Documentos de Académico
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Philosophical Studies in
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VOLUME 1
LEIDEN BOSTON
2009
ISSN 1877-8542
ISBN 978 90 04 17787 1
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CONTENTS
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The slow process of the European construction of the spheres of science and religion and the hardening of the boundaries between them
during the 17th and 18th centuries created an intellectual milieu in
which traditional Christian ways of interpreting religious experience
in the world increasingly came into competition with new scientific
explanations of the world. The idea of divine action was relatively
unproblematic and generally presupposed within Western medieval cosmology, with its philosophical mixture of Neo-platonic active principles
and Aristotelian final causes, both of which were ultimately grounded
in the divine (the Form of the Good, the Unmoved Mover).
However, as early modern science (especially classical mechanics)
progressively filled the gaps in human knowledge about natural causes
within a mechanical universe, the necessity (and plausibility) of appealing to divine causation gradually diminished. The rise of deism and
protest atheism in the 18th and 19th centuries was partially in response
to the growing philosophical challenges to the coherence of the notion
of divine action, and its alleged incompatibility with human freedom
and natural evil. All of this is well known. But where does the discussion stand in light of contemporary science and philosophy?
f. leron shults
treated philosophical issues. I think it is also fair to say that all of the
essays involve philosophical engagement at least implicitly, insofar
as they utilize philosophical categories and attempt to contribute to
our understanding of topics that have a long history of philosophical
disputation.
The chapters in the current volume were selected for inclusion first
and foremost because they demonstrate the value of explicitly attending
to the philosophical issues that shape the dialogue between science and
Christian theology about the idea of divine action in the world. Below
I will provide a brief preview of each of these chapters. First, however,
I want to back up and briefly outline three of the classical themes in
philosophy (epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics) and three of the
shifts in philosophical categories in late modernity (relation, kinesis,
and difference), to which we can then make reference as we preview
the chapters.
f. leron shults
sponsored by CTNS/VO is focusing on the issue of natural evil.1 Second, if events in the world (including human actions) are completely
(or even partially) determined by God (or the laws of nature), then in
what sense can we speak plausibly of human freedom and responsibility? Clearly metaphysical (and epistemological) claims about the relation between necessity and chance in the world are relevant for moral
discourse as well.
Attending to these three general areas of philosophical discourse
provides a synchronic overview of some of the most significant issues
in the SPDA project. But we can also see the influence of philosophy
if we think diachronically, pointing out historical shifts in the meaning
and use of key categories. For most of its history Christian theology
has been couched in the categories of Platonism and/or Aristotelianism, and has shared the resistance of both of these ancient philosophical schools to Stoicism. Many early modern scientific developments,
however, were motivated by renaissance retrievals of aspects of Stoic
philosophy, including some of its atomistic and deterministic elements.
This contributed to an intellectual milieu that increasingly challenged
Platonic-Aristotelian categories, as well as the Christian doctrinal formulations that relied heavily upon them. Our purpose here is not to
recount the difficulties this caused for early modern theologians but to
point out three specific categorical shifts in late modern philosophy that
have shaped the conceptual space within the dialogue now occurs: the
growing preference for relation, kinesis and difference over substance,
stasis and sameness.
Whence and whither these philosophical trajectories? In Platos
Sophist the visitor convinces Theaetetus that there are five general
kinds (genn): that which is or being (to on) rest, (stasis) change
(kinesis) the same (tauton) and the different (heteron). For the most
part traditional Western philosophy (as well as science and theology)
has followed Plato in starting with the category of being, which has
to do with the essence or substance (ousia) of things, as distinct from
their relations (or accidental attributes). Plato also tended to value rest
over change (or motion) and sameness over difference, tendencies that
were hardened in Neo-platonism and registered a profound effect on
1
Nancey Murphy, Robert John Russell and William R. Stoeger, S.J., eds, Physics
and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, vol. I (Berkeley:
CTNS/VO, 2007).
f. leron shults
A Philosophical Preview
The essays included in this volume are exemplary in several ways. They
are all examples of state-of-the-art contributions to the debate over
divine action among scientists and Christian theologians. They also
represent the work of some of the most active participants in the SPDA
project, and the broader international theology and science dialogue.
Mostly importantly for the purposes of this book, they illustrate the
care with which and depth to which the project attended to the role of
philosophy in this dialogue. The following preview does not attempt to
summarize the complex arguments of each essay; rather, it alerts the
reader to some of the key philosophical concerns and concepts that are
relevant for understanding and assessing the ongoing discussion.
The first three chapters included here were written by the three
scholars who are widely acknowledged to be the leading figures of
the contemporary resurgent interest in international dialogue among
scientists and Christian theologians, which picked up momentum in the
1970s and has grown consistently to the present: Ian Barbour, Arthur
Peacocke and John Polkinghorne. The fourth chapter is by William
f. leron shults
Barbour, Ways of Relating Science and Theology, in Russell, et al., eds., Physics,
Philosophy and Theology: A Common Quest for Understanding (Vatican Observatory,
1988), 2148. The four ways are conflict, independence, dialogue and integration. Cf.
Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science (New York: HarperOne, 1990).
3
Peacockes engages these and other philosophical issues (including the epistemological implications of critical realism) in more detail in Theology for a Scientific Age:
Being and BecomingNatural, Divine and Human (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993).
10
f. leron shults
4
For an overview of Polkinghornes approach to the dialogue, cf. his Belief in God
in an Age of Science (New Haven: Yale, 2003).
11
biology, but also by the fundamental metaphysical ambiguity that characterizes philosophical discourse. Based on his analysis of the notion
of having an end throughout the philosophical tradition, Wildman
offers several schemata for making sense of this complex conceptual
debate. For example, he distinguishes between four types of teleological views in biology, outlines three stages that must be included in any
teleological argument for divine action, and delineates the way in which
six modes of divine action can be correlated with teleological loci in
nature. Wildmans essay illustrates both the material significance of
metaphysical questions and the methodological value of philosophical
distinctions in the ongoing debate. He also represents the inclusion
within the project of a minority position among Christian theologians
in the dialogue. In light of the problem of evil and other conceptual
issues, Wildman is willing to give up the idea that God acts (intentionally, or in a way analogous to human agency) in the world, and prefers
to speak of God (or ultimate reality) as the ground of being.5
The remaining five chapters explicitly try to maintain the idea of
intentional or special divine action in the world, and do so in a variety
of ways, all of which heavily engage quantum theory. We begin with an
essay by Philip Clayton: Tracing the Lines: Constraint and Freedom in
the Movement from Quantum Physics to Theology. Like most of the
other contributors to this volume, Clayton argues that the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum indeterminacy opens up new possibilities for
making sense of divine action. However, he emphasizes the importance
of balancing metaphysical courage with epistemic humility as we explore
these possibilities. Clayton suggests that instead of thinking of physics
and metaphysics in dichotomous terms, we should imagine them as
falling at different points on a continuum of abstraction. Questions
about divine action require us to move further along the continuum
toward abstraction, but should nevertheless be connected to (and in
some sense constrained by) questions about the concrete nature of
the physical world. On the other hand, Clayton also acknowledges the
insight of post-positivist philosophy of science that metaphysical decisions are not simply determined by the data of physical theories. Like
Peacocke and others, Clayton commends a panentheistic metaphysics as
5
In his contribution to the capstone volume, Wildman makes this argument more
extensively in the context of his classification of the projects participants. Cf. Wildman,
The Divine Action Project, Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, 176.
12
f. leron shults
offering the best current option for tracing the lines between quantum
physics and theology.6
In his essay Creation, Providence and Quantum Chance, Thomas
Tracy also (like William Stoeger) utilizes the philosophical distinction
between primary and secondary causality. On the one hand, God primarily and directly causes the (continual) existence of all finite things.
On the other hand, God can also act through secondary causes,
producing results indirectly through the operation of finite things.
Tracy suggests that quantum theory has led to a philosophical challenge to exceptionless causal determinism, long accepted by scientists
and theologians, which opens up a new way to think of Gods special
(and objective) action in the world. The kind of divine action in history
that is central for the faith of the Abrahamic religions, argues Tracy,
requires that there be gaps (of the right sort) in the causal structures
of nature. These gaps appear to him to be provided in the indeterminacy of quantum events. For Tracy, such gaps are not created ad hoc
in the world by Gods special acts of intervention but are built into
structure of the world created by God ex nihilo. Like most of the other
contributors who engage quantum theory, Tracy also explicitly makes
the connection between metaphysical decisions (about compatibilism
and incompatibilism for example) and issues that bear on ethics, such
as the plausibility of the idea of human free will and responsibility.
Nancey Murphy was another one of the most active of the participants in the project, serving as co-editor for three of the volumes
in the series as well as the capstone volume. In the paper included
here, Divine Action in the Natural Order, she outlines a theory
of causation that attempts to account for both scientific phenomena
and religious experience. Murphy stresses that the problem of divine
action is, at base, a metaphysical problem. Nothing short of a revision
of current metaphysical notions regarding the nature of matter and
causation is likely to solve the problem of divine action. Murphys
essay also demonstrates the importance of the first two late modern
philosophical trajectories outlined above. For example, in her treatment
of the metaphysical considerations that shape the dialogue, she traces
the role of concepts such as matter, substance, change, and motion in
6
In his chapter in the capstone volume, Toward a Theory of Divine Action that has
Traction, Clayton commends emergence theory as a valuable and viable metaphysic
for incorporating both scientific and theological concerns.
13
7
Nancey Murphys chapter in the capstone volume explored Emergence, Downward
Causation and Divine Action, outlining several key philosophical issues and evaluating
a variety of approaches to these themes.
8
Cf. George Ellis and Nancey Murphy, On the Moral Nature of the Universe (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996).
14
f. leron shults
in the fifth and final volume of the series, and it offers a summary of
the key issues in the field, outlines a constructive proposal and suggests directions for future research. Throughout the essay, Russell pays
special attention to philosophical aspects of the dialogue, including the
metaphysical and epistemological questions that shape the interpretation
of quantum mechanics. His own proposal involves the appropriation
of theologians like Jurgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, for
whom trinitarian reflection plays a central role in articulating the relation between God and the world. Russell also explicitly addresses the
two main ethical (or moral) questions that shape Christian discourse
on divine action: the problem of human freedom and the challenge of
theodicy.9
Conclusion
Although showcasing these influential essays from the SPDA project
would be sufficient warrant for the production of the current book, its
inclusion in the Brill series Philosophical Studies in Science and Religion suggests that another motivation lies behind their compilation.
Both individually and as a group these chapters illustrate the significant
role of philosophy in the dialogue between science and Christian theology over the question of divine action. This is so amply demonstrated
in the various essays that I have limited myself in this Introduction
to alerting the reader to some of the major philosophical themes and
shifts that shape the general context of the dialogue and the particular
material and methodological argumentation of each contribution.
The project was not intended to offer a final anwer on the question
of divine action but to press the dialogue between Christian theology
and natural science further in light of the significant scientific (and
philosophical) developments of the last century. No single project can
accomplish everything, and the organizers self-consciously focused
their interdisciplinary exploration by limiting themselves to dealing
with those scientific fields that appeared most promising for opening
up new opportunities for reconstructing Christian interpretations of the
experience of Gods action in the world. Although they welcomed and
9
For a more detailed treatment of these and related issues, cf. Russell, CosmologyFrom Alpha to Omega (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008).
15
CHAPTER ONE
Is evolutionary theory compatible with the idea that God acts in nature?
Through most of Western history it had been assumed that all creatures
were designed and created by God in their present forms, but Darwin
claimed that they are the product of a long process of natural selection.
His theory of evolution not only undermined the traditional version
of the argument from design; it also explained the history of nature by
scientific laws that seemed to offer no opportunity for Gods providential guidance. However several themes in the biological sciences offer
promising new ways of conceiving of divine action in evolutionary
history without intervention or violation of the laws of nature.
The first section of this essay traces the development of evolutionary
theory from Darwin himself to molecular biology and recent hypotheses
about complexity. The second explores four themes in recent writing
about biological processes: self-organization, indeterminacy, top-down
causality, and communication of information. Subsequent sections
examine theological models of Gods action in nature based on analogies with each of these four characteristics of organic life. I will suggest
that a fifth model from process theology avoids some of the problems
arising in other models of Gods relation to nature.
1. Darwinism Evolving
Evolutionary theory has undergone significant reinterpretation and
modification since Darwin. First, the growth of population genetics
and molecular biology is briefly described. Then the expansion of
Darwinism is discussed, particularly the recognition that other factors
in addition to natural selection influence the direction of evolutionary
change. Finally, recent theories of complexity and self-organization
are considered.
18
ian g. barbour
Michael Ruse, Philosophy of Biology Today (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New
York Press, 1988), 6; idem, The Darwinian Paradigm (New York: Routledge, 1989).
2
David P. Depew and Bruce H. Weber, Darwinism Evolving (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1995), Part I.
19
the influence of nineteenth-century physics on his ideas about calculating gene probabilities in individual organisms and gene frequencies in
populations. The modern synthesis in which Julian Huxley, G.G. Simpson and Ernst Mayr were prominent, continued the Darwinian belief
that the evolution of species was the result of a gradual accumulation of
small changes. If some members of a population are geographically or
reproductively isolated from other members, accumulated changes may
result in a new species that can no longer interbreed with the original
population. In a very small isolated population, gene frequencies may
differ, purely by chance, from those in the larger population; the direction of evolutionary change (genetic drift) would then be the result
of chance rather than natural selection. But natural selection was still
viewed as the principal agent of evolutionary change.3
The discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953 led to the identification
of the molecular components of the genes which population genetics
had postulated. The central dogma of molecular biology asserted that
information is transferred in one direction only, from the sequences of
bases in DNA to the sequences of amino acids assembled by the DNA
to form proteins. It was claimed that the environment has no direct
effect on genes except to eliminate or perpetuate them through selective pressures on the organisms that carried them. Molecular biology
has been immensely fruitful in illuminating almost every aspect of
evolutionary history, but some of the assumptions initially associated
with it have more recently been questioned.
1.2. The Expansion of Darwinism
Most of the challenges to the modern synthesis in recent decades should
be seen as part of an expanded Darwinism (or neo-Darwinism), rather
than as a rejection of earlier insights. For example, it has been claimed
that selection occurs at many levels, and not just on the level of organisms in populations. Dawkins speaks of selection at the level of genes; he
views organisms as mechanisms by which genes perpetuate themselves.
E.O. Wilson speaks of kin selection and others defend group selection.
Both philosophers and biologists have argued that selection occurs also
at the species level. Whereas an organism produces other organisms
by reproduction, and it perishes by death, a species produces other
20
ian g. barbour
4
R.N. Brandon and R.M. Burian, eds., Genes, Organisms, Populations: Controversies
over the Units of Selection (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984); Niles Eldredge and Stanley
Salthe, Hierarchy and Evolution, in Oxford Surveys of Evolutionary Biology (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1985).
5
Stephen Jay Gould, Darwinism and the Expansion of Evolutionary Theory, Science
216 (1982), 38087; S.J. Gould and Niles Eldredge, Punctuated Equilibrium Comes
of Age, Nature 366 (1993), 22327.
6
S.J. Gould and Richard C. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptionist Programme, Proc. of Royal Society
of London B 205 (1979), 58198.
21
7
G. Ledyard Stebbins and Francisco Ayala, Is a New Evolutionary Synthesis Necessary? Science 213 (1981), 96771.
8
John Campbell, An Organizational Interpretation of Evolution, in Evolution at
the Crossroads, David P. Depew and Bruce H. Weber, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1985).
9
C.H. Waddington, The Strategy of the Genes (New York: Macmillan, 1957); Robert
J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), chap. 10.
22
ian g. barbour
10
Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1982); idem, How Biology Differs from the Physical Sciences, in Evolution at
the Crossroads, Depew and Weber, eds.
11
Ilya Prigogine and Irene Stengers, Order Out of Chaos (New York: Bantam Books,
1984).
12
Stuart Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); idem, At Home in the Universe: The
Search for Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995).
23
13
Jeffrey Wicken, Evolution, Thermodynamics, and Information: Extending the
Darwinian Program (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
14
George Halder, Patrick Callaerts, and Walter Gehring, Induction of Ectopic
Eyes by Targeted Expression of the Eyeless Gene in Drosophila, Science 267 (1995),
178892.
24
ian g. barbour
15
Mae-Won Ho and Peter Saunders, eds., Beyond Neo-Darwinism (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984); Brian Goodwin and Peter Saunders, eds., Theoretical Biology: Epigenetic and Evolutionary Order from Complex Systems (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1989); see also Robert Wesson, Beyond Natural Selection
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).
25
2.1. Self-organization
Evolutionary history does indeed show a directionality, a trend toward
greater complexity and consciousness. There has been an increase in
the genetic information in DNA, and a steady advance in the ability of
organisms to gather and process information about the environment and
respond to it. The emergence of life, consciousness, and human culture
are especially significant transitions within a gradual and continuous
process. But evolution does not display any straight-line progressive
development. For the majority of species, opportunistic adaptations
led to dead ends and extinction when conditions changed. The pattern
of evolution does not resemble a uniformly growing tree so much as a
sprawling bush whose tangled branches grow in many directions and
often die off. Nevertheless, there is an overall trend. Who can doubt
that a human being represents an astonishing advance over an amoeba
or a worm?
Some authors have argued that if the amino acids in primeval oceans
had assembled themselves by chance to form protein chains, the probability of being assembled in the right order to form a particular protein
would be fantastically small. It would be highly unlikely to occur even
in spans of time many times longer than the history of the universe.16
The argument is dubious because amino acids do not combine by
chance with equal probability, for there are built-in affinities and bonding preferences and structural possibilities. Some combinations form
stable units which persist, and these units combine to form larger units.
Organic molecules have a capacity for self-organization and complexity
because of structural constraints and potentialities.
Other authors have used hierarchy theory to indicate how advances
to a higher level of organizational complexity are preserved. Imagine
a watchmaker whose work is disrupted occasionally. If he has to start
over again each time, he would never finish his task. But if he assembles
groups of parts into stable sub-assemblies, which are then combined,
he will finish the task more rapidly. Living organisms have many stable
sub-assemblies at differing levels which are often preserved intact and
only loosely coupled to each other. The higher level of stability often
arises from functions that are relatively independent of variations in the
microscopic details. Evolution exhibits both chance and directionality
16
Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe, Evolution from Space (London: Dent,
1981).
26
ian g. barbour
because higher levels embody new types of order and stability that are
maintained and passed on.17
Let us examine Kauffmans thesis that evolution is a product of selforganization as well as of random variation and natural selection. He
finds similar patterns in the behavior of complex systems that appear
very differentfor example, in molecules, cells, neural networks, ecosystems, and technological and economic systems. In each case feedback mechanisms and nonlinear interactions make cooperative activity
possible in larger wholes. The systems show similar emergent systemic
properties not present in their components. Kauffman gives particular
attention to the behavior of networks. For example, an array of 100,000
light bulbs, each of which goes on or off as an adjustable function of
input from its four neighbors, will cycle through only 327 states from
among the astronomical number of possible states. Genes are also connected in networks; in the simplest case, gene A represses gene B and
vice versa, so only one of them is turned on. Kauffman notes that there
are only 256 cell types in mammals, and suggests that this may be the
result of system principles and not merely an historical accident.18
Many of Kauffmans ideas are speculative and exploratory, but they
reflect a new way of looking at evolution. He finds that order emerges
spontaneously in complex systems, especially on the border between
order and chaos. Too much order makes change impossible; too much
chaos makes continuity impossible. We should see ourselves not as a
highly improbable historical accident, but as an expected fulfilment
of the natural order. In his book, At Home in the Universe, Kauffman
calls for awe and respect for a process in which such self-organization
occurs.
2.2. Indeterminacy
Many features of evolutionary history are the product of unpredictable
events. The particular pair of organisms that mate and the particular
combination of genes that are inherited by their offspring cannot be
predicted; genetic laws can only be expressed probabilistically for individuals in large populations. Many mutations and replication errors
17
Stanley Salthe, Evolving Hierarchical Systems (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1985).
18
Kauffman, At Home in the Universe, chap. 4.
27
19
Ian G. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science (San Francisco: Harper Collins,
1990), 96104.
28
ian g. barbour
20
On the topic of quantum indeterminacy and its possible role in mutations, see
Ellis, Murphy, Tracy, and Russell in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on
Divine Action, Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur R. Peacocke, eds.
(Rome: Vatican Observatory, and Berkeley, CA: Center for Theology and the Natural
Sciences, 1995).
21
James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Penguin Books, 1987);
John Holte, ed., Chaos: The New Science (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
1993).
29
22
Stephen Kellert, In the Wake of Chaos: Unpredictable Order in Dynamical Systems
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
23
For analyses of reduction, see Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 32437 and Religion in an Age of Science,
16569; Francisco Ayala, Reduction in Biology in Evolution at the Crossroads, Depew
30
ian g. barbour
and Weber, eds.; Arthur Peacocke, God and the New Biology (London: J.M. Dent &
Sons, 1986), chaps. 1 and 2.
24
On top-down causation, see Donald Campbell, Downward Causation in Hierarchically Ordered Biological Systems in The Problems of Reduction, Francisco Ayala and
Theodosius Dobzhansky, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Michael
Polanyi, Lifes Irreducible Structures, Science 160 (1968), 130812; Elizabeth Vrba,
Patterns in the Fossil Record and Evolutionary Processes in Beyond Neo-Darwinism,
Ho and Saunders, eds.
31
We know little about how memories are preserved in the brain, but
computer simulations of neural nets suggest that memory may be
stored in distributed patterns rather than at discrete locations. In some
computer networks with parallel distributed processing, the nodes in a
series of layers can be connected by links whose strength can be varied.
In one experiment, the inputs are groups of letters, and the outputs
are random sounds in a voice synthesizer. Every time the correlation
between an input and the correct output is improved, the strongest links
are strengthened, so the network gradually improves its performance.
The network can be taught to pronounce written words. The connective
patterns involve the whole network and they are learned by experience
rather than by being directly programed. Patterns develop in the whole
without prior specification of the parts; the readjustment of the parts
can be considered a form of top-down causation.26 We should also note
that the brain of a baby is not finished or hard-wired at birth. The
neural pathways are developed in interaction with the environment
and are altered by the babys experiences.
Of all the sciences, ecology is the most holistic in its outlook. No
part of an ecosystem can be considered in isolation because changes
in one component often have far-reaching ramifications elsewhere in
the system. The participants in an ecosystem are linked by multiple
connections and cycles. The oxygen inhaled by animals is exhaled as
carbon dioxide which is in turn taken in by plants and converted back
to oxygen. The food chain connects various life forms. Predator and
prey are dependent on each other in maintaining stable populations.
A holistic approach is also used in the field of systems analysis which
25
James Gleick, address at 1990 Nobel Conference, Gustavus Adolphus College,
quoted in Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory (New York, N.Y.: Pantheon
Book, 1992), 60.
26
C. Rosenberg and T. Sejnowski, Parallel Networks That Learn to Pronounce
English Text, Complex Systems 1 (1987), 14568.
32
ian g. barbour
27
Jeremy Campbell, Grammatical Man: Information, Entropy, Language, and Life
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).
33
computer, living cell, etc.) responds selectivelythat is, when information is coded, transmitted, and decoded. The meaning of the message
is dependent on a wider context of interpretation. It must be viewed
dynamically and relationally rather than in purely static terms as if the
message were contained in the pattern itself.
The information in DNA sequences in genes is significant precisely
because of its context in a larger organic system. In the growth of an
embryo, a system of time delays, spatial differentiation, and chemical
feed-back signals communicates the information needed so that the
right proteins, cells, and organs are assembled at the right location
and time. Complicated developmental pathways, with information
flowing in both directions, connect genes with molecular activities and
physiological structures. A genome contains an immense number of
possible developmental scenarios, of which only a few are realized. In
The Ontogeny of Information, Susan Oyama argues that the meaning
and informational significance of genetic instructions depend on what
cells and tissues are already present, and on the actual functioning of
the developmental system. In place of a one-way flow of information
we must imagine interactive construction in a particular context.28
An enzyme speeds the interaction of two molecules by recognizing
them (by shape and chemical affinity) and holding them at adjacent
sites where they can react with each other. Molecules of the immune
system recognize an invading virus, which is like a key that fits a lock,
and they are activated to release a specific antibody. The communication between molecules is dependent on properties of both the sender
and the receiver. A receptor is part of an embodied action system that
implements a response to signals.
Stored in the DNA is a wealth of historically acquired information
including programs for coping with the world. For example, a bird or
animal uses specific visual or auditory clues to recognize and respond
to a dangerous predator which it has not previously encountered. Individuals in some species are programed to communicate warning signals
to alert other members of the species. Higher primates are capable of
symbolic communication of information, and human beings can use
words to express abstract concepts. Human information can be transmitted between generations not only by genes and by parental example,
28
Susan Oyama, The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and Evolution
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
34
ian g. barbour
but also in speech, literature, art, music and other cultural forms. The
storage and communication of information is thus an important feature
of biological processes at many levels and it must always be understood
dynamically and relationally rather than in purely static and formal
terms. Even at low levels, reality consists not simply of matter and
energy, but of matter, energy, and information.
29
Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).
Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues (San Francisco:
Harper Collins, 1997), chap. 4.
30
35
31
Paul Davies, The Cosmic Blueprint: New Discoveries in Natures Creative Ability
to Order the Universe (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988); idem, The Mind of God:
The Scientific Basis for a Rational World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); idem,
Teleology without Teleology (CTNS/VO, v. III).
36
ian g. barbour
Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1967),
chaps. 4 and 10; William R. Stoeger, Describing Gods Action in the World in the
Light of Scientific Knowledge of Reality, in Chaos and Complexity, Russell, Murphy,
and Peacocke, eds.
37
33
William Pollard, Chance and Providence (New York: Charles Scribners Sons,
1958); Donald MacKay, Science, Chance, and Providence (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1978).
38
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levels of mental activity, but does it in such a way that human freedom
is not violated.34
An alternative would be to say that most quantum events occur by
chance, but God influences some of them without violating the statistical laws of quantum physics. This view has been explained by Robert
Russell, George Ellis and Thomas Tracy, and it is consistent with the
scientific evidence.35 A possible objection to this model is that it assumes
bottom-up causality within nature once Gods action has occurred,
and thus seems to concede the reductionists claim that the behavior
of all entities is determined by their smallest parts (or lowest levels).
The action would be bottom-up even if one assumed that Gods intentions were directed to the larger wholes (or higher levels) affected by
these quantum events. However most of these authors also allow for
Gods action at higher levels which then results in a top-down influence
on lower levels, in addition to quantum effects from the bottom up.
The model can thus be combined with one of the models discussed
below.
3.3. God as Top-down Cause
The idea of levels of reality can be extended if God is viewed as acting
from an even higher level than nature. Arthur Peacocke holds that
God exerts a top-down causality on the world. Gods action would be
a constraint on relationships at lower levels that does not violate lowerlevel laws. Constraints may be introduced not just at spatial or temporal
boundaries, but also internally through any additional specification
allowed by lower-level laws. In human beings, God would influence their
highest evolutionary level, that of mental activity, which would affect
the neural networks and neurons in the brain.36 Within human beings,
divine action would be effected down the hierarchy of natural levels,
34
Nancey Murphy, Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridans Ass and
Schrdingers Cat, in Chaos and Complexity, Russell, Murphy, and Peacocke, eds;
Nancey Murphy and George F.R. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology,
Cosmology and Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996).
35
Thomas F. Tracy, Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps, and George
F.R. Ellis, Ordinary and Extraordinary Divine Action: The Nexus of Interaction, in
Chaos and Complexity, Russell, Murphy, and Peacocke, eds.
36
Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and BecomingNatural,
Human, and Divine, enlarged edition (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), chap. 3, and
his Gods Interaction with the World in Chaos and Complexity, Russell, Murphy,
and Peacocke, eds.; idem, in CTNS/VO, v. III.
39
37
40
ian g. barbour
But the analogy breaks down if it is pressed too far. The cosmos as a
whole lacks the intermediate levels of organization found in the body.
It does not have the biochemical or neurological channels of feedback
and communication through which the activities of organisms are
coordinated and integrated. To be sure, an omnipresent God would
not need the cosmic equivalent of a nervous system. God is presumably
not as dependent on particular bodily structures as we are. However,
we would be abandoning the analogy if we said that God is a disembodied mind acting directly on the separate physical components of
the world. It appears that we need a more pluralistic analogy allowing
for interaction among a community of beings, rather than a monistic
analogy that pictures us all as parts of one being. The world and God
seem more like a community with a dominant member than like a
single organism.
3.4. God as Communicator of Information
In radio transmissions, computers, and biological systems, the communication of information between two points requires a physical input
and an expenditure of energy (the Brillouin-Szilard relationship). But if
God is omnipresent (including presence everywhere at the microlevel),
no energy would be required for the communication of information.
Moreover, the realization of alternative potentialities already present
in the quantum world would convey differing information without any
physical input or expenditure of energy.
Arthur Peacocke has used a rich variety of analogies in addition to
top-down causality. Some of these involve the communication of information. God is like the choreographer of a dance in which much of the
action is left up to the dancers, or the composer of a still unfinished
symphony, experimenting, improvising, and expanding on a theme
and variations.39 Peacocke suggests that the purposes of God are communicated through the pattern of events in the world. We can look on
evolutionary history as the action of an agent who expresses intentions
but does not follow an exact predetermined plan. Moreover, an input
of information from God could influence the relationships among our
memories, images and concepts, just as our thoughts influence the
39
Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979),
chap. 3, and Theology for a Scientific Age, chap. 9.
41
40
42
ian g. barbour
43
45
Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1953).
James Huchingson, Organization and Process: Systems Philosophy and Whiteheadian Metaphysics, Zygon 11.4 (1981): 22641.
46
44
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4.2. Interiority
Interiority is the most controversial theme in process thought. Reality is construed as a network of interconnected events which are also
moments of experience, each integrating in its own way the influences
from its past and from other entities. The evolution of interiority, like
the evolution of physical structures, is said to be characterized by both
continuity and change. The forms taken by interiority vary widely, from
rudimentary memory, sentience, responsiveness and anticipation in
simpler organisms, to consciousness and self-consciousness in more
complex ones. Human life is the only point at which we know reality
from within. If we start from the presence of both physical structures
and experience in human life, we can imagine simpler and simpler
structures in which experience is more and more rudimentary. But if
we start with simple physical structures totally devoid of interiority, it
is difficult to see how the complexification of external structures can
result in interiority.47
The approach and avoidance reactions of bacteria can be considered elementary forms of perception and response. An amoeba learns
to find sugar, indicating a rudimentary memory and intentionality.
Invertebrates seem to have some sentience and capacity for pain and
pleasure. Purposiveness and anticipation are clearly present among
lower vertebrates, and the presence of a nervous system greatly enhances
these capacities. The behavior of animals gives evidence that they suffer
intensely, and even invertebrates under stress release endorphins and
other pain-suppressant chemicals similar to those in human brains.
Some species exhibit considerable problem-solving and anticipatory
abilities and a range of awareness and feelings. Conceptualizing interiority requires that we try to look on an organisms activities from its
own point of view, even though its experience must be very different
from our own.48
We noted earlier that evolutionary change can be initiated by the
activity of organisms in selecting their own environments (the Baldwin effect). Their diverse responses and novel actions may create new
47
Charles Birch, A Purpose for Everything (Mystic, CT: Twenty-Third Publications,
1990); Birch and Cobb, The Liberation of Life: From the Cell to the Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
48
Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of
Mental Experience (Los Altos, CA: William Kaufmann, 1981); Charles Birch and John
B. Cobb, Jr., The Liberation of Life.
45
evolutionary possibilities. Among the creatures who were the common ancestors of bison and horses, some charged their enemies head
on, and their survival would have been enhanced by strength, weight,
strong skulls and other bison-like qualities. Others in the same population fled from their enemies, and their survival depended on speed,
agility, and other abilities we see in horses. The divergence of bison
and horse may have arisen initially from different responses to danger,
rather than from genetic mutations related to anatomy. Emotions and
mental responses are not uniquely determined by the genes, though
they occur in nervous systems which are the product of an inherited
set of genes. Organisms participate actively in evolutionary history
and are not simply passive products of genetic forces from within and
environmental forces from without.49
In the study of human beings, psychology was once dominated
by behaviorists who correlated observable stimuli and responses and
claimed that mental life is inaccessible to science. But the more recent
cognitive psychologists talk about perception, attention, memory, intention, mental representation and consciousness. These issues are highly
disputed today, but some authors have been trying to relate data from
three sources: phenomenological self-description, neurological research
on the brain, and computer simulations of neural nets.50 Others insist
that subjectivity, which always involves a particular perspective or
point of view, cannot be represented in the objective framework of
science.51
We are each aware of our experience despite the difficulty of studying it scientifically. It is this direct awareness that leads us to attribute
subjectivity to other humans, animals, and even to lower forms of life.
While the terms consciousness and mind should be restricted to organisms with a nervous system, it is reasonable to attribute rudimentary
forms of perception and experience to organisms as simple as the
amoeba. I would argue that in the light of evolutionary continuity and
in the interest of metaphysical generality we should take experience as
a category applicable to all integrated entities, even if consciousness
appears only in higher life forms.
49
C.H. Waddington in Mind in Nature, John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Griffin, eds.,
(Washington DC: University Press of America, 1977).
50
Owen Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992).
51
Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press,
1986); Colin McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
46
ian g. barbour
47
for God always works along with other causes. In process thought
Gods activity occurs at higher levels of organization in addition to
the quantum level. This avoids a reliance on quantum events alone
which would perpetuate the reductionists assumption that only
bottom-up causality operates within natural systems.
c. Like those who postulate God as top-down cause, process thinkers
stress Gods immanence and participation in an interdependent
many-leveled world. But process thought has no difficulty conceptualizing the interaction between the highest level (God) and the
lowest (inanimate matter) in the absence of intermediate levels,
because God is present in the unfolding of integrated events at all
levels. Hartshorne has indeed used the analogy of the world as Gods
body, though we must remember that in the process scheme the body
is itself a community of integrated entities at various levels. Most
process theologians, however, insist on a greater divine transcendence
and greater human freedom than the analogy of a cosmic body suggests. Using a social rather than organic analogy they imagine us,
not as cells in Gods body, but as members of a cosmic community
of which God is the preeminent member.
d. The idea that God communicates information to the world is consistent with process thought. Gods ordering and valuation of potentialities is a form of information within a larger context of meaning.
God also receives information from the world, and God is changed
by such feedback. The communication of information occurs within
the momentary experience of integrated events at any level, rather
than by bottom-up causality through quantum phenomena alone, or
through the trigger points of chaos theory, or by top-down causality
acting on the whole cosmos. God, past events, and the events present response join in the formation of every event. Process thought
uses a single conceptual representation for divine action at all levels,
whereas some of the authors mentioned earlier assume very different
modes of divine action at various levels in the world. At the same
time, process thought tries to allow for differences in the character
of events that occur at diverse levels.
The idea of Gods self-limitation or kenosis in recent theology is in
many ways similar to the assertions of process theology. Some theologians have suggested that God voluntarily set omnipotence aside in
creating a world. They hold that the life and death of Christ reveal a
God of love who participates in the worlds suffering. They suggest
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ian g. barbour
that, like a wise teacher or the parent of a growing child, God respects
the integrity of the created world and the freedom of human beings,
but does not abandon them. They balance the classical emphasis on
transcendence, eternity, and impassibility with a greater emphasis on
Gods immanence, temporality, and vulnerability.53 Feminist authors
have urged that patriarchal images of power as coercive control be
replaced by the images of empowerment, nurture, and cooperation
that are associated with women in our culture. They propose the image
of God as Mother to balance the traditional image of God as Father.54
Many feminists are sympathetic to the idea of kenosis, but with the
caveat that divine vulnerability and suffering love must not be cited
to support the submission and self-abnegation of women. Power as
control is a zero-sum game: the more one party has, the less the other
can have. Power as empowerment is a positive-sum situation and does
not imply weakness in either party. Empowerment and the nurturing
of growth and interdependence also seem to be appropriate features
of a model of God in an evolutionary world.
Proponents of self-limitation hold that God is in principle omnipotent but voluntarily accepts a limitation of power in order to create
a community of love and free response. The goal is relationship and
transformation, not kenosis in itself. Moreover, the use of personal
images of the relation between God and the world suggests that God
might influence events in the world without controlling them, so we do
not end up with a powerless or deistic God. Gods dialogic relation to
human beings serves as a model of divine activity throughout nature.
Process thought agrees with many of these assertions. However, it holds
that the limitations of Gods power are not voluntary and temporary
but metaphysical and necessarythough they are integral to Gods
essential nature and not antecedent or external to it.
The role of God in process thought has much in common with the
biblical understanding of the Holy Spirit. Like the process God, the
Spirit works from within. In various biblical passages, the Spirit is said
to indwell, renew, empower, inspire, guide, and reconcile. According to
53
W.H. Vanstone, Loves Endeavor, Loves Expense (London: Dartmon, Longman,
and Todd, 1977); Jrgen Moltmann, God in Creation (San Francisco: Harper & Row,
1985), 8693; Paul Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1988); Murphy and Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe.
54
Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987); Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God
in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroads, 1992).
49
Psalm 104, the Spirit creates in the present: Thou dost cause the grass
to grow for the cattle and plants for man to cultivate. . . . When thou
sendest forth thy Spirit, they are created; and thou renewest the face of
the ground. The Spirit represents Gods presence and activity in the
world. This is an emphasis on immanence which, like that in process
theology, does not rule out transcendence. Moreover, the Spirit is God
at work in nature, in human experience, and in Christ, so creation and
redemption are aspects of a single activity.55 Process thought similarly
applies a single set of concepts to Gods role in human and nonhuman
life, and it is not incompatible with the idea of particular divine action
and human response in the life of Christ. The Holy Spirit comes to us
from without to evoke our response from within. It is symbolized by
the dove, the gentlest of birds. Other symbols of the Spirit are wind
and fire, which can be more overpowering, but they usually represent
inspiration rather than sheer power. I have elsewhere tried to show
that the process view of God is consistent with other aspects of the
biblical message.56
4.4. Some Objections
Let me finally note some possible objections to process thought.
a. Is panexperientialism credible? Process thinkers attribute rudimentary
experience, feeling, and responsiveness to simple entities. They hold
that mind and consciousness are present only at higher levels in more
complex organisms, so they are not panpsychists as the term is usually understood. Rocks and inanimate objects are mere aggregates
with no unified experience. There are no sharp lines between forms
of life in evolutionary history or among creatures today. It appears
that for matter to produce mind, in evolution or in embryological development, there must be intermediate stages or levels, and
mind and matter must have some characteristics in common. No
extrapolation of physical concepts can yield the concepts needed to
describe our subjective experience. Process thought interprets lowerlevel events as simpler cases of higher-level ones, rather than trying
55
G.W.H. Lampe, God as Spirit (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); Alisdair Heron,
The Holy Spirit (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983).
56
Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, 23538.
50
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51
CHAPTER TWO
[Elijah] got up, and ate and drank; then he went in the strength of that
food forty days and forty nights to Horeb the mount of God. At that
place he came to a cave, and spent the night there.
Then the word of the Lord came to him, saying, What are you doing
here, Elijah? He answered, I have been very zealous for the Lord, the
God of hosts; for the Israelites have forsaken your covenant, thrown down
your altars, and killed your prophets with the sword. I alone am left, and
they are seeking my life, to take it away.
He said, Go out and stand on the mountain before the Lord, for the
Lord is about to pass by. Now there was a great wind, so strong that it
was splitting mountains and breaking rocks in pieces before the Lord,
but the Lord was not in the wind; and after the wind an earthquake, but
the Lord was not in the earthquake; and after the earthquake a fire, but
the Lord was not in the fire; and after the fire a sound of sheer silence.
When Elijah heard it, he wrapped his face in his mantle and went out
and stood at the entrance of the cave.
I Kings 19: 813 (NRSV)
1
This essay amplifies and extends a train of thought concerning the significance of
whole-part constraint in relation to divine action which has engaged me since 1987;
cf. fn. 1, p. 263, of my Gods Interaction with the World, in Chaos and Complexity:
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy and Arthur
Peacocke, eds. (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory; Berkeley, Calif.: Center for
Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1995), henceforth CAC. I have used the term wholepart constraint to avoid any possible Humean implications of downward/top-down
causation previously employed in this context. Perhaps this was unnecessarily cautious
(cf. my guarded language in fn. 22, p. 272, in CAC!), since I continued to envisage a
causative influence of the whole on the parts in complex systems (i.e., of the system
on its constituents), as my essay in CAC, 27276, 28287, shows. Here I take the
opportunity to emphasize this and to take account of other concepts that have been
used to describe the whole-part and the mind-brain-body relation so that the inclusive
notion of whole-part influence (as I here denote it) can be applied as an analogy for
divine action, especially in relation to Gods communication with humanity, that is,
with possible divine effects on human consciousness (an approach which I developed
earlier in my Theology for a Scientific Age, 2nd enlarged edition, [London: SCM Press;
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993], esp. in chap. 11henceforth TSA).
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arthur peacocke
1. Introduction
When Elijah in extremis and in flight from the wrath of Jezebel sought
a message from God and stood expectantly on the mount of God,
Horeb, what brought him to the mouth of his sheltering cave was not
the great wind, the earthquake, or the fire, butwe are tolda sound
of sheer silence, from the depths of which Elijah is addressed by God.2
The story encapsulates the directness and immediacy of such experiences and at the same time exemplifies their baffling character. For it
is not only these archetypal figures and events in the tradition which
have this character, but also the widespread religious experiences of
humanityboth those inside and those outside of religious tradition.3
The content of such experiences will be the concern of the last section of this essay, but their very existence raises questions about the
general nature of Gods interaction with the world and with humanity,
especially when both are viewed in the contemporary perspectives of
the natural and human sciences. The track of inquiries into scientific
perspectives on divine action in the CTNS-Vatican Observatory series
of research conferences has inevitably led to the question of how God
possibly can communicate with a humanity that is part of the natural
world and evolved in and from it.
The natural and human sciences clearly provide a context entirely
different from the cultural milieu of the legends concerning Elijahand
indeed from that of even a hundred years ago. The dominance of the
essentially Greek, and unbiblical, notion in the Christian world that
human beings consist of two distinct kinds of entity (or substance)a
mortal, physical body and an immortal spirit (or soul)provided
a deceptively obvious basis for envisaging how God and humanity
might communicate. The divine Spirit was thought then to be in
some way closely related to, and capable of communication with, the
human spiritboth were capable of being, as it were, on the same
wavelength for inter-communication. This ontology of spirit was not
physicalist insofar as it was understood that spirit was not part of the
2
I Kings 19: 12 (NRSV). The implicit paradox is well illustrated by the alternative
translations: a low murmuring sound (NEB); a faint murmuring sound (REB);
a sound of gentle stillness (RV, footnote); and, of course, the familiar a still small
voice of AV and RV.
3
See also sec. 4.1 below, Revelation and Religious Experience, and fn. 80.
55
causal nexus of the physical and biological world which the natural
sciences continue to explicate.
The basis for such an ontology has been undermined by the general
pressure of the relevant sciences towards a monistic nondualist view
of humanity. In what follows we shall examine (2.1) the perspectives
of science on the world4 and advocate an emergentist monism as the
epistemology and ontology most appropriate to these perspectives. The
relation of wholes to parts in the systems of the world, which bears upon
how effects and influences are transmitted in the world, is discussed
(2.2) and the idea of whole-part influence is again utilized (2.2.1).
