
How did this purchase of rice transaction started? (sic)
A:
He talked with me over the phone and told me that he would like to
purchase two hundred bags of rice and he will just issue a check.29

Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see
and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had made the
demand for payment, and that he had talked with him only over the
telephone, to wit:
Q:

It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged,

must have used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What
the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the
worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply
because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof
of guilt must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer
who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.

After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do next?
A:
I made a demand on them.
Q:
How did you make a demand?
A:
I called him over the phone.
Q:
Who is that "him" that you are referring to?
A:
Gilbert Wagas.30
Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash.
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was
payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery
without the need of an indorsement.31 This rendered it highly probable
that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else
like Caada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to
Ligaray.1wphi1 Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself
see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and
expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the
stocks of rice was Caada.

Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Caada who received the rice
from him and who delivered the check to him. Considering that the
records are bereft of any showing that Caada was then acting on
behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to conclude
and find that Caada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual
and legal bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being
Caadas brother-in-law.
Finally, Ligarays declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted
with him over the telephone was not reliable because he did not
explain how he determined that the person with whom he had the
telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or
known before then. We deem it essential for purposes of reliability
and trustworthiness that a telephone conversation like that one
Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to be first authenticated
before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person
with whom the witness conversed by telephone should be first
satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any other
means.32 Without the authentication, incriminating another person just
by adverting to the telephone conversation with him would be all too
easy. In this respect, an identification based on familiarity with the
voice of the caller, or because of clearly recognizable peculiarities of
the caller would have sufficed.33 The identity of the caller could also be
established by the callers self-identification, coupled with additional
evidence, like the context and timing of the telephone call, the
contents of the statement challenged, internal patterns, and other
distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge of facts known
peculiarly to the caller.34
Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a
telephone communication is accorded probative weight. The identity

of the caller may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence.

According to one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court:

If he is present inside the courtroom []

A:

Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they

are relevant to the fact or facts in issue, and admissibility is governed
by the same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face conversations
except the party against whom the conversations are sought to be
used must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary that the witness
be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify the person with
whom the conversation was had, provided subsequent identification is
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the
development of the case. The mere statement of his identity by the
party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such identity, in the
absence of corroborating circumstances so as to render the
conversation admissible. However, circumstances preceding or
following the conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller.
The completeness of the identification goes to the weight of the
evidence rather than its admissibility, and the responsibility lies in the
first instance with the district court to determine within its sound
discretion whether the threshold of admissibility has been met.35 (Bold
emphasis supplied)
Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer
any proof to definitely establish that it had been Wagas whom Ligaray
had conversed with on the telephone. The Prosecution did not show
through Ligaray during the trial as to how he had determined that his
caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought to elicit from him
was whether he had known and why he had known Wagas, and he
answered as follows:
Q:

No, sir. He is not around.

Q:
Why do you know him?
A:
I know him as a resident of Compostela because he is an ex-mayor of
Compostela.36
During cross-examination, Ligaray was allowed another opportunity to
show how he had determined that his caller was Wagas, but he still
failed to provide a satisfactory showing, to wit:
Q:
Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you and the accused entered into [a]
transaction of rice selling, particularly with these 200 sacks of rice
subject of this case, through telephone conversation?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:

Do you know the accused in this case?

But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused whom you are
talking with?

A:

A:

Yes, sir.

I know it was him because I know him.

Q:

Q:

Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you had a
transaction with the accused through telephone conversation, and as
a consequence of that alleged conversation with the accused through
telephone he issued a check in your favor?
A:
No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.
Q:
But still through the telephone?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see you
personally regarding the 200 bags rice transaction?
A:
No. It was through telephone only.
Q:
In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200 bags of rice
through the accused himself?
A:
Yes. It was through Robert.
Q:
So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200 sacks of rice
through somebody other than the accused?

A:
Yes, sir.37
Ligarays statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had
ordered the rice because he "know[s]" him was still vague and
unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the identification, and
should not support a finding of Ligarays familiarity with Wagas as the
caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligarays answers that Wagas
was not even an acquaintance of Ligarays prior to the transaction.
Thus, the RTCs conclusion that Ligaray had transacted with Wagas
had no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the RTC was
speculating on a matter as decisive as the identification of the buyer
to be Wagas.
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the
person who had conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the
order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as the States
rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of
entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could
be considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of
evidence, the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for
which it is offered,38 not for any other purpose.39 Fairness to the
adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high
plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter
only because his sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do
so could not be taken for granted.
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the
onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit
probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts,
not he who denies, must prove,40 and as a means of respecting the
presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock
for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1)
the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality
of the commission of the offense with the participation of the accused.
All these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt
on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness

of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is
inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge
the onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence
dictates that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not
for the accused to establish innocence.41 Indeed, the accused, being
presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her
shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to
prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the
commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof
of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be
no conviction.42
There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a
reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary
force.43 Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification
of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a
reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up
to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in
criminal cases. Perforce, the accuseds constitutional right of
presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome,
and he is entitled to an acquittal,44 even though his innocence may be
doubted.45
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be
held civilly liable where the preponderance of the established facts so
warrants.46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was legally
liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due
course.47 Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay
the amount of the dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per
annum from the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, in
Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas of the crime of estafa on
the ground of reasonable doubt, but ORDERS him to pay Alberto
Ligaray the amount of P200,000.00 as actual damages, plus interest
of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

2.
PEOPLE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

OF

THE

G.R. No. 186228

her identity, including those of her immediate family or household

members, are not disclosed in this decision.

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

-versus-

The Facts
In an Information dated 21 September 2000,[2] the appellant
was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed
as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in
the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx,
province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with
the use of force and intimidation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal
knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old
minor against her will.[3]

Promulgated:
ANTONIO
LAUGA
PINA ALIASTERIO,
Accused-Appellant.

Y
March 15, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.

[4]

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense

stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in

the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that
AAA was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense was
committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the appellant. [5] On

Before Us for final review is the trial courts conviction of the

appellant for the rape of his thirteen-year old daughter.

trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim
AAA;[6] her brother BBB;[7] and one Moises Boy Banting,[8] a bantay
bayan in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following:

Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v.

Cabalquinto,[1] the real name and the personal circumstances of the

In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at

victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise

home.[9] AAAs father, the appellant, was having a drinking spree at the
neighbors place.[10] Her mother decided to leave because when

appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAAs mother.[11] Her
only brother BBB also went out in the company of some neighbors.[12]

moderate bloody discharges 2 to an alleged raping

incident[28]

At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up;

On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He

removed his pants, slid inside the blanket covering AAA and

believed that the charge against him was ill-motivated because he

removed her pants and underwear;[14]warned her not to shout for help

sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children after

while threatening her with his fist;[15] and told her that he had a knife

engaging in a heated argument,[29] and beats the children as a

placed above her head.[16] He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her

disciplinary measure.[30] He went further to narrate how his day was on

repeatedly, and inserted his penis inside her vagina.[17]

the date of the alleged rape.

[13]

Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.[18] Appellant

He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food

claimed he scolded her for staying out late.[19] BBB decided to take

prepared for him at lunchtime.[31] Shortly after, AAA arrived.[32] She

AAA with him.[20] While on their way to their maternal grandmothers

answered back when confronted.[33] This infuriated him that he kicked

house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father.

her hard on her buttocks.[34]

[21]

Upon

reaching

their

grandmothers

house,

they told

their

grandmother and uncle of the incident,[22] after which, they sought the

Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3

oclock in the afternoon.[35] Finding nobody at home,[36] he prepared his

assistance of Moises Boy Banting.[23]

dinner and went to sleep.[37]

Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only
his underwear.[24] He invited appellant to the police station, [25] to which

Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of

appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he

the Bantay Bayan headed by Moises Boy Banting.[38] They asked him

raped AAA because he was unable to control himself.[26]

to go with them to discuss some matters. [39] He later learned that he

was under detention because AAA charged him of rape.[40]

The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical

examination.[27] Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal Health Officer of
x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads:

On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,

Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its decision[41] in Criminal Case
No. 10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship

hyperemic vulvae
oclock freshly lacerated

with 4
hymen; (+)

oclock & 6
minimal to

and minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua.[42] It also ordered him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as

moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity with exemplary

damages of P25,000.00.[43]
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS[44] by the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN.[45] The appellate court found that
appellant is not eligible for parole and it increased both the civil
indemnity and moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.[46]
On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course
to the appellants notice of appeal.[47] This Court required the parties to
simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs, [48] but both
manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings.[49]
The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the

Admissibility in Evidence of an
Extrajudicial Confession before
a Bantay Bayan

Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy

Banting, a bantay bayan, the confession was inadmissible in evidence
because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid
waiver of such requirement.[54]
The case of People v. Malngan[55] is the authority on the scope
of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1)
[56]

and (3)[57] of the Constitution. InMalngan, appellant questioned the

admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay

chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court
distinguished. Thus:

trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the
failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt,[50] because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of
AAA and her brother BBB;[51] (2) his extrajudicial confession before
Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in
violation of his constitutional right;[52] and (3) AAAs accusation was illmotivated.[53]
Our Ruling

Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged

confession with a bantay bayan and the credibility of the witnesses for
the prosecution.

Arguably, the barangay tanods,

including
the Barangay Chairman,
in
this
particular
instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer
for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and
(3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was
brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2
January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the
only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses
x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the]
Constitution should have already been observed or
applied to her.Accused-appellants confession to
Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the
interrogation made by the latter admittedly conducted
without first informing accused-appellant of her rights
under the Constitution or done in the presence of
counsel. For this reason, the confession of accusedappellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well

as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible

in evidence against her x x x.
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal.
x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during custodial
investigations do not apply to those not elicited
through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case at
bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita
Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the private
complainant].[58] (Emphasis supplied)

Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government

Organization Representative well-known in his community.[62]
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based
volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case
of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the local government unit to
perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at
the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions
taken byMoises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the

Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court

authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes

needs to ascertain whether or not a bantay bayan may be deemed a

has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the

law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section

entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under

12 of the Constitution.

Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the

Miranda Rights, is concerned.

In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,

[59]

this Court had the

occasion to mention the nature of a bantay bayan, that is, a group of

male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of

We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant,

which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.

keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of

the x x x PNP.[60]

Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the

conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed

Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section

1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as

extrajudicial confession but from the confluence of evidence showing

his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[63]

amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be

organized to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace
and Order Council at the Barangay level.

[61]

Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution

The composition of the

Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as

Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and

Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a

her brother BBB. AAA testified that BBB accompanied her to the

Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a BarangayTanod; and

house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her

(5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-

relatives, proceeded to look for a bantay bayan. On the other hand,

BBB testified that he brought her sister to the house of their bantay

witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies have been

bayan after he learned of the incident.

coached or rehearsed.[67]

Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,[64] appellant argues that

Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she

where the testimonies of two key witnesses cannot stand together, the

bore grudges against him is likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not

inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie, and their

dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor

story a mere concoction.

[65]

complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge.[68] As

correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals:

The

principle,

however,

is

not

applicable

in

the

case

at

bar. In Bartocillo, the two testimonies could not simply stand together
because:
On one hand, if we are to believe
Susan, Orlando could not have possibly seen the
hacking incident since he had accompanied Vicente
home. On the other hand, if we are to accept the
testimony of Orlando, then Susan could not have
possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she was
with Vicente at that time.

Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of

BBB. Both testified that they sought the help of a bantay bayan. Their
respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for,
which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of
BBB, a shortcut version of AAAs testimony that dispensed with a
detailed account of the incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the
assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of the

Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong

enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a
charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation
upon them and their families but also bring their fathers
into the gallows of death.[69] The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a daughter to
charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to
the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and
subjecting her private parts to examination if such
heinous crime was not in fact committed.[70] No person,
much less a woman, could attain such height of cruelty
to one who has sired her, and from whom she owes
her very existence, and for which she naturally feels
loving and lasting gratefulness. [71] Even when
consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of
psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct
a story which would put her own father to jail for the
most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the
family including herself to a lifetime of shame.[72] It is
highly improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of
sexual perversity or loose morality has been shown to
fake charges much more against her own father. In fact
her testimony is entitled to greater weight since her
accusing words were directed against a close relative.
[73]

testimonies.[66] In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or

inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the

Elements of Rape

AAA. Settled is the rule that, alibi is an inherently weak defense that is
Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the

viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate. [81] Alibi and

prosecution, We now examine the applicability of the Anti-Rape Law

denial must be supported by strong corroborative evidence in order to

of 1997[74] to the case at bar.

merit credibility.[82] Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the

accused

must

establish

two

elements

(1)

he

was

not

at

The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among

the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was

others, [b]y a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman

physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its

through force, threat or intimidation.[75] The death penalty shall be

commission.[83] Appellant failed in this wise.

imposed if it is committed with aggravating/qualifying circumstances,

which include, [w]hen the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent.

Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances

[76]

The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and

The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how

relationship with the offender in the instant case has likewise been

she was raped, culminating with the penetration of appellants penis

adequately

into her vagina, suffices to prove that appellant had carnal knowledge

specifically alleged in the Information, stipulated on and admitted

of her. When a woman states that she has been raped, she says in

during the pre-trial conference, and testified to by both parties in their

effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.

respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission, as

[77]

Further, when such testimony corresponds with medical findings,

correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this

there is sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of

Court because they are judicial admissions within the contemplation

carnal knowledge have been established.[78]

of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. It provides:

The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or

intimidation is not essential when the accused is the father of the
victim, inasmuch as his superior moral ascendancy or influence
substitutes for violence and intimidation.[79] At any rate, AAA was
actually threatened by appellant with his fist and a knife allegedly

Penalty
cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward testimony of

Both

qualifying

circumstances

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or

written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made.

placed above AAAs head.[80]

It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant

established.

were

Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and

damages each from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, the Court of Appeals
correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to the effect that where,
as here, the rape is committed with any of the qualifying/aggravating
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the
victim

is

entitled

to P75,000.00

indemnity ex delicto[84] and P75,000.00

[85]

as

as
moral

civil
damages.

