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Humean Moral Knowledge

Margaret Watkins a
a
Baylor University, USA

To cite this Article Watkins, Margaret'Humean Moral Knowledge', Inquiry, 51: 6, 581 602
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/00201740802536639
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Inquiry,
Vol. 51, No. 6, 581602, December 2008

Humean Moral Knowledge

MARGARET WATKINS
Baylor University, USA

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(Received 31 May 2008)

ABSTRACT I develop resources from Hume to account for moral knowledge in the
qualified sense developed by Bernard Williams, according to which the proper
application of thick ethical terms constitutes moral knowledge. By applying to moral
discernment the criteria of the good aesthetic critic, as explained in Humes Of the
Standard of Taste, we can see how Humean moral knowledge might be possible. For
each of these criteria, an analogous trait would contribute to moral discernment. These
traits would enable moral judges to distinguish valid from invalid uses of thick moral
terms. The deliverances of such judgments constitute mitigated moral knowledge, as
opposed to knowledge in the stricter sense that Hume clearly says cannot be had of
moral distinctions. This account has the potential to explain how moral judgments may
be valid or invalid without appealing to unique operations of the understanding and how
moral knowledge might escape the threat, identified by Williams, of reflective
destruction.

In the following, I develop resources from Hume to account for moral

knowledge in a qualified sense. There is clearly something odd about this
project. Hume famously asserts that morality is more properly felt than
judged of and that [m]orals and criticism are not so properly objects of
the understanding as of taste and sentiment.1 Indeed, insofar as Hume uses
knowledge to refer to that which we perceive by intuition or learn from
demonstration, Humean moral knowledge is not to be had.2
Despite widespread acceptance of broader conceptions of knowledge, we
still encounter difficulties when attempting to generalize criteria for
knowledge over the domains of science, common experience, and ethics.
In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams offers an intriguing
response to these difficulties. Like Hume, Williams has no patience with
rationalist accounts of moral knowledge. Williams, however, offers a limited
Correspondence Address: Margaret Watkins, Department of Philosophy, Baylor University,
One Bear Place #97273, Waco, TX 76798-7273, USA. Email: Margaret_Watkins@baylor.edu
0020-174X Print/1502-3923 Online/08/06058122 # 2008 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/00201740802536639

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(and somewhat pessimistic) account of moral judgment that can be counted

as moral knowledge. This account appeals to a distinction between thick
and thin ethical terms.
Judgments including thick terms, like treachery and promise and
brutality and courage, can be world-guided; people living together in a
moral community can agree on more or less clear application criteria for
them.3 (Such communities need not agree overtly on a definition of such
terms; expertise in using their own moral language is sufficient.) Moreover,
such concepts are action-guiding: when appropriately applied, they
usually (though not necessarily directly) provide reasons for action.4 These
terms, in Williamss view, do not have a descriptive and a prescriptive
meaning that can be divorced from one another without doing violence to
the language. Rather, they have a unified meaning that certain kinds of
reflection can uproot or destroy, especially reflection that involves
questioning whether the reasons offered by the terms are the best reasons
to have, all things considered, or if the way of life that such terms
presuppose is right in a global sense that transcends the form of life of the
community. After such reflection, ethical knowledge that had been available
disappears, because members of the moral community lose the ability to use
the terms. The changes reflection brings about have made the once clear
application criteria of such terms unavailable.5
I contend that by applying to moral discernment the criteria of the good
aesthetic critic that Hume explains in Of the Standard of Taste, we can see
how Humean moral knowledge (in Williamss mitigated sense) might be
possible. Such knowledge, though of the kind that Williams identifies,
neither depends on strict convergence of opinion among members of a
moral community nor need be destroyed by reflection. Although
philosophical study can identify certain characteristics of a person with
moral knowledge, particularized moral knowledge (judgments, for instance,
that a particular person has or lacks some virtue) is rarely accessible in the
abstract. We must depend, for such knowledge, on the discernment of the
good moral judge.
In the first section, I explain why it is appropriate to ascribe to Hume
some recognition of the existence of thick moral terms and how the
flexibility of such terms leads Hume to a different, though related, problem
from Williamss own worries about destructive reflection. Humes concern is
not that people can lose the ability to use such terms, but that they can use
them in polymorphic ways, so that they retain their reason-giving or
motivating force but apply to different kinds of traits. He introduces this
concern as an entry into an analogous problem in aesthetics, the solution of
which is to describe the features of the good critic.
Although Hume thus suggests a possible analogy between the good critic
and the good moral judge, he does not develop this analogy by considering
the relationship between the criteria he identifies for the critic and the

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discerning moral judge. Some commentators have considered the relationship between the critics freedom from prejudice and the general point of
view for morals,6 but I focus on Humes other criteria for good aesthetic
judges: delicacy, practice and comparison, and good sense. For each of these
criteria, an analogous trait would contribute to moral discernment. These
traits would enable moral judges to distinguish valid from invalid uses of
thick moral terms. The deliverances of such judgments constitute mitigated
moral knowledge.7 That such knowledge requires discernment that many
people do not have raises a question about why it would motivate Humean
moral agents. I address this question in the concluding section.
I do not claim that these ideas are implicitly in Humes texts; developing
the analogy between ethics and aesthetics as I do goes beyond his suggestive
remarks. It is indeed odd to ascribe to Hume a view now associated with
moral cognitivism. Such associations would no doubt lead Hume to eye
thick terms with suspicion, as does his contemporary ally, Simon
Blackburn.8 For this reason, I focus on Williamss own account of thickness
rather than delving into the interesting developments in the theory of the
thick resulting from debates between cognitivists and non-cognitivists.
Williams had few, if any, cognitivist ambitions; thus, his analysis may prove
more palatable from a Humean point of view.9 This focus on Williams also
has the advantage of simplifying the discussion, but sometimes at the cost of
over-simplification. I will not be able, for example, to take into account
Blackburns claims that our reactions to actions associated with thick
concepts are likely to be more complicated than single-attitude models have
suggested, though I agree with Jonathan Dancy that proponents of the thick
should just accept this correction as a friendly amendment to their view.10
Ultimately, I do not think the view that I articulate is in fundamental
tension with Humes views on moral judgment. These views develop over
time: for instance, the Enquiry seems to leave more room than the Treatise
for differing levels of moral discernment.11 Throughout his work, however,
Hume aims to uphold our sense that moral judgments can be valid or invalid
without appealing to unique operations of the understanding. The
development of a rich conception of thick moral concepts is entirely
consistent with this aim.
I. Hume on thick moral terms
From the beginning of Of the Standard of Taste, Hume casts his discussion
in terms of language and questions about term usea difficulty of applying
proper terms to proper cases. We are apt to call barbarous, he says in the
first paragraph, whatever departs widely from our own taste and
apprehension: But soon find the epithet of reproach retorted on us.12 The
earliest uses of barbarous referred to language and originally meant not in
the pure classical languages.13 Thus this first paragraph contains a double

