Civpro Cases Batch 1

SECOND DIVISION
This is a petition for certiorari to review the actuations of the

Court of First Instance of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-11882 in
respect of the correct amount to be paid for the filing of the case
as provided in Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
[G.R. No. L-34840. July 20, 1982.]

MARIO RODIS MAGASPI, JUSTINO R. MAGASPI,
BALDOMERA M. ALEJANDRO, and MANOLITA M.
CORTEZ, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE JOSE R. RAMOLETE,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, ESPERANZA
V. GARCIA, Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, THE
SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES LIMITED and/or THE
SHELL REFINING COMPANY (Phil.) INC., CENTRAL VISAYAN
REALTY & INVESTMENTS CO., INC., CEBU CITY SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION and the GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
On September 16, 1970, the petitioners filed a complaint for the

recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with
damages against The Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd and/or The
Shell Refining Co. (Phil.) Inc., Central Visayan Realty &
Investment Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings & Loan Association in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon filing and the payment
of P60.00 as docketing fee and P10.00 for sheriff fees, the
complaint was assigned Civil Case No. R11882.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The complaint contains, among other prayers, the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Petitioners paid only P60.00 as docketing fee when they filed a

complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land with damages (Civil Case No. R-11882) against
herein private respondents, prompting the latter to file a motion
to compel them to pay the correct filing fee of 16,730.00, based
on the total demand of the former, but the Court ordered the
payment of the amount of P3,164.00 plus P2.00 Legal Research
fee as fixed by the Clerk of Court. Thereafter, an amended
complaint was filed by the petitioners, so as to include the
government as a defendant but the complaint still sought the
return of the lot in question, limiting however the pecuniary
claim. The admission of the amended complaint by Judge
Canonoy without petitioners payment of the required additional
amount was opposed by the private respondents on the ground
that the amended complaint which had been admitted had
replaced the original complaint. Respondent Judge Jose R.
Ramolete, who had replaced Judge Canonoy, resolved private
respondents motion by giving the plaintiffs-petitioners the
choice to pay the docket fee assessed or to forego the
proceeding, but said order was assailed by the latter, insisting
that they correctly paid the correct amount of P8.00, or in the
alternative, that if they are to pay an additional docketing fee, it
should be based on the amended complaint.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court had acquired
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. R-11882 which was docketed
upon the payment of P60.00 although said amount is insufficient
and that the additional docket fee to be paid by the petitioners
should be based on their amended complaint for the original
pleading is deemed abandoned.
Petition granted.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS, FILING OF; PAYMENT OF DOCKET

FEES, SETTLED RULE. The rule is well-settled that a case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of
the actual date of its filing in court. (Malimit v. Degamo, No. L17850, Nov. 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 450, 120 Phil. 1247; Lee v.
Republic, L-15027, Jan. 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 65.)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE WHERE CONTROVERSY REFERS
TO AMOUNT OF DOCKET FEE TO BE PAID. The rule settled in
the Malimit and Lee cases concerned the timeliness of the
payment of the docket fee. It does not cover the case at bar
where there is no reference to the time of payment but concerns
the amount that has to be paid.
3. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION ACQUIRED BY COURT DESPITE PAYMENT
OF INSUFFICIENT DOCKET FEE. Civil Case No. R-11882 was
docketed upon the payment of P60.00 although said amount is
insufficient. Accordingly, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction
over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper
and regular.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCKET FEES TO BE ASSESSED ON THE BASIS OF
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT. Petitioners assertion that the
docket fee be based on the amended complaint which was
admitted on November 14, 1970, is in point. "When a pleading is
amended, the original pleading is deemed abandoned. The
original ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The
case stands for trial on the amended pleading only." (1 Moran,
Rules of Court, 363 (1970), citing Reynes v. Compania General de
Tobacos de Filipinas, 21 Phil. 417; Reyman v. Director of Lands,
34 Phil. 428.) On the basis of the foregoing, the additional docket
fee to be paid should be based on petitioners amended
complaint.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
"3. To declare Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41215 issued in the

name of the defendant Central Visayan Realty & Investment Co.,
Inc. as null and void and hence of no legal effect;
"4. That the herein plaintiffs in their capacity as heirs of the
deceased spouses Crispulo Magaspi and Rosalia Rodis be
declared as owners of the land in question;
"5. That once declared as null and void, The Register of Deeds for
the City and Province of Cebu be ordered to cancel the
abovementioned Transfer Certificate of Title and issue another in
their place in the name of the herein plaintiffs;
"6. To order the defendants, The Shell Company of the Philippines
Limited, formerly known as The Asiatic Petroleum Co. (P.I.), Ltd.,
and/or The Shell Refining Company (Phil), Inc., to pay the
plaintiffs the amount of P3,500.00 a month representing unpaid
monthly rentals starting from June 2, 1948 up to May 15, 1968,
and to order all the defendants jointly and solidarily to pay the
plaintiffs the amount of P3,500.00 a month representing unpaid
monthly rentals starting from May 16, 1968 up to the date that
the land is actually delivered to the herein plaintiffs;
"7. To order the defendants jointly and solidarily to return the
ownership and possession of the lot in question to the herein
plaintiffs;
"8. To order the defendants jointly and solidarily to pay the
plaintiffs the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages and
attorneys fees in the amount of P250,000.00 and the cost of this
action;
"9. Exemplary damages be imposed on the defendants jointly
and solidarily in the amount of P500,000.00 as an example and
deterrent to any similar acts in the future."cralaw virtua1aw
library
On September 18, 1970, Central Visayan Realty & Investment
Co., Inc. and Cebu City Savings and Loan Assn. filed a motion to
compel the plaintiffs to pay the correct amount for docket fee.
The motion, omitting the confusing footnotes, reads:chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
"1. That the complaint of the plaintiffs contains or states two, if
not three alternative causes of action:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
a) Reconveyance of real property.
Par. 4. That the herein plaintiffs in their capacity as heirs of
the deceased spouses Crispulo Magaspi and Rosalia Rodis be
declared as owners of the land in question;
Par. 5. That once declared null and void, the Register of Deeds
for the City and Province of Cebu are ordered to cancel the
above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and issue another in
their place in the names of the herein plaintiffs.
"If the plaintiffs are unable to have the property reconveyed and
the title canceled, having passed to an innocent purchaser for
value, their recourse would be for damages, i.e., recovery of the
value of the land and other damages.
b) Recovery of the value of the land and Damages.
1. To order the defendants, to pay plaintiffs the amount of P3,
500.00 a month representing unpaid monthly rentals starting
from June 2, 1948 up to May 15, 1968, and to order all the
defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the amount
of P3,500.00 a month starting from May 16, 1968 up to the date
that the land is actually delivered to herein plaintiffs;
2. To order the defendants jointly and solidarily to pay the
plaintiffs the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages and
attorneys fees in the amount of P250,000.00;
3. Exemplary damages be imposed on the defendants jointly and

severally in the amount of P500,000.00;
4. That because of the unlawful occupation and usurpation the
plaintiffs suffered damages in the amount of P1,250,000.00
which is the reasonable market value of the land in question it
being a first class commercial land.
c) Cancellation of Titles.
1. To declare Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41215 null and void;
2. That each of these alternative causes of action is distinct and
separate from each other. Each may be instituted by plaintiffs
against the defendants and the same may constitute a valid
cause of action. Each constitutes an appropriate basis therefore,
for determining the correct amount of the docket fee in this case;
3. That in the suit for reconveyance, the recovery of the
improvements existing on the land is deemed included, since
defendant Cebu City Savings is alleged to be a builder in bad
faith. The value of existing improvement, i.e., assessed value is
P70,000.00;
4. Therefore, the docket fee should be:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Docket fee
Land and Improvement at P87,280.00 assessed value P100.00
Recovery of Value of the Land and damages:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
a) P1,250,000.00 Land value
b) 500,000.00 Moral Damages
c) 500,000.00 Exemplary Damages
d) 250,000.00 Attorneys fees
e) 890,633.24 Monthly rentals up to date of filing of complaint
6,632.00
1. Less than P200.00 P16.00

2. P200.00 or more but less than P600.00 24.00
3. P600.00 or more but less than P3,000.00 32.00
4. P3,000.00 or more but less than P5,000.00 40.00
7. P50,000.00 or more but less than P100,000.00 100
9. And for each P1,000.00 in excess of P150,000.00 2.00
10. When the value of the case cannot be estimated 200.00
11. When the case does not concern property (naturalization,
adoption, legal separation, etc.) 32.00
12. In forcible entry and illegal detainer cases appealed from
inferior cases 20.00
If the case concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof shall
be considered in computing the fees. (Italics supplied)
In case the value of the property or estate of the sum claimed is
less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the
difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be.
"2. That a reading of the complaint in this case would show that
the action is not only for recovery of property but also for actual
and moral damages as well as for attorneys fees;
"3. That under the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, already cited above, it appears that for the purpose of
determining the amount of the fees that should be collected for
the filing of an action or proceeding, the basis should be the
totality of the sum or sums claimed, exclusive of interest, except
in the case of real estate where the assessed value thereof shall
be considered in computing the fees;
P3,390,633.24.
"4. That in the light of the foregoing, it is the opinion of the

undersigned that the basis for computing the fees for the filing of
the complaint in this case should be as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
(Six Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Two Pesos) 6,732.00
(a) Assessed value of the land
5. That under the Old Rules of Court, Sec. 5, Rule 130 provides
that it is the sum claimed, exclusive of interest and damages;
while under the new Rules of Court, Sec. 5, Rule 141, it is the
sum claimed, exclusive of interest, the word damages having
been excluded purposely, indicating the intent to include
damages in the computation of the docket fee;
(please see par. 4 of the complaint) P17,280.00
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the plaintiffs be made

to pay the correct docket fee within the time prescribed by this
Honorable Court, as properly computed by the Clerk of Court and
failing to pay the same within the prescribed period to dismiss
the case.
"Further, until such time as the correct docket fee is paid, the
time for filing of responsive pleadings by the defendants be
suspended."cralaw virtua1aw library
The motion was opposed by the plaintiffs (petitioners herein)
who claimed that the main cause of action was the recovery of a
piece of land and on the basis of its assessed valued, P60.00 was
the correct docketing fee and that although the Revised Rules of
Court do not exclude damages in the computation of the docket
fee, damages are nonetheless still to be excluded.
On October 5, 1970, the presiding judge ordered the Clerk of
Court to comment on the motion and the opposition. The
following comment was submitted:chanrobles law library
"1. That in the matter of fixing the amount of fees that shall be
collected by the Clerks of Court of First Instance for the filing of
an action or proceeding, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
provides as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 5. Clerks of Court of First Instance. (a) For filing an action
or proceeding, or a permissive counterclaim or cross-claim not
arising out of the same transaction subject of the complaint, a
third-party complaint and a complaint in intervention and for all
services in the same, if the sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or
the value of the property in litigation, or the value of the estate,
is:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(b) Moral damages 500,000.00

(c) Attorneys fees 250,000.00
(d) Monthly rentals at P3,500.00 a month up to the filing of
complaint 890,633.24
TOTAL P1,657,913.24
"Accordingly, the correct amount of the legal fees for the filing of
this case should be fixed at P3,164.00 plus P2.00 Legal Research
fee;"
On October 14, 1970, Judge Mateo Canonoy issued the following
order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This is a motion of the defendants to order the plaintiffs to pay a
filing fee of P6,730.00 on the ground that the total demand of the
said plaintiffs (the value of the land, which is P17,280.00, plus
the damages amounting to P3,390,633.24) should be the basis
for computing the filing fee and not the value of the land alone.
The plaintiffs paid the amount of P60.00 as filing fee in this case.
"Examining the allegations of the complaint, the Court is
constrained to sustain the Manifestation or contention of the
Clerk of Court, dated October 14, 1970. The damages are not
merely incidental or ancillary but are principal demands. Besides,
Rule 141, Sec. 5 (a) of the new Rules of Court no longer excludes
damages, like interest, from computing the filing fees. (The Old
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 5 (a), expressly includes damages
and interest in the exemption.) The exclusion of damages from
the exemption in the computation of the filing fees in the new
Rules of Court is intentional, since oftentimes, as in the present
case, the claim for damages far exceeds the value of the land. To
thus exempt the plaintiffs from paying the filing fee for damages
is against reason. Besides, in determining the jurisdiction of the
court, the amount of damages claimed is taken into account.
"The opinion of Undersecretary Guillermo Santos that the Court
ought to be left alone to determine the question of the filing fee

of cases pending therein without any interference from the
Secretary of Justice (Attorney General) is commendable.
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby overrules the
opposition of the plaintiffs and orders them to pay an additional
sum of P3,104.00 as filing fees."cralaw virtua1aw library
On October 19, 1970, the Shell companies filed their respective
answers.
On October 23, 1970, Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City
Savings filed the following manifestation:cralawnad
"1. That this Honorable Court issued an Order, dated October
14th, 1970 for the plaintiffs to pay an additional P3,104.00
docket fee, per computation and manifestation of the Clerk of
Court;
"2. That the Clerk of Court manifestations is predicated on the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Land Value P17,280.00 P60.00
Damages:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) Moral Damages P500,000.00
b) Attorneys fees 250,000.00
c) Monthly Rental 890,633.24
P1,640,633.24
and excusably excluded was the exemplary damages sought
(Par. 22 Complaint, Par. 9, Prayer) in the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that in the computation of
the correct docket fee, besides the sum of P3,104.00, an
additional sum of P1,000.00 be imposed in accordance with Sec.
5 (Par. 9) Rule 141 of the Rules of Court: and should the plaintiffs
within a period fixed by this Honorable Court fail to pay the
same, the complaint be dismissed with prejudice, and for such
other reliefs as this Honorable Court may deem just under the
premises."cralaw virtua1aw library
On November 3, 1970, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to
amend the complaint so as to include the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines as a defendant. The amended
complaint still sought the return of the lot in question but the
pecuniary claim was limited to the following:chanrobles law
library : red
"8. To order the defendants jointly and solidarily except the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines moral damages in
such amount as this Court may determine and attorneys fees in
the amount of P100,000.00 and the cost of this action;
"9. Exemplary damages be imposed on the defendants jointly
and solidarily except the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount as this Court may deem just and
proper as an example and deterrent to any similar acts in the
future." (Italics not supplied.)
On November 12, 1970, the defendants (herein respondents)
filed an opposition to the admission of the amended complaint.
They based their opposition on the following
grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That while the only reason given for the amendment of the
complaint is the inclusion of the Government of the Philippines as
an indispensable party; the plaintiffs have taken the improper
liberty of amending portions of the allegations in the complaint
and even has eliminated entire paragraph, thus:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
a) By not mentioning the previously alleged value of the land at
P1,250,000.00 in paragraph 19;
b) By not mentioning the previously averred to monthly rentals
due at P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948, or computed at
P890,633.24;
c) By eliminating completely the claim for moral damages of
P500,000.00 and reducing attorneys fees from P250,000.00 to
P100,000.00 under par. 21;
d) By not mentioning the amount previously claimed as
exemplary damages in the sum of P500,000.00, as alleged in par.
21;
substituting thereto, the averment that, the amount of these