However, the award of exemplary damages should have been

increased

from P25,000.00to P30,000.00.[86] Also,

of reclusion perpetua in

lieu of

death

was

the

penalty

correctly

imposed

considering that the imposition of the death penalty upon appellant

would have been appropriate were it not for the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines.[87] We further affirm the ruling of the Court
of Appeals on appellants non-eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic
Act No. 9346 clearly provides that persons convicted of offenses
punished withreclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for
parole.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30
September

2008 in CA-G.R.

hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant

CR

HC

No.

00456-MIN is

Antonio Lauga isGUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and is hereby sentenced to suffer

the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to
pay

AAAP75,000.00 as

civil

indemnity, P75,000.00

damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

as

moral

SO ORDERED.

3. G.R. No. 170338

December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.

surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust

the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present
administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the
Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello
Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her
favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were
to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.1

x----------------------x

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then

Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege
speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the
inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But
on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director
Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI
Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House
Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed
three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned
debate by the committee members on the admissibility and
authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the
chambers of the House.2

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO,

RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B.
LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F.
TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to

suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to
prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the
testimonies of the resource persons.3

x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275

December 23, 2008

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D.

AGCAOILI, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE
MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped
conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and
a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano

(Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and
Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that
the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these
tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in
their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored

that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken
off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees
directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the
House proceedings.5

G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its
scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the
intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3,
Article III of the Constitution.11

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates

on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.

As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded
with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September
7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson

roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse
That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised
to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth the whats,
whens, wheres, whos and whys" of the alleged wiretap, and sought
an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications
providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons speech
was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed
two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of
wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate
ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the
possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body
were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28,
2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege
speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the
contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a
legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the
AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government
entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo
Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court
a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as

Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,

Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson,
Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes
filed their Comment16on the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the
ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to
appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in
G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos.
170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci"
recordings, they have different objectivesthe first is poised at
preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent
inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit
and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants
the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-IBefore delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve
the issue on the parties standing, argued at length in their pleadings.

In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "[l]egal standing

or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because
of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he
can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural
technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct
injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal
policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of
Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings."24 The fairly
recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the
broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice
and the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in
the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has
repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as
impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions
that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Courts duty
under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other
branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to
initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the

"Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the

members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the
recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be
directly injured by the House committees actions and charges of
electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the
petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their
standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and
members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt
to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish
to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will necessarily be
defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the
continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant
attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of
legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings
without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins
the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the
useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the
conduct of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the
execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his
constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of
the Republic.
Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranadas and
Agcaoilis and intervenor Sagges allegation that the continuous
conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be
noted that inFrancisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the

House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the

petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the
vindication of their own rightsas taxpayers, members of Congress,
citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of
the legal professionwhich were also supposedly violated by the
therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the
petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty
and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and
paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and
the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal
attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case
of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners
Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.
- II The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and
academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle
that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the
determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By
actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the
decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of
judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.36 Neither
will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no
practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its
purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment
thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of
things, cannot be enforced.38

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as

aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the
respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and
from including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays
that the said tapes be stricken off the records of the House
proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already
played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the
widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci"
inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the
respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events,
the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and
academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the
doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a
remedy for an act already accomplished.41
- III As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The
Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that
"[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication
of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2
of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15
days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and
even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of
general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the

present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of

half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened
their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question.
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that
respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in
accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure."
We quote the OSGs explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure"
requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its
rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the
one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are
held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates
membership, the composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may
thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem
fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the
subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by
the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion,
reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a
continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twentyfour members, twelve of whom are elected every three years
for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators
expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of
Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987
Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of
Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the

same reasoning inArnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the

1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than
majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The
consequence is that the Rules of Proceduremust be
republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of
twelve Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On
the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court
sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate
that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not
dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in
the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its
day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts
separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress
before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it
states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the
session shall be taken up at the next session in the
same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall
terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress,
but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if
present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress
and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same
status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and

practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that

the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically
have a different composition as that of the previous Congress)
should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the
Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing
body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then
pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the
expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution
and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is
reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the
Senates main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the
Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin
their term of office, the President may endorse the
Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or
revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion
which should be presented at least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of the majority of the
Senators present in the session shall be required for its
approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of
their adoption and shall remain in force until they are
amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into
account the new composition of the Senate after an election

and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules

at the start of each session in which the newly elected
Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its
main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their
adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language
is conspicuously absent from theRules. The Rules simply state
"(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does
not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules
until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in
the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be
presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would
continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next
Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution
requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the
duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is
incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its
legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in
subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed
to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress,
it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in
its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senates internet web page.49

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the
rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not
make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the
said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by
the Senate.
Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by the
respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the
Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not
sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that
the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any
other form of publication. Publication in accordance
with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons
liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of
Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to
support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the
more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.52 It
does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore,

could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in
the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October
31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial
notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of
the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as
the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation
subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear
contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to
discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and
the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition
be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines
and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of
legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.

4. G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994

TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding
Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL
S. ORTANEZ, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
seeks to reverse the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CAG. R. SP No. 28545 entitled "Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez versus Hon.
Romeo F. Zamora, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City and Rafael S. Ortanez".

A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of

Appeals assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned
cassette tapes.
On 10 June 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment which is
the subject of the present petition, which in part reads:
It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail,
for two basic reasons:
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They
and any other variant thereof can be admitted in
evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they
are presented and offered and on how the trial judge
utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and
the even handed administration of justice.

The relevant facts of the case are as follows:

On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez,
on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity
of the petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-905360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by
respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally
offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to "M".
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3)
cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner
and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's
oral offer of evidence on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court
admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence.
A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June
1992.

(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to

rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced
during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory;
neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous,
the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the
judgment on the merits and not through the special civil
action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously
that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law,
properly correctible by appeal and not
by certiorari.Otherwise, we will have the sorry
spectacle of a case being subject of a
counterproductive "ping-pong" to and from the
appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to
have made an error in any of its rulings with respect to
evidentiary matters in the course of trial. This we
cannot sanction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid
of merit, is hereby DISMISSED. 1
From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for
review, stating:

Grounds for Allowance of the Petition

10. The decision of respondent [Court of Appeals] has
no basis in law nor previous decision of the Supreme
Court.
10.1 In affirming the questioned order of
respondent judge, the Court of Appeals
has decided a question of substance not
theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court as the question of admissibility in
evidence of tape recordings has not,
thus far, been addressed and decided
squarely by the Supreme Court.
11. In affirming the questioned order of respondent
judge, the Court of Appeals has likewise rendered a
decision in a way not in accord with law and with
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
11.1 Although the questioned order is
interlocutory in nature, the same can still
be [the] subject of a petition
for certiorari. 2
The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the remedy
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed
of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.
The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to
challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in
such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment,
incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous
and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress. 3

In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting
all of the evidence offered by private respondent, including tape
recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified
persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when
private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his
home telephone. 4
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep.
Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not
being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or
the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained, obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasijudicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider
the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the
cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to
the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the

inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No.

4200.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned
Republic Act in Section 2 thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment
of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6) years for violation of
said Act. 5
We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties,
involving the applicability of American jurisprudence, having arrived at
the conclusion that the subject cassette tapes are inadmissible in
evidence under Philippine law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP
No. 28545 is hereby SET ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes are
declared inadmissible in evidence.
SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.
GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of
the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other
expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to
costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's
discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi)
Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG)
Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot
ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke
member ka na, magsumbong ka kung
ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses

na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon

ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo,

ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan
hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang
babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States,
nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo,
kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano
ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to
10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na
kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto
mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on
your own makakapasok ka kung hindi
ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita
(Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana
ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong
binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung
paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on
your own merit alam ko naman kung
gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang
nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam

noon.

CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang

na loob.

ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang

na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni

Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na
may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala
mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papaexplain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano
ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabisabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at
tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

CHUCHI Paano kita

nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi
na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas
ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the
said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted
herewith:
INFORMATION

ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil

nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka
puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan
nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako
ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero
huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung
hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa
akin, dahil tapos ka na.

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses

Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No.
4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of
February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this honorable court, the
above-named accused, Socorro D.
Ramirez not being authorized by Ester
S. Garcia to record the latter's
conversation with said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a tape

recorder secretly record the said

conversation and thereafter
communicate in writing the contents of
the said recording to other person.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its

assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null
and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. 5

Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September
16, 1988.
MA
RIA
NO
M.
CU
NE
TA
Ass
t.
City
Fisc
al
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3,
1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with
petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under
R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a
the taping of a communication by a personother than a participant to
the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case
to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June
19, 1989.

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that
the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the
taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the
unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than
those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be
alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not
constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A.
4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said
act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a
statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized

Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication
and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
"even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports
the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our
lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by
the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or
recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to

be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording

is not made by all the parties but by some parties and
involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned
under section 3 but would cover, for example civil
cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is
made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by
some in an effort to show the intent of the parties
because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous
even subsequent to the contract or the act may be
indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a
recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention
is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this
bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not
in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be
used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban
on tape recorded conversations taken without the
authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your
Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is
not sporting to record the observation of one without
his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not
fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor,
is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all
the parties should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of
recorders.

Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say

that in meetings of the board of directors where a tape
recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the
parties know. It is but fair that the people whose
remarks and observations are being made should
know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements
of persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever
you say here may be used against you." That is
fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of
that warning, he makes damaging statements against
his own interest, well, he cannot complain any
more. But if you are going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a person without him
knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him
knowing that what is being recorded may be used
against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March
12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that
under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party
secretly records a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is
public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not
contemplated by the bill. It is the communication
between one person and another person not
between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March

12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together
with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that
the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of
the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically
alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The
mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed."14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication"
in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations"
narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point
of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting,
as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are
broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include
the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.

Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase

"private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that
the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably
used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted
below:

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is

clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to

fear from their conversations being overheard. But this
statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as
well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized
people have some aspects of their lives they do not
wish to expose. Freeconversations are often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable
falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of
views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to
the privacy of communication, among others, has
expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless
to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have
recognized the nature of conversations between
individuals and the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must
have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions
of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free
exchange of communication between individuals
free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever
means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with
the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a
telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because
a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or
arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the
applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200
suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the
unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of
tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

6. G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act
(RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the
issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the
prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to
overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception
of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent
court's decision are not disputed by the petitioner.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty.
Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the
living room of complainant's residence discussing the
terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they
had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant
made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26,
1981, pp. 3-5).
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant,
who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him
on the settlement of the direct assault case because
his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a
business trip. According to the request, appellant went
to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about
the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
When complainant called up, Laconico requested
appellant to secretly listen to the telephone

conversation through a telephone extension so as to

hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the
following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for
direct assault.
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that
the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A
breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together
with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for
the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor
himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case for
Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu
City Fiscal's Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before
the students of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty
club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school
or another section of Don Bosco Technical High
School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the
Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel
Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas
Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault
Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the
Don Bosco Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the
Direct Assault Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn,
August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).

Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to

ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions.
Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told
Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the
money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico
to give the money to his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier
alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary,
insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he
received the money at the Igloo Restaurant,
complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine
Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit
stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00
for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the
complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against
complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone
conversation without complainant's consent,
complainant charged appellant and Laconico with
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November
22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section
1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1)
year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the
petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the
decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the
complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and,
therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard
such communication without the knowledge and consent of the
complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the

petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between

complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided
in Rep. Act No. 4200.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the
appellate court and raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the
telephone conversation between the complainant and accused
Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension
telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep.
Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen
or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep.
Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in
favor of the petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant
or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape
record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the effective
date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or
to replay the same for any other person or persons; or
to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or
in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, that
the use of such record or any copies thereof as
evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of

offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be

covered by this prohibition.
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal
statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of
evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third
party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the
telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension
line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension
was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at
extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between
complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in
the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and
another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public.
It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the
authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of
an extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member
of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand
for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a
direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City
Fiscal's Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We
have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal conviction
would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line
can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or
annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against
the listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of
electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone
cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often
encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who
happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a
crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he
could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to
secretly overhear the private communications of the would be

criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous
results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves
around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement."
Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as
would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six
years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with
extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to
use answering or recording devices to record business conversations
between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a
recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or
for that matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under
the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are
not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or
recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of
enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains
that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was
being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones
were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly
known communication device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be
punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the
bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in
the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however
otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight.
Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of
the Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is
embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context of the
aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete
set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of
a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone

receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be

detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to
another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get
the desired communication corning from the other party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device
or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken
words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1
of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping"
the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this
case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there
for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order
to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses
and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see
Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA
113,120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437,
443-444), we ruled:
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that
'however general the terms of a contract may be, they
shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those upon
which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article
1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various
stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together,
attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may
result from all of them taken jointly.
xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of

the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should
be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory
and should not be construed as to comprehend all
other obligations of the decedent. The rule that
'particularization followed by a general expression will
ordinarily be restricted to the former' is based on the
fact in human experience that usually the minds of
parties are addressed specially to the particularization,
and that the generalities, though broad enough to
comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used
in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the
parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin
R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in
Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973
ed, pp. 180-181).
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No.
4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be
construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature,
that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping
the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation
or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common
usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or
recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common
especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected
by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place
within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely
presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line
probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third
party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which
shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v.
United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular
telephone number may cause the bell to ring in more

than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a

telephone conversation takes the risk that the other
party may have an extension telephone and may allow
another to overhear the conversation. When such
takes place there has been no violation of any privacy
of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one
element of 605, interception, has not occurred.

for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the
Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our
lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as
a prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they
were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act
of merely listening to a telephone conversation.
xxx xxx xxx

In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party
would differ in no way if instead of repeating the message he held out
his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no
distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to
use an extension telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed
strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case
at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the
phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed
as not including an extension telephone. In the case of People v.
Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the
rule:
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this
rule to be the tenderness of the law of the rights of
individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris,
177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin
Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind
531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA
821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The
purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape
punishment through a technicality but to provide a
precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro,
20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory
Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction
or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search

Senator Taada. Another possible

objection to that is entrapment which is
certainly objectionable. It is made
possible by special amendment which
Your Honor may introduce.
Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel
that entrapment would be less possible
with the amendment than without it,
because with the amendment the
evidence of entrapment would only
consist of government testimony as
against the testimony of the defendant.
With this amendment, they would have
the right, and the government officials
and the person in fact would have the
right to tape record their conversation.
Senator Taada. In case of entrapment,
it would be the government.
Senator Diokno. In the same way, under
this provision, neither party could record
and, therefore, the court would be
limited to saying: "Okay, who is more
credible, the police officers or the
defendant?" In these cases, as
experienced lawyers, we know that the
Court go with the peace offices.