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linguistic reference: we accuse others of barbarismusing terms badlyfor

using approving language to refer to something we find distasteful, but after
noticing that others feel as strongly about their own taste as we do ours, we
become unsure if we are using this epithet itself correctly.
Humes references to language become more explicit in the next
paragraph. Aesthetic sentiments differ, even when general discourse is
the same. There are certain terms in every language, which import blame,
and others praise; and all men, who use the same tongue, must agree in their
application of them. Praise terms include elegance, propriety, simplicity,
spirit in writing; on the other hand, we have fustian, affectation, coldness,
and a false brilliancy (ST, 227).
These opening paragraphs taxonomize enquiries according to the degree
to which apparent consensus is more or less genuine. When Hume says that
all who use the same tongue agree in their application of aesthetic terms,
he means not that they agree on which objects to apply them to, but that
they agree that these terms convey approbation or disapprobation. But
when critics come to particulars, he says, it is found, that they had
affixed a very different meaning to their expressions. In matters of
opinion and science, however, people probably agree on more than initial
impressions suggest. Finally, in ethics, he finds a problem analogous to the
one in aesthetics.
It would be difficult not to read Hume as referring to himself when he says,
Those who found morality on sentiment, more than on reason, are inclined
to maintain, that, in all questions, which regard conduct and manners, the
difference among men is really greater than at first sight it appears (ST, 227
228). The ensuing discussion, however, is puzzling in many respects. After
noting that all writers praise the same virtues (justice, magnanimity, veracity,
etc.), he allows that the view that credits plain reason for this consensus is
satisfactory to the extent that the consensus is genuine (ST, 228). This
concession seems odd, given Humes sentiment-based ethics. We may resolve
this puzzle by keeping in mind Humes discussion of that reason which is
able to oppose our passion, and which we have found to be nothing but a
general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or
reflection (T, 3.3.1.18). In an essay, Hume would have no cause to press his
point about the basis of morality in sentiments as opposed to reason,
especially when he can apparently concede a point to the other side without
misleading careful readers of his strictly philosophical work. Reason in this
sense could explain how people in different ages praise the same virtues;
indeed, Hume appeals to such reason to explain how this happens through the
general point of view.14
Hume explains, however, that much of this agreement can be imaginary in
ethics as in aesthetics due to the very nature of language. The word
virtue, with its equivalent in every tongue, implies praise; as that of vice does
blame: And no one, without the most obvious and grossest impropriety,

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could affix reproach to a term, which in general acceptation is understood in a

good sense (ST, 228). The impropriety here must be semantic rather
than moral. In a reference to the Koran that follows this passage, he says that
it would have argued the greatest ignorance, not of morals, but of language
to have used the ARABIC words, which correspond to the ENGLISH, equity,
justice, temperance, meekness, charity in a non-praiseworthy sense (ST,
229). But again, this level of agreement does not reflect true unanimity:
Homer and Fenelon portray different conceptions of heroism and prudence.15
The former intermixes a much greater degree of ferocity in heroism and
cunning and fraud in prudence than the latter (ST, 228). And Mohammad,
Hume says, bestows praise on such instances of treachery, inhumanity,
cruelty, revenge, bigotry, as are utterly incompatible with civilized society
(ST, 229).
What is most puzzling is that at the end of the next paragraph, Hume
seems to take it all back:
The merit of delivering true general precepts in ethics is indeed very
small. Whoever recommends any moral virtues, really does no more
than is implied in the terms themselves. That people, who invented the
word charity, and used it in a good sense, inculcated more clearly and
much more efficaciously, the precept, be charitable, than any
pretended legislator or prophet, who should insert such a maxim in
his writings. Of all expressions, those, which together with their other
meaning, imply a degree either of blame or approbation, are the least
liable to be perverted or mistaken. (229)
How can Hume say that these terms are the least liable to be perverted or
mistaken, when he has just explained that they can refer to all manner of
vicious behaviour and traits? Is it not perverse to refer to fraud as prudence
or to call bigotry charity? We must, it seems, interpret this claim as we did
the earlier assertion that all men, who use the same tongue, must agree in the
application of certain aesthetic terms. The final sentence of this passage
reiterates the first: what we might call the evaluative sense of these terms
cannot be mistaken. Therefore, moralists get little credit for offering advice
like, It is good to be just. Those who use language with facility cannot utter
sentences such as, Saving those children was heroic, but we wont hold that
against him, unless they are making an odd joke. Apparent counterexamples seem parasitic on this general understanding. Suppose Scorsese
grins and says, Thank you, in response to That was just cruel. We
recognize that the grin reflects evil delight, because we know that such delight
arises partly from resistance to general disapproval of cruelty.
The mention of an evaluative sense may make it seem that these terms
cannot refer to thick concepts. A concept of this sort, Williams says,
may be rightly or wrongly applied, and people who have acquired it can

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agree that it applies or fails to apply in some new situation. Ambiguous

cases do not imply that any use of the term is valid: As with other concepts
that are not totally precise, marginal disagreements can indeed help to show
how their use is controlled by the facts.16 Thus, the terms are world-guided.
If a concept of this kind applies, moreover, this often provides someone
with a reason for action, though that reason need not be a decisive one and
may be outweighed by other reasons .17 So they are also action-guiding.
But because these concepts are inextricably both world-guided and actionguiding, they undermine the fact-value distinction. Therefore, Humes
suggestion that the evaluative sense of these terms might come apart from
what we might call their descriptive sense seems inconsistent with Williamss
conception of these terms, although they seem to be the kind of terms
Williams calls thick. (Their examples even overlap in treachery).18
We have here two related objections. First, if the descriptive and the
evaluative senses of Humes terms are separable, then it seems that these terms
do not constitute the union of fact and value that Williams appeals to when he
argues that facility with thick moral language can constitute mitigated moral
knowledge. Second, if the evaluative rather than the descriptive sense of such
terms is stable, then it seems that the concepts are not world-guided after all,
because evaluative stability will not help us distinguish between proper and
improper uses of the terms. Let us consider each objection in turn.
With regard to the first objection, Williamss primary target is a
prescriptivism that sees the descriptive as the stable element of the term. On
this view, the concept is guided round the world by its descriptive content,
but has a prescriptive flag attached to it. It is the first feature that allows it to
be world-guided, while the second makes it action-guiding. Accordingly,
for any concept of this sort, you could produce another that picked out just
the same features of the world but worked simply as a descriptive concept,
lacking any prescriptive or evaluative force.19 One could, it is claimed,
specify the descriptive meaning of a term like brutality yet leave open the
question, But is brutality good or bad?20 The prescriptive or evaluative
elements of such terms depend on the logical properties of thinner terms (like
good or right,) which generate their moral force.21
Note, however, that Hume does not suggest that the evaluative sense of
the thick terms is unstable. The sense of approbation or disapprobation
carried by these terms is their least liable to be perverted or mistaken
aspect, as I have argued. Humes worry in Of the Standard of Taste is not
that people will continue to call acts of self-giving love charity yet do so
with a negative sense. It is rather that people will continue to use charity
or charitable in a positive sense but apply it to different acts or character
traits. The variation that makes agreement in morals seem greater than it is
derives from changes in the descriptive, not evaluative, sense of thick terms.
The prescriptivist division of fact and value threatens the viability of
moral knowledge because it houses the moral element of such terms in their