various claims for damages will be proven during the trial of the
case;
"2. That these amendments are obviously intended to
circumvent, if not entirely subvert, the lawful Order of this
Honorable Court for the plaintiff to pay the amount of P3,104.00
as docket fee, on the basis of the total amount claimed for
damages (plus P1,000.00 docket fee on the P500,000.00
exemplary damages, pending resolution before this Honorable
Court);
"3. That if the amended complaint is admitted as it is, plaintiffs
would effect, have their cakes and eat it too, in the manner of
speaking;
"4. That the payment of the correct and in this case, by an Order
of this Honorable Court of the docket fee, is a condition
precedent for the complaint, amended or otherwise, of the
plaintiff to be given due course;"
On November 16, 1970, Judge Canonoy admitted the amended
complaint although the plaintiffs had not yet complied with his
Order of October 14, 1970, that they should pay an additional
P3,104.00 docket fee.
On December 2, 1970, Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City
Savings filed the following motion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That this Honorable Court issued an Order dated October 14,
1970, for the plaintiffs to pay an additional docket fee of
P3,104.00;
"2. That such an Order has not been complied with by the
plaintiffs nor an appeal or a petition for review filed and the
same has become final;
"3. That Sec. 3 Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that if
plaintiff fails:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
to comply with these rules of any order of the court, the action
may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant, or upon the
courts own motion.
"4. That the filing of the answer by these defendants is premised
on the payment of the correct or as ordered docket fee by the
plaintiffs; for which reason, no answer has yet been filed;
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the plaintiffs be
ordered to pay the additional docket fee within seven (7) days,
otherwise the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The above motion was opposed by the plaintiffs on the ground
that the amended complaint which had been admitted by the
court had replaced the original complaint.
On February 12, 1971, the Republic filed its answer to the
amended complaint and the plaintiffs filed a reply on February
23, 1971.
On March 13, 1971, Central Visayan Realty and Cebu City
Savings filed a petition to have their motion of December 2,
1970, resolved by the court.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On April 3, 1971, Judge Jose R. Ramolete who had replaced Judge
Canonoy issued the following order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This is a petition of the defendants praying for the resolution of
their motion dated December 3, 1970. This motion was brought
about by virtue of the order of this Court dated October 14,
1970, ordering the plaintiffs to pay additional docket fees of
P3,104.00.
"Going over the record of the case, it appears that after the
issuance of the above order, the plaintiffs filed their amended
complaint which was also admitted on November 16, 1970.
"At the hearing of this petition the parties supported their
respective positions with oral arguments after which they
submitted the matter for resolution.
"It is a rule that the correct docket fee must be paid before the
Court will act on the petition or complaint. The Court of Justice is
not called upon to act on a complaint or a petition in the absence
of payment of a corresponding docket fee. (Garcia v. Vasquez, 28
SCRA 330, 331.) Before the payment of the docket fee, the case
is not deemed registered and docketed (Lazaro v. Endencia, 57
Phil., 552; Malimit v. Degamo, 12 SCRA 454; Lee v. Republic, 10
SCRA, 67).
"In the light of the above rulings on the matter, the original
complaint, up to the present, is not deemed registered or

docketed. It follows, therefore, that there is likewise no amended
complaint deemed to have been filed and admitted.
"The Court, therefore, is of the view that up to the present the
parties are in the same situation as they were before this
proceeding was started. It cannot also order the plaintiffs to
comply with the order of this Court dated October 14, 1970,
because it has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them neither
can it order the dismissal of the complaint for non-compliance of
the order of October 14, 1970, by the plaintiffs, for obvious
reasons. The plaintiffs are given the choice to pay the docket fee
assessed or to forego this proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioners assail the above order. They insist that they had
correctly paid the docketing fee in the amount of P60.00, or in
the alternative, that if they are to pay an additional docketing
fee, it should be based on the amended
complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
For initial determination is the question as to whether or not Civil
Case No. 11882 may be considered as having been filed and
docketed when P60.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court even on the
assumption that said payment was not sufficient in amount.
The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its
filing in court. (Malimit v. Degamo, No. L-17850, Nov. 28, 1964,
12 SCRA 450, 120 Phil. 1247; Lee v. Republic, L-15027, Jan. 31,
1964, 10 SCRA 65.)
Is the case at bar covered by the above rule? It is not because
the question posed in the Malimit and Lee cases was the
timeliness of the payment of the docket fee whereas the case at
bar has no reference to the time of payment but concerns the
amount that has to be paid.
The case of Garcia v. Vasquez, L-26808, May 23, 1969, 28 SCRA
330, mentioned in the order of Judge Ramolete will be discussed
below. And as to Lazaro v. Endencia, 37 Phil. 552 (1932), it does
not appear to have relevance to the question. In that case an
appeal in an ejectment case was made and the appellant
deposited only P8.00 as docket fee instead of P16.00 as required
by law. It was only after the period for perfecting an appeal that
the appellant deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the
amount of said docket fee. This Court dismissed the appeal on
the ground "that payment of the full amount of the docket fees is
an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal." (At p.
553.)
The case at bar can be distinguished from the Lazaro case in at
least two respects, namely: (a) The Lazaro case involved the
timeliness of the perfection of the appeal which was made to
depend in turn on the timeliness of the full payment of the
docket fee whereas the instant case does not involve an appeal
nor the timeliness of the payment of the docket fee; and (b) in
the Lazaro case, the amount (P8.00) which was initially paid was
palpably inadequate, whereas in the case at bar there is an
honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid
as docket fee.
The Garcia case, supra, appears to favor the petitioners. In that
case, a will was sought to be probated in Special Proceeding No.
62818. Docket fees amounting to P940.00 were paid. Later, a
second will was sought to be probated in the same special
proceeding. This Court held that there was no need to pay a
separate docket fee because the probate of the second will was
not sought in another proceeding.
We hold that under the circumstances, Civil Case No. R-11882
was docketed upon the payment of P60.00 although said amount
is insufficient. Accordingly, the trial court had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had
were proper and regular.cralawnad
The next question is in respect of the correct amount to be paid
as docket fee. Judge Canonoy on October 14, 1970, ordered the
payment of P3,104.00 as additional docket fee based on the
original complaint. However, the petitioners assert as an
alternative view, that the docket fee be based on the amended
complaint which was admitted on November 14, 1970, also by
Judge Canonoy.
The petitioners have a point. "When a pleading is amended, the
original pleading is deemed abandoned. The original ceases to
perform any further function as a pleading. The case stands for
trial on the amended pleading only." (1 Moran, Rules of Court,
363 [1970], citing Reynes v. Compaia General de Tobacos de
Filipinas, 21 Phil. 417; Reyman v. Director of Lands, 34 Phil. 428.)
On the basis of the foregoing, the additional docket fee to be
paid by the petitioners should be based on their amended
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the petitioners shall

be assessed a docket fee on the basis of the amended complaint;
and after all of the lawful fees shall have been paid, the
proceedings in Civil Case No. R-11882 shall be resumed. No
special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and De
Castro, JJ., concur.
Escolin, J., concurs in the result.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 75919. May 7, 1987.]
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET
AL., Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, CITYLAND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW
LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE
MAISIP, Respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco, for Petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; NON-PAYMENT OF DOCKET
FEE; RENDERS NULL AND VOID AND COMPLAINTS AND
SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS WHERETO. The rule is wellsettled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court." Thus,
in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee.
Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest
jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there is no
such original complaint that was duly filed which could be
amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended
complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by
the trial court are null and void. The Court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.
An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of
the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT; CONTENTS; AMOUNT OF MANDAMUS
MUST BE SPECIFIED NOT ONLY IN THE BODY BUT ALSO IN THE
PRAYER. All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed
for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer,
and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the
filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record. The court acquires
jurisdiction over any upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the
Second Division of January 28, 1987 and another motion to refer
the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the Court En
Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the
Court en banc is granted but the motion to set the case for oral
argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must
be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint cite the case
of Magaspi v. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the filing fee should be levied by
considering the amount of damages sought in the original
complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in
that
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with damages, 2 while the present
case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance
with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. 3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not
only the annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the
declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to
plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual, moral,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees arising therefrom in the
amounts specified therein. 4 However, in the present case, the
prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction during the pendency of the action against the
defendants announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by
the plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such property

of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that
maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to
execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property
and annul defendants illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff,
ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual,
compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said
amounts as maybe proved during the trial as attorneys fees and
declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff
valid and producing the effect of payment and to make the
injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not
specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint
alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as damages suffered
by plaintiff. 5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest
difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in the Magaspi
case. The complaint was considered as primarily an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The
damages stated were treated as merely ancillary to the main
cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00
for the sheriffs fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of
opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint
as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for
damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon
filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering
the action to be merely one for specific performance where the
amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is
obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages
sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is
spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the amount
of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of
the filing fee.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
4. When this under-assessment of the filing fee in this case was
brought to the attention of this Court together with similar other
cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the Court.
Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court
filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for the
inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and
by eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the
body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was
maintained. After this Court issued an order on October 15, 1985
ordering the re-assessment of the docket fee in the present case
and other cases that were investigated, on November 12, 1985
the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended
complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It
was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in
the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of damages were specified in
the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered
the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee
covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did
not consider the damages to be merely ancillary or incidental to
the action for recovery of ownership and possession of real
property. 8 An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with
leave of court to include the government of the Republic as
defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and attorneys
fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was
also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for
recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee
for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although the
payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be
insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was
the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had
were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint
superseded the original complaint, the allegations of damages in
the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation
of the filing fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was
possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and
the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and
specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by
considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original
complaint.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a
case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court." 12 Thus, in the
present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can
the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon
the Court. 13 For all legal purposes there is no such original
complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and

all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court
are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case
that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the
amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in
the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation
that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original
complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount
of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78
million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly
intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the
correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the
assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was
compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of
the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through
another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all
mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body
of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of
this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the
amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that
petitioners counsel wrote the damages sought in the much
reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint
but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the
required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a
repetition of this unethical practice.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints,
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 79937-38. February 13, 1989.]
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS AND
D.J. WARBY, Petitioners, v. HON. MAXIMIANO C.
ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO
TIONG, Respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles
Law Offices, for Petitioners.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law
Offices for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
STATUTES; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLIED

RETROSPECTIVELY. Private respondent claims that the
ruling in Manchester (149 SCRA 562) cannot apply
retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the time
said civil case was filed in court there was no such
Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent
avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in
2.
Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this Court held that the

trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the
docket fee paid was insufficient. The contention that
Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is
untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; VESTS IN COURTS
UPON PAYMENT OF THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES. It
is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject- matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
3. ID.; ID.; PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRDPARTY CLAIMS; NOT CONSIDERED FILED UNLESS
PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEE IS PAID. The same rule
applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims
and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered
filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is
paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
4. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FEE REQUIRED
WHERE JUDGMENT AWARDS CLAIM NOT SPECIFIED IN
THE PLEADING. Where the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a
court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and
proper docket fee has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL
for brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium refund on
a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of
its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private
respondent was declared in default for failure to file the required
answer within the reglementary
period.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a
complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the
refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177,
initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B.
Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint
sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory,
moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorneys fees,
expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer
in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought
said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to
be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as
docket fee which prompted petitioners counsel to raise his
objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge
Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case.
Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together
with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under
investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were
transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said
records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled
to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge
Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a
sala which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in
Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in
said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of
deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all
clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket
fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their
pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala

Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issued an
order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate of
assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in
case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer
was filed by petitioners. On August 30, 1984, an amended
complaint was filed by private respondent including the two
additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q- 41177
was thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on
January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the
parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Courts letterreport signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of
this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by
private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to
be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a
"Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a
claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual compensatory
damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended
complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and
compensatory damages and attorneys fees in the total amount
of about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order
admitting the second amended complaint and stating therein
that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution
of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the
Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The
reassessment by the Clerk of Court bases on private
respondents claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual
and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket
fee. This was subsequently paid by private Respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion dated
January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental
complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as
damages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70.
On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the
supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the
additional docket fee of P80,396.00. 1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
ruling, among others, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. L-09715
insofar as it seeks annulment of the order.
(a) denying petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint, as
amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due
course to the portion thereof questioning the reassessment of
the docketing fee, and requiring the Honorable respondent Court
to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent
on the basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00." 2
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the
said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the
additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred
in not finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of non-payment of
the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it
may be true that private respondent had paid the amount of
P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and
considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the
amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the
docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is
P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners
contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents
arising therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory,
petitioner cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester
Development Corporation v. CA, 4 as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi Case in so far it is inconsistent with this pronouncement

is overturned and reversed."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in
Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177
for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no such
Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that
what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v.
Ramolete, 5 wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was
insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this
case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 6
In Lazaro v. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the
payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable
step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry and
detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the case, the
plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited
only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required,
within the reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after
receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional
P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee only fourteen
(14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held that
the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction to hear and
determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.
In Lee v. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of
intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through
registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but
the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5-1/2 months
prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled
that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal
requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one
year before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro,
this Court concluded that the filing of petitioners declaration of
intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the
required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
In Malimit v. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated in Lazaro
and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for quo warranto
contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates which was
mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance,
within the one-week period after the proclamation as provided
therefor by law. 10 However, the required docket fees were paid
only after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this Court
held that the date of such payment must be deemed to be the
real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it
was mailed.
Again, in Garica v. Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule that
the docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition
or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is not
applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of
the same decedent as he is not required to file a separate action
for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the
same special proceeding then pending before the same court.
Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit
and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. Said
case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the
docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint
sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of
the defendant be declared as null and void. It was also prayed
that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper
title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay
monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time
the property is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral
damages, attorneys fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the
costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount of
P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay
the correct amount of the docket fee to which an opposition was
filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for the recovery
of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its
assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 was the correct
docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay
P3,140.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint
to include the Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the
amended complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought was
eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages

as the court may determine, attorneys fees of P100,000.00 and
the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to the
amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the
amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial
court reiterated its order for the payment of the additional
docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then challenged before
this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee in
the amount of P60.00 and that if he had to pay the additional fee
it must be based on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff
may be considered to have filed the case even if the docketing
fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule
that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the
correct amount for the docket fee regardless of the actual date of
the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest difference of
opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that
as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the
docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also
for damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional docket
fee based on the damages alleged in the amended complaint as
against the assessment of the trial court which was based on the
damages alleged in the original complaint.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in
Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts and
damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
during the pendency of the action against the defendants
announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the
plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of such
property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any
judgment that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance
of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of
purchase and sale of the subject property and annual
defendants illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also
prayed that the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff, jointly
and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as
well as 25% of said amounts as may be proved during the trial
for attorneys fees. The plaintiff also asked the trial court to
declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff
valid and sufficient for purpose of payment, and to make the
injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not
specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint
alleges the total amount of over P78 Million allegedly suffered by
plaintiff.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of
only P410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the action
for specific performance where the amount involved is not
capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from
the allegation of the complaint as well as its designation that the
action was one for damages and specific performance. Thus, this
court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct docket fee
computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million,
although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the
complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court,
filed a amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by the
inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention of
the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer
in the original complaint was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of
the docket fee in the said case and other cases that were
investigated. On November 12, 1985 the trial court directed the
plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts
which they were asking for. This plaintiff did as instructed. In the
body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged was
reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was
specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed
only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for
the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint
thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes
they was no such original complaint duly filed which could be
amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended
complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by
the trial court were declared null and void. 13
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several
cases of under-assessment of docket fee which were investigated
by this Court together with Manchester. The facts and
circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester. In the body
of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought
amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of
damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund
of the premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment with damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid
for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed
an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he
be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and
exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount
of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said
amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent
was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on
his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he
paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental
complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in
damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70.
On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional
docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision
of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private
respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket
fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the
promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private
respondent paid an additional docket fee on P62,132.92.
Although private respondent appears to have paid a total
amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total
amount of this claim in the amended and supplemental
complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists
that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the
present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the
government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the
filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second
amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional
docket fee until the case was decided by this Court on May 7,
1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the
government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could
not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was
null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is
called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private
respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation
of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering
influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional
docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his
change for stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such
additional docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was
paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim.
This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or
his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should
determine and, thereafter, it any amount is found due, he must
require the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable
time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the
filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed
filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left
for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy
to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee.chanrobles.com:cralaw:nad
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess
and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by
private respondent considering the total amount of the claim
sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint
as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof
and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any,

without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Corts, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 85879. September 29, 1989.]
NG SOON, Petitioner, v. HON. ALOYSIUS ALDAY, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BILLIE GAN AND CHINA
BANKING CORPORATION, Respondents.
Braulio R.G. Tansinsin for Petitioner.
Augusto Gatmaytan for private respondent Billie T. Gan.
Del Rosario, Lim, Telan, De Vera & Vigilia for China
Banking Corp.
SYLLABUS
1. REMDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; LEGAL FEES; DAMAGES

CONSIDERED IN THE ASSESSMENT OF FILING FEES.
Manchester laid down the rule that all Complaints should specify
the amount of damages prayed for not only in the body of the
complaint but also in the prayer; that said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case; and
that any pleading that fails to comply with such requirement
shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall, otherwise, be
expunged from the record.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO STATE EXACT AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEYS FEES DOES NOT NEGATE COMPUTATION OF
AMOUNT OF DOCKET FEE PAYABLE. While it may be that the
body of petitioners Complaint below was silent as to the exact
amount of moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees,
the prayer did specify the amount of not less than P50,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages, and not less than P50,000.00 as
attorneys fees. These amounts were definite enough and
enabled the Clerk of Court of the lower Court to compute the
docket fees payable. The amounts claimed need not be initially
stated with mathematical precision. The same Rule 141, Section
5(a) (3rd paragraph), allows an appraisal "more or less."cralaw
virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO STATE RATE OF INTEREST DEMANDED,
NOT FATAL. The failure to state the rate of interest demanded
was not fatal not only because it is the Courts which ultimately
fix the same, but also because Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the
Rules of Court, itemizing the filing fees, speaks of "the sum
claimed, exclusive of interest." This clearly implies that the
specification of the interest rate is not that indispensable.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FILING FEES SUBJECT TO ADJUSTMENT. There is
merit in petitioners claim that the third paragraph of Rule 141,
Section 5(a) clearly contemplates a situation where an amount is
alleged or claimed in the complaint but is less or more than what
is later proved. If what is proved is less than what was claimed,
then a refund will be made; if more, additional fees will be
exacted. Otherwise stated, what is subject to adjustment is the
difference in the fee and not the whole amount" (Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corp., et als., v. Court of Appeals, et als., G.R. No.
76119, April 10, 1989).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING IN PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEE, RELAXED;
PAYMENT WITHIN REASONABLE TIME, NOW ALLOWED. In the
case of Sun Insurance Office Ltd., Et Al., v. Hon. Maximiano
Asuncion Et. Al. (G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989), this
Court had already relaxed the Manchester rule when it held, inter
alia,: "1. it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period."cralaw virtua1aw library
6. ID.; SUPREME COURT; NOT A TRIER OF FACTS. In respect of
the questioned identity of petitioner, this is properly a matter
falling within the competence of the Court a quo, this Court not
being a trier of facts.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
"She prays for such other and further relief to which she may be
entitled in law and equity under the premises." [Emphasis
supplied] (pp. 11-13, Rollo).
For the filing of the above Complaint, petitioner paid the sum of
P3,600.00 as docket fees.
Applying literally the ruling on docket fees enunciated in

Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (L75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562), respondent Judge, on 11
August 1988, ordered (1) that petitioners Complaint below (in
Civil Case No. Q-52489), for reconstitution of a savings account,
and payment of damages and attorneys fees, be expunged; and
(2) that the case be dismissed. He also denied, on 21 October
1988, the reconsideration sought by petitioner of that Order.
Respondent Billie Gan and the Bank, respectively, moved for the
dismissal of the Complaint. Subsequently, respondent Gan,
joined by the Bank, moved to expunge the said Complaint from
the record for alleged non-payment of the required docket fees.
The aforementioned savings account was allegedly maintained

with the China Banking Corporation (CBC) by Gan Bun Yaw, both
of whom are respondents herein. Petitioner, Ng Soon, claims to
be the latters widow.
"It can thus be seen that while it can be considered at best as

impliedly specifying the amount (namely, P900,000.00, more or
less) of what is referred to in its par. 11 as missing money
(which apparently is the main part of the alleged actual
damages), the body of the complaint does not specify the
following, to wit: the amount of the rest of the alleged actual
damages; the amount of the alleged moral damages; the amount
of the alleged exemplary damages; and, the amount of the
alleged attorneys fees . As regards the alleged attorneys fees,
in particular, the clause the amount equivalent to twenty
percent payable to her is vague and indefinite. It leaves to
guesswork the determination of the exact amount relative to
which the twenty percent shall be reckoned. Is it the amount of
P900,000.00, more or less? Or is it the total amount of all the
actual damages? Or is it the grand total amount of all the
damages actual, moral, and exemplary payable to her?
The pertinent portions of the Complaint and Prayer read as

"2. During his lifetime, Mr. Gan Bun Yaw opened Savings Account
No. 17591-2 with CBC wherein he deposited P900,000.00 more
or less.
"3. Before his death on January 3, 1987 he lapsed into a coma
until he finally took his last breath. But his passbook still showed
a deposit of P900,000.00 more or less.
x
"5. For almost three (3) long years, she looked for the deposit
passbook with the help of her children to no avail.
x
"7. She discovered further that aforesaid savings account was

closed by defendant CBC on December 8, 1988. . . .
"8. She discovered finally that defendant Billie T. Gan connived
and colluded with the officers and officials of CBC to withdraw all
of the aforesaid savings account of Mr. Gan Bun Yaw by forging
his signature. This has to be done because Mr. Gan Bun Yaw
slipped into a comatose condition in the hospital and could not
sign any withdrawal slip.
x
"11. Due to the wanton and unfounded refusal and failure of

defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she suffered
actual damages in the form of missing money in aforesaid
savings account and expenses of litigation.
"12. Due also to the unfounded and malicious refusal of
defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she suffered
moral damages, the amount whereof she leaves to the discretion
of the Court.
"13. Due likewise to the unfounded and wanton refusal and
failure of defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she
suffered exemplary damages, the amount whereof she leaves to
the discretion of the Court.
"14. Due finally to the unfounded and wanton refusal and failure
of defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she was
constrained to hire the services of counsel, binding herself to pay
the amount equivalent to twenty percent payable to her, thereby
suffering to the tune thereof.
PRAYER
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that this Honorable
Court render judgment:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
On 11 August 1988, respondent Judge issued the questioned

Order granting the "Motion to Expunge Complaint." He
explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As regards the prayer of the complaint, while it may be

regarded as specific enough as to the principal sum of
P900,000.00 as actual damages, it cannot be so regarded with
respect to the amount of moral and exemplary damages (No. 2
of the prayer) and attorneys fees (No. 3 of the prayer); for,
evidently, the phrase not less than P50,000.00 in each of Nos. 2
and 3 of the prayer merely fixes the minimum amount, but it
does not mean that plaintiff is not praying for an unspecified sum
much higher than said minimum. And, again, the clause
equivalent to twenty percent of all amounts reconstituted or
payable to her in No. 3 of the prayer is as vague and indefinite
as the similar clause found in the complaints body referred to
earlier. What exactly is the amount relative to which the twenty
percent shall be determined? Is it the amount of P900,000.00,
more or less? Or is it the total amount of all the actual damages?
Or is it the grand total amount of all the damages actual,
moral, and exemplary payable to her? Certainly, the great
difference between any of these amounts, on the one hand, and
the amount of P50,000.00 in the phrase not less than
P50,000.00 in No. 3 of the prayer, on the other hand, is quite too
obvious to need underscoring.
"Needless to state, implicit in the obligation to specify is the duty
to be clear and definite. A purported specification which is vague
and indefinite obviously is no specification at all; indeed, it will
serve no purpose other than to evade the payment of the correct
filing fees by misleading the docket clerk in the assessment of
the filing fees.
x
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants defendants aforesaid

MOTION TO EXPUNGE COMPLAINT and hereby denies plaintiffs
aforesaid URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION (ETC.) and OPPOSITION
(ETC.) inclusive of all the prayers contained therein and,
accordingly, plaintiffs complaint herein is hereby deemed
EXPUNGED from the record. Further, being rendered moot and
academic as a result hereof, defendant Billie T. Gans MOTION
TO DISMISS dated April 25, 1988 and defendant China Banking
Corporations MOTION TO DISMISS dated May 25, 1988 are
hereby dismissed." (pp. 16-18, Rollo)
Petitioners Motion for the reconsideration of the said Order
having been denied, she asks for its review, more properly for a
Writ of Certiorari.
"1. Ordering defendants China Banking Corporation to

reconstitute Savings Account No. 47591-2 in the name of Mr. Gan
Bun Yaw in the amount of P900,000.00 with interest from
December 8, 1977 or ordering them both to pay her the principal
and interest from December 9, 1977, jointly and severally.
The Petition is anchored on two grounds, namely:chanrob1es

virtual 1aw library
"2. Ordering both defendants to pay moral and exemplary

damages of not less than P50,000.00.
2. Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when

he ordered the Complaint expunged from the record although
petitioner had paid the necessary filing fees.
"3. Ordering both defendants to pay her attorneys fees

equivalent to twenty percent of all amounts reconstituted or
payable to her, but not less than P50,000.00.
1. The doctrine laid down in the Manchester case was incorrectly

applied by respondent Judge; and
During the pendency of this case, respondent Gan filed a

Manifestation alleging, among others, that petitioner is an
impostor and not the real Ng Soon, wife of Gan Bun Yaw, since
the real Mrs. Gan Bun Yaw (Ng Soon) died on 29 July 1933, as
shown by a Certificate issued on 27 April 1989 by, and bearing
the seal of, the An Hai Municipal Government.
This allegation was, however, denied by petitioner in her "Surrejoinder to Manifestation" filed on 12 August 1989, to which
respondent Gan has countered with a Reply on 9 September
1989.
We resolved to give due course to the Petition and dispensed
with the submittal of Memoranda, the issues having been
thoroughly threshed out by the parties.
Upon the facts, the pleadings, and the law, we grant the Petition.
It is true that Manchester laid down the rule that all Complaints
should specify the amount of damages prayed for not only in the
body of the complaint but also in the prayer; that said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case; and that any pleading that fails to comply with such
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall,
otherwise, be expunged from the record.
While it may be that the body of petitioners Complaint below
was silent as to the exact amount of moral and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees, the prayer did specify the amount
of not less than P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
and not less than P50,000.00 as attorneys fees. These amounts
were definite enough and enabled the Clerk of Court of the lower
Court to compute the docket fees payable.
Similarly, the principal amount sought to be recovered as
"missing money" was fixed at P900,000.00. The failure to state
the rate of interest demanded was not fatal not only because it is
the Courts which ultimately fix the same, but also because Rule
141, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court, itemizing the filing fees,
speaks of "the sum claimed, exclusive of interest." This clearly
implies that the specification of the interest rate is not that
indispensable.
Factually, therefore, not everything was left to "guesswork" as
respondent Judge has opined. The sums claimed were
ascertainable, sufficient enough to allow a computation pursuant
to Rule 141, section 5(a).
Furthermore, contrary to the position taken by respondent Judge,
the amounts claimed need not be initially stated with
mathematical precision. The same Rule 141, section 5(a) (3rd
paragraph), allows an appraisal "more or less."
Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is
less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the
difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may
be."cralaw virtua1aw library
In other words, a final determination is still to be made by the
Court, and the fees ultimately found to be payable will either be
additionally paid by the party concerned or refunded to him, as
the case may be. The above provision clearly allows an initial
payment of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated
amount of the claim subject to adjustment as to what later may
be proved.
". . . there is merit in petitioners claim that the third paragraph
of Rule 141, Section 5(a) clearly contemplates a situation where
an amount is alleged or claimed in the complaint but is less or
more than what is later proved. If what is proved is less than
what was claimed, then a refund will be made; if more, additional
fees will be exacted. Otherwise stated, what is subject to
adjustment is the difference in the fee and not the whole
amount" (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., et als., v. Court of
Appeals, et als., G.R. No. 76119, April 10, 1989).
Significantly, too, the pattern in Manchester to defraud the
Government of the docket fee due, the intent not to pay the
same having been obvious not only in the filing of the original
complaint but also in the filing of the second amended
complaint, is patently absent in this case. Petitioner
demonstrated her willingness to abide by the Rules by paying
the assessed docket fee of P3,600.00. She had also asked the
lower Court to inform her of the deficiency, if any, but said Court
did not heed her plea.
Additionally, in the case of Sun Insurance Office Ltd., Et Al., v.
Hon. Maximiano Asuncion Et. Al. (G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February
13, 1989), this Court had already relaxed the Manchester rule
when it held, inter alia,:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate

beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period"
(Emphasis ours).
In respect of the questioned identity of petitioner, this is properly
a matter falling within the competence of the Court a quo, this
Court not being a trier of facts.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of respondent Judge, dated 11
August 1988 and 21 October 1988, are SET ASIDE, and he is
hereby directed to reinstate Civil Case No. Q-52489 for
determination and proper disposition of the respective claims
and rights of the parties, including the controversy as to the real
identity of petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 88075-77. December 20, 1989.]
MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA
NOEL, Petitioners, v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM,
Davao del Norte, Branches 1 and 2, Presided by Hon.
Marcial Fernandez and Hon. Jesus Matas, respectively,
PATSITA GAMUTAN, Clerk of Court, and GODOFREDO
PINEDA, Respondents.
Eduardo C. De Vera for petitioners.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; REAL ACTIONS