(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No.

33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Diokno. The point I have in
mind is that under these conditions, with
an agent outside listening in, he could
falsify the testimony and there is no way
of checking it. But if you allow him to
record or make a recording in any form
of what is happening, then the chances
of falsifying the evidence is not very
much.
Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is
not intended to prevent the presentation
of false testimony. If we could devise a
way by which we could prevent the
presentation of false testimony, it would
be wonderful. But what this bill intends
to prohibit is the use of tape record and
other electronic devices to intercept
private conversations which later on will
be used in court.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33,
March 12, 1964, p. 629).
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage,
through punishment, persons such as government authorities or
representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to
gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain
some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable
must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No.
4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension
telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then

Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of
violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the AntiWiretapping Act.
SO ORDERED.

7.
EN BANC
BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 181881

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

- versus -

CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINODAVID,

DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN
BUENSALIDA,
DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A.
CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III
ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND
Promulgated:
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Respondents.
October 18, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a

government employee who was charged administratively and
eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files
stored in the computer were used by the government employer as
evidence of misconduct.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule

45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision [1] dated October
11, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R.
SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner Briccio Ricky A. Pollo to nullify the
proceedings conducted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which
found him guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6713 and penalized him with dismissal.
The factual antecedents:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the
CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the
Public
Assistance
and
Liaison
Division
(PALD)
under
the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint
addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David
which was marked Confidential and sent through a courier
service (LBC) from a certain Alan San Pascual of Bagong Silang,
Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated Records Management
Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following office practice in
which documents marked Confidential are left unopened and instead
sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to
Chairperson David.
The letter-complaint reads:
The Chairwoman
Civil Service Commission
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Dear Madam Chairwoman,

Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New

Year!
As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I
would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright
for an employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an
accused govt employee having a pending case in the
csc. I honestly think this is a violation of law and unfair
to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one
of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the chief of
the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division. He
have been helping many who have pending cases in
the Csc. The justice in our govt system will not be
served if this will continue. Please investigate this
anomaly because our perception of your clean and
good office is being tainted.

office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer

files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair. The text
messages received by petitioner read:
Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going
over the PCs of PALD and LSD per instruction of the
Chairman. If you can make it here now it would be
better.
All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per
memo of the chair.
CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We
were not also informed about this.
We cant do anything about it its a directive from chair.
Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous
complaint; ill send a copy of the memo via mms[5]

Concerned Govt employee[3]

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with
background in information technology (IT), and issued a memo
directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically to back up
all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD)
and Legal divisions.[4] After some briefing, the team proceeded at
once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Upon
their arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the team informed the officials
of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo (Director
Castillo) and Director III Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of
Chairperson Davids directive.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD
and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by several
employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely
monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text
messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the

Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the
matter to Director Unite and that he will just get a lawyer. Another text
message received by petitioner from PALD staff also reported the
presence of the team from CSC main office: Sir may mga taga C.O.
daw sa kuarto natin.[6] At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the
investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the computers
in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of preserving all
the files stored therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files
sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned
over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were
examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found
that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from
the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering
about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters [7] in
connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals.
On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the ShowCause Order[8] dated January 11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who

had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counteraffidavit within five days from notice.
Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioners personal
files, Chairperson David made the following observations:
Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal
pleadings or documents that are related to or
connected with administrative cases that may broadly
be lumped as pending either in the CSCRO No. IV, the
CSC-NCR, the CSC-Central Office or other tribunals. It
is also of note that most of these draft pleadings are for
and on behalves of parties, who are facing charges as
respondents in administrative cases. This gives rise to
the inference that the one who prepared them was
knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and
advancing interests adverse and inimical to the interest
of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the
government tasked to discipline misfeasance and
malfeasance in the government service. The number of
pleadings so prepared further demonstrates that such
person is not merely engaged in an isolated practice
but pursues it with seeming regularity. It would also be
the height of naivete or credulity, and certainly against
common human experience, to believe that the person
concerned had engaged in this customary practice
without any consideration, and in fact, one of the
retrieved files (item 13 above) appears to insinuate the
collection of fees. That these draft pleadings were
obtained from the computer assigned to Pollo
invariably raises the presumption that he was the one
responsible or had a hand in their drafting or
preparation since the computer of origin was within his
direct control and disposition.[9]
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to
in the anonymous letter-complaint which had no attachments to it,
because he is not a lawyer and neither is he lawyering for people with
cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a fishing

expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in

his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his comment
which violated his right against self-incrimination. He asserted that he
had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was
on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed
Director Castillo that the files in his computer were his personal files
and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that
he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as
these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection
against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He
pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and
ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt
(MR) is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of
ownership, including its use for personal purposes. As to the
anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is not actionable as it failed
to comply with the requirements of a formal complaint under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied
from his computer without his consent is thus inadmissible as
evidence, being fruits of a poisonous tree.[10]
On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No.
070382[11] finding prima facie case against the petitioner and charging
him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). Petitioner was directed to submit his answer under oath
within five days from notice and indicate whether he elects a formal
investigation. Since the charges fall under Section 19 of the URACC,
petitioner was likewise placed under 90 days preventive suspension
effective immediately upon receipt of the resolution. Petitioner
received a copy of Resolution No. 070382 on March 1, 2007.

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss

and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having
proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the
CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. Petitioner
reiterated that he never aided any people with pending cases at the
CSC and alleged that those files found in his computer were prepared
not by him but by certain persons whom he permitted, at one time or
another, to make use of his computer out of close association or
friendship. Attached to the motion were the affidavit of Atty. Ponciano
R. Solosa who entrusted his own files to be kept at petitioners CPU
and Atty. Eric N. Estrellado, the latter being Atty. Solosas client who
attested that petitioner had nothing to do with the pleadings or bill for
legal fees because in truth he owed legal fees to Atty. Solosa and not
to petitioner. Petitioner contended that the case should be deferred in
view of the prejudicial question raised in the criminal complaint he
filed before the Ombudsman against Director Buensalida, whom
petitioner believes had instigated this administrative case. He also
prayed for the lifting of the preventive suspension imposed on him. In
its Resolution No. 070519[12] dated March 19, 2007, the CSC denied
the omnibus motion. The CSC resolved to treat the said motion as
petitioners answer.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent
Petition[13] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 98224, assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause
Order and Resolution No. 070382 dated February 26, 2007 as having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
total absence of jurisdiction. Prior to this, however, petitioner lodged
an administrative/criminal complaint against respondents Directors
Racquel D.G. Buensalida (Chief of Staff, Office of the CSC Chairman)
and Lydia A. Castillo (CSC-RO IV) before the Office of the
Ombudsman, and a separate complaint for disbarment against
Director Buensalida.[14]

On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing from the

CSC setting the formal investigation of the case on April 30, 2007.
On April 25, 2007, he filed in the CA an Urgent Motion for the
issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction.[15] Since he failed to
attend the pre-hearing conference scheduled on April 30, 2007, the
CSC reset the same to May 17, 2007 with warning that the failure of
petitioner and/or his counsel to appear in the said pre-hearing
conference shall entitle the prosecution to proceed with the formal
investigation ex-parte.[16] Petitioner moved to defer or to reset the prehearing conference, claiming that the investigation proceedings
should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of his petition by
the CA. The CSC denied his request and again scheduled the prehearing conference on May 18, 2007 with similar warning on the
consequences of petitioner and/or his counsels non-appearance.
[17]
This prompted petitioner to file another motion in the CA, to cite the
respondents, including the hearing officer, in indirect contempt.[18]
On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071134 [19] denying
petitioners motion to set aside the denial of his motion to defer the
proceedings and to inhibit the designated hearing officer, Atty. Bernard
G. Jimenez. The hearing officer was directed to proceed with the
investigation proper with dispatch.
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the
motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his
right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420, [20] the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
the Commission hereby finds Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a.
Ricky A. Pollo GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is
meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE

SERVICE with all its accessory penalties, namely,

disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, cancellation of civil service
eligibilities and bar from taking future civil service
examinations.[21]
On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted on
petitioners computer, the CSC noted the dearth of jurisprudence
relevant to the factual milieu of this case where the government as
employer invades the private files of an employee stored in the
computer assigned to him for his official use, in the course of initial
investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee and
without the latters consent or participation. The CSC thus turned to
relevant rulings of the United States Supreme Court, and cited the
leading case of OConnor v. Ortega[22] as authority for the view that
government agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather than law
enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure in the
governmental workplace without meeting the probable cause or
warrant requirement for search and seizure. Another ruling cited by
the CSC is the more recent case of United States v. Mark L.
Simons[23] which declared that the federal agencys computer use
policy foreclosed any inference of reasonable expectation of privacy
on the part of its employees. Though the Court therein recognized that
such policy did not, at the same time, erode the respondents
legitimate expectation of privacy in the office in which the computer
was installed, still, the warrantless search of the employees office was
upheld as valid because a government employer is entitled to conduct
a warrantless search pursuant to an investigation of work-related
misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its inception and
scope.
With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the CSC
held that petitioner has no reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to the computer he was using in the regional office in view of
the CSC computer use policy which unequivocally declared that a

CSC employee cannot assert any privacy right to a computer

assigned to him. Even assuming that there was no such
administrative policy, the CSC was of the view that the search of
petitioners computer successfully passed the test of reasonableness
for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the
aforecited authorities. The CSC stressed that it pursued the search in
its capacity as government employer and that it was undertaken in
connection with an investigation involving work-related misconduct,
which exempts it from the warrant requirement under the
Constitution. With the matter of admissibility of the evidence having
been resolved, the CSC then ruled that the totality of evidence
adequately supports the charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of
R.A. No. 6713 against the petitioner. These grave infractions justified
petitioners dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.
In his Memorandum[24] filed in the CA, petitioner moved to
incorporate the above resolution dismissing him from the service in
his main petition, in lieu of the filing of an appeal via a Rule
43 petition. In a subsequent motion, he likewise prayed for the
inclusion of Resolution No. 071800[25] which denied his motion for
reconsideration.
By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA held that: (1)
petitioner was not charged on the basis of the anonymous letter but
from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-finding investigation was
conducted and the results thereof yielded a prima facie case against
him; (2) it could not be said that in ordering the back-up of files in
petitioners computer and later confiscating the same, Chairperson
David had encroached on the authority of a judge in view of the CSC
computer policy declaring the computers as government property and
that employee-users thereof have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the

computer system; and (3) there is nothing contemptuous in CSCs act

of proceeding with the formal investigation as there was no restraining
order or injunction issued by the CA.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA,
petitioner brought this appeal arguing that
I
THE
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED SERIOUS
IRREGULARITY AND BLATANT ERRORS IN LAW
AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT RULED THAT ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT
IS ACTIONABLE UNDER E.O. 292 WHEN IN TRUTH
AND IN FACT THE CONTRARY IS EXPLICITLY
PROVIDED UNDER 2nd PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 8
OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 99-1936, WHICH IS AN
[AMENDMENT] TO THE ORIGINAL RULES PER CSC
RESOLUTION NO. 94-0521;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
AND COMMITTED PALPABLE ERRORS IN LAW
AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT
INVOKE
HIS
RIGHT
TO
PRIVACY,
TO
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION, BY VIRTUE OF OFFICE
MEMORANDUM NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL
MEMORANDUM
SIGNED
SOLELY
AND
EXCLUSIVELY BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND NOT
BY THE COLLEGIAL COMMISSION CONSIDERING
THAT POLICY
MATTERS
INVOLVING
SUB[S]TANTIAL RIGHTS CANNOT BE COVERED BY
AN OFFICE MEMORANDUM WHICH IS LIMITED TO
PROCEDURAL AND ROUTINARY INSTRUCTION;
III

THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH DATED
JANUARY 3, 2007 AND THE TAKING OF
DOCUMENTS IN THE EVENING THEREOF FROM
7:00 TO 10:00 P.M. IS NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION LIMITING THE DEFINITION [OF]
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ONE
INVOLVING AND TAINTED WITH PERSONAL
HOSTILITY. IT
LIKEWISE ERRED IN
HOLDING
THAT DATA STORED IN THE GOVERNMENT
COMPUTERS ARE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES
INCLUDING THE PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE
CONTRARY IS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 14 OF
OM. 10 s. 2002. AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL
WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT DAVID BY
VIRTUE OF O.M. 10 DID NOT ENCROACH ON THE
DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF A JUDGE PURSUANT
TO ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION;
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED
TO CONSIDER ALL OTHER NEW ARGUMENTS,
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HEREUNTO SUBMITTED
AS WELL AS ITS FAILURE TO EVALUATE AND TAKE
ACTION ON THE 2 MOTIONS TO ADMIT AND
INCORPORATE CSC RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420
DATED JULY 24, 2007 AND CSC RESOLUTION 071800 DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 2007. IT DID NOT
RULE LIKEWISE ON THE FOUR URGENT MOTION
TO RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR TRO.[26]
Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search
conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files
without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression on his
constitutional right to privacy.