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evaluative sense but construes this sense as not world-guided. Linguistic

properties of the moral may bind users of moral language to apply
evaluative terms in a certain way, but not because the facts dictate this
usage. Because Hume argues that the use of thick moral terms can vary, he
does raise a problem for the attempt to ground moral knowledge in the
world-guidedness of such terms, which I will address later. But it is not the
problem that is Williamss concern.
Williamss target is the notion that what governs the application of the
concept to the world is the descriptive element and that the evaluative
interest of the concept plays no part in this.22 He insists that thick
concepts evaluative sense determines their linguistic role as well, and that
we will not understand their meaning or application without appreciating
this sense. Humes remarks in Of the Standard of Taste do not contradict
this point; indeed, they support it.23 His assertion that thick terms imply
praise or blame suggests that the evaluative sense of such terms is essential
for their function in human language.
The second objection claims that evaluative stability cannot help establish
the world-guidedness of thick concepts, because evaluative sense does not
determine which are the proper and which the improper uses of thick terms.
It should be evident now that this objection begs the important question. We
will only find a stable evaluative element irrelevant to deciding how a term is
applied if we believe that the evaluative sense does no work in picking out
how the term functions in our language. If we are trying to decide whether it
is proper to call a particular act heroic, or to deem a particular character
trait arrogant, our intention to praise the former and condemn the latter
is not irrelevant to the decision. In the next section, I give several examples
that show how the evaluative function of these terms can indeed help us
distinguish between proper and improper applications of them.24
These considerations suggest that Humean thick moral terms may be
world-guided inasmuch as at least one sense of those termsthe evaluative
senseis stable in such a way that users of the language can agree on when
to apply these terms. When new users to a language use approving moral
terms to express disapprobation or disapproving moral terms to express
approval, they misapply those terms to the moral world they occupy. Hume
identifies a more problematic (because more likely) misapplication
difficulty, concerning application of the terms descriptive sense. If the
ability to apply thick terms correctly is to count as Humean moral
knowledge, we must address this descriptive problem: how might we decide
which is the true heroismHomers or Fenelons? The world-guidedness of
thick concepts, and therefore ascriptions of moral knowledge, require the
ability to make such distinctions. Developing a Humean account of such
discernment is the work of the next section.25
What about the other characteristic of thick ethical terms: their reasongiving force or action-guidingness? Even without Humes insistence, in the

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Treatise and second Enquiry, on moral distinctions motivating force, Of

the Standard of Taste provides evidence of this action-guidingness.
Consider his claim that those who invented the word charity, and used it
in a good sense, inculcated more clearly and much more efficaciously, the
precept, be charitable, than any pretended legislator or prophet . To say
that designating certain acts or traits as falling under a particular ethical
description like charitable efficaciously inculcates a moral precept is
radical but not implausible. This claim suggests that the mere denomination
gives people a reason to perform these acts or encourage these traits.
Though the reason may be overridden, the general motivating force of
moral distinctions means that it is a reason to be reckoned with. Suppose
that I accuse you of craven behaviour. The designation of your behaviour as
craven carries with it a primary characteristic of a reason for action: if you
choose to continue behaving in this way, I will expect some response to my
accusation. I cannot force you to give me such a response; it might even be
silly to demand one. But I will be surprised if you fail to offer one, because I
think I have given you a reason to stop.
II. The discerning moral critic
The conception of moral knowledge I am attempting to develop claims that
facility with thick ethical terms constitutes such knowledge: language users
who appropriately apply these terms possess moral knowledge insofar as the
terms denote discernable features of the moral world. Various aspects of
experience constitute this world, but those with moral knowledge need not
access some irreducibly other realm of metaphysically necessary moral
facts. The problem for this theory that Hume identifies in Of the Standard
of Taste is that people disagree about the proper application of these terms
to specific behaviours and traits. Unless we can distinguish between valid
and invalid application of these terms, it is unclear how their use could
evince moral knowledge in particular language users.
Hume responds to the analogous problem in aesthetics by articulating the
standard of taste as the joint verdict of true judges. The absurdity of
proclaiming all artists of equal genius moves him to seek such a standard.
(Can Ogilby be equal to Milton? Michael Bolton to Mozart?) Human nature
responds to certain objects and characteristics with sentiments of aesthetic
approval. The rules of composition, he says, are general observations,
concerning what has been universally found to please in all countries and in
all ages (ST, 231). If features of a composition are found to please, they
cannot be faults (ST, 232). In the Treatise, he writes similarly about
morals: The distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure
or pain which results from the view of any sentiment or character; and, as
that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it
follows, that there is just so much vice or virtue in any character as every one

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places in it, and that it is impossible in this particular we can ever be

mistaken (T, 3.2.8.8). It seems as if Hume thinks we can never have
grounds for questioning moral judgment, but he makes this qualification in
a footnote: This proposition must hold strictly true with regard to every
quality that is determined merely by sentiment. In what sense we can talk
either of a right or a wrong taste in morals, eloquence, or beauty, shall be
considered afterwards. In the meantime it may be observed, that there is
such an uniformity in the general sentiments of mankind, as to render such
questions of but small importance (T, 3.2.8.8.fn 80).
Despite this confidence in the uniformity of humankinds sentiments,
Hume clearly considered such questions of philosophical, if not practical,
import. He returns to them in both Of the Standard of Taste and in A
Dialogue. In the Treatise footnote, he acknowledges that particular moral
judges might be mistaken. (Perhaps they fail to perceive relevant aspects of
the situation or character, or perhaps self-interest overrides the moral
sentiment they would have in response to some trait; these failures would
not be determined merely by sentiment.) And in discussing the point of
view from which we make moral judgments, he addresses the question of
what makes a moral judgment reasonable or unreasonable, just or unjust. In
the Treatise, Hume claims that we judge characters by sympathizing with
the effects that traits tend to have on their possessor and those who have a
connexion with him, not the traits actual effects or its effects on ourselves
and those we love (T, 3.3.1.30). In the Enquiry, Hume emphasizes the
importance of reasoning in moral judgment26 and notes that, because of
differences in temper, great superiority is observable in one man over the
other in a delicate feeling of all moral distinctions (EPM, 5.39).27 He
then says, however, that none are so entirely indifferent to the interest of
their fellow-creatures as to perceive no distinctions of moral good and evil.
If some people are more morally discerning than others, and we are faced
with conflicting applications of thick terms, a better moral judge might
help us discern which applications are appropriate. Williams, in a later
development of the ideas in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, suggests
such a model for the transmission of moral knowledge:
An all-round advisor who is prepared to help you to decide what is
the best thing to do period, may well contribute some ethical insight to
this, and that insight may take the form of certain kinds of knowledge
under ethical conceptsthat a certain course of action would be
cowardly, for instance, or would count as a betrayal, or would not
really be kind, and contributions of this kind can offer the person who
is being advised a genuine discovery.28
Again, Williams is pessimistic about extending these kinds of advisorknowledge to support a broad-spectrum cognitivism. But for our purposes,