Other terms used in this context are also surveyed and related to this
notion (2.2.2). The idea of a flow of information between, and even
in, systems proves to be illuminating (2.3), especially when the world is
viewed (2.4) as a System-of-systems. The mind-brain-body relation is
considered (2.5) in the light of the foregoing and it transpires that the
details of the relation between cerebral neurological activity and consciousness (the concern of many of the essays in this volume [Ed: v. IV
of CTNS/VO Series, Neuroscience and the Person]) cannot in principle
detract from or particularly illuminate the causal efficacy of the content
of the latter on the former. In other words, folk psychology and the
holistic language of personhood are held to be justified and vindicated.
The nature of communication between persons is then analyzed (2.6)
and found to be mediated entirely through patterns within the physical constituents of the world, consistently with the monist feature of
this approach and without eliminating the place for consciousness and
intention in interpersonal communication.
With this as background, the inquiry can then move on to considering Gods interaction with the world (3) and to distinguishing between
various modes of this relation (3.1). In section 3.2, reasons for eschewing
any attribution of intervention by God will be given, while recognizing that the key problem of the ontological gap(s) at the causal
joint of divine interaction may, in principle, never be solublethough
its location can usefully be discussed and affirmed to be holistic and
everywhere. How God may be best conceived as bringing about events,
or patterns of events, in the world will be addressed in section 3.3, and
an earlier hypothesis of the authorof divine holistic action on the
4
Here, and elsewhere, the world = all-that-is, including humanitythat is,
everything other than God.
56
arthur peacocke
5
Oliver C. Quick, The Christian Sacraments (London: Nisbet, 1927; repr. 1955),
chap. 1.
57
are, and not something else, because of Gods intention and purposes
to communicate to humanity. Quicks analysis points to the need to
clarify the instrumental mode of Gods interaction with the world in
order to underpin the possibility of Gods symbolic, communicating
action on human-brains-in-human-bodies, that is, in our thinking. So
what are the features of the world unveiled by the sciences that are
relevant to such an inquiry?
2. The World
2.1. Scientific Perspectives on the WorldEmergentist Monism
The underlying unity of the natural world is testified to by its universal, embedded rationality which the sciences assume and continue
to verify successfully. In the realm of the very small (the subatomic)
and of the very large (the cosmic), the extraordinary applicability of
mathematicsthe free creation of human ratiocination in elucidating
the structures, entities, and processes of the worldcontinues to reinforce that it is indeed one world. Yet, the diversity of the same world is
apparent not only in the purely physicalmolecules, the Earths surface,
the immensely variegated denizens of the astronomical heavensbut
even more strikingly in the biological world. New species continue to
be discovered, in spite of the depredations caused by human action.
This diversity has been rendered more intelligible in recent years by
an increased awareness of the principles involved in the constitution of
complex systems. There is even a corresponding science of complexity
concerned with theories about such systems. It will be enough here to
recognize that the natural (and also human) sciences increasingly give
us a picture of the world as consisting of a complex hierarchyor more
accurately, hierarchiesa series of levels of organization of matter in
which each successive member of the series is a whole constituted of
parts preceding it in the series.6 The wholes are organized systems of
6
Conventionally, the series is said to run from the lower less complex systems
to the higher more complex systemsfrom parts to wholesso that these wholes
themselves constitute parts of more complex entities, rather like a series of Russian
dolls. In the complex systems I have in mind here, the parts retain their identity and
properties as isolated individual entities. So the systems referred to are those which,
loosely speaking, were the concern of the first phase of general systems theory. In those
systems the parts (elements) of the complex wholes are physical entities (e.g., atoms,
58
arthur peacocke
parts that are dynamically and spatially interrelateda feature (sometimes called a mereological relation) which will concern us further
below (section 2.2). This feature of the world is now widely recognized
to be of significance in relating our knowledge of its various levels of
complexitythat is, the sciences which correspond to these levels.7 It
also corresponds not only to the world in its present condition but
also to the way complex systems have evolved in time out of earlier
simpler ones.
What is significant about this process in time and about the relation of complex systems to their constituents now is that the concepts
needed to describe and understandas indeed also the methods needed
to investigateeach level in the hierarchy of complexity are specific to
and distinctive of those levels. It is very often the case (but not always)
that the properties, concepts, and explanations used to describe the
higher level wholes are not logically reducible to those used to describe
their constituent parts, themselves often also constituted of yet smaller
entities. This is an epistemological assertion of a nonreductionist kind,
and its precise implications have been much discussed. With reference
to a particular system whose constitutive parts (or elements) are
stable (see footnote 6), I think it is possible to affirm that there can
be theory autonomy in the sense indicated above (that is, the logical
and conceptual nonreducibility of predicates, concepts, laws, etc., of
the theories applied to the higher level) without there being processautonomy (defined to mean that the processes occurring at the higher
level are more than an interlocking, in new relations, of the processes
in which the constituent parts participate).8
molecules, cells) which are either individually stable or which undergo processes of
change (as, e.g., in chemical reactions), themselves analyzable as being the interchange
of stable parts (atoms in that case). The internal relations of such elements are not
regarded as affected by their incorporation into the system.
7
See, e.g., TSA, 3643, 21418, and figure 3, based on a scheme of W. Bechtel
and A. Abrahamson in their Connectionism and the Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991),
figure 8.1; for a bold extension of the schema developed there, see Nancey Murphy
and George F.R. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cosmology and
Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), chaps. 2, 4.
8
See the Appendix to this essay and my God and the New Biology (London: Dent,
1986, repr. Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1994), chaps. 1, 2, henceforth GNB. Whether
or not this statement about theory- and process-autonomy applies to the relations
between distinctive systems is a matter which will be examined further in sec. 2.4 and
the Appendix. [Editors Note: the appendix to this essay is not included in the current
volume].
59
When the nonreducibility of properties, concepts, and explanations applicable to higher levels of complexity is well established, their
employment in scientific discourse can often, but not in all cases, lead to
a putative and then to an increasingly confident attribution of a causal
efficacy to the complex wholes which does not apply to the separated,
constituent parts, for to be real, new, and irreducible . . . must be to
have new, irreducible causal powers.9 If this continues to be the case
under a variety of independent procedures and in a variety of contexts,
then new and distinctive kinds of realities at the higher levels of complexity may properly be said to have emerged.10 This can occur with
respect either to moving synchronically up the ladder of complexity,
or diachronically through cosmic and biological evolutionary history.
This understanding accords with the pragmatic attribution, both in
ordinary life and scientific investigation, of the term reality to that
which we cannot avoid taking account of in our diagnosis of the course
of events, in experience or experiments. Real entities have effects and
play irreducible roles in adequate explanations of the world.
We have been assuming, with the physicalists, that all entities,
all concrete particulars in the world, including human beings, are
constituted of fundamental physical entitieswhatever it is that current physics postulates as the basic constituents of the world (which,
of course, includes energy as well as matter). This is a monistic view
(a constitutively-ontologically reductionist one)everything can be
broken down into fundamental physical entities and no extra entities
are to be inserted at higher levels of complexity to account for their
properties. I shall denote this position as that of emergentist monism,
rather than as nonreductive physicalism, for those who adopt this
latter label for their view, particularly in their talk of the physical
realization of the mental in the physical, often seem to me to hold a
much less realistic view of higher level properties than I wish to affirm
9
Samuel Alexander, as quoted by Jaegwon Kim, Non-reductivism and Mental
Causation, in Mental Causation, John Heil and Alfred Mele, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1993), 204.
10
William C. Wimsatt has elaborated criteria of robustness for such attributions
of reality for emergent properties at the higher levels. These involve noting what is
invariant under a variety of independent procedures; this is summarized in GNB, 2728,
from Wimsatts paper Robustness, Reliability and Multiple-Determination in Science,
in Knowing and Validating in the Social Sciences: A Tribute to Donald T. Campbell,
Marilynn Brewer and Barry Collins, eds. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981).
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hereand also not to attribute causal powers to that to which higherlevel concepts refer.11
If we do make such an ontological commitment about the reality of
the emergent whole of a given total system, the question then arises:
How is one to explicate the relation between the state of the whole
and the behavior of parts of that system at the micro-level? The simple
concept of chains of causally related events (ABC . . .) in constant
conjunction ( la Hume) is inadequate for this purpose. Extending and
enriching the notion of causality now becomes necessary because of
new insights into the way complex systems in general and biological
ones in particular behave. This subtler understanding of how higher
levels influence the lower levels, and vice versa, still allows application
in this context of the notion of a causal relation from whole to part
(of system to constituent)never ignoring, of course, the bottom-up
effects of parts on wholes, for the properties of wholes depend on the
properties of the parts being what they are.
2.2. The Relation of Wholes and Parts in Complex Systems
A number of related concepts have been developed in recent years to
describe these relations in both synchronic and diachronic systemsthat
is, respectively, both those in some kind of steady state with stable,
characteristic emergent features of the whole, and those which display
an emergence of new features in the course of time.
11
My view of emergent monism is in harmony with that of Philip Clayton, to
whom I am much indebted for his shrewd and useful comments on this essay. Note
that the term monism is emphatically not intended (as is apparent from the nonreductive approach adopted here) in the sense in which it is taken to mean that physics
will eventually explain everything. Note also that this position is distinct from that
of dual-aspect monism or two-aspect monism, which could appear to be purely
epistemological, being about how an entity is viewed from two different perspectives.
Even when the two and dual refer to distinct properties of a single entity, there
is not in these terms any implication of a causal relation between the aspects (any
more than between the wave and particle aspects of the single entity of the electron).
Talk of two aspects is not strong enough to include an affirmation that the higher
level is real and has causal efficacy.
61
12
Donald T. Campbell, Downward Causation in Hierarchically Organized Systems, in Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems, Francisco
J. Ayala and Theodosius Dobzhansky, eds. (London: Macmillan, 1974), 17986. A
valuable and perspicacious account (with which I entirely agree) of emergent order,
top-down causation (fully illustrated by its operation in the hierarchical organization
of the modern digital computer), and the physical mediation of top-down effects has
been given in Murphy and Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe, 2232. For brevity here, I refer the reader to that recent excellent exposition. For earlier expositions of
the hierarchies of complexity, of the relation of scientific concepts applicable to wholes
to those applicable to the constituent parts, and of top-down/downward causation and
whole-part influence (as discussed below), see GNB, chaps. 1, 2; TSA, 3941, 5055,
21318 (esp. figure 3); and CAC, 27276.
13
For a survey with references, see Arthur Peacocke, The Physical Chemistry of
Biological Organization (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, 1989), henceforth PCBO.
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14
Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos (London: Heinemann,
1984).
15
PCBO; Prigogine and Stengers, Order Out of Chaos; Niels H. Gregersen, The Idea
of Creation and the Theory of Autopoietic Processes, Zygon 33 (1998): 33367.
16
Prigogine and Stengers, Order Out of Chaos.
63
nature of the system, in some sense the same; so this causal relation
might, adding confusion, entice some to regard the higher level as possessing a somewhat metaphysical character.
2.2.2. Other Analyses
Various interpretations have been deployed by other authors to represent this whole-part relation in different kinds of systems (and notably
the mind-brain-body onesee section 2.5), though not usually with
causal implications.
a. Structuring causes. The notion of whole-part influence is germane
to one that Niels Gregersen has recently employed17 in his valuable
discussion of autopoietic (self-making) systemsnamely that of structuring causes, as developed by Fred Dretske18 for understanding mental
causation. Gregersen and Dretske refer to the event(s) that produced
the hardware conditions (actual electrical connections in the computer)
and the word-processing program (software) as the structuring causes
of the cursor movement on the screen connected with the computer;
whereas the triggering cause is usually pressure on a key on the
keyboard. The two kinds of causes exhibit a different relationship to
their effects. A triggering one falls into the familiar (Humean) pattern
of constant conjunction. However, a structuring cause is never sufficient to produce the particular effect (the key still has to be pressed);
there is no constant relationship between structuring cause and effect.
In the case of complex systems, such as those already mentioned, the
system-as-a-whole often has the role, I suggest, of a structuring cause
in Dretskes sense.
This idea helps in responding to two features that Thomas Tracy19
has found to be problematic in my own earlier use of top-down
explanations.20 Tracy was, firstly, concerned with the supposition that
17
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21
65
27
For example, Michael Polanyi, Life Transcending Physics and Chemistry, Chemistry and Engineering News (August 21, 1967): 5466; and idem, Lifes Irreducible
Structure, Science 160 (1968): 130812. In his discussion, and mine in this essay, the
term boundary condition is not being used, as it often is, to refer either to the initial
(and in that sense boundary) conditions of, say, a partial differential equation as
applied in theoretical physics, or to the physical, geometrical boundary of a system.
28
Bernd-Olaf Kppers, Understanding Complexity, in CAC, 100.
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as physical influences within the system or between the system and its
immediate environment. Boundaries are local phenomena, rather than
global states of the system-as-a-whole.29
But the system is what has a boundaryand only the system can have
it. It is because the system-as-a-whole is an entity, immersed in a conditioning environment with which it has a boundary, that it undergoes
holistic reorganization of its constituent units. Indeed the Bnard
phenomenon is independent of the shape of the container provided its
dimensions are large with respect to convection cell size (the very condition that makes physical boundary effects negligible). The theory that
has to give an intelligible account of all this has to deal with properties
of the system-as-a wholethe temperature dependence of the viscosity and density of aggregates of molecules, their thermal conductivity
and the mutual interplay of all these factors together in the behavior
of the whole assembly. It is not enough, therefore, to pinpoint only the
environment-system interaction as uniquely determinative. For it is
only because of the nature of the entire system-as-a-whole that under
such boundary conditions the constituent molecules manifest their
unexpected, bizarre behavior. It is a case of whole-part influence in
the sense defined above.
There is a sense in which the system-as-a-whole, because of its distinctive configuration, can constrain and influence the behavior of the parts
to be otherwise than if they were isolated from this particular system.
Yet the system-as-a-whole would not be describable by the concepts
and laws of that level and still have the properties it does have, if the
parts (in the Zhabotinsky case, the ceric and cerous ions) were not of
the particular kind they are. What is distinctive in the system-as-awhole is the new kind of interrelations and interactions, spatially and
temporally, of the parts.
d. Supervenience. Another, much debated term which has been used
in this connection, especially in describing the relation of mental events
to neurophysiological ones in the brain, is that of supervenience. The
term, which does not usually imply any whole-part causative relation,
goes back to Donald Davidsons employment of it in expounding his
view of the mind-brain-body relation as anomalous monism.30 The
29
67
various meanings and scope of the term in this context had been formulated and classified by Jaegwon Kim as involving: the covariance of
the supervenient properties with, the dependency of the supervenient
properties on, and the nonreducibility of the supervenient properties
to, their base properties.31 Another definition has been proposed elsewhere by Nancey Murphy.32 In the wider context of hierarchical systems
(prescinding from the mind-brain-body problem, for the momentsee
section 2.5 below) the term supervenience may be taken to refer to the
relation between properties of the same system that pertain to different
levels of analysis . . . higher-level properties supervene on lower-level
properties if they are partially constituted by the lower-level properties
but are not directly reducible to them.33
One can ask the question:
[H]ow are the properties characteristic of entities at a given level related
to those that characterize entities of adjacent levels? Given that entities
at distinct levels are ordered by the part-whole relation, is it the case
that properties associated with different levels are also ordered by some
distinctive and significant relationship?34
The attribution of supervenience asserts primarily that there is a necessary covariance between the properties of the higher level and those of
the lower level. When the term supervenience was first introduced its
attribution did not imply a causal influence of the supervenient level on
the subvenient one.35 Its appropriateness is questionable for analyzing
whole-part relations, which by their very nature relate, with respect to
complex systems, entities that are in some sense the same.
Yet, in the context of the physical and biological (and, it must also
be said, ecological and social) worlds, the mutual interrelations between
whole and parts in any internally hierarchically organized system often,
31
Jaegwon Kim, Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation, Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 9 (1984): 25770; repr. in Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical
Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
32
Nancey Murphy, Supervenience, and the Downward Efficacy of the Mental: A
Nonreductive Physicalist Account of Human Action, in CTNS/VO, v. IV.
33
Murphy and Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe, 23.
34
Kim, Non-reductivism and Mental Causation, in Mental Causation, 191.
35
However, utilizing her definition of supervenience, Nancey Murphy has suggested (personal communication, July, 1998) that the supervenient level may involve
additional circumstances that cannot be described at the subvenient level, and these
additional circumstances can have a causal impact on the series of events. Thus, the
causal connections will show up (be intelligible) only at the supervenient level of
description.
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we have seen, appear to involve causal effects of the whole on the parts.
We shall continue, therefore, to use the term whole-part influence,36
rather than the terms 14 above, to refer to the subtle interlocking
influences of the whole of any particular hierarchically organized system
on its constituent parts.
2.3. Flow of Information
A general concept which has often been found to be applicable to
understanding the relation between higher and lower levels in a single,
hierarchically stratified complex system is that of there being a flow of
information from the higher to the lower level. The higher level is seen
as constraining and shaping the patterns of events occurring among
the constituent units of the lower one. Although information is a
concept distinct from those of matter and energy, in actual systems
no information flows without some exchange of energy and/or matter. Nevertheless, as an interpretative concept it is useful not only in
the more obvious context of the mind-brain-body relation but also in
considering the relation of environment to biological processes, including that of evolution.37 Thus, the case of the worker termite cited by
Donald Campbell could well be interpreted as manifesting a temporal
flow of information: information about the environment is, over a long
period of time, impressed indirectly (via the effect of the environment
on the viability of organisms possessing mutated DNA) on the DNA.
This DNA then shapes the functioning of the organism that is capable
of producing viable progeny. The concept of information is indeed apt
for situations in which a form at one level influences forms at lower
levels. This process can at least be conceived as a process of transfer
of information, as distinct from energy or matter. John Puddefoot has
usefully distinguished between:
a. Information in the physicists, communication engineers, and
brain scientists sense, that of C.E. Shannonthe sense in which
information is related to the probability of one outcome or case
36
It must be stressed that the whole-part relation is not regarded here necessarily, or
frequently, as a spatial one. Whole-part is synonymous with system-constituent.
37
Cf. Jeffrey S. Wicken, Evolution, Information and Thermodynamics: Extending the
Darwinian Paradigm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
69
38
John C. Puddefoot, Information and Creation, in The Science and Theology of
Information, C. Wassermann, R. Kirby, and B. Rordoff, eds. (Geneva: Labor et Fides,
1992), 15 (my numbering). For further discussion, especially in relation to biological
complexity, see PCBO, 25963, and in relation to evolution, 26368.
39
The transition from 1 to 3 is also closely akin to that from semiotics to semantics
and coheres well with the emergentist-monist position.
40
See PCBO, 25963; Frank J. Tipler, The Physics of Immortality (London: Macmillan, 1995), 12427.
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41
Michael J. Apter and L. Wolpert, Cybernetics and Development. I. Information
Theory, Journal of Theoretical Biology 8 (1965): 24457.
42
By the world-as-a-whole, I here mean all-that-is, or ever has been; all that is
created, i.e., all that is not God. (The outer dashed circle in figure 1 on p. 85 is meant
to denote this).
43
Recall also the notorious gravitational effect of the motion of an electron at the
edge of, say, our galaxy on the collisions of macroscopic billiard balls; Michael Berry,
Breaking the Paradigm of Classical Physics from Within, Cercy Symposium on
Logique et Thorie des Catastrophes, 1983.
71
all forms of life (including human), as well as their matter and energy
cycles, themselves related to atmospheric and geological ones, has in
recent years become increasingly apparent in all its baffling intricacies.
These interactions between individual systems over space and time are
as real in their mutual influencing as anything else described by the
natural sciences, and their existence cannot be ignored in our reflections
on the nature of the world and of Gods relation to it, simply because
we can never have one comprehensive theory of them.
This character of the world-as-a-whole suggests that it is metaphysically plausible to perceive it as a System-of-systems (using the word
system with the weight already attached to it in the light of complexity theory of individual systems). Such an epistemological assertion
would have, as always, a putative ontological significance. In that case,
the world-as-a-whole is not simply a concept44 nor an abstract
description,45 but could at least provisionally be regarded as an holistic
reality at its own leveleven if the coupling between systems is much
looser and more diffuse, and therefore less classifiable, than it is within
a particular individual hierarchically stratified system clearly demarcated
from its environment. The apprehension of all-that-is in its holistic
unity as a System-of-systems is, of course, scarcely vouchsafed to the
limited horizons and capacities of humanity, though every advance
in the sciences serves to reveal further cross-connections between its
component systems. Such interconnectedness would be transparent to
the omniscient Creator, who continuously gives its constituents and its
processes existence and in Whom all-that-is exists, from a sacramental,
panentheistic perspective.
The relation between higher and lower levels within an individual
hierarchically stratified system I have been designating by the pantechnicon term whole-part influence.46 This influence, I suggested,
can often be regarded as a flow of information. We now have to ask:
Can these notions be applied to the relations between systems in the
world-as-a-whole? In order to respond to this question, it turns out
44
Niels Henrik Gregersen, Providence in an Indeterministic World, CTNS Bulletin, 14.1 (Winter, 1994): 26.
45
Idem. Three Types of Indeterminacy, in The Concept of Nature in Science and
Theology, part I, vol. 3 of Studies in Science and Theology of the European Society for
the Study of Science and Theology (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1995), 175.
46
See sec. 2.2 above.
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to be necessary to clarify the relation between theory- and processautonomy and this issue is discussed in the Appendix. There I conclude
that, although theory-autonomy can occur without process-autonomy
with respect to the internal relations of a particular system of stable
parts, in the relation between two mutually interacting type-different
systems both the theories applicable to and processes of each can be
autonomous with respect to the other.
From that discussion it transpires that we shall have to recognize that
the interactions and relations between distinctive systems are unlikely to
be describable in the same way as those within hierarchically stratified
systems of stable parts. We are regarding the world as a System-ofsystems, but not as a hierarchically stratified one, so that the principles
of weak nonreducibility do not have to apply to the relation between
the component systems of the world.47 Indeed, if we could have a cosmic-global science of the world-as-a-whole as a System-of-systems, the
theories (and predicates, concepts, laws, etc.) of that science would be
expected to manifest not only theory-autonomy but also ex hypothesi
process-autonomy since the processes going on in that whole System
consist of the changing relations among type-different component
systems (often containing type-different component parts).
Earlier we noted that when a particular hierarchical system was
considered, the idea that there can be envisaged a flow of information from the higher level to the lower one could sometimes be usefully employed. Is this notion of the flow of information any help
in thinking of the multiple interactions between individual systems in
the world System? Such interactions are obviously highly variegated,
multiple, and overlapping, as Gregersen says, for we face a criss-cross
interpenetration of different kinds of operational systems . . . a world of
naturally polycentric systems . . ., a nexus of realities,48 or a network
of influences.49
47
For weak nonreducibility, see the Appendix. If the systems in question are
themselves part of an actual hierarchy of organization and are themselves stable, then
the analysis may well revert to that applicable to the internal relationships within a
larger hierarchical system of stable parts, each of which is then itself a system. For the
world-as-a-whole, it is the interaction between systems not so described that is chiefly
under consideration . . . the reality of the world as a whole is itself a result of the
interpenetrations between the type- and code-different systems observed . . . (Gregersen,
The Idea of Creation and the Theory of Autopoietic Processes, 337).
48
Ibid.
49
Gregersen (personal communication, 12 November, 1996), describing my own
view.
73
The world may be conceived of as an interconnected web of type-different systems interacting in specific ways and mutually influencing each
other.50 A common factor then discernible in the multiple interactions
between such systems (in the whole cosmic System) is the transfer of
information whereby patterns of events in one system affect patterns
of events in anotherand the interchange between the myriad systems
of energy and/or matter are ex hypothesi variegated beyond the possibility of generalization. The use of the concept of information is thus
particularly apt for elucidating these interactions since it is, conceptually
at least, independent of those of matter and energythough in nature
it never occurs without their exchange.
2.5. The Mind-Brain-Body Relation and Personhood
Much of the discussion of the relation of higher levels to lower ones in
hierarchically stratified systems has centered on the mind-brain-body
relation, on how mental events are related to neurophysiological ones
in the human-brain-in-the-human-bodyin effect the whole question
of human agency and what we mean by it. A hierarchy of levels can
be delineated,51 each of which is the focus of a corresponding scientific
study, from neuroanatomy and neurophysiology to psychology. Those
involved in studying how the brain works have come to recognize
that properties not found in components of a lower level can emerge
from the organization and interaction of these components at a higher
level. For example, rhythmic pattern generation in some neural circuits is a property of the circuit, not of isolated pacemaker neurons.
Higher brain functions (e.g., perception, attention) may depend on
temporally coherent functional units distributed through different maps
50
Gregersen (personal communication, March, 1998) has expressed this point to
me thus: [P]erhaps the most curious feature about our universe is that it starts out as
a unity and ends up in a plurality of systems . . . . forever based on the same uniform
matter, always interacting with one another in ever-new constellations of mutual influences (thus certainly interlocked) but nonetheless appearing in type-different forms,
thus also operating by virtue of type-different causalities (emphasis original).
51
As indicated in the legend to fig. 1 on p. 85, where the schema of Patricia S.
Churchland and T.J Sejnowski is depicted (Perspectives in Cognitive Neuroscience
Science 242 [1988]: 74145). The physical scales of these levels are, according to these
authors, as follows: molecules, 1010m; synapses, 106m; neurons, 104m; networks, 103m;
maps, 102m; systems, 101m; central nervous system, 1m, in human beings.
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52
Terrence J. Sejnowski, C. Koch, and P. Churchland, Computational Neuroscience, Science 241 (1988): 12991306, see p. 1300.
53
Churchland and Sejnowski, Perspectives in Cognitive Neuroscience, 744.
54
See, for example, the collection of papers in Mental Causation, Heil and Mele, eds.
55
Kim, Non-reductivism and Mental Causation, 193.
75
56
Broadly, this is the nonreductive physicalist view of the mental-physical relation,
which has been summarized (ibid., 198) as follows:
a. Physical Monism. All concrete particulars are physical.
b. Anti-reductionism. Mental properties are not reducible to physical properties.
c. The Physical Realization Thesis. All mental properties are physically realized; that
is, whenever an organism, or system, instantiates a mental property M, it has some
physical property P such that P realizes M in organisms of its kind.
d. Mental Realism. Mental properties are real properties of objects and events; they are
not merely useful aids in making predictions or fictitious manners of speech.
57
The idea of mental states being physically realized in neurons was expanded
as follows by John Searle, Minds, Brain and Science, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1984), 26 (emphasis added):
Consciousness . . . is a real property of the brain that can cause things to happen.
My conscious attempt to perform an action such as raising my arm causes the
movement of the arm. At the higher level of description, the intention to raise my
arm causes the movement of the arm. At the lower level of description, a series
of neuron firings starts a chain of events that results in the contraction of the
muscles . . . [T]he same sequence of events has two levels of description. Both of
them are causally real, and the higher-level causal features are both caused by and
realized in the structure of the lower level elements. What follows in the main text
here shows that I am not satisfied with Searles parallelism between the causality
of the mental and physical; it is not enough. I argue later on in this essay for a
joint causality whereby the mental influences the physical level in the brain.
58
Kim, Non-reductivism and Mental Causation, 2025.
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theory can in principle account for all phenomena (causal closure). Steven Cain has succinctly summarized these conclusions of Kim: . . . the
nonreductive physicalist cannot live without downward causation, and
the nonreductive physicalist cannot live with it.59
Crain argues (and I agree) that it is Kims assumption that a physical
microstructure in physically realizing a mental property is its sufficient
cause, which leads to the exclusion of any causative role for mental properties, for in the wider range of physical, biological, and other systems
discussed in section 2.2, the causative effects of the higher levels on the
lower ones were real but different in kind from the effects the parts had
on each other operating at the lower level. Thus, what happens in these
systems at the lower level is the result of the joint operation of both
higher- and lower-level influencesthe higher and lower levels could
be said to be jointly sufficient, type-different60 causes of the lower-level
events. When the higher-lower relation is that of mind/brain to body,
it seems to me that similar considerations should apply.
Up to this point, I have been taking the term mind, and its cognate mental, to refer to that which is the emergent reality distinctive
especially of human beings. But in many wider contexts, not least that
of philosophical theology, a more appropriate term for this emergent
reality would be person, and its cognate personal, to represent the
total psychosomatic, holistic experience of the human being in all its
modalitiesconscious and unconscious, rational and emotional, active
and passive, individual and social, etc. The concept of personhood
recognizes that, as Philip Clayton puts it,
We have thoughts, wishes and desires that together constitute our character. We express these mental states through our bodies, which are
simultaneously our organs of perception and our means of affecting other
things and persons in the world . . . [The massive literature on theories
59
77
There is, therefore, a strong case for designating the highest level, the
whole, in that unique system which is the human-brain-in-the-humanbody-in-social-relations as that of the person. Persons are inter alia
causal agents with respect to their own bodies and to the surrounding
world (including other persons). They can, moreover, report on aspects
of their internal states concomitant with their actions with varying
degrees of accuracy. Hence the exercise of personal agency by individuals
transpires to be a paradigm case and supreme exemplar of whole-part
influencein this case exerted on their own bodies and on the world
of their surroundings (including other persons). Thus, the details of
the relation between cerebral neurological activity and consciousness
cannot in principle detract from the causal efficacy of the content of
the latter on the former and thus on behavior. In other words, folk
psychology and the real reference of the language of personhood
are both justified and necessary.
2.6. Communication Between Persons
We are aiming at understanding better, in the light of what we now
know through the sciences about human nature, how God might be
conceived of as communicating with humanity. Let us remind ourselves first how human persons communicate with each other. How
do we get to know each other, not only by description, but also by
acquaintancethat is, get to know what is, as we say, in each others
mind?62
All communication at its most basic level is mediated through
the senseshearing, sight, touch, taste, and smell. The physical
61
Philip Clayton, The Case for Christian Panentheism, Dialog 37.3 (Summer 1998):
2018 (quotation on 205); see also his Rethinking the Relation of God to the World:
Panentheism and the Contribution of Philosophy, chap. 4 in God and Contemporary
Science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), in which the nuances of panentheism are well developed. Broadly, they amount to a stronger form of immanence
in which God is seen as in, with, and under the very processes of the world almost in
a sacramental modality. See also TSA, passim.
62
See the articles in CTNS/VO, v. IV by Leslie Brothers and Marc Jeannerod.
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79
65
80
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81
69
70
82
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71
For panentheism, see TSA, chap. 9 and fn. 67, above. The metaphor of natural
events as, in some sense, Gods actions should not, in my view, be stretched to include
a metaphor employed by some authors of the world as Gods body. The first has, like all
metaphors, an is/is-not aspectnamely, in this case, my emphasis on the ontological
distinction between God and the world. The second might tempt us unwarrantedly to
seek for a divine analogy for the human brains and nerves whereby human decisions
effect events in their bodies!
72
Cf. my remarks in CAC (p. 287, first para.) which apply here too: [T]he present
exercise could be regarded essentially as an attempt, as it were, to ascertain where
this ontological gap, across which God transmits information (i.e., communicates),
is most coherently located, consistently with Gods interaction with everything else
having particular effects and without abrogating those regular relationships to which
Gods own self continues to give an existence which the sciences increasingly discover.
This concurs with Gregersen in his article, Three Types of Indeterminacy (fn. 14,
p. 184), in which he says: We cannot expect to find the causal routes of divine action
and their subsequent joints with natural causes. The most we can do, is to suggest
meaningful localizations of possible divine actions.
73
TSA, passim, especially 15760; and CAC, 27276, 28287, where I proposed: If
God interacts with the world at a supervenient level of totality, then God, by affecting the state of the world-as-a-whole, could, on the model of whole-part constraint
relationships in complex systems, be envisaged as able to exercise constraints upon
events in the myriad sub-levels of existence that constitute that world without abrogating the laws and regularities that specifically pertain to themand this without
intervening within the unpredictabilities we have noted [I had in mind here the inprinciple, inherent kinds, i.e., quantum events, though the remarks would also apply
to the practical unpredictabilities of chaotic systems]. Particular events might occur
in the world and be what they are because God intends them to be so, without at any
83
point any contravention of the laws of physics, biology, psychology, or whatever is the
pertinent science for the level of description in question (283).
Ernan McMullin has raised the question of how this proposal of mine relates to
quantum indeterminism in his, Cosmic Purpose and the Contingency of Human
Evolution, Theology Today 55 (1998): 407 and fn. 50. As he points out, in my view
God does not definitively know the future, but has a maximally conceivable capacity to
predict it based on total knowledge of present events and of the laws and regularities of
natural processes (TSA, 12833). In the case of quantum events, this would, to respond
to his query, have to refer to Gods prediction of the statistical outcome of multiple
quantum events and not individual onesif the standard Copenhagen interpretation
of quantum mechanics is assumed. In his article, McMullins other query about the
proposal concerns how the interaction between an ontologically distinct God and the
world might be conceived of without being the forbidden sort of intervention. This is
met by the suggestion of the interaction being analogous to a flow of information, as
described later in this section.
74
Note that the same may be said of human agency. Also, this proposal recognizes
explicitly that the laws and regularities which constitute the sciences usually apply only
to certain perceived, if ill-defined, levels within the complex hierarchies of nature.
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75
TSA, 161,164; CAC, 27475, 285. John Polkinghorne has made a similar proposal
in terms of the divine input of active information in his Scientists as Theologians
(London: SPCK, 1996), 3637.
76
Morever, I would not wish to tie the proposed model too tightly to a flow of
information interpretation of the mind-brain-body problem (see also fn. 63 above).
77
This is an elaboration of fig. 1 of TSA to include a depiction of the multi-leveled
nature of human beings. While it hardly needs to be said, the infinity sign represents
not infinite space or time, but the infinitely more that Gods being encompasses in
comparison with that of everything else.
85
GOD
G
O
D
G
O
D
GOD
GOD
Mental experiences
[conscious and unconscious]
Brain and CNS
Systems
Maps
Networks
Multi-leveled
HUMANITY
Neurons
Synapses
Apart from the top one, these are the levels of
organization of the human nervous system
depicted in fig. 1 of Patricia S. Churchland and T.J.
Sejnowski, Perspectives on Cognitive
Neuroscience, Science 242 (1988): 741745.
Figure 1. Diagram representing spatially the ontological relation of, and the
interactions between, God and the world (including humanity).
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arthur peacocke
78
Recall Augustines representation of the whole creation as if it were some
sponge, huge , but bounded floating in the boundless sea of God, environing and
penetrating it . . . everywhere and on every side (Confessions, VII.7).
87
framework and coherently with the worldview (cf. section 3.2, above)
which the sciences engender.79
When I was using nonhuman systems in their whole-part relationships as a model for Gods relation to the world in special providence, I
resorted to the idea of a flow of information as being a helpful pointer
to what might be conceived as crossing the ontological gap(s) between
God and the world-as-a-whole. But now as I turn to more personal
categories to explicate this relation and interchange, it is natural to
interpret a flow of information between God and the world, including
humanity, in terms of the communication that occurs between personsnot unlike the way in which a flow of Shannon-type information
metamorphoses in the human context into information in the ordinary
sense of the word.80 Thus whatever else may be involved in Gods personal interaction with the world, communication must be involved,
and this raises the question: To whom might God be communicating?
We would not be deliberating here on scientific perspectives on divine
action if it had not been the case that humanity distinctively and, it
appears, uniquely has regarded itself as the recipient of communication
from an Ultimate Reality, named in English as God. But in what ways
has the reception of communication from God been understood and
thought to have been experienced?
79
See TSA, 16066, and, more recently, CAC, 28487, for an elaboration of this
move and a discussion of the extent to which it is appropriate, if at all, to think of
the world as the body of the ultimately transcendent God, who has a panentheistic
relation to that same world.
80
That is, Puddefoots 1 2 3; see sec. 2.3 above.
81
The sequence of thought in this section is more fully amplified in TSA, chap. 11.
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world of which human beings are part and in which human actions
occur. Furthermore, all interactions between human beings (the pairs
of solid single-headed arrows in fig. 1) also occur through the mediation of the constituents of the physical world, including the cultural
heritage coded on to material substrates.82 Such interactions include, of
course, communication between human beings, that is, between their
states of consciousness, which are also, under one description, patterns of activity within human brains. This raises the question: How,
within such a framework of understanding, can one conceive of Gods
self-communication with humanity? This in turn raises the traditional
question: How might God reveal Godself to humanity? How (in what
way) can we conceive of God communicating with and to humanity
in the light of the foregoing?
4.1. Revelation and Human Experience
In communication between human beings some of our actions, gestures,
and responses are more characteristic and revelatory of our distinctive
selves, of our intentions, purposes and meanings, than are others. Its
not what you say but the way youre saying it. This prompts us to
seek in the world those events and entities, or patterns of them, which
unveil Gods meaning(s) most overtly, effectively, and distinctively
constituting what is usually called revelation, for in revelation God
is presupposed to be active.
The ways in which such a revealing activity of God have been thought
to occur in the different ranges and contexts of human experience can
be graded according to the increasing extent to which God is said to
be experienced as taking the initiative in making Godself explicitly
known.
a. General Revelation. If the world is created by God then it cannot
but reflect Gods creative intentions and thus, however ambiguously,
Gods character and purposes;83 and it must go on doing so if God
continuously interacts with the world in the way we have proposed.
Hence there can be a knowledge of God (and by inference, of Gods
purposes), however diffuse, which is available to all humanity through
82
83
89
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The Jewish and Christian traditions have, more than most others,
placed a particular emphasis on Gods revelation in the experienced
events of a history. Such special revelation, initiated (it is assumed)
by God, has been regarded by Christians as recorded particularly in the
Bible. How we are to receive this record today in the light of critical
and historical study is a major issue in contemporary Christianity since
it involves a subtle dialogue of each generation with its own past.
d. Revelation and religious experience. My attempt to discriminate
between modes of revelation according to the degree to which God is
experienced as taking the initiative in making Godself explicitly known
is helpful only up to a point, for there must be avoided the not uncommon tendency to press the distinctions too sharply and to ignore the
smooth gradations between the different categories of revelation already
distinguished. It is notable from a wide range of investigations how
widespread such religious experience is, even in the secularized West,
and that it is continuous in its distribution over those who are members of a religious community and those who are not.84 The evidence
suggests that the boundary between general revelation and revelation
to members of a religious tradition is very blurred. But so also is the
boundary between the latter and special revelation, for there are welldocumented non-Scriptural accounts over the centuries of devotional
and mystical experiences, regarded as revelations of God, among those
who do belong to a religious tradition.
It is also widely recognized that the classical distinction between
natural and revealed theology has proved difficult to maintain in
modern times, for it can be held that the only significant difference
between supposedly natural and supposedly revealed insights is
that the former are derived from considering a broader (though still
selected) range of situations than the latter. The same could also be said
of the subsequently more widely favored distinction between general
and special revelation, for the range of, and overlap between, the
84
See, for example, David Hay, Religious Experience Today: Studying the Facts
(London: Mowbray, 1990). Typical questions concerning religious experience to
which positive responses from between one third and one half of people in Western
countries were obtained were: Have you ever been aware of or influenced by a presence or power, whether you call it God or not, which is different from your everyday
self? or, Have you ever felt as though you were very close to a powerful spiritual
force that seemed to lift you out of yourself?
91
means whereby insights are gained into the divine reality has had to
be recognized.85
There is therefore a gradation, but there are also differences in intensity
and the degree of explicitness with which these religious experiences
are received as revelations of God as their initiatorrather as a variegated and rough terrain may be accentuated to give rise to distinctive
hills and even sharp peaks without loss of continuity. The questions now
that follow are: How does our understanding of Gods interaction with
the world, including humanity, relate to human revelatory experiences
of God? How can the notion of religious experience be accommodated
by, be rendered intelligible in, and be coherent with, the understanding
of Gods interaction with the world that we have been developing?86
4.2. How Does God Communicate with Humanity?
If God interacts with the world in the way already proposed, through
a whole-part constraining influence on the whole world system, how
could God communicate with humanity in the various kinds of religious experience? It has been noted that the interpersonal relationships
which we know of occur through the mediation of the constituents
of the world. This suggests that religious experience that is mediated
through sensory experience is intelligible in the same terms as that of
the inter-personal experience of human beings. It is therefore plausible to think of God as communicating with human persons through
the constituents of the world, through all that lies inside the dashed
circle representing the world in figure 1that is, via the nonhuman
constituents represented by the inner dotted circle in the figure. God is
seen as communicating symbolically through such mediated religious
experiences by imparting meaning and significance to constituents of
85
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the world or, rather, to patterns of events among them.87 Insights into
Gods character and purposes for individuals and communities can
thereby be generated in a range of contexts from the most general to
the special. The concepts, language, and means of investigating and
appraising these experienced signals from God would operate at their
own level and not be reducible to those of the natural and human sciences. The interpretation of mediated religious experience would have
its own autonomy in human inquirymystical theology cannot be
reduced without remainder to sociology or psychology, or a fortiori to
the biological or physical sciences.
What about those forms of religious experience which are unmediated
through sense experience? Brown subdivides them into the mystical,
where the primary import of the experience is a feeling of intimacy
with the divine, and the numinous, those experiences where awe of
the divine is the central feature.88 Swinburne divides them, on the
one hand, into the case where the subject has a religious experience
in having certain sensations . . . not of a kind describable by normal
vocabulary, and on the other hand, religious experiences in which
the subject . . . is aware of God or of a timeless reality. . . . [I]t just so
seems to him, but not through his having sensations.89 The experience
of Elijah at the mouth of the cave on Mount Horeb was of all kinds:
God communicated to him, not only through the natural phenomena
of wind, earthquake, and fire, but eventually, apparently, and paradoxically, in an unmediated waythrough a sound of sheer silence, an
image of absolute nonmediation.
In such instances, is it necessary to postulate some action of God
whereby there is a direct communication from God to the human consciousness that is not mediated by any known natural means, that is,
by any known constituents of the world? Is there, as it were, a distinctive layer or level within the totality of human personhood that has a
unique way of coming into direct contact with God? This was, as we
saw in section 1, certainly the assumption when the human person was
divided into ontologically distinct parts, one of which (often called the
spirit or the soul) had this particular capacity.
87
This may properly be thought of as a flow of information from God to humanity, so long as the reductive associations of such terms are not deemed to excludeas
they need and should notinterpersonal communication.
88
David Brown, The Divine Trinity (London: Duckworth, 1985), 37, 4251.
89
Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 251.
93
Now, we cannot but allow the possibility that God, being the Creator
of the world, might be free to set aside any limitations by which God has
allowed his interaction with that created order to be restricted. However,
we also have to recognize that those very self-limitations which God is
conceived of as having self-imposed are postulated precisely because
they render coherent the whole notion of God as Creator with purposes
that are being implemented in the natural and human world we actually
have and which the sciences increasingly unveil. Such considerations
also make one very reluctant to postulate God as communicating to
humanity through what would have to be seen as arbitrary means,
totally different in kind from any other means of communication to
human consciousness. The latter would include the most intensely
personal inter-communications, yet even these, as we saw above, are
comprehensible as mediated subtly and entirely through the biological
senses and the constituents of the world (section 2.6).
So, to be consistent, even this capacity for unmediated experience
of God cannot but be regarded as a mode of functioning of the total
integrated unity of whole personspersons who communicate in the
world through the worlds own constituents. For human beings this
communicating nexus of natural events within the world includes not
only human sense data (qualia) and knowledge stored in artefacts, but
also all the states of the human brain that are concomitant (or whatever
word best suits the relation of mind-brain-body) with the contents of
consciousness and of the unconscious. The process of storage and accumulating both conscious and unconscious resources is mediated by the
various ways in which communication to humanity can occurand all
these have been seen to be effected through the natural constituents of
the world and the patterns of events which occur in them.