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this

jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution,[27] which provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and
seizures but only of unreasonable searches and seizures. [28] But to
fully understand this concept and application for the purpose of
resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the
doctrine in the light of pronouncements in another jurisdiction. As the
Court declared in People v. Marti[29]:
Our present constitutional provision on the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as
follows:
The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to
be seized. (Sec. 1[3], Article III)

was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such,
the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the
United States Federal Supreme Court and State
Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this
jurisdiction.[30]
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,[31] the US Supreme Court
held that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a
conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone
booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a search and
seizure. Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone
call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted that
the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold
requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).[32]
In Mancusi v. DeForte[33] which addressed the reasonable
expectations of private employees in the workplace, the US Supreme
Court held that a union employee had Fourth Amendment rights with
regard to an office at union headquarters that he shared with other
union officials, even as the latter or their guests could enter the
office. The Court thus recognized that employees may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government
workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of OConnor v.
Ortega[34] where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was employed
by a state hospital, claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights
when hospital officials investigating charges of mismanagement of the
psychiatric residency program, sexual harassment of female hospital
employees and other irregularities involving his private patients under

the state medical aid program, searched his office and seized
personal items from his desk and filing cabinets. In that case, the
Court categorically declared that [i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government
instead of a private employer.[35] A plurality of four Justices concurred
that the correct analysis has two steps: first, because some
government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public
that no expectation of privacy is reasonable, a court must consider
[t]he operational realities of the workplace in order to determine
whether an employees Fourth Amendment rights are implicated; and
next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an
employers intrusion on that expectation for noninvestigatory, workrelated purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness
under all the circumstances.[36]
On the matter of government employees reasonable expectations of
privacy in their workplace, OConnor teaches:
x x x Public employees expectations of privacy
in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar
expectations of employees in the private sector, may
be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and
procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The
employees expectation of privacy must be assessed in
the context of the employment relation. An office is
seldom a private enclave free from entry by
supervisors, other employees, and business and
personal invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are
continually entered by fellow employees and other
visitors during the workday for conferences,
consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put,
it is the nature of government offices that others such
as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors,
and the general public may have frequent access to an
individuals office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that
[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable
searches by the government does not disappear
merely because the government has the right to make

reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer, x x x

but some government offices may be so open to
fellow employees or the public that no expectation
of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great
variety of work environments in the public sector,
the question of whether an employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy must be
addressed on a case-by-case basis. [37] (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US
Supreme Court declared that Dr. Ortegas Fourth Amendment rights
are implicated only if the conduct of the hospital officials infringed an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider as
reasonable. Given the undisputed evidence that respondent Dr.
Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with any other
employees, kept personal correspondence and other private items in
his own office while those work-related files (on physicians in
residency training) were stored outside his office, and there being no
evidence that the hospital had established any reasonable regulation
or policy discouraging employees from storing personal papers and
effects in their desks or file cabinets (although the absence of such a
policy does not create any expectation of privacy where it would not
otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr. Ortega has a
reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file
cabinets.[38]
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted by
hospital officials was reasonable, the OConnor plurality decision
discussed the following principles:
Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the
Court of Appeals simply concluded without discussion
that the searchwas not a reasonable search under the
fourth amendment. x x x [t]o hold that the Fourth
Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public

employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the

standards governing
such searches[W]hat is
reasonable depends on the context within which a
search takes place. x x x Thus, we must determine the
appropriate standard of reasonableness applicable to
the search.A determination of the standard of
reasonableness applicable to a particular class of
searches requires balanc[ing] the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion. x x x In the
case of searches conducted by a public employer,
we must balance the invasion of the employees
legitimate expectations of privacy against the
governments need for supervision, control, and the
efficient operation of the workplace.
xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a
warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an
employees office, desk, or file cabinets for a workrelated purpose would seriously disrupt the routine
conduct of business and would be unduly
burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in
such cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise
have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is
simply
unreasonable. In
contrast
to
other
circumstances in which we have required warrants,
supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly
in the business of investigating the violation of criminal
laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely
incident to the primary business of the agency. Under
these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant
requirement would conflict with the common-sense
realization that government offices could not function if
every employment decision became a constitutional
matter. x x x
xxxx

The governmental interest justifying workrelated intrusions by public employers is the efficient
and proper operation of the workplace. Government
agencies provide myriad services to the public, and the
work of these agencies would suffer if employers were
required to have probable cause before they entered
an employees desk for the purpose of finding a file or
piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to
give the concept of probable cause, rooted as it is in
the criminal investigatory context, much meaning when
the purpose of a search is to retrieve a file for workrelated reasons. Similarly, the concept of probable
cause has little meaning for a routine inventory
conducted by public employers for the purpose of
securing state property. x x x To ensure the efficient
and proper operation of the agency, therefore, public
employers must be given wide latitude to enter
employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory
reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches
conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-related
employee misconduct. Even when employers conduct
an investigation, they have an interest substantially
different from the normal need for law enforcement. x x
x Public employers have an interest in ensuring that
their agencies operate in an effective and efficient
manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably
suffers
from
the
inefficiency,
incompetence,
mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of
its employees. Indeed, in many cases, public
employees
are
entrusted
with
tremendous
responsibility, and the consequences of their
misconduct or incompetence to both the agency and
the public interest can be severe. In contrast to law
enforcement officials, therefore, public employers are
not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public
employers have a direct and overriding interest in
ensuring that the work of the agency is conducted in a
proper and efficient manner. In our view, therefore, a
probable cause requirement for searches of the
type at issue here would impose intolerable

burdens on public employers. The delay in

correcting the employee misconduct caused by the
need for probable cause rather than reasonable
suspicion will be translated into tangible and often
irreparable damage to the agencys work, and
ultimately to the public interest. x x x
xxxx
In sum, we conclude that the special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement make
theprobable-cause requirement impracticable, x x x
for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory
intrusions as well as investigations of work-related
misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither
unduly burden the efforts of government employers to
ensure the efficient and proper operation of the
workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the
privacy of public employees. We hold, therefore,
that public
employer
intrusions
on
the
constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for noninvestigatory, workrelated purposes, as well as for investigations of
work-related misconduct, should be judged by
the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under
this
reasonableness
standard, both the inception and the scope of the
intrusion must be reasonable:
Determining the reasonableness of any
search involves a twofold inquiry: first,
one must consider whether theaction
was justified at its inception, x x
x ; second, one must determine whether
the search as actually conducted was
reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place, x x x
Ordinarily, a search of an employees office
by a supervisor will be justified at its inception
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting

that the search will turn up evidence that the

employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or
that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory
work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed
file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope
when the measures adopted are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of the nature of the [misconduct].
x x x[39] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a hearing
on the factual dispute as to the character of the search and neither
was there any finding made as to the scope of the search that was
undertaken, the case was remanded to said court for the
determination of the justification for the search and seizure, and
evaluation of the reasonableness of both the inception of the search
and its scope.
In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs authorize
warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related
reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which
government interests are weighed against the employees reasonable
expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither
probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law
enforcement.[40]
OConnor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on
employees privacy rights in the workplace. One of these cases
involved a government employers search of an office
computer, United States v. Mark L. Simons[41] where the defendant
Simons, an employee of a division of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing materials containing
child pornography. Simons was provided with an office which he did
not share with anyone, and a computer with Internet access.The
agency had instituted a policy on computer use stating that
employees were to use the Internet for official government business

only and that accessing unlawful material was specifically

prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall understand that the
agency will periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the users
Internet access as deemed appropriate. CIA agents instructed its
contractor for the management of the agencys computer network,
upon initial discovery of prohibited internet activity originating from
Simons computer, to conduct a remote monitoring and examination of
Simons computer. After confirming that Simons had indeed
downloaded pictures that were pornographic in nature, all the files on
the hard drive of Simons computer were copied from a remote work
station. Days later, the contractors representative finally entered
Simons office, removed the original hard drive on Simons computer,
replaced it with a copy, and gave the original to the agency security
officer. Thereafter, the agency secured warrants and searched
Simons office in the evening when Simons was not around. The
search team copied the contents of Simons computer; computer
diskettes found in Simons desk drawer; computer files stored on the
zip drive or on zip drive diskettes; videotapes; and various documents,
including personal correspondence. At his trial, Simons moved to
suppress these evidence, arguing that the searches of his office and
computer violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After a hearing, the
district court denied the motion and Simons was found guilty as
charged.
Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court
ruled that the searches of Simons computer and office did not violate
his Fourth Amendment rights and the first search warrant was valid. It
held that the search remains valid under the OConnor exception to
the warrant requirement because evidence of the crime was
discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative
inspection. Simons violation of the agencys Internet policy happened
also to be a violation of criminal law; this does not mean that said
employer lost the capacity and interests of an employer. The
warrantless entry into Simons office was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment standard announced inOConnor because at the inception

of the search, the employer had reasonable grounds for suspecting

that the hard drive would yield evidence of misconduct, as the
employer was already aware that Simons had misused his Internet
access to download over a thousand pornographic images. The
retrieval of the hard drive was reasonably related to the objective of
the search, and the search was not excessively intrusive. Thus, while
Simons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, he did
not have such legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the files
in his computer.
x x x To establish a violation of his rights under
the Fourth Amendment, Simons must first prove that he
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place
searched or the item seized. x x x And, in order to
prove a legitimate expectation of privacy, Simons must
show that his subjective expectation of privacy is one
that society is prepared to accept as objectively
reasonable. x x x
xxxx
x x x We conclude that the remote searches of
Simons computer did not violate his Fourth
Amendment rights because, in light of the Internet
policy, Simons lacked a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the files downloaded from the
Internet. Additionally, we conclude that Simons Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated by FBIS retrieval
of Simons hard drive from his office.
Simons did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy with regard to the record or
fruits of his Internet use in light of the FBIS Internet
policy. The policy clearly stated that FBIS would
audit, inspect, and/or monitor employees use of the
Internet, including all file transfers, all websites
visited, and all e-mail messages, as deemed
appropriate. x x x This policy placed employees on
notice that they could not reasonably expect that their
Internet activity would be private. Therefore, regardless
of whether Simons subjectively believed that the files

he transferred from the Internet were private, such a

belief was not objectively reasonable after FBIS
notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet
use. x x x Accordingly, FBIS actions in remotely
searching and seizing the computer files Simons
downloaded from the Internet did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
xxxx
The burden is on Simons to prove that he
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office.
x x x Here, Simons has shown that he had an office
that he did not share. As noted above, the operational
realities of Simons workplace may have diminished his
legitimate privacy expectations. However, there is no
evidence in the record of any workplace practices,
procedures, or regulations that had such an effect. We
therefore conclude that, on this record, Simons
possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in
his office.
xxxx
In the final analysis, this case involves an
employees supervisor entering the employees
government office and retrieving a piece of government
equipment in which the employee had absolutely no
expectation of privacy equipment that the employer
knew contained evidence of crimes committed by the
employee in the employees office. This situation may
be contrasted with one in which the criminal acts of a
government employee were unrelated to his
employment. Here, there was a conjunction of the
conduct that violated the employers policy and the
conduct that violated the criminal law. We consider that
FBIS intrusion into Simons office to retrieve the hard
drive is one in which a reasonable employer might
engage. x x x[42] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs

Board[43] which involved the constitutionality of a provision in R.A. No.
9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offenses, have also recognized the fact
that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the
workplace.
The first factor to consider in the matter of
reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which effects a search
within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution,
intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as
the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation
of the employees and the reasonableness of drug
testing requirement. The employees privacy interest
in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by
the companys work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their
privacy expectation in a regulated office environment
is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon
such privacy has been upheld. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying
the
analysis
and
principles
announced
in OConnor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address the
following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search
authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard
drive on petitioners computer reasonable in its inception and scope?
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider
include (1) the employees relationship to the item seized; (2) whether
the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was
seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his

privacy in the item. These factors are relevant to both the subjective
and objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider
the two questions together.[44] Thus, where the employee used a
password on his computer, did not share his office with co-workers
and kept the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy
and any search of that space and items located therein must comply
with the Fourth Amendment.[45]
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove
that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his
office or government-issued computer which contained his personal
files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office
which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always
locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he
allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other
employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he
submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he
normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and
even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer
which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as full
of people, his friends, unknown people and that in the past 22 years
he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is personally
assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on
appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan
Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name,
accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that
in fact he stays in the office as a paying customer. [46] Under this
scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such
expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or

proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had
at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he

claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of

office computers, as in Simons.
Office Memorandum No. 10,
(CUP) explicitly provides:

S. 2002 Computer

Use Policy

POLICY
1.