COMMENCED AND PROSECUTED WITHOUT AN ACCOMPANYING
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES; WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE, ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. The actions in
the case at bar are principally for recovery of possession of real
property, in the nature of an accion publiciana. Determinative of
the courts jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature
thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or
connected with the issue of title or possession, and regardless of
the value of the property. Quite obviously, an action for recovery
of possession of real property (such as an accion plenaria de
posesion) or the title thereof, or for partition or condemnation of,
or the foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real property in other
words, a real action may be commenced and prosecuted
without an accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or
exemplary damages; and such an action would fall within the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
2. ID.; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129; EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; SCOPE. Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over "all civil
actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts." The rule applies
regardless of the value of the real property involved, whether it
be worth more than P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule also
applies even where the complaint involving realty also prays for
an award of damages; the amount of those damages would be
immaterial to the question of the Courts jurisdiction. The rule is
unlike that in other cases e.g., actions simply for recovery of
money or of personal property, or actions in admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction in which the amount claimed, or the
value of the personal property, is determinative of jurisdiction;
i.e., the value of the personal property or the amount claimed
should exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in order to
be cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
3. ID.; SUPREME COURT NO. 7; PURPOSE. Circular No. 7 was
aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from the prayer
of their complaints "any specification of the amount of
damages," the omission being "clearly intended for no other
purposes than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if
not to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing
fee."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; TRIAL COURT AUTHORIZED TO ALLOW PAYMENT OF
FILING FEES WITHIN PRESCRIPTIVE OF REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.
The requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions,
answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading
but also in the prayer, has not been altered by the clarification
and additional rules paid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion, G.R. No.s 79937-38, February 13, 1989. What has been
revised is the rule that subsequent "amendment of the complaint
or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount
sought in the amended pleading," the trial court now being
authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHERE JUDGMENT AWARDS A CLAIM NOT
SPECIFIED IN THE PLEADING. A new rule has been added,
governing awards of claims not specified in the pleading i.e.,
damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment.
6. ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF MONEY OR DAMAGES;
AMOUNT CLAIMED MUST BE SPECIFIED NOT ONLY IN THE BODY
OF THE PLEADING BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER. Where the action
is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees
are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed,
exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint
or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this
Court, "specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only
in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees
in any case."cralaw virtua1aw library
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES WHERE NO AMOUNT BEING CLAIMED IS
SPECIFIED OR FEES PAID ARE INSUFFICIENT. Where the
complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money
or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts
being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will "not
be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from
the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be
dismissed, or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified
may be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on
motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the
fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become timebarred. The other is where the pleading does specify the amount
of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again,
the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for
the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and
upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may
properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime
prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of
action.
8. ID.; COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER ACTION OF
ACCOMPANIED BY REQUISITE FEES ON REAL ACTIONS WITH
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES. Where the action involves real property
and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be
assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and
(b) the total amount of related damages sought. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory
pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees,
or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the
pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such
reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime.
9. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO SPECIFY AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BEING
CLAIMED NOT FATAL; PROPER REMEDY THEREFOR. When
the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have
been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages
(actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified,
the action may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has
jurisdiction over the action involving the real property, acquiring
it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and
payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that
authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the accompanying claims or damages because
of lack of specification thereof. What should be done is simply to
expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are
stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on
motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints
so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and
accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant
prescriptive period.
RESOLUTION
NARVASA, J.:
In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte, 1 three (3)
actions for recovery of possession (acciones publicianas 2) were
separately instituted by Godofredo Pineda against three (3)
defendants, docketed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1) v. Antonia Noel Civil Case No. 2209

2) v. Ponciano Panes Civil Case No. 2210
3) v. Maximo Tacay Civil Case No. 2211.
Civil Cases Numbered 2209 and 2211 were raffled to Branch I of
the Trial Court, presided over by Judge Marcial Hernandez. Civil
No. 2210 was assigned to Branch 2, presided over by Judge Jesus
Matas.
The complaints 3 all alleged the same essential facts: (1) Pineda
was the owner of a parcel of land measuring 790 square meters,
his ownership being evidenced by TCT No. T-46560; (2) the
previous owner had allowed the defendants to occupy portions of
the land by mere tolerance; (3) having himself need to use the
property, Pineda had made demands on the defendants to
vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefor, but
these demands had been refused; and (4) the last demand had
been made more than a year prior to the commencement of suit.
The complaints prayed for the same reliefs, to wit:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
1) that plaintiff be declared owner of the areas occupied by the
defendants;
2) that defendants and their "privies and allies" be ordered to
vacate and deliver the portions of the land usurped by them;
3) that each defendant be ordered to pay:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1) P2,000 as monthly rents from February, 1987;
2) "Actual damages, as proven;
3) "Moral and nominal damages as the Honorable Court may fix;"
4
4) "P30,000.00, "as attorneys fees, and representation fees of
P5,000.00 per day of appearance;"
and
4) that he (Pineda) be granted such "further relief and remedies .
. .just and equitable in the premises."cralaw virtua1aw library
The prayer of each complaint contained a handwritten notation
(evidently made by plaintiffs counsel) reading, "P5,000.00 as
and for," immediately above the typewritten words, "Actual
damages, as proven," the intention apparently being to make the
entire phrase read, "5,000.00 as and for actual damages as
proven." 5
Motions to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the defendants
by common counsel. 6 Every motion alleged that the Trial Court
had not acquired jurisdiction of the case
". . . for the reason that the . . . complaint violates the mandatory
and clear provision of Circular No. 7 of the . . . Supreme Court
dated March 24, 1988, by failing to specify all the amounts of
damages which plaintiff is claiming from defendant;" and.
". . . for . . . failure (of the complaint) to even allege the basic
requirement as to the assessed value of the subject lot in
dispute."cralaw virtua1aw library
Judge Matas denied the motion to dismiss filed in Civil Case No.
2210 but ordered the expunction of the "allegations in paragraph
11 of the . . . complaint regarding moral as well as nominal
damages." 7 On motion of defendant Panes, Judge Matas later
ordered the striking out, too, of the "handwritten amount of
P5,000.00 as and for, including the typewritten words actual
damages as proven . . . in sub-paragraph b of paragraph 4 in the
conclusion and prayer of the complaint . . .." 8
The motions to dismiss submitted in Civil Cases Numbered 2211
and 2209 were also denied in separate orders promulgated by
Judge Marcial Fernandez. 9 His Order in Case No. 2209 dated
March 15, 1989 (a) declared that since the "action at bar is for
Reivindicatoria, Damages and Attorneys fees . . . (d)efinitely this
Court has the exclusive jurisdiction," (b) that the claims for
actual, moral and nominal damages "are only one aspect of the
cause of action," and (c) because of absence of specification of
the amounts claimed as moral, nominal and actual damages,
they should be "expunged from the records."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to both Judges Matas and
Fernandez in the rendition of the Orders above described, the
defendants in all three (3) actions have filed with this Court a
"Joint Petition" for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with
prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction," praying essentially that said orders be

annulled and respondent judges directed to dismiss all the
complaints "without prejudice to private respondent Pinedas refiling a similar complaint that complies with Circular No. 7." The
joint petition (a) re-asserted the proposition that because the
complaints had failed to state the amounts being claimed as
actual, moral and nominal damages, the Trial Courts a quo had
not acquired jurisdiction over the three (3) actions in question
indeed, the respondent Clerk of Court should not have accepted
the complaints which initiated said suits, and (b) it was not
proper merely to expunge the claims for damages and allow "the
so-called cause of action for reivindicatoria to remain for trial"
by itself. 10
The joint petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
It should be dismissed for failure to comply with this Courts
Circular No. 1-88 (effective January 1, 1989). The copies of the
challenged Orders thereto attached 11 were not certified by the
proper Clerk of Court or his duly authorized representative.
Certification was made by the petitioners counsel, which is not
allowed.
The petition should be dismissed, too, for another equally
important reason. It fails to demonstrate any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent Judges in rendering the
Orders complained of or, for that matter, the existence of any
proper cause for the issuance of the writ of mandamus. On the
contrary, the orders appear to have correctly applied the law to
the admitted facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being
claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages. It is also true,
however, that the actions are not basically for the recovery of
sums of money. They are principally for recovery of possession of
real property, in the nature of an accion publiciana.
Determinative of the courts jurisdiction in this type of actions is
the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly
arising from or connected with the issue of title or possession,
and regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously, an
action for recovery of possession of real property (such as an
accion plenaria de posesion) or the title thereof, 12 or for
partition or condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage
on, said real property 13 in other words, a real action may
be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim
for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an
action would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.cralawnad
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over "all
civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry
into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts."
14 The rule applies regardless of the value of the real property
involved, whether it be worth more than P20,000.00 or not, infra.
The rule also applies even where the complaint involving realty
also prays for an award of damages; the amount of those
damages would be immaterial to the question of the Courts
jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases e.g., actions
simply for recovery of money or of personal property, 15 or
actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 16 in which the
amount claimed, 17 or the value of the personal property, is
determinative of jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the personal
property or the amount claimed should exceed twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court.
Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus
be invoked, as the petitioner does, as authority for the dismissal
of the actions at bar. That circular, avowedly inspired by the
doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (May 7, 1987), has but limited
application to said actions, as shall presently be discussed.
Moreover, the rules therein laid down have since been clarified
and amplified by the Courts subsequent decision in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, Et Al., G.R. Nos. 7993738, February 13, 1989.
Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who
omit from the prayer of their complaints "any specification of the
amount of damages," the omission being "clearly intended for no
other purposes than to evade the payment of the correct filing
fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the
filing fee." The following rules were therefore set
down:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only
in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees
in any case.
2. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall
not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record.
3. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
amount sought in the amended pleading.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd v. Asuncion, supra, read as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
initiatory pleading, but (also) the payment of the prescribed
docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no ease beyond the applicable prescriptive or
specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that
complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not been altered.
What has been revised is the rule that subsequent "amendment
of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amount sought in the amended pleading," the trial
court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has
been added, governing awards of claims not specified in the
pleading i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint
or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed
on the basis of the "sum claimed," on the one hand, or the "value
of the property in litigation or the value of the estate," on the
other. 18 There are, in other words, as already above intimated,
actions or proceedings involving real property, in which the value
of the property is immaterial to the courts jurisdiction, account
thereof being taken merely for assessment of the legal fees; and
there are actions or proceedings, involving personal property or
the recovery of money and/or damages, in which the value of the
property or the amount of the demand is decisive of the trial
courts competence (aside from being the basis for fixing the
corresponding docket fees). 19
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or
damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the
aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs.
In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should, according
to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar
pleading sets out a claim purely for money or damages and there
is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In this
event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record." In
other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the
claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be
expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion,
permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees
provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred.
The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of
every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again,
the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for
the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and
upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may
properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime
prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of
action.
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for
damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of
both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of
related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the
action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by
the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at
the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full
payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court
may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the
meantime. But where as in the case at bar the fees
prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid,
but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual, moral
and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may
not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the
action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of
the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed
fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance
that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying
claims or damages because of lack of specification thereof. What
should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages
as to which no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent
Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the
amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount
of each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite
fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement
as to costs.
Fernan (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Corts, GrioAquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 88421. January 30, 1990.]
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PIAS VENTURES, INC., AND
FILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioners, v.
THE HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL
REGION, BRANCH 145 and THE SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA.
MARLENE SABIO, Respondents.
Renato L. De la Fuente, for Petitioners.
Camilo L. Sabio for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WITH DAMAGES;