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the question is: can we offer any compelling description of the Humean
moral judge?
Humes criteria for the good aesthetic judge, I submit, are good starting
points for such a description. The significant differences between aesthetic
and moral judgment mean that some of the characteristics of the good
aesthetic judge will be unnecessary for the good moral judge and vice
versa.29 Nonetheless, some overlap between the criteria should not be
surprising, especially if one finds plausible, as I do, Humes suggestion that
cultivation of aesthetic taste contributes to cultivation of moral character.30
Hume summarizes the characteristics of the true judge in the finer arts
as [s]trong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice,
perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice. The joint verdict of
such, he says, is the true standard of taste and beauty (ST, 241). I will
consider the relevant characteristics in the order in which Hume presents
them, beginning with delicate sentiment or, as he initially characterizes it,
delicacy of imagination.31 The delicate critic can perceive the minute
presence of those qualities that all generally agree make some particular
thing an excellent instance of its kind. Appropriately, he chooses a winetasting example, but one from Don Quixote (so, he says, not to draw our
philosophy from too profound a source (ST, 234)). Two men are asked to
taste an excellent vintage of wine. Though both admit the wines quality, one
claims that it smacks slightly of iron, and the other finds a slight leather
flavour. The observers roundly abuse them, until they find a key with a
leather thong at the bottom of the container.
The men qualify as excellent judges not because they deprecate qualities
that others would love. (Presumably, few people like leather or iron-tasting
wine.) They simply notice and respond to those qualities when other people
do not. Acknowledged models of excellence help us to formulate general
principles of aesthetics, but such principles do not depend on there being
actual cases of extremely beautiful or extremely ugly artistic performances.
It would be more difficult to mortify the bad critic without such examples,
but not impossible:
But when we show him an avowed principle of art; when we illustrate
this principle by examples, whose operation, from his own particular
taste, he acknowledges to be conformable to the principle; when we
prove, that the same principle may be applied to the present case,
where he did not perceive or feel its influence: He must conclude, upon
the whole, that the fault lies in himself, and that he wants the delicacy,
which is requisite to make him sensible of every beauty and every
blemish, in any composition or discourse (ST, 236).32
What analogous kind of delicacy would help us distinguish between better
and worse moral judges, or between those who properly apply thick moral

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terms and those who do not? A literary example might prove illuminating.
In Pride and Prejudice, numerous sources (including the local townspeople)
warn Elizabeth Bennet of Georgiana Darcys vicious pride. Elizabeth
expects, upon meeting her, a young woman contemptuous of those beneath
her in rank and circumstance. Instead, the observation of a very few
minutes convinced her, that she was only exceedingly shy.33 Jane Austen
does not say precisely how Elizabeth discerns this shyness; she mentions
Miss Darcys unwillingness to speak, that there was sense and good
humour in her face, and that her manners were perfectly unassuming and
gentle.34 Georgianas reticence must contribute to her reputation for
conceit, but Elizabeth sees this for what it is.35 Elizabeth notices signs that
others miss: perhaps a reluctance to raise the eyes, a tone of voice, or a
willingness to defer to others judgment. Anyone, presumably, who
recognized these features would not mistakenly label Miss Darcy proud,
but one who lacked delicacy would miss them because of their subtlety. Her
most salient characteristic is a refusal to talk. Without noticing the other
features, then, most people assume she is proud.
This example shows how moral perception might be more or less delicate
and illustrates Humes point that the good judge responds to features
approvable by all. Given the opportunity, Elizabeth could make a case that
Georgiana is not proud, and reasonable townspeople would admit that
Georgianas exhibiting the relevant behaviours would support Elizabeths
view. Humes various references to the sound state of the organ suggest that
some people may, by nature, possess less aesthetic delicacy than others (ST,
234).36 That he is willing to allow for innate deficiency in moral judgment is
questionable, although he suggests that superstitious religion, for example,
can damage capacities for moral judgment.37 And, as noted above, in the
Enquiry he allows for differences in delicacy with regard to moral distinctions.
Surely, whether by nature or nurture, some people possess the kind of delicate
sensibility that Elizabeth exhibits and others do not.
On the other hand, this example may suggest that delicacy of sentiment is
immaterial to the problem at hand, which is not that people might agree
about what features make a particular ethical term apply but fail to perceive
those features in a specific case. The problem arises because people might
disagree over the application criteria of a thick term. Take, for example,
proper pride as opposed to vicious pride. Suppose I say that people who
publicly glory in athletic prowess are arrogant, and you insist that they
exemplify the honesty and self-knowledge that constitutes proper pride. We
disagree not because you see something I do not or vice versa. We disagree
about the application criteria of the terms.
It turns out, however, that delicacy of sentiment is relevant to this
particular concern. Hume claims that moral judgment involves imagining
from a certain point of view the effects that a character trait tends to have
on its possessor or others and then sympathizing with those effects. Thus,

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determining which of similar character traits are virtuous or vicious requires