The Computer Resources are the property of the

Civil Service Commission and may be used only for
legitimate business purposes.

2.

Users shall be permitted access to Computer

Resources to assist them in the performance of
their respective jobs.

3.

Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege

that may be revoked at any given time.

xxxx
No Expectation of Privacy
4. No

expectation of privacy. Users except the

Members of the Commission shall not have an
expectation of privacy in anything they create,
store, send, or receive on the computer system.

The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination

and Placement shall select and assign Users to
handle the confidential examination data and
processes.
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any
right to privacy in anything they create, store,
send, or receive on the computer through the
Internet
or
any
other
computer
network.Users understand that the CSC may use

human or automated means to monitor the

use of its Computer Resources.
6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer
resource is not a personal property or for the
exclusive use of a User to whom a memorandum
of receipt (MR) has been issued. It can be shared
or operated by other users. However, he is
accountable therefor and must insure its care and
maintenance.
xxxx
Passwords
12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be
responsible for safeguarding their passwords for
access to the computer system. Individual
passwords shall not be printed, stored online, or
given to others. Users shall be responsible for all
transactions made using their passwords. No
User may access the computer system with
another Users password or account.
13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords
to gain access to the computer system or to
encode particular files or messages does not
imply that Users have an expectation of privacy in
the material they create or receive on the
computer system. The Civil Service Commission
has global passwords that permit access to all
materials stored on its networked computer
system regardless of whether those materials
have
been
encoded
with
a
particular Users password. Only members of the
Commission shall authorize the application of the
said global passwords.
x x x x[47] (Emphasis supplied.)

The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees
on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they
create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the
CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections
may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only
for such legitimate business purposes.
One of the factors stated in OConnor which are relevant in
determining whether an employees expectation of privacy in the
workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy
policy.[48] In one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit held that
a state university employee has not shown that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his computer files where the universitys
computer policy, the computer user is informed not to expect privacy if
the university has a legitimate reason to conduct a search. The user is
specifically told that computer files, including e-mail, can be searched
when the university is responding to a discovery request in the course
of litigation.Petitioner employee thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth
Amendment rights when university officials conducted a warrantless
search of his computer for work-related materials.[49]
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the search
conducted on petitioners computer, we answer in the affirmative.
The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in connection
with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an
anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David
regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of
the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly
lawyering for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson
David stated in her sworn affidavit:
8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned
has received several text messages from
unknown sources adverting to certain anomalies

in Civil Service Commission Regional Office IV

(CSCRO IV) such as, staff working in another
government agency, selling cases and aiding
parties with pending cases, all done during office
hours and involved the use of government
properties;
9. That said text messages were not investigated for
lack of any verifiable leads and details sufficient
to warrant an investigation;
10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and
details as it pinpointed the persons and divisions
involved in the alleged irregularities happening in
CSCRO IV;
11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of
irregularities happening in CSCRO IV and its
effect on the integrity of the Commission, I
decided to form a team of Central Office staff to
back up the files in the computers of the Public
Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and
Legal Division;
x x x x[50]
A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified
at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it
will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct.[51] Thus, in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of
Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held that where a government agencys
computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with
pornographic content and in addition expressly provided that
employees do not have any personal privacy rights regarding their
use of the agency information systems and technology, the
government employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy as to
the use and contents of his office computer, and therefore evidence
found during warrantless search of the computer was admissible in
prosecution for child pornography. In that case, the defendant

employees computer hard drive was first remotely examined by a

computer information technician after his supervisor received
complaints that he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed
non-work-related e-mail messages throughout the office. When the
supervisor confirmed that defendant had used his computer to access
the prohibited websites, in contravention of the express policy of the
agency, his computer tower and floppy disks were taken and
examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued and later
search warrants were secured by the police department. The initial
remote search of the hard drive of petitioners computer, as well as the
subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid under
the OConnor ruling that a public employer can investigate workrelated misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception and
is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in
the first place.[52]
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners
computer was justified at its inception and scope. We quote with
approval the CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its actions,
consistent as it were with the guidelines established by OConnor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no
such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind
of the Commission that the search of Pollos computer
has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for
warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in
the above-discussed American authorities. It bears
emphasis that the Commission pursued the search
in its capacity as a government employer and that
it was undertaken in connection with an
investigation involving a work-related misconduct,
one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant
requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint
was received recounting that a certain division chief in
the CSCRO No. IV was lawyering for parties having
pending cases with the said regional office or in the
Commission. The nature of the imputation was
serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a

CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in

the practice of lawyering for parties with pending cases
before the Commission would be a highly repugnant
scenario, then such a case would have shattering
repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt
upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a
quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less
effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and
objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is
settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must
not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be
so, otherwise the general public would not have any
trust and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the
accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only
to arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or
fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was
received, a search was forthwith conducted involving
the computer resources in the concerned regional
office. That it was the computers that were
subjected to the search was justified since these
furnished the easiest means for an employee to
encode and store documents. Indeed, the
computers would be a likely starting point in
ferreting
out
incriminating
evidence.
Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer
files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a
click of a button, necessitated drastic and
immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to
comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related
investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the
Commission effected the warrantless search in an
open and transparent manner. Officials and some
employees of the regional office, who happened to be
in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the process
until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself
was duly notified, through text messaging, of the

search and the concomitant retrieval of files from his

computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the
warrantless search done on computer assigned to
Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with
unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the
managerial prerogative of the Commission as an
employer aimed at ensuring its operational
effectiveness and efficiency by going after the workrelated misfeasance of its employees. Consequently,
the evidence derived from the questioned search are
deemed admissible.[53]
Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to
privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy
of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition
accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees
in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We
likewise find no merit in his contention that OConnor and Simons are
not relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal
offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of
petitioners computer was justified there being reasonable ground for
suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating
evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as
government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous
complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the
warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined
in OConnor.
The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous
Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila[54] involving a branch clerk (Atty.
Morales) who was investigated on the basis of an anonymous letter
alleging that he was consuming his working hours filing and attending
to personal cases, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. The

OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI agents. The team

was able to access Atty. Morales personal computer and print two
documents stored in its hard drive, which turned out to be two
pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in the RTC of Manila, both
in the name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales computer was seized and
taken in custody of the OCA but was later ordered released on his
motion, but with order to the MISO to first retrieve the files stored
therein. The OCA disagreed with the report of the Investigating Judge
that there was no evidence to support the charge against Atty.
Morales as no one from the OCC personnel who were interviewed
would give a categorical and positive statement affirming the charges
against Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also charged in
the same case. The OCA recommended that Atty. Morales should be
found guilty of gross misconduct. The Court En Banc held that while
Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required
of every court employee, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained
from his personal computer against him for it violated his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Court found no evidence to support the claim of OCA that they were
able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales,
as in fact the latter immediately filed an administrative case against
the persons who conducted the spot investigation, questioning the
validity of the investigation and specifically invoking his constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure. And as there is no
other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly
confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him
administratively liable, the Court had no choice but to dismiss the
charges against him for insufficiency of evidence.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar
because, unlike the former which involved a personal computer of a
court employee, the computer from which the personal files of herein
petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence
government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to
regulate and monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with the item

seized (office computer) and other relevant factors and circumstances

under American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the
existence of CSC MO 10, S. 2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed to
establish that petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
office computer assigned to him.
Having determined that the personal files copied from the
office computer of petitioner are admissible in the administrative case
against him, we now proceed to the issue of whether the CSC was
correct in finding the petitioner guilty of the charges and dismissing
him from the service.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not only respect but even finality
if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.[55]
The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a
substantial number of drafts of legal pleadings and documents stored
in his office computer, as well as the sworn affidavits and testimonies
of
the
witnesses
it
presented
during
the
formal
investigation. According to the CSC, these documents were confirmed
to be similar or exactly the same content-wise with those on the case
records of some cases pending either with CSCRO No. IV, CSCNCR or the Commission Proper. There were also substantially similar
copies of those pleadings filed with the CA and duly furnished the
Commission. Further, the CSC found the explanation given by
petitioner, to the effect that those files retrieved from his computer
hard drive actually belonged to his lawyer friends Estrellado and
Solosa whom he allowed the use of his computer for drafting their
pleadings in the cases they handle, as implausible and doubtful under
the circumstances. We hold that the CSCs factual finding regarding

the authorship of the subject pleadings and misuse of the office

computer is well-supported by the evidence on record, thus:
It is also striking to note that some of these
documents were in the nature of pleadings responding
to the orders, decisions or resolutions of these offices
or directly in opposition to them such as a petition for
certiorari or a motion for reconsideration of CSC
Resolution. This indicates that the author thereof
knowingly and willingly participated in the promotion or
advancement of the interests of parties contrary or
antagonistic
to
the
Commission. Worse,
the
appearance in one of the retrieved documents the
phrase, Eric N. Estr[e]llado, Epal kulang ang bayad
mo,lends plausibility to an inference that the
preparation or drafting of the legal pleadings was
pursued with less than a laudable motivation. Whoever
was responsible for these documents was simply doing
the same for the money a legal mercenary selling or
purveying his expertise to the highest bidder, so to
speak.
Inevitably, the fact that these documents
were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises
the presumption that he was the author
thereof. This is because he had a control of the
said computer. More significantly, one of the
witnesses,
Margarita
Reyes,
categorically
testified seeing a written copy of one of the pleadings
found in the case records lying on the table of the
respondent. This was the Petition for Review in the
case of Estrellado addressed to the Court of
Appeals. The
said
circumstances
indubitably
demonstrate that Pollo was secretly undermining the
interest of the Commission, his very own employer.
To deflect any culpability, Pollo would, however,
want the Commission to believe that the documents
were the personal files of some of his friends, including
one Attorney Ponciano Solosa, who incidentally served
as his counsel of record during the formal investigation
of this case. In fact, Atty. Solosa himself executed a

sworn affidavit to this effect. Unfortunately, this

contention of the respondent was directly rebutted by
the prosecution witness, Reyes, who testified that
during her entire stay in the PALD, she never saw Atty.
Solosa using the computer assigned to the
respondent. Reyes more particularly stated that she
worked in close proximity with Pollo and would have
known if Atty. Solosa, whom she personally knows, was
using the computer in question. Further, Atty. Solosa
himself was never presented during the formal
investigation to confirm his sworn statement such that
the same constitutes self-serving evidence unworthy of
weight and credence. The same is true with the other
supporting affidavits, which Pollo submitted.
At any rate, even admitting for a moment the
said contention of the respondent, it evinces the fact
that he was unlawfully authorizing private persons to
use the computer assigned to him for official purpose,
not only once but several times gauging by the number
of pleadings, for ends not in conformity with the
interests of the Commission. He was, in effect, acting
as a principal by indispensable cooperation Or at the
very least, he should be responsible for serious
misconduct for repeatedly allowing CSC resources,
that is, the computer and the electricity, to be utilized
for purposes other than what they were officially
intended.
Further, the Commission cannot lend credence
to the posturing of the appellant that the line appearing
in one of the documents, Eric N. Estrellado, Epal
kulang ang bayad mo, was a private joke between the
person alluded to therein, Eric N. Estrellado, and his
counsel, Atty. Solosa, and not indicative of anything
more sinister. The same is too preposterous to be
believed. Why would such a statement appear in a
legal pleading stored in the computer assigned to the
respondent, unless he had something to do with it?[56]

Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC should not
have entertained an anonymous complaint since Section 8 of CSC
Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACC) requires a verified complaint:
Rule II Disciplinary Cases
SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil service
official or employee shall not be given due course
unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by
the complainant. However, in cases initiated by the
proper disciplining authority, the complaint need not
be under oath.
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained
unless there is obvious truth or merit to the
allegation therein or supported by documentary or
direct evidence, in which case the person complained
of may be required to comment.
xxxx
We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The administrative
complaint is deemed to have been initiated by the CSC itself when
Chairperson David, after a spot inspection and search of the files
stored in the hard drive of computers in the two divisions adverted to
in the anonymous letter -- as part of the disciplining authoritys own
fact-finding investigation and information-gathering -- found a prima
facie case against the petitioner who was then directed to file his
comment. As this Court held in Civil Service Commission v. Court of
Appeals[57] -Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6,
Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and Section 8, Rule
II of Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, a complaint may be initiated against a civil
service officer or employee by the appropriate
disciplining authority, even without
being
subscribed and sworn to. Considering that the CSC,
as the disciplining authority for Dumlao, filed the

complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao

acquired. (Emphasis supplied.)

was

validly

As to petitioners challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002

(CUP), the same deserves scant consideration. The alleged infirmity
due to the said memorandum order having been issued solely by the
CSC Chair and not the Commission as a collegial body, upon which
the dissent of Commissioner Buenaflor is partly anchored, was
already explained by Chairperson David in her Reply to the
Addendum to Commissioner Buenaflors previous memo expressing
his dissent to the actions and disposition of the Commission in this
case. According to Chairperson David, said memorandum order was
in fact exhaustively discussed, provision by provision in the January
23, 2002 Commission Meeting, attended by her and former
Commissioners
Erestain,
Jr.
and
Valmores. Hence,
the
Commission En Banc at the time saw no need to issue a Resolution
for the purpose and further because the CUP being for internal use of
the Commission, the practice had been to issue a memorandum
order.[58] Moreover, being an administrative rule that is merely internal
in nature, or which regulates only the personnel of the CSC and not
the public, the CUP need not be published prior to its effectivity.[59]
In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA
in affirming the CSCs ruling that petitioner is guilty of grave
misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713. The gravity of these offenses
justified the imposition on petitioner of the ultimate penalty of
dismissal with all its accessory penalties, pursuant to existing rules
and regulations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
The Decision dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution dated February
29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224
are AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

8. G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but
he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally
transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was
high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment
plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after
disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in
Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The
two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified
as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act was filed against him. 2Later, the information was amended
to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him
that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to
dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of
the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough
investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only
against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip
from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a

vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was
Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the
evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from
the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained
him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain
three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI
forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic,
chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this
finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all
he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts
and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested
and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a
search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force
him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting
him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the
blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even
know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling
watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the
marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly
Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the
stock room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of
the accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches
but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other
expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a
secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered
when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they
damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one
of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the
watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full
name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his
allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently
proved the injuries sustained by him. 19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering

that it was the trial judge who had immediate access to the testimony
of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on
the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and
hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or
expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial
judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the
falsities.