ADDITIONAL FILING FEE CONSTITUTE A LIEN ON THE JUDGMENT
WHEN DAMAGES AROSE AFTER THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.
The trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling
of this Court wherein it is stated that "where the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the
same has been left for the determination of the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body and
prayer of the complaint there is a prayer, say for exemplary or
corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion
of the Court, there is no need to specify the amount being
sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute a lien on
the judgment.
2. ID.; ID.; RULE IN THE PROPER DETERMINATION OF THE
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES. In the latest case of Tacay v. Regional
Trial Court of Tagum, this Court had occasion to make the
clarification that the phrase "awards of claims not specified in
the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after the filing of
the complaint or similar pleading . . . . as to which the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The
amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before
the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be specified.
While it is true that the determination of certain damages as
exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion
of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages
to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court
may make a proper determination, and for the proper
assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception
contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although
specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to

any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to
specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
3. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO STATE THE PRECISE AMOUNT
OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL
COMPLAINT. The amended and supplemental complaint in the
present case, therefore, suffers from the material defect in failing
to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for. As ruled
in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be
expunged from the record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over
the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time,
the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so
as to state the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought
and require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the
relevant prescriptive period.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Once more the issue relating to the payment of filing fees in an

action for specific performance with damages is presented by
this petition for prohibition.
Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific
performance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower
court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case as private
respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee and to
specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the body and
prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint. The trial
court denied the motion in an order dated April 5, 1989. A
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise
denied in an order dated May 18, 1989. Hence this
petition.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent paid
only the total amount of P1,616.00 as docket fees instead of the
amount of P13,061.35 based on the assessed value of the real
properties involved as evidenced by its tax declaration. Further,
petitioners contend that private respondents failed to specify the
amount of exemplary damages sought both in the body and the
prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint.
In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals 1 a
similar case involving an action for specific performance with
damages, this Court held that the docket fee should be assessed
by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original
complaint.
However, the contention of petitioners is that since the action
concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof should be
considered in computing the fees pursuant to Section 5, Rule 141
of the Rules of Court. Such rule cannot apply to this case which is
an action for specific performance with damages although it is in
relation to a transaction involving real estate. Pursuant to
Manchester, the amount of the docket fees to be paid should be
computed on the basis of the amount of damages stated in the
complaint.
Petitioners also allege that because of the failure of the private
respondents to state the amount of exemplary damages being
sought, the complaint must nevertheless be dismissed in
accordance to Manchester. The trial court denied the motion
stating that the determination of the exemplary damages is
within the sound discretion of the court and that it would be
unwarrantedly presumptuous on the part of the private
respondents to fix the amount of exemplary damages being
prayed for. The trial court cited the subsequent case of Sun
Insurance v. Judge Asuncion 2 in support of its ruling.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance
are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
initiatory pleading, but (also) the payment of the prescribed
docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or

specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left
Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the
above ruling of this Court wherein it is stated that "where the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified, the same has been left for the determination of the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body
and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer, say for exemplary
or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the
discretion of the Court, there is no need to specify the amount
being sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute a
lien on the judgment.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
In the latest case of Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, 3 this
Court had occasion to make the clarification that the phrase
"awards of claims not specified in the pleading" refers only to
"damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading . . . . as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment." The amount of any claim for
damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the
complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it is true
that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or
corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it
is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the
amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a
proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the
appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to
claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for
determination of the court is limited only to any damages that
may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for
then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor
speculate as to the amount thereof.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case,
therefore, suffers from the material defect in failing to state the
amount of exemplary damages prayed for.
As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be
expunged from the record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over
the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time,
the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so
as to state the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought
and require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the
relevant prescriptive period. 4
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The trial court is directed
either to expunge from the record the claim for exemplary
damages in the amended and supplemental complaint, the
amount of which is not specified, or it may otherwise, upon
motion, give reasonable time to private respondents to amend
their pleading by specifying its amount and paying the
corresponding docketing fees within the appropriate
reglementary or prescriptive period. No costs.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
and unpaid rent in the sum of P6,278.68, as well as for rent

which may have become due during the period between the
filing of the complaint and the execution of the judgment to be
rendered, together with the costs and the sum of P2,000 for
attorney's fees. The defendant's amended answer denies that he
has breached the contract and sets up a counterclaim in the sum
of P2,051.52 for money advanced to the plaintiff in excess of the
rent due under the contract.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the
rescission of the lease, for the unpaid balance of the rent for the
agricultural year 1920-1921 in the sum of P5,949.28, with
interest from August 26, 1922, the date of the filing of the
complaint, and for the rent for the agricultural year 1922-1923,
with costs. From this judgment the defendant appeals to this
court.
The decision turns upon the interpretation of the contract in
question which was executed on August 2, 1920, and which
reads as follows:
Este contrato de arrendamiento es sostenido por una
parte por la arrendadora D.a Josefina Rubio, Viuda de
Larena, duena y propietaria de la Hacienda Tacgajan,
ubicada en este Municipio de Bais, Negros Oriental, I. F.,
y por otra parte por los arrendatarios Hermenegildo
Villanueva y Mateo Montenegro, todos mayores de edad
y vecinos de este municipio, con capacidad legal para
contratar y otorgar el presente contrato de
arrendamiento, y solemnemente manifiestan que de
comun acuerdo pactan lo siguiente:
1. Que D.a Josefina Rubio, Vda. de Larena, cede en
arriendo a los Sres. Hermenegildo Villanueva y Mateo
Montenegro por un periodo consecutivo de cinco aos, o
sea, cinco cosechas completas, su hacienda cana dulce
denominada Tacgajan con todos sus terrenos, edificios,
mejoras, tranvia, ganado de labor, cerros, aperos de
labranza y demas implementos agricolas, especificado
todo en el inventario que se acompanara a la presente
escritura, incluyendo todas las siembras existentes asi
como una parcela de terreno, o sea la parte de que la
arrendadora es propietaria situada al lado del riachuelo
que circunda la Hacienda Tacgajan. No se entiende
incluidos en este contrato la tractora, huerta y
cementerio.
2. Que los Sres. Hermenegildo Villanueva y Mateo
Montenegro aceptan este contrato bajo el pago anual
de ocho mil pesos (P8,000) pagando cada cual la parte
que le corresponde, o sea cuatro mil pesos (P4,000) que
paga Mateo Motenegro, y cuatro mil pesos (P4,000)
Hermenegildo Villanueva, ambos se entenderan
directamente con la arrendadora.
3. La duracion de este contrato sera de cinco aos o
sea cinco cosechas completas, contando con la cosecha
actual de 1920-1921, hasta la cosecha de 1925-1926.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21706
March 26, 1924
JOSEFINA RUBIO VDA. DE LARENA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HERMENEGILDO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Del Rosario and Del Rosario for appellant.
Francisco Zialcita for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
This action is brought by a lessor against her lessee for the
rescission of the contract of lease on the ground that the lessee
has violated the terms of the contract by failing to pay the rent
therein specified. The plaintiff also asks judgment for overdue
4. Inmediatamente despues de firmado el presente

contrato, la arrendadora dara posesion a los
arrendatarios de la Hacienda libre de toda carga y
gravamen, haciendose estos cargo de todas las cosas
inventariadas con la obligacion de cuidarlas con la
diligencia conveniente y devolverlas a la arrendadora, a
la expiracion del arriendo tal como han sido recibidas,
excepto aquellas cosas que por deterioro natural hiciera
inutil todo esfuerzo que los arrendatarios emplearen por
conservarlas, pero los referidos arrendatarios seran sin
embargo responsables de la reposicion de todo ganado
mayor de labor incluido en el inventario, despues de
que han sido asegurados inmediatamente bajo la Ley de
Seguros de Animales de Labor.
5. Los arrendatarios respetaran el contrato que la
arrendadora tiene con la central como si la Hacienda
Tacgajan continuara en poder de ella. Asimismo
permitiran a la continuacion en sus respectivas
aparcerias a D. a Agueda Somosa y Demetrio Larena.
6. Los arrendatarios no podran transpasar sus derechos

de tales sin el consentimiento de la arrendadora.
7. Todas las mejoras permanentes que dejaren los
arrendatarios a la expiracion del presente contrato
quedaran en beneficio de la Hacienda a libre disposicion
de la arrendadora D.a Josefina.
8. El incumplimiento de cualquiera de las dos partes
contratantes dara derecho a la otra a la rescision del
presente contrato.
Asi han convenido y pactado todas las partes
contratantes que firman el presente contrato con las
copias necesarias para cada interesado.
Subsequently to the execution of the contract quoted, the
defendant, with the consent of the plaintiff, assumed the
obligations of Mateo Montenegro under the lease.
It will be noted that paragraph 3 of the contract contains an
apparent contradiction inasmuch as it fixes the term of the
contract at "five years, that is to say, five complete crops,
beginning with the present crop 1920-1921 until the crop of
1925-1926." It may also be noted that the land in question is
used for the cultivation of sugar cane and the years are counted
by agricultural years and not by calendar years. If the duration of
the lease is for five annual crops, beginning with the crop of
1920-1921, the term will expire with the crop of 1924-1925 and
not with the crop of 1925-1926. The plaintiff maintains that the
number of crops control in computing the term of the lease and
that the insertion of the figures "1925-1926" in the third
paragraph of the lease is due to a miscalculation and should read
"1924-1925."
It is conceded that sugar cane requires at least fourteen months
from the time of planting for its full development, so that cane
planted in the fall of 1920 would not be ready for harvest until in
the last month of 1921 and the early part of 1922. It is also fully
established that the crop of 1920-1921 on the land in question
was a ratoon crop (sprout or second growth). The defendant
therefor contends that this crop was not a complete crop and
therefore not the kind of crop referred to in the contract of lease;
that the first complete crop was that planted by him immediately
after the execution of the contract in the fall of 1920 and which
was harvested in 1921-1922; and that he therefore should not be
required to pay rent for the agricultural year which embraces the
crop of 1920.
We agree with the trial court that the defendant's position is
untenable. As stated, if his interpretation of the contract were
adopted, the plaintiff would receive no rent for the agricultural
year 1920-1921 and we cannot assume that she would have paid
the taxes on the property for that year and still have allowed the
defendant to use the land, including machinery, tools, work
animals, etc., and to carry off the crop without any compensation
whatever to her.
It may well be conceded that the ratoon crop was not as valuable
as a first crop after planting would have been, but the testimony
of the plaintiff, as well as of the witnesses Montenegro, the
defendant's original cotenant under the lease, shows that in the
fall of 1920 the crop in question was estimated at from 2,000 to
3,000 piculs. The lower court also found as a fact that in the
same year sugar sold at P45 per picul. The plaintiff's estimate of
the yield is probably exaggerated; the defendant testifies to a
much lower figure and the mill receipts presented by him in
evidence indicate that the crop actually harvested amounted to
899.27 piculs, of which he was entitled to one-half and which
was sold at only P16 per picul. But as against the plaintiff's
estimate, it appears that after taking possession of the land he
destroyed a large portion of the ratoon crop by constructing a
road through the cane fields and by taking ratoons for seeds for
another hacienda.
It is therefore safe to suppose that at the time of entering into
the contract the parties had in mind prospects of a yield
considerably greater than that actually obtained and that they
did not at that time foresee the violent decline in the price of
sugar. Taking into consideration that the ratoon crop did not
involve any expense for planting and that it was ready for
harvest within a few months after the execution of the contract,
we may reasonably conclude that the parties considered that the
rental value of the property for the year 1920-1921 would easily
amount to P8,000.
The fact that the defendant paid the plaintiff P4,000 in January,
1921, and another P4,000 in November of the same year,
materially strengthens the plaintiff's contention. The defendant's
explanation that these payments were advances on the rent for
the year 1921-1922 is flatly contradicted by Exhibit E, a letter
written by him to the plaintiff on August 7, 1921, and which
reads as follows:
Sra. JOSEFINA R. VDA. DE LARENA,
MI APRECIABLE PINANG: No tengo inconveniente en
pagar con el arriendo tu cta. con la Tabacalera como son
los deseos pero debe ser de acuerdo con las fechas del
vencimiento que hemos estipulado. Por ejemplo, yo
pagare a la Compaia los 4,000 pesos que tengo que
pagar por el arriendo correspondiente al mes de junio
pasado, arriendo perteneciente al ano 1920 y 1921. Con
respeto al arriendo que corresponde al ano 1922 yo
pagare a la Compaia 4,000 pesos el plazo que
corresponde al mes de noviembre proximo como pago
del primer plazo del arriendo que pertenece a dicho ano
1922 y para junio de 1922 el ultimo pago del arriendo
del mismo ano, y asi sucesivamente.
Solo espero tu aviso para escribar a la Tabacalera.
Dodong esta algo mejor pero es una enfermedad cuya
curacion es lenta.
Ascion y yo le enviamos nuestros afectos.
(Sgd.) "BINDOY"
Considering further the admitted fact that the lease was
prepared by the defendant, or under his direction, and therefore
must be construed in favor of the plaintiff, there can be no
question but that the judgment appealed from is entirely in
conformity with the law and the established facts.
Said judgment is therefor affirmed, with the costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Avancea, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 32958. November 8, 1930. ]
BLOSSOM & COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MANILA
GAS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Harvey & OBrien for Appellant.
Ross, Lawrence & Selph and John B. Miller for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. WHEN FORMER JUDGMENT IS A BAR. In its compliant of
March 3, 1927, plaintiff seeks to recover damages accrued since
November 23, 1923, for a willful breach of a contract for the sale
and delivery of water gas and coal gas tar at stipulated prices,
and for answer defendant alleges that in the former action in the
Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, in which plaintiff here
was the plaintiff, and the defendant here was the defendant, and
founded upon the same cause of action alleged in the complaint
that plaintiff recovered judgment against the defendant on the
merits, decreeing a breach of the same contract and awarding
damages in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of P26,119.08 with
legal interest from November 23, 1923, which judgment became
and is now final. Held, That the judgment which the plaintiff
obtained in the former action founded upon a breach of the same
contract is a bar to this action.
2. ONLY ONE CAUSE OF ACTION WHEN CONTRACT IS ENTIRE.
As a general rule, a contract to do several things at several times
is divisible, and a judgment for a single breach of a continuing