consideration of the precise kinds of effects those traits may have. Hume is
careful, for instance, when discussing pride, to distinguish between various
kinds of pride and their associated effects. He famously praises a wellregulated pride, which secretly animates our conduct, without breaking out
into such indecent expressions of vanity, as may offend the vanity of others
(T, 3.3.2.13). We approve of this pride because of sympathy with its
usefulness and agreeableness for its possessor. It is useful only when
regulated by prudence but always agreeable, as it conveys an elevated and
sublime sensation to the person, who is actuated by it (T, 3.3.2.14). Now
Hume has something to explain. Consider another example: the pompous
academic, (call him Jacques.) He is always giving his vita, turns all
conversations into recitations of his accomplishments, and greets you at
conferences with stories of how much Professor Famous Person admired his
argument or paper or book. Hume must explain why we find this character
insufferable, given that the pompous academic derives such pleasure from
his self-esteem.
Humes explanation is not flattering: any expression of pride and
haughtiness, is displeasing to us, merely because it shocks our own pride,
and leads us by sympathy into a comparison, which causes the disagreeable
passion of humility (T, 3.3.2.17). Even if Jacques has never been haughty
to us in particular, we disapprove from a sympathy with others, and from
the reflection, that such a character is highly displeasing and odious to every
one, who converses or has any intercourse with the person possest of it (T,
3.3.2.17).
Note that this kind of judgment, involving sympathy with both the
possessor of the trait and those likely to be affected by it, requires strong
delicacy of sentiment. Moreover, this delicacy determines when we have a
case of proper pride as opposed to arrogance, not just in the sense of
deciding when someones character trait satisfies agreed-upon criteria, but
also in the sense of determining the proper criteria. Humes idea that the
critic should be able to defend her views to someone without her
discernment may be helpful. Suppose the good moral judgecall her
Elizabethinsists that Jacques is indeed arrogant and thus possesses a vice.
Fitzwilliam, on the other hand, insists that Jacques is merely self-assured
and possesses proper pride. Let us stipulate that Jacquess esteem for himself
is merited; he is talented and well-respected in his field. Elizabeth and
Fitzwilliam both perceive this merit and believe in the value of an honest
perusal of ones own character, (Elizabeth does not believe that good people
think less of themselves than they deserve.) Elizabeth, however, insists that
Jacquess tendency to public self-promotion is insensitive to others feelings
and beneath one of superior academic achievement; Fitzwilliam counters
that it animates Jacquess work by providing him with pleasant reinforcement for his accomplishments, informs Jacquess colleagues of his

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accomplishments (which is wise in a competitive work environment), and

inspires those colleagues to strive for excellence as well.38
If Elizabeths moral discernment is superior to Jacquess, then she may
possess more delicacy, enabling her to see, for instance, the dejection in
Jacquess peers after one of his bragging sessions. Or perhaps, though
Jacques clearly derives pleasure from regaling his company with tales of his
achievements, she imaginatively perceives a calmer, more inspiring, and
more lasting pleasure that he might receive from caring more about his
colleagues work and keeping his own accomplishments to himself. The
results of her reflection might extend beyond Jacquess case. If she can
plausibly claim that these more hidden negative effects of traits like
Jacquess, though only discernable through delicacy of taste, are commonly
caused by a kind of self-esteem that manifests itself in public pronouncements, she gives warrant for the view that proper pride, which is a virtue,
does not include these tendencies. Thus, her heightened delicacy of taste,
while appealing to features of character that other moral judges (all else
being equal) would approve equally could they see them, gives her reasons
for applying a thick term in a particular way that others do not have as long
as they fail to perceive those features. Note also that her warrant for
applying the terms as she does depends on the stable evaluative meaning of
the thick terms: braggarts do not possess proper pride (an approbation)
because their traits negative effects lead the discerning judge, through
sympathy, to condemn that trait as vicious.39
After explaining the importance of delicacy of taste, Hume argues that the
good judges delicacy will be improved by practice and perfected by
comparison. These two characteristics of good aesthetic judges in part
explain how one hones the first characteristic (delicacy) but are interesting in
themselves as well. Hume details what improvements in critical ability come
from each kind of training. First, practice in a particular art, and the
frequent contemplation of a particular species of beauty enables the judge
to be more confident in his general judgment of a works beauty and better
identify what features of the work contribute to its aesthetic success or
failure. He not only, Hume says, perceives the beauties and defects of
each part, but marks the distinguishing species of each quality, and assigns it
suitable praise or blame (ST, 237).
In addition to studying many examples of, for example, abstract
expressionist paintings, the critic should repeatedly scrutinize a particular
work, like Jackson Pollocks Convergence. This kind of practice prevents
misjudgments arising from two sources of confusion: the flutter or hurry of
thought which attends the first perusal of any piece and the pleasing
impression that might arise from a quick look at florid artwork appealing
to a childlike fascination with shiny things (ST, 238). By examining the same
piece at different times under different conditions, the judge can make more
precise distinctions. When she first encounters a work, [t]he several

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perfections and defects seem wrapped up in a species of confusion, and

present themselves indistinctly to the imagination (ST, 238).
Moreover, one must compare several species and degrees of excellence
to avoid mistakes in judgment arising from not having experienced anything
higher than what appeals to base sensibility. By comparison alone, Hume
says, we fix the epithets of praise or blame, and learn how to assign the due
degree of each (ST, 238).
Each of these benefits of aesthetic practice has corollary benefits for
improving our application of thick ethical terms. Take, for example, the
virtue of temperance, conceived as the appropriate moderation of desires for
bodily goods. Consider first the benefits of comparison for discerning how
to apply this term. Ones upbringing undoubtedly has a strong, but not
necessarily predictable, effect on ones sensibilities here. A child reared by a
father whose extreme alcohol consumption make him an abusive parent
may grow to see a level of drinking that is still excessive as temperate,
because it is less excessive than her fathers or does not lead to physical
abuse. Or she may decide that drinking is inherently evil and that
temperance requires complete abstinence from alcohol. On the other hand,
a child reared in a teetotalling home may adopt her parents standards and
see any drinking as intemperance, or a rebellious spirit may make her find
absurd the suggestion that one has any obligation to moderate alcohol
consumption.
All of these over-reactions demonstrate how lack of comparison could
corrupt our application of thick ethical terms. What we deem temperate
depends to a large degree on our observations about what kind of bodily
desires humans can resist, and what we see as virtuous in general depends on
the limits and possibilities that we find in our observations of human
behaviour. If we think, for instance, that people have no control over sexual
appetites, we will not recommend even occasional abstinence as virtuous,
just as we do not suggest that giving up eating for months at a time is
virtuous. More realistically, people may believe that a middling level of
decency is virtuous, because they have never seen anyone strive for anything
higher and therefore believe it to be impossible for human nature to do so.
Comparison of people from different times and cultures could correct this
tendency to indulgent ethical evaluations.
We might see studies of particular character traits as analogous to
practice in a particular art, or repeated survey of a particular species of
beauty. Take, for example, solicitude, where this term refers to the virtue of
being properly concerned for those in distress and disposed to take action to
ameliorate that distress insofar as doing so is in ones power. This virtue
manifests itself in a number of ways: attempts to comfort those who are
wounded, efforts to think constructively about ways to tend those wounds,
anger at those responsible for the suffering, and respect for the importance
of the sufferers making some effort to help herself as much as possible