When human beings have an experience of God apparently unmediated by something obviously sensoryas when they are simply waiting
upon God in silencethey can do so through God communicating
via their recollected memories, the workings of their unconscious and
everything that has gone into their Bildung, everything that has made
them the persons they are. All of this can be mediated through patterns
in the constituents of the world, including brain patterns. Experiences
of God indeed often seem to be ineffable, incapable of description in
terms of any other known experiences or by means of any accessible
metaphors or analogies. This characteristic they share with other types
of experience, such as aesthetic and interpersonal experience, which
are unquestionably mediated through patterns in the events of this
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world. Experiences of God could take the variety of forms that we have
already described and could all be mediated by the constituents of the
world and through patterns of natural events, yet could nonetheless be
definitive and normative as revelations to those experiencing them, for
if God can influence patterns of events in the world to be other than
they otherwise would have been but for the divine initiativeand still
be consistent with scientific descriptions at the appropriate levelthen
it must be possible for God to influence those patterns of events in
human brains which constitute human thoughts, including thoughts
of God and a sense of personal interaction with God.
The involvement of the constituents of the world in the so-called
unmediated experiences of God is less overt and obvious because in
them God is communicating through subtle and less obvious patterns in
the constituents of the world and the events in which they participate.
The latter include the patterns of memory storage and the activities of
the human brain, especially all those operative in communication at all
levels between human persons (including inter alia sounds, symbols,
and possibly Jungian archetypes), and the artefacts that facilitate this
communication.
On the present model of special providential actionas the effects of
divine whole-part influenceit is intelligible how God could also affect
patterns of neuronal events in a particular brain, so that the subject
could be aware of Gods presence with and without the mediation of
memory in the way just suggested. Such address from God, whether
or not via stored (remembered) patterns of neuronal events, could
come unexpectedly and uncontrivedly by the use of any apparently
external means. Thus, either way, it would seem to the one having
the experience as if it were unmediated. The revelation to Elijah at the
mouth of the cave had both this immediacy and a basis in a long prior
experience of God.
On examination, therefore, it transpires that the distinction between
mediated and unmediated religious experiences refers not so much to
the means of communication by God as to the nature of the content
of the experiencejust as the sense of harmony and communion with
a person far transcends any description that can be given of it in terms
of sense data, even though they are indeed the media of communication. We simply know we are at one with the other person. Similarly, in
contemplation the mystic can simply be aware of God . . . it just seems
so to him (as Swinburne puts it), and both experiences can be entirely
95
90
Editors note: the original chapter included an appendix on the distinction between
theory-autonomy and process autonomy, which has been omitted for this edition.
CHAPTER THREE
1. Introduction
Metaphysics is not a popular word in contemporary culture but, in fact,
no one can live a reflective life without adopting some broad view of
the nature of reality, however tentative and subject to possible revision
it might need to be. Even militant scientific reductionists, for whom
physics is all, are metaphysicians. They claim to be able to extend the
insights and laws of physics into regimes, such as human behavior, in
which their total adequacy is an untested hypothesis. They are certainly
going beyond (meta) physics.
Anyone who wishes to speak of agency, whether human or divine,
will have to adopt a metaphysical point of view within which to conduct the discourse. The conceptual edifice thus constructed must be
consonant with its physical base, but it will no more be determined by
it than the foundations of a house completely determine the character
of the building. In each case, there is constraint but not entailment.
Metaphysical endeavor in general, and talk of agency in particular,
will inevitably require a certain boldness of conjecture as part of the
heuristic exploration of possibility. In our present state of ignorance,
no one has access to a final and definitive proposal. The test of the
enterprise will be the degree to which it can attain comprehensiveness
of explanation and overall coherence, including an adequate degree of
consonance with human experience. The principal strategy of nearly all
writers on divine agency has been to appeal in some way to an analogy
with human agency, though our ignorance about the latter makes this
a precarious undertaking.
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2. Epistemology and Ontology
99
100
john polkinghorne
See, e.g., Polkinghorne, The Quantum World (London: Longman, 1984), chap. 7.
See, e.g., James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (London: Heinemann, 1988),
chap. 1.
6
101
Certainly such laws would be more difficult to discover than the familiar
laws governing the behavior of parts, and their form would surely be
different from that of the differential equations which are the staple of
current localized mathematical physics. Yet it would be a Procrustean
imposition on science to deny that it could have access to such laws. It
is clearly worthwhile to pursue the program of reductionist explanation
as far as it can legitimately be pursued, but that is a methodological
strategy for investigation, not a metaphysical strategy determining the
total nature of reality. The dawning holism of physics points in a more
hopeful direction if science is eventually to find a satisfactory integration
into a comprehensive and adequate metaphysical scheme.
One final criticism of too great a reliance on the principle of selforganization needs to be made. The insights of non-equilibrium thermodynamics seem helpful in relation to the generation of structure
and long-range order. Agency, however, seems to correspond to an
altogether more flexible and open kind of time-development than that
corresponding to typical self-organizing patterns, such as convection
columns or chemical clocks.
3.2. Primarily Theology-Based: Primary Causality
At least since Thomas Aquinas, there has been a tradition of theological
thinking which seeks to explain divine agency by appeal to the distinction between primary and secondary causality. A notable modern
exponent of this point of view has been Austin Farrer with his idea of
double agency.7 The secondary web of created causality is treated as
being complete and unriven. Yet the primary causality of God is supposed nevertheless to be ineffably at work in and through these created
causalities. How this is so is not explained. Indeed Farrer would regard
it as risking monstrosity and confusion if one were to attempt to discern
the causal joint by which divine providence acts.
It is not clear to me what is gained by so apophatic an account of
Gods action. In the end, the answer seems to be God only knows. I
agree with Arthur Peacockes judgment on the paradox of double agency
that it comes perilously close to that mere assertion of its truth . . . since
7
Austin Farrer, Faith and Speculation: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (London:
A&C Black, 1967).
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Farrer on his own admission can give no account of the causal joint
between the agency of the Creator and even human action.8 This seems
to me to be a strategy of absolutely last resort, only to be undertaken
if it proves impossible to make any satisfactory conjecture about the
causal joint of Gods agency. I do not believe we are in so desperate a
case, and I make my own suggestion in the course of what follows.
3.3. Top-Down Causality
The causality which physics most readily describes is a bottom-up causality, generated by the energetic interaction of the constituent parts of
a system. The experience of human agency seems totally different. It is
the action of the whole person and so it would seem most appropriately to be described as top-down causality, the influence of the whole
bringing about coherent activity of the parts. May not similar forms of
top-down causality be found elsewhere, including Gods causal influence on the whole of creation?
It is an attractive proposal, but it is important to recognize that
without further explanation top-down causality is a far from unproblematic concept. Its uncritical use would amount to no more than
sloganizing. It seems to me that two important difficulties have to be
faced and discussed.
The first is one I have already referred to in discussing the limitations on the insights provided by the principles of self-organization. If
one is to give an account of intentional agency, it will require something much more open and dynamic than simply the generation of
long-range order or the propagation of boundary effects. Striking as
instances of this kind can be (involving the coherent motion of billions
of molecules), they are often fully explicable in terms of a bottom-up
approach, generating long-range correlations between localized constituents (phase transitions in physics are good examples of this kind
of phenomenon). True top-down causality will have to be more open
and more non-local than that. I believe that chaotic dynamics, with
its picture of the open exploration of proliferating possibilities within
the confines of a strange attractor, may offer an important clue to
8
Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and BecomingNatural and
Divine (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 149.
103
4. Ontological Gaps
It seems to me that our experience of human agency is basic and by
itself sufficient to indicate that a metaphysical scheme affording no
scope for top-down causality would be seriously defective. Yet metaphysics must be consonant with its physical basis and so it is necessary
to consider whether there are appropriate intrinsic gaps already known
to us in the bottom-up description of the physical world. There seem to
be two broad possibilities:
4.1. Quantum Theory
May not agents, human or divine, act in the physical world by a power
to determine the outcomes of individual indeterminate quantum events,
even if the overall statistical pattern of many such events may still be
expected to lie within the limits of probabilistic quantum laws?10
This form of causality would actually be effected in the basement of
subatomic processes. The proposal requires, of course, the adoption of
the metaphysical strategy of interpreting quantum theory as involving
9
See Thomas Tracy, Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps (CTNS/VO,
v. III).
10
William Pollard, Chance and Providence: Gods Action in a World Governed by
Scientific Law (London: Faber, 1958); see also Nancey Murphy, Divine Action in the
Natural Order: Buridans Ass and Schrdingers Cat (in this volume); and Tracy,
Particular Providence (CTNS/VO, v. III.).
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john polkinghorne
intrinsic indeterminacies, but that is a strategy consciously or unconsciously endorsed by the great majority of physicists. For agency thus
exercised, these microscopic determinations would have to have their
consequences amplified up to the macroscopic level.
There are a number of difficulties about this proposal in relation
to human and divine agency. One relates to the amplification effect.
Exactly how the quantum world interlocks with the everyday world is
still a question of unresolved dispute. In essence, this is the measurement problem in quantum theory.11 Until this question is settled, the
micro-macro boundary is a difficult barrier to cross with confidence.
One might hope that a way around this might result from the sensitivity of chaotic systems to small triggers. Very quickly, there seems
to be established a dependence of the behavior of such systems on
details of what is going on at the level of quantum indeterminacy. Yet
the grave and unresolved difficulties of relating quantum theory to
chaos theory,12 or of what is often called quantum chaos, makes this
a perilous strategy to pursue.
There is a particular difficulty in using quantum indeterminacy to
describe divine action. Conventional quantum theory contains much
continuity and determinism in addition to its well-known discontinuities and indeterminacies. The latter refer, not to all quantum behavior,
but only to those particular events which qualify, by the irreversible
registration of their effects in the macro-world, to be described as
measurements. In between measurements, the continuous determinism of the Schrdinger equation applies. Occasions of measurement
only occur from time to time and a God who acted through being
their determinator would also only be acting from time to time. Such
an episodic account of providential agency does not seem altogether
satisfactory theologically.
4.2. Chaos Theory
The exquisite sensitivity of chaotic systems certainly means that they are
intrinsically unpredictable and unisolable in character. In accordance
11
105
with the realist strategy already discussed, I propose13 that this should
lead us to the metaphysical conjecture that these epistemological properties signal that ontologically much of the physical world is open and
integrated in character. By open is meant that the causal principles
that determine the exchange of energy among the constituent parts
(bottom-up causality) are not by themselves exhaustively determinative of future behavior. There is scope for the activity of further causal
principles. By integrated is meant that these additional principles will
have a holistic character (top-down causality).
The deterministic equations from which classical chaos theory developed are then to be interpreted as downward emergent approximations
to a more subtle and supple physical reality. They are valid only in the
limiting and special cases where bits and pieces are effectively insulated
from the effects of their environment. In the general case, the effect of
total context on the behavior of parts cannot be neglected.
Of course, with present ignorance, it is no more possible for me to
spell out the details of the subtle and supple physical reality I propose
than it is for the physical reductionist to spell out how neural networks
generate consciousness, or for those who rely on quantum indeterminacy to spell out how it generates macroscopic agency, or for those who
rely on an unanalyzed notion of top-down causality through boundary
conditions to spell out how it actually operates. We are all necessarily whistling in the dark. I prefer the tune I have chosen because it
has a natural anchorage in what we know about macroscopic physical
process and because it exhibits certain promising features which I will
now discuss.
For a chaotic system, its strange attractor represents the envelope
of possibility within which its future motion will be contained. The
infinitely variable paths of exploration of this strange attractor are not
discriminated from each other by differences of energy. They represent
different patterns of behavior, different unfoldings of temporal development. In a conventional interpretation of classical chaos theory, these
different patterns of possibility are brought about by sensitive responses
to infinitesimal disturbances of the system. Our metaphysical proposal
13
See n. 3 above. See also Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief: Theological
Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker (London: SPCK Press, 1994; printed in the United
States as The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker [Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1994]), chap. 1.
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john polkinghorne
replaces these physical nudges by a causal agency operating in the openness represented by the range of possible behaviors contained within
the monoenergetic strange attractor. What was previously seen as the
limit of predictability now represents a gap within which other forms
of causality can be at work.
Because of the unisolability of chaotic systems, this new agency
will have a holistic top-down character. It will be concerned with the
formation of dynamic pattern, rather than with transactions of energy.
In a vague but suggestive phrase I have proposed that it might best
be thought of as active information. There seems a hope that here
we might discern a glimmer of how it comes about that intentional
agency is exercised, either by our minds upon our bodies or by God
upon creation.
It is important to recognize that, in this scheme, the significance of
the sensitivity of chaotic systems to the effect of small triggers is diagnostic of their requiring to be treated in holistic terms and of their being
open to top-down causality through the input of active information. It
is not proposed that this is the localized mechanism by which agency
is exercised. I do not suppose that either we or God interact with the
world by the carefully calculated adjustment of the infinitesimal details
of initial conditions so as to bring about a desired result. The whole
thrust of the proposal is expressed in terms of the complete holistic
situation, not in terms of clever manipulation of bits and pieces.14 It is,
therefore, a proposal for realizing a true kind of top-down causality.
It may fittingly be called contextualism, for it supposes the behavior of
parts to be influenced by their overall context. This implies a strong
form of anti-reductionism in which processes are capable of being
modified by the context in which they take place. This will be so for
cloudy chaotic systems, but there will also be some clockwork
systems, insensitive to details of circumstance, in which the behavior
of the parts will be unmodified. Thus, one can understand the successes of molecular genetics in describing the (mechanical) behavior of
DNA, without having to suppose that this justifies a claim that all
14
The discussion of Peacocke in Theology for a Scientific Age, p. 154, does not
correctly represent my view. I have never supposed agency to be exercised through
(calculated!) manipulations of individual atoms and molecules. See n. 3 above.
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5. A Metaphysical Proposal
The classical metaphysical options were materialism, idealism, and
dualism. None seems satisfactory. Materialism implausibly devalues the
mental. Idealism implausibly devalues the physical. Dualism has never
succeeded in satisfactorily integrating the disjoint realms of matter
and mind and it faces the problem of how to account for the apparent
continuity of evolutionary history, in which a world which was once a
hot quark soup (apparently purely material) has turned into the home
of human beings.
In consequence, in the twentieth century some have felt encouraged
to explore the possibility of a dual-aspect monism, in which the mental
and material are conceived of as being opposite poles (or phases, as a
physicist might say) of a single (created) reality. A key idea may well be
that of complementarity. Quantum theory discovered that the apparently qualitatively different characters of wave and particle were present
in the nature of a single entity, light. This proved possible to understand
when quantum field theory identified the feasibility of reconciling these
complementary descriptions as due to the presence of an intrinsic
indefiniteness. (A wavelike state is associated with the presence of an
indefinite number of photons.) The essence of complementarity is its
ability to hold together apparently irreconcilable characteristics (spread
out wave and point-like particle) in a simple reconciling account. We
experience the apparently qualitatively different realms of the material
and the mental. May not the understanding of this duality be found
in the intrinsic indefiniteness associated by our hypothesis with the
behavior of chaotic systems, influenced by both energetic transactions
and by active information? Of course consciousness is a much more
profound and mysterious property than history formation by active
information, but at least the latter seems to point in a mildly hopeful
direction.
In common with all the other metaphysical proposals here discussed, a dual-aspect monism based on a complementary mind/matter
metaphysic, is largely conjectural and heuristic. We do not have the
knowledge to produce definitive proposals of a fully articulate kind.
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6. Some Comments
There are well-known relationships, due to Leon Brillouin and Leo
Szilard, which connect the transfer of units of information (in a communications-theory sense) with minimal transfers of energy. This might
seem to imply that for a physical system there could not be a totally pure
distinction between energetic action and active information. Careful
analysis would be required before such a conclusion was firmly established. It is not clear that active information is subject to exactly the
same constraints as communications theory imposes on the storage of
elements of passive information.15 Even if that were so, it would simply
reflect the embodied character of human beings. We are mind/matter
amphibians and are never in the state of being pure spirits.
God, in any case, is not embodied in the universe and there does not
seem to be any reason why Gods interaction with creation should not
be purely in the form of active information. This would correspond to
the divine nature being pure spirit and it would give a unique character
to divine agency in a way that theologians have often asserted to be
necessary. (God is not just an invisible cause among other causes.)
A world open to both bottom-up and top-down causality is a world
released from the dead hand of physical determinism. It is a world of
true becoming, in which the future has novel aspects not predictable
from the past. It is a world of true temporality.16 God knows things
as they really are and this surely implies that God knows the temporal in its temporality. Divine knowledge of temporal events must be
knowledge of them in their succession, not just that they are successive.
15
109
This implies, I believe, that the God who is the creator of a world of
becoming must be a God who possesses a temporal pole as well as an
eternal pole.17 Because the future of such a world is not yet formed,
even God does not yet know it. This is no imperfection in the divine
nature. God knows all that can be known, but the future is still inherently unknowable.
17
CHAPTER FOUR
1. Introduction
I intend this brief essay as a trial balloon. I shall sketch how we can
describe Gods action in the world, accepting with critical seriousness
both our present and projected knowledge of reality as we have it from
the sciences, philosophy and other non-theological disciplines, and our
present knowledge of God, his/her relationship with us and our world,
and his/her activity within it.
By saying that we shall accept the knowledge we have from both
ranges of experience with critical seriousness, I mean accepting it
as indicating something about the realities it claims to talk about,
after carefully applying the critical evaluations of such claims which
are available within the disciplines themselves, and within philosophy
and the other human sciences. This obviously involves beginning with
a number of definite presuppositions, some of which favor neither the
sciences nor religion and spirituality, and some of which do. But it also
involves the presupposition that the claims of each have been carefully
examined in the light of the different ranges of experience and certain
principles of interpretation and validation. I shall not spend time here
going through that process step by step, but instead shall simply assert
some general results in each area which derive from such a distillation. It will be somewhat obvious to those in the respective fields what
critiques I have applied to reach the results I shall assert. Then I shall
attempt to marshall these results into a roughly-sketched, integrated
theory of Gods action in the world.
The input into this integrated, coherent theory of Gods action
will not consist of highly technical assertionseither from science or
from philosophy and theologybut rather assertions which more or
less describe the general character of the world as we know it from
the contemporary sciences and the limits of our knowledge of it, and
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1
Personal communication. Here and elsewhere in this paper I am indebted to
Happels very helpful comments.
113
2
See Frederick Suppe, The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 475; and William Stoeger, Contemporary
Physics and the Ontological Status of the Laws of Nature, in Quantum Cosmology
and the Laws of Nature: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and C.J. Isham (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 1993;
Berkeley, CA: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1993), 20934.
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which are applied in these areas. First of all, we presuppose that God
exists and is and has been actively present and involved in our lives
and in our world. How this action, presence, and involvement are
to be described and understood will be modifiedeven significantly
modifiedin the conversation with the natural sciences. We are not
attempting to prove Christian doctrines by appealing to scientific evidence, but rather attempting to re-articulate and understand theological
truths in a more satisfactory way by looking at the relevant knowledge
available to us in the sciences and other disciplines. As Happel has said,
religion and theology are put in conversation with the data, concepts
and language of scientific performance and theory.3
Secondly, we presuppose that the sources of revelation, the scriptures,
tradition, and our living experience as believers who are individually and
communally openmore or lessto God and to Gods action, do give
us some reliable knowledge about God and about his/her action in our
world. As in the sciences, this is very limited and corrigible knowledge,
subject to error and modification, particularly with regard to interpretation and understanding of that revelation, and of our overall response to
it. And, as in the sciences, it too is dependent on the careful application
of critical principles of interpretation, discernment, and confirmation
suitable to the experiences being examined. We might also mention
that the limits and uncertainties of this knowledge derive both from the
extraordinary but limited character of the revelation we have available,
and perhaps most of all from our own limitations and lack of openness
to receiving, interpreting, and living out that revelation.
1.2. The Aim of Our Discussion
The aim of our discussion is simply to describe Gods action in the
world in terms which are faithful to Christian sources of revelation
and consistent with what we know from the sciences about reality, its structure, evolution, and processes, especially in view of the
self-organizing capabilities of matter, from the chaotic and dissipative
structures evident even in inanimate systems to the complex systems
of living organisms themselves. One of the key issues here is causality.
How can we speak of divine causality within the world as we know it,
Private communication.
115
4
Somefor instance Ellis, Murphy, and Tracyconsider the indeterminacy at the
quantum level to be an essential gap which requires filling (see their papers in this
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william r. stoeger
volume). Though this view needs much more careful discussion than is possible here,
my assessment is that indeterminacy is not a gap in this sense, but rather an expression
of the fundamentally different physical character of reality at the quantum level. It does
not need to be filled! To do so, particularly with divine intervention, would lead in
my view to unresolvable scientific and theological problems. The demand for a cause
to determine the exact position and time of an event misconstrues the nature of the
reality being revealed. Quantum events need a cause and have a cause, but not a cause
determining their exact time and position of occurrence, beyond what is specified by
quantum probability (the wave function).
5
See Stoeger, Contemporary Physics.
117
That is, why are there laws of nature in the first place? And why these
laws of nature and not some others? In fact, not even philosophy can
adequately answer these questions.
A third conclusion stemming from the sciences is one which is not
usually mentioned but one which I believe is quite importantbut
not for the first reason that will probably occur to us: The laws of
nature and nature itself constrain but underdetermine what develops
or occurs. Great possibilities are left open in nature. It is very pliable.
This does not mean that nothing happens, obviously, but it does mean
that uncorrelated coincidences often end up filling in what is needed
to complete determination. It is this pervasive feature of realityalong
with others, such as its knowability and its localizabilitywhich enables
human beings and other animals to manipulate and harness reality, and
even to know it. We can fly in airplanes, build bridges, and heal the
sick, precisely because the laws of nature as we know them, and perhaps
even as they are in themselves, underdetermine events. In fact we are
who we are as human beings because of this important featurewe
can decide to do things which otherwise would not happen within the
constraints imposed by physics, chemistry, and biology. Some of this
underdetermination is due to the indeterminism and unpredictability
of physical systems at the quantum level and to the unpredictability
of both simple and complex systems on the macroscopic level. As we
have seen in studying the behavior of chaotic, nonlinear, or nonequilibrium systems, very slight changes in the initial conditions or the
boundary conditions can severely alter how they will behave, and what
sort of self-organizing behavior they will manifest. However, the underdetermination of phenomena by the laws of nature is due to much more
than these important sources of indeterminism and unpredictability. It
is due primarily to the freedom that exists in establishing initial conditions and boundary conditions throughout nature. An agent can, with
some expenditure of energy, change initial conditions and/or boundary conditions of a system or, even more importantly, construct new
systems, thus determining outcomes much different from those which
would otherwise occur.
Aha! You have pointed this out in order to leave room for divine
intervention! someone might say. In fact I have not, because, as we
shall see, this underdetermination of reality by the laws of nature does
not easily allow for divine interventionat least not direct divine
interventionbecause that would involve an immaterial agent acting
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See n. 1 above.
Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and BecomingNatural and
Divine (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
8
As Happel points out (private communication), this creedal summary is deceptive.
The meaning of the language used is neither static nor agreed on by all who accept it.
It will change, even radically so, as we live out of and reflect upon our individual and
common experience of Gods presence and action among us.
7
119
nothing. But how that was done is still very much a mystery, as well as
whether or not creation is eternaldoes God create from all eternity?
How that was done is understandable only to God, at the very depths
of the divine being. We know in a very limited way how it was done
by looking at nature as revealed to us by the sciencesor let us say,
we know how it was not done!
A second conclusion from revelation is Gods motivation for creation
and for his/her interaction with the worldit is Gods goodness, Gods
innate drive as God to share that goodness, and Gods love both for
him/herself and for all that he/she creates and holds in existence. So,
interpersonal relationships are of paramount importance to Godas
are the values of goodness and truth. This is true of God in him/
herselfGod as Trinity. But it is also true of Gods relationships ad
extra. This divine priority is most fully expressed in the Incarnation
of the Son of God in Jesus, and in the sending of the Spirit. But it is
manifest throughout creation at every level.
A third conclusion is that creation itself is good, and an expression
of Gods goodness and love. Therefore, it makes perfect sense that it
should reflect to some extent who God is and what his/her characteristics are. Also, the more complex and capable beings are, the more
they reflect who God isincluding humanity, which is made in the
image and likeness of God. This perspectivethe priority of the values
of goodness and truth, along with reverence and respect for all that
isis consistent with the importance and value God gives to personal
relationships.
A fourth conclusion is that, although God reveals him/herself through
everything in creation, Gods most particular revelation is in terms of
persons and personal relationships involving generous, self-sacrificing
love and forgiveness. And our principal way of responding to Gods
revelation is in those same terms. So we experience revelation as personal and social, God among usas creator and source of life, yes,
but also as a personal presence and force who loves, invites love, gives
and invites giving, forgives and reconciles, and invites forgiveness
and reconciliation. The created, inanimate, and non-personal levels of
reality, though they exist in their own right and reveal God and Gods
goodness, power, and love in their own way, and give glory to God
in their own way (they cannot do otherwise!), exist also to enable the
development and maintenance of persons to whom God can reveal
him/herself and with whom God can maintain a personal relationship
leading to the full and harmonious union of the divine with created
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reality. The degree to which this is desired by God is expressed in creation itself, in the Incarnation and all that follows from it, and in the
sending of the Spirit.9
These are the principal conclusions flowing from Christian revelation
which I wish to highlight. Our endeavor now will be to bring these
conclusions into critical interaction with what we know about reality from the sciences, as outlined in the preceding section. As I have
already emphasized, these conclusions will have to be re-articulated and
modified as a result of this interaction. For instance, the strong anthropocentrism of this particular articulation would have to be significantly
mitigated. And the radical non-objectifiability of God would have to be
factored in, on other, more theological and religious grounds.10
9
My emphasis here on the priority of persons does not deny the wider role the Spirit
has throughout the created order, and the impact of the Incarnation on the cosmos.
Nor does my formulation properly describe the relationship of non-conscious entities
to the divine presence and their essential mystery.
10
Jos Porfirio Miranda, Marx and the Bible (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1974),
40ff.
121
is the agent of creatio ex nihilo. In one way this is not accurate, for, as
I have already implied above, God has always existed as a necessary
being. He/she is, as the uncaused cause, or primary cause, as Christian
theology has traditionally described him/her. So something (i.e., God)
has always existed. There was never absolutely nothing, if something
exists. What we really want to say is that the only explanation for
something created to emerge from the absence of anything created is
God. This affirmation, as I have just said, does not particularly deepen
our understandinghow this happened, the detailsbut it is, strictly
speaking, an adequate answer to the fundamental question we are
considering.
It should be clear, furthermore, that this is not basically a temporally
weighted answer to the question of existence. It does not necessarily
imply that there was a state or situation when there was nothing besides
God, and then at some juncture God created entities other than him/
herself, and with them time, space, etc. As Thomas Aquinas11 realized,
it could be that God has created from all eternitythat created reality is
eternal in the sense that it has no temporal beginning (there was never
a state in which God existed and created reality did not), but it is still
radically contingent on God.12 There may have been a beginning of
time, but that is by no means essential. Ultimate origins are essentially
ontological, not temporal. In fact, I believe a good argument can be
made for eternal creation on the basis of who God must be as God. If
God is of his/her very nature bonum diffusivum sui, infinite love, and
therefore creator, then he/she was always and eternally such. Therefore,
in order to fully realize who he/she is, creation must in some sense,
at least in intention, be an eternal process. This may at first seem to
infringe on Gods freedom to create. But it really does not do that at
all. His/her creating is perfectly free, but is also a natural consequence
of Gods very nature. Nor does this mean that God or Gods love is
dependent on creation for self-origination. God and Gods love must
be sovereign. But Gods love must also be fruitful, and that one principal manifestation of its fruitfulness be an eternal created order is not
surprising.
11
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13
Stoeger, The Origin of the Universe in Science and Religion, in Cosmos, Bios,
Theos, ed. Henry Margenau and Roy A. Varghese (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1992),
25469.
14
Ibid.
15
See ibid.; and idem, Contemporary Cosmology and Its Implications for the Science-Religion Dialogue, in Physics, Philosophy, and Theology: A Common Quest for
Understanding, ed. Robert John Russell, William R. Stoeger, and George V. Coyne
(Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 1988), 21944.
123
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that the operation of the laws of nature, from the divine perspective,
is a principal channel of Gods active presence in our world, and as
such is an expressioninadequate and imperfect though it may beof
who he/she is. Thus, our investigation of these regularities, constraints,
and relationships, and our imperfect formulation of them in scientific
theories and in our laws of nature, articulates an important mode of
divine activity in created reality.
I shall have more to say about this later when we discuss Gods action
within personal and social contexts. Looking forward briefly to the
issues which will emerge there, we see that it is crucial to distinguish
carefully between the laws of nature, the regularities, constraints,
and relationships realized in nature, as we have conceptualized and
formulated them, and the laws of nature as they in fact function
in created realityfrom Gods full and complete point of view, so to
speakwhich somehow includes the internal or interior relationship
he/she has with nature, with us, and with other created entities.18
We immediately see the importance of this distinctionsince our
very limited account and formulation of these laws may leave out
crucial relationships (even constitutive relationships) which organize
the inanimate and unconscious world at a very profound level, which
function to subtlety link the personal and the non-personal, or which
subordinate the non-personal to the personal. We are not fully able to
see how this might happen, but we begin to see something of it in the
underdetermination of physical reality and its vulnerability to human
agency, which can mold it within its constraints to our intended use,
for better or for worse.19
From our point of view, manifestations of this may be interpreted
by us as contravening the laws of nature simply because we have not
fully understood them, whereas in fact they are in perfect accord with
the laws of nature as they are in reality. In other words, God may
act in a purely natural way within the relationships and regularities
he/she has established and maintained, but in a way which we see as
supernatural intervention simply because we have not yet come to
comprehend fully the relationships and regularities (the higher laws)
which obtain.20
18
125
needs more careful consideration than I can give it here. Certainly, relative to a more
restricted notion of lawas what is generalizablesome events will fall outside its
comprehension, e.g., what is important and significant in its radical particularity.
21
By direct I mean unmediated; by indirect I mean mediated.
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127
22
St. Ignatius of Loyola, Rule for the Discernment of Spirits, The Spiritual Exercises. See Karl Rahner, The Dynamic Element in the Church, trans. W.J. OHara, vol. 12,
Quaestiones Disputatae (New York: Herder & Herder, 1964), for a theological account
of this.
23
Cf. F. Suppe, The Scientific Vision and the Beatific Vision, paper presented at
the Notre Dame Symposium on Knowing God, Christ, and Nature in the Post-Positivisitic Era, University of Notre Dame, April 1417, 1993.
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24
129
26
At the same time, however, we must find a way of avoiding an overly anthropocentric theology.
27
Stoeger, Origin of the Universe.
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131
132
william r. stoeger
133
28
134
william r. stoeger
135
is realized. And, if God exists and is the primary cause, he/she must
have either chosen this realization, or allowed it to develop from some
other more primordial laws.
In either case, God at some point or in some way acts directly to
effect them, and continues to act directly and immanently to conserve
them. Again, we have the nexus problem, for which we have no
real solutionother than the observations made above concerning
the immanently and transcendently interior active presence of God in
all that is. God chose to make the world the way it is, however much
he/she allowed it to develop on its own. God implements that choice
by initiating and maintaining an existence-endowing (constitutive)
relationship with the possibilities he/she wishes to realize. The choice
of a particular instantiation and its direct implementationwhatever
the number of allowed outcomeswas necessary at some level. From
revelation, we appreciate some of the motivations directing that choice,
in terms of freedom and the primacy of love, dictating a world in which
God remains involved and caring, but in which we remain free and able
to freely give or refuse love and service to God and to one another.29
Top-Down Causality
In this discussion we are already aware of the final problem we shall
briefly discuss, that of top-down causality. The brief discussion of human
agency above provided examples of top-down causalitya human being
building a bookcase, typing a letter, brewing a pot of coffeein which
an entity of higher complexity or possessing greater versatility determines or causes entities at lower, more fundamental levels to behave in
a certain wayin a more organized and coherent way than they would
do otherwise. In the hierarchical layers of organization and complexity which characterize our universe, top-down causality is pervasive.
Although some causal influences operate from lower levels of organization to higher levels, constraining and also enabling what more complex
entities do, other causal influences act from the top down to marshall
and coordinate less organized constituents into coherent, cooperative
action in service of the more complex organism or system. A precondition for this being possible is the radical underdetermination of effects
29
Cf. George F.R. Ellis, The Theology of the Anthropic Principle, in Quantum
Cosmology, 367405.
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by the laws of nature at lower levels (the freedom and the need to
establish initial conditions, or boundary conditions)rendering nature
very pliable within certain limits. There is really no problem herejust
a characteristic of reality which requires proper recognition and careful
analysis. Obviously in the case of divine action, we have the ultimate
case of top-down causality, in which the essential issues challenging our
understanding are those which we have already discussed.
30
See Richard J. Clifford, Creation in the Hebrew Bible, in Physics, Philosophy,
and Theology, 15170. In saying this, however, we must not separate what is personal
and self-conscious from Gods action in its deepest form in inanimate creation. The
focus of much of revelation on the personal should not insulate us from attending
to and celebrating Gods active presence in all creation. In fact, in light of both what
we know from revelation and from contemporary sciences, part of our commitment
must be to emphasize our profound unity with the rest of creation, to learn from it
by contemplating it, and to take a more enlightened responsibility in caring for it
and fostering reverence for it. Though we must be faithful to revelation in terms of
the priority of the personal, we must be faithful to all that it offers us, and we cannot
continue to indulge in an overweening anthropocentrism.
137
31
138
william r. stoeger
139
9. Conclusions
This has been a sketch of my synthesis of a model of Gods action in
the world, taking seriously both revelation and the knowledge of reality
we have from the sciences. There are aspects of divine action which we
are able to understand somewhat better by letting these two areas of
our knowledge critically interact and dialogue with each other. There
are other aspects which seem to be thoroughly resistant to our understanding, particularly that of the nexus between God and the secondary
causes through which God acts or between God and the direct effects of
divine action, as in creatio ex nihilo. The analogue of human agency is
of some limited help here. However, the principal barrier seems to be
that we can only know that critical nexusan adequate answer to how
divine causality operates in this circumstancesif we are divine, or if
God reveals such knowledge to us. Otherwise we do not have enough
knowledge of the key term in the nexusGod.32
32
My special thanks to all those who have given me comments on a previous draft of
this paper or who have discussed aspects of it with me, especially Stephen Happel, Ian
Barbour, Tom Tracy, Nancey Murphy, George Ellis, Arthur Peacocke, Denis Edwards,
Bob Russell, Wim Drees, and John Polkinghorne.
CHAPTER FIVE
1. Introduction
1.1. Divine Action and Evolutionary Biology
There are many ways to conceptualize divine action in nature and
history, ranging from attribution to God of natural-law suspending
miracles or natural-law conforming activity, to virtual identification of
the laws and processes of nature with the initiating creative act of God
or with the divine nature itself. It must be recognized from the outset
that some of these conceptions cannot possibly profit from insights
drawn from the natural sciences, including evolutionary biology. One
example is Rudolf Bultmanns assertion that divine action occurs only
in the realm of human existence and leaves no traces in history and
nature; this depends upon a dualism of being or language. Another is
John Lockes reliance on the miraculous as a mode of special divine
action. To the extent that miraculous and various forms of dualistic
theories of divine action are defensibleand I think they are if the
right approach is takena theory of divine action that is independent
of considerations from the natural sciences, including evolutionary
biology, is still feasible. Theories of divine action that take the natural
sciences to have something crucial to offer, however, have much better
chances of achieving the virtues of specificity and plausibility.
If we accept this, then we will be inclined to try to establish substantive connections between theories of divine action and all kinds
of scientific theories, including evolutionary biology. One type of connection begins with the appearance of purposes or ends in nature and
attempts to construe this as evidence of the reality of divine action
by means of the argument that such apparent ends indicate genuine
teleology in natural objects and processes, and that this teleology (in
any of a number of possible forms) is the mode of Gods action. I shall
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call this argument the teleological argument for divine action. The
English divine William Paley appealed to the teleological argument for
divine action when he drew his famous analogy between a watch and the
wondrous structures and processes of nature: both demand a designer.1
Likewise, Alfred Russel Wallace, co-discoverer with Charles Darwin of
the principle of natural selection, found the complexity of some features
of biology so amazing that he invoked an active designer God to explain
it.2 This peculiarly aggressive form of the teleological argument for
divine action (the so-called design argument) is comparatively rare in
our day because evolutionary biology has made impressive advances in
explaining how complex organs and biological systems developed from
simpler forms. That has made it exceedingly difficult to attempt to move
from the products of biological evolution to divine action by means of
the argument that the beauty and functionality of those products is so
wonderful as to demand a divine mind whose intention they are; or
from the process of biological evolution to divine action by means of
the argument that the evolutionary process requires occasional divine
moderation, adjustment, acceleration, or specific directing to account
for the forms of life that exist. The theory of evolution is increasingly
well justified in asserting that wonderful forms of life result from the
evolutionary process regardless of what any mind intends, and that this
process is automatic, in need of no occasional, special adjustments.3 The
argument from design has been thoroughly undermined as a result.
The teleological argument for divine action, however, has more modest, more viable forms. One is driven by the question of the significance
and possible ultimate purpose of the evolutionary trajectory that has
produced human life.4 Another finds a congenial starting point in one
of the intuitions guiding neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, namely,
that increases in biological complexity probably occur at different speeds
143
(albeit virtually always gradually) within the evolutionary process5 suggesting the possibility of higher-level laws of complexity,6 and leading
to the question about whether teleological categories are needed for the
adequate description of the conditions for the possibility of punctuation
in evolutionary equilibrium. Yet another seeks to move from the laws
and capacities of naturethe conditions of the possibility of biological
evolutionto the reality of divine action by means of an argument that
nature is purposefully designed by God to have the laws and capacities
it has, in which case divine design of nature is the primordial divine
act. There are other motivations for exploring the teleological argument
for divine action, but what has been said is enough to show that this
form of the connection between evolutionary biology and divine action
might be well worth examining closely. The special virtue of the teleological argument for divine action is its promise of relevant, detailed
support for the reality of divine action. Other advantages of centralizing
the category of teleology when examining the relation between divine
action and evolutionary biology will become evident later.
1.2. The Argument of this Paper and its Significance
The argument of this paper leads to my provisional conclusion that
no relevant, detailed, supportive relation between evolutionary biology and the reality of divine action is possible using this approach.
This is a negative result as far as the teleological argument for divine
action is concerned, but it does not imply that evolutionary biology
bluntly rebuts the claim that God acts in nature and history. Rather,
evolutionary biology is one of many considerations that can influence
theories of divine action without having much evidentiary effect one
way or the other.
This argument will merely confirm what many theorists of divine
action seem already to hold, but it may challenge the assumptions
5
See, for example, Stephen Jay Gould, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the
Nature of History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), and Niles Eldredge, Macroevolutionary Dynamics: Species, Niches, and Adaptive Peaks (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989),
and Time Frames: The Rethinking of Darwinian Evolution and the Theory of Punctuated
Equilibria (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).
6
This topic is explored perhaps most vigorously by Stuart Kauffman. See The
Origins of Order: Self-organization and Selection in Evolution (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University, 1993), and At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of
Self-Organization and Complexity (New York and Oxford: Oxford University, 1995).
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7
This is not the place to defend the possibility of such metaphysical reflection. Suffice to say that I do not suppose that Kants strictures on metaphysics can be set aside
lightly. On the contrary, the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce offers a way around them while
taking them with proper seriousness. My interpretation of the task of inquiry, and my
general indebtedness to pragmatism (not, however, to Richard Rortys neo-pragmatism), is laid out briefly in Similarities and Differences in the Practice of Science and
Theology, CTNS Bulletin 14.4 (Fall, 1994).
145
8
For an example of such an ambitious undertaking, see William R. Stoegers paper
in CTNS/VO, v. IV.
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and nature. These depreciations range from the denial of the reality of
God and the God-affirming denial that divine action is a meaningful
phrase, to the rejection of nature and history as metaphysically significant categories, as a result of the contention (typical of much Indian
and Buddhist philosophy) that ultimate reality lies deeply beneath its
misleading natural, historical appearance. Centralizing the category of
teleology helps here, because it is possible within limits to specify its
meaning for a wide variety of metaphysical and religious traditions;
the idea of divine action cannot be generalized to the same degree.
After conclusions about the conceptual relations between teleology and
biological evolution are drawn, the possibility will then exist of relating
these conclusions to other concepts, such as divine actionor, for that
matter, the Indian philosophical concepts of samsara and maya, though
I will not be pursuing this.9 The teleological argument for divine action
follows this procedure precisely.
2. Speaking of Teleology
Teleological categories have been generally out of favor in the West for
some time, so it is necessary to clear some terminological ground.
2.1. The Meaning of Having an End
The ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle (384322 BCE)10 contended
that the essence (and so the behavior) of a thing is understood when
four questions about it can be answered: What is it made of? What are
its essential attributes? What brought it into being? What is its purpose? (Physics II.3, 194b.16195a.2; Metaphysics V.2, 1013a.241013b.2.11
These questions correspond to what scholastic philosophers aptly called
9
This two staged approach to the problem of teleology and divine action has been
adopted before to good effect, notably and influentially as the distinguishing principle
for the two books constituting Paul Janet, Final Causes, tr. From the 2nd French ed.
by William Affleck (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1892; 1st French ed., 1876).
10
The following translations of Aristotles works are referred to or quoted in what
follows: Physics (Physica), tr. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye; Metaphysics (Metaphysica),
tr. by W.D. Ross; On the Parts of Animals (De partibus animalium), tr. William Ogle;
On the Gait of Animals (De incessu animalium), tr. A.S.L. Farquharson; and On the
Generation of Animals (De generatione animalium), tr. Arthur Platt.
11
References are in the form book.chapter, pagecolumn.line of the Berlin Greek text.
147
the material, formal, efficient and final causes.12 The fourth of Aristotles
questions is answered by identifying the end of a thing. But how was
this conceived?
Aristotle implicitly defined an end when he spoke of the cause of
a thing in the sense of end or that for the sake of which a thing is
done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about (Physics II.3, 194b.33).
Thus, an end causes its means by virtue of the fact that the means
(as cause) are capable of securing that end (as effect). Now, the end,
since it lies in the future relative to the means, cannot obviously be
their cause, though the idea of the end can certainly be the cause of
the means. Thus, we arrive at a definition: An end, E, is the cause of
means, M, insofar as E is the foreseen effect of M. This is a common
definition of having an end, and fits Aristotles view rather well. It
captures the meaning of end through being explicit about how it is
that ends cause.
The usual way of allowing for literal application of teleological categories is through the concept of intending: since human beings and
some other animals intend, their behavior is genuinely purposeful and
causal. In the context of intentional agents, therefore, since foreseeing effects can be spoken of literally, the definition of end just given
is uncontroversial. Extending this definition to cover some cases of
habitual, preconscious, unconscious, goal-directed, and even some
acquired and instinctive behavior poses comparatively few problems.
Outside the realm of intending and its physiological derivatives, however, making sense of having an end is far more difficult. Aristotle
accepted human beings as free agents and allowed human intending
to be the metaphysical ground of many kinds of events that are for the
sake of something, such as habitual and what we would call unconscious
behaviors. Contemporary philosophy will go that far with Aristotle,
but rarely much further. In particular, Aristotles attribution of ends
to inanimate natural processes is genuinely difficult to justify.