Q You mentioned an intelligence report,

you mean with respect to the coming of
Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's
conclusion that the accused-appellant was not really beaten up
because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a
medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible
Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under
detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free
since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been
allowed for his release.

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it

was supported by reliable sources.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it

is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and searched without
warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The
decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor
General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest
of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b)
of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search
also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who
testified for the prosecution, that they had no warrant when they
arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and
regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in
Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time
they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the
arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June
25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the
arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:

A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence
report?

Q Were you informed of the coming of

the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking
of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25,
1984 when we received this information
from that particular informer, prior to
June 25, 1984 we have already reports
of the particular operation which was
being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence
report two days before June 25, 1984
with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside
from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other
reports but not pertaining to the coming
of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of
illegal gambling operation.
COURT:

Q Previous to that particular information

which you said two days before June
25, 1984, did you also receive daily
report regarding the activities of Idel
Aminnudin

Q And this information respecting Idel

Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with
marijuana was received by you many
days before you received the
intelligence report in writing?

A Previous to June 25, 1984 we

received reports on the activities of Idel
Aminnudin.

A Not a report of the particular coming of

Aminnudin but his activities.

Q What were those activities?

Q You only knew that he was coming on

June 25,1984 two days before?

A Purely marijuana trafficking.

A Yes, sir.

Q From whom did you get that

information?

Q You mean that before June 23, 1984

you did not know that minnudin was
coming?

A It came to my hand which was written

in a required sheet of information,
maybe for security reason and we
cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular
informer?
A Yes, sir.

A Before June 23,1984, I, in my

capacity, did not know that he was
coming but on June 23, 1984 that was
the time when I received the information
that he was coming. Regarding the
reports on his activities, we have reports
that he was already consummated the
act of selling and shipping marijuana
stuff.

ATTY. LLARIZA:
COURT:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were
more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is
coming with drugs?

Q And as a result of that report, you put

him under surveillance?

A Marijuana, sir.

A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the
name of Idel Aminnudin was
mentioned?

A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the
woman.
Q So that even before you received the
official report on June 23, 1984, you had
already gathered information to the
effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to
Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search
warrant for the seizure or search of the
subject mentioned in your intelligence
report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that
our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever
it will yield positive result you do not
need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes
from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme Court cannot
countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and
not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant
issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence
of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the
accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about
to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless
arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as
in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that
vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures
for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can
be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two
days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival
was certain. And from the information they had received, they could
have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to
justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was
made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether
because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team,
had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless
arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been

shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are

popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule
113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the
accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of
his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to
do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like
any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel.
It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined
by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country
after fourteen years of the despised dictatorship, when any one could
be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without
trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is
allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution
and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for
indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone
does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional
presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if
his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough
to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from
Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence
cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the
trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally.
It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous
phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because
there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not

come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the
warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby
was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against
drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement
officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the
Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the
realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with
the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against
any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however
praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is
too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said,
"I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in
the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the
law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as
evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the
presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

9 G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.

That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila,

Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T

CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession
of firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person
at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the
weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been
illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The
Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in
evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest
that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the
Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that
there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna
and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later narrated
at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there
saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his
abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape
because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was
found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the
chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife
secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them.
Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for
investigation by the Intelligence Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the
accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y
TEJAS of a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
committed as follows:

without first having secured the necessary license or

permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the
prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the subject weapon
as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in
Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers.
He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles
stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no
effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it
and claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time
of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as
Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted over the objection of the defense. As
previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led to
Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have
been admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure. no warrant
therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been
seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote
was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The
defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery
in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been
disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature

and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search

warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That
is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution.
This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given
by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will
the wrong be repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule,
maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the
arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him
were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as
follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace
officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has

escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how
we can agree with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an
escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. We therefore
confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either
Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed
or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the
time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking
from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been
committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted
by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was
not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion
on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an
offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had
committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could
possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side"
and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made
them less so, if at all. It might have been different if Mengote bad been

apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason

to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was
arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after
alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not
skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was
nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the
blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of
them innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to side and be was
holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not
been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen
themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because
of the telephone call from the informer that there were "suspiciouslooking" persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at
North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men
looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the
warrantless arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in his waist that
excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out
to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused
boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of
the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His
suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to
contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and
seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had
been sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the
arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his
hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have
been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or
was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their
presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, where the Court held that the
warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected
while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent
than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be
actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the
7

arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no
probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed
with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements

have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the
time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and
that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been
committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the
accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the
Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of
Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of the
firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched
and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to
possess it.

Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of

Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully
carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's
house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a
person who has just committed, is committing, or is about
to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of
the fact. The offense must also be committed in his
presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80
Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however,
it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.
That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may

have been committed. The fact of the commission of the

offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable
ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
(Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the
Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be
committed, being committed, or just committed, what was
that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a
falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that
under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer
making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the
ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People
v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant
might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their overzealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the
requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the
vital evidence they had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may
be the very cause of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be
convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically enough, it
has not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately
unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested

and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be
possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp
handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have
committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. This
simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where
order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the
arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accusedappellant as the ruling we here make is sufficient to sustain his
exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the
time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important
exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote
(which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense
of the accused-appellant not only in the brief but also in the reply brief,
which she did not have to file but did so just the same to stress the
constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a
counsel de oficio with no expectation of material reward makes her
representation even more commendable.

Contrary to law.2
10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y
CHEN, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has
directly come to this Court via this petition for review on certiorari to
nullify and set aside the Resolution1 dated 13 March 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. 96149990 to 96-149992, entitled People of the Philippines v. Lawrence
Wang y Chen, granting private respondent Lawrence C. Wangs
Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the three (3) charges filed
against him, namely: (1) Criminal Case No. 96-149990 for Violation of
Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article I of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act); (2) Criminal Case No. 96149991 for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms); and (3) Criminal Case No. 96-149992 for
Violation of Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166
(COMELEC Gun Ban).
The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang
in the court of origin respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control a bulk of white and yellowish crystalline substance known as
SHABU contained in thirty-two (32) transparent plastic bags weighing
approximately 29.2941 kilograms, containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription therefor.

Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):

That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic pistol with one loaded
magazine and one AMT Cal. .380 9mm automatic backup pistol with
magazine loaded with ammunitions without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm automatic pistol with one loaded
magazine and one (1) AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic backup pistol
with magazine loaded with ammunitions, carrying the same along
Maria Orosa St., Ermita, Manila, which is a public place, on the date
which is covered by an election period, without first securing the
written permission or authority from the Commission on Elections, as
provided by the COMELEC Resolution 2828 in relation to Republic
Act 7166.
Contrary to law. 4
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all
the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. Thus,
the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for
him.5 Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases
followed.
The pertinent facts are as follows:

On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public

Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior
and Local Government, namely, Captain Margallo, Police Inspector
Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal, arrested SPO2 Vergel
de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug
popularly known as shabu. In the course of the investigation of the
three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio
were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation
was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source
and pretend to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag
of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Redentor Teck
and Joseph Junio informed the police operatives that they were
working as talent manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of
Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck
and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted
that they were working for Wang.6 They also disclosed that they knew
of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17
May 1996, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the
Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives
decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and
his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the
same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at
about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996, Wang, who was described to the
operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a
parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with
Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang,
introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and,
upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him
and asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car.7 When
frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and
confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic
Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other

members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it
were the following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing
white crystalline substance with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms,
which substance was later analyzed as positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally known as shabu; (b) cash in
the amount ofP650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one mechanical
scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine.
Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.8
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon
motion, accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within
which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence.9 On 19 December
1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation10 to the effect that it had
rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned,
and not as regards the two cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms
(Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the Comelec Gun Ban
(Crim. Case No. 96-149992). Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to
Evidence,11 praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3)
cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and
the inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him.
Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition to the
demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification12 to his Demurrer of Evidence
on 20 January 1997. On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its
Opposition13 alleging that the warrantless search was legal as an
incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is now
time for the defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S.
Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed Resolution14 granting Wangs
Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of
evidence, thus:
WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is
hereby granted; the accused is acquitted of the charges against him
for the crimes of Violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms, and Violation of Comelec

Gun Ban, for lack of evidence; the 32 bags of shabu with a total
weight of 29.2941 kilograms and the two unlicensed pistols, one AMT
Cal. .380 9mm and one Daewoo Cal. 9mm. are ordered confiscated in
favor of the government and the branch clerk is directed to turn over
the 32 bags of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board in Intramuros,
Manila, and the two firearms to the Firearms and Explosive Units,
PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for proper disposition, and the
officer-in-charge of PARAC, Department of Interior and Local
Government, is ordered to return the confiscated amount of
P650,000.00 to the accused, and the confiscated BMW car to its
registered owner, David Lee. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition15 for review on certiorari by the People, submitting
that the trial court erred I
XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE
WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF
THE CONSTITUTION, AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED THE WARRANTLESS
SEARCH OF ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE
CONTRABAND THEREIN.
ll
XXX IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH
IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE AND CAN ONLY BE VALID
AS AN INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
lII
XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE
ACCUSED AND THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS HANDGUNS
UNLAWFUL.

IV
XXX IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED, AS
A RESULT OF HIS SUBMISSION AND FAILURE TO PROTEST THE
SEARCH AND HIS ARREST, HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND HIS
OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED.
V
XXX IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED
AND OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION AND IN NOT DENYING
ACCUSED'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course
to the petition, required the public and private respondents to
comment thereon within ten days from notice. Private respondent
Wang filed his comment17on 18 August 1997.
On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a
reply,18 which the Office of the Solicitor General did on 5 December
1997, after several extensions.19
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda,20 which they did.
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may
appeal the trial courts resolution granting Wangs demurrer to
evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him without
violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy; and
(b) whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police
operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest
and/or a search warrant.
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal
filed directly with this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of
Court raising only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal by mere

filing of a notice of appeal not being allowed as a mode of appeal

directly to this Court. Then, too, it bears stressing that the right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being
merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the
manner provided for by law (Velasco v. Court of Appeals21). Although
Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that
any party may appeal, the right of the People to appeal is, in the very
same provision, expressly made subject to the prohibition against
putting the accused in double jeopardy. It also basic that appeal in
criminal cases throws the whole records of the case wide open for
review by the appellate court, that is why any appeal from a judgment
of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy. In effect,
the very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, disallows appeal by the People from judgments of
acquittal.
An order granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence is a resolution
of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally,
any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate
the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule,
however, the Court has previously made some exceptions.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan22 presents one
exception to the rule on double jeopardy, which is, when the
prosecution is denied due process of law:
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or
suggestions" from the very President who by an amendatory decree
(disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984
on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder
cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court
martial, as mandatorily required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time
providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal
offenses committed by military men) made it possible to refer the
cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the
very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote,
"jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by
preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily
transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual

cases." This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the

cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference
(and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab
initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the
extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals
Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has
been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the
erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make
him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and
evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and
suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all these
arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases
herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and
travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its
aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no
reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of
injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth,
instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and
committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a
wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of
politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people
and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our
judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military
tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to
due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the
victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives
and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for
due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham
trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century and that the
predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy
cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts'

judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which

represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due
process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar,
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute
and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over
or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of
due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right
is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25,
19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416
Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding
such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits
its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and
void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper
basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58
Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of
the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower
courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and
does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of

discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accuseds
demurrer to evidence. In point is the fairly recent case of People v.
Uy,23 which involved the trial courts decision which granted the two
separate demurrers to evidence filed by the two accused therein, both
with leave of court, resulting in their acquittal of their respective
charges of murder due to insufficiency of evidence. In resolving the
petition for certiorari filed directly with this Court, we had the occasion
to explain:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is
final and unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals explains the
rationale of this rule:
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard
against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first
enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case, verdicts of
acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The
cases of United States v. Yam Tung Way, People v.
Bringas, Gandicela v. Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v. Bao, to
name a few, are illustrative cases. The fundamental philosophy
behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to
afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and
safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of
criminal processes. As succinctly observed in Green v. United
States "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all
its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty." (Underscoring supplied)
The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence
is granted. As held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is
"filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is

granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the

prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a
criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be
appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in doublejeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
(Italics in the original)

disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly,

once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an
exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with
the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a
plea of double jeopardy. The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed
thus in People v. Velasco:

Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By
way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the
assailed judgment void. (Emphasis supplied.)