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under the circumstances. At an early stage of moral education, we may see

any gestures of concern or efforts to help as signalling the virtue of
solicitude. As we gain practice in observing varieties of related traits,
however, we learn to recognize the degree to which these different aspects of
solicitude contribute to someones possessing this virtue. The sympathy that
proved important in training delicacy of taste may help us become better
able to judge which of these aspects is most important to the virtue. Perhaps,
for example, comforting the sufferer is more crucial to the virtue than
righteous indignation. Observing different instances of this trait would teach
us ways that these aspects of the trait tend towards the good of those who
possess the trait and others affected by it.
Repeated examination of one particular instance of a trait, finally, might
help us decide when to apply the thick term describing this trait in other
cases. Humes claim that this kind of practice helps us overcome mistakes
due to florid expressions of beauty is suggestive. Consider, for instance, how
instructive repeated observation of someone with a scatological sense of
humour would be for determining the proper application of the term wit.
Even here, we have the potential for increased ethical knowledge.40
The last characteristic of the true aesthetic judge that Hume discusses is
good sense, which qualifies one to discern the beauties of design and
reasoning, which are the highest and most excellent (ST, 241). Here he strives
to show the importance of reason to the operation of our essentially passional
taste. Reason enables the true judge to discern the relations between the parts
of a work of art as well as evaluate how well the work is adapted to its
intended end or purpose. Among the relations that the good judge discerns
are the chain of propositions and reasonings that constitute every kind of
composition insofar as fictional persons must be portrayed as acting in ways
befitting their character and circumstances (ST, 240). Furthermore, the same
excellence of faculties which contributes to the improvement of reason, the
same clearness of conception, the same exactness of distinction, the same
vivacity of apprehension, are essential to the operations of true taste, and are
its infallible concomitants (ST, 240241).
Hume thus assigns reason an expansive role in aesthetic judgment. I will
focus, however, on a single point about reasons analogous role in moral
judgment, concerning inferences about how well some work or act is
adapted to its purpose. Because Hume insists that we judge acts only as
signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper, moral
judgment requires causal inferences about the relations between motive and
act (T, 3.2.1.2). Acts themselves are too ephemeral to be proper objects of
moral judgment. In Humes words, Actions themselves, not proceeding
from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or
humility; and consequently are never considerd in morality (T, 3.3.1.4).
For the natural virtues, at least, when we praise or blame any particular act,
we always suppose, that one in that situation shoud be influencd by the

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proper motive of that action, and we esteem it vicious in him to be regardless

of it (T, 3.2.1.3).41 To make specific moral judgments, then, the spectator
must infer the intention of the agent who performed the act, as well as the
relation between that intention and the agents character.42 In particular,
the moral judge wants to know whether an act that appears praiseworthy,
for example, reflects the appropriate natural motive.
Consider, for instance, the virtue of complaisance.43 The OED offers in its
first definition of complaisance: the habit of making oneself agreeable;
desire and care to please; compliance with, or deference to, the wishes of
others (2nd ed). How might we distinguish acts reflecting these
admirable impulses from those reflecting sinister motives of flattery? It
may seem relatively easy to do so; flattery, we might say, involves deception.
It is false praise as opposed to genuine expression of admiration. Such
deception is difficult to conceal unless one is a particularly skilled flatterer.
The object of the person doling out the praise is, however, at least as
important if not more so than the presence of deception. Is someone who
compliments a friend on an abysmal performance to spare the friends
feelings properly called a flatterer? Perhaps, but we might also identify
this error (if it is one) with a less disapproving term. How about someone
whose praise is always veracious but also carefully tailored to manipulate
others for the service of her own ends? (She makes sure to say anything
complimentary she can think of to her boss, for instance, but spends no
mental energy seeking opportunities to praise those who work for her.)
These examples show that the ends of true complaisance are different
from and indeed incompatible with the ends of flattery. The virtuously
complaisant person pleases others because she wants to further their ends;
she shows deference to those ends and enjoys seeing others pleased. The
flatterer, however, pleases others for the sake of achieving her own private
ends and would disregard the purposes of others to achieve her own.
Now consider again the borderline case of the complimentary friend who
lies to spare feelings. If I think that such a lie is an excusable or even
appropriate component of virtuous complaisance, and you insist that any
dishonesty implicates the friend as a vicious flatterer, we disagree over the
application criteria of thick terms. One possible way to adjudicate this
dispute would be to appeal to the natural motives of the virtue of
complaisance and discuss whether or not lying to a friend tends to serve
those motives. This kind of reflection calls for the kind of causal reasoning
that Hume insists that the good judge must possess. We need not assume
that you and I will be able to settle our dispute to everyones satisfaction, or
even that an obvious and distinct judgment will be available. The possibility
that it will not, I take it, is one of the reasons why Hume appeals to the
judgment of people for standards of taste, as opposed to setting out a list of
rules anyone could follow. But we will have some criteria to appeal to,
something over which to dispute rationally. Just as the good aesthetic judge

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must discern whether a work is suited to its particular end or purpose, a

good moral judge must discern whether a particular tendency is suited to the
ends of virtue.

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III. Conclusion
My aims here have been modest. I do not claim that training moral judges
with the characteristics I describe here can resolve all disputes over the
application criteria of thick ethical terms. I only claim that judges with these
traits have more warrant for their moral judgments than those without these
traits. Practiced judges with delicacy of taste and good sense have reasons
for insisting that heroism is never ferocious and prudence never dishonest.
These reasons are not in principle unavailable to other moral judges, but
failures of capacity or training may preclude other judges seeing what the
good moral judge sees. The verdicts of good moral judges determine
the world-guidedness of ethical terms insofar as they tell us what features of
the moral world must be present for a particular thick term to apply. A
space is thereby opened between full consensus on how thick terms should
be applied and complete scepticism about the possibility of our having the
kind of moral knowledge had by those who properly use such terms. In that
space, even discerning moral judges may disagree: Hume sets the standard
of taste as the joint verdict of good judges, I think, because in such
complex matters, having a standard does not imply always knowing
precisely when we are correctly following the standard. As Williams says,
marginal disagreements can indeed help to show how a terms use is
controlled by the facts. In times of moral confusion, we might appeal to
discerning moral counsellors to help us to decide difficult cases, and
although our counsellors may not immediately agree among themselves,
they have reason to hope that discussion between them may lead to greater
consensus. The hope here is not that we might eliminate all moral
disagreement but that we might be able to account for the differences
between better and worse use of moral language.
One might wonder why those without the characteristics of good moral
judges would or should care about the good judges assessment. If
Fitzwilliam cannot see that Jacques is a braggart rather than properly
prideful, how could Elizabeths assessment motivate him to resist developing
Jacquess trait, rear his children to keep their pride to themselves, or even
disapprove of Jacques himself? And if her assessment cannot provide such
motivation, then how is this kind of ethical knowledge reason-giving in a
Humean sense at all, given Humes repeated insistence on the motivating
power of moral distinctions?
Humes Treatise account of one way in which moral distinctions motivate
may seem to exacerbate the problem: we catch others approbation or
disapprobation through the working of sympathy, and these pleasures and