Aristotle was fully aware of the problems with this more ambitious
usage of end. In the context of a discussion of the various kinds of
processes that have ends.13 Aristotle dealt with the problem of assigning
12
Aristotle himself used only nouns or nominal phrases to designate the four causes
(e.g. to telos); the adjectival forms are later Latin creations.
13
For details of the classification, see Physics II.5, and especially the discussion of
spontaneous and chance processes in Physics II.6, 197b.1821.
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14
Something akin to this is defended in R.B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1953), and in many other writers. Dawkins, whose
uses the term designoid for apparently designed, introduces statistical measures
that reflect human intuitions about what is designed and what is not designed. This
approach seems useful also for furnishing an approach to apparent endedness. See
Climbing Mount Improbable, chapter 1.
149
15
This appears to be the reason for Francisco J. Ayalas approach to the problem.
He begins with a vague and general criterion: An object or a behavior is said to be
teleological or telic when it gives evidence of design or appears to be directed toward
certain ends. He then partially overcomes the vagueness of this definition by distinguishing between artificial (external) teleology, due to deliberate purposefulness,
and natural (internal) teleology, when no deliberate purposefulness is involved; and
then again by further distinguishing within the category of natural teleology between
determinate teleology (what I am calling closed-endedness) and indeterminate teleology (open-endedness). The vagueness of the initial definition is understandable in
view of what it must cover. See Theodosius Dobzhansky, et. al., eds., Evolution (W.H.
Freeman, 1977), p. 497; reprinted as Teleological Explanations in Michael Ruse, ed.,
Philosophy of Biology (New York: Macmillan, London: Collier Macmillan, 1989). Also
see Ayalas contribution to CTNS/VO, v. IV.
16
Edwin Levy presents a hierarchy that is a subset of this one in Networks and
Teleology, pp. 159186, in Mohan Matthen and Bernard Linsky, eds., Philosophy
and Biology, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 14 (Calgary:
University of Calgary, 1988).
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Table 1. Hierarchical class of events, objects, and processes with nominal ends
Realm of Nature
Characteristics
Self-conscious animals
(human beings)
necessary for adequate explanations, while those lower in the table are
less well placed. Unsurprisingly, it is Aristotles intelligent ends that are
at the top of the table (especially conscious and habitual behavior).
For each of the objects and processes falling under one of the categories in this table, it is possibleand this is the point of the criterion for
endednessto ask: Is the appearance of endedness in this instance due
to real ends in nature, or is it merely a misleading epiphenomenon of
complex natural processes without ends? If the epiphenomenal explanation is to be preferred in every case, then this constitutes a strong
argument for eliminating the more metaphysically loaded usages of
teleological language from all descriptions and explanations of nature,
though of course speaking of ends and purposes may still serve a useful heuristic function. If in some cases the explanation for apparent
ends is that they are real, then teleological categories will be needed for
adequate explanations of the processes in question, and some mediating
metaphysical theory of causality and teleology will be needed also.
2.3. Dangers and Virtues of Teleology
If the teleological argument for divine action is to move even a step
forward, then it is necessary first to deflect a fundamental objection to
teleology. To that end, let us venture a brief evaluation of Aristotles
teleological vision so as to illumine the modern suspicion of teleological categories.
According to Aristotle, everything has a natural, in-built purpose, a
purpose fitted to its nature (the ambiguity of the English word nature
151
17
This makes the prime mover something like the life principle of the entire cosmos,
which might seem inconsistent with Aristotles rejection of life principles in living
beings. It is his view nonetheless. This tension is closely related to a complex corner
of Aristotle interpretation having to do with his distinction between active and passive
reason. Aristotles need to find in human beings something akin to Platos indestructible
soul is the basis for attributing a mixture of active and passive reason to them. Active
reason suggests a life principle that requires no body and it is active reason that is
generalized and perfected in Aristotles concept of God. Nonetheless, Aristotle insists
in relation to all beings apart from God that their soul is their principle of unity and
not a mystical life principle separable from their constitution as formed matter.
18
The works on zoology include, in addition to those mentioned above, On the
Motion of Animals (De motu animalium), tr. A.S.L. Farquharson; History of Animals
(Historia animalium), tr. DArcy Wentworth; and the so-called Short Physical Treatises
(Parva naturalia).
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19
See especially Nicomachean Ethics (Ethica Nicomachea), tr. W.D. Ross; and Politics
(Politica), tr. Benjamin Jowett.
20
See Politics I, esp. I.1213, 1259a.371260b.25; and Nicomachean Ethics V.11,
1138b.59, VIII.11, 1161a.101161b.10.
153
his analyses of purposes are too often indistinguishable from conservative rationalizations of social practices he found desirable.
The more dubious aspects of Aristotles use of final causes were amplified in much subsequent philosophy, some of which was not characterized by a steadying critical instinct to the extent that Aristotles was.
Thus, it is unsurprising that modern Western thinkers have frequently
been quite aggressive in banishing consideration of purposes from most
natural, and even many ethical, inquiries. This anti-teleological posture
has secured many desirable results, including protection of scientific
research and social policy from the negative effects of unchecked speculation, and increased efficiency of the powerful process of scientific
discovery and theorizing. The main reason for the decline of interest in
teleology, however, is that analyses based on efficient causation proved
to be far more specific and fruitful than teleological analyses. Instead
of resting content with the statement that the final, internal purpose of
an acorn is to grow into an oak, for example, the dynamism of natural
change is now explained primarily through efficient causes: the acorns
genetic capacities decisively constrain the chemical processes of growth
made possible by the causal interactions between acorn and environment. That is an explanation that fosters further detailed development,
and leads out into testable consequences, so it is far better suited to
scientific theorizing.
This abandonment of the explanatory contribution of final causes in
favor of the greener pastures of efficient causes also has a significant
disadvantage. It obscures some important perspectives that the teleological approach keeps in the forefront, such as the question of the ultimate
basis for the amazing capacities of acorns. For this reason, final causes
have never vanished into the realm of philosophical curiosities. There
have always been thinkers willing to argue forcefully that ultimately
satisfying explanations of nature cannot be achieved in isolation from
the category of purpose, that ethics is untenable without final causes,
or that Gods action in the world is impossible to discern if teleological categories are not admittedinto metaphysical explanations, if not
physical ones. Moreoverand for my purposes this is crucialends in
nature seem to be everywhere, and denying their reality on the basis of
an efficient-causal reduction carried out only part-way in theoretical
detail and the rest of the way in the imagination is probably hasty, and is
certainly difficult to justify. Thus, there is no way preemptively to block
the teleological argument for divine action by invoking the achievements
of modernity against Aristotelian natural science and ethics.
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155
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sake of argument, however, as the crux of his argument lies elsewhere. Note that he
includes human-made objects as honorary living things (12,10). He considers that
this class of objects and processes will be explained when an account of it is provided
that is consistent with, and relies on nothing other than, the basic laws of physics.
Chapter three is devoted to spelling out the special way that the laws of physics are
deployed in evolutionary theory.
23
Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of
Modern Biology, tr. from the French by Austryn Wainhouse (New York, Alfred A.
Knopf, 1971). Monod advances a form of existentialist polemic against all manner of
vitalisms and animisms, superstitions, and self-deceptive metaphysics, in the name of
a materialist ethic of knowledge.
157
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This is a crucial decision, because modern societies owe their material wherewithal to this fundamental ethic upon which knowledge is
based, and their moral weakness to those value systems, devastated by
knowledge, to which they still try to refer. The contradiction is deadly.
It is what is digging the pit we see opening under our feet. The ethic of
knowledge that created the modern world is the only ethic compatible
with it, the only one capable, once understood and accepted, of guiding
its evolution. (177)
159
24
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161
a living organism do not emerge inexplicably from thin air, but from
incipient possibilities already present in its constituent elements.26 On
one view, the doctrine of internal relations is superfluous, a metaphysical enthusiasm; while on the other it is necessary to make sense
of self-organization, and is even an unacknowledged implication of the
emergence-due-to-complexity-of-arrangement view.27
2.4.4. Fourth Dispute: Ground of TeleologyLaws, Chance, or Basic
Constituents?
When a fundamental teleological principle is affirmed, it is natural to
inquire as to how it shows up in nature. Perhaps it is expressed only
in the laws of nature. Perhaps it is expressed also in anarchic chance
orwhich probably amounts to the same thing in view of the sensitivity
of complex systems close to bifurcationsin boundary conditions. Or
perhaps the fundamental teleological principle is also expressed in the
basic constituents of nature, which we might expect to be the case for
some forms of panpsychism or dipolar metaphysics. It is certainly the
case for those views affirming the doctrine of internal relations.
There is an important correlation between positions taken on the
first three disputes and positions taken on the fourth. This correlation
appears in the similarity between the pairs of columns marked A, B,
and C in the following table, where Y and N denote Yes and No
respectively, N/A denotes not applicable, and Disputes refers to
the disputes described in this section. Four hypothetical positions are
assigned Roman numerals in the first column; I have already mentioned
examples of each.
The great virtue of this schema is that it highlights some of the
metaphysical decisions that need to be settled in the three stages of
the teleological argument for divine action. In so doing, it illumines
the complexity of that argument and the difficulty of prosecuting it
especially its second stagewithout heavy reliance on highly contentious
26
Here again, process philosophers make an interesting contribution. See, for
example, the affirmation of the doctrine of internal relations in Charles Birch and John
B. Cobb, Jr., The Liberation of Life: From the Cell to the Community (Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University, 1981), and Birch, A Purpose for Everything: Religion
in a Postmodern Worldview (Kensington: New South Wales University Press; Mystic:
Twenty-Third Publications, 1990).
27
This contrast is most evident when Davies view is compared to that of Birch
and Cobb.
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Table 2. Four types of views on teleology in biological evolution
Views
Type I
Type II
Type III
Type IV
Dispute 1:
Teleological
categories
are nonreducible?
[A]
Dispute 2:
Teleology
permits
specific
goals?
[B]
Dispute 3:
Internal
relations
are
needed?
[C]
Dispute 4:
In the
laws of
nature?
Dispute 4:
In chance or
boundary
conditions?
Dispute 4:
In the basic
constituents
of nature?
[A]
[B]
[C]
N
Y
Y
Y
N/A
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
163
to at least some of these appearances. But this raises the question: How
can we tell whether ends are merely apparent or real? More generally:
Do teleological categories have some advantages in spite of the objections to them in contemporary science.28
3.1. The Evolutionary Objection to Real Ends in Nature
The debate over the reducibility of natural ends has classic status in
Western philosophy. It is evident, for example, in Aristotles critiques
of his predecessors, especially Democritus:
Democritus, however, neglecting the final cause, reduces to necessity all
the operations of Nature. Now they are necessary, it is true, but yet they
are for a final cause and for the sake of what is best in each case. . . . [T]o
say that necessity is the only cause is much as if we should think that
the water has been drawn off from a dropsical patient on account of the
lancet, not on account of health, for the sake of which the lancet made
the incision. (On the Generation of Animals V.8, 789b.36,1115).
28
It is because of this bias that Richard Feynmans demonstration that classical
mechanics can be based entirely on least action principles (which are teleological in a
certain sense) is so striking.
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and useful for grinding down the foodsince they did not arise for this
end, but it was merely a coincident result; and so with all other parts in
which we suppose that there is a purpose? Wherever then all the parts
came about just what they would have been if they had come to be for
an end, such things survived, being organized spontaneously in a fitting
way; whereas those which grew otherwise perished and continue to perish, as Empedocles says his man-faced ox progeny did. (Physics II.8,
198b.1732)
165
29
166
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167
30
See, for example, the contribution of Robert John Russell to CNTS/VO, v. III.
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169
If nothing else, this shows that Aristotle thought a lot harder and
more clearly about causation than is sometimes assumed. This is
essentially his reply, after all. But more needs to be said, and to take
the discussion further, it is necessary to ask about the nature of those
ends on account of which we say kidneys are for the sake of waste
processing. Two levels of answer present themselves, and the distinction between these two is of the utmost importance for the teleological
argument for divine action.
On the first level, being for the sake of may be a functional way
of speaking about the properties of the thing in question in some
larger context. For example, waste processing is a property that is only
functional in the context of a living body, and being for the sake of
expresses that context silently. To see this, imagine a change of context,
which for me brings up memories of having to eat steak and kidney pie
as a child. In that case, kidneys are for the sake of eating. The examples
can be multiplied. The signification of for the sake of shifts with the
context in which the kidney is considered. Now, if this was all there
was to be said about the ends, then ends in nature could be admitted
without interfering with efficient-causal explanations, and the richer
structure of a teleological metaphysics really would be superfluous.
On the second level, however, one context may have priority over
the others in the sense that it is the natural context for thinking about
the natural end of kidneys. This is, of course, a way to say that the
functional analysis just given may not exhaust what of significance
can be said about the end of kidneys. Indeed, it is the story furnished
at the level of efficient causation about the development and function of kidneys that determines the natural context for assessing the
natural end of kidneys. In that context, asserting that kidneys are for
the sake of waste processing has a more fundamental status than the
statement kidneys are for the sake of eating has in any context. It is
the fundamental status of the natural end that so impressed Aristotle;
it has always driven, and will continue to drive, teleologically minded
thinkers to try to speak of natural ends as a way of capturing what
is important in nature, even if such ends have no part in functionalempirical accounts of evolutionary biology.
This is a subtle point, so let me be as clear as I can. We know roughly
how kidneys developed the capacities and functions that they have. We
can tell this story of origins and development in some detail without
recourse to categories of purpose. We can show how this process gives
kidneys the appearance of having been designed, even though no self-
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171
due to its influence, any claim that teleological categories are necessary for efficient-causal explanations of apparent ends is desperately
weak. But teleological categories can no more be kept from the task of
accounting for naturalness than can metaphysics in general be kept
from the human imagination. Kant thought of these as understandable
but misleading impulses, but I see no sound reason decisively to ban
either, Kant to the contrary notwithstanding. Teleology may only appear
as teleonomy, at the level of the laws of nature, but appear it ought.
So, while admitting that this is a complex judgment involving balancing competing considerations, I conclude that there is a place for
teleological categories in accounting for apparent ends in nature. But
exactly what place is this? This question brings us to the first metaphysical crossroads of the teleological argument for divine action, with
two more to come later. The way teleological categories are actually
wielded varies. Some philosophers, theologians and scientists would
be inclined to find real ends underlying apparent ends by virtue of
the laws of nature (for example, Davies). Some would make use of a
philosophical strategy hinging on supervenience, whereby multiple
independent descriptions of the same process can each be true on its
own level (for example Murphy).31 Some (such as myself ) are inclined
to resort to teleology to engage the topics of value and importance in
nature. And, as I have mentioned, there are even a few (including some
extremists in the process philosophy camp) who contend that teleological categories are needed even to produce adequate efficient-causal
accounts of apparent ends in nature. I have argued only that teleological
categories cannot be entirely ruled out of comprehensive explanations
for apparent ends in nature, and I have suggested that I find the causalgap prediction of the last option breathtaking but implausible. To that
I will add only that the other options seem compatible, and that every
option, even the supervenience strategy, requires contextualization in
a wider metaphysical theory to achieve intelligibility.32
31
See Nancey Murphys essay in CTNS/VO, v. III for a definition and discussion
of supervenience (primarily with regard to ethics). See also William Stoegers use of
this concept in CTNS/VO, v. III.
32
Nancey Murphy denies this; see her essay CTNS/VO, v. III. Murphy adopts the
supervenience strategy in order to argue for the feasibility of higher-order language
about ethics and theology, yet feels no need to explain how those higher order languages
relate in detail to other levels of discourse about the world, for which metaphysics is
indispensable. This freedom from the worries of metaphysics is held to be a desirable state of affairs to which we are propelled by Wittgensteins later philosophy. By
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4. The Second Stage: Teleology and Metaphysics
The second stage of the teleological argument for divine action attempts
to situate the affirmation of the reality of natural ends in a broader
metaphysical theory that is capable of presenting real natural ends as
instances of a more general fundamental teleological principle. This
metaphysical context is the bridge between real ends in nature and a
theory of divine action, and must be compatible with both. It is clear
that real ends in nature can be metaphysically contextualized in a
variety of ways. The question for evaluation here is whether the second
stage of the teleological argument for divine action can successfully
move from real ends in nature to only those metaphysical theories that
are amenable to divine action (in some sense), avoiding all otherwise
adequate metaphysical theories that are antagonistic to divine action.
The answer to this question is negative, I shall argue, notwithstanding
the fact that the science-religion literature at the present time exhibits
views with a strong correlation between being friendly to teleology and
being friendly to divine action. This, therefore, is the second crossroads
at which a wealth of metaphysical choices obstructs the clear lines of
inference needed by the teleological argument for divine action.
4.1. Counterexamples: Teleology without Divine Action
The obvious place to begin is with arguments that the second stage of
the teleological argument for divine action cannot succeed. For this, it
is necessary to find examples clearly illustrating that real ends in nature
can be contextualized in metaphysical systems that are both antagonistic to divine action and otherwise adequate, or at least comparable
in adequacy to metaphysical systems within which divine action can
be imagined. There are a number of such counterexamples, and I shall
mention several from a variety of philosophical traditions here.
173
174
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175
176
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177
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33
An attempt to develop such a tradition of inquiry out of fragmentary, extant efforts
has been funded for 19956 and subsequent years by the National Endowment for the
Humanities in conjunction with some private foundations. The Principle Investigator for the three year project is Robert C. Neville, and the Co-Investigators are Peter
Berger and John Berthrong.
179
To be a little more specific at the level of this sprawling metaphysical wildness that is closest to the sphere in which divine action can be
conceived, there is important variation even in traditionally recognized
forms of theism, both within and among the three major Abrahamic
traditions. One debate that appears within all three is that over whether
or not God is ontologically fundamental. In Christianity, it is usually debate over omnipotence and creation that signals the presence
of this question, with process and classical theism taking opposed
views on both doctrines. In Judaism it appears in legal debates over
the ontological primacy of the law, and in metaphysical and ethical
debates surrounding Kabbalah (Jewish mysticism) over whether God
needs salvation through human cooperation. In Islam it shows up
in some of the ethical and legal debates between the competing medieval Mu`tazilite and Ash`arite schools, as when they argued that God
forbade killing because it is bad, and that killing is bad because God
forbade it, respectively. All three traditions, therefore, have ways to
think of God either as subject to fundamental teleological principles, or
as their absolute groundand kenotic theories of creation try to have
both at once. Thus, it appears that, even when systematic metaphysical accounts of fundamental teleological principles include some form
of theism, multiple ways of envisaging the relation between God and
teleology are still possible.
4.4. Metaphysical Ambiguity and Evolutionary Biology
In spite of this staggering diversity, these metaphysical views of teleology in the evolutionary process do have common features. Three of
these common characteristics become evident from the point of view
of evolutionary biology. In fact, these shared characteristics apply even
to metaphysical contextualizations of teleology that reject teleological
categories. There are metaphysical ways of understanding teleology
that do not have all of these characteristics, and so stand outside of
the diverse mainstream I seek to characterize here, but they seem to
be relatively rare and theoretically fragile. These common features suggest a somewhat skeptical conclusion about the usefulness of biological
evolution for resolving debates about teleology in the short term.
The first common characteristic is that: Current knowledge of biological evolution is consistent with all of these views of the place of
teleology in the evolutionary process. The obvious upshot is that none
of these views can be rejected on the grounds of simple inconsistency
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181
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interferes with the easy inferences that would make the teleological
argument for divine action simpler than it is.
5.1. The Connection between Teleology and Divine Action
Some dimensions of the question of divine action are not highlighted
when teleology is the source of illumination, but there are compensating
advantages. Among these is the fact that, because apparent endedness
is a highly effective category for expressing what is interesting about
nature, it is useful as a principle for organizing conceptions of divine
action. So, then, what possibilities for divine action are suggested by
this discussion of the place of teleology in biological evolution.34
Let us begin by noting that, if the apparent ends of objects and processes are only apparent, then the rough and ready conclusioncertainly
the one that we are entitled to assume Dawkins would drawis that
there is no possibility of divine action. Strictly speaking, I suppose it is
conceivable that God might act without leaving apparently teleological
traces, but the metaphysical and theological viability of such a view is
low, as it would shut creation, all patterns in nature, and all stories in
history out of the domain of divine interest, leaving miscellaneous,
unintelligible (to us) interference as the sole mode of divine action.
Similarly, if Monods view is correct, then traditional deism and theism
are highly misleading accounts of ultimate reality. The more natural
metaphysical contextualization of his view (Monod does not propose
this himself) is the dualist one of a primal battle between principles of
order and anarchy, such as was and is still found in Zoroastrianism,
except that these two principles must be symbiotically related. If this
symbiosis itself is named God (rather than the more obvious Nature),
then we are speaking of a kind of pantheism in which divine action is
synonymous with event, which renders this God profoundly morally
ambivalent and evacuates divine action of specific meaning. Against
34
Owen Thomas distinguishes six ways to parse the question How does God act?
in Gods Activity in the World: The Contemporary Problem (Chico: Scholars Press,
1983): By what means? In what way or manner? To what effect? With what meaning
or purpose? To what extent? On analogy with what? (234236). While these six questions considerably enlarge the ordinary sense of the original query, they also helpfully
draw attention to the fact that divine action probably cannot be discussed thoroughly
without suggesting answers to all or most parts of this six-fold battery of questions.
The following discussion focuses chiefly only on the first two questions, and so stops
short of complete thoroughness.
183
these anti-teleological views is ranged an array of metaphysical contextualizations of fundamental teleological principles, many of which
are not amenable to divine action. I will not revisit these views here. It
is enough to see that the teleological argument can break down when
trying to speak of divine action even in the context of emphatically
teleological metaphysics.
Now, moving by these open metaphysical options, let us suppose for
the sake of argument that the second stage of the teleological argument
for divine action has been successful and that we begin the third stage
from within the ambit of the traditional deistic, theistic, or panentheistic
worldviews that allow us to speak in recognizable ways about divine
action. In this case, the locus in nature of the fundamental teleological
principlethe fourth dispute discussed earlierwill be the key insight
into the possible modes of divine action. So let us reflect on the relations
between the locus of teleology in nature and divine action.
When the locus in nature of this fundamental teleological principle
is natural laws only, then divine action cannot include the expression
of specific divine intentions in the context of an ongoing providential
relationship with that creation because this requires the fundamental
teleological principle also to be expressed in chance (or boundary conditions), as discussed earlier. Nor can divine action presuppose teleological
characteristics within the constituents of nature. That leaves two modes
of divine action, both bearing on creation, and both expressed in the
laws of nature: the universal determination of natural possibilities and
the ontological grounding of nature.
The locus in nature of this fundamental teleological principle might
include chance, understood as a general category including the influence
on complex systems of their boundary conditions. If so, then divine
intentions (or analogues thereof ) can conceivably be expressed either
directlythere are a number of proposals for such mechanismsor less
specifically in the striving for general ideals of harmony, complexity,
and intensification of value in history and nature (as in Whiteheads
version of process philosophy).
Finally, when the locus in nature of this fundamental teleological
principle also includes the constituents of nature, two other ideas of
divine action come into play. On the one hand, process philosophy
stipulates a rich theory of causality that posits specifically teleological
characteristics in the fundamental constituents of nature. In this case,
divine action consists in the performance of the necessary regulative
tasks associated with that theory of causation: offering initial aims
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to concrescent actual occasions from out of a primordial envisagement of possibilities, and reconciling the actuality of the world in the
maximally harmonized consequent nature. On the other hand, it is
possible to conceive of God as furnishing the material conditions for
the possibility of the emergence of complex, self-organizing systems
through creation. These conditions would be realized in the constituents of matter itself, but the mode of divine action would be creation
rather than creativity, the latter being the category to which process
metaphysics appeals in explaining the emergence of complex and
novel forms of self-organization. This view of divine action is implied
whenever complexity and self-organization require the constituents of
nature to have particular capacities in addition to the constraints on
their interaction stipulated by the laws of nature. An example of such
a view is the philosophy of Robert Neville whose theory of causality is
similar to Whiteheads process philosophy, but affirms the metaphysical theory of creation ex nihilo, and denies that God furnishes initial
aims to actual occasions.35
5.2. A Schema for Further Discussion
These six modes of divine action and their relationships to the loci in
nature of fundamental teleological principles are represented in the following diagram. Note that all three classes of divine action appear here.
Creation appears in modes 1, 2, and 5; creativity shows up in modes
3 and 6; and the expression of specific divine intentions is covered in
mode 4, which can be specified in a number of different ways.
It is clear from this table that there are a lot of possibilities for
envisaging modes of divine action, even after the philosophical contextualization of real ends in nature is specified to be compatible with
one or more types of divine action. If the locus in nature of teleology is
limited to the laws of nature, then there are fewer options. If it extends
into the processes and constituents of nature, however, the possibilities
multiply rapidly. Deciding among them depends not upon teleological
considerations but upon other metaphysical issues including such tough
problems as causality and time.
Note, too, how the contrast between essentially deistic proposals
(Davies) and more traditional theistic proposals (Peacocke, Russell)
35
See Robert Cummings Neville, Creativity and God: A Challenge to Process Theology (New York: Seabury, 1980).
185
Laws of nature
Fundamental
constituents of nature
34
This use of creatio continua is problematic on some views of causality. It is, of
course, quite natural in the context of process metaphysics. On some other views,
however, the teleological capacities of natural laws as currently understood are by
themselves sufficient for fostering trajectories toward complexity, which implies that
divine action would not be needed for the maintenance of processes of complexification, except in the most basic sense that God, on this view, is the ultimate ground of
all natural processes (this is mode 2). This narrows the meaning of creatio continua as
it applies in these cases, accordingly. It also illustrates the intimate connection between
the meaning of creatio continua and metaphysical theories about causality and the
fundamental constituents of nature.
35
For example, it has been proposed by Troy Catterson in conversation with me
that superspace versions of quantum cosmology, in conjunction with an interpretation of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle that applies to the relation of space and
time, allow for the possibility of understanding natural-law-conforming action of a
non-temporal deity in temporal nature.
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wesley j. wildman
6. Conclusions
The main conclusion to be stated here is that the teleological argument
for divine action is not very teleological. That is, there is no sound chain
of implications from analysis of apparent ends in nature to judgments
about the ontological irreducibility of those apparent ends, to estimations of the locus in nature of fundamental teleological principles, and
then to specification of the modes of divine action. In fact, the implications run more smoothly in the reverse direction. In the order stated,
the chain breaks down at each link, at least when biological evolution
remains the sphere of discussion. Additional premises are needed to
move from apparent ends in nature to the affirmation of real ends,
from there to metaphysical theories affirming a fundamental teleological
principle consistently with divine action, and from any such teleological
metaphysics to the reality of divine action in particular modes. None of
these missing premises is furnished by biological evolution, and I have
tried to spell out what some of them might be at each stage. Because
the additional premises needed to make the teleological argument for
divine action valid characteristically have little specifically to do with
teleology, we need to conclude that the argument does not depend as
much on its starting point of the ubiquity of apparent ends in nature
as the way it is stated promises.
Discussions about divine action in connection with biological evolution must not casually assume that these missing premises are unproblematic. In particular, it would be easy to fall into a kind of blinkered
or perhaps ideological ignorance of alternative, profound teleological
visions that are antagonistic toward divine action and that are as well
supported by biological evolution as any that permit us to speak of
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39
189
CHAPTER SIX
1
Acknowledgment. I am grateful to the entire workshop group for criticisms that
have improved the argument of this essay. Once again, the CTNS/Vatican Observatory project has demonstrated the virtue of detailed and sustained critical interaction.
Indeed, importing the ethos of scientific critique into theology may be the greatest
long-term contribution of this fifteen-year project. I thank in particular John Polkinghorne, Owen Thomas, and Kirk Wegter-McNelly for their criticisms during the
final writing phase.
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193
See e.g., James Cushing, Philosophical Concepts in Physics: The Historical Relation
between Philosophy and Scientific Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998); John Polkinghorne, The Quantum World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1985).
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The conceptual space defined by the quantum mathematical formalism and the associated empirical observations neither proves
nor disproves the existence of any divine being. Nor will it, by itself,
establishor rule outany claims about divine action. But it may tell
us something about how a being (human or divine) must act if it acts
in the physical world and in conformity with physical law. That is, the
conceptual space of quantum physics may constrain the ways such a
being could be manifested and the sorts of actions a human observer
could in principle detect.
All this assumes, of course, that any inklings we might have of a divine
being would have to be drawn from its creative actions (as reflected,
say, in the structure of the physical world or the evolutionary development of the cosmos) or from its interactions with us (as reflected
in human experience, including claims regarding religious experience
and revelation in the various world religions).4 Let me use the word
God to designate whatever might be the actual nature of the divine
and divine action to designate the manifestations of God (if any) in
the cosmos and its history. If God exists and has not acted at all, or
if these actions fail to indicate anything about the divine natureand
especially if the actions lead us to infer things about the divine nature
that are falsethen we are completely sunk, epistemically speaking
(and perhaps in other ways as well!). In such cases our best reflection
will yield only false conclusions about the divine.
On the other hand, it is possible that the constraints of physics do
represent the context within which God chooses to act; thus it is possible that the constraints imposed by the physical order themselves tell
us something interesting about the nature of that orders Creator. Of
course, when one reads possible rather than probable or necessary, one realizes that this is theology in a hypothetical moderather
unlike the old certainties of the faith. If theologians must proceed
with this sort of tenuousness, one is always justified in choosing not
to play. The same holds, by the way, for any theology of divine action
in light of contemporary science. Whether one plays will depend on
how expensive one judges the wager to be (do I lose credibility by
even considering the God-hypothesis seriously?) and how valuable one
4
This is a more philosophical formulation of what theologians call Rahners Rule.
See Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, Geoffrey Bromiley, trans. (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991).
195
thinks the possible outcome is. Clearly ones decision on these questions
depends on subjective factors that go far beyond the context of this
(or any) academic essay. The most I can show here is that the wager is
not irrational. There is no point in wagering on an impossible option,
making bets one can only lose. But it is not irrational to wager on a
possible outcome.
What, precisely, is the wager? Formulated negatively, the wager is
that none of the three if s in the sentence two paragraphs above is
true. It is a wager because no empirical result can determine the answer,
at least at present. Nonetheless, it is the positive side of the wager that
sets the agenda for the present essay. Put positively, one can wager
that the structure of the physical world sets parameters onand thus
gives us some knowledge ofthe manner in which God could act. The
physical world would thus provide us some epistemic access to divine
action (if God acts); it would be conducive to knowledge of the source
of these actions and of the nature of that hypothetical source. Indeed,
if there is a God who creates, the bets not a bad one, for wouldnt one
expect the nature of the Creator to be represented in some way in the
structures of what has been created?5 As Owen Thomas has pointed
out in conversation, my approach also amounts to the wager that there
is some analogy between human and divine action, for our actions
are certainly constrained by the physical world. Hypothesizing some
similarity between the human and divine agent gives us some basis
for understanding divine action (if it exists), whereas hypothesizing
5
James Cushing refers to the problem of evil at this point. My approach, rather
than dodging this difficult set of issues, puts them right at the center. The history of
evolution in general, and human history in particular, includes incredible waste and
suffering, and the wager suggests that the biological and psychological structures that
cause this suffering are somehow indicative of the nature of the underlying divine cause
(if any). One pursuing this method must therefore introduce the categories of evil and
good, ask whether God can consistently be called good, and examine the reasons that
a divine being might have had for allowing biological and psychological structures of
this sort. Such debates belong to the field of theodicy; see e.g., John Hick, Evil and the
God of Love (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); John Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil:
Theological Systems and the Problem of Evil (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1994);
Thomas F. Tracy, ed., The God Who Acts: Philosophical and Theological Explorations
(University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); David Ray Griffin, Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1991);
Jane Mary Trau, The Co-existence of God and Evil (New York: P. Lang, 1991); Richard
Worsley, Human Freedom and the Logic of Evil: Prolegomenon to a Christian Theology of Evil (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press; New York: St. Martins Press,
1996). Needless to say, I cannot resolve the debate in this essay, though the successful
outcome of my argument requires that I eventually address it.
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that divine action is utterly sui generis would rule out any general
knowledge of it.6
But why treat quantum physics separately? If we had a unified
science in which the interrelationships between the various special
sciences were fully understood, as in the third-order form of theology
proposed above, we could use the shared structures common to all
scientific fields as the starting point for asking about the nature and
action of the divine. The task would be difficult, of course, even with
an agreed upon empirical and theoretical basis on which to draw. At
present, however, we are far from unified science; and major areas of
physics, such as quantum physics and gravitational theory, remain
theoretically distinct. There is no other option, then, but to consider
the various scientific fields seriatim, asking what divine action would
mean in that context, how it might occur (if it occurs) and, given the
laws and structures in question, what the nature of the divine source
might be. Whether or not the conclusions that one reaches within the
various fieldsfor example physics, evolutionary biology or genetics,
the neurosciences, and the social sciencesfit together into a single
picture is a separate question.7
I recognize that these proposals are controversial; there are opponents on all sides (Cannon to the left of them, cannon to the right of
them/Volleyed and thundered . . .) and the debates are often heated. If
one uses not only the present book but also other recent publications
as data, one finds at least five alternative positions:8
a. No reasons can be given, other than purely subjective ones, for any
theological position (Cushing);
b. Serious theological positions can be defended in light of science
in some cases, but quantum physics is too unclear, and subject to
too much difficulty, to give rise to helpful theological conjectures
(Polkinghorne);
c. Some constructive theology can be written on the topic of divine
action and quantum physics, even if our conjectures remain highly
6
This is the opposition of faith and reason first formulated by Tertullian and associated in the twentieth century with the No! of Karl Barth in his debate with Emil
Brunner.
7
In The Emergence of Spirit (forthcoming) I argue for the affirmative, but obviously
that case cannot be made here.
8
Predictably, each of these schools view those to their left as unnecessarily empiricist and positivist and those to their right as insufficiently aware of the power and
rigor of scientific thought.
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speculative (the present essay, but also, inter alia, those by Chiao,
Russell, Stoeger and Tracy);
d. Rather strong theological conclusions can be reached on the basis
of modern physics, presumably including quantum physics. Thus,
for example, the physicist Cyril Domb finds clear evidence of the
Creator in the world, and the intelligent design theorists (William
Dembski, Michael Behe, et al.) argue that evolution requires a prior
intention and in-built design on Gods part.
e. The convergence between scientific conclusions and the teachings
of the religious traditions is so great that they should no longer
be viewed as separate realms that need to be connected but rather
as one integrated whole. The Mystics and Scientists conferences
have produced a variety of calls for their unification;9 Fritjof Capra
has long been famous for touting the role of intuition and holism
in quantum physics; and much popular and New Age thinking
presupposes that the science-religion separation is now defunct.
For many of these individuals quantum physics actually serves as
the central argument for their position.
Those of us who write in the neighborhood of (c) make the plea to
advocates of (a) and (b) that they would at least consider our proposals
with an open mind, recognizing that they are not excluded by sound
empirical science and that they are different from many of the dogmatic
and unquestioning theologies of the past. Likewise, we caution advocates
of (d) and (e ) to be aware of the hypothetical and contingent nature
of all such theological reflection, as well as to observe the continuing
distinctions between theology and the sciences.
See David Lorimer, ed., The Spirit of Science: From Experiment to Experience (New
York: Continuum, 1999).
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199
theory of subjectivity. What are the intuitions that underlie their effort?
At the deepest level, as Jeremy Butterfield has argued in the context of
the CTNS/Vatican conference, physics has an inherent resistance to
invoking subjectivity. Subjectivity is certainly not part of that family of
physical properties (such as mass, charge, location, time, and entropy)
that makes up standard physical explanations.
It does seem true that one does not immediately need to invoke a
full metaphysics in order to interpret the transition from quantum
propensities to actual measurements. Some level of analysis lies between
the straight physical report and the robust metaphysics of subjectivity
or holism that some interpreters favor. In this middle level of analysis
one can formulate a more minimalist account of the transition. What
occasions the move from quantum coherence to decoherence? Is it a
sheer result of size, of the number of particles in a system, or does the
act of measurement, or even the intent to measure, play a crucial role
in this occurrence? The minimalist wants to know only what is entailed
by the physicsor, to put it differently, whether anything is presupposed in doing physics and formulating physical theories that (presently, or perhaps necessarily) lies outside the scope of physics. Some
minimalists thus argue that an observer is presupposed by quantum
theory, and that there is no place for the observer within that theory
as currently formulated.
It is important to ask how strong a role is played in this debate by
another assumption that has been a part of the history of physics in the
modern era. We might call it the ladder of disciplines or ladder of
the sciences assumption. That is, the success of science is based on the
explanatory reduction of one discipline to another. If chemistry were a
unique domain of its own, not connected via physical chemistry to the
fundamental laws of physics, then (it is argued) we would have a situation very similar to the age of alchemy: chemistry would be a completely
separate discipline, governed by its own rules, laws, and principles. But
(they argue) such isolation of explanatory fields would cast questions
on the unity of science and thus on the prospect of the completion of
science, or even of genuine scientific advancement. Likewise, if some
unique principle of life characterized all the biological sciences, such
as the striving for perfection or self-development (entelechy), then
biochemistry would not be sufficient to explain the functioning of living beings, and again the ladder of the sciences would fail. Isnt some
such concern, at any rate, at the root of the resistance to allowing the
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interpretation of quantum mechanics to rest on a higher-order principle such as conscious observation rather than on a principle proper
to physical theory itself?
Now consider an alternative metaphysical frameworkif only as a
Gedanken experiment.10 On this imagined view one expects interconnections between scientific disciplines but not relationships of reduction
between all of them. More complicated natural systems are sometimes
genuinely or strongly emergent from underlying physical systems.
New emergent levels presuppose the law-like relations that we find at
the lower levels, but they are not fully explainable in terms of those
laws. Indeed, phenomena occurring at the higher levels are sometimes
actually constitutive of the lower-level processes. Systemic patterns
describable only at higher levels of analysis affect what occurs at the
lower levelswhether it be epigenesis affecting the way a cells genetic
code is actually expressed, or qualities of an ecosystem influencing the
behavior of particular organisms in the ecosystem, or the observations
of a subject affecting which of the quantum mechanical probabilities
are in fact observed and become a part of the macrophysical world.
The choice between these two models, which we might call the
reductionist and the emergentist models respectively, is a difficult
one, and there is much to be said for both and against both. At the
most cautious level, it may suffice to note that the interpretation of the
quantum mechanical formalism is deeply affected by ones metaphysical
inclinations on this matter. But there is also a less cautious response to
the questionone that a number of well-known quantum physicists
have pursued. An additional set of conclusions can be drawn about
the measurement problem by those who are inclined to postulate that
observers are a basic part of the furniture of the universe. In its strong
form (cf. the strong anthropic principle) this view holds that subjectivity in certain important respects makes the physical world to be what
it is. Perhaps as a result of being more strongly dualist in its theory
of the human person than the emergentist view sketched above, the
subjectivity is basic view opens the door more readily to a theory of
God and Gods actions. If subjectivity has this sort of foundational role
in the becoming of the physical world, and if a divine being exists, then
10
I have developed these ideas in more detail in the above-cited works; I list them
here only to illustrate some of the effects of alternative metaphysical or theological
frameworks.
201
See Nicholas Saunders, Divine Acnun and Modern Science (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), which explores some of the difficulties associated with this view.
12
See David Bohm and Basil J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe: An Ontological
Interpretation of Quantum Theory (New York: Routledge, 1993), 296ff.
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of these actual universes and not the others. In either case, no actual
reduction of the wavepacket occurs. Its not that the physical world
changes from indeterminate to determinate; its rather that a branching of universes occurs and the observer subsequently finds herself in
only one of them.
Everett was explicit that his interpretation was designed to avoid the
consequence that some mysterious subject should cause an ontological
change in the physical world, namely the collapse of the wavepacket.
He was thus reacting against the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which held this sort of view. Consider, for example,
the position of Werner Heisenberg, who explained the Copenhagen
interpretation by taking a fundamentally Aristotelian view of quantum
mechanics. Heisenberg believed that quantum indeterminacy was like
the world of Aristotles metaphysics, in which (actual existing) potentials
strive to become actual. In this theory the subject acts as a sort of final
cause, pulling a certain (real) potential into actual existence. Note that
this view reverses the stance of classical (Newtonian) physics, which
requires that the subject ultimately be explained in terms of physical
laws. For the Copenhagen theorists, by contrast, when a definite measurement is made at the subatomic level, the resulting macrophysical
state is a combination of a quantum-physical probability distribution
and the scientists decision of what, when, and how to measure. Indeed,
on this view the subjects role is in one sense the primary one: the
world is merely potential until the moment of observation, when the
conscious observer resolves it into an actual state. In its most extreme
form, the form propounded for instance by John Wheeler, the entire
universe may have existed in a state of quantum potentiality until the
first observer emerged, at which point it was retroactively resolved into
macrophysical structures such as stars, planets, and the like. Wheeler
even applied this view backwards to the creation of the universe:
Is the very mechanism for the universe to come into being meaningless
or unworkable or both unless the universe is guaranteed to produce life,
consciousness and observership somewhere and for some little time in its
history-to-be? The quantum principle shows that there is a sense in which
what the observer will do in the future defines what happens in the past
even in a past so remote that life did not then exist, and shows even more
that observership is a prerequisite for any useful version of reality.13
13
John Wheeler, quoted in Paul C.W. Davies, Other Worlds: A Portrait of Nature
in Rebellion, Space, Superspace, and the Quantum Universe (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1980), 126.
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The debate between the many-worlds and the subject-centered interpretation cannot yet be physically resolved. (It may be resolved in the
future if many worlds is an entailment of string theory or hyperspace
or a cosmology of universes birthing universes, as some claimand if
these theories are in fact empirically checkable. Of course, it would also
be resolved if one could produce a physical theory that explained the
collapse of the wavepacket.) It is therefore at present a philosophical
debate, and one that, as I hope to show, is deeply influenced by metaphysical intuitions or assumptions. At the risk of oversimplification, we
might state the basic opposition in this way: if you take it to be crucial
that the explanation of the world be given ultimately in physical terms,
then you will be justified in rejecting explanations that are essentially
subject-basedeven at the cost of an incredible loss of parsimony.
For it certainly seems like ontological exuberance (or over-kill) of the
worst sort to assert, with DeWitt, that our universe must be viewed
as constantly splitting into a stupendous number of branches and that
every quantum transition taking place on every star, in every galaxy,
in every remote corner of the universe is splitting our local world into
myriads of copies of itself. Here is schizophrenia with a vengeance!14
But if one holds, as many many-worlds theorists have, that this is the
only viable scientific interpretation that interprets quantum mechanics
in a purely physical fashion, and if one has a strong enough commitment to avoiding any reference to conscious observers, then it may be
a cost one is willing to pay.15
But what if you believe that subjects are irreducible parts (inhabitants) of the one universe? In this case your metaphysical belief will
incline you to see quantum mechanics as evidence for a metaphysics
of the subjectas a number of its leading theorists have in fact maintained (Eugene Wigner, John von Neumann, Henry Stapp). Instead of
multiplying worlds unnecessarily, youll argue, one should see quantum mechanics as a (the?) point at which the physical and the mental
connect. Thus the quantum physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizscker
argued in the 1950s that quantum physics was the vindication of Kants
dualism, his sharp separation between the kingdom of causes and the
14
Ibid., 136.
Put more strongly, it sometimes seems that the major motivation for many-worlds
theorists is that Copenhagen or subjectivity-based views would stand in the way of a
strong, unambiguous reduction of all sciences, including the sciences of human subjectivity, to physical objects, forces, and laws.
