Of course, it should not be supposed that every inadequacy or breakdown of causa

l laws must necessarily

be due to the effects of chance fluctuations. Indeed, as happened in connection
with the experiments leading
to the theory of relativity (Michelson-Morley experiment, etc.), the failure of
a given set of causal laws may
represent just a simple and reproducible deviation between the predictions of th
ese laws and the
experimental results. A deviation of this kind implies only that the causal laws
in question must be replaced
by newer, more extensive, and more accurate causal laws (as indeed happened with
Newtonian mechanics,
which was replaced by the more general and more nearly correct relativistic mech
anics). Quite often,
however, experiments have disclosed not just simple and reproducible deviations
from the predictions of a
certain set of causal laws, but rather a breakdown of the entire scheme by which
a specified set of properties
are found to be related in a unique and necessary way in terms of a set of causa
l laws of a given general
kind. Such a breakdown manifests itself in the appearance of chance fluctuations
, not coming from anything
in the context under investigation, but coming rather from qualitatively differe
nt kinds of factors existing in
contexts that are new relative to the one under consideration.* In such a case,
the original causal law is seen
to be valid only to the extent that the chance fluctuations in question cancel o
ut, while in any given
application the law will have a certain characteristic minimum range of error. T
his range of error is an objective
property of the law in question, a property that is determined by the magnitudes
of the chance fluctuations
arising outside the context under investigation.
Vice versa, however, the characteristic limitation on the domain of validity of
any given causal law which
results from the neglect of the effects of chance fluctuations is balanced by a
corresponding limitation on
the domain of validity of any given law of chance, which results from the neglec
t of systematic causal
interconnections between different contexts. In many cases (e.g. throws of a die
) these interconnections are
so unimportant that they have never yet been significant in any real application
s. Nevertheless, this need not
always be so. Consider, for example, the case of insurance statistics. Here, one
is able to make approximate
predictions concerning the mean lifetime of an individual in a given group (e.g.
one of definite age, height,
weight, etc.) without the need to go into a detailed investigation of the multit
udes of complex factors that
contribute to the life or death of each individual in this group. This is possib
le only because the factors
responsible for the death of any individual are extremely manifold and diverse,
and because they tend to
work more or less independently in such a way as to lead to regular statistical
laws. But the assumption
underlying the use of these statistical laws are not always true. Thus, in the c
ase of an epidemic or a war, the
systematic interconnection between the cause of death of different individuals g
rows so strong that statistical
predictions of any kind become practically impossible. To apply the laws of chan

ce uncritically, by ignoring
the possibility of corrections due to causal interconnections that may be unimpo
rtant in some conditions but
crucially important in others, is therefore just as capable of leading to errone
ous results as is the uncritical
application of causal laws, in which one ignores the corrections that may be due
to the effects of chance
fluctuations.
A point of view that avoids the errors that generally result from assuming eithe
r causal laws or laws of
chance to be basic and final kinds of laws is that suggested in Chapter II, Sect
ion 15. In this point of view we
*More generally, causal laws must be corrected by taking into account contingenc
ies (see Chap. I, Sec. 8); because of
the complex, multifold and interconnected character of these contingencies, howe
ver, their average effects can, in a
wide range of conditions, be treated in terms of chance fluctuations and the the
ory of probability.
* This is, for example, what happens to classical physics. For a particle such a
s an electron follows the classical orbit only
approximately, and in a more accurate treatment is found to undergo random fluct
uations in its motions, arising outside
the context of the classical level (see Chapters III and IV).
See, for example, Chapter I, Section 8.
MORE GENERAL CONCEPT OF NATURAL LAW 97
regard both classes of laws as approximations, in the sense that just as a causa
l law can arise as a statistical
approximation to the average behaviour of a large aggregate of elements undergoi
ng random fluctuations, a
law of chance can arise as a statistical approximation to the effects of a large
number of causal factors
undergoing essentially independent motions.* Actually, however, neither causal l
aws nor laws of chance
can ever be perfectly correct, because each inevitably leaves out some aspect of
what is happening in
broader contexts. Under certain conditions, one of these kinds of laws or the ot
her may be a better
representation of the effects of the factors that are dominant and may therefore
be the better approximation
for these particular conditions. Nevertheless, with sufficient changes of condit
ions, either type of law may
eventually cease to represent even what is essential in a given context and may
have to be replaced by the
other. Thus, we are led to regard these two kinds of laws as effectively furnish
ing different views of any
given natural process, such that at times we may need one view or the other to c
atch what is essential, while
at still other times, we may have to combine both views in an appropriate way. B
ut we do not assume, as is
generally done in a mechanistic philosophy, that the whole of nature can eventual
ly be treated completely
perfectly and unconditionally in terms of just one of these sides, so that the o
ther will be seen to be
inessential, a mere shadow, that makes no fundamental contribution to our repres
entation of nature as a whole.
Thus, the notion of the qualitative infinity of nature leads us to the necessity
of considering the laws of
nature both from the side of causality and from t