Making the Bomb: Pakistans Nuclear Journey

By ::: Shehzad H. Qazi

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Developed in secrecy and tested in defiance, Pakistans nuclear

weapons program has been a point of pride for Pakistanis, a worrisome portent
for Indians, a source of profit for nuclear proliferators, and a security concern
for US policymakers. While much is feared, little is really known about
Pakistans nuclear program. Retired Brigadier General Feroz Khans Eating Grass
(the title comes from a 1965 statement by Pakistans then Prime Minister
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto proclaiming that if India acquired the bomb, so would
Pakistan, even if it had to eat grass, or leaves or even go hungry) is
important because it presents a complete account of Pakistans quest
for nuclear weapons, with close focus on the role played by culture,
personality, domestic, regional, and global politics, and technical challenges in
the
development
of
the
Islamic
Bomb.
The books author is a former Pakistan Army officer and senior official in the
National Command Authority. Khan was not only a key policymaker in Pakistans
nuclear command and control system, but played important roles in
negotiations with American and Indian officials over the nuclear program,
especially regarding Pakistans force posture.Drawing on primary
and secondary sources, his own experiences, and numerous interviews with
decisionmakers and former scientists who were intimately involved in the
program, Khan recapitulates Pakistans nuclear journey. He analyzes key
decisions by its leaders that shaped the trajectory of Pakistans strategic
capabilities and its foreign relations, bureaucratic disputes over the program,
and competition between actors in the scientific community trying to put
their individual stamp
on
the
bomb.
Eating Grass begins in the 1960s, during General Ayub Khans military
dictatorship, when many Pakistani leaders were reluctant to pursue nuclear
weapons because they felt the country could not afford them. The author then
provides a blow-by-blow account of several major decisions that created a
weapons program, and then the cold tests in 1983, and finally the testing of
the
bomb
itself
in
1998.
Inside this chronology, Khan also explores the technological and capacity

challenges Pakistani scientists faced, especially as the global nonproliferation

regime made nuclear trade increasingly difficult. He details how they
developed uranium enrichment and plutonium production capabilities and the
secret procurement networks to supply the clandestine program. Along the
way, Khan reveals the intense rivalry that developed between the Pakistan
Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the Khan Research Laboratories to
develop
and
claim
credit
for
the
weapon.
The role of foreign countries was a significant part of this nuclear journey.
Once Canada stopped supplying nuclear technology, Pakistan received loans and
investments worth hundreds of millions of dollars from Libya, along with
yellowcake from Niger and uranium from Chad. China provided high enriched
uranium and a bomb design, and helped in missile production.
No history of Pakistans march toward nuclearization would be complete, of
course, without the sub-narrative of complications caused in relations between
Pakistan and the US, which was initially strongly opposed to the nuclear
program, but later became covertly complicit in it, only subsequently to punish
Pakistan and ultimately grudgingly accept its membership in the international
nuclear
club.
Khan also discusses Pakistans nuclear doctrine, the development of its
command and control system, and the way the notorious scientist A.Q. Khan
became the governments proliferator in chief, selling Pakistans nuclear
innovations
to the
North Koreans,
Iranians,
and
others.
The fundamental question driving this book is why Pakistan decided to
acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Khan attributes this decision to
Pakistans unique strategic culturethat is, the beliefs, values, and historical
experiences of the ruling elite that influenced how it perceives and responds to
the security environment. He contends that the defeat and dismemberment of
Pakistan in the 1971 war and Indias 1974 nuclear tests, which altered the
balance of power, became central components of Pakistans strategic culture,
leading to the perception that nuclear weapons were a national necessity.
But between the lines of the book is a slightly different story: that domestic
politics rather than national security per se was key to the decision to go
forward with a nuclear program. As Scott Sagan, a renowned scholar of nuclear
weapons, has argued, countries acquire nuclear weaponsbecause individuals
within the nuclear energy establishment and research laboratories (who benefit
financially and in terms of prestige), the military, and political leaders become
chief advocates for acquisition of these weapons, seeing them as tools to

accomplish

parochial

political

or

bureaucratic

goals.