15
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kingdom of means and ends.16 This was also the view taken by Eugene
Wigner and his followers. Wigner used the quantum revolution to argue
that the minds of sentient beings occupy a central role in the laws of
nature and in the organization of the universe, for it is precisely when
the information about an observation enters the consciousness of an
observer that the superposition of waves actually collapses into reality.17
Interestingly, one of Roger Penroses arguments against many-worlds
theories also appeals to subject-based considerations. He calls them
zombie theories of the world because the continual branching of the
world and the threading of my own consciousness through it would
seem to result in my becoming separated from the tracks of consciousness of all my friends.18 Penrose insists that one needs an adequate
theory of consciousness before one can make sense of the many-worlds
view as an interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Now there are also serious objections to the subjective interpretation,
objections that emphasize its counterintuitive features. Every text on
the philosophy of quantum physics includes diagrams of the counterexamples of Schrdingers Cat and Wigners Friend. Another form of
the objection imagines that a meter is set up to permanently register
whether the radioactive particle has decayed at the end of a minute
(assuming an experimental set-up in which there is a 50% probability
of this occurring). Two photographs are then automatically taken of
the meter reading, first photo A and then photo B. The photographs
are developed but no one looks at them. Imagine that ten years are
allowed to pass during which no subject observes either the meter or
the photos. At the end of that time a subject looks at photo B, and
suppose that she observes the meter to register a radioactive decay.
On Wigners viewaccording to the criticat that moment, but not
before, the superposition of states will be collapsed, the particle will
(retroactively) have decayed, the meter will (retroactively) register its
decay, and photo A (which no one has yet looked at) will suddenly
show a picture of the meter in its on position. Before that moment
16
Carl Friedrich von Weizscker, Zum Weltbild der Physik, 4th ed., revised (Stuttgart: S. Hirzel, 1949).
17
Eugene Wigner quoted in Davies, Other Worlds, 132f.
18
Roger Penrose, Singularities and Time-Asymmetry, in General RelativityAn
Einstein Centenary Survey, S.W. Hawking and W. Israel, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979).
205
19
Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science
(New York: Harper and Row, 1958); Carl Friedrich von Weizscker, Zum Weltbild der
Physik (Stuttgart: S. Hirzel, 1949).
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207
There is no danger that we will resolve this debate here, though some
progress has been made in recent years.22 In this context we can ask
only about the effects of the debate on the interpretation of quantum
mechanics and theology, and vice versa. If one accepts compatibilism, then the whole issue of physical determinacy or indeterminacy is
clearly irrelevant to the question of freedom and deserves no further
mention here. By contrast, what happens if one shares the incompatibilist intuition and holds that humans are, at least on some occasions,
genuinely free (as I do)? One answer is to side with a strongly dualist
view of the physical and mental realms. For the dualist (of the Cartesian as well as the Kantian variety), it doesnt matter if the physical
order is deterministic, since the action of the mental agent23 is by itself
sufficient to guarantee that the action is free, whatever the state of the
physical world.
But many of us do not find such dualistic views credible as a theory
of human nature and action. For nondualists who are incompatibilists, there must be some place or places in the physical order where an
outcome in the natural world is not determined by the set of antecedent conditions and states. Call it the Nondeterminism Postulate. As
Robert Russell has written, an ontological indeterminacy of this type
seems necessary if human beings are to enact their own choices in the
world.
We might look, for example, to see whether brain functioning allows
for an openness of outcome that is sufficient for counterfactual freedom.
Could the same complex brain state result in more than one subsequent
outcome (assuming that we had the knowledge to establish that it was
the same brain state that was correlated with two different outcomes
in two different cases)? Those of us who accept the Nondeterminism
have also weighed in on this side, e.g., Richard M. Restak, The Modular Brain: How
New Discoveries in Neuroscience are Answering Age-old Questions about Memory,
Free Will, Consciousness, and Personal Identity (New York: Scribners, 1994). But the
incompatibilist side has, if anything, become stronger in recent years. Among many
examples see especially Peter Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983); Timothy OConnor, ed., Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays
on Indeterminism and Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); John Martin
Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994);
Derk Pereboom, ed., Free Will (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub. Co., 1997); Robert
Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
22
Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will represents a particularly strong example.
23
By agent I mean here Descartess res cogitans, or a member of the kingdom of
means and ends, as in Kants Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.
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Postulate argue that there must be this sort of openness at least somewhere in the hierarchy of natural phenomena. And, given what we
know of the microphysical world, its at least plausible that the required
openness of outcome has its first (and perhaps only) source at the
quantum level. As long as the openness could be amplified up through
the causal chain so that it remained relevant to the description of some
of your actionse.g., to the complex physical state underlying your
choice to commit a crime or notthen you could be said to be free and
thus responsible for your actions. Only in this sense could quantum
indeterminacy (if it exists) be said to be the necessary condition for
human free will. Incidentally, note that nothing in this account makes
indeterminacy sufficient to establish robust free will in humans; it is
only a prerequisite, a first step in showing how genuine freedom might
arise at the level of complex organisms like ourselves.
In this third example there is again room for one to engage in
some serious metaphysical reflection, though not all will wish to do
so. Imagine that you accept incompatibilism as defined above, as well
as some version of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics: you hold that the quantum world is genuinely indeterministic.
Suppose also that you do not think that indeterminacy arises at any
other or higher physical level than quantum mechanics. The minimal
formulation of your view is that quantum indeterminacy is a necessary
condition for human freedom. But you might also postulate and look
for other kinds of openness as well. You might hold, for instance, that
the hierarchical structure of the physical world, rather than eliminating the indeterminacy, actually augments or amplifies it. You might
look for expressions of indeterminacy at multiple levels of the physical
hierarchy, from the macrophysical level of measuring devices through
genetic variation to indeterminacy in neuronal firing within the brain
and the resulting behavioral plasticity. In your more philosophical
moments you might argue that the existence of mentality in general,
and free will in particular, are among the results of this openness of
the world at whatever levels it occurs.24
Your view would then commit you to giving some account of how
quantum indeterminacy could find macrophysical expression. Could
you suggest a physical mechanism for making this indeterminacy
24
Having said this, I must add that I am not currently aware of any concrete results
that suggest such openness at any other level than the quantum level.
209
4. Taking Stock
In examining these three classic areas in the interpretation of quantum
mechanics it has been my goal not so much to decisively establish
one set of systematic conclusions as to defend the importance of this
25
Henry P. Stapp, Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics (Berlin: Springer,
1993).
26
See e.g., Robert J. Russell, Nancey C. Murphy, Theo C. Meyering, and Michael
A. Arbib, eds., Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action
(Vatican City State/Berkeley, Calif.: Vatican Observatory/Center for Theology and the
Natural Sciences, 2000), hereafter NAP.
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philip clayton
27
Recent introductory texts to the philosophy of physics include James Cushing,
Philosophical Concepts in Physics: The Historical Relation between Philosophy and Scientific Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter Kosso, Appearance
and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998); Roger G. Newton, Thinking about Physics (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2000). Significant works (among many others) in the field include Jarrett Leplin,
ed., The Creation of Ideas in Physics: Studies for a Methodology of Theory Construction (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995); Bernard dEspagnat, Veiled Reality: An Analysis of
Present-Day Quantum Mechanical Concepts (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1995);
Jeremy Butterfield and Constantine Pagonis, eds., From Physics to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Elena Castellani, ed., Interpreting Bodies:
Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1998).
211
Indeed, many have actually published on meta-physical questions raised by quantum physics, and some even have books in which the word metaphysics appears in the
title! So the problem cannot be that all metaphysical statements are strictly speaking
meaningless and to be eschewed, as Professor Ayer famously held; A.J. Ayer, Language,
212
philip clayton
Truth, and Logic, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover, 1946). For positivists in Ayers tradition, metaphysical questions are unacceptable whenever they introduce any entities
or categories that cannot be directly justified by the mathematical formalism and the
empirical data. On this view, debates about the foundations or interpretation of quantum
mechanics might or might not be acceptable, depending on how they are pursued.
213
214
philip clayton
29
See Bernard dEspagnat, In Search of Reality (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1983). More
recently, see his Veiled Reality. See also idem, Realism and the Physicist: Knowledge,
Duration, and the Quantum World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
and his article in W. Schommers, ed., Quantum Theory and Pictures of Reality: Foundations, Interpretations, and New Aspects (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1989).
30
Several critics are right to point out that dEspagnats monism is not a strict
entailment of his interpretation of quantum theory. The point of the continuum and
the pluralistic model I am advocating is that broader metaphysical discussions are
underdetermined by formalism + empirical data, and even by the basic interpretive
options, without thereby becoming purely arbitrary, bad metaphysics.
215
31
32
33
216
philip clayton
34
See Kevin J. Sharpe, Mysticism in Physics, in Religion and Nature, K.J. Sharpe and
J.M. Ker, eds. (New Zealand: The University of Auckland Chaplaincy, 1984), 43f.
35
Dennis Postle, Fabric of the Universe (London: Macmillan, 1976), 8f.
217
36
218
philip clayton
It is common among the new-paradigm thinkers to claim that the basic
problem with science is that, under the Newtonian-Cartesian worldview,
the universe is viewed as atomistic, mechanistic, divided, and fragmented,
whereas the new sciences (quantum/relativistic and systems/complexity
theory) have shown that the world is not a collection of atomistic fragments but an inseparable web of relations. This web-of-life view, they
claim, is compatible with traditional spiritual worldviews, and thus this
new paradigm will usher in the new quantum self and quantum society,
a holistic and healing worldview disclosed by science itself.42
The problem, in other words, was not that the scientific worldview was
atomistic instead of holistic, since it was basically holistic from the start.
No, the problem was that it was a thoroughly flatland holism. It was
not a holism that actually included all of the interior realms of the I
and the We (including the eye of contemplation).43
When concepts such as these are fleshed out in full form by the more
radical Eastern mystics, the results can be startling:
. . . in quantum physics the elements are not physical themselves; they
do not exist as objects. Their very existence depends on the idea of their
existence beforehand. They are treated as tendencies to exist rather
than as already existing possibilities like the sides of a flipped coin.
In the quantum world the quantum coins sides do not appear unless
someone calls for them to appear. . . . Thus we conclude that the new
physics introduces the element of consciousness into the material world.
This consciousness will not arise from the molecule itself, as seen as a
material unit, but will arise as a risk-taking psychethat is, one that
chooses. These choices cannot be made willy-nilly. Reason must begin
to make its appearance, which surpasses the simple mechanism of cause
and effect. We know that atoms do not follow the laws of cause and effect
except statistically or on the average. To explain the evolution of learning, associative memory, and possibly even the more primitive forms of
memory called habituation and sensitization, we must face the quantum.
States of consciousness, feelings, emotional states, and psychology as a
science may depend on the recognition that mind, the consciousness of
the universe, arises through quantum physics.44
42
Ken Wilber, The Marriage of Sense and Soul: Integrating Science and Religion
(New York: Random House, 1998), 38.
43
Ibid., 57.
44
Fred Alan Wolf, Star Wave: Mind, Consciousness, and Quantum Physics (New
York: Macmillan, 1994), 179.
219
220
philip clayton
45
Classically, Christian theology claimed that there were mental objects or souls
that constituted the essence of (at least) each person. Recent dialogue with the neurosciences has led many theologians to think instead of mental properties rather than
essentially mental things. See, e.g., the essays in NAP.
46
I cannot do justice to the complicated criticisms in five sentences. In addition
to other works cited here, see Philip Clayton, The Case for Christian Panentheism,
Dialog 37 (1998): 2018; idem, Panentheist Internalism: Living within the Presence
of the Trinitarian God, Dialog 40 (2001), in press.
47
Even Christian theologians are now arguing that the notion of a (dualistically
understood) soul does not make sense. See, e.g., Warren S. Brown, Nancey C. Murphy, and Newton Malony, Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological
Portraits of Human Nature (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1998).
221
48
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philip clayton
order: That is, there is a universal flux that cannot be defined explicitly,
but which can be known only implicitly, as indicated by the explicitly
definable forms and shapes, some stable and some unstable, that can be
abstracted from the universal flux.49 Some label this the fundamental
metaphysical move: to distinguish between the world of appearances
and something deeper. Think of Platos distinction between the phenomena and the realm of the formsor, for that matter, any of the
other Greek attempts to specify the archor ultimate principle. Note
also that what the world ultimately turns out to be will depend on the
nature of this deeper principle.
Consider some candidates for the nature of this underlying reality.
In the Spinozistic tradition with which dEspagnat aligns himself, the
One is not an active principle; it is neither mind nor matter (though it
manifests itself as both); it is unchanging, eternal, and in itself unitary
and undivided. Contrast this position with the view of Bohm and the
physicists who draw on the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead,50 for whom the deeper reality is process or movement: What
is is a whole movement, in which each aspect flows into and merges
with all other aspects. Atoms, electrons, protons, tables, chairs, human
beings, planets, galaxies, etc. are then to be regarded as abstractions
from the whole movement and are to be described in terms of order,
structure, and form in movement.51 One must then ask whether or not
this reality-in-motion is conscious. The Hindu traditions, for example,
have often understood it as a universal ground of consciousness. Thus
the Hindu quantum physicist Amit Goswami solves the measurement
problem by imagining all conscious observers to be manifestations of
a universal, omnipresent ground of consciousness.52 For Spinozists, by
contrast, although mentality appears among the infinite attributes of the
One, mind is no more basic to reality than matter. Panentheism can
be seen to split the difference. It does not draw the sharp separation
between this material world and its purely spiritual source that we found
in CPT. On the other hand, it does not equate world and God, physical
49
223
6. Conclusion
In this essay I have attempted to trace some of the lines that connect
quantum physics and theology. Admittedly, we have not found the
sort of tight conceptual connections that sometimes arise within the
philosophy of physics; in this sense there is certainly more freedom
than constraint. At least five tentative conclusions have emerged out
of the discussion:
53
On the supervenience relation see several of the essays in NAP, e.g., Murphy and
Clayton, and the literature cited therein.
54
See Bede Griffiths, The Vision of Non-Duality in World Religions, in The Spirit
of Science, Lorimer, ed.
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philip clayton
55
Cf. Nancey C. Murphy and George F.R. Ellis. On the Moral Nature of the Universe:
Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996); Arthur Peacocke,
225
Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and BecomingNatural, Divine, and Human (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993); Harold J. Morowitz, Emergences: Twenty-Eight Steps
from Matter to Spirit, forthcoming.
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philip clayton
CHAPTER SEVEN
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thomas f. tracy
1
Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (Haven: Yale University Press, 1974),
and The Identity of Jesus Christ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975).
2
The Meaning of Revelation (New York: Macmillan, 1941), especially Ch. 3.
229
the actions described in the biblical stories, then what if anything does
God do? If, for example, we are not prepared to say that God sent a
series of plagues to Egypt, parted the waters of the Red Sea to let the
Hebrew people pass, guided them with pillars of cloud by day and fire
by night, and fed them heavenly mana in the desert, then in what way
is God the agent of their liberation?3 Having granted that the biblical
narratives should not be read as direct reports of God mighty deeds,
modern theologians confront a host of difficult questions about how
to interpret these stories and about what claims they warrant regarding
divine action in the world.
Second, the rise of the natural sciences has profoundly changed
the intellectual context within which this theological enterprise of
interpretation is carried out. Since the sixteenth century, the various
sciences have progressively disentangled themselves from the explicitly
religious conceptions of the universe to which they initially were tied.
For example, the periodic divine interventions that Newton introduced
to correct the planetary orbits were replaced by the deterministic causal
closure of Laplace; traditional flood geology gave way to the uniformitarianism of Hutton and Lyell; the exquisite divine design of each
creature for its place in nature (that Paley illustrated in his anatomical
studies) was succeeded by Darwins theory of natural selection. At
every point the sciences have proven their ability to provide powerful
explanations of events in the world without appeal to a transcendent
cause. Laplace spoke for the modern sciences generally in his famous
remark, when asked about the role of God in his astronomical theories,
that he had no need for that hypothesis. The sciences, for their own
explanatory purposes, not only get along perfectly well without God,
they systemically exclude appeals to such an agent from their battery
of explanatory strategies.
Langdon Gilkey famously pressed this question with great effect against the biblical theology movement (Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Language,
The Journal of Religion 41 (1961), pp. 194205). The biblical theologians, e.g. G. Ernest
Wright in The God Who Acts: Biblical Theology as Recital (London: SCM, 1952), argued
that nineteenth century liberal theology made a fatal error in identifying revelation
with certain modifications of human religious consciousness. By contrast, Wright
and others contended that we come to know God in response to Gods self-revealing
mighty acts in salvation history, as narrated in the biblical texts. Gilkey pointed out
that the biblical theologians were unwilling to take these stories at face value and yet
offered no alternative account of what they meant by an act of God. As a result, they
were left in the embarrassing position of proclaiming Gods self-revelation in action
without being able to say what God has done.
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thomas f. tracy
4
See Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H.R. Macintosh and J.S.
Stewart (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), Para. 46; Rudolph Bultmann, Kerygma and
Myth, ed. H.W. Bartsch (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), and Gordon Kaufman,
God the Problem, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972). Also see Langdon
Gilkey, op. cit.
231
5
Anonymous, Bethu Brigte, ed. Donncha O hAodha (Dublin: Dublin Institute for
Advanced Studies, 1978), Sect. 21.
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thomas f. tracy
of the world and on habits of explanation that have been shaped by the
natural sciences. Accordingly, miracles are very much out of favor, if
by miracles we mean events that a) are brought about by God and
b) depart from the laws of nature. Although nothing in the sciences
entitles us to say that such events cannot occur, we know that there are
important evidential hurdles facing any particular claim that one has
occurred; on this point, critical approaches in historical analysis and
our scientifically shaped understanding of nature reenforce each other.
We have grown instinctively resistant to picturing the world as a place
where God persistently breaks in with astonishing displays of divine
power. So while the modern theologians predicament is not as severely
constrained as our initial dilemma suggested (viz. to a choice between
the scientific enterprise as a whole or the God who acts in history), the
options appear quite limited. We can speak of God as the creator who
sets the terms of cosmic history, which then unfolds according to the
natural laws God has established. But if we want to go on to affirm that
God acts within that history, then it appears that we must take up the
epistemic burdens associated with miracles.
There are, I think, at least two ways to respond to this theological
predicament. The first argues that Gods relation to the world as creator, properly understood, provides the basis for an account of Gods
particular actions in history that is sufficiently robust for theological
purposes. This is to challenge the claim that constitutes the first horn of
the dilemma we constructed; the strategy here is to show that traditional
claims about Gods special providence in history can be explicated by
reference to Gods activity as the creator of history. The second response
addresses the other horn of the dilemma; it challenges the claim that if
God acts to redirect the course of events in the world, then this must
constitute an intervention that departs from the lawful structures of
nature. If a) the structures of nature include events that are not fully
determined by the past, and b) these events have effects that sometimes
are amplified in the causal sequences that flow from them, then God
could shape the course of history by acting in these open interstices of
creation without disrupting its immanent structures. It is at this point
that quantum mechanical indeterminism may be relevant.
I want to explore some of the strengths and weaknesses of each of
these approaches. Much of the discussion of the relevance of contemporary natural science to the theology of divine action has focused on
variants of the second approach. In this paper, I would like to counterbalance this tendency by including extended consideration of the
233
prospects for a position of the first type. There are two reasons for this.
First, it is important not to underestimate the resources available in the
classical theological tradition for giving an account of special divine
action in history that does not appeal to causal openness in the structures of nature. Note that if a position of this type could be sustained,
there would no longer be as clear and pressing a theological need to
need to develop a position of the second type; the theological stake in
scientific debates about (for example) deterministic interpretations of
quantum mechanics would be considerably reduced. Second, if we do
go on to claim that God acts through indeterministic structures in the
natural world, it is important to root this claim firmly in an account
of the basic creative relation of God to nature.
2. God as Creator
Gods fundamental action is the act of creating the world, i.e., the
totality of non-divine things. As this idea developed in the theological
traditions in the West, it came to include three elements. First, creation
is a free intentional action, rather than a necessity of the divine nature.
Because Gods being is complete quite without the world of created
things, creation is an act of gracious generosity. The effect of affirming
the freedom of Gods creative action is to emphasize the utter contingency of the existence of created things. This stands in contrast, for
example, to Neo-Platonic conceptions of creation as a necessary and
involuntary emanation of the super-abundant plentitude of the divine
being. This classical understanding of creation also contrasts with the
views of most process theologians. Whiteheads metaphysical scheme,
for example, specifies that every individual entity must be a creative
integration of relations to other entities. God is no exception to this
scheme; God makes a uniquely pervasive contribution to the creative
becoming of the world, but God and world are co-eternal.
Second, Gods creative act cannot be understood on the familiar
human model of refashioning materials already at hand. There is no
prime matter, no chaotic primordial stuff, that is presupposed by and
constrains Gods creative work. Rather, God creates ex nihilo; apart
from Gods creation action, nothing but God would exist. Creation
accounts for the very being of the creature, and not just for the way it
is or for its properties over time. It follows that the divine creative act
cannot be regarded as a species of change; in creating, God does not
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thomas f. tracy
transform or modify the state of things, but rather brings it about that
there are finite things at all.
Third, Gods creative action includes the continuous giving of being
to the created world in its entirety. Creation is not a particular event,
completed at some time in the distant past, which leaves behind (as
it were) a world that gets along perfectly well on its own. This understanding of creation was characteristic of eighteenth century Deism.
But the mainstream of the theological tradition has held that created
things do not possess a power of continuing in existence on their own;
rather, the existence of the created world depends absolutely at every
moment upon Gods creative action. This has typically been expressed
by saying that the act of creation includes the activity of sustaining, or
conserving, the existence of each creature.6 If God were to cease this
continuous creative action, finite things would cease to be.
2.1. Direct and Indirect Divine Action
This understanding of Gods relation to the world provides a rich context within which to interpret talk of divine action in history. God is
universally and intimately present to every creature at every moment,
and nothing takes place without Gods agency. Thus we can speak
not only of creatio ex nihilo but also of creatio continua, a continuous
creative activity expressed in the unfolding history of the world. There
is a sense in which everything that happens can properly be described
as Gods act, but we must be careful about just what sense this is. The
theistic traditions have wanted to affirm that God gives to created things
active and passive causal powers of their own, that is, the capacity to
affect other things and to be affected by them. Aquinas held that this is
part of Gods providential governance of creation. Divine Providence
works through intermediaries. For God governs the lower through the
6
The idea of divine conservation of the existence of created things should not be
confused with the scientific idea of conservation of mass and energy. The latter is
concerned with physical interactions between entities, and it specifies that these interactions and the transitions they bring about cannot involve the creation or destruction
of matter/energy. This does not conflict with the theological idea of continuous divine
conservation of the being of finite things; on the contrary, the two ideas compliment
each other, since both assert that interactions between created things involve changes
of state but not the giving of being. For an extended discussion of this point, see J.L.
Kvanvig and H.J. McCann, Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World,
in Divine and Human Action, ed. Thomas Morris (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1988), pp. 1349.
235
higher, not from any impotence on his part, but from the abundance
of his goodness imparting to creatures also the dignity of causing.7
God could simply cause, say, a kettle of water to become increasingly
warm until it begins to boil. But God instead grants to created things
the dignity of causing, so that the water is heated by the fire. This
contrasts with the view of those who have taken Gods working in
everything that acts to mean that no created power effects anything
in the world, but that God alone does everything without intermediaries.8 The position that Aquinas rejects here has come to be called
occasionalism, because it holds that the created entities (or events)
identified as causes are merely occasions for Gods own direct action.
If we are to avoid occasionalism we must make a distinction between
direct and indirect divine action. In causing the being of creatures ex
nihilo God acts directly, without employing any subordinate agency as
a means, since there are no such agents until God creates them. But
in bringing about particular events in the world, God ordinarily acts
through secondary causes, producing the result through the operation
of created things.9
7
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. Thomas Gilby, O.P. (Garden City, NY:
Image Books, 1969), Ia, 22, 3.
8
Ibid., Ia, 105, 5.
9
We can borrow a distinction from the philosophy of action to help explain the
ideas of direct and indirect divine action. Philosophers of action have recognized that
any instrumental intentional actioni.e. an action in which an agent does one thing
as the means of doing anothermust, on pain of infinite regress, have at its base an
action that the agent intentionally undertakes without having to perform any prior
intentional action as the means to it. This basic action is direct, in contrast to its
intended result which is indirect. There has been controversy about which element
in an indirect human action should count as the basic action, and we could, in a
perverse mood, carry over this question into theology and speculate about whether
there is some divine action that is intentionally prior to the act of creation. For my
purposes it is enough to note that Gods act of creating and conserving creatures ex
nihilo obviously cannot have creaturely intermediaries, and so it is basic for all the
indirect divine acts that flow from it.
It is also worth observing in this connection that there are two crucially different
senses in which we may speak of bringing about the existence of something. On
the one hand, there is the act of creating/sustaining ex nihilo, which is unique to God
alone. On the other hand, there is the bringing to be of a particular arrangement of
matter/energy in the world. Finite agents create in this sense; we are able to bring about
changes in things, and thereby cause complex individuals to come into existence or
to pass out of existence, as in birth and death. God can also be said to create in this
second sense, by acting indirectly through secondary causes. Bearing this distinction
in mind, we can say that all complex individuals (like ourselves), which are produced
by the operation of secondary causes, are created by God both directly (in sustaining
our being ex nihilo) and indirectly (by working through the order of nature).
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thomas f. tracy
237
straightforwardly that this wind was sent by God. The wind, and the
deliverance it makes possible, is no less Gods act if it is a result of the
lawful operations of the natural order than if it is the product of a divine
intervention within that order. In either case, it is something that God
intentionally brings about in accordance with Gods overarching purposes for history. On this view, Gods providential action in the world
is principally a function of Gods creative action at the foundation of
the world.11 The strong east wind is written into the course of history
when God establishes the laws of nature and the initial conditions of
the created world, and the billions of years of cosmic history that follow are the means by which God carries out this action, along with an
unimaginably vast range of other actions.
It is important to note that while every event in such a world will be
Gods act, our ability to describe these divine actions will depend upon
our understanding of Gods purposes. Jews, Christians, and Muslims
might agree with the general principle that God as creator acts throughout the history of the created world, but the traditions disagree about
some important aspects of the overarching plot-line that is being
enacted and therefore about which intention-descriptions should be
given of these actions. The differing stories they tell about Gods acts
have as their corollary diverging understandings of who God is, i.e.
of the identity of the divine agent.
2.3. Special Divine Action in a Deterministic World
If every event, taken under the right description, is an act of God, is
there any sense in which we can single out some events as special, or
particular, divine acts? Gods action, on this account, is universal and
uniform; God acts in the same way in every event, i.e. as the source of
its being. So there is no basis for picking out some events as bearing
a distinctive relation to Gods agency or as being attributable to God
in a way that other events are not. Nonetheless, there are at least two
senses in which events may be singled out as special divine actions. First,
events may play a special epistemic role if they become the occasion for
our recognition of Gods purposes, and thereby provide guidance in
11
I add the qualifier, principally, because it is possible to hold that God ordinarily
acts through secondary causes, but sometimes intervenes directly to bring about effects
outside the expected course of nature or beyond the natural powers of creatures. This
was Aquinass view.
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thomas f. tracy
12
239
15
Given the chaotic dynamics of some deterministic systems, however, no finite
intelligence could specify the initial conditions with sufficient precision to make these
calculations. Determinism asserts that the laws of nature and the initial conditions
jointly entail every future state of the system, but determinism does not entail predictability for any knower other than God.
240
thomas f. tracy
indirectly through secondary causes, but that b) this direct action need
not disrupt the causal structures of nature, since chance events, ex
hypothesi, do not have sufficient secondary causes. This is the second
way of responding to the original dilemma we considered, and I will
consider this possibility at greater length in section 3 below.
An alternative would be to say that God leaves some or all chance
events undetermined, so that God really does play dice with the universe. To be sure, an extensive web of secondary causal conditions will
be necessary for the occurrence of the chance event. But this causal
nexus is not sufficient to produce the event, and if God does not
determine it, then nothing does. This situation generates a conceptual
puzzle. Is it coherent to say that God brings about a state of affairs in
which an entity or system undergoes a change that has no sufficient
cause, whether in creatures or in God? It is helpful here to recall the
distinction between Gods act of causing existence ex nihilo and the
act of causing creatures to undergo various changes; the divine action
of giving being to the entity does not cause the change of state that is
the chance event; creation/conservation is not, we have said, a matter
of working a change in the creature but rather of positing the creature
in existence. But in the special case of chance events, the creature that
God creates/conserves undergoes a change that not even God determines. Perhaps Gods creative act in such instances amounts to willing
that one from among a set of possible states for the system shall be the
one to which God gives being, without specifying which and without,
of course, providing any means by which a selection is made.16 This is
a puzzling idea, but this or something like it appears to be required if
we say that a) God is the creator of the world ex nihilo, b) the world
includes indeterministic chance, and c) God does not determine chance
events.
If it is a coherent possibility that God might build this kind of randomness into the structure of the world, how would this affect our
account of divine action? The answer will depend on the role that chance
16
Peter van Inwagen discusses this possibility with regard to Gods creative choice
between equally good alternative initial states of the world. God might, van Inwagen
suggests, will that one from among a set of alternatives be actualized, without determining which it shall be. It does not seem to me to be logically or metaphysically
impossible that God should decree that either X or Y should be without decreeing
that X should be and without decreeing that Y should be. The Place of Chance in a
World Sustained by God, in Thomas Morris, ed. Divine and Human Action, (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 227.
241
plays within the worlds unfolding history. If chance events at one level
in the structures of nature are entirely subsumed within higher order
deterministic regularities, then the account of Gods indirect action
through these structures will be unaffected. On the other hand, if indeterministic chance plays a significant role in shaping the direction of
the worlds unfolding history,17 then the attribution of events to God as
divine acts must be correspondingly qualified. In establishing the laws
of nature, God determines how chance figures in the course of events,
and sets the range of outcomes that are possible. But if God chooses
not to determine these chance events, then at least some features of
the worlds future will be open, bounded but left unspecified in Gods
creative intention. The structures of nature will include within them a
means for trying out novel possibilities not rigidly prescribed by the
past; God would, in effect, make a world that must in some respects fill
in the details of its own creation. If, for example, some of the genetic
changes amplified by natural selection result from processes that involve
not just epistemic chance but also indeterministic chance, then which
living creatures appear over the course of cosmic history will not be
written into the design of the world.18 The natural order God establishes may assure the emergence of diverse forms of life with a wide
range of capacities, including eventually the ability to gain theoretical
knowledge of the world and to wonder about its creator.19 But on this
view, God may not have provided specifically that personhood should
be realized in a bipedal mammal; the particular species identity of the
rational agents that arise within the evolutionary process could be one
of the accidents of biological history. Gods agency would, of course, be
at work throughout this history as the creator who sustains all of the
secondary causes at work in it. And because God sets the boundaries
17
242
thomas f. tracy
within which chance operates, thereby designing the dice that are set
rolling in cosmic history, the general result can certainly be attributed
to Gods action. But if, returning to our earlier example, the strong east
wind at the Sea of Reeds happened to be the meteorological amplification of a chance event somewhere else in the structures of nature, then
it seems more appropriate to view the wind as a stroke of good luck,
rather than as a particular divine action in history.20
2.4.2. Human Freedom
The second form of indeterministic transition that we noted above is
a particular, and particularly controversial, form of free human action.
One family of positions in the longstanding (and probably intractable)
philosophical debate about freedom of the will holds that an action is
free only if it is not determined by antecedent circumstances. On this
view the past history of universe and the laws of nature do not uniquely
determine the agents choice; under precisely these causal conditions
the agent could do otherwise than she does. This is commonly referred
as incompatibilist freedom because it holds that free action is incompatible with causal determinism.21 Note that causal indeterminism is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for incompatibilist free action; in
order for a free act to be distinguished from a chance event, an account
is needed of the agents capacity for self-determination, and this account
must not reduce to an explanation by appeal to the causal efficacy of
antecedent events. This is the metaphysical burden carried by defenders of incompatibilist freedom, and it is important to remember, as we
consider quantum mechanics, that searching out causal indeterminisms in nature (even if they are located in the brain) is not going to be
sufficient to provide us with a theory of free action. My interest here,
however, is simply to consider the impact that creaturely freedom of
20
The story here could be made more complex, however. If omniscience includes
knowledge of how every random transition would in fact turn out if God were to permit
it, then God could choose which total set of chance and determined events to permit
(i.e. which world to create) with particular effects in mind. In this case, it seems to me,
the east wind would be Gods act by a different route but in just a strong a sense as if
it were the deterministic outcome of a closed series of secondary causes.
21
For some arguments that human freedom is incompatible with certain types of
determinism see Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1983). For some representative compatibilist arguments see Daniel C. Dennett,
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free-Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1984).
243
this sort would have, if the world were to include it, on the attribution
of events in the world to God as divine acts.
Just as we saw in considering chance events, there are two ways of
relating the divine agency to this second type of indeterministic transition. First, God might directly bring it about that the agent acts as she
does. There are at least two ways to argue that this divine causal role in
human action is compatible with the claim that the action is free. First,
one might insist that because God acts directly as creator to constitute
the finite agent and her act, God cannot be regarded as a determining cause that compromises the agents freedom. Second, one might
qualify the conditions for freedom of action so that indeterminism is
required only on the horizontal level of relations within the world; created agents would possess indeterministic freedom in relation to other
creatures, but not in relation to God. This second view combines a
creaturely incompatibilism with divine determination, and so generates
a distinctive theological compatibilism. This seems to have been John
Calvins position, and it has also been attributed to Aquinas, though
some interpreters read him as taking a position of the first type, and
the construal of Aquinass view continues to be a matter of dispute.22
The alternative is to say that God empowers and permits human
agents to make choices that are not determined by other creatures or
by God. Gods creative agency, of course, intimately and pervasively
shapes the exercise of free human agency by establishing our powers of action, their limitations, and the circumstances under which
they are exercised. In this respect, it is appropriate to say both that 1)
God always acts with the created agent, and that 2) when free human
actions conform to Gods will, the human agent is the means by which
22
For the first way of reading Aquinas see, e.g., David Burrell, C.S.C., Aquinas: God
and Action (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979) and Freedom
and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
1993); and Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1988). For the second reading see, e.g., Thomas Flint, Divine Providence:
The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), and Thomas J.
Loughran, Aquinas: Compatibilist, in Human and Divine Agency, ed. F. Michael
McLain and W. Mark Richardson, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999).
The first approach faces important conceptual objections. See the discussion of these
issues in my Divine Action, Created Causes, and Human Freedom, and Kathryn
Tanner, Human Freedom, Human Sin, and God the Creator, in The God Who Acts:
Philosophical and Theological Explorations, ed. Thomas F. Tracy (University Park, PA:
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994). Also see David Burrells reply to me,
and William Haskers reply to Tanner.
244
thomas f. tracy
23
Although there are various traditional strategies for blunting the force of this
conclusion, they face important conceptual and moral objections. See, for example,
Kathryn Tanners careful discussion of this problem and William Haskers reply in
The God Who Acts, ed. Tracy.
24
This idea lies at the heart of most modern responses to the problem of evil. Gods
good purposes in creation may require (as a logically necessary condition) that God
245
This leads to a second set of theological issues. The Christian tradition affirms that although history can and does go wrong through the
misuse of human freedom, Gods good purposes lie at its foundation
and ultimately will be fulfilled. The freedom that God grants to creatures
is a gift that expresses, rather than compromises, Gods providential
care for the created world. But how is this divine superintendence of
history to be exercised if creatures have the capacity to stray from Gods
purposes? God is not only creator but also redeemer, and redemptive
divine action would appear to require that God act in response to the
actions of free creatures. If we insist, however, that Gods action in
history always takes the form of indirect action through the order of
nature, then it is not clear that such responsive action is possible. The
fundamental structures of the natural world are fixed and in place long
before human agents appear on the scene and make the choices to
which God responds. If human choices were determined by antecedent
conditions, then both the human action and the divine response could
be built into the causal program of the world. But indeterministic free
human actions present problems for divine providence that cannot be
addressed in this way. This provides a compelling theological reason to
affirm that God not only acts indirectly through secondary causes but
also acts directly among them. And this, in turn, motivates theological
interest in points of under-determination in nature at which God could
act directly and yet without a miraculous intervention.
permit various evils to occur. This can be argued with respect both to so-called natural
evils (i.e., the harm that befalls creatures simply by virtue of the natural conditions
of their lives) and moral evils (i.e., the misuse of moral freedom by rational agents).
A full defense of Gods goodness must 1) identify the good for the sake of which evil
is permitted, 2) explain the relation between evils and this good, and 3) argue that
this good is worth having even at this price. I have argued elsewhere that there are
important limits in principal on our ability to do this; we can make some helpful points
about why, in general, a God of perfect goodness, power, and knowledge would create
a world that includes the sorts of evils we see around us, but we cannot expect to give
a full explanation of the magnitude and distribution of evils in the world. Rather than
offering an explanation of evil, however, the central focus of Christian theology is on
Gods redemptive actions in response to it. See my Evolution, Divine Action, and
the Problem of Evil, in Evolutionary and Molecular Biology: Scientific Perspectives on
Divine Action, ed. Robert John Russell, William R. Stoeger, S.J., and Francisco J. Ayala
(Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 1998), pp. 51130, and Why Do the Innocent
Suffer? in Why Are We Here: Everyday Questions and the Christian Life, ed. Ronald
F. Thiemann and William C. Placher (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International,
1988). Also see Russells comments on the problem of evil, in the context of evolution,
in Special Providence and Genetic Mutation: A New Defense of Theistic Evolution,
in Evolutionary and Molecular Biology, pp. 220223.
246
thomas f. tracy
247
248
thomas f. tracy
28
Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps, in Chaos and Complexity:
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and
Arthur Peacocke (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 1995), pp. 289324.
29
It has often been noted that it is not possible to spell out very fully the action that
is ascribed to God when Christianity affirms that God raised Jesus from the dead. If
we interpret this language as pointing to an eschatological transformation of the human
creature, then the familiar notion of miraculous divine intervention in nature is not
so much wrong as insufficiently radical. Certainly the new creation is not merely the
disruption or violation of the old order, but rather its fulfillment.
249
250
thomas f. tracy
causes. Note that this is not to say that God acts entirely without created
causes. The effects God brings about will have an extensive network
of causal antecedents in the world, but these will be necessary, rather
than sufficient, conditions.30 There are a number of different ways in
which this general theological strategy can be deployed, and the details
will vary from case to case. I will focus here on the possibility of direct
divine action through indeterministic events at the lowest levels in the
structures of nature.31 It is worth noting at the outset, however, that
there may be causal incompleteness at other levels of the natural order;
if the case can be made for the existence such open structures, then
it may be possible to conceive of God acting directly through these
structures as well.32
3.1. Multiple Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics
There are a number challenges facing any attempt to make use of
quantum physics in developing a proposal of this kind about divine
action. Perhaps the first and most obvious is that quantum theory can
be interpreted in a bewildering variety of different ways, not all of which
are congenial to this theological project. The formalism of quantum
mechanics is well-established, but there has been a remarkable prolifera-
30
Russell makes a distinction between mediated and immediate divine action in
Divine Action and Quantum Mechanics: A Fresh Assessment (note #30) in this
volume. The former refers to divine action that presupposes secondary causal conditions and works together with them. The latter would be unilateral divine action. If an
immediate divine action truly had no necessary causal conditions in the prior history
of the world, however, it is not clear that it could be an action in the world at all. So
all divine actions within nature and history will be mediated, whether those actions
are performed indirectly by means of secondary causes or directly in the way we are
now considering. Gods direct act of creating/conserving the world, of course, will be
unmediated.
31
William Pollard is an early proponent of one version of this theological strategy. See
Chance and Providence: Gods Action in a World Governed by Scientific Law (London:
Faber and Faber, 1958). For contemporary varieties of this approach see Robert Russell,
Special Providence and Genetic Mutation: A New Defense of Theistic Evolution, in
Evolutionary and Molecular Biology, and the articles by George Ellis, Nancey Murphy,
and Thomas Tracy in Chaos and Complexity.
32
John Polkinghorne, for example, argues that the unpredictability in principle of
macroscopic chaotic systems suggests an underlying ontological openness. Although
the non-linear equations describing chaotic systems are deterministic, Polkinghorne
suggests that this formalism is an abstract and approximate description of natural systems that are more flexible than the mathematics suggests. See Science and Providence:
Gods Interaction with the World (London: SPCK Press, 1989), and The Metaphysics
of Divine Action, in Chaos and Complexity.
251
33
A brief overview of competing interpretations of quantum mechanics can be found
in John Polkinghorne, The Quantum World, and Robert John Russell, Quantum
Physics in Philosophical and Theological Perspective, both in Physics, Philosophy and
Theology: The Common Quest for Understanding, ed. Robert John Russell, William R.
Stoeger, S.J., George V. Coyne, S.J. (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 1988).
Also see Butterfield and Polkinghorne in CTNS/VO, v. V. There are a number of good
introductions to quantum mechanics written for the general reader. For example, see
Nick Herbert, Quantum Reality: Beyond the New Physics (Garden City, NJ: Anchor/
Doubleday, 1985); Peter Kosso, Appearance and Reality: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); John Polkinghorne, The
Quantum World (London: Longman, 1984); Alastair Rae, Quantum Physics: Illusion
or Reality? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
34
This is the title of John Bells book (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1987).
35
Werner Heisenberg is well-known for this indeterministic interpretation of quantum theory. See his Physics and Philosophy: the Revolution in Modern Science (New
York: Harper & Row, 1958).
252
thomas f. tracy
36
Niels Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (New York: Wiley, 1958).
John Bell, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987). Also see James T. Cushing and Ernan McMullin,
eds. Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory: Reflections on Bells Theorem
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989); Michael L.G. Redhead,
Incompleteness, Nonlocality, and Realism: a Prolegomenon to the Philosophy of Quantum
Mechanics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
38
David Bohm, A Suggested Interpretation of Quantum Theory in Terms of Hidden
Variables, I & II, Physical Review 85 (1952), and Wholeness and the Implicate Order
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).
37
253
are determinate values for the properties (like position, which he treats
as basic and from which other properties, such as spin, are derived)
of entities in quantum systems, and he accounts for the probabilistic
character of our knowledge by postulating that these classical-like
particles interact with a pilot wave, which is mathematically related to
the wave function of the quantum formalism. In order to explain the
correlation of properties when measurement occurs on linked two-particle systems, these pilot waves must themselves be correlated in a way
that instantaneously incorporates information about the measurement
situation. In this way Bohm constructs an interpretation of quantum
theory according to which its probabilistic character is strictly an artifact
of the limits of our knowledge, and does not reflect any indeterminateness in the properties of the quantum entities nor any indeterminism
in their causal histories.
Bohms version of quantum theory has not been widely embraced.
There are a variety of reasons for this: e.g. worries about how it handles
special relativity, uneasiness with its postulation of additional entities
for which there can in principle be no experimental evidence, its failure
so far to suggest novel lines of empirical research.39 But Bohms account
does save determinism and the principle of sufficient reason, and these
are powerful considerations in its favor. James Cushing has argued that
the current consensus in favor of the Copenhagen interpretation reflects
various historical contingencies in the development of modern physics.40 At this point in the development of quantum theory, the decision
for or against a Bohm-like approach remains perhaps a matter more
of metaphysics than of physics.
The alternative views I just sketched are by no means the only interpretative options that the theologian faces, nor is Bohms account the
only deterministic interpretation of quantum theory. In a rather different way, many worlds interpretations are deterministic, insofar as
they insist that when measurement takes place all the possibilities (of
non-zero amplitude) prescribed by the wave equation are actualized.