contract is not a bar to a suit for a subsequent breach. But where
the contract is entire, and the breach total, there can be only one
action in which plaintiff must recover all damages.
3. WHEN CONTRACT IS INDIVISIBLE. When the defendant
terminated a continuing contract by absolute refusal in bad faith
to perform, a claim for damages for a breach is an indivisible
demand, and where, as in this case, a former final judgment was
rendered, it is a bar to any damages which plaintiff may
thereafter sustain.
4. WHAT PLAINTIFF SHOULD PROVE. In an indivisible contract
plaintiff should prove in the first action not only such damages as
it has then actually sustained, but also such prospective
damages as it may be legally entitled to recover by reason of the
breach.
STATEMENT
In its complaint filed March 3, 1927, the plaintiff alleges that on
September 10, 1918, it entered into a contract with the
defendant in which the plaintiff promised and undertook to
purchase and receive from the defendant, and the defendant
agreed to sell and deliver to the plaintiff, for a period of four
years, three tons of water gas tar per month from September to
January 1, 1919, and twenty tons per month after January 1,
1919, for the remaining period of the contract; one-half ton of
coal gas tar a month from September to January 1, 1919, and six
tons per month after January 1, 1919, for the remainder of the
contract, delivery to be made at the plant of the defendant in the
City of Manila, without containers, and at the price of P65 per ton
for each kind of gas tar, it being agreed that this price should
prevail only so long as the raw materials coal and crude oil
used by the defendant in the manufacture of gas should cost the
defendant the same price as that prevailing at the time of the
contract, and that in the event of an increase or decrease in the
cost of raw materials, there would be a corresponding increase or
decrease in the price of the tar. That on January 31, 1919, this
contract was amended so that it should continue to remain in
force for a period of ten years from January 1, 1919, and it was
agreed that the plaintiff should not be obliged to take the
quantities of the tars required during the year 1919, but that it
might purchase tars in such quantities as it could use to
advantage at the stipulated price. That after the year 1919, the
plaintiff would take at least the quantities specified in the
contract of September 10, 1918, to be taken from and after
January 1, 1919, and that at its option it would have the right to
take any quantity of water gas tar in excess of the minimum
quantity specified in that contract, and up to the total amount of
output of that tar of defendants plant, and also to take any
quantity of coal gas tar in excess of the minimum quantity
specified in that contract and up to 50 per cent of defendants
entire output of coal gas tar, and that by giving the defendant
ninety days notice, it would have the right at its option to take
the entire output of defendants coal gas tar, except such as it
might need for its own use in and about its plant. That in
consideration of this modification of the contract of September
10, 1918, plaintiff agreed to purchase from the defendant a
certain piece of land lying adjacent to its plant at the price of P5
per square meter, and proof of which is evidenced by Exhibit C.
That pursuant to Exhibit C, defendant sold and conveyed the
land to the plaintiff which in turn executed a mortgage thereon to
the defendant for P17,140.20, to secure the payment of the
balance of the purchase price.
It is then alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"VIII. That about the last part of July, 1920, the defendant herein,
the Manila Gas Corporation, willfully and deliberately breached
its said contract, Exhibit C, with the plaintiff by ceasing to deliver
any coal and water gas tar to it thereunder solely because of the
increased price of its tar products and its desire to secure better
prices therefor than plaintiff was obligated to pay to it,
notwithstanding the frequent and urgent demands made by the
plaintiff upon it to comply with its aforesaid contract by
continuing to deliver the coal and water gas tar to the plaintiff
thereunder, but the said contract, and finally on November 23,
1923, the plaintiff was forced to commence action against the
defendant herein in the Court of First Instance of Manila, being
case No. 25352, of that court, entitled Blossom & Co., Plaintif, v.
Manila Gas Corporation, defendant, to recover the damages
which it had up to that time suffered by reason of such flagrant
violation of said contract on the part of the defendant herein,
and to obtain the specific performance of the said contract, and
after due trial of that action, judgment was entered therein in
favor of the plaintiff herein and against the said defendant, the
Manila Gas Corporation, for the sum of P26,119.08, as the
damages suffered by this plaintiff by the defendants breach of
said contract from July, 1920, up to and including September,
1923, with legal interest thereon from November 23, 1923, and
for the costs but the court refused to order the said defendant to
resume the delivery of the coal and water gas tar to the plaintiff
under said contract, but left the plaintiff with its remedy for
damages against said defendant for the subsequent breaches of
said contract, which said decision, as shown by the copy
attached hereto as Exhibit G, and made a part hereof, was
affirmed by our Supreme Court on March 3, 1926;
"IX. That after the defendant had willfully and deliberately
violated its said contract, as herein-before alleged, and the
plaintiff had suffered great damage by reason thereof, the
plaintiff claimed the right to off-set its damages against the
balance due from it to said defendant on account of the purchase
of said land from the defendant, and immediately thereupon and
notwithstanding said defendant was justly indebted to the
plaintiff at that time, as shown by the judgment of the court,
Exhibit G, in more than four times the amount due to it from the
plaintiff, the said defendant caused to be presented against the
plaintiff a foreclosure action, known as the Manila Gas
Corporation versus Blossom & Company, No. 24267, of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, and obtained judgment therein
ordering that Blossom & Company pay the last installment and
interest due on said land or else the land and improvements
placed thereon by the plaintiff would be sold, as provided by law
in such cases of satisfy the same, and the said defendant
proceeded with the sale of said property under said judgment
and did everything in its power to sell the same for the sole
purpose of crushing and destroying the plaintiffs business and
thus rendering it impossible for the plaintiff herein to continue
with its said contract in the event that said defendant might in
the future consider it more profitable to resume performance of
the same, but fortunately the plaintiff was able to redeem its
property, as well as to comply with its contract, and continued
demanding that the defendant performed its said contract and
deliver to it the coal and water gas tar required thereby."cralaw
virtua1aw library
That the defendant made no deliveries under its contract, Exhibit
C, from July, 1920, to March 26, 1926, or until after the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court for damages in
the sum of P26,119.08. 1
It is then alleged that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . On March 26, 1926, the said defendant offered to resume
delivery to the plaintiff from that date of the minimum monthly
quantities of tars stated in its contract, and the plaintiff believing
that the said defendant was at least going to try to act in good
faith in the further performance of its said contract, commenced
to accept deliveries of said tars from it, and at once ascertained
that the said defendant was deliberately charging it prices much
higher than the contract price, and while the plaintiff accepted
deliveries of the minimum quantities of tars stated in said
contract up to and including January, 1927, (although it had
demanded deliveries of larger quantities thereunder, as
hereinafter alleged) and paid the increased prices demanded by
the defendant, in the belief that it was its duty to minimize the
damages as much as possible which the defendant would be
required to pay to it by reason of its violation of said contract, it
has in all cases done so under protest and with the express
reservation of the right to demand from the said defendant an
adjustment of the prices charged in violation of its contract, and
the right to the payment of the losses which it had and would
suffer by reason of its refusal to make additional deliveries under
said contract, and it also has continuously demanded that the
said defendant furnish to it statements supported by its invoices,
showing the cost prices of its raw materials coal and crude oil
upon which the contract price of the tars in question is fixed,
which is the only way the plaintiff has to calculate the true price
of said tars, but said defendant has and still refuses to furnish
such information, and will continue to refuse to do so, unless
ordered to furnish such information to the plaintiff by the court,
and the plaintiff believes from the information which it now has
and so alleges that the said defendant has overcharged it on the
deliveries of said tars mentioned in the sum of at least P10,000,
all in violation of the rights of the plaintiff under its said contract
with the defendant."cralaw virtua1aw library
That on January 31, 1926, and pursuant to Exhibit C, plaintiff
notified the defendant in writing that commencing with the
month of August, 1926, it desired to take delivery of 50 per cent
of defendants coal tar production for that month, and that on
November 1, 1926, it desired to take the entire output of
defendants coal gas tar, but that the defendant refused and still
refuses to make such deliveries, unless plaintiff would take all of
its water gas tar production with the desired quantity of coal gas
tar, which refusal was a plain violation of the contract. That on
January 29, 1927, and in accord with Exhibit C, plaintiff notified
the defendant in writing that within ninety days after the initial
delivery to it of its total coal gas tar production, or in February,
1927, it would require 50 per cent of its total water gas tar
production, and that in April, 1927, it would require the total
output of the defendant of both coal and water gas tars, and that
it refused to make either of such deliveries.
It is then alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"XIV. That as shown by the foregoing allegations of this
complaint, it is apparent that notwithstanding the plaintiff in this
case has at all times faithfully performed all the terms and
conditions of said contract, Exhibit C, on its part to be performed,
and has at all times and is now ready, able and willing to accept
and pay for the deliveries of said coal and water gas tar required
by said contract and the notices given pursuant thereto, the said
defendant, the Manila Gas Corporation, does not intent to comply
with its said contract, Exhibit C, and deliver to the plaintiff at the
times and under the terms and conditions stated therein the
quantities of coal and water gas tars required by said contract,
and the several notices given pursuant thereto, and that it is
useless for the plaintiff to insist further upon its performance of
the said contract, and for that reason the only feasible course for
the plaintiff to pursue is to ask the court for the rescission of said
contract and for the full damages which the plaintiff has suffered
from September, 1923, and will suffer for the remainder of said
contract by reason of the defendants failure and refusal to
perform the same, and the plaintiff has no notified the said
defendant."cralaw virtua1aw library
That since September, 1923, by reason of the bad faith of the
defendant, the plaintiff has been damages in the sum of
P300,000, for which it prays a corresponding judgment, and that
the contract, Exhibit C, be rescinded and declared void and
without force and effect.
After the filing and overruling of its demurrer, the defendant filed
an answer in the nature of a general and specific denial, and on
April 10, 1928, and upon stipulation of the parties, the court
appointed W. W. Larkin referee, "to take the evidence and, upon
completion of the trial, to report his findings of law and fact to
the court."cralaw virtua1aw library
July 18, 1928, the defendant filed an amended answer in which it
alleged as an affirmative defense, first, that the complaint does
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for the
reason that a prior adjudication has been had of all the issues
involved in this action, and, second, "that on or about the 16th
day of June, 1925, in an action brought in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, before the
Honorable Geo. R. Harvey, Judge, by Blossom &
Company, Plaintif, v. Manila Gas Corporation, defendant, being
civil case No. 25352, of said court, for the same cause of action
as that set forth in the complaint herein, said plaintiff recovered
judgment upon the merits thereof, against said defendant,
decreeing a breach of the contract sued upon herein, and
awarding damages therefor in the sum of P26, 119.08 with legal
interest from November 23, 1923, and costs of suit, which
judgment was upon appeal affirmed by the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands, in case G.R. No. 24777 of said court, on the 3d
day of March, 1926, and reported in volume 48 Philippine
Reports at page 848," and it prays that plaintiffs complaint be
dismissed, with costs.
After the evidence was taken, the referee made an exhaustive
report of sixty-six pages in which he found that the plaintiff was
entitled to P56,901.53 damages, with legal interest from the date
of filing of the complaint, to which both parties filed numerous
exceptions.
In its decision the court says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Incidental references have been made to the referees report. It
was admirably prepared. Leaving aside the question of damages
and the facts upon which the referee assessed them, the facts
are not in dispute at least not in serious dispute. They appear
in the documentary evidence and this decision is based upon
documents introduced into evidence by plaintiff. If I could have
agreed with the referee in respect to the question of law, I should
have approved his report in toto. If defendant is liable for the
damages accruing from November 23, 1923, the date the first
complaint was filed, to April 1st, 1926, the date of resumption of
relations; and if defendant, after such resumption of relations,
again violated the contract, the damages assessed by the
referee, are, to my way of thinking, as fair as could be estimated.
He went to tremendous pains in figuring out the details upon
which he based his decision. Unfortunately, I cannot agree with
his legal conclusions and the report is set aside except wherein
specifically approved.
"It is unnecessary to resolve specifically the many exceptions
made by both parties to the referees report. It would take much
time to do so. Much time has already been spent in preparing
this decision. Since both parties have informed me that in case of
adverse judgment, an appeal would be taken, I desire to
conclude the case so that delay will be avoided.
"Let judgment be entered awarding damages to plaintiff in the
sum of P2,219.60, with costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
From which plaintiff only appealed and assigns twenty-four

different errors, of which the following are material to this
opinion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. The trial court erred in holding that this suit is so far as the
damages from November, 1923, to March 31, 1926, are
concerned, is res adjudicata.
"II. The trial court erred in holding that the defendant repudiated
the contract in question as a whole, and that the plaintiff when it
brought its first suit to collect damages had already elected and
consented to the dissolution of the contract, and its choice once
made, being final, it was estopped to claim that the contract was
alive when that suit was brought.
x
"VII. The trial court erred in refusing to sustain plaintiffs third

exception to the legal interpretation placed on the contract in
this case by the referee with reference to quantity of tars and his
conclusion with respect to the terms thereof
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Plaintiff must take and defendant must deliver either the
minimum or maximum quantity of water gas tar and not any
quantity from the minimum to the maximum and/or
"2. Plaintiff must take either the minimum and any quantity up
to fifty per cent of entire output of coal gas tar.
"3. With ninety days notice by plaintiff to defendant the former
must take and the latter must deliver total output of both tars,
except such as might be needed by defendant for use in and
about its plant and not any quantity from the minimum up to
total output of both tars. (See page 47, Referees report.)
"And in holding that the option contained in said contract, taking
into consideration the purpose of both parties in entering into the
contract, was as claimed by defendant: all the water gas tar and
50 per cent of the coal gas tar upon immediate notice, and all
tars upon ninety days notice.
"VIII. The trial court erred in refusing to sustain plaintiffs fourth
exception to the finding and conclusion of the referee that from
the correspondence between the parties, it was apparent that
plaintiff did not make a right use of its option, and that the letter
of June 25, 1926, and the subsequent demands, with exception
of the letter of July 31, 1926, were not made in pursuance to the
terms of the contract, and that defendant had no liability in
refusing to comply therewith, and in allowing plaintiff damages
only for the failure of the defendant to deliver quantities shown
in Exhibits Ref. 21 and 22. (See pages 51, 52, Referees report.)
"IX. The trial court erred in finding and holding that the demands
of plaintiff for additional tars under its contract with the
defendant were extravagant and not made in good faith, and
that when it wrote to defendant that it desired maximum
quantities of coal gas tars and only minimum of water gas tars,
but with the reservation of going back to minimum quantities of
both at any time it chose, it announced its intention of breaching
the contract, the defendant was under no obligation to deliver
maximum quantities of either tars, and since this was the
efficient cause of the failure of defendant to deliver or plaintiff to
accept tars, the blame is attributable to plaintiff, and it cannot
recover for a rescission.
x
"XXIII. The trial court erred in refusing to sustain plaintiffs

seventeenth exception to the finding and conclusion of the
referee that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant
only the following sums:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Water gas tar (Exhibit Ref. 21) P 38,134.60
Coal gas tar (Exhibit Ref. 22) 16,547.33
Overcharges on deliveries (Exhibit Ref. 23) 2,219.60
__________
or a total of 56,901.53
with interest, and in not awarding to the plaintiff as damages in
this case the sum of P319,253.40, with legal interest thereon
from the date of filing the complaint in this case, in the manner
and form computed by it, and in awarding damages to the
plaintiff for the sum of only P2,219.60, with costs."cralaw
virtua1aw library
x
x
DECISION
JOHNS, J.:
In this action plaintiff seeks to recover damages from the