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pains transform into pride or humility.44 Because virtue is therefore pleasant

and vice painful, this complex interaction provides motives to pursue the
former and avoid the latter. But these motives rise to the level of obligations
at least in part because we cannot avoid them simply by changing the
company we keep. These are inescapable motives. The fabric of Humes
moral society seems to require almost ubiquitous intercourse between agent
and spectator, where the spectator always provides at least a secondary
motive to virtue.
These issues are important, but I do not have space to address them fully
here. That the criteria to which the discerning moral judge appeals are in
principle available to everyone may be of some help, however. Elizabeths
standards are not foreign to Fitzwilliam; she is simply a more accomplished
observer of human nature and therefore has evidence that he does not have.
We would all prefer, it seems, not to apply our own standards irrationally.
As Hume says, no one bears patiently the imputation of ignorance and
stupidity (EPM, 6.16). But to explain why the moral verdicts of more
discerning judges would motivate me, we need not appeal to the fear of
appearing foolish, which may seem too external to moral concerns to count
as moral motivation. Nor need we make too much of a desire for rational
consistency, which might seem to conflict both with Humes antirationalism and his philosophical anthropology.
If we are continually catching others sentiments and therefore judgments,
we will of course have some initially conflicting opinions. Which of these
becomes our own, however, is not necessarily a straightforward function of
which happens to be the more prevalent opinion. A discerning observer who
can articulate the bases for her judgments in terms of shared standards will
inspire admiration, and, Hume says, such people are more likely to influence
us: The judgment of a fool is the judgment of another person, as well as
that of a wise man, and is only inferior in its influence on our own
judgment (T, 2.1.11.11).45 Therefore, someone who can explain her moral
judgments will have more influence than a crowd of facile observers.
Because of sympathy, this influence results in others adopting the good
judges ethical assessments, which then have their own motivating force.
This account does imply that moral progress may require conversation with
those more advanced than we, and it also suggests that some peopledeaf
to or unimpressed with the good judgewill not feel the force of some
moral judgments. Both of these results, I think, are plausible and consistent
with Humes ethics.46
Clearly, the discerning judgment I am describing requires a great deal of
reflection, but it is not the kind of reflection that Williams believes will
destroy the moral knowledge had by those who are masters of their
communitys moral language. It does not involve reflection about whether a
common ethical theory could justify using our thick terms as opposed to any
other terms. Instead, it involves reflection beginning from where we are, in

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our little corner of the moral universe, which attempts to clarify the moral
discourse that we have. The degree to which we share Humes optimism
about the universality of human nature or are willing to supplement Humes
confidence about our common moral sentiments with theories of human
nature that go beyond Humes oblique references to the sound state of the
organ will determine, I suspect, the degree to which we are optimistic about
how far such reflection will take us.47
Notes

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1.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

9.

Hume, D. [17391740] (2002) A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by David Fate Norton
and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 3.1.2.1; and Hume, D. [1748] (1999)
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford:
Oxford University Press) 12.33. Future references to the Treatise will be to this edition
and identified parenthetically in the text by T followed by book, chapter, section, and
paragraph numbers. Future references to the first Enquiry will be to this edition and
identified parenthetically as EHU followed by section and paragraph numbers.
Hume explains this strict sense of knowledge at T, 1.3.1.2 and 1.3.11.2. He uses
knowledge in looser senses as well. See, for example, EHU, 12.3.6: It is only
experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us
to infer the existence of one object from that of another. Such is the foundation of moral
reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all
human action and behaviour.
Williams, B. (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press), pp. 129 and 141.
Ibid., 129130.
Ibid., 167.
See, for instance, Sayre-McCord, G. (1994) On Why Humes General Point of View
Isnt Idealand Shouldnt Be, Social Philosophy and Policy 11, pp. 202228 and
Mason, M. (2001) Moral Prejudice and Aesthetic Deformity: Rereading Humes Of
the Standard of Taste, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 59, pp. 5971. For a
helpful general review of the contemporary literature on Humes aesthetics, see
Costelloe, T. M. (2004) Humes Aesthetics: The Literature and Directions for
Research, Hume Studies 30, pp. 87126.
Cf. Allan Gibbards claim that with reasons and with thick description, when we ask
after the logic of a concept, we are in effect inquiring into agreement and disagreement
conditions (2003) Reasons Thin and Thick, The Journal of Philosophy 100, p. 289.
See Blackburn, S. (1992) Through Thick and Thin, Aristotelian Society Supplementary
Volume 66, pp. 285299 and Blackburn, S. (1998) Ruling Passions (Oxford: Clarendon)
pp. 101ff.
In the course of arguing for a related, advisor model of ethical knowledge, Williams
says that the model does very little for the larger concerns of cognitivism. Cognitivisms
question has often been expressed simply by asking whether there is any ethical
knowledge or not, but in fact it has typically been concerned with the hopes of resolving
the kinds of disagreement that separate from one another the local practices of advice
under shared ethical presuppositions (1993) Who Needs Ethical Knowledge? in: A.
Phillips Griffiths (Ed.), Ethics, p. 208 (New York: Cambridge University Press). For a
partial defence of the claim that deployment of thick terms constitutes knowledge that
reflection may destroy, see Moore, A. W. (2003) Williams on Ethics, Knowledge, and
Reflection, Philosophy 78, pp. 337354. Even if one disagrees with Williamss analysis

600

10.
11.

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12.

13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.

19.
20.

21.

22.
23.

24.

Margaret Watkins
of moral knowledge, one could allow that judges with the characteristics I describe below
produce more justified moral judgments than others. I am grateful to an anonymous
reader for this suggestion.
See Dancy, J. (1995) In Defense of Thick Concepts, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20,
pp. 266ff.
In drawing from both the Treatise and the Enquiry to explain aspects of Humes moral
philosophy, I do not mean to imply that we can assume that these texts are entirely
consistent with one another, or with essays such as The Standard of Taste. I do think,
however, that the psychological principles from the Treatise that I appeal to are
consistent with the later works and that Hume does not radically revise his views about
sympathy, for example, after the Treatise.
Hume, D. [1757] (1985) Of the Standard of Taste, in: E. F. Miller (Ed.), Essays Moral,
Political, and Literary, p. 227 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund). Hereafter, references to this
essay will be made parenthetically in the text as ST.
See OED, 2nd ed., barbarous, 1a.
See T, 3.3.1.18.
Cf. Hume, D. [1751] (2003) An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Edited by T.
L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 7.15. Future references to the second
Enquiry will be to this edition and identified parenthetically as EPM followed by
section and paragraph number.
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 141.
Ibid., p. 140.
Jacqueline Taylor briefly discusses the apparent thickness of Humes trait terms in
relation to the separability of their evaluative and descriptive senses in (2002) Hume on
the Standard of Virtue, The Journal of Ethics, 6, pp. 5960.
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 141.
Such an interpretation of moral concepts grows out of and fits comfortably with a
Moorean open-question suspicion of ethical naturalism, where naturalism refers to
any attempt to define basic moral terms like good.
As R. M. Hare puts it, We say something prescriptive if and only if, for some act A,
some situation S and some person P, if P were to assent (orally) to what we say, and not,
in S, do A, he logically must be assenting insincerely (1981) Moral Thinking (Oxford:
Oxford University Press), p. 21.
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 141.
Hence Simon Blackburns criticism of Hume on this point. Blackburn quotes Humes
parallel remarks in the second Enquiry that the names of certain traits force an avowal
of their merit and laments, Unfortunately, it is fairly plain that Hume is wrong
(Through Thick and Thin, pp. 285286).
This does not imply that the descriptive sense of the terms could stand on its own either:
we do not have purely descriptive senses of cruelty, for example, that get fed into some
mechanism to determine whether they are the appropriate ones to be designated as really
cruel. What we have are complex actions and attitudes to which we are tempted to apply
the label, and part of Humes point is that we fail to understand the meaningful place of
these actions and attitudes in human life if we fail to understand the way in which our
evaluations of them change the moral landscape we inhabit. Dancy suggests that a
proper understanding of thick terms does not hold that there are two really distinct
elements which by a pseudo-chemical reaction somehow become indistinguishable from
each other. There are no elements at all, in any normal sense. There is indeed a property
and an attitude , but these things are not elements of a concept. They are incapable of
being so because the property is best characterized as being that of meriting the attitude,
and the attitude is best characterized as the appropriate one given the presence of the
property (In Defense of Thick Concepts, p. 268).