There is no indeterministic transition from superposed possibilities to
a single actuality; the wave equation does not collapse, rather the world
branches, and it does so in accordance with the deterministic evolution
39
254
thomas f. tracy
of the wave function.41 The only uncertainty in this transition is epistemic; we know what outcomes are possible (i.e. what worlds will be
spawned by our act of measurement ) and we can precisely state the
relative probability of each outcome (i.e. the likelihood of our world
actualizing any one of these possibilities), but we cannot know which
outcome will occur (which world we will find that we inhabit).
This interpretive pluralism creates both an opportunity and a hazard
for the theologian. On the one hand, it is perfectly legitimate under
these circumstances for a thinker grappling with the theology of nature
to prefer one interpretation to another on theological grounds. Indeed,
there can be no theological appropriation of quantum mechanics that
does not make use of one or another of the currently viable interpretations. On the other hand, in casting our theological lot with a particular
interpretation, we take the risk that new developments in physics or
in the philosophy of physics will significantly undercut our theological
constructions. It is important to acknowledge this possibility in framing
our discussion of these matters, and this suggests two caveats. First,
the particular interpretive approach we favor should not be presented
as the conclusion to be drawn from quantum mechanics. Second,
proposals about the theological relevance of quantum theory should be
regarded as tentative and provisional hypotheses reflecting the current
uncertainty of the relevant science and the extraordinary difficulty of
interpreting it.
3.2. The Measurement Problem
One of the considerations driving the proliferation of interpretations of
quantum theory is the nest of puzzles generated by the role of measurement in the standard interpretation. As we have seen, when a
measurement takes place, the superposed possibilities described by the
wave equation collapse to a single determinate value for the measured
property. The outcome of this transition is not determined by the prior
state of the system; rather, one state is actualized from among a probabilistically structured ensemble of possible states. Unless a measurement
is made, the quantum system continues to evolve deterministically in
accordance with the wave equation. Here we encounter one of the
41
Bryce S. DeWitt and Neill Graham, eds. The Many-Worlds Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
255
central puzzles of quantum theory. What is it about the act of measurement that induces the collapse of the wave function? Bohr was inclined
to point out that the macroscopic apparatus in the laboratory registers
determinate states that are distributed in conformity with the wave
function, and leave it at that. But if we move beyond this instrumentalism and interpret the quantum formalism as representing an actual
indeterminacy in the system studied, then a host of difficult questions
arise about how and where the indeterminateness of quantum entities
gives way to the definiteness of macroscopic objects.
The puzzles surrounding measurement, as it is understood by the
standard account of quantum theory, have at least two kinds of consequences for theological uses of this interpretation. First, they provide
a motive for adopting an interpretation that avoids the idea of wave
function collapse, and this may well result in a view that is less congenial to theological use. In the perplexing enterprise of interpreting
quantum mechanics, however, each approach engenders its own set of
problems. We just noted, for example, that although Davids Bohms
deterministic interpretation generates no measurement problem, it faces
difficulties about the privileged role it gives to position over momentum, the postulation of pilot waves, and the way it handles special
relativity. Second, if we say that God acts through chance events at the
quantum level, then it appears that this form of divine action is limited
to occasions of measurement. John Polkinghorne has argued that this
restricts Gods action in a way that severely undercuts the usefulness
of quantum indeterminism for a theology of divine action. If (at the
quantum level) causal openness is found only in the collapse of the
wave function, and if the wave function collapses only when there is
an irreversible macroscopic registration of the state of the quantum
system, then Gods action appears to be discontinuous and episodic.
Occasions of measurement only occur from time to time and a God
who acted through being their determinator would also only be acting
from time to time. Such an episodic account of providential agency
does not seem altogether satisfactory theologically.42
42
John Polkinghorne, The Metaphysics of Divine Action, in Chaos and Complexity,
pp. 152153. Also see Polkinghornes remarks on this problem in this volume. The
idea that measurement should be understood as the irreversible macroscopic registration of a quantum effect can be found both in Polkinghorne, CTNS/VO, v. V and
in Russell, Special Providence and Genetic Mutation, in Evolutionary and Molecular
Biology, p. 212.
256
thomas f. tracy
43
257
44
See Nancey Murphy, Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridans Ass and
Schrodingers Cat, in Chaos and Complexity especially section 4.4.
45
George Ellis, Reflections on Quantum Theory and the Macroscopic World,
and Robert Russell, Divine Action and Quantum Mechanics: A Fresh Assessment,
in CTNS/VO, v. V. Also see Carl S. Helrich, Measurement and Indeterminacy in the
258
thomas f. tracy
Quantum Mechanics of Dirac, Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 35, 4 (December
2000), pp. 489503.
46
Quantum Physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 61.
47
Special Providence and Genetic Mutation: A New Defense of Theistic Evolution,
in Evolutionary and Molecular Biology.
48
James P. Crutchfield, J. Doyne Farmer, Norman H. Packard, and Robert S. Shaw,
Chaos, and Wesley J. Wildman and Robert John Russell, Chaos: A Mathematical
Introduction with Philosophical Reflections, both in Chaos and Complexity.
259
It is not clear, for example, whether chaotic processes really are pervasive within the structures of nature, how chaotic systems are related
to non-chaotic systems, and how much the latter tend to dampen out
the effect of the former.49 An even more basic set of issues concerns the
relation of quantum mechanics and chaotic systems.50 As has often been
noted, the Schrdinger equation for the evolution of quantum systems
is linear, and the prospects are not promising at present for a non-linear
reformulation of the quantum formalism. So it is not clear how deep
chaos goes in the structures of nature or how chaotic behavior emerges
at the macroscopic level out of its quantum mechanical substrate. The
idea of chaotic amplification of indeterministic quantum effects is an
enticing possibility, but it remains to be seen whether it will become
more than that.
4. Conclusion
A theological proposal tied to currently disputed scientific questions
must, of course, be hedged about with qualifications and put forward
with a significant degree of diffidence. But given the current state of
knowledge, it remains a viable possibility to hold that God might act at
points of indeterministic transition in quantum systems, and thereby
1) bring about particular effects in the world which were not built into
history from the beginning, and 2) do so without intervening, if by
this we mean that God interrupts the ordinary lawful operations of the
natural order. Clearly, this conception of divine action depends upon
a whole series of interpretive judgments and on unsettled questions of
fact, and so it has more the character of a program for further research
than of a thesis that can be confidently asserted.
How seriously we take this possibility will depend in part on how
much we think a proposal of this kind is needed in contemporary
theology. The key consideration is whether the idea of divine action
in response to human actions requires that God act in ways that affect
49
See Jeffrey Koperski, God, Chaos, and the Quantum Dice, Zygon: Journal of
Religion and Science, 35, 4 (December 2000), pp. 54559.
50
This is the question of quantum chaos. For helpful discussion of these issues, see
the essays by Michael Berry and John Polkinghorne in CTNS/VO, v. V. Also see Abner
Shimony Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, in The New Physics, ed.
Paul Davies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 391392.
260
thomas f. tracy
the course of events in the world once the worlds history is underway.
I have argued that responsive divine action does not require that God
act directly to alter the course of events in the world, though some of
the specific things Christians have traditionally said about how God
responds to us (especially in Jesus Christ) do appear to require this. If
this is right, then theologians have less at stake than it might first appear
in the question of whether the science of quantum mechanics (or of
chaos theory or of emergent systems at higher levels of organization)
provide openings in the causal structures of nature through which God
can act without intervening. Even if the natural order is deterministic,
we can understand God to act responsively in history with particular
intentions, bringing about events that reflect Gods special providence
and doing so in most instances without miraculous interventions.
We may find, however, that our best physical theories support (even
if they do not require) an ontological interpretation that recognizes
a significant role for chance within the structures of nature, so that
chance and law are dynamically woven together in a way that makes
possible creative new developments not rigidly prescribed by the past.
This picture of the world would be consonant with theological understandings of Gods good purposes in creation, and it invites theological
interpretation. If what we think we know about the world suggests that
the structures of nature are open in this way, then there is good reason
for the theologian to consider the possibility that Gods providential care
for creation might be exercised in part by acting directly through these
flexible structures without forcing or deforming them. It is important to
bear in mind that this mode of divine action is limited and theologically
secondary.51 It clearly would not be sufficient by itself to provide a full
account of all that the theistic traditions have wanted to say about Gods
activity in the world. On the account I have given, Gods foundational
action is that of directly establishing and sustaining the existence of
all finite things. Because this creative action gives creatures genuine
causal powers of their own, God also acts indirectly by means of created causes in an endless variety of particular ways. Now we tentatively
add to this account the idea that God may also act directly at points of
51
This has been overlooked by some of the critics of the idea of divine action
through quantum indeterminisms. For example see Nicholas Saunders, Does God
Cheat at Dice? Divine Action and Quantum Possibilities, Zygon: Journal of Religion
and Science, 35, 4 (September 2000), pp. 51744, and my response Divine Action and
Quantum Theory, Zygon, 35, 5 (December 2000), pp. 88998.
261
52
For a more detailed discussion of this objection, see my Particular Providence
and the God of the Gaps, sect. 1, in Russell, Murphy, and Peacocke, eds., Chaos and
Complexity.
CHAPTER EIGHT
1. Introduction
In the Medieval period, especially after the integration of the lost works
of Aristotle into Western thought, Gods action in the world could be
explained in a way perfectly consistent with the scientific knowledge
of the time. Heaven was a part of the physical cosmos. Gods agents,
the angels, controlled the movements of the seven planets, which, in
turn, gave nature its rhythms. But modern science has changed all that,
primarily by its dependence on the notion of laws of nature. For Isaac
Newton and other architects of the modern scientific worldview, the
laws of nature were a direct expression of Gods willGods control
of all physical processes. However, today they are generally granted
a status independent of God, not only by those who deny the very
existence of God, but also by many Christians, who seem to suppose
that God, like a U.S. senator, must obey the laws once they are on the
books. Consequently, for modern thinkers, deism has been the most
natural view of divine action: God creates in the beginningand lays
down the laws governing all changes after thatthen takes a rest for
the duration.
Not all modern theologians have opted for this deistic account, but
in many cases the only difference has been in their additional claim that
God sustains the universe in its existence. Those who have wanted (or
who have believed Christianity needed) a more robust view of Gods
continued participation in the created order have been forced to think
in terms of intervention: God occasionally acts to bring about a state
of affairs different from that which would have occurred naturally.1
1
Authors represented in this volume are some of a small number of more recent
thinkers who have sought non-interventionist accounts of special divine acts.
264
nancey murphy
2
John Polkinghorne is the most important proponent of this view. See, e.g., his
Science and Providence: Gods Interaction with the World (Boston: Shambhala, 1989);
and idem, Laws of Nature and Laws of Physics, in Quantum Cosmology and the Laws
of Nature: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert John Russell, Nancey
Murphy, and C.J. Isham (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 1993; Berkeley, CA:
Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1993).
3
Arthur Peacocke is to be credited with the most compelling accounts to date of
the role of top-down causation in accounting for Gods continuing action. See his
Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and BecomingNatural, Divine and Human, 2d
ed., enlarged, (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993). I owe a great debt to Peacockes
thought throughout this paper.
265
266
nancey murphy
Now, let us grant the realist thesis that what we know is (unproblematically) linked to what is the case. Let P stand for any proposition, then
X knows that P entails P. So far so good.
But Polkinghornes argument is not from the content of some known
proposition P to the character of the world; it is rather an argument
from the character of our knowledge of P to the character of the world.
Take any P that is a statement about the future (chaotic) state of a
chaotic system: what the unpredictability amounts to is that for any
person, X, and for any P, it is not the case that X knows that P. This
implies nothing at all about the worlds likeness to P.
To make such an argument is comparable to confusing a modal
qualifier, which qualifies a proposition as a whole, with a property of
an object described by that proposition. Possibly there are unicorns
does not entail that there are possible unicornsthat is, entities that
are both unicorns and possible. Neither does The outcome of chaotic
processes are inherently unpredictable imply that there are outcomes
that are indeterminate.
Is this move in Polkinghornes thought simply an instance of using
a bad argument for a position that may well be defensible on other
grounds? I think not. The grounds upon which chaos theorists argue
for the unpredictability of future states depend upon the assumption
that the future states are determined by initial conditions in so sensitive
a manner that we cannot measure them. So the systems are presumed
to be determined at a very precise levelsmall changes produce large
effects.
So what chaos shows is not that there is genuine indeterminacy in
the universe, but rather that we have to make a more careful distinction
between predictability (an epistemological concept) and causal deter4
267
Ibid., 33.
John V. Taylor, The Go-Between God (London: SCM Press, 1972), 28, quoted in
Polkinghorne, Science and Providence, 31.
6
268
nancey murphy
7
It is interesting to speculate about the meaning of the distinction between God
working on the inside versus from the outside. We can give a clear sense to from
the inside when we are speaking of macroscopic entities and God working within
them by manipulating constituent quantum entities, since the quantum entities are
inside of the macroscopic entity. But can we make sense of a distinction between
the inside and outside of the quantum entities themselves? If God has no physical
location, literally speaking, yet we say that God is omnipresent and immanent in all
of creation, perhaps we are assuming that a disembodied agents presence is to be
defined in terms of the agents causal efficacywherever God acts, there God is. Thus,
to say that God works within quantum entities would be equivalent to saying that God
affects quantum entities.
8
Ideally, one would like to be able to show that such a proposal is progressive in
the sense defined by Imre Lakatos. He proposed that a scientific research program is
progressive if it can be developed in such a way that its theoretical content anticipates
the discovery of novel facts. A similar criterion could be devised for metaphysical
theories: that they anticipate and solve problems in other disciplines. That is, a metaphysical theory should be counted progressive if it turns out to contain resources for
solving conceptual or empirical problems in or between other disciplines that it was not
originally designed to solve. Lakatoss scientific methodology is found in Falsification
269
and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in Criticism and the Growth
of Knowledge, ed. I. Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970), 91196. See my adaptation of his work in Evidence of Design in the
Fine-Tuning of the Universe, in Quantum Cosmology.
9
These terms go back at least to Augustine, who formulated the discussion of
grace and free will using the concepts of providence, sustaining activity, governance
and cooperation. The terms have been used frequently in subsequent discussions of
divine action.
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nancey murphy
10
My use of special here corresponds to that of objectively special divine acts as
defined in Russells Introduction to Chaos and Complexity.
11
See, e.g., David Humes critiques of the argument from design in Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion, and John Wisdoms parable, Gods, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 19445.
12
See my Does Prayer Make a Difference? in Cosmos as Creation: Theology
and Science in Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989),
23545.
13
See Polkinghorne, Science and Providence, 6667.
271
world where outcomes of our actions are often predictable, and this in
turn requires that the universe exhibit law-like regularity.
Extraordinary Divine Acts
Many modern and contemporary Christians would be satisfied with
an account of causation and divine action that met all of the above
requirements. However, earlier Christians would have insisted as well
that there be room in such an account for something on the order of
miracles. I prefer not to use the term miracle because it is now so
closely associated with the idea of a violation of the laws of nature. I
believe it could be shown that the primary reason for current rejection
of miracles, in fact, has been this very definition.
So one reason for going against the Enlightened consensus and
including as a second requirement for a theory of divine action that
it leave room for what I shall call extraordinary acts of God is that the
modern rejection of such acts was based on a mistaken view of the
nature of miracles. A second is that elimination of all such events from
Christian history leaves too little: the resurrection is an extraordinary
act of God if ever there was one. Yet, as Paul asserts, if Christ is not
raised, then Christian faith comes to nothing (cf. 1 Cor. 15:14,17,19).
But if the resurrection is credible, then lesser signs cannot be ruled
out a priori.
2.1.3. Summary
We can sum up the discussion of theological requirements by saying
that an adequate account of divine action will have to avoid the opposite
poles of deism and occasionalism. Occasionalism, as applied to theories
of divine action, denies the causal interaction of created things: created
entities only provide an occasion for the action of God, who is the
sole cause of all effects. This position has been rejected on the grounds
that it ultimately denies the reality of finite beings.
Schematic representations make clear the difference between these
two extreme positions. Occasionalism can be represented as follows,
where G stands for an act of God and E stands for an observable
event:
G1 G2 Gn
E1
E2
En
time
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nancey murphy
Here, God is the sole actor, and any causal efficacy on the part of
observable events is mere illusion.
The following sketch represents the deist option, where L represents
a law of nature:
{
{
G E1 E2 En
L1
Ln
time
G2
Gn
E1 E2 En
time
This approach suffers from two defects. First, it leaves no room for
any sort of special divine acts and, second, it seems impossible to do
justice to both accounts of causation (the problem of double agency);
one inevitably slides back into occasionalism or else assigns God the
role of a mere rubber stamp approval of natural processes.
In short, we need a new picture of the relation of Gods action to the
world of natural causes that allows us to represent Gods sustenance,
governance, and cooperation in such a way that we can make sense of
revelation, petitionary prayer, human responsibility, and of extraordinary acts such as the resurrection, without at the same time blowing
the problem of evil up to unmanageable proportions.
2.2. Scientific Requirements
An adequate account of divine action must also be consistent with the
sciences. Here, again, we can distinguish several types of consistency.
2.2.1. The Results of Scientific Research
An adequate account of causation in general and divine action in particular needs to save the phenomena. That is, we are setting out to
273
explain how God and natural causes conspire to bring about the world
as we know it. The salient features seem to be, first, the general law-like
behavior of macroscopic objects and events, qualified, however, by two
major exceptions: the apparent randomness of individual events at the
quantum level and human free actions.14 The fact that the rule of law
needs to be so qualified, however, suggests the value of recognizing as
a second, equally important, feature of the world known by science its
organization into a hierarchy of levels of complexity.15 More on this
below. It also suggests that in an account of divine action, attention
needs to be given to three very different regions or regimes within
the hierarchy: the quantum level, the realm of human freedom, and
an intermediate regime wherein the behavior of entities is describable
by means of deterministic laws.
2.2.2. Presuppositions of the Practice of Science
The law-like character of the natural world is not only a finding of
science; it is a presupposition for engaging in scientific research in the
first place. It has often been argued that the Christian (and Jewish)
doctrines of God, stressing both Gods freedom and Gods rationality
and reliability were crucial assumptions for the development of empirical science.16 No revised account of divine action that undercuts the
practice of science will be acceptable.
2.2.3. Metascientific Factors
I have been careful in the two preceding subsections to speak of the
law-like character of the natural world, not of the existence of laws of
nature. While many scientists assume that there must in some sense
be such lawsthat they must have some sort of existence17I do not
believe such a view is either a necessary prerequisite for doing science
or necessarily supported by the findings of science.18 Thus, I shall argue
14
Perhaps the higher animals are also capable of free actions, but if philosophers
are not agreed what it means to say that human actions are free, a fortiori we do not
know what to say about the animals.
15
See Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, inter alia.
16
See Ian Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 46.
17
See, e.g., Paul Davies, The Mind of God: Science and the Search for Ultimate
Meaning (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).
18
For a discussion of this issue, see William Stoeger, Contemporary Physics and
the Ontological Status of the Laws of Nature, in Quantum Cosmology. See also Bas C.
van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
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nancey murphy
3. Metaphysical Considerations
I claimed above that nothing short of a revision of current metaphysical notions regarding the nature of matter and causation is likely to
solve the problem of divine action. In this section we survey some
important changes in the history of metaphysics as background, and
then attempt to see where we are now and where we must go in our
thinking about causes.
3.1. From Aristotle to Newton
One of the most striking changes from medieval (Aristotelian) hylomorphism to modern corpuscularism ( l Descartes and Newton) regards
the powers of material things to move themselves or to change in other
ways. Of course Aristotle and Newton would both agree that horses,
for example, are material bodies, and horses, obviously, can move. So
the question is a deeper one about the nature of matter itself.
For Aristotelians, all individual substances were constituted by two
principles: matter and form. Individual substances could be arranged
hierarchically with the more complex at the top. For the higher beings,
the matter of which they were composed was already en-formed by
the forms of lower realities. The lowest entities in the hierarchy of
existents were the four elements: earth, water, air, and fire. But these
elements were themselves constituted by forms (of earth, water, air, or
fire) and prime matter. Prime matter, however, was assumed to exist
only as ingredient in the four elements (and hence as a basic ingredient
in all higher substances), so it was only a theoretical construct within
the system.
However, in Aristotles system, prime matter, were it to exist independently of all forms, would be entirely passive since it is form that
gives individual characteristics to existent beings, including whatever
powers and actions are natural to that species of existent. Conversely,
since all existent material beings are enformed matter, all material
beings have certain inherent powers and certain motions that are
natural to them. Even stones, simple objects composed primarily of
275
the element earth, have the intrinsic power to seek their natural position, which is at the center of the cosmos. That is why rocks fall when
dropped, and sink when placed in water. So in this worldview, while
prime matter is passive, it does not exist as such. All material beings
(primary substances), in contrast, have inherent powers to act in
their own characteristic ways. The self-moving capacities of animals
and humans need no special explanation.
In contrast, Ren Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Newton, and other early
modern thinkers developed a worldview in which material bodies were
inherently passive or inert. All macroscopic phenomena, including the
movements of animals and human bodies, were manifestations of matter in motion. According to Hobbes, all that exist are bodies. Bodies
move. In doing so they move other bodies; that is all that happens.19
We can describe this change by making use of terms coined by
Baruch Spinoza. He distinguished between immanent causes, which
produce changes within themselves, and transeunt causes, which produce changes in something else. The change from the Aristotelian to
the Newtonian worldview included a change from a world filled with
immanent causes to one in which all causes, when properly understood,
are transeunt causes. According to Newton, all motion in the universe
was introduced from the outside by God. The laws of nature were,
in the first instance, laws of motion that determined the patterns of
motion after that initial impetus.
It has been argued that Newton had theological motives for developing the inertial view of matter.20 One motive was what might be called
Calvinist theological maximalismto give as much credit to God as
possible for whatever happens. So Newton ascribed all motive power to
God. Second, this view of the physical universe made an obvious argument for the existence of God: someone had to have set it in motion
in the beginning.
So a second change in the understanding of causes, from Aristotle
to Newton, regards the question of what it is that causes cause. For
Aristotle causal analysis was given of substances and their modification
19
This summary of Hobbess materialism is Wallace Matsons, A New History of
Philosophy, vol. 2 (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), 288.
20
See Eugene Klaaren, Religious Origins of Modern Science: Belief in Creation in
Seventeenth-century Thought (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977).
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nancey murphy
277
23
See Carl Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation: and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Free Press, 1965).
24
See Mary Hesse, Lawlessness in Natural and Social Science, draft paper for
conference on quantum cosmology and the laws of nature, Vatican Observatory,
September, 1991, typescript, p. 1.
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speakor should we abandon the very notion of laws of nature as an
unnecessary hangover from a religious past?25
Davies, along with a number of other scientists, opts for what I shall
call a Platonistic account of the laws of nature, meaning that like Platos
eternal forms, the laws have an existence independent of the entities
they govern.
However, no one, to my knowledge, has provided a suitable account
of how (or where) the laws might exist and how they affect physical
realitythe same problems that have led most philosophers to abandon Platonic metaphysics. Furthermore, William Stoeger has argued
persuasively that no such account of the laws of nature is necessary.
All one needs to recognize is that there are objective regularities and
relationships in nature, which scientists describe in human language
and with the aid of mathematics.26
Stoegers view appears the most credible account of the status of
the laws of nature, but even if his arguments were not persuasive, this
would still be the most viable option, since there seems to be no intelligible answer to the question of how the laws of nature could exist
independently of either the mind of God or of the reality that instantiates them. Still, Stoegers account leaves unanswered the question of
what accounts for the objective regularities and relations in nature if
not pre-existent laws. To this question we return in section 4.
3.4. Pointers Toward a New Metaphysic
An absolutely crucial development in contemporary understandings of
the nature of reality regards its non-reducible hierarchical ordering in
terms of increasingly complex systems. In some ways this recognition
represents a return to the Aristotelian view that the form (organization,
functional capacities) of an entity is equally constitutive of reality as is
the stuff of which a thing is made.
The recognition of top-down causation is integral to this view. The
hierarchical conception of reality suggests that an investigation of
causation and the role of divine action begin at either the top or the
bottom of the hierarchy, or both. The present state of our knowledge
25
26
279
4. A Proposal
Let me summarize the requirements and hints so far assembled for
an account of divine action. We are looking for a way to make sense
of the traditional claim that God not only sustains all things, but also
cooperates with and governs all created entities. This account needs to
be consistent with other church teaching; it needs to leave room for
special divine acts for both doctrinal and practical reasons; and it must
not exacerbate the problem of evil.
It also needs to be consistent with science in the sense of saving the
phenomena, and must not undercut the practice of science. However,
I claim that it need not be consistent with metaphysical assumptions
about matter and causation, which seem at present to be in great
disarray.
Finally, a revised metaphysical account of causation that includes
divine action as an integral part needs to take into account the recent
recognition of the non-reducible hierarchy of complexity; this suggests
two likely starting points, based on either top-down or bottom-up
causation.
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281
282
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283
28
284
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31
This point stands even for those who want to add a mind or soul to the human
body in order to get a living person: the body is still nothing but a complex organization of its most basic physical parts.
285
This being the case, much (but not all) of the behavior of macro-level
objects is determined by the behavior of their smallest constituents.
Therefore, Gods capacity to act at the macro-level must include the
ability to act upon the most basic constituents. This is a conceptual
claim, not theological or scientific.
However, the theological question that arises immediately is whether
God acts upon these parts-making-up-wholes only in rare instances, or
whether God is constantly acting on or in everything. Over the long
history of the tradition, I believe, the majority view has been that God
acts in all things at all times, not just on rare occasions.
We can approach this question from the following angle: we object to
interventionist accounts of divine action because it seems unreasonable
that God should violate the laws he has established. We object to God
of the gaps accounts of divine action for epistemological reasonsscience will progress and close the gaps. But I think there is a more basic
intuition behind the rejection of both of these views: God must not be
made a competitor with processes that on other occasions are sufficient
in and of themselves to bring about a given effect. In addition, if Gods
presence is identified with Gods efficacy32 then a God who acts only
occasionally is a God who is usually absent.
So our theological intuitions urge upon us the view that, in some
way, God must be a participant in every (macro-level) event. God is not
one possible cause among the variety of natural causes; Gods action
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for every (post-creation)
event. In addition, I claim that Gods participation in each event is by
means of his governance of the quantum events that constitute each
macro-level event. There is no competition between God and natural
determinants because, ex hypothesi, the efficient natural causes at this
level are insufficient to determine all outcomes.33
4.3.3. Conclusions
In this section I have proposed a bottom-up account of divine action.
God governs each event at the quantum level in a way that respects the
natural rights of the entities involved. Gods action is (and from the
point of view of science, must be) such that, in general, these events
32
See n. 6 above.
My suspicion is that arguments based on quantum non-locality could also be
used to reinforce the claim that if God works in any quantum event, God must work
in all of them.
33
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Here S1 represents the prior state of the entity or system, and G represents an intentional act of God to actualize one of the possibilities
inherent in S1. Notice that this is a radical revision of the meaning
of cause as it is used in science and everyday life, since on the view
presented here no set of natural events or states of affairs is ever a sufficient condition for an event. One necessary condition will always be
an element of divine direction; nothing ever happens without Gods
direct participation.
Notice, also, that this view splits the difference between Newtons
view of the utter passivity of matter and Aristotles view of substances
possessing their own inherent powers to act. On this view, created
entities have inherent powers, yet they are radically incomplete: they
require Gods cooperation in order to be actualized.
4.4. Gods Action in the Regime of Law
By the regime of law I mean to refer to the events occurring at all
levels of complexity above the quantum level but below the level of
free action. In this section I shall first mention the constraints placed
upon our conclusions by the requirements of both science and theology.
Second, I shall attempt to state the consequences that the proposal of
the previous section has for a conception of the relationship of divine
action to the laws of nature.
4.4.1. Reconciling the Needs of Science and Religion
We come to the crux of the problem of divine action when we address
the regime of law. Science both presupposes for its very existence the
strictly law-like behavior of all entities and processes, and constantly
287
34
288
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35
And of course they are intended to be subtle. The goal here is to produce an
account of divine action that does not conflict with observations.
36
There may be exceptions here, such as the law of gravity.
289
37
The contentious point here has to do with the question whether or not quantum
effects necessarily wash out at the macro-level. I am assuming that they need not.
See section 5.4.
38
That is, within the limits circumscribed by top-down causation.
39
This is true even if the laws at higher levels cannot be derived mathematically
from the laws of quantum mechanics.
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40
See John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (London: Macmillan, 1966).
291
Yet the argument seems faulty, too. It seems to overlook the traditional
account of disbelief as sin, and the fact that even in the face of the
most astounding evidence given by and on behalf of Jesus, the crowds
largely failed to believe. I suggest that Gods action does remain largely
hidden and is always ambiguouswhen manifest it is always subject
to other interpretations. But this is not because we would otherwise be
forced to believe in God (as Hick claims) and then to obey him. Rather
it is because we would lose our sense of the reliable behavior of the
environment. When the environment is taken to behave in a set (and
therefore predictable) manner, we can make responsible choices about
how to act within it. If instead we saw the environment as a complex
manifestation of divine action, we would lose our sense of being able
to predict the consequences of our actions, and would also lose our
sense of responsibility for them. So, for instance, if I carelessly allow
my child to fall off a balcony, I would not see myself as responsible
for his injuries since God was there with all sorts of opportunities for
preventing them.
These psychological requirements for responsible action seem to
require in turn that extraordinary acts of God be exceedingly rare (that
we not have any adequate justification for expecting God to undo the
consequences of our wrong choices) and that they normally be open
to interpretation as (somehow) in accord with the laws of nature. So
Gods relation with us requires a fine line between complete obviousness and complete hiddennessthe latter since we could not come to
know God without special divine acts.41 The difficulty in describing
Gods action is that we want to have it both ways: both that there be
evidence for divine actionsomething that science cannot explainand
that there be no conflict with science. So a suitable theory of how
God acts leaves everything as it was scientifically. But then there is no
evidence upon which to argue that such a view ought to be accepted
over a purely naturalistic account. Perhaps the ambivalence we find
41
History, both in scripture and elsewhere, reports frequent miracles in ancient times;
relatively few are reported today, and contemporary reports come more often from
less-educated populations. Most commentators assume that we are seeing a decrease
in gullibility. It is possible, though, that there are in fact fewer extraordinary events
because, with our sharpened sense of the order of nature, with increased abilities to
make measurements, our sense of the order of nature has become more fragile. As
technological and scientific capabilities to test miracle claims have increased, so have
our abilities to cast doubt upon causal regularity.
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293
294
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See George F.R. Ellis, The Theology of the Anthropic Principle, in Quantum
Cosmology, section 8.1.
43
This notion originated with Augustines Platonic epistemology, but there must
have been some experiential correlate to keep the emphasis alive.
295
5. Evaluation
In this final section I shall attempt an evaluation of the position presented herein. First, I shall indicate the ways in which this proposal
meets the theological and scientific criteria proposed in section 2.
Second, I shall mention some of the objections that I expect will be
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297
that all events fall into this category), and events that count as Gods
actions. In discussing human action we distinguish, from among all of
the events that humans cause, the smaller class of those that express
their intentions. Only the latter are described as actions. So all events
are the result of Gods causal influence; only some events express (to
us) Gods intentions. It is the latter that ought, strictly speaking, to be
called Gods actions.
5.1.3. Prayer
Petitionary prayer makes sense on this account, but more so for some
kinds of events than others. Events that are recognized as possible yet
unpredictable (i.e., the results of chaotic processes, unpredictable coincidences) are more to be expected than events that defy the law-like
behavior of natural processes. However, prayers for the latter are not
out of the question. One condition under which we might expect such
prayers to be answered is when the divine act would serve a revelatory
purpose, since, by hypothesis, God must occasionally act in extraordinary ways to make himself known.
It is clear that in cases where outcomes are not predictable (e.g.,
weather, healing), one of the most valuable conditions for recognizing
the action of God is that it constitutes a meaningful complex of prayer
and response. The prayer beforehand makes it possible for an unpredictable eventan event that might have happened in any caseto
reveal the purposes of God. So while prayer might not be necessary to
persuade God to act, it will be necessary for us to recognize the fact
that God is acting.44
5.1.4. Deism and Occasionalism
The central goal of this paper was to present an account of divine action
that steers a course between deism and occasionalism. I believe that this
proposal does so. Gods action in every event is guaranteed, and so is
some measure of control over the course of events such that special,
even extraordinary, acts are possible. At the same time, Gods decision
to cooperate with created entities rather than to override their natural
characteristics means that entities above the quantum level, with their
44
There are surely other reasons for prayer, as well, such as building a relationship
with God, and perhaps the praying itself in some way contributes to bringing about
the desired effect.
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45
See Ellis, Ordinary and Extraordinary Divine Action (in this volume).
299
300
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(Gen. 45:5). The full account of the event involves both human and
divine agency. Joseph emphasizes Gods providence while recognizing
at the same time that his brothers can indeed be held accountable.
5.3.4. Gods Lack of Knowledge
Peacocke claims that Gods action at the quantum level is forestalled
by the fact that particular events are as unpredictable to God as they
are to us. My proposal evades this difficulty since by hypothesis these
events are not random; they are manifestations of divine will.
5.4. Advantages Over Previous Proposals
The theorist in this area whose work comes closest to mine is W.G.
Pollard, who suggested that God works through manipulation of
all sub-atomic events.46 Pollard has been criticized by both David
J. Bartholomew and Barbour for providing an account whereby all
events are determined by divine action. Such an account, they say, in
incompatible with human freedom. My account avoids this problem,
first, by qualifying bottom-up divine influences by means of top-down
causation.47 Second, and more importantly, my account of Gods respect
for the natural rights of all creatures leaves room for genuine human
freedom.
Another criticism of Pollard is that he takes Gods action at this level
to be constrained within fixed statistical laws. However, I concur with
Bartholomew, who claims that Pollards work involves a misunderstanding of the very nature of statistical laws.48
The constraints upon Gods action that I propose come instead from
Gods commitment to respect the innate characteristics with which he
has endowed his creatures. This seems to leave some room for God to
maneuver at the macro-level, but, as I mention below, the exact amount
of room is difficult to ascertain. This same factor (constraint) allows
me to answer a charge Bartholomew makes against Donald MacKay.
MacKay claims that God is in detailed control of the behavior of all
46
William Pollard, Chance and Providence: Gods Action in a World Governed by
Scientific Law (New York: Scribner, 1958).
47
Barbour has already noted the need for this qualification in his discussion of
Pollards position in Issues in Science and Religion, 430.
48
See David J. Bartholomew, God of Chance (London: SCM Press, 1984), 12728.
301
49
See Donald MacKay, The Clockwork Image: A Christian Perspective on Science
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1974).
50
Bartholomew, God of Chance, 25.
51
It also avoids the interventionist overtones of Bartholomews suggestion that it
might be better to assume that God leaves most quantum events to chance and only
acts upon occasion to determine some specific outcome. See ibid., 130.
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through being their determinator would also only be acting from time
to time. Such an episodic account of providential agency does not seem
altogether theologically satisfactory.52
Polkinghorne would include among these possible instances of meaningful divine action, I believe, cases where sensitivity of chaotic systems to
initial conditions involves changes so slight as to fall within the domain
of quantum mechanics. The classic example of a macroscopic system
that measures quantum events is Schrdingers poor cat, whose life
or death is made to depend on the status of one quantum event.
Against Polkinghornes view, Robert Russell would argue that the
important fact that has been overlooked here is the extent to which
the general character of the entire macroscopic world is a function of
the character of quantum events. Putting it playfully, he points out that
the whole cat is constituted by quantum events!
We can imagine in a straightforward way Gods effect on the quantum event that the experimental apparatus is designed to isolate; we
cannot so easily imagine the cumulative effect of Gods action on the
innumerable quantum events that constitute the cats existence. Yet
this latter is equally the realm of divine action.53 I have been assuming
Russells position throughout this paper. Yet even if Russell is correct,
there still remains a question. Does the fact that God is affecting the
whole of reality (the whole cat) in a general way by means of operation
in the quantum range allow for the sort of special or extraordinary
divine acts that I claim Christians need to account for? Or would such
special acts be limited to the few sorts of instances that Polkinghorne
envisions?54
A second open question comes from our lack of knowledge regarding the possibilities for top-down causation, and the role of holist
laws. In particular, we lack knowledge of the possibilities of divine
top-down causation and of the possible behavior of natural entities
within a regime constituted by the full presence and action of God.
We have a glimpse of this regime in the resurrection of Jesus, and a
hint from Paul that the whole cosmos awaits such a transformation.
52
303
Are there states in between this final state, in which God will be all in
all, and the present state of Gods hiddenness in natural processes? Do
the extraordinary events surrounding the lives of Jesus and the saints
represent such an intermediate regime?
Finally, it has been the consistent teaching of the church that God
respects the freedom and integrity of his human creatures. I have proposed as an axiom of my theory of divine action that God respects the
natural rights of entities at the quantum level as well. Is it, then, the
case that all created entities have intrinsic characters that God respects in
his interaction with the world? And what does God do when the rights
of creatures at different levels of the hierarchy come into conflict? The
claim that God acts consistently throughout the hierarchy of complexity
has consequences regarding what sort of thing God should and should
not be expected to do with creatures within the intermediate realm
between humans and quarks. For instance, it would be consistent with
my proposal for God to cause Buridans ass to eat, but not to cause
Balaams ass to speak. Does our experience of Gods action in our lives
bear out such a distinction, and does this distinction help explain why
some prayers are answered and others not?
My hope is that despite these unanswered questions, the foregoing
proposal provides insights that are worthy of further pursuit.55
55
I thank all conference participants for their responses to this paper. Steve Happel
and Bob Russell were especially diligent critics.
CHAPTER NINE
Prologue
This paper touches controversial issues, and some of the possibilities
discussed will undoubtedly make some readers uncomfortable. This is
because it takes seriously in a particular way both the historic Christian
message and a modern scientific perspective, emphasizing their cognitive claims as I understand them from a Quaker perspective. The reader
may not share this double commitment. Nevertheless the argument is
logically and epistemologically sound; the unease is at a theological
and/or metaphysical level. This issue will be discussed briefly in the last
main section. However, a full treatment cannot be given here; an indepth justification for the view taken has been given in other works.1
For the moment I make the initial claims that: (1) there are other
types of knowledge besides that given by the hard sciences, for
example, that given by philosophy, theology, humanistic, and artistic
disciplinesthe task is to find a viewpoint that does justice to these
issues as well as to hard science, in a compatible way; (2) the hypothetico-deductive method used to support the viewpoint presented here
is essentially the same as that underlying our acceptance of modern
science; and (3) the main themes proposed, controversial as they are,
are supported by as much or indeed more evidence (admittedly of a
more general form than that used by physics alone) than many of the
themes of modern theoretical physics.
The requirement in order to approach the material fairly is an open
mind in looking at the various logically possible options, rather than
Nancey Murphy and George F.R. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe:
Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics (Mineapolis: Fortress, 1996)developing themes
outlined in Ellis, Before The Beginning: Cosmology Explained (New York: Bowerdean/
Boyars, 1993).
306
1. Introduction
This paper is largely a response to Nancey Murphys contribution to
this volume, Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridans Ass and
Schrdingers Cat. That paper is revolutionary because it represents a
conservative interpretation of the Christian faith2 which, unlike most
other such interpretations, takes the content of modern science seriously as part of the task of constructive theology. The viewpoint here
will be to basically agree with Murphys paper, and comment on some
specific issues raised by its thesis.
Accepting the main thesis of that paper, the themes I would like to
discuss further are: (a) the issue of capricious action; (b) the issue of
top-down causation through intention, and the particular causal nexus
of the action; and (c) the issue of evidence for the position stated.
As regards (a), one of the main problems for the proposal is the
charge of capriciousness in Gods action, in terms of God deciding
now and then to act contrary to the regular patterns of events but often
deciding not to do so. One would like to have articulated some kind
of criterion of choice underlying such decisions, and then an analysis
given of how that criterion might work out in practice. This has to take
very seriously indeed the issue of evil, pain, and suffering as experienced in the present-day world, of Gods acceptance and allowance of
horrors of all kinds, which one might a priori presume he/she could
and would prevent if he/she so desired. If the usual Christian view is
to make sense, there has to be a cast-iron reason why a merciful and
loving God does not alleviate a lot more of the suffering in the world,
if he/she has indeed the power to do so. This leads to the question of
when divine action may be expected to take place, in either an ordi2
That is, it is in agreement with centuries-old aspects of the Christian tradition. See,
e.g., Dictionary of Christian Spirituality, ed. Gordon Wakefield (London: SCM Press,
1989); and Denis Edwards, Human Experience of God (Ramsey, NJ: Paulist Press, 1983).
However it is certainly not fundamentalist in its attitude; rather it is in agreement with
the kind of modernizing approach advocated by Peter Berger in his superb book, A
Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural (New York:
Doubleday, 1969; reprint, New York: Anchor Books, 1990).
307
3
See John Polkinghorne, Gods Action in the World, CTNS Bulletin 10, no.
2 (Spring 1990), 7; idem, Science and Providence: Gods Interaction with the World
(London: SPCK Press, 1989); and William Stoeger Describing Gods Action in the
World in the Light of Scientific Knowledge of Reality (in CTNS/VO, v. II).
4
See Arthur Peacocke, Gods Interaction with the World (in CTNS/VO, v. II).
5
Bernd-Olaf Kppers, Understanding Complexity (in CTNS/VO, v. II).
6
See, e.g., Roger Penrose, The Emperors New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds,
and the Laws of Physics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Euan Squires,
Conscious Mind in the Physical World (Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1990).
7
CTNS/VO, v. II.
308
solution to this problem of causal gaps; and (b3) the fact that quantum
uncertainty does indeed have this potential. Overall these contentions
are supportive of the argument in Murphys paper.
As regards (c), while proof will not be available, one would like
some broad brush-stroke defense of the position presented in terms of
general lines of evidence.8 The main point here is that, as emphasized
in Murphys present paper, one of the needs is to satisfy the Christian
tradition in terms of doctrine and practice; but then the issue is, Whose
doctrine? Whose practice? What is the foundation for choosing and
supporting one particular brand of tradition?
Either one goes here for a rather inclusive, broad-stream interpretation which aims to be widely acceptable across the many varieties of
Christian tradition, and therefore will inevitably be regarded as weak
by many of them; or one aims to be more particular and detailed in
terms of developing the view of some particular branch of that tradition
in depth. But then the product becomes rather exclusive in its nature,
and may be regarded as irrelevant by others. In either case the issue
becomes that of validating what is claimed to be true by the chosen
traditions or doctrines, in the light of manifest errors, in many cases,
in what has been claimed in the past.
To cope with the issue of inclusivity, one can suggest that this defense
should, first, have a broad base aimed at validating a religious worldview
in general, strongly supported by widely acceptable evidence; second,
support a more specifically Christian view developed as a second stage
of the argument, refining its methods, detail, and evidence; and with
support for a particular tradition developed in the third stage. I shall
make some comments along these lines at the end. The proposal made
here is that the idea of top-down causation, with different layers of
description, effective laws, meaning, and evidence, is the best framework
for understanding and testing the overall scheme suggested.
309
Indeed not only are such different levels of description permitted, they
are required in order to make sense of what is going on. This is true
not only of biological systems: Kppers shows convincingly that such
emergent properties are important even in a physical system such as a
gas, being mediated by the systems structural conditions and boundary
conditions (as discussed further below).11 Ian Barbour12 and Peacocke13
develop the theme of emergence in depth.