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by

the trial court cuts deep into the "humanity of the laws and in jealous
watchfulness over the rights of the citizens, when brought in unequal
contest with the State xxx. Thus Green expressed the concern that
"(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty."

In Sanvicente v. People,24 the Court allowed the review of a decision

of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the accuseds acquittal
upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with leave of court,
the CA ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and
authenticity of certain letter marked therein as Exhibit "LL," which
supposedly "positively identified therein petitioner as the perpetrator
of the crime charged." The Court, in a petition for certiorari, sustained
the CAs power to review the order granting the demurrer to evidence,
explaining thus:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed
by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving accuseds
demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an

acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying
this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the
protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in
the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not
guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose", a desire to know
the exact extent of ones liability. With this right of repose, the criminal
justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent,
even those whose innocence rests upon a jurys leniency, will not be
found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right against double
jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of
evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not
attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the

prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where
the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to
correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal
orders of trial courts granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence. This
may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of
dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original
special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against
double jeopardy is not violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through then
Secretary of Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor
General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed with the Court in the present case
is an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
raising a pure question of law, which is different from a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,25 we
have enumerated the distinction between the two remedies/actions, to
wit:
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial
distinctions which shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods
Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in
this light:

"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so

engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when
the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice
would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of
certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the basis either of
the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness
of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long
as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond
the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but
of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the
remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its
appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher
court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of
control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An
appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for
certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the
trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the
action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the
aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the
lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the
public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those
that the Rules of Court so declared are appealable. Since the issue is
jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the
judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy.

As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within

fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice
of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said
notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed
and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the
decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition
should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or
final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later
than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the
period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for
reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for
certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the
alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate
remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required
before appealing a judgment or final order.
Also in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of certiorari
and appeal are two different remedies mutually exclusive; they are
neither alternative nor successive. Where appeal is available,
certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon
demurrer to evidence, appeal is not available as such an appeal will
put the accused in double jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the
Philippines in this case, this petition is outrightly dismissible. The
Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial court by
appeal without violating private respondents right against double
jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil
action of certiorari, which definitely this Court has the power to do,

when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion committed

by the lower court, the instant petition will nevertheless fail on the
merits as the succeeding discussion will show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the
warrantless arrest and the warrantless search. There is no question
that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid
warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed.26However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful
search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is
currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in
flagrante delicto27 without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in
the case at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer
to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of
evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of
the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search. The trial
courts ratiocination is quoted as follows:
The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to
Evidence is whether his warrantless arrest and search were lawful as
argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by the defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer
may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it, and (c) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while being transferred from one confinement to
another. None of these circumstances were present when the
accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the
Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car
when the police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his
car. The accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of

his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to

commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense. The
unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the
accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front
pocket of his pants. And the handgun was bantam and slim in size
that it would not give an outward indication of a concealed gun if
placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done by the accused. The
arresting officers had no information and knowledge that the accused
was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him in
possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal.
9mm Pistol with magazine that were found and seized from the car.
The contraband items in the car were not in plain view. The 32 bags of
shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo handgun was
underneath the drivers seat of the car. The police officers had no
information, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car,
or that the accused had placed them there. The police officers
searched the car on mere suspicion that there was shabu therein.

A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.

xxx xxx xxx
Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen
effected the arrest of the accused?
A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by one of
those whom we have previously apprehended in connection with the
delivery of shabu somewhere also in Ermita, Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa,
what did you do?
A. We waited for him.
xxx xxx xxx

On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police

Inspector Cielito Coronel and SP03 Reynaldo are hereunder quoted:

Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during
that time?

POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONELS TESTIMONY

A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.

"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination

Q. What about your other companions where were they?

Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?

A. They were position in strategic places within the area.

A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.

Q. What happened when you and your companions were positioned

in that place?

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?
A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along Maria
Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila.
Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?

A. That was when the accused arrived.

Q. How many of your approached him.
A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives.
Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr. Witness?

A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him and

we asked him to open the back compartment of his car.

A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that?
A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one loaded
magazine and likewise when the compartment was opened several
plastic bags containing white crystalline substance suspected to be
shabu (were found).
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness?
A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm, a
Daewoo Pistol at the place under the seat of the driver.
Q. Then what happened?
A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further
investigation.
Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did you
do with that?
A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the NBI
for laboratory examination.

Q. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the

Glenmore Modeling Agency, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
.Q. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence Wang, is it
not?
A. I supposed, Sir.
Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he is
an employee of the Glenmore Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence
Wang, naturally, you and your companions look for Lawrence Wang to
shed light on the transporting of shabu by Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Thereafter, you spotted a person previously described by Redentor
Teck as Lawrence Wang, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you come to know the results?

A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (TSN,
pp. 3-8, November 15, 1996).

Q. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang, your companions at the

same time searched the BMW car described in your affidavit of arrest,
is it not?

ATTY. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged

transporting of shabu on May 16, 1996, at 11:00 p.m., is it not?

xxx xxx xxx

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was
searched, is it not?

Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not?

A. He was outside, Sir.

Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and search
were made, is it not?

Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of the
accused, please tell us the antecedent circumstances which led you
to recover or confiscate these items?

A. He was likewise outside, Sir.

Q. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not?

A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested one
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.

A. Yes, Sir.

COURT: Where did you arrest these people?

Q. When you effected the arrest, there was no warrant of arrest, is it

not?

A They were arrested in Metro Manila also.

COURT: The same date?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no search
warrant, is it not?

A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they were
investigated, Teck mentioned the name of Lawrence Wang as his
employer.

A. Yes, none, Sir. (TSN, pp. 3-12, November 15, 1996)

COURT: Why were these people, arrested?

SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBALS TESTIMONY

A. For violation of R.A. 6425.

PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION

COURT: How were they arrested?

Q. What is you role or participation in this case?

A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or

handling shabu to another previously arrested person. It was a series
of arrest.

A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx
Q. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so that
you arrested him, Mr. Witness?
A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his
possession placed inside his car.

COURT: So, this involved a series of operation?

A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three (3)
persons, SPO2 Vergel de Dios, a certain Arellano and a certain
Rogelio Noble. When they were arrested they divulged the name of
the source.
COURT: They were arrested for what, for possession?

xxx xxx xxx

A. Yes, Your Honor. For unlawful possession of shabu . Then they
divulged to us the name of the person from whom they get shabu.

COURT: Whose name did they mention:

A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio. We let them call Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio thru the
cellphone and pretend and to order another supply of shabu.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT: What happened during the stake out?
A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw him
opening his car together with his driver.

COURT: So there was an entrapment?

COURT: So, he was about to leave when you saw him?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
A. Probably, Sir.
COURT: So, these two (2) were arrested?
COURT: What did you do?
A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble
and company.

A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there
was a shabu inside the compartment of the car.

COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as

to the source of the shabu?
A. Yes, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car, what did
you do?

COURT: What was the information?

A. We approached him.
A. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang.
COURT: What happened when you approached him?
COURT: What did you do when you were told about that?
A. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car.
A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on
that morning.

COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the
car, what did you do with that?

COURT: When?
A. Of that date early morning of May 17, 1996.

A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. Coronel

while I was the one who inspected and opened the compartment of
the car and saw the shabu. (TSN, pp. 15-24, December 16, 1996).

COURT: At what place?

A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck
lead us to Maria Orosa Apartment where we conducted a stake out
which lasted up to 2:00 a.m.

CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY THE

COURT
COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito
Coronel, this Court has gathered that prior to the arrest of the accused

there were three (3) men that your team arrested. One of whom is a
police officer.

A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me that
they were working for the accused.

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was
another delivery of shabu scheduled that morning of (stop) was it May
16 or 17? The other delivery that is scheduled on?

xxx xxx xxx

COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu
were confiscated from them?

A: On the 17th.
xxx xxx xxx

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?
Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you were
able to discover that Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were the
source of the regulated drug that were confiscated from the three men
that you have arrested?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were able to
apprehend also these two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio?

A: No, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to
shed light on the matter concerning the arrest of these two employees
in possession of shabu. Did you and did your team suspect the
accused as being involved in the transaction that lead (led) to the
arrest of Redentor and Joseph?

A: Yes, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also
investigated by your team?

Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know
whether he was carrying a gun?

A: Yes, Sir.
A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.
Q: You were present while they were investigated?
Q: It was concealed?
A: I was the one whom investigated them.
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you
confiscated from them at the time of the (their) arrest?

Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in
possession of the gun is when he was bodily search?

A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when
Capt. Margallo handed to me the gun.
Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing
anything else?
A: None, Sir.
Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was
intending to do something unlawful or illegal?
A: No, Sir.
Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to
prevent your team from searching his car?
A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the
search of his person and the car were without probable cause and
could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any of
the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule
113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his
constitutional right of liberty. x x x
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the
arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a
lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful.
Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof
are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case
for lack of evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now
posits that "inasmuch as it has been shown in the present case that
the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and unlicensed
firearms in the accuseds possession had been validly made upon
probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then the
warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be
regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission of

the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and

statutorily permissible and lawful."28 In effect, the People now
contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest.
Since the case falls under an exception to the general rule requiring
search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure, the police officers
were justified in requiring the private respondent to open his BMW
cars trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search
or vice versa, is a matter of credibility of evidence. It entails
appreciation of evidence, which may be done in an appeal of a
criminal case because the entire case is thrown open for review, but
not in the case of a petition for certiorari where the factual findings of
the trial court are binding upon the Court. Since a dismissal order
consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal and
reviewable only by certiorari, the factual finding that the arrest
preceded the search is conclusive upon this Court. The only legal
basis for this Court to possibly reverse and set aside the dismissal
order of the trial court upon demurrer to evidence would be if the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction
when it ruled that there was no legal basis to lawfully effect a
warrantless arrest.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure on warrantless arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has

escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless
arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge
of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was
the author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending.

that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who
were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu.
Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their
source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon
the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early
morning of the following day, May 17, which is only a few hours
thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment
along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted
"surveillance" operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a
person which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the
employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently
establish the existence of probable cause based on personal
knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.

For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto

under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.291awphi1.nt

And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph
(c) of Section 5.

The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not
manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent
Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the
police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and
was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives
arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to
open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be
owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible
offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in
flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that
would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.30

In People v. Aminnudin,31 the Court declared as inadmissible in

evidence the marijuana found in appellants possession during a
search without a warrant, because it had been illegally seized, in
disregard of the Bill of Rights:

Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of

Section 5. What is clearly established from the testimonies of the
arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the information

The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that

the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search
incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of

his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to
do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like
any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel.
It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became a suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the fugitive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification of the informer was the probable cause as determined by
the officer (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against

unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis. While we
agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search,
however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest
and the search on his person and belongings.32 The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within
the purview of the constitutional guarantee.33 Moreover, the continuing
objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record
during the arraignment bolsters Wangs claim that he resisted the
warrantless arrest and search.
We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who
are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price
for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes once said, "I think it is less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to
violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.34
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

11.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182348
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
CARLOS DELA CRUZ, Promulgated:
Accused-Appellant.
November 20, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

Criminal Case No. 6517

That, on or about the 20th day of October 2002, in the
Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being then a private
citizen, without any lawful authority, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control One (1)
Gauge Shotgun marked ARMSCOR with Serial No.
1108533 loaded with four (4) live ammunition, which
are high powered firearm and ammunition respectively,
without first securing the necessary license to possess
or permit to carry said firearm and ammunition from the
proper authorities.
Criminal Case No. 6518

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the November 29, 2007 Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02286 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Carlos Dela Cruz which affirmed the September 16,
2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77 in San
Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case Nos. 6517 (Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition) and 6518 (Possession of Dangerous Drug).
The RTC found accused- appellant Carlos Dela Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11(2) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On November 15, 2002, charges against accused-appellant were
made before the RTC. The Informations read as follows:

That on or about the 20th day of October 2002, in the

Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and
control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag
weighing 49.84 grams of white crystalline substance,
which gave positive results for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[1]
Accused-appellant entered a not guilty plea and trial ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, showed that in the morning
of October 20, 2002, an informant tipped off the Drug Enforcement
Unit of the Marikina Police Station that wanted drug pusher Wifredo
Loilo alias Boy Bicol was at his nipa hut hideout in San Mateo, Rizal.
A team was organized to arrest Boy Bicol. Once there, they saw Boy
Bicol by a table talking with accused-appellant. They shouted Boy
Bicol sumuko ka na may warrant of arrest ka. (Surrender yourself Boy

Bicol you have a warrant of arrest.) Upon hearing this, Boy Bicol

The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of

engaged them in a shootout and was fatally shot. Accused-appellant

firearm and ammunition but convicted him of possession of dangerous

was seen holding a shotgun through a window. He dropped his

drugs. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

shotgun when a police officer pointed his firearm at him. The team
entered the nipa hut and apprehended accused-appellant. They saw a
plastic bag of suspected shabu, a digital weighing scale, drug
paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines lying on the table. PO1
Calanoga, Jr. put the markings CVDC, the initials of accusedappellant, on the bag containing the seized drug.
Accused-appellant was subsequently arrested. The substance seized
from the hideout was sent to the Philippine National Police crime
laboratory for examination and tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. He was thus separately indicted for violation

According to the defense, accused-appellant was at Boy Bicols house

having been asked to do a welding job for Boy Bicols motorcycle.
accused-appellant

was

there,

persons

In Criminal Case No. 6518 for Possession of

Dangerous Drug under Section 11, 2nd paragraph of
Republic Act 9165, the Court finds said accused
CARLOS DELA CRUZ Y VICTORINO, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to Life
Imprisonment and to Pay a Fine of FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00).
SO ORDERED.[4]

of RA 9165 and for illegal possession of firearm.