Humean Moral Knowledge

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26.
27.

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28.
29.

30.

31.

32.

33.
34.
35.
36.

37.

38.
39.

601

For an interesting account of how we might distinguish valid from invalid extensions of
thick terms into new contexts, see Flakne, A. (2005) Through Thick and Thin: Validity
and Reflective Judgment, Hypatia, 20, pp. 115126.
See EPM, 1.9.
Jacqueline Taylor argues that this emphasis on the virtues of good judgment represents a
fundamental break from and improvement on the account of moral evaluation that
Hume gives in the Treatise. (Hume on the Standard of Virtue, pp. 4362, especially
pp. 5657.)
Who Needs Ethical Knowledge, p. 206.
Michelle Mason, for instance, has argued (in Moral Prejudice and Aesthetic
Deformity) that aesthetic judgment is first-personal, whereas moral judgment is
third-personal. Jacqueline Taylor notes the greater inclusiveness of the intercourse of
sentiments that produce moral standards: Experience with certain forms of art
typically requires an education not readily available to all, but nearly everyone has the
capacity to cultivate a sense of morality and acquire experience of different characters
(Hume on the Standard of Virtue, p. 57).
See, for example, Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion, where Hume argues that a
cultivated taste for the polite arts improves our sensibility for all the tender and
agreeable passions; at the same time that it renders the mind incapable of the rougher
and more boisterous emotions (in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, p. 6).
The imaginations ability to produce related ideas in accordance with the principles of
association is central to our judgments of beauty, according to Hume. See Dabney
Townsends discussion of delicacy of imagination in (2001) Humes Aesthetic Theory
(London: Routledge), p. 204.
It is important not to underestimate the obstacles to communication resulting from a
lack of shared delicacy. In an interesting discussion of the relationship between the
development of aesthetic delicacy and character, Rochelle Gurstein notes that from the
perspective of someone who has taste, the person who lacks it is regarded as blind or
tone-deaf. Such people seem to be missing a faculty of perception and, in consequence,
occupy a different world (Taste and the Conversible World in the Eighteenth
Century, Journal of the History of Ideas, 61, p. 220).
Austen, J. (1988) Pride and Prejudice, in: The Novels of Jane Austen, vol. 2. Edited by R.
W. Chapman (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 261.
Ibid.
Although the events of the novel turn on particular failures of Elizabeths discernment,
these failures are interesting in part because Elizabeth is not generally undiscerning.
For example: Some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of the
internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to displease; and if they fail of their
effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection in the
organ (ST, p. 233). See ST, pp. 234, 235, and 241 for additional examples.
See, for example, Humes oft-cited criticism of the monkish virtues at EPM, 9.3. He does
say here, however, that no superstition has force sufficient, among men of the world, to
pervert entirely these natural sentiments that distinguish virtue from vice.
Hume, somewhat humourously, addresses a version of this issue himself in Of
Impudence and Modesty (Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, pp. 552556).
The differences between those people whom Jacquess trait affects adds another level of
complexity here, not only because of the resulting different effects of the trait, but also
because we sympathize with people differently based on their relations to us. I cannot
address these complexities here, but doing so would appeal to the correction of Humes
general point of view. Of course, Hume discusses an analogous kind of correction in
aesthetics when he argues that the critic must place herself in the position of the intended
audience of a work. See ST, 239ff.

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Margaret Watkins

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When Hume suggests in appendix 4 to the second Enquiry that wit might be a virtue, he
probably means wit in the sense of mental quickness or sharpness, or wisdom, good
judgement, discretion, prudence. (See OED, 2nd ed, definitions 5a and 6a.) He does,
however, pair wit with humour in this appendix, and the wit that he classes with
qualities agreeable to others in section 8 seems to be wit allied with humour.
One of the reasons why artificial virtues are artificial, according to Hume, is that they
do not exhibit this clear connection between a natural motive and action. This
disconnect means that moral discernment about artificial virtues will involve a different
level of complexity. Unfortunately, an examination of these issues is beyond the scope of
this paper.
This is not to say that the judgments themselves are inferences, which would pose
problems for Humes anti-rationalism. My claim is only that the moral judge must make
some inferences prior to having the sentimental response that Hume thinks constitutes
the judgment of virtue or vice. For a discussion of the challenges posed by the apparently
inferential nature of the general point of view, see Cohon, R. (1997) The Common
Point of View in Humes Ethics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57,
pp. 827850. For Humes discussion of the complexity of the relationship between
intention, character, and our evaluation of an agent, see T, 2.2.3.4.
I recognize that this term is somewhat archaic, but I think it nonetheless signals an
important and admirable trait of character, not captured by related terms such as
people-pleaser, considerate, or respectful.
See T, 3.1.2.5.
Hume makes this remark in the context of discussing the influence of sympathy on the
relationship between others opinions of our own character and our own pride or
humility. This discussion makes it clear that Hume recognizes that we do not see all
character evaluations as equal, and that our estimation of the spectator in question
determines to a great extent whether or not we will sympathetically adopt her
evaluations.
Hume emphasizes the importance of linguistic communication in correcting moral
sentiments in his discussions of the general point of view. See, e.g., T, 3.3.1.16 and EPM,
5.42.
A Baylor University research leave in the fall of 2006 supported the research for this
piece. I am grateful to two anonymous readers for Inquiry for very helpful suggestions
for improvement. I am also thankful to my colleagues, Robert Kruschwitz and Robert
Miner, who both read earlier versions of this article and provided valuable feedback and
conversation about these ideas.

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