310
I
community
structure
Organism
Organ Systems
Organs
Tissues
II
organism structure
Cells
Organelles
Molecules
Atoms
Ions and electrons
III
cell
structure
In a biological system, the two crucial levels of order are that of the cell
and the individual organism; at each of these levels there is a higher
level of autonomy of coherent action than at any of the other levels. A
biologist regards individuals as the elementary components of a population, and cells as elementary components of the individual, while
(broadly speaking) a microbiologist regards molecules and a biochemist,
ions and electrons, as the elementary components. A physicist would
continue down the hierarchical scale, reducing these to quarks, gluons,
and electrons.
2.1. Hierarchies of Software: Digital Computers
A particularly clear example is given by modern digital computers,
which operate through hierarchies of software: from the bottom up
there are machine language (expressed in binary digits), assembly
language (expressed in hexadecimal), operating system and programming language (expressed in ASCII), and application package (e.g.,
word processor) levels of software. At every level there is a completely
deterministic type of behavior described by algorithms applicable at
that level. All of this is realized in terms of the motion of electrons
flowing in the integrated circuits as determined by the laws of physics.
This is where the actual action takes place, but it does so according to
311
Level n
Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
14
For a very clear exposition of the hierarchical structuring in modern digital
computer systems, see Andrew S. Tannenbaum, Structured Computer Organization
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990).
15
Ibid., 23.
312
Level 6
Application package
(e.g., word-processor)
Translation (compiler)
Level 5
Problem-oriented language
level (e.g., C or Basic)
Translation (compiler)
Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Conventional machine
level
Interpretation
(microprogram)
Level 1
Microprogramming level
Directly executed by
hardware
Level 0
Ibid., 47.
313
Consequently the machine language at each level also has a tight logical
structure with a very precise set of operations resulting from each
statement in that language. The detailed relation of operations from
high to low levels, and at each level, will depend on the actual memory
locations used for the program and data; but the logical operation is
independent of these details.17
In biological systems, with hierarchical levels as indicated above,
the same kind of logical structure holds; however the languages
at the higher levels are much less tightly structured than in the case
of the computer,18 and the links between different levels correspondingly less rigid.
2.2. The Physical Mediation of Top-Down Action
Consider now how the hierarchically structured action is designed
to occur, in physical terms. We can represent this as follows: for a
structured hierarchical physical system S, made up of physical particles
interacting only through physical forces, top-down and bottom-up
action are related as shown in Figure 4 (on following page).
The boundary B separates the system S from its environment E.
Interaction with the outside world (the environment) takes place by
information/energy/matter flow in or out through the boundary, and is
determined by the boundary conditions at B. The structure of the system
is determined by its structural conditions, which can be expressed as
constitutive relations between the parts. I distinguish here structural
conditions, fixed by the initial state of the physical system but then
remaining constant in a stable physical system (e.g., the structure of
a computer as determined by its manufacture), and initial conditions
and boundary conditions as usually understood in physics (e.g., the
initial state of motion of a fluid in a cell and temperature conditions
imposed at the cell boundaries over a period of time).19
17
These structures and their interconnections are described in considerable detail
in Tannenbaums book.
18
The major aim of the AI (artificial intelligence) movement is to arrive at a correspondingly loose structure in the computers higher-level languages.
19 Kpperss concept of boundary condition conflates these three rather different
concepts. See Understanding Complexity.
314
* Level of Meaning N
* Level of Law N
TopDown
I*
Lowest level
Constituents
* Level of Meaning N1
* Level of Law N1
F*
Microscopic laws
Environment
E
Boundary B
BottomUp
315
Because the semantics of the higher level are intrinsic to its nature, the
language (vocabulary and syntax) at each level cannot be reduced to
that at a lower level, even though what happens at each higher level is
uniquely determined by the coordinated action taking place at the lowerlevels, where it is fully described in terms of the lower-level languages.
Thus, the whole structure shows emergence of new properties (at the
higher levels) not reducible to those of the constituent parts.
Examples: (1) lowering the undercarriage in an aircraft (realized by
gas particles exerting forces on a piston in a cylinder); and (2) a computer reading out a text file and printing it on the screen (realized by
electrons impinging on the screen).
What happens to a given system is controlled by the initial state
along with the boundary conditions. The system boundary is either:
(i) closed (no information enters); or (ii) open (information enters;
possibly also mass, energy, momentum). In the latter case we have to
know what information enters in order to determine the future state
of the system.
B: The final state attained at the bottom level is uniquely determined
by the prior state at that level (the initial conditions) and the incoming
information at that levelthat is, by the boundary conditions (assuming a given system structure and given microlaws). This determines
uniquely what happens at the higher levels. We assume that a unique
lower-level state determines uniquely the higher-level states through
appropriate coarse-graining. When this is not true, the system is either
ill-defined (for example, because our description has omitted some
hidden variables), or incoherent (because it does not really constitute
a system). We exclude these cases. Note that the loss of information
implied in the definition of entropy results because a particular higherlevel state can correspond to a number of different lower-level states
(each of which leads to that single higher-level state).
Note 1: This statement does not contradict the idea of top-down
causation. Any given macro-state at the top level will correspond to a
restricted (perhaps even unique) set of conditions at the basic level. It
is through determining a set of micro-states as initial conditions at the
bottom level, corresponding to the initial macro-state, that the top-level
situation controls the evolution of the system as a whole in the future.
How uniquely it does so depends on how uniquely the top-level state
determines a state at the bottom.21
21
Or, equivalently, it does so depending on how much information of the microstates is lost by giving only a top-level descriptionthis information loss defining the
entropy of the macroscopic state.
316
22
In this paper the prime quantum effect considered is that of indeterminacy (which
is closely related to the problem of measurement). There are other equally important
aspects of quantum theoryFermi vs. Bose statistics, nonlocality, etc.; but they do not
seem to bear directly on the argument at hand, except perhaps that of non-locality.
23
These are really two ways of saying the same thing.
24
See Robert John Russell, Quantum Physics in Philosophical and Theological
Perspective, in Physics, Philosophy, and Theology: A Common Quest for Understanding,
Robert John Russell, William R. Stoeger, and George V. Coyne, eds. (Vatican City State:
Vatican Observatory, 1988).
317
problem in deciding whether or not this is the case is that measurement in quantum theory proper is not yet a well defined concept.
However, this effect is quite sufficient to allow the effects we have in
mind in this paper.
2.2.3. Simple Biological Systems
By this we mean systems in the biological hierarchy at the level of an
individual organism or lower.
Examples: (4) a mosquito; (5) a dog; and (6) a person.25
In these examples complex neural systems convey, route, and filter
information in a hierarchically structured way so as to allow maximal
local autonomy and yet coordinate overall action,26 the whole being
coordinated by the extraordinarily complex structure of the brain.27
The fundamental point is that, despite this complexity, if in these
systems what happens macroscopically is determined at the micro-level
simply by the action of known physical laws, then the analysis is the
same as in the case of the classical or quantum machines considered
above. One can consider, for example, a moving human hand (realized
by the motion of electrons and ions in muscles).
The analysis and examples given above lead to the following propositions about hierarchically-structured, physically-based systems, even
given the high complexity of a living system:
Proposition 1: Top-down action underlies meaningful activity, for it
enables lower levels to respond coherently to higher-level states, but
does not by itself imply openness.
Proposition 2: Chaos generates unpredictability, but does not by itself
underlie meaningful action.
Proposition 3: Quantum uncertainty allows openness (as it only makes
probabilistic statements), which can be amplified to macro-levels.
25
In principle, the same kind of description applies to complex biological systems,
e.g.: (7) people in a room; and (8) an ecosystem. But so many extra issues arise because
of social, economic, and political interaction that it is better first to consider and
understand the simpler examples.
26
See Stafford Beer, Brain of the Firm: The Managerial Cybernetics of Organization,
2d. ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981), for an illuminating discussion.
27
See, e.g., John C. Eccles, The Human Mystery (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1984); or idem, The Wonder of Being Human: Our Brain and Our Mind (New York:
Free Press, 1984); and Gerald M. Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of
Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1992), for contrasting views.
318
In the latter case, the issue is the nature of this openness: is it truly
indeterminaterepresenting a random process whose final state is not
determined by the initial stateor is it in fact determinate, through
some hidden variable presently inaccessible to us? We will return to this
later. In any case the above analysis suggests the following speculation:
Meaningful physical top-down action with openness in a hierarchical
structure can occur only either (i) via injection of information from
outside, that is, by manipulation of the boundary conditions (probably
in a very directed manner, conveying specific information to specific
sub-components); or (ii) through a process that resolves quantum
uncertainty at the microscopic level by a choice of a particular outcome from all those that are possible according to quantum laws, thus
resolving the uncertainties in a quantum mechanical prediction. This
effect can then be amplified,28 or it could be effective at the larger scale
because it takes place in a coordinated way at the micro-level (as in
superconductivity).
Note to (i): Bill Stoeger29 has pointed out that it is essential to be clear
about what is inside and what is outside the system considered
particularly when non-local effects occur. A more adequate characterization of a system to better account for the observed phenomena may
result in some of what was outside being brought inside the system.
Our comment applies after such adjustments have been made.
Note to (ii): The basic point made here is that our present description of the quantum world is essentially causally incomplete,30 as is
clear from every discussion of the measurement process in standard
quantum mechanics. Quantum theory determines the statistical properties of measurements, but does not determine the result of individual
measurements where the initial state is not an eigenstatea condition
which includes almost all measurements. However, a specific final
state does in fact result in each case. There is no known rule that leads
uniquely from the initial state to the final state. Thus, the final state in
28
See, e.g., I. Percival, Schrdingers Quantum Cat, Nature 351 (1991): 357ff. DNA
responds to quantum events, as when mutations are produced by single photons, with
consequences that may be macroscopicleukemia, for example.
29
Private communication.
30
This issue is separate from the further thorny problem of defining what a measurement is, in a fully quantum system, and when it will take place. See, e.g., M.A. Morrison,
Altered States: The Great Measurement Mystery, in Understanding Quantum Physics:
A Users Manual (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990).
319
This may or may not imply a specific event at t=0. Cf. the discussions in Physics,
Philosophy and Theology; and Quantum Cosmology.
32
As seen from within the universe. Seen from outside, this may well be no different from Action 1.
320
321
36
Cf. Ellis in The Anthropic Principle: Proceedings of the Second Venice Conference
on Cosmology and Philosophy, ed. F. Bertola and U. Curi (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993).
322
37
See, e.g., Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York: Norton, 1986).
See, e.g., Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (London: Penguin Books,
1991).
39
Cf. L. Wolpert, The Triumph of the Embryo (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1990).
40
Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 18487. The basic point here is that if there
is a high peak of suitability associated with some specific brain wiring state but not
any nearby states, nevertheless nearby states will be more likely to survive because of
brain plasticity. Their initial wirings will alter during their lifetime, because of plasticity of the brain connections, and will explore the region near where they start; all
those ending up at (or passing through?) the highly preferred state will be more likely
to survive than those that do not. But they will be more likely to end up there if they
start nearby.
38
323
organized complexity,
chaotic motion (openness),
quantum uncertainty,
mental fields.
41
See R.E. Lenski and J.E. Mittler, The Directed Mutation Controversy and
Neo-Darwinism, Science 259 (1993): 188ff., for a discussion refuting directed mutation.
42
Cf. Kppers, Understanding Complexity; and Stoeger, Describing Gods
Action.
43
See, e.g., Squires, Conscious Mind; Dennett, Consciousness Explained; Edelman,
Bright Air, Brilliant Fire; Eccles, The Human Mystery; and Penrose, The Emperors
New Mind.
324
44
45
46
47
48
49
325
for a lack of cause. For example, Morrison states, after discussing the
unsatisfactory state of the problem of measurement, that:
Underlying the problem of measurement there is a deeper question. As
a consequence of an ensemble measurement of an observable Q, the
original state collapses into one of the eigenstates of Q. The question
is, what mechanism determines which eigenstate a particular member
collapses into? According to the conventional epistemology of quantum
mechanics, the answer is that random chance governs what happens to
each member of an ensemble. Many (your author included) consider
this no answer at all.50
View III suggests rather that there is some cause: something not
contained in our current physical descriptions of quantum theory
determines the details of what happens in each specific case. This
something may be related to mind in two ways. First, indeterminism
is needed at the quantum level of nature if mind/consciousness is to
be effective in animals as in humankind,51 and it extends the possibility of a non-algorithmic kind of activity that is essential in a full view
of consciousness.52 Second, mind/consciousness could be necessary to
collapse the wave function and give a complete account of natural
events, which quantum physics by itself cannot supply.
The suggestion is that the apparent randomness of quantum theory
is not truly random but rather is a reflection of the operation of mind,
intricately linked to the unsolved problems of the observer in quantum
mechanics and the collapse of the wave function.53 Imbedded in a complexly structured system, this provides the freedom for consciousness to
function, mind being allowed to determine some of the uncertainty
that quantum physics leaves open (thus being completely compatible
with quantum physics, but allowing some other level of order to act
in the physical world with openness). On this view one can maintain
that information entry from mental to physical levels of nature is,
for example, through the choice of when a quantum state will decay,
which, because of quantum uncertainty, is not determined by known
physical laws. This allows a transfer of information between levels of
the world without an expenditure of energy or a violation of the known
physical laws.
50
51
52
53
Ibid., 61718.
See, e.g., Squires, Conscious Mind; and Eccles, The Human Mystery.
See Penrose, The Emperors New Mind.
Squires, Conscious Mind.
326
54
327
Indeed view III is basically consonant with the view of special divine
action in Murphys paper.57
Second, and related to the first point, what is at stake here is the
closedness or openness of the physical world to other influencesnot
the rattle of a dice (as in view II) but the intervention of some purposeful consciousness that is not wholly bound into physical systems.58
On the latter views, physics is not all that controls the functioning of
the physical universe: at higher levels of organization, information is
introduced that affects lower levels by top-down action. This theme
will be picked up again in the discussion of special divine action in
the next section, and later sections will consider how that higher-level
information could be inserted.
3.3. The Divine in the Ordinary
What is miraculous? The birth of a baby; the design and function of a
flower or a tree; the everyday and the ordinary:
I like to walk alone on country paths, rice plants and wild grasses on both
sides, putting each foot down on the earth in mindfulness, knowing that I
walk on the wondrous earth. In such moments, existence is a miraculous
and mysterious reality. People usually consider walking on water or in
thin air a miracle. But I think the real miracle is not to walk on water or
in thin air, but on earth. Every day we are engaged in a miracle which
we dont even recognize: a blue sky, white clouds, green leaves, the black,
curious eyes of a childour own two eyes. All is miracle.59
While these features are ordinary given our laws of physics and the
nature of our universe, which allows or even prefers these events to take
place, they are not ordinary if one considers the range of all possible
universes. This is where the anthropic arguments are relevant: most of
these possibilities will probably not be actualized in most universes.60
57
328
61
329
I identify two main themes here: revelatory insight and the possibility
of miracles proper, and consider them in turn.
4.1. Revelatory Insight
The first aspect is:
Action 6: revelation as to the nature and meaning of reality. This
may be taken as having two parts:
Action 6a: providing spiritual insight; Action 6b: providing moral
insight.
4.1.1. Spiritual Insight
Whatever ones view may be of consciousness and free will in general,
to make sense of the standpoint of Murphys paper66 and the broad
Christian tradition, there must be a possibility of specifically revelatory processes being made accessible to the mind of the believer (and
the unbeliever).67
The first point is that the existence of such a causal joint or communication channel is required as the foundation of Christian (and
other) spirituality,68 which we are taking to be a reality. This requirement underlies any theory of revelation whatever, for without some
such causal nexus, an immanent God, despite his/her immanence, is
powerless to affect the course of events in the world, but is simply a
spectator watching the inevitable unfolding of these events. Such a God
has no handle with which to alter in any way, in the minds of the faithful, the conclusion of that physical unfolding governed by the physical
regularities (the laws of nature) that he/she has called into being and
is faithfully maintaining. Here I am rejecting the somewhat paradoxical notion of revelation without special divine acts.69 While one can
certainly envisage people who are unusually receptive or perceptive of
Gods action through natural processes, they cannot reach that stage of
understanding without somehow knowing of the existence and nature
of God. But this in turn requires some kind of specific revelatory act
66
330
to convey those concepts, so that faith can be based in personal experience and knowledge rather than unsupported imagination, which could
arrive at any conclusion whatever.
The second point is the use made of this capability by the creator.
This is where various traditions diverge, and the position one obtains
depends on ones view of revelation. It could in principle be used to
convey information, images, emotions, instructions, or pre-conceptual
intimations of the nature of reality to humanity. Which of these actually
occurs depends on the nature of the revelatory process implemented
by the creator, which must be compatible with his/her nature and the
character of his/her action in the world. As a specific example, consider
the theory of revelation proposed by Denis Edwards. He states:
Only an adequate theology of experience can do justice to the Old and
New Testament understandings that God breaks in on our individual lives,
that the Spirit moves within us, that Gods word is communicated to us,
and that we live in Gods presence. . . . It is possible to show that while we
do not have access to Gods inner being, and while God transcends our
intellectual comprehension, yet we can and do experience the presence
and activity of this Holy One in a pre-conceptual way.70
This experience is the reason why the kind of causal joint mentioned
above is necessary; it could not plausibly be the result of the blind action
of physical forces alone. How does this happen?
When I speak of the experience of God I will always mean pre-conceptual
experience . . . [this] allows us to speak of a real human awareness of
God who yet remains always incomprehensible to our intellects. It is, I
will argue, precisely as mystery that we experience Gods presence and
action.
. . . experience of grace is experience of something that transcends us,
which breaks in on our lives in a mysterious way, and which we experience as a gift given to us.71
Denis Edwards, Human Experience of God (New York: Paulist Press, 1983), 5.
Ibid., 13; 28.
72
See Christian Faith and Practice in the Experience of the Society of Friends
(London: Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, 1972).
71
331
73
See, e.g., Edwards, Human Experience of God; and Murphy, Theology in The Age
of Scientific Reasoning (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), where this topic
is discussed in depth.
74
Cf. Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age; idem, Gods Interaction with the
World; Ellis, Theology of the Anthropic Principle; and Murphy and Ellis, Cosmology,
Theology, and Ethics.
332
75
76
77
333
This is where the traditions differ most, the modern liberal view denying
their existence at all, in contrast to many more traditional views. They
may or may not occur (or have occurred in the past); we will return to
that issue in the next subsection. For the moment we simply consider
this as a possibility in a non-committed, open-minded way. In doing so,
we note that action 7a is the only possibility considered in this paper
that does not respect the laws of physics;78 all the rest do (they are all
strictly compatible with the regularities of those laws).
Considering the first type of exception (7a), these certainly are possible, although there may be a problem of interface with the rest of the
universe: If some exceptional interaction takes place in a space-time
domain U, then in general these illegitimate effects will causally
interact with events outside U, eventually spreading the consequences
to a large part of the universe. Problems could arise at the interface of
the region where the laws of physics hold and the region where they
are violated; for example, how are energy, momentum, and entropy
balances maintained there?
Leaving this technical issue aside, examples of what might conceivably
occur range from the Resurrection to altering the weather or making
someone well if they are ill. It is here that one needs to distinguish
different strands of the Christian tradition, and the various ways they
view the question of miracles. Some will take literally all the miracle
stories in the Old and the New Testaments; others will explain away
some, many, or even all of them. Supposing that they do occur, or have
occurred, one has then to face the thorny questions: What is the criterion that justifies such special intervention? When would they indeed
occur? These issues will be picked up in the next sub-section.
The second type (7b) is quite possible in principle too, the classic
case being God affecting the weather through the butterfly effect but
within the known laws of physics. In its effect this is similar to the
previous possibility, but of course in practical terms this has to be seen
through the eyes of faith: no physical investigation could ever detect
the difference between such action and chance effect, even if it was
clear that the desired rain had fallen just after a major prayer meeting
called to petition God for an end to the drought. Thus, one has here the
possibility of an uncertainty effect deliberately maintained in order
78
In terms of the types of modes of divine action, these are objectively special
interventionist events.
334
that true faith be possible. Such intervention would never be scientifically provable. Whether we believe it takes place or not depends on
our overall worldview and experience.79
4.3. Capricious Action or Regular Criteria
The problem of allowing miraculous intervention80 to turn water into
wine, to heal the sick, to raise the dead, or to alter the weather is that
this involves either a suspension or alteration of the natural order.81
Thus, the question arises as to why this happens so seldom. If this is
allowed at all to achieve some good, why is it not allowed all the time,
to assuage my toothache as well as the evils of Auschwitz?
Indeed when we look at the world around, seeing the anguish of
Bosnia, Somalia, Mozambique, and so on, and seeing children dying
of drought and famine in many parts of the world, we pray God
have mercy on us and wonder what would induce him/her to do so:
to relinquish for a minute the iron grip of physical law held there by
his/her apparently pitiless will. After all, these laws hold in being the
material in its inexorable course while it is used to destroy and torture
humanity. Here one recalls the unspeakable horrors of necklacing in
the townships of South Africa, or the materials used in previous times
by clerics of many theological persuasions who pitilessly tortured and
burnt to death those of differing views. We even arrive at the extraordinary concept of God holding to their natural behavior and nature the
nails and wood used in the cross at Calvary to crucify Jesus.
Thus, if the usual Christian view is to make sense, there has to be a
cast-iron reason why a merciful and loving God does not alleviate a lot
more of the suffering in the world, if he/she has indeed the power to
do so, as envisaged in Murphys paper. This reason has to be sufficient
to outlaw any pity in all these cases, and to prevent the taking of that
decision that would end the suffering. This is of course just the age-old
79
Perhaps this corresponds to the non-basic objectively special events identified in
the typology of divine action.
80
It is not possible in the space available here to do justice to the debates on the
enormous hermeneutical and historical problems concerning the miracles reportedly
performed by Jesus, and their relation not only to enlightenment science but also to
the problems of interpreting ancient, often contradictory, texts.
81
Such an occurance is allowed and possible because the laws are the expression
of the will of God, who could therefore suspend them if he/she wished. See Murphy,
Divine Action.
335
problem of evil, brought to special focus by the claim that the laws that
enable it to take place are the optional choice of God.
In broadest terms,82 the solution has to be that greater good comes
out of the arrangement we see, based on the unwavering imposition
of regularities all or almost all the time, even though that conclusion
may not be obvious from our immediate point of view. For example,
death is not so important when life is considered in a full perspective
that takes into account the promise of resurrection. More particularly
the regularity and predictability gained by the laws of physics must be
seen as the necessary path to create beings with independent existence
incorporating freedom of will and the possibility of freely making a
moral and loving response.83 Pain and evil are the price to be paid both
for the existence of the miracle of the ordinary (cf. the previous section)
and for allowing the magnificent possibility of free, sacrificial response.
But thenif miracles do occurthe issue is why on some occasions
this apparently unchanging law should be broached; this would strongly
suggest a capriciousness in Gods action, in terms of sometimes deciding to intervene but mostly deciding not to do so.
What one would like hereif one is to make sense of the idea of
miraclesis some kind of rock-solid criterion of choice underlying such
decisions to act in a miraculous manner,84 for if there is the necessity
to hold to these laws during the times of the persecutions and Hitlers
Final Solution, during famines and floods, in order that true morality
be possible, then how can it be that sometimes this iron necessity can
fade away and allow turning water to wine, or the raising of Lazarus?
Here as before I am not going to deal directly with the enormous
hermeneutical problems of interpreting texts on miracles. Instead I
am asking a different kind of question. If we are to be able to make
any sense whatsoever of these miracles, what one would like to have
is some kind of almost inviolable rule that such exceptions shall not
82
336
85
337
86
Apart from a point made by Willem Drees about respecting the integrity of science, relevant to 7a. See Willem Drees, Gaps for God? (CTNS/VO, v. II).
338
339
90
340
intentions are made a reality, and where the causal nexus could be
whereby this top-down action could be initiated in the world (whatever
interpretation one may give to the concept of special divine action).
It is essential here to distinguish two rather different kinds of downward causation. Firstly, there is generic downward causation: this
influences a whole range of events through alteration of operational
conditions in a region (e.g., variation in temperature or pressure or
magnetic fields affects the way matter responds). Most of the examples
mentioned by Kppers are of this kind.91 This kind of general top-down
influence alters conditions over a wide range of events in a region, and
affects them all.
By contrast, there is specific or directed downward causation, which
influences very specific events as occurs, for example, in the human body
or complex machinery and is essential to their functioning. Instances
include brain action to move a specific muscle in the body, a command
to a computer that activates a particular relay or sensor, or hitting a
specific typewriter or organ key that effects the desired result. In each
of these cases a very specific local change in environment (current flow,
pH levels, etc.) is effected, which causes proximate events to proceed
in a specific way that is very localized and directed. This is possible
through specific communication channels (nerves in a human body,
bus lines in a computer, wires in a telephone exchange, or fiber optics
in an aircraft) conveying messages from the command center to the
desired point of activity.92
The point here is that setting boundary conditions at the beginning
of the universe can achieve generic downward action but not specific
action. An event such as influencing a mental state requires specific
acts, changing circumstances in a locally highly specific way, rather
than an overall change in the boundary conditions (a change in temperature, for example). I reject the possibility of setting special initial
conditions at the beginning of the universe (t=0) to make this happen.
While this is theoretically possible, it would amount to solving the
problems involved in a reversal of the arrow of time. It would require
setting precisely coordinated initial conditions over a wide area of the
universe so as to come together at the right time and place in such a
way as to achieve the desired effect, despite all the interactions and
91
92
341
interfering effects that will have taken place from the hot early universe, where the mean free path even for neutrinos is extremely small,
up to the present day, where the possibility of agents acting with free
will implies an essential unpredictability in the environment within
which this distant effect will be propagating. This tuning would in fact
be impossible to accomplishwith the usual arrow of timefor one
highly specific event, let alone a whole series of such events, each to be
accomplished independently. According to Oliver Penrose,93 this feature
is the essential foundation of the second law of thermodynamics, based
on a lack of correlations in initial conditions in the past (in contrast to
the existence of such correlations in the corresponding final conditions
in the future). This law can in principle be confounded; for example,
one could reverse the motion of molecules from a fallen and broken
glass to reassemble it. In practice, however, this is not possible94or
at least not without special directed intervention.
Thus, the specific top-down action needed requires either specifically
directed lines of access to particular nerve cells (as in the physiology
of the human body), or a universal presence with detailed and specific
knowledge of and access to each atom (as conveyed by the idea of
the immanent presence of God). The latter is what is required for the
Christian tradition to make sense as envisaged in Murphys essay in
this volume. Thus, in order for any of the special action discussed
in the previous section to be possible (and specifically the provision of
pre-images of ultimate reality or notions of spirituality to a persons
mind), the interaction must be such as to provide highly directed
information and influence, rather than some broad, overall top-down
influence.
5.1. The Nexus of Interaction
The point then is that the action envisaged will be top-down in the
sense that it originates in some higher level of organization (the mind
of a person, the mind of God) but is highly specific in the time and
place of action (as discussed here in terms of the specificity of action).
93
Oliver Penrose, Foundations of Statistical Mechanics, Reports on Progress in
Physics 42 (1979): 19372006.
94
See Penrose, Emperors New Mind.
342
343
97
98
344
The analysis supports the proposal of Murphy and Tracy that quantum uncertainty is a, perhaps even the only, vehicle through which special divine action (particularly as experienced in revelatory acts affecting
human minds) can take place as required by many religious traditions.
This provides an important part of the foundation of Christian spirituality. It also supports view III above as to the functioning of the brain,99
which seems to be a closely related issue.
6. Evidence
The final topic I wish to discuss briefly is the issue of supporting evidence for these views.100 It is clear from the nature of the argument that
some aspects are compatible both with chance and with divine action;
they will only be seen in the latter context through the eye of faith.
But what then is the starting point for our discussion of the nature of
faith? Furthermore, in view of conflicting standpoints, whose doctrine
of faith and whose practice will one accept and why?
This is the whole issue of apologetics, which cannot be dealt with
properly here.101 However, some key points can be made. The suggestion
will be that the Christian Anthropic Principle102 selects a particular
viewpoint based on the theme of self-sacrifice or kenosis,103 which
structures the argument and opts for specific Christian traditions from
among the competitors. We can present the analysis in summary form
by referring to the implied scheme of top-down action, with emergent
layers of description and meaning,104 that arises from that discussion.
The structure envisaged is one of layers of meaning and morality as
shown in Figure 5 (on following page).
Top-down causation is active in this hierarchy in terms of action and
meaning. The fundamental intention of the creator shapes the structure
and brings into being the physical foundations. The interactions at the
physical level are the basis for all the higher levels of order (through
99
345
Level 1: Spiritual/religious
Spiritual values:
kenosis in relation to transcendence
Data 1
Level 2: Moral/ethical
Ethical values:
kenosis in relation to others: serving
Data 2
Data 3
Data 4
Level 5: Biological
Levels of biological organization: life
self-organization, evolution
Data 5
Level 6: Physical
Level of physical entities and action
regularities of physical law
Data 6
346
105
See Anthony N. Flew, Thinking about Social Thinking: Escaping Deception, Resisting
Self-Deception (London: Harper Collins, 1991), for a discussion of the dangers of such
selective choices.
106
See Murphy, Divine Action; and Ellis, Theology of the Anthropic Principle.
107
Cf. Ellis, Before the Beginning; and idem, Theology of the Anthropic Principle.
347
108
This is really an aspect of W. Ross-Ashbys law of requisite variety. See his
Introduction to Cybernetics (London: Chapman & Hall, 1956); and Beer, Brain of the
Firm.
348
The view of divine action presented in Murphys paper109 seems coherent and reasonable. It emphasizes first ordinary action in terms of
the creation and preservation of the universe, providing the ground for
the existence of the dependable physical systems that allow objects and
people their independent existence and rights, through the upwards
emergence of physical properties based on physical laws. It also allows
special divine action, particularly in terms of intimations of right action
provided to those willing to see. Gods action is then able to lead to
action in the world through directed downwards causation in the body,
and so to effective changes in the world.
Problems arise in terms of the possible choice to act specially in a
miraculous manner as is certainly possible in this scheme of things.
The issue then is how to avoid the charge of capriciousness and, in
some sense, conniving with evil in those cases where such action is
not taken. A clear-cut criterion controlling such interventions provides
some kind of safeguard against such charges. This could be a partial
answer, when taken in conjunction with a strong argument to the effect
that the conditions leading to apparent evil are those required to create
free will and independence.110
However, a different possibility is the existence of an alternative
domain of action in the physical world, coming into effect in those cases
where wills are in concert with God.111 This preserves a fixed order of
behavior in the universe without miraculous intervention, but allows
special action to become commonplace where the conditions for this
alternative order exist. This possibility needs further exploration to
make clear the criteria that could govern such a phase change and
to characterize some of the features of the new domain of action that
could then arise. Experimental data relevant to this situation would
appear to be rather few; the motivation for its acceptance on other
grounds would then have to be compelling.
109
I see Murphys paper as being complementary to my own (Theology of the
Anthropic Principle). I regard the two as being (in broad terms) in agreement with
each other and with others in CTNS/VO, v. II, for example, that of Tracy.
110
I am here avoiding an explicit reference to free evil spirits, e.g., a Devil operating
independently of God, or to the Jungian alternative of a dark side of God. This could
be one of the areas where various Christian traditions differ strongly from each other,
possibly leading to significant variations of the theme proposed in Murphys paper.
111
Polkinghorne, Science and Providence; Stoeger, Describing Gods Action.
349
112
CHAPTER TEN
1. Introduction
In this essay, I will explore further a thesis about divine action and
quantum mechanics whose roots trace back four decades in the field
of theology and science.1 It has been extensively developed recently
by scholars in the decade-long CTNS/Vatican Observatory series of
research conferences. The thesis is the following: if quantum mechanics is interpreted philosophically in terms of ontological indeterminism (as found in one form of the Copenhagen interpretation), one
can construct a bottom-up, noninterventionist, objective approach2
to mediated direct divine action in which Gods indirect acts of general and special providence at the macroscopic level arise in part, at
least, from Gods objective direct action at the quantum level both in
sustaining the time-development of elementary processes as governed
1
For historical background, see Robert J. Russell, Special Providence and Genetic
Mutation: A New Defense of Theistic Evolution, in Evolutionary and Molecular Biology:
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, R.J. Russell, W.R. Stoeger, and F.J. Ayala, eds.
(Vatican City State/Berkeley, Calif.: Vatican Observatory/Center for Theology and the
Natural Sciences, 1998), secs. 2.3.12, the volume hereafter EMB.
2
For a discussion of such terms as objective and noninterventionist, see Robert
J. Russell, Introduction, in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine
Action, R.J. Russell, N.C. Murphy, and A. Peacocke, eds. (Vatican City State/Berkeley,
Calif.: Vatican Observatory/Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1995),
secs. 3.3 and 3.4, esp. figure 1, the volume hereafter CAC. For an anthology and
careful analysis of the contemporary theological literature on divine action see Owen
Thomas, ed., Gods Activity in the World: The Contemporary Problem (Chico, Calif.:
Scholars Press, 1983), hereafter GAW, and idem, Recent Thought on Divine Agency,
in Divine Action, B. Hebblethwaite and E. Henderson, eds. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1990). For a detailed analysis of the philosophical problems involved, see Keith Ward,
Divine Action (London: Collins, 1990), and Thomas F. Tracy, ed., The God Who Acts:
Philosophical and Theological Explorations (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State
University, 1994).
352
2. Clarifications
The general position of noninterventionist, objective, special divine
action actually includes several distinct approaches: (i) agential models
of Gods interaction with the world; (ii) agential models in combination with embodiment models of the God/world relation; (iii) agential
models deployed through complex metaphysical systems, such as
process philosophy and neo-Thomism. This essay will focus on the
first approach, which, in turn, includes three versions distinguished
primarily by their focus on inter- or intra-level causality: top-down
causality, whole-part constraints, and bottom-up causality.3 Though this
3
For a discussion of how a bottom-up approach relates to possible top-down
approaches, as well as why a bottom-up approach is essential in the context of the
early evolution of life, see Russell, Introduction, in CAC, sec. 4.3.
353
essay will focus on bottom-up causality, like most scholars I believe that
a combination of all three will eventually be needed for an adequate
account of objective, noninterventionist divine action.
In the bottom-up approach, God is thought of as acting at a lower
level of complexity in nature to influence the processes and properties
at a higher level. To qualify as a noninterventionist approach, the lower
level must be interpretable philosophically as ontologically indeterministic. A number of scholars4 have focused on quantum mechanics
because it deals with the lowest levels in nature (i.e., fundamental particles and physical interactions) and because it can be given such an
interpretation. Their work will serve as sources for the current essay.
First, however, I need to stress what the approach adopted in this essay
does not claim.
1. This approach does not explain how God acts or even constitute an argument that God acts.5 Instead it assumes that warrants for
the belief in divine action come from extended theological arguments
4
Karl Heim, The Transformation of the Scientific World (London: SCM Press,
1953); Eric L. Mascall, Christian Theology and Natural Science: Some Questions in Their
Relations (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1956); William G. Pollard, Chance and
Providence: Gods Action in a World Governed by Scientific Law (London: Faber and
Faber, 1958); Mary Hesse, On the Alleged Incompatibility Between Christianity and
Science, in Man and Nature, Hugh Montefiore, ed. (London: Collins, 1975); Donald
M. MacKay, Chance and Providence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); Nancey
Murphy, Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridans Ass and Schrdingers
Cat, 32558, Thomas F. Tracy, Particular Providence and the God of the Gaps,
289324, and George F. Ellis, Ordinary and Extraordinary Divine Action: The Nexus
of Interaction, 35996, all three in CAC; Ian G. Barbour, Five Models of God and
Evolution, EMB, 41942; see as far back as idem, Issues in Science and Religion (New
York: Harper & Row, 1971); Mark W. Worthing, God, Creation, and Contemporary
Physics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), esp. 13046; Christopher F. Mooney,
Theology and Scientific Knowledge: Changing Models of Gods Presence in the World
(Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1996), esp. chap. 3, 10810; Philip Clayton, God and
Contemporary Science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), esp. chap. 7,
8. Some scholars have raised objections to the approach taken by these scholars. See,
for example, Arthur Peacocke, Gods Interaction with the World: The Implications
of Deterministic Chaos and of Interconnected and Interdependent Reality, in CAC,
27981. For an interesting recent response to Peacocke in terms of quantum indeterminacy, see John J. Davis, Quantum Indeterminacy and the Omniscience of God,
Science and Christian Belief 9.2 (October 1997): 12944. and Peacockes reply in the
same volume. See also John C. Polkinghorne, The Metaphysics of Divine Action, in
CAC, esp. 1523, articles in Niels H. Gregersen et al., eds., Studies in Science & Theology
1996: Yearbook of the European Society for the Study of Science and Theology, vols. 3
and 4, The Concept of Nature in Science & Theology, Parts I and II (Geneva: Labor et
Fides, 1997), articles in Science and Christian Belief 7.2 (October 1995), and George
Murphy, Does the Trinity Play Dice? Zygon 51.1 (March 1999).
5
See Russell, Special Providence and Genetic Mutation, sec. 4.1.
354
6
Michael Ruse, Can a Darwinian Be a Christian? The Relationship Between Science
and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 868, 912, provides a
thoughtful and often conciliatory approach to the relations between Darwinism and
theism. Unfortunately, though, he reiterates the charge that the appeal to quantum
mechanics is an epistemic form of the gaps argument without discussing previous
responses by Tracy, Ellis, Murphy, and myself. He adds to it the claim that it raises
the problem of theodicy. I think the latter is a valid point, but again, it is one that I
have discussed in Special Providence and Genetic Mutation, sec. 5.2, and that I treat
in some detail below.
7
Here I am again following Tracys usage in his Particular Providence, sec. 1.1.
355
acts within these natural processes and together with natural causes to
bring them about.
The theological warrants for a noninterventionist account of divine
action include the following: objective special providence is achieved
without contradicting general providence (since Gods particular acts,
being noninterventionist, do not violate or suspend Gods routine
acts as represented in the laws of nature); God as the transcendent
creator ex nihilo of the universe as a whole is the immanent on-going
creator of each part (creatio continua); Gods intentions are disclosed
in what we know, not in what we dont know, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer
urged;8 noninterventionist objective special divine action offers a robust
response to atheistic challenges to the intelligibility and credibility of
Christian faith, since the presence of chance in nature does not imply
an absent God and a pointless world but an ever-present God acting
with purpose in the world.
3. It does not reduce God to a natural cause, nor does Gods direct9
action at the quantum level give rise to phenomena that cannot be
explained by science. It affirms that science is characterized by methodological naturalism, and thus it abstains from viewing God as an
explanation within science.10 Instead, Gods direct action at the quantum
level is hidden in principle from science, supporting the integrity of
science and yet allowing science to be integrated fruitfully into constructive theology where God as an explanation of natural events is
appropriately and fully developed.
8
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, enlarged ed. (London: SCM
Press, 1972/1979), 311. See Tracy, Particular Providence, 289.
9
God may be thought of as acting directly at the quantum level (more precisely, the
effects of Gods direct action may occur at the quantum level). The events we attribute
to God at the macroscopic level are their indirect result. A direct, or basic, act is one
for which there is no prior act (such as willing my arm to move), and one which may
initiate a sequence of acts resulting in an indirect act (such as my arm moving). Thus
divine acts of general and special providence at the ordinary, classical level are mediated and indirect divine acts that arise from Gods direct acts mediated in, through,
and by quantum processes. Such providential acts can equally be seen as a form of
Gods ongoing, continuous creative action. See Tracy, Particular Providence and the
God of the Gaps, in CAC, 2956.
10
This approach thus differs from that of Intelligent Design since it does not
introduce concepts such as agency or designer into scientific theory. Instead it argues
that when quantum physics is introduced into theology through the lens of philosophy,
it offers a new theological approach to noninterventionist divine action.
356
11
Nicholas T. Saunders, Does God Cheat at Dice? Divine Action and Quantum
Possibilities, Zygon 35.4 (September 2000): 51744, offers a helpful overview of the
kinds of interpretations of quantum physics and of the theological notions of providence and divine action. He then delineates four ways of relating divine action and
quantum mechanics. The first three are the ones I have mentioned here: that God alters
the wavefunction between measurements, makes measurements on a given system, or
alters the probabilities of obtaining a particular result. They do not seem to describe
the actual positions of any of the principal scholars in theology and science, nor does
Saunders claim that they do.
I agree with Saunders that I and several others probably fit into his fourth approach:
as Sanders puts it, God ignores the probabilities predicted by orthodox quantum
mechanics and simply controls the outcomes of particular measurements. (I would
rather say that God acts with nature to bring about the outcomes of particular measurements consistent with the probabilities given before the event occurs.) Saunders
acknowledges that he does not find any specific problems with this approach, except
that it requires us to work within a particular philosophical position. I agree with
him, but I think that this is unavoidable. I have discussed this problem extensively in
previous publications and return to it below.
12
One can think of God as acting either in, through, and together with the processes of nature (mediated) or as acting unilaterally (unmediated). In the latter case,
often called occasionalism, all events in the world occur solely through Gods action.
Occasionalism denies that there are natural causes in the world and undercuts the
importance of science in discovering and in representing them mathematically. As
Murphy stresses, any adequate account of divine action must avoid both occasionalism
and deism (in which Gods action is restricted to a single event, the beginning of the
world); Murphy, Divine Action in the Natural Order, 332.
13
Again, what is crucial here is that the inclusion of a philosophical interpretation
is not an option; the only option is which interpretation is to be chosen.
14
Chris J. Isham, Lectures on Quantum Theory: Mathematical and Structural
Foundations (London: Imperial College Press, 1995), 1312; Paul Davies, Quantum
Mechanics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 4; Ian G. Barbour, Religion in
an Age of Science (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990), 123.
357
15
For earlier detailed discussion see Robert John Russell, Quantum Physics in
Philosophical and Theological Perspective, in Physics, Philosophy, and Theology: A
Common Quest for Understanding, R.J. Russell, W.R. Stoeger, and G.V. Coyne, eds.
(Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications, 1988), hereafter Quantum
Physics; idem, Special Providence and Genetic Mutation. How macroscopic phenomena first arose out of the quantum processes of the very early universe remains
a profound problem. Here I simply take it for granted that we can describe both our
ordinary experience using classical science and our subatomic data using quantum
physics, and look to their relation.
358
16
Technically, superfluidity and superconductivity involve both FD and BE statistics,
as Carl York pointed out (private communications). FD and BE statistics are intimately
connected to the indistinguishability of fundamental particles (all electrons are identical) and their spin: y is anti-symmetrized for fermions (which carry odd spin) and
symmetrized for bosons (which carry even spin). Indistinguishability and spin, in turn,
are strictly quantum features, and yet they too can be seen as giving rise to the ordinary
features of the classical world. The space-like correlations in these statistics are also
intimately related to the problem of nonlocality in quantum physics, as Bells theorem
reveals (discussed below). A full discussion of spin-statistics requires a relativistic treatment of quantum physics, such as given by Dirac. Thus, in a strict sense, it lies outside
the confines of nonrelativistic quantum physics, although quantum statistics can be
warranted at least in part on the basis of indistinguishability.
17
FD statistics, 1/(eE/kT + 1), and BE statistics, 1/(eE/kT 1), both approach Boltzmann
statistics, namely 1/eE/kT, at energies E >> kT. Here E is the energy of the system, k is
Boltzmanns constant and T is the equilibrium temperature of the system. At low
energies, BE statistics still resemble the classical form, but FD statistics are strikingly
different. See for example figures 11:13 and table 11:1 in Robert Eisberg and Robert
Resnick, Quantum Physics of Atoms, Molecules, Solids, Nuclei, and Particles (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1974), chap. 11.