defendant which it claims to have sustained after September,
1923, arising from, and growing out of, its original contract of
September 10, 1918, as modified on January 1, 1919, to continue
for a period of ten years from that date.
In paragraph VIII of its complaint, plaintiff alleges that about the
last part of July, 1920, the defendant "willfully and deliberately
breached its said contract," and that it "flatly refused to make
any deliveries under said contract, and finally on November 23,
1923," it was force to commence action in the Court of First
Instance against the defendant, known as case No. 25352, to
recover the damages which it had then sustained by reason of
such flagrant violation of said contract on the part of the
defendant, in which judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant for P26,119.08, as damages
"suffered by his plaintiff by the defendants breach of said
contract from July, 1920, up to and including September, 1923,
with legal interest thereon from November 23, 1923, and for the
costs," in which the court refused to order the defendant to
resume the delivery of the coal and water gas tar to the plaintiff,
in accord with said contract, but left it with its remedy for
damages against the defendant for any subsequent breaches of
the contract. A copy of that judgment, which was later affirmed
by this court, at attached to, marked Exhibit G, and made a part
of, the complaint in this action.
In their respective briefs, opposing counsel have much to say
about the purpose and intent of that judgment, and it is
vigorously asserted that it was never intended that it should be
or become a bar to another action by the plaintiff to recover any
damages it may have sustained after September, 1923, during
the remainder of the ten-year period of that contract. Be that as
it may, it must be conceded that the question as to what would
be the legal force and effect of that judgment in that case was
never presented to, or decided by, the lower court or this court.
In the very nature of things, neither court in that case would
have the power to pass upon or decide the legal force and effect
of its own judgment, for the simple reason that it would be
premature and outside of the issues of any pleading, and could
not be raised or presented until after the judgment became final,
and then only by an appropriate plea, as in this case.
Plaintiff specifically alleges that the the defendant willfully and
deliberately breached the contract, and "flatly refused to make
any deliveries under said contract," by reason of which it was
forced to and commenced its former action in which it was
awarded P26,119.08 damages against the defendant by reason
of its breach of the contract from July, 1920, to September,
1923.
In the final analysis, plaintiff in this action seeks to recover
damages growing out of, and arising from, other and different
breaches of that same contract after November, 1923, for the
remainder of the ten-year period, and the question is thus
squarely presented as to whether the rendition of the former
judgment is a bar to the right of the plaintiff to recover damages
from the after September, 1923, arising from, and growing out
of, breaches of the original contract of September 10, 1918, as
modified on January 1, 1919. That is to say, whether the plaintiff,
in a former action, having recovered judgment for the damages
which it sustained by reason of a breach of its contract by the
defendant up to September, 1923, can now in this action recover
damages it may have sustained in this action recover damages it
may have sustained after September, 1923, arising from, and
growing out of, a breach of the same contract, upon and for
which it recovered its judgment in the former action.
"9. That owing to the bad faith of the said Manila Gas
Corporation, defendant herein, in not living up to its said contract
Exhibit A, made with this plaintiff, and refusing now to carry out
the terms of the same, by delivering to this plaintiff the coal and
water gas tar mentioned in the said Exhibit A, has caused to this
plaintiff great and irreparable damages amounting to the sum
total of one hundred twenty-four thousand eight hundred fortyeight pesos and seventy centavos (P124,848.70); and that the
said defendant corporation has refused, and still refuses, to pay
to this plaintiff the whole or any part of the aforesaid sum.
"10. That the said contract Exhibit A, was to be in force until
January 1, 1929, that it to say, for ten (10) years counted from
January 1, 1919; and that, unless the defendant again
commence to furnish and supply this plaintiff with coal and water
gas tar, as provided for in the said contract Exhibit A, the
damages already suffered by this plaintiff will continually
increase and become larger and larger in the course of years
preceding the termination of the said contract on January 1,
1929."
In that action plaintiff prays for judgment against the
defendant:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) That upon trial of this cause judgment be rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of
P124,848.70, with legal interests thereon from November 23,
1923;
"(b) That the court specifically order the defendant to resume
the delivery of the coal and water gas tar to the plaintiff under
the terms of the said contract Exhibit A of this complaint."
In the final analysis, plaintiff must stand or fall on its own
pleadings, and tested by that rule, it must be admitted that the
plaintiffs original cause of action, in which it recovered judgment
for damages, was founded on the ten-year contract, and that the
damages which it then recovered were recovered for a breach of
that contract.
Both actions are founded on one and the same contract. By the
terms of the original contract of September 10, 1918, the
defendant was to sell and the plaintiff was to purchase three tons
of water gas tar per month from September to January 1, 1919,
and twenty tons of water gas tar per after from January 1, 1919,
one-half ton of coal gas tar per month from September to
January 1, 1919, and six tons of coal gas tar per month after
January 1, 1919. That from and after January 1, 1919, plaintiff
would take at least the quantities specified in the contract of
September 10, 1918, and that at its option, it would have the
right to take the total output of water gas tar of defendants
plant and 50 per cent of the gross output of its coal gas tar, and
upon giving ninety days notice, it would have the right to the
entire output of coal gas tar, except such as the defendant might
need for its own use. That is to say, the contract provided for the
delivery to the plaintiff from month to month of the specified
amounts of the different tars as ordered and requested by the
plaintiff. In other words, under plaintiffs own theory, the
defendant was to make deliveries from month to month of the
tars during the period of ten years, and it is alleged in both
complaints that the defendant broke its contract, and in bad faith
refused to make any more deliveries.
In 34 Corpus Juris, p. 839, it is said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As a general rule a contract to do several things at several
times is divisible in its nature, so as to authorize successive
actions; and a judgment recovered for a single breach of a
continuing contract or covenant is no bar to a suit for a
subsequent breach thereof. But where the covenant or contract
is entire, and the breach total, there can be only action, and the
plaintiff must therein recover all his damages."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In the former action in which the judgment was rendered, it is

alleged in the complaint:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
In the case of Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S., 1; 44 Law. ed., 953, that
court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"7. That about the last part of July or the first part of August,
1920, the Manila Gas Corporation, the defendant herein, without
any cause ceased delivering coal and water gas tar to the
plaintiff herein; and that from that time up to the present date,
the plaintiff corporation, Blossom & Company, has frequently and
urgently demanded of the defendant, the Manila Gas
Corporation, that it comply with its aforesaid contract Exhibit A
by continuing to deliver coal and water gas tar to this plaintiff but that the said defendant has refused, and still refused, to
deliver to the plaintiff any coal and water gas tar whatsoever
under the said contract Exhibit A, since the said month of July,
1920.
"An unqualified and positive refusal to perform a contract,

though the performance thereof is not yet due, may, if the
renunciation goes to the whole contract, be treated as a
complete breach which will entitled the injured party to bring his
action at once."cralaw virtua1aw library
15 Ruling Case Law, 966, 967, sec. 441,
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Similarly if there is a breach by the vendor of a contract for the
sale of goods to be delivered and paid for in installments, and
the vendee maintains an action therefor and recovers damages,
he cannot maintain a subsequent action to recover for the failure
to deliver later installments."cralaw virtua1aw library

In Pakas v. Hollingshead, 184 N. Y., 211; 77 N. E., 40; 3 L. R. A.
(N.S.) , 1042, the syllabus says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Upon refusal, by the seller, after partial performance, longer to
comply with his contract to sell and deliver a quantity of articles
in installments, the buyer cannot keep the contract in force and
maintain actions for breaches as they occur, but must recover all
his damages in one suit."cralaw virtua1aw library
And on page 1044 of its opinion, the court
"The learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that the former
judgment did not constitute a bar to the present action, but that
the plaintiff had the right to elect to waive or disregard the
breach, keep the contract in force, and maintain successive
actions for damages from time to time as the installments of
goods were to be delivered, however numerous these actions for
damages from time to time as the installments of goods were to
be delivered, however numerous these actions might be. It is
said that this contention is supported in reason and justice, and
has the sanction of authority at least in other jurisdictions. We do
not think that the contention can be maintained. There is not, as
it seems to us, any judicial authority in this state that gives it any
substantial support. On the contrary, we think that the cases, so
far as we have been able to examine them, are all the other way,
and are to the effect that, inasmuch as there was a total breach
of the contract by the defendants refusal to deliver, the plaintiff
cannot split up his demand and maintain successive actions, but
must either recover all his damages in the first suit or wait until
the contract matured or the time for the delivery of all the goods
had arrived. In other words, there can be but one action for
damages for a total breach of an entire contract to deliver goods,
and the fact that they were to be delivered in installment from
time to time does not change the general rule."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The case of L. Bucki & Son Lumber Co. v. Atlantic Lumber Co.
(109 Federal, 411), of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, is very similar.
The syllabus says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. CONTRACTS CONSTRUCTION ENTIRE CONTRACT. A
contract was made for the sale of a large quantity of logs to be
delivered in monthly installments during a period of eight years,
payments to be made also in installments at times having
relations to the deliveries. It contained stipulations as to such
payments, and guaranties as to the average size of the logs to
be delivered in each installment. Held, that it was an entire
contract, and not a number of separate and independent
agreements for the sale of the quantity to be delivered and paid
for each month, although there might be breaches of the minor
stipulations and warranties with reference thereto which would
warrant suits without a termination of the contract.
"2. JUDGMENTS MATTERS CONCLUDED ACTION FOR
BREACH OF INDIVISIBLE CONTRACT. The seller declared the
contract terminated for alleged breaches by the purchaser, and
brought suit for general and special damages, the latter covering
payments due for installment of logs delivered. By way of set-off
and recoupment against this demand, the purchaser pleaded
breaches of the warranty as to the size of the logs delivered
during the months for which payment has not been made. Held,
that the judgment is such action was conclusive as to all claims
or demands of either party against the other growing out of the
entire contract, and was a bar to a subsequent suit brought by
the purchaser to recover for other breaches of the same
warranty in relation to deliveries made in previous
months."cralaw virtua1aw library
On page 415 of the opinion, the court
"When the contract was ended, the claims of each party for
alleged breaches and damages therefor constituted an indivisible
demand; and when the same, or any part of the same, was
pleaded, litigation had, and final judgment rendered, such suit
and judgment constitute a bar to subsequent demands which
were or might have been litigated. (Baird v. U.S., 96 U.S., 430; 24
L. ed., 703.)"
In Watts v. Weston (238 Federal, 149), Circuit Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit, the syllabus says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. JUDGMENT 593 JUDGMENT AS BAR MATTERS
CONCLUDED. Where a continuing contract was terminated by
the absolute refusal of the party whose action was necessary to
further perform, a claim for damages on account of the breach
constituted an indivisible demand, and when the same of any
part of the same was pleaded, litigated, and final judgment
rendered, such suit and judgment constitute a bar to subsequent

demands which were or might have been litigated
therein."cralaw virtua1aw library
And on page 150 of the opinion, the court
"It is enough to show the lack of merit in the present contention
to point out as an inexorable rule of law that, when Knevals
contract was discharged by his total repudiation thereof, Watts
claims for breaches and damages therefor constituted an
indivisible demand, and when the same, or any part of the same,
was pleaded, litigation had and final judgment rendered, such
suit and judgment constitute a bar to subsequent demands
which were or might have been litigated. (Bucki, etc., Co. v.
Atlantic, etc., Co., 109 Fed. at page 415; 48 C. C. A., 459; Cf.
Landon v. Bulkley, 95 Fed., 344; 37 C. C. A., 96.)
"The rule is usually applied in cases of alleged or supposed
successive breaches, and consequently severable demands for
damages; but if the contract has been discharged by breach, if
suit for damages is all that is left, the rule is applicable, and
every demand arising from that contract and possessed by any
given plaintiff must be presented (at least as against any given
defendant) in one action; what the plaintiff does not advance he
foregoes by conclusive presumption."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Abbott v. 76 Land and Water Co. (118 Pac., 425; 161 Cal., 42),
at page 428, the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In Fish v. Folley, 6 Hill (N.Y.) , 54, it was held, in accord with the
rule we have discussed, that, where the defendant had
covenanted that plaintiff should have a continual supply of water
for his mill from a dam, and subsequently totally failed to
perform for nine years, and plaintiff brought an action for the
breach and recovered damages sustained by him to that time,
the judgment was a bar to a second action arising from
subsequent failure to perform, on the theory that, although the
covenant was a continuing one in one sense, it was an entire
contract, and a total breach put an end to it, and gave plaintiff
the right to sue for an equivalent in damages.
"In such a case it is no warrant for a second action that the party
may not be able to actually prove in the first action all the items
of the demand, or that all the damage may not then have been
actually suffered. He is bound to prove in the first action not only
such damage as has been actually suffered, but also such
prospective damage by reason of the breach as he may be
legally entitled to, for the judgment he recovers in such action
will be a conclusive adjudication as to the total damage on
account of the breach."cralaw virtua1aw library
It will thus be seen that, where there is a complete and total
breach of a continuous contract for a term of years, the recovery
of a judgment for damages by reason of the breach is a bar to
another action on the same contract for and on account of the
continuous breach.
In the final analysis, there is no real dispute about any material
fact, and the important and decisive question is the legal
construction of the pleadings in the former case and in this case,
and of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant of
January 1, 1920.
The complaint in the former case specifically alleges that the
defendant "has refused, and still refuses, to deliver to the
plaintiff any coal and water gas tar whatsoever under the said
contract Exhibit A, since the said month of July, 1920." "That
owing to the bad faith of the said Manila Gas Corporation,
defendant herein, in not living up to its said contract Exhibit A,
made with this plaintiff, and refusing now to carry out the terms
of the same." That is a specific allegation not only of a breach of
the contract since the month of July, 1920, but of the bad faith of
the defendant in its continuous refusal to make deliveries of any
coal and water gas tar. That amended complaint was filed on July
11, 1924, or four years after the alleged bad faith in breaking the
contract.
Having recovered damages against it, covering a period of four
years, upon the theory that the defendant broke the contract,
and in bad faith refused to make deliveries of either of the tars,
how can the plaintiff now claim and assert that the contract is
still in force and effect? In the instant case the plaintiff alleges
and relies upon the ten-year contract of January 1, 1920, which
in bad faith was broken by the defendant. If the contract was
then broken, how can it be enforced in this action?
It is admitted that the defendant never made any deliveries of
any tar from July, 1920, to April, 1926. Also that it made nine
deliveries to plaintiff of the minimum quantities of coal and water
gas tar from April 7, 1926, to January 5, 1927.
Plaintiff contends that such deliveries were made under and in
continuation of the old contract.