While

WHEREFORE, the Court based on insufficiency of

evidence hereby ACQUITS accused CARLOS DELA
CRUZ Y VICTORINO in Criminal Case No. 6517 for
violation of P.D. 1866 as amended by RA 8294.

who

identified

themselves as police officers approached the place, prompting

accused-appellant to scamper away. He lied face down when
gunshots rang. The buy-bust team then helped him get up. He saw
the police officers searching the premises and finding shabu and
firearms, which were on top of a table or drawer. [2] When he asked the
reason for his apprehension, he was told that it was because he was
a companion of Boy Bicol. He denied under oath that the gun and
drugs seized were found in his possession and testified that he was
only invited by Boy Bicol to get the motorcycle from his house.[3]

On December 7, 2005, accused-appellant filed a Notice of

Appeal of the RTC Decision.
In his appeal to the CA, accused-appellant claimed that: (1)
the version of the prosecution should not have been given full
credence; (2) the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that he was guilty of possession of an illegal drug; (3) his arrest
was patently illegal; and (4) the prosecution failed to establish the
chain of custody of the illegal drug allegedly in his possession.
The CA sustained accused-appellants conviction.[5] It pointed
out that accused-appellant was positively identified by prosecution
witnesses, rendering his uncorroborated denial and allegation of
frame-up weak. As to accused-appellants alleged illegal arrest, the CA

held that he is deemed to have waived his objection when he entered

his plea, applied for bail, and actively participated in the trial without
questioning such arrest.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN

CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT
ILLEGALITY OF HIS ARREST
IV

On the supposedly broken chain of custody of the illegal drug,

the appellate court held that accused-appellants claim is unpersuasive
absent any evidence showing that the plastic sachet of shabu had
been tampered or meddled with.
On December 20, 2007, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal
of the CA Decision.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN

CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II, RA 9165
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE
ILLEGAL DRUG ALLEGEDLY FOUND IN HIS
POSSESSION

On June 25, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit

Accused-appellant claims that the presence of all the elements

supplemental briefs if they so desired. The parties later signified their

of the offense of possession of dangerous drug was not proved

willingness to submit the case on the basis of the records already with

beyond reasonable doubt since both actual and constructive

the Court.

possessions were not proved. He asserts that the shabu was not
found in his actual possession, for which reason the prosecution was

Accused-appellant presents the following issues before us:

required to establish that he had constructive possession over

the shabu. He maintains that as he had no control and dominion over

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
FULL CREDENCE TO THE VERSION OF THE
PROSECUTION
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF VIOLATION
OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II, RA 9165 DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
III

the drug or over the place where it was found, the prosecution
likewise failed to prove constructive possession.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has merit.
The elements in illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be
a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. [6] On

the third element, we have held that the possession must be with

by a table inside the nipa hut. That table, they testified, was the same

knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed with the

table where they saw the shabu once inside the nipa hut. This fact

[7]

possession or control of said articles. Considering that as to this

was used by the prosecution to show that accused-appellant

knowledge, a persons mental state of awareness of a fact is involved,

exercised dominion and control over the shabu on the table. We,

we have ruled that:

however, find this too broad an application of the concept of

Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused

and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty,
resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus
possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on
a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the
prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well
as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may
and usually must be inferred from the attendant events
in each particular case.[8]

constructive possession.
In People v. Torres,[10] we

held there was

constructive

possession of prohibited drugs even when the accused was not home
when the prohibited drugs were found in the masters bedroom of his
house.
In People v. Tira,[11] we sustained the conviction of the accused

The prior or contemporaneous acts of accused-appellant show

husband and wife for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Their

that: he was inside the nipa hut at the time the buy-bust operation was

residence was searched and their bed was found to be concealing

taking place; he was talking to Boy Bicol inside the nipa hut; he was

illegal drugs underneath. We held that the wife cannot feign ignorance

seen holding a shotgun; when PO1 Calanoga, Jr. pointed his firearm

of the drugs existence as she had full access to the room, including

at accused-appellant, the latter dropped his shotgun; and when

the space under the bed.

apprehended, he was in a room which had the seized shabu, digital

weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines.

In Abuan v. People,[12] we affirmed the finding that the accused

Accused-appellant later admitted that he knew what the content of the

was in constructive possession of prohibited drugs which had been

seized plastic bag was.[9]

found in the drawer located in her bedroom.

Given the circumstances, we find that the prosecution failed to

In all these cases, the accused was held to be in constructive

establish possession of the shabu, whether in its actual or

possession of illegal drugs since they were shown to enjoy dominion

constructive sense, on the part of accused-appellant.

and control over the premises where these drugs were found.

The two buy-bust team members corroborated each others

In the instant case, however, there is no question that

testimonies on how they saw Boy Bicol talking to accused-appellant

accused-appellant was not the owner of the nipa hut that was subject
of the buy-bust operation. He did not have dominion or control over

the nipa hut. Neither was accused-appellant a tenant or occupant of

Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest

the nipa hut, a fact not disputed by the prosecution. The target of the

provides:

operation was Boy Bicol. Accused-appellant was merely a guest of

Boy Bicol. But in spite of the lack of evidence pinning accusedappellant to illegal possession of drugs, the trial court declared the
following:
It cannot be denied that when the accused was
talking with Boy Bicol he knew that the shabu was on
the table with other items that were confiscated by the
police operatives. The court [surmises] that the
accused and boy Bicol were members of a gang hiding
in that nipa hut where they were caught red-handed
with prohibited items and dangerous [drugs].[13]

The trial court cannot assume, based on the prosecutions

evidence, that accused-appellant was part of a gang dealing in illegal
activities. Apart from his presence in Boy Bicols nipa hut, the
prosecution was not able to show his participation in any drug-dealing.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A

peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed,
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

He was not even in possession of drugs in his person. He was merely

found inside a room with shabu, not as the rooms owner or occupant

The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected

but as a guest. While he allegedly pointed a firearm at the buy-bust

under Sec. 5(a), arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. For this type

team, the prosecution curiously failed to produce the firearm that

of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the

accused-appellant supposedly used.

person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has

just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a

The prosecution in this case clearly failed to show all the

elements of the crime absent a showing of either actual or

crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.[14]

constructive possession by the accused-appellant.

Accused-appellants act of pointing a firearm at the buy-bust
Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal

team would have been sufficient basis for his arrest in flagrante

drugs in Boy Bicols nipa hut, his subsequent arrest was also invalid.

delicto; however, the prosecution was not able to adequately prove

that accused-appellant was committing an offense. Although accused-

appellant merely denied possessing the firearm, the prosecutions

charge was weak absent the presentation of the alleged firearm. He
was eventually acquitted by the trial court because of this gaffe. His
arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation targeting Boy Bicol, was
therefore not lawful as he was not proved to be committing any
offense.
In sum, we find that there is insufficient evidence to show
accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Having ruled on
the lack of material or constructive possession by accused-appellant
of the seized shabu and his succeeding illegal arrest, we deem it
unnecessary to deal with the other issue raised.
WHEREFORE,
dated November

the
29,

appeal
2007 in

is GRANTED.
CA-G.R.

The

CR-H.C.

CA
No.

Decision
02286

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Carlos Dela Cruz

is ACQUITTED of violation of Sec. 11(2) of RA 9165 in Criminal Case
No. 6518 of the RTC, Branch 77 in San Mateo, Rizal.
SO ORDERED.

12. G.R. No. 204603

September 24, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 204603 PHILIPPINES, represented

by THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONALDEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and THE CHIEFOF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, Petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE, MORO CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S
ALLIANCE, FR. JOE DIZON, RODINIE SORIANO, STEPHANIE
ABIERA, MARIA LOURDES ALCAIN, VOLTAIRE ALFEREZ,
CZARINA MAYALTEZ, SHERYL BALOT, RENIZZA BATACAN,
EDAN MARRI CAETE, LEANA CARAMOAN, ALDWIN
CAMANCE, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, RODRIGO
FAJARDO III, ANNAMARIE GO, ANNA ARMINDA JIMENEZ, MARY
ANN LEE,LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL
OCAMPO, NORMAN ROLAND OCANA III, WILLIAM RAGAMAT,
MARICAR RAMOS, CHERRY LOU REYES, MELISSA ANN SICAT,
CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA TORNO, and HON. JUDGE
ELEUTERIO L. BATHAN, as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 92, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the April 23, 20122 and July
31, 20123 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
92(RTC) in Special Civil Action (SCA) No. Q-07-60778, denying
petitioners motion to dismiss (subject motion to dismiss) based on the
following grounds: (a) that the Court had yet to pass upon the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 9372,4 otherwise known as
the "Human Security Act of 2007," in the consolidated cases of
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council5 (Southern Hemisphere); and (b) that private respondents
petition for declaratory relief was proper.
The Facts
On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition6 for declaratory
relief before the RTC, assailing the constitutionality of the following
sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3,7 for being void for vagueness;8 (b)
Section 7,9for violating the right to privacy of communication and due
process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent
relationships;10 (c)Section 18,11 for violating due process, the
prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as for contradicting
Article 12512 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;13 (d) Section
26,14 for violating the right to travel;15 and (e) Section 27,16 for violating
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.17
Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings,18 averring that certain
petitions (SC petitions) raising the issue of RA 9372s constitutionality
have been lodged before the Court.19 The said motion was granted in
an Order dated October 19, 2007.20
On October 5, 2010, the Court promulgated its Decision21 in the
Southern Hemisphere cases and thereby dismissed the SC petitions.
On February 27, 2012, petitioners filed the subject motion to
dismiss,22 contending that private respondents failed to satisfy the
requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the
constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in
the Southern Hemisphere cases.

In their Comment/Opposition,23 private respondents countered that:

(a) the Court did not resolve the issue of RA 9372s constitutionality in
Southern Hemisphere as the SC petitions were dismissed based
purely on technical grounds; and (b) the requisites for declaratory
relief were met.
The RTC Ruling
On April 23, 2012, the RTC issued an Order24 which denied the
subject motion to dismiss, finding that the Court did not pass upon the
constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private respondents petition for
declaratory relief was properly filed.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration25 which was, however, denied
by the RTC in an Order dated July 31, 2012.26 The RTC observed that
private respondents have personal and substantial interests in the
case and that it would be illogical to await the adverse consequences
of the aforesaid laws implementation considering that the case is of
paramount impact to the Filipino people.27

The petition is meritorious.

An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.28 It is wellsettled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be
so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of
law.29 In this relation, case law states that not every error in the
proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.30 The degree of gravity, as abovedescribed, must be met.
Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no grave
abuse of discretion could be ascribed on the part of the RTC when it
found that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372
in the Southern Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its
jurisdiction when it ruled that private respondents petition had met all
the requisites for an action for declaratory relief. Consequently, its
denial of the subject motion to dismiss was altogether improper.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues Before the Court
The present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not
the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the subject
motion to dismiss.
Asserting the affirmative, petitioners argue that private respondents
failed to satisfy the requirements for declaratory relief and that the
Court had already sustained with finality the constitutionality of RA
9372.
On the contrary, private respondents maintain that the requirements
for declaratory relief have been satisfied and that the Court has yet to
resolve the constitutionality of RA 9372, negating any grave abuse of
discretion on the RTCs part.
The Courts Ruling

To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not

make any definitive ruling on the constitutionality of RA 9372. The
certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases were dismissed based
solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the remedy of certiorari was
improper;31 (b) petitioners therein lack locus standi;32 and (c)
petitioners therein failed to present an actual case or
controversy.33 Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion.
The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with regard to the
RTCs ruling on the sufficiency of private respondents petition for
declaratory relief.
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for
declaratory relief:
first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said documents and

the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third ,
there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth ,
the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth , adequate
relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.34
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that
while the first,35 second,36 and third37requirements appear to exist in
this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain
wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual
justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one exists in this
case.
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not
one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.38 Corollary thereto, by
"ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be
dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before
it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and
violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept
describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation
provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing
declaration.39
A perusal of private respondents petition for declaratory relief would
show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain
or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far
removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases,
private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and
taxpayers and infractions which the government could prospectively
commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled.
As their petition would disclose, private respondents fear of
prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government
officials which were addressed to the general public.40 They, however,

failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or

governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372
against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent
threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas
for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double
contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are
merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of
ripeness.1wphi1
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372does not
avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and
merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the
exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of
abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.41 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in
the Southern Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among others, lack
of actual justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds of one), the
RTC should have dismissed private respondents petition for
declaratory relief all the same.
It is well to note that private respondents also lack the required locus
standi to mount their constitutional challenge against the
implementation of the above-stated provisions of RA 9372 since they
have not shown any direct and personal interest in the case.42 While it
has been previously held that transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that the petitioner has experienced or
is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury,43 it must be
stressed that cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation
belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional
litigation.44 Towards this end, compelling State and societal interests in
the proscription of harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial
scrutiny of locus standi,45 as in this case. To rule otherwise, would be

to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause

is an interest shared by the general public.46
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it
be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since
the possibility of abuse, based on the above-discussed allegations in
private respondents petition, remain highly-speculative and merely
theorized.1wphi1 It is well-settled that a question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it.47 This private respondents failed
to demonstrate in the case at bar.
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to
proceed with a discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since
no impending threat or injury to the private respondents exists in the
first place.

All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for an
action for declaratory relief, as well as the irrelevance of the sixth
requisite, private respondents petition for declaratory relief should
have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to the same, it
cannot be gainsaid that the RTC gravely abused its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the April23,
2012 and July 31, 2012 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 92 in SCA No. Q-07-60778 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the petition for declaratory relief before the said court is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.