In the case at hand, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the prime minister (197377) who made
the decision to go nuclear, already belonged to a coalition comprising PAEC
scientists and some foreign-ministry bureaucrats who had been strongly
advocating such a capability since at least 1965. By the time he took office, the
military was also on board. Thus the desire to pursue nuclear
weapons predated the 1971 war or Indias 1974 tests. In Khans own words,
with Bhuttos rise,
the
bomb
lobby
was
now
in
power.
According to weapons specialist Bhumitra Chakma, Pakistans nuclear program
has faced two key challenges: the absence of a formally declared nuclear
doctrine, including ambiguity about the redline risks that could prompt use,
and the lack of an institutionalized and transparent command and control
system.
Pakistans ten-point nuclear doctrine is India-focused, and has three major
principles: minimum credible deterrence, nuclear first use, and massive
retaliation. While arguing that counterforce targeting is increasingly becoming
a principle for both Pakistan and India, Khan also reports that Pakistan is
operationalizing its minimal deterrence concept by continually improving its
delivery means, by inducting ballistic and cruise missiles, and by developing a
second-strike
capability.
Whats missing in this book is an investigation into Pakistans redline risks
beyond what is already known. Khan states that the nuclear program has two
objectives: deterring India from overwhelming Pakistan with a conventional
attack and using nuclear weapons in the event of an Indian invasion, the sizable
destruction of its armed forces, or Indian-perpetrated political destabilization
and economic strangulation. While Khan acknowledges that these criteria are
deliberately imprecise, the ambiguity, he argues, is a non-issue because with
the unlikelihood of Pakistans accepting a no-first-use policy, the doctrinal
puzzle
of
the
Pakistani
nuclear
program
is
put
to
rest.
But the author does provide an insightful analysis of the most critical issue:
Pakistans nuclear command and control architecture. Since 2000 the National
Command Authority, composed of chief civilian and military leaders, has been
responsible for decisionmaking on the programs policy, planning, procurement,
and use. Nevertheless this oversight and control system was developed almost
forty-five years after the weapons program began. The author attributes A. Q.
Khans ability to erect an alternative universe of proliferation to this absence
of oversight, explaining that Khans significant autonomy in secretly procuring

nuclear technology for Pakistan and immunity from regularly reporting to a

government body allowed his private and illicit operations to go undetected.
In the aftermath of the Khan Network fiasco, Pakistan revised its export
control laws, while the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) began using assessment
tools, such as Personnel and Human Reliability Programs, to screen personnel,
and created a security force with an intelligence unit to counter assaults,
espionage, and other threats against nuclear installations and weapons.
But while the author describes the reforms in command and control, explains
that Pakistan undertakes a variety of assessments to ensure the secrecy,
dispersal, and survivability of its strategic weapons against foreign attacks,
and mentions that safety measures are in place for weapons storage and
transport, he inexplicably fails to address directly the threat of terrorists
acquiring Pakistans nuclear weapons and materials, perhaps the greatest
concern
among
US
and
international
policymakers
today.
There has been a steady accumulation of books on Pakistans nuclear weapons
program, ranging from accounts by former Pakistani military officers giving
their views about why Pakistan sought the bomb, to academic analyses
exploring nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia, to journalistic
accounts focusing on Pakistans covert acquisition of nuclear technology, the
Khan Networks proliferation, and Americas secret compliance in exchange for
assistance during the Soviet-Afghan war and the War on Terror.
Khans book is a bit of all of this, framed by an insider account of Pakistani
decisionmaking that can help policymakers better understand how Pakistani
leaders thought through some of the most crucial decisions of the countrys
history, what assumptions they made, and how they view the world. A nuanced
narrative accessible to a general readership, Eating Grass is a comprehensive
study on how and why Pakistan went nuclear.