March 26, 1926, after the decision of this court affirming the
judgment in the original action, plaintiff wrote the defendant;
". . . It is our desire to take deliveries of at least the minimum
quantities set forth therein and shall appreciate to have you
advise us how soon you will be in a position to make
deliveries; . . .
". . . In view of the fact that you have only effected settlement up
to November 23, 1923, please inform us what adjustment you
are willing to make for the period of time that has since elapsed
without your complying with the contract."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In response to which on March 31, 1926, the defendant wrote
this letter to the plaintiff:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In reply to your letter of March 26th, 1926, in regard to tar, we
beg to advise you that we are prepared to furnish the minimum
quantities of coal and water gas tars as per your letter, viz:
twenty tons of water gas tar and six tons of coal gas tar. The
price figured on present costs of raw materials is P39.01 (Thirtynine and 01/100 Pesos) per ton of water gas and P33.59 (Thirtythree and 59/100 Pesos) per ton of coal tar.
"We shall expect you to take delivery and pay for the above
amount of tars at our factory on or before April 7th prox.
"Thereafter we shall be ready to furnish equal amounts on the
first of each month. Kindly make your arrangements
accordingly."cralaw virtua1aw library
On January 29, 1927, the plaintiff wrote the defendant
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On July 31st last, we made demand upon you, under the terms
of our tar contract, for 50 per cent of your total coal tar
production for that month and also served notice on you that
beginning 90 days from August 1st we would require your total
output of coal tar monthly; this in addition to the 20 tons of
water gas tar provided for in the contract to be taken monthly.
x
"We are here again calling on you for your total output of coal tar
immediately and the regular minimum monthly quantity of water
gas tar. In this connection we desire to advise you that within 90
days of your initial delivery to us to your total coal tar output we
will require 50 per cent of your total water gas tar output, and,
further, that two months thereafter we will require your total
output of both tars."cralaw virtua1aw library
February 2, 1927, the defendant wrote the
plaintiff:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Replying to your letter of Jan. 29, we would say that we have
already returned to you the check enclosed therewith. As we
have repeatedly informed you we disagree with you as to the
construction of your contract and insist that you take the whole
output of both tars if you wish to secure the whole of the coal
tar.
"With regard to your threat of further suits we presume that you
will act as advised. If you make it necessary we shall do the
same."cralaw virtua1aw library
From an analysis of these letters if clearly appears that the
plaintiff then sought to rely upon and enforce the contract of
January 1, 1920, and that defendant denied plaintiffs
construction of the contract, and insisted "that you take the
whole output of both tars if you wish to secure the whole of the
coal tar."cralaw virtua1aw library
February 28, 1927, the plaintiff wrote the
defendant:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In view of your numerous violations of and repeated refusal and
failure to comply with the terms and provisions of our contract
dated January 30-31, 1919, for the delivery to us of water and
coal gas tars, etc., we will commence action," which it did.
The record tends to show that the tars which the defendant
delivered after April 7, 1926, were not delivered under the old
contract of January 1, 1920, and that at all times since July,
1920, the defendant has consistently refused to make any
deliveries of any tars under that contract.
The referee found as a fact that plaintiff was entitled to
P2,219.60 for and on account of overcharges which the
defendant made for the deliveries of fifty-four tons of coal gar
tar, and one hundred eighty tons of water gas tar after April,
1926, and upon that point the lower court
"The fourth charge that plaintiff makes is meritorious. The price
was to be fixed on the basis of raw materials. The charge for
deliveries during 1926 were too high. In this I agree with entirely
with the referee and adopt his findings of fact and calculations.
(See Referees report, p. 83). The referee awarded for overcharge
during the period aforesaid, the sum of P2,219.60. The defendant
was trying to discourage plaintiff from buying tars and made the
price of raw material appear as high as possible."cralaw
virtua1aw library
That finding is sustained upon the theory that the defendant
broke its contract which it made with the plaintiff for the sale and
delivery of the tars on and after April, 1926.
After careful study of the many important questions presented on
this appeal in the exhaustive brief of the appellant, we are
clearly of the opinion that, as found by the lower court, the plea
of res judicata must be sustained. The judgment of the lower
court is affirmed.
It is so ordered, with costs against the Appellant.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and VillaReal, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-66620. September 24, 1986.]
REMEDIO V. FLORES, Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE HEILIA S.
MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL & FERNANDO
CALION, Respondents.
Lucio A. Dixon for respondent F. Calion.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129; SECTION 33(1)

OF ITS INTERIM RULES; SUBJECT TO REQUIREMENTS FOR
PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES UNDER THE RULES OF COURT.
The Court rules that the application of the totality rules under
Section 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the
Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the permissive
joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as
follows: "Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or
against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the
same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist,
whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as
otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact
common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise
in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just
to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or
put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he
may have no interest."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; SECTION 39 THEREOF; APPLICABLE ONLY TO
ORDINARY APPEALS FROM REGULAR TRIAL COURT TO COURT OF
APPEALS. Petitioner did not attach to his petition a copy of his
complaint in the erroneous belief that the entire original record
of the case shall be transmitted to this Court pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 39 of BP 129. This provision applies
only to ordinary appeals from the regional trial court to the Court
of Appeals (Section 20 of the Interim Rules). Appeals to this
Court by petition for review on certiorari are governed by Rule 45
of the Rules of Court (Section 25 of the Interim Rules).
3. ID.; ID.; SECTION 33(1) OF ITS INTERIM RULES; DISTINGUISHED
FROM SECTION 88 OF JUDICIARY ACT OF 1948. There is no
difference between the former and present rules in cases where
a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate causes of
action. In such cases, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of
whether the cause of action arose out of the same or different
transactions. If the total demand exceeds twenty thousand
pesos, then the regional trial court has jurisdiction. Needless to
state, if the causes of action are separate and independent, their
joinder in one complaint is permissive and not mandatory, and
any cause of action where the amount of the demand is twenty
thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a separate
complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal trial court.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. There is a difference between the former
and present rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having
separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single
causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint.
Under the former rules, "where the claims or causes of action

joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to
different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test" (Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended, supra). This was based on the ruling in the case of
Vda. de Rosario v. Justice of the Peace, 99 Phil. 693. As worded,
the former ruled applied only to cases of permissive joinder or
parties plaintiff. However, it was also applicable to cases of
permissive joinder of parties defendant, as may be deduced from
the ruling in the case of Brillo v. Buklatan, thus: "Furthermore,
the first cause of action is composed of separate claims against
several defendants of different amounts each of which is not
more than P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace court under Section 88 of Republic Act No. 296. The
several claims do not seem to arise from the same transaction or
series of transactions and there seem to be no questions of law
or of fact common to all the defendants as may warrant their
joinder under Rule 3, Section 6. Therefore, if new complaints are
to be filed in the name of the real party in interest they should be
filed in the justice of the peace court." (87 Phil. 519, 520,
reiterated in Gacula v. Martinez, 88 Phil. 142, 146). Under the
present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two
or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a
defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a
plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or more
defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes of
action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or
more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or
series of transactions and there should be a common question of
law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The difference between the former and
present rules in cases of permissive joinder of parties may be
illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the case of Vda.
de Rosario v. Justice of the Peace (supra) as exceptions to the
totality rule. In the case of Soriano y Cia v. Jose (86 Phil. 523),
where twenty-nine dismissed employees joined in a complaint
against the defendant to collect their respective claims, each of
which was within the jurisdiction of the municipal court, although
the total exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held that
under the law then the municipal court had jurisdiction. In said
case, although the plaintiffs demands were separate, distinct
and independent of one another, their joint suit was authorized
under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the
jurisdictional test. In the case of International Colleges, Inc. v.
Argonza (90 Phil. 470), where twenty-five dismissed teachers
jointly sued the defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court also
held that the municipal court had jurisdiction because the
amount of each claim was within, although the total exceeded,
its jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties
plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule 3. Under the present law, the two
cases above cited (Assuming they do not fall under the Labor
Code) would be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court).
Similarly, in the above-cited cases of Brillo v. Buklatan and
Gacula v. Martinez (supra), if the separate claims against the
several defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there is a common question of law or fact, they
would now be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
6. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES;
JURISDICTIONAL TESTS; HOW FURNISHED. In cases of
permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as
defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims
shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if
instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate
actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded
in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
DECISION
FERIA, J.:
The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under
Section 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the
Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the permissive
joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as
"Permissive joinder of parties, All persons in whom or against
whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise
provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact
common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise
in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just
to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or
put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he
may have no interest."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge

Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City and Benguet Province which dismissed his complaint for lack
of jurisdiction. Petitioner did not attach to his petition a copy of
his complaint in the erroneous belief that the entire original
record of the case shall be transmitted to this Court pursuant to
the second paragraph of Section 39 of BP 129. This provision
applies only to ordinary appeals from the regional trial court to
the Court of Appeals (Section 20 of the Interim Rules). Appeals to
this Court by petition for review on certiorari are governed by
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Section 25 of the Interim Rules).
However, the order appealed from states that the first cause of
action alleged in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio
Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
from petitioner on various occasions from August to October,
1981; and the second cause of action was against respondent
Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of
P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased
on credit from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981
to January, 1982.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
amount of the demand against said respondent was only
P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP 129 the regional trial
court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of
the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It
was further averred in said motion that although another person,
Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the
amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct
from that of the other Respondent. At the hearing of said Motion
to Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to
Dismiss. As above stated, the trial court dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the
case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section
33(1) of BP 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
The pertinent portion of Section 33(1) of BP 129 reads as
". . . Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of
action between the same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality
of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Application of the totality rule. In actions where the
jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved,
the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the
money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs,
irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned by
or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil
action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the
pertinent portion of the former rule under Section 88 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which reads as
follows:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
". . . Where there are several claims or causes of action between
the same parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount
of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions; but where the
claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are
separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate
claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library
and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former
rule, the totality rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the
jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all, not in each, of
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions.
This argument is partly correct. There is no difference between
the former and present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a
defendant on two or more separate causes of action. In such
cases, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.
If the total demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the

regional trial court has jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the
causes of action are separate and independent, their joinder in
one complaint is permissive and not mandatory, and any cause
of action where the amount of the demand is twenty thousand
pesos or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filed
with a metropolitan or municipal trial court.
On the other hand, there is a difference between the former and
present rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having
separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single
complaint. Under the former rule, "where the claims or causes of
action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or
due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test" (Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended, supra). This was based on the ruling in the case of
Vda. de Rosario v. Justice of the Peace, 99 Phil. 693. As worded,
the former rule applied only to cases of permissive joinder of
parties plaintiff. However, it was also applicable to cases of
permissive joinder of parties defendant, as may be deduced from
the ruling in the case of Brillo v. Buklatan, thus:chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
"Furthermore, the first cause of action is composed of separate
claims against several defendants of different amounts each of
which is not more than P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of
the justice of the peace court under section 88 of Republic Act
No. 296. The several claims do not seem to arise from the same
transaction or series of transactions and there seem to be no
questions of law or of fact common to all the defendants as may
warrant their joinder under Rule 3, section 6. Therefore, if new
complaints are to be filed in the name of the real party in interest
they should be filed in the justice of the peace court." (87 Phil.
519, 520, reiterated in Gacula v. Martinez, 88 Phil. 142, 146).
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases
where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action
against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases
where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or
more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the
causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against
the two or more defendants should arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there should be a
common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule
3.
The difference between the former and present rules in cases of
permissive joinder of parties may be illustrated by the two cases
which were cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario v. Justice of the
Peace (supra) as exceptions to the totality rule. In the case of
Soriano y Cia v. Jose (86 Phil. 523), where twenty-nine dismissed
employees joined in a complaint against the defendant to collect

their respective claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction
of the municipal court although the total exceeded the
jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law then the
municipal court had jurisdiction. In said case, although the
plaintiffs demands were separate, distinct and independent of
one another, their joint suit was authorized under Section 6 of
Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the jurisdictional test.
In the case of International Colleges, Inc. v. Argonza (90 Phil.
470), where twenty-five dismissed teachers jointly sued the
defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court also held that the
municipal court had jurisdiction because the amount of each
claim was within, although the total exceeded, its jurisdiction and
it was a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff under
Section 6 of Rule 3.
Under the present law, the two cases above cited (assuming they
do not fall under the Labor Code) would be under the jurisdiction
of the regional trial court. Similarly, in the abovecited cases of
Brillo v. Buklatan and Gacula v. Martinez (supra), if the separate
claims against the several defendants arose out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there is a common
question of law or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction
of the regional trial court.
In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether
as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total
of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless
to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint
separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount
demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the
jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint,
it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that
the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are
separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.

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SECOND DIVISION

This is a petition for certiorari to review the actuations of the

[G.R. No. L-34840. July 20, 1982.]

On September 16, 1970, the petitioners filed a complaint for the

Petitioners paid only P60.00 as docketing fee when they filed a

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS, FILING OF; PAYMENT OF DOCKET

"3. To declare Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41215 issued in the

3. Exemplary damages be imposed on the defendants jointly and

1. Less than P200.00 P16.00

"4. That in the light of the foregoing, it is the opinion of the

(Six Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Two Pesos) 6,732.00

(a) Assessed value of the land

(please see par. 4 of the complaint) P17,280.00

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the plaintiffs be made

(b) Moral damages 500,000.00

ought to be left alone to determine the question of the filing fee

substituting thereto, the averment that, the amount of these

complaint, up to the present, is not deemed registered or

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the petitioners shall

the plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such property

Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and

STATUTES; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLIED

Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this Court held that the

On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala

Magaspi Case in so far it is inconsistent with this pronouncement

eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages

and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any,

1. REMDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; LEGAL FEES; DAMAGES

Applying literally the ruling on docket fees enunciated in

The aforementioned savings account was allegedly maintained

"It can thus be seen that while it can be considered at best as

The pertinent portions of the Complaint and Prayer read as

"7. She discovered further that aforesaid savings account was

"11. Due to the wanton and unfounded refusal and failure of

On 11 August 1988, respondent Judge issued the questioned

"As regards the prayer of the complaint, while it may be

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants defendants aforesaid

"1. Ordering defendants China Banking Corporation to

The Petition is anchored on two grounds, namely:chanrob1es

"2. Ordering both defendants to pay moral and exemplary

2. Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when

"3. Ordering both defendants to pay her attorneys fees

1. The doctrine laid down in the Manchester case was incorrectly

During the pendency of this case, respondent Gan filed a

not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; REAL ACTIONS

1) v. Antonia Noel Civil Case No. 2209

prohibitory injunction," praying essentially that said orders be

1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WITH DAMAGES;

specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to

Once more the issue relating to the payment of filing fees in an

time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or

and unpaid rent in the sum of P6,278.68, as well as for rent

Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

March 26, 1924

JOSEFINA RUBIO VDA. DE LARENA, plaintiff-appellee,

4. Inmediatamente despues de firmado el presente

6. Los arrendatarios no podran transpasar sus derechos

is divisible, and a judgment for a single breach of a continuing

From which plaintiff only appealed and assigns twenty-four

"VII. The trial court erred in refusing to sustain plaintiffs third

"XXIII. The trial court erred in refusing to sustain plaintiffs

In this action plaintiff seeks to recover damages from the