18
Here, bulk properties of solids, liquids, and gases were derived mathematically
from a statistical treatment of the deterministic interactions between their component
parts (e.g., the kinetic theory of gases).
359
360
3. Methodological Issues
3.1. Is a bottom-up approach to divine action warranted, and does
it exclude other approaches?
We should not see the present focus as a general limitation or restriction of divine action to bottom-up causality alone.25 Instead, I see the
present argument as located within a much broader context, namely the
theology of divine action in personal experience and human history,
because that is primarily where we, as persons of faith, encounter the
23
See Ellis, in this volume, sec. 2; Barbour, Five Models of God and Evolution, in
EMB, 426. For an extended discussion of quantum mechanics, evolutionary biology,
and divine action see Russell, Special Providence and Genetic Mutation.
24
Polkinghorne, Metaphysics of Divine Action, section 4.1. Also see Polkinghornes
contribution to this volume, secs. 4 and 5. See also Fred Sanders, The Image of the
Immanent Trinity: Implications of Rahners Rule for a Theological Interpretation of
Scripture (Berkeley: GTU dissertation, unpublished, 2000), 540. Although quantum
chaos is not a problem for the present approach relating divine action and quantum
physics, it is a serious problem when one tries to relate chaos theory, at least in its
present state, to divine action, particularly when an appeal is made to quantum physics
to provide those variations in initial conditions of specifically chaotic systems that give
rise to the appearance of openness in deterministic, closed systems.
25
As Barbour notes, most authors who explore this approach also insist on eventually
combining these approaches; Barbour, Five Models of God and Evolution, 4323.
361
362
27
Murphy outlines similar problems with a strictly top-down approach to divine
action in Murphy, Divine Action in the Natural Order, 4.1.
363
28
Actually this is a concrete example of the multiple interpretability and historical
relativity that inevitably surround any scientific theory. How these factors affect the
philosophical and theological discussions of a scientific theory is a crucial methodological issue lying at the heart of any conversation about theology and science. A decision
regarding it is required of every scholar in the field. I will try to describe mine here,
though all too briefly. See also Russell, Special Providence and Genetic Mutation,
sec. 4.2; idem, Quantum Physics.
29
But note Berrys careful discussion of this issue in CTNS/VO, v. V.
364
has pointed out.30 Thus their arguments, too, are fundamentally flawed.
So sticking only with proven theories is out.
As is well known, quantum mechanics can be given a variety of philosophical interpretations.31 The Copenhagen interpretation is, arguably,
the most widely held view by physicists and philosophers of science.
According to Jim Cushing, it essentially involves complementarity (e.g.,
wave-particle duality), inherent indeterminism at the most fundamental
level of quantum phenomena, and the impossibility of an event-byevent causal representation in a continuous spacetime background.32
Although rooted in the work of Niels Bohr, the term Copenhagen interpretation includes several distinct versions. Bohr himself stressed the
epistemic limitations on what we can know about quantum processes.
Compared with their effortless union in classical physics, spacetime
description and causal explanation become complementary (necessary
but mutually exclusive) aspects of a quantum account of microscopic
processes.33 Bohr also believed that quantum formalism applies to
individual systems, compared with Einsteins statistical view in which
the formalism applies to ensembles only.34 Heisenberg both supported
the completeness of quantum mechanics and developed his own realist,
30
George F.R. Ellis, The Thinking Underlying the New Scientific World-Views,
in EMB, 25180.
31
In 1966, Ian Barbour provided what is still one of the most helpful surveys of
these interpretations. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, chap. 10, sec. III. See also
Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, 1014. For a more recent and accessible account
see Nicholas Herbert, Quantum Reality: Beyond the New Physics (Garden City, N.Y.:
Anchor Press; Doubleday, 1985). For a technical survey of the philosophical problems in
quantum physics see Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics; Michael Redhead,
Incompleteness, Nonlocality, and Realism: A Prolegomenon to the Philosophy of Quantum
Mechanics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); James T. Cushing and Ernan McMullin,
eds., Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory: Reflections on Bells Theorem
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989); Abner Shimony, Conceptual
Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, in The New Physics, Paul Davies, ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989); James T. Cushing, Quantum Mechanics: Historical
Contingency and the Copenhagen Hegemony (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994); Isham, Lectures on Quantum Theory.
32
Cushing, Quantum Mechanics, 24.
33
In his famous 1927 Como lecture Bohr argued that the spacetime coordination
and the claim of causality, the union of which characterizes the classical theories, [are]
complementary but exclusive features of the description, symbolizing the idealization
of observation and definition respectively. For a convenient source and translation,
see Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, 8694. See also Cushing, Quantum
Mechanics, 28.
34
See Cushing, Quantum Mechanics, for a discussion of Leslie Ballentines arguments about Bohr versus Einstein. Cushing views Stapps interpretation as close to
Ballentines statistical approach.
365
35
Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science
(New York: Harper, 1958); idem, Physics and Beyond (New York: Harper & Row,
1971). Heisenberg apparently had a two truths view of the relation between science
and religion, with religion as a set of ethical principles. See for example idem, Across
the Frontiers, Peter Heath, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1974/1971), chap. XVI.
He also argued that the extension of scientific methods of thought far beyond their
legitimate limits of application led to the much deplored division between science and
religion; idem, Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Science (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett
Publications, 1952), chap. 1.
36
Henry Margenau, Advantages and Disadvantages of Various Interpretations of
the Quantum Theory, Physics Today 7 (1954), quoted in Barbour, Issues in Science
and Religion, 3034.
37
Cushing, Quantum Mechanics, 32.
38
What is particularly interesting here is that Shimony not only argues for one
philosophical interpretation against its competitors, but that he allows his philosophical
commitments (i.e., to realism) to drive his scientific research program in new directions that seek to revise current physics; Shimony, Search for a Worldview which
can Accommodate Our Knowledge of Microphysics, in Philosophical Consequences
of Quantum Theory, Cushing and McMullin, eds., 2537, esp. 34. His interest in a
modified version of quantum mechanics provides an excellent example of how ones
philosophical and theological commitments can play a positive influence in the construction of new and empirically successful scientific theories. In essence, the creative
mutual interaction between theology, philosophy, and science can include not only
366
367
40
368
41
369
of the wavefunction and its implications for divine action below, I will
stress again the challenge posed to a realist interpretation.43
4.1. The phenomenological domain of the measurement problem
We begin with a well-known distinction that arises in the Copenhagen
interpretation between (i) the time development of the wavefunction
of a quantum system, as governed by the deterministic Schrdinger
equation, and (ii) the irreversible interaction between the quantum
system and other systems. Ex hypothesi, these systems must be of such
size and complexity that their interaction with the quantum system is,
at least in practice, irreversible, i.e., the Schrdinger equation does not
apply. Irreversible interactions are routinely called measurements, but
they are not limited to interactions with the ordinary world around
us; instead, they include phenomena ranging from what we can call,
for want of better terms, micro-macro, micro-meso, and micromicro interactions.44
Micro-macro involves interactions between elementary particles and
classical measuring devices, such as the response of a Geiger counter
to an alpha particle, but it also includes any irreversible interaction
between an elementary particle and an ordinary object, such as the
absorption of a photon by an animal retina or an electron by a TV
43
An excellent example of the challenge that quantum mechanics poses to realism is
given by the wavefunction y. On the one hand, y can be thought of as a mathematical
function defined on a multidimensional configuration space; for n particles, configuration space is 3n-dimensional. Thus to represent the quantum state of two particles in
three dimensional physical space requires a six-dimensional configuration space. From
this perspective, a realist (versus, say, a Platonic) interpretation of y is problematic at
best. (Abstraction increases as one moves from configuration space to Hilbert space).
On the other hand, elementary texts on quantum mechanics routinely treat y as a physical wave in ordinary three-dimensional space, and not without precedent: de Broglie
favored a physicalist interpretation of quantum waves, while Schrdinger (and later
Bohm) recognized their imbedding in configuration space. For an excellent discussion and references, see Cushing, Quantum Mechanics. For the difference between de
Broglie and Schrdinger, see Cushings comments, 105 (and fn. 72) and 120. Cushing
tells us (124) that Schrdinger began with a realist interpretation of the wavefunction,
but quickly ran into the problems posed by its configuration space context. For the
gloss on Bohm, see 149.
44
Since we are working within the Copenhagen interpretation, we have not invoked
consciousness in accounting for the measurement process. Thus references to macro
might involve laboratory instruments, but not conscious observers per se. However,
see Butterfield, in CTNS/VO, v. V for complex ways of including consciousness in the
analysis of measurement.
370
371
372
49
373
5. Theological Issues
A variety of theological issues now emerge in the general relation
between divine action and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
physics as we look more closely at the thesis we are exploring here. I
will separate them into background issues and crucial issues.
5.1. Background Issues
5.1.1. Divine action at the quantum level and general providence
God creates ex nihilo and sustains the existence of quantum systems
as they undergo time-evolution (governed by the Schrdinger equation) and as they undergo irreversible interactions (quantum events,
measurements) with other micro- and macro-systems whose existence
God also sustains. The time evolution of quantum systems applies to
isolated systems, such as elementary particles traveling through relatively
empty intergalactic space, or to the very early universe. It also applies to
elementary particles bound together, as atoms and molecules undergo
time evolution in conformity with the Schrdinger equation. Quantum
events arise when micro-systems interact irreversibly with each other
or with more complex, molecular or macroscopic systems. (Here I am
not considering those irreversible interactions that lead indirectly to
significant changes in the world, and are thus interpreted in terms of
special providence.)
The point here is that during both time evolution and irreversible
interactions, particles and systems retain their FD or BE properties,52
and these properties account for the classical properties of bulk matter that we experience as the ordinary world of nature and describe in
terms of the classical laws of nature and classical statistics (i.e., epistemic
chance). It is to this world of ordinary experience that we attribute
Gods general providence (or continuous creation), namely the ongoing
creation and sustenance of the general features of the classical world
together with the emergence and evolution of physical, chemical, and
52
A fuller warrant for including the discussion of FD and BE statistics would require
relativistic quantum mechanics, and this lies beyond the scope of this essay; here we simply have introduced it in relation to the symmetry properties of the wavefunction.
374
53
When applied to the realm of molecular and evolutionary biology, the relations
are further complicated, since the micro-macro processes are involved in all genotypic-phenotypic relations, including those that have little effect on a species, as well
as those that, accumulated over time, lead to species differentiation and in turn to
what might be called general and special providence. See Russell, Special Providence
and Genetic Mutation.
54
See in particular Arthur Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1979) and his many subsequent publications.
55
Ilya Prigogines order out of chaos program, adapted so creatively by Peacocke.
375
376
57
See my previous response in Special Providence and Genetic Mutation, 2112.
There I did not mean ubiquitous in the sense that both (i) the time-evolution of a
quantum system and (ii) its irreversible interaction with other systems are the domain of
noninterventionist direct divine action and, in turn, of indirect special providence in the
macroscopic world. But surely this was evident since it was the indeterminism implied
by quantum physics that allowed us to think of noninterventionist direct divine action
in the first place, and indeterminism obviously does not apply to the time-evolution of
quantum systems governed by the deterministic Schrdinger equation.
58
However, these claims presuppose a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics in general, and of as referring, even if only partially, to the physical world. But
a variety of profound problems are associated with any such realist interpretation of
, not the least of which is that is typically formulated in an abstract space called
configuration space, mentioned above in fn. 43. Such challenges to realism should
be borne clearly in mind in the following discussion.
59
Again, this tends to presuppose a physical space approach instead of configuration space and this would be highly problematic when considering a quantum state
composed of more than one system. However, see Cushing, Quantum Mechanics, fn.
33, 2512.
60
For simplicity, we will work strictly in configuration space, although a momentum-space formulation is certainly an option, too. Again, for simplicity, we restrict the
discussion to one spatial dimension, x.
61
Of course, to be physically admissible, must be normalized properly and thus
be square integrable.
377
62
In essence, the classical ontology is of a fully localized material object whose
properties include its place in space, and this place can change in time, allowing an
x = x(t) conceptuality. In the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics,
however, we picture y as defined everywhere in space and in time.
63
Of course there are qualifications here. Consider, for example, a wavefunction
bounded by an infinite square well of length L (such that = 0 when 0 x L).
Although wavefunctions of this type are useful for various practical purposes, infinite
square wells do not exist in nature. In principle, the ubiquity of always holds, and
thus the caution about presupposing a classical assumption of locality in conceptualizing special divine action.
378
64
379
380
68
These issues are extraordinarily subtle. Cushing claims that Bohm gives us a preferred frame for instantaneous action, and thus allows for true becomingwhich may
sound strange, since it is also a completely deterministic theory in which what becomes
is fully predetermined. He has also argued that Bohms approach allows for actionat-a-distance but without remote signaling either, and that it offers a unique solution
to the problem of simultaneity in special relativity. Michael Redhead, however, claims
that Bohms approach is inconsistent with a stronger requirement, the philosophically
grounded invariance principle. See their essays in CTNS/VO, v. V.
381
69
382
every quantum event or only in some? And what are the theological
implications for human freedom and the problem of evil in nature?
To respond to these questions, it will be helpful to focus carefully on
the responses given by Murphy, Ellis, and Tracy as they have explored
these and other crucial issues.
5.2.1. Does God act providentially (general and/or special) in all, or
only in some, quantum events?
Nancey Murphy74 has given what I consider one of the most important
accounts we have of divine action in relation to quantum physics. Her
arguments have been pursued in helpful ways by George Ellis,75 as we
shall see below. Murphy starts with the claim that God acts intentionally
in all quantum events. She begins by providing two theological criteria
for an acceptable theory of divine action: it should enable us to distinguish between events that are special acts of God and those that are not,
and it should leave room for extraordinary acts of God.76 These criteria are needed if we are to allow for divine revelation through natural
and historical events, to account for the practice of petitionary prayer,
and to respond to the problem of evil (theodicy), with their associated
entailments about human agency, natural goodness, and the regularity and autonomy of natural processes. Moreover, because Murphys
approach depicts Gods action as mediated (God acting together with
nature), it avoids making God the sole determiner of the processes of
nature (occasionalism). Because it is a bottom-up approach to divine
causation, God can effect the behavior of macroscopic objects without
intervening in the everyday world. By viewing God as an indirect
participant in every macro-level event, God is kept from becoming a
competitor with processes that on other occasions are sufficient in and
of themselves to bring about a given effect.77
Murphy points to the close relation between her work and that of
William G. Pollard. Unlike Pollard, though, Murphy claims that her
approach does not portray God as unilaterally determining, and thus
dominating, all events in the world, nor does it undercut human free74
383
78
Ibid., 3556.
Tracy, Particular Providence. Tracy clearly indicates that his thought on this
issue is not settled. He is instead exploring a particular option to test its strengths and
weaknessesa research approach that I find highly congenial.
80
Ibid., 3212.
79
384
(the ordinary physics of solid matter and Ohms law, the routine biology
of metabolism, etc.), which we describe as general providence. But it
also results in specific differences in the ordinary worldthe cat living
instead of dyingwhen God acts in one way instead of another in a
specific quantum event. For example, God acts with nature so that the
particle is emitted now and not later, or it is emitted in the +x direction rather than -x, etc. Which way God acts determines (indirectly)
a specific result in the ordinary world. Thus we may attribute special
providence to the cat being spared from death and granted life in the
crucial moment. In fact, it is precisely the nature of the measurement
problem, namely the collapse of the wavefunction from a superposition
of states to a single state, that might allow us to combine Murphys pervasiveness of divine causality with Tracys concern for the event to be
objectively special: God acts in this event as in all events (Gods action
is never more or less but the same, equally causative). Still in this
occasion, with two states superposed before the event, God will chose
one state in particular and not the other, the one destined to promote
life, thus conveying Gods intentionality in this particular event. We
can thus interpret this particular event, in which the cat lives instead
of dying, in terms of objective special providence without restricting
Gods action to that event, and yet still maintain the objectively revelatory character of that particular event.
The chief virtue of Tracys option is that it provides a more intuitive
connection between the idea of Gods occasional action at the quantum
level and Gods special providence in the everyday world. Still, it seems
less clear how Gods general providence could be based on Gods occasional action at the quantum level. Murphys approach, unlike Tracys,
conforms with the principle of sufficient reason, which I find a highly
attractive philosophical advantagealthough I agree with Tracy that, at
least in principle, God need not create a world in which the principle
of sufficient reason holds.
In sum, Murphys approach (and possibly Tracys too) delivers just
what is needed for noninterventionist objective, special providence. It
involves objective special providence, for the actual fact is that the cat
lives when it might have died; it is objective special providence since it
truly conveys Gods intentions through the event of the cat living; and
it is special providence because it is that event that we use to refer to
Gods providence against the assumed backdrop of the general situation itself: the cat purring, the sun shining, the apparatus functioning
routinely, and so on. Most importantly, it is noninterventionist objective
385
Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, 133, 30514, particularly 308; Arthur
Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1928);
Arthur Compton, The Freedom of Man (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1935).
82
Russell, Special Providence and Genetic Mutation, 215, point 2.
386
83
See Nancey Murphys careful discussion in her Supervenience and the Downward
Efficacy of the Mental: A Nonreductive Physicalist Account of Human Action, in
NAP, esp. 1547. If Murphy adopts a compatibilist view then it would be clearer why
she doesnt need quantum indeterminism.
84
Tracy, Particular Providence, 3169.
85
Ellis, Ordinary and Extraordinary Divine Action, 393.
86
See Russell, Special Providence and Genetic Mutation, secs. 3.3, 4. This approach
might also shed light on the profoundly hard problem of the origins of sin in an evolutionary perspective.
387
87
In this sense, my approach is compatible with either a neo-orthodox or a process
view of divine self-limitation. I wish to note, however, that Ted Peters rejects the use of
divine limitation in general as a zero-sum view of freedom. Instead he argues for a
both-and view theologically. In future work I wish to consider the issue of quantum
physics, divine action, and human freedom from the perspective that Peters offers.
88
It is one of the most powerful arguments used by atheists in their rejection of
attempts to accommodate Christianity and Darwinian evolution. See for example
Richard Dawkins, A River Out of Eden (New York: Basic Books, 1995). In fact, the
argument goes back to Darwins own writings. For the pertinent reference to Darwins
letter to Asa Gray, May 22, 1860, see Ruse, Can a Darwinian Be a Christian?, 130. It
is noteworthy that, even while suggesting some creative ways in which Christianity
and Darwinism might find a bit of common ground (or at least some appreciation for
their respective positions), Ruse underscores the fundamental problem for that common ground raised by pain and suffering in the natural world; ibid., 912. Ruse refers
specifically to the thesis being explored here, but he does not discuss the response to
the problem of theodicy in this reference, although he, too, suggests that a theology
that stresses the suffering of God might be relevant to Darwinian evolution; ibid., 134,
and Russell, Special Providence and Genetic Mutation, sec. 5.2.
89
Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, chap. 8, pt. 4; Denis Edwards, Original
Sin and Saving Grace in Evolutionary Context, in EMB, 37792; David Ray Griffin,
God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976);
Gary Emberger, Theological and Scientific Explanations for the Origin and Purpose
of Natural Evil, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 46.3 (September 1994):
1508; John F. Haught, Evolution, Tragedy, and Hope, in Science & Theology: The
New Consonance, Ted Peters, ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998); Philip
J. Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 1993), 271; Nancey Murphy and George F. Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the
Universe: Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1996),
sec. 4.1; Ruth Page, God and the Web of Creation (London: SCM Press, 1996), esp.
91105; Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, chap. 8, sec. 2e; Polkinghorne, The
Faith of a Physicist, esp. 817, 169; Robert J. Russell, Entropy and Evil, Zygon 19.4
(December 1984): 44968; Worthing, God, Creation, and Contemporary Physics, 14656.
A frequent source for these ideas is John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, rev. ed. (San
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1966).
388
90
389
animals at Natures hand. For a classic version of the challenge of theodicy involving animal pain, see John Stuart Mill, Three Essays on Religion (London: Longmans,
Green, Reader & Dyer, 1875).
94
Murphy and Ellis, On the Moral Nature of the Universe, chap. 10, sec. 4. See my
response in Robert J. Russell, The Theological Consequences of the Thermodynamics
of a Moral Universe: An Appreciative Critique and Extension of the Murphy/Ellis
Project, CTNS Bulletin 19.4 (Fall 1998): 1924.
95
Tom Tracy, Evolution, Divine Action, and the Problem of Evil, in EMB, sec. 3.
Also see the extensive discussion in Howard-Snyder, God, Evil, and Suffering, sec.
6, of what he calls the argument from amount.
390
Edwards, Peters and many others in the theology and science conversation, I believe we must look to a kenotic theology that respects human
freedom and focuses on the passibility and suffering of God: through
the cross and the atonement of Christ, God redeems the world, suffering with and taking on the pain and death of all creatures. We could
explore the route Murphy and Ellis have taken, or pursue the theologies
of nature articulated by Peacocke and Polkinghorne, or explore the
directions taken by other scholars in theology and science. However,
I am still persuaded by Barbours argument some thirty years ago that
an elaborated metaphysics is needed if we want to relate rather than
simply juxtapose divine causation, natural causation, and free human
causation.96 Owen Thomas has recently underscored the lasting centrality of this problem, asserting that the most promising options are
the metaphysical systems of neo-Thomism and Whitehead;97 I would
add to these the metaphysical framework of Wolfhart Pannenberg and
other theologians exploring the doctrine of the Trinity.
It would be natural to explore divine action and quantum physics
from the perspective of process theology. Ground breaking research in
theology and science has already come from a variety of scholars who
work in differing ways within the broad outlines of process theology,
including Ian Barbour, Charles Birch, John Cobb, Jr., David Griffin, and
John Haught. These scholars draw on a crucial aspect of Whiteheadian
metaphysics: namely, that reality consists of actual occasions that
perish as they come to be, an idea highly reminiscent of quantum
events. Such actual occasions experience the causal efficacy of the past
by prehension, are characterized by inherent novelty, and respond freely
to Gods inviting, subjective lure. Process theology views God as active
in all levels of nature, stressing Gods respect of human free will and
Gods kenotic and redemptive suffering with all creatures.98
96
391
392
103
Ibid., 309. Shimony proposes a hybrid between the most radical elements in
quantum theory and the philosophy of organism, but in my view the input is almost
entirely from quantum physics after the fact and not a priori from process metaphysics
(chap. 19, esp. 3034). Shimony also points to Whiteheads treatment of an n-particle
system as being at odds with a quantum treatment and leading to revolutionary
philosophical implications (3002).
104
Henry P. Stapp, Quantum Mechanics, Local Causality, and Process Philosophy,
Process Studies 7.4 (Winter 1977): 17382; Charles Hartshorne, Bells Theorem and
Stapps Revised View of Space-Time, Process Studies 7.4 (Winter 1977): 18391;
William B. Jones, Bells Theorem, H.P. Stapp, and Process Theism, Process Studies
8.1 (Spring 1978): 25061; Henry J. Folse, Jr., Complementarity, Bells Theorem, and
the Framework of Process Metaphysics, Process Studies 11.4 (Winter 1981): 25973.
See also the two recent issues of Process Studies, vols. 26.34 (1997), guest edited by
Timothy Eastman and devoted to the question of the relation between process thought
and physics.
105
Jrgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and
Criticism of Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 236. At the same
time, he claims that only a theology of the cross can extricate us from the perpetual
warfare over the problem of evil between theism, which is tantamount to idolatry,
and its brother atheism. Ibid., 250, 221.
393
106
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 3 vols., G.W. Bromiley, trans. (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998), 3:chap. 15, sec. 5, 645. See also Pannenbergs comments on Barths response to eighteenth-century theodicies.
107
Ibid., 1:382ff; idem, The Doctrine of Creation and Modern Science, in Cosmos
as Creation: Theology and Science in Consonance, Ted Peters, ed. (Nashville: Abingdon
Press, 1989), esp. 1627; idem, Toward a Theology of Nature: Essays on Science and
Faith, Ted Peters, ed. (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), esp. chaps.
5, 6, 7.
394
108
See for example John Polkinghorne, Pannenbergs Engagement with the Natural
Sciences, Zygon 34.1 (March 1999): 1518.
109
Ernest Simmons has developed this approach in relation to divine kenosis. See
his recent article, Toward a Kenotic Pneumatology: Quantum Field Theory and the
Theology of the Cross, CTNS Bulletin 19.2 (Spring 1999): 116.
110
Acknowledgment. I wish to thank Nancey Murphy, John Polkinghorne, and Kirk
Wegter-McNelly for their helpful comments on this essay, and all the participants for
a most enjoyable conference.
395
111
2000.
112
Note: Chiao suggests that the non-localities in nature and the possibility of temporal quantum entanglement may lead to a nonlocal form of divine action. See Chiao,
Raymond Y. Quantum Nonlocalities: Experimental Evidence, 12, 2000.
113
Cushing, James T. Quantum Mechanics: Historical Contingency and the Copenhagen Hegemony, 5660. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. where he also
discusses non-locality in Bohms theory.
114
Cushing, James T. Determinism Versus Indeterminism in Quantum Mechanics:
A Free Choice: DRAFT, 8, 2000.
396
115
397
116
Mermin, N.D. Is the Moon There When Nobody Looks? Physics Today 38
(April 1985): 38. See also Mermin, N. David. Can You Help Your Team Tonight
by Watching on TV? More Experimental Metaphysics from Einstein, Podolsky, and
Rosen. In Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory: Reflections on Bells Theorem,
edited by James T. Cushing and Ernan McMullin. Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1989.
398
117
Cushing, James T. Quantum Mechanics: Historical Contingency and the Copenhagen Hegemony. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994; Cushing, James T.
Determinism Versus Indeterminism in Quantum Mechanics: A Free Choice:
DRAFT, 2000; see also Greenstein, George, and Arthur G. Zajonc, Eds. The Quantum
Challenge: Modern Research on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Boston: Jones
and Bartlett Publishers, 1997; Polkinghorne, John. Physical Process, Quantum Events
and Divine Agency, 2000.
399
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
118
See for example Cushing, James T. Quantum Mechanics: Historical Contingency
and the Copenhagen Hegemony, Appendix 1.1, 6063. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1994.
400
(7)
401
402
119
Greenstein, George, and Arthur G. Zajonc, Eds. The Quantum Challenge: Modern
Research on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Ch. 6. Boston: Jones and Bartlett
Publishers, 1997.
120
Greenstein, George, and Arthur G. Zajonc, Eds. The Quantum Challenge: Modern
Research on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, 145 and Figures 611, 612.
Boston: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 1997.
403
through the factor R=R (r1, r2, . . .,rn), and not just on the coordinates
of the particle at ri . As Cushing stresses, the many-body quantum
potential entangles the motion of the various particles.121 In essence,
the force is a function of a local gradient on a non-local potential U
as well as on a local potential V. It thus combines both classical and
highly non-classical features in producing the net acceleration of each
individual particle.
4) Moreover, quantum nonlocality is highly non-mechanical in the
sense that the quantum potential U depends not only on the positions
of the other particles, but also on their wave functions and thus on the
state of the entire system. As Greenstein and Zajonc write: The interpretation of Bohm and colleagues . . . goes beyond simple non-locality,
and calls upon us to see the world as an undivided whole. Even in a
mechanical world of parts, the interactions between the parts could,
in principle, be nonlocal but still mechanical. Not so in the quantum
universe.122
In short, it should now be abundantly clear that the meaning of
determinism in the Bohmian formulation is highly non-classical,
involving these strikingly non-local and non-mechanical features simply
not found in the Newtonian picture. This point is crucial if we compare
Bohm and Bohr: Bohm does not offer a deterministic interpretation
in comparison with the indeterminism of Bohr, as though the term
referred to its ordinary, classical sense. Both quantum indeterminism
and quantum determinism are highly non-classical. The use of either
in a discussion of divine action thus requires a thorough rethinking of
the conversation compared to its traditional context.
121
An important exception arises with independent systems in which the wave
function factors out and the quantum potential reduces to a linear sum of terms for
each system. See Cushing, James T. Quantum Mechanics: Historical Contingency and
the Copenhagen Hegemony, 6263. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
122
Greenstein, George, and Arthur G. Zajonc, Eds. The Quantum Challenge: Modern
Research on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, 148. Boston: Jones and Bartlett
Publishers, 1997. In a helpful example, Greenstein and Zajonc show how even in
Bohms case the motion of electrons in an atom is not mechanical in the way the
motion of the planets is.
APPENDIX
Science can purify religion from error and superstition; religion can purify
science from idolatry and false absolutes. Each can draw the other into a
wider world, a world in which both can flourish.1
408
appendix
in the Papal Palace in the picturesque town of Castel Gandolfo overlooking Lake Albano thirty miles southeast of Rome. Since 1935 it has
been the site of basic research in both observational and theoretical
astronomy. It is also here that Pope John Paul II often resided during
the summer. In earlier years the Pope, then Cardinal Archbishop of
Krakow, had regularly entered into conversations on cosmology and
philosophy with Polish friends and colleagues. On becoming Pope in
1978, he continued his interest in this dialogue and sought to improve
the relationships between the Church and the scientific community. In
1979, in an address to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the birth
of Albert Einstein, John Paul II said:
I hope that theologians, scholars, and historians, animated by a spirit of
sincere collaboration, will study the Galileo case more deeply and, in loyal
recognition of the wrongs from whatever side they come, will dispel the
mistrust that still opposes, in many minds, the fruitful concord between
science and faith, between the Church and the world. I give my support
to this task which will be able to honor the truth of faith and of science
and open the door to future collaboration.2
2
Discourses of the Popes from Pius XI to John Paul II to the Pontifical Academy of
Sciences (Vatican City State: Pontificia Accademia Scientiarum, 1986), Scripta Varia
66, 7384.
3
G.V. Coyne, M. Heller and J. Zycinski, eds., The Galileo Affair: A Meeting of Faith
and Science (Libreria Editrice Vaticana: Vatican City State, 1985).
4
G.V. Coyne, M. Heller, and J. Zycinski, eds., Newton and the New Direction in
Science (Libreria Editrice Vaticana: Vatican City State, 1988).
409
5
Robert John Russell, William R. Stoeger, and George V. Coyne, eds. (Vatican
Observatory Publications, 1990).
6
CTNS was able to accept the invitation thanks to a generous grant from a local
Bay Area family foundation which supported our participation for the entire series
of conferences.
410
appendix
411
412
appendix
7
8
9
See QC.
See CC, EMB, and NP.
See QM.
413
10
The text is excerpted and edited from the analytic introductions to the five volumes,
four of which I wrote and one (NP) which was written by Nancey Murphy. It goes
without saying that the choice of which to include reflects my own perspective and not
necessarily those of the other editors in the series. More to the point, it was a difficult
task both because I sincerely appreciate all of the chapters in the series and because I
truly value the lasting collegiality, team effort and friendship with the authors.
414
appendix
Landmark Publications
This series includes several pieces that have been extremely influential
in the field. These include the statements by Pope John Paul II: on science and religion (Message to George Coyne in PPT), and on evolution (Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences in EMB). It also
includes Ian Barbours 4-fold typology on science and religion in PPT,
preceding its publication in Religion in an Age of Science, which was to
become a standard for the field in the following decade.
Important Introductory Resources in Science and Philosophy
The series contains important introductory resources for future research.
This includes key essays on science by Arbib, Ayala, Berry, Brothers,
Cela-Conde, Chela-Flores, Chiao, Crutchfield et al., Ellis and Stoeger,
Hagoort, Heller, Isham, Jeannerod, Kppers, LeDoux, Shimony, Stoeger;
essays on metaphorical language in science and theology by Happel,
Hesse, Lash, McFague, Soskice; and essays on the philosophy of science
and philosophical issues raised by science, by Arbib, Alston, Barbour,
Butterfield, Clarke, Clayton, Cushing, Drees, Ellis, Happel, Heller, Hesse,
Leslie, Meyering, Murphy, Peacocke, Polkinghorne, Redhead, Russell,
Shimony, Soskice and Wildman/Russell.
Jointly-authored Essays and Coordinated, Separately-authored Essays
on Interdisciplinary Research Topics in Theology, Philosophy and
Science
This includes the joint essay by Isham and Polkinghorne on time in
special relativity and its philosophical and theological significance, the
joint essay by Wildman and Brothers on neuroscience and religious
experience, the joint essay by Wildman and Russell on the philosophical and theological implications of chaos theory, and the joint essay by
Cela-Conde and Marty on biology and culture. In addition there were
coordinated essays on the theological significance of cosmological finetuning (i.e. the Anthropic Principle) by Ellis and Murphy, coordinated
essays on evolutionary biology and human nature by Edwards and
Hefner and coordinated essays on the philosophical and theological
implications of quantum physics by Barbour, Clayton, Ellis, Murphy,
Peacocke, Polkinghorne, Russell, Stoeger, and Tracy.
Novel Directions in Research in Theology and Science
This includes research on the ontological status of the laws of nature
and the degree to which our scientific laws represent the laws of
415
nature (Polkinghorne, Stoeger), on metaphor in science and in theology (Soskice, Barbour, Clifford, Happel, McMullin, Soskice), on time
in nature and in theology (Drees, Happel, Isham and Polkinghorne,
Lucas), on science and atheism (Buckley, Ellis), on science and models
of God (Barbour, Edwards, Gilkey, McFague, Moltmann, Peters), on
science and creation (Barbour, Ellis, Haught, Isham, Leslie, Murphy,
Peacocke, Peters, Russell, Tracy), on science and the intelligibility of
nature (Davies, Heller), science and human nature (Barbour, Clayton,
Edwards, Ellis, Hefner, Murphy, Watts, Wildman and Brothers), on
divine action and science (Alston, Barbour, Birch, Clayton, Edwards,
Ellis, Happel, Murphy, Peacocke, Polkinghorne, Russell, Tracy) and on
science and theodicy (Ellis, Russell, Tracy).
Major Impact on Scholars and the General Public
Sales of PPT and the series have been surprisingly high considering that
science and religion is still a fairly specialized field among scholars.
Over 3000 copies of PPT had been sold by the end of 2003, and it had
been translated into Spanish and Arabic. Total sales for the five volumes
in the series have topped 10,000 copies. Records taken by the CTNS
Science and Religion Course Program indicate that over 250 courses
internationally have included PPT or the volumes in the series. Finally,
the CTNS website, which makes available summaries of all the chapters
in the series, typically receives over 60,000 extensive visits per year.
Special Focus on Divine Action
I believe the series resulted in progress on the philosophical and theological topic of divine action in several ways.
On Terminology Regarding Divine Action
Over time we tended towards a shared meaning for key terms and concepts so that genuine differences and disagreements could be adequately
illuminated by the common use of these terms and concepts. This in
turn led to the possibility of solid conceptual progress on the diverse
meanings of divine action in light of science. An early version of this
commitment to shared meanings was published in the Introduction
to the second volume in the series, CC, Section 3.4, pp. 913. Additional
clarification came in key chapters throughout the series, with particularly helpful insights by George Ellis, Nancey Murphy, Bill Stoeger, and
Tom Tracy, to which I also sought to contribute. Key terms include:
416
appendix
laws of nature
ontological indeterminism
objective vs. subjective divine action
direct (basic) vs. indirect divine action
mediated vs. unmediated divine action
compatibilist and incompatibilist views of divine action
417
Nature is Deterministic
Subjective Acts
Objective Acts
Non-Interventionist
Interventionist
LIBERAL
CONSERVATIVE
Nature is Indeterministic
Subjective Acts
Objective Acts
LIBERAL
CONSERVATIVE
NIODA
Figure 1
On the left half of the figure, nature, viewed through the lens of classical physics,
is interpreted deterministically. This in turn leads to the historical split between
liberal and conservative approaches to special divine action. For liberals, the
notion of subjectively special divine action reduces, in essence, to a verbal redescription of what is in fact ordinary divine action. For conservatives, objectively
special divine action requires interventionism and thus amounts to miraculous divine action (in the Humean sense). Note that determinism, as a philosophical interpretation of classical physics, forces the theological split between
these approaches to divine action. On the right half of the figure, nature, understood through contemporary science, is interpreted indeterministically. Here
we see that, while liberal and conservative approaches to divine action are still
options, a third possibility arises for the first time: NIODA. NIODA combines
the virtues of the liberal approach (non-interventionism) and the conservative
approach (objective divine action) without their corresponding disadvantages.
Note in particular that the indeterministic interpretation of nature allows us
to separate out miraculous objective divine action from non-miraculous
(non-interventionist) objective divine action, a move which has tremendous
theological promise. The challenge is to find one or more areas in contemporary
science that permit such an indeterministic ontology for nature. CTNS/VO
scholars pursued a variety of areas in science in response to this challenge.
when we have one such scientific theory at one level which permits an
indeterministic interpretation, we can claim that the direct, mediated
effects of the objective acts of God occur within that domain of nature
without intervention. The crucial role of science in thus offering the
possibility for non-interventionist objective divine action is portrayed
schematically (Figure 1), given ontological determinism or indeterminism in nature.
418
appendix
Results to date: I believe that quantum mechanics provides a particularly promising area for NIODA because it is clearly capable of
supporting an indeterministic interpretation. I am not optimistic about
chaos theory as it currently stands, since its only interpretation is deterministic, making objective divine action interventionist. Perhaps more
complex theories of chaotic systems will one day be found which will,
in turn, be open to an indeterministic interpretation, but these theories
have yet to be discoveredand interpreted. I am not optimistic about
top-down approaches which focus by analogy from open systems
embedded in larger boundaried systems to the universe-as-a-whole and
which depict divine action on the boundary of the embedding system
because technical problems in scientific cosmology preclude us from
viewing the universe as having a boundary (and because Gods action
on the boundary, if it existed, would still be interventionist).
Process theology clearly allows for non-interventionist divine action
through the metaphysical conception of the intrinsic role of the divine
subjective lure for each actual occasion, but that is only a starting point.
One must still search the sciences to determine whether Gods lure can
actually be said to affect the outcome of these occasions in an unpredictable way and thus the debate over the ambiguous interpretations of
science is still required. Neo-Thomism might be interpreted as including events which suggest objective divine action within the standard
primary/secondary causal context but I am unconvinced that this can
be done without violating the metaphysical distinction between primary
and secondary causality and without the intervention of miracles.
Challenges
There are also a number of topics and issues that have emerged in
the discussion which call for continued exploration. They constitute
challenges, problems and insights whose sustained analysis is pivotal
in making further progress. The importance of these topics and issues
has been brought out by our work so far. They include previously
recognized and newly formulated areas on the growing edge of theology/science research.
Actually new challenges are to be expected, even celebrated, because
a mark of real progress is that initial problems come to be seen as
partly confusions over terms and partly genuine issues to be addressed.
When these issues are successfully addressed, this in turn leads to new
insights into the depth and character of the overall problematic and
419
420
appendix
11
For an earlier criticism of the way the concept of divine action was formulated in
terms of direct vs. indirect and mediated from a neo-Thomistic perspective see Stephen
Happel, Divine Providence and Instrumentality: Metaphors for Time in Self-Organizing
Systems and Divine Action, in CC, 416, esp. Section 4.6, 197201.
12
Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action & Modern Science (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002).
13
Wildmans chapter in that volume was previously published in Wesley J. Wildman,
The Divine Action Project, 19882003, Theology and Science 2.1 (2004): 3175.
421
14
Philip Clayton, Wildmans Kantian Skepticism: A Rubicon for the Divine Action
Debate, Theology and Science 2.2 (2004): 186190.
15
John Polkinghorne, Response to Wesley Wildmans The Divine Action Project,
Theology and Science 2.2 (2004): 190192.
16
William R. Stoeger, S.J., The Divine Action Project: Reflections on the Compatibilism/Incompatibilism Divide, Theology and Science 2.2 (2004): 192196.
17
Thomas Tracy, Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action?: Mapping the Options,
Theology and Science 2.2 (2004): 196201.
18
Wesley Wildman, Further Reflections on The Divine Action Project, Theology
and Science 3.1 (2005): 7183.
19
Saunders stipulates a test that any successful theory of non-interventionist objective
divine action must meet, and the test is spelled out in terms of four distinct criteria. In
my opinion, two of the four criteria of the test are mutually contradictory: that there
is genuine openness in nature (i.e., ontological indeterminism) and that the laws of
nature, viewed as ontological realities, determine individual events whether the laws
are stochastic or deterministic. Because of this contradiction, Saunderss test fails to
constitute be a valid test for assessing theories of divine action and Saunderss assessment of the failure of the proposals deployed by scholars in the CTNS/VO series based
on his test should be set aside.
Wildman is also highly critical of the possibility of successful theories of non-interventionist objective divine action, but in this case his reasons are based on his agreement
with Kant. According to Wildman, Kant showed that we must inevitably understand
nature in terms of causal closure. Thus any theory of objective divine action will always
be interventionist. My response is that quantum mechanics challenges Kants insistence
on causal determinism (in ways similar to how non-Euclidean geometry challenged
his view of Euclidean geometry as a synthetic a priori judgment) and thus, contrary to
Kant, quantum mechanics does allow for the possibility of ontological indeterminism
in nature. For this reason I think Wildmans criticisms of the CTNS/VO proposals
based on his agreement with Kant should also be set aside.
Note: Wildman offers an additional, and I think more serious, criticism of the divine
action project based on what he understands to be the view of God underlying the
proposals on divine action: namely, the problem of theodicy. Whether or not Wildman
correctly represents that underlying view of God, the problem of theodicy is a serious
one for any theory of objective divine action, non-interventionist or not. That is why
it has already been raised and discussed frequently in the five volumes, particularly
by Tracy, Ellis, Murphy and me. That is also why the problem of theodicy, whether
or not it is genuinely exacerbated by the possibility of non-interventionist objective
divine action, is a driving factor in the formulation of an overarching theme for a new
series of CTNS/VO research.
422
appendix
now, but the challenges raised by the other scholars noted here should
be pursued vigorously as part of future CTNS/VO research.20
Natural Theodicy/Suffering in Nature
To the extent that the case for non-interventionist divine action in light
of science has been strengthened by these volumes, so the problem raised
by suffering in nature and Gods relation to it (e.g., natural theodicy)
is, arguably, exacerbated. (Note: Tom Tracy raises important objections
to the claim that it is, in fact, exacerbated).21 If God really does act in
nature in ways that make a difference in the course of natural history,
what is the relation between such divine action and suffering in nature:
Does God cause it? Does God allow it? Does God suffer with creation?
What is the result of Gods suffering with creation?
Recommendation: A new series by CTNS/VO on natural theodicy has
already been launched to address these questions. The first conference,
held at the Specola Vaticana in September 2005, focused on physics and
cosmology.22 Future conferences are being planned which then shift the
scientific focus to evolutionary and molecular biology and, perhaps, to
anthropology, the neurosciences and cognitive science, exploring the
preconditions for the possibility of human moral evil in our biological,
genetic and neurological roots.
Eschatology
Perhaps the most promisingand most challengingtheological
response to natural theodicy is to move the conversation from the locus
of creation theology where it is at present to that of redemption. If one
claims that Gods response to suffering in nature is to suffer with nature
and in doing so to redeem nature, as many CTNS/VO scholars have
suggested, this takes us directly to the various forms of the theology of
the cross. Of course this, in turn, takes us to the Resurrection of Jesus
20
I offer an extended analysis and critical assessment of the preceding issues in
Robert John Russell, Cosmology from Alpha to Omega: Theology and Science in Creative
Mutual Interaction (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2007), chaps. 46.
21
Thomas F. Tracy, Evolution, Divine Action, and the Problem of Evil, in EMB,
51130.
22
Nancey Murphy, Robert John Russell, and William R. Stoeger, S.J., eds., Physics
and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, Vol. 1 (Vatican
City State: Vatican Observatory Publications/Berkeley, Calif.: Center for Theology and
the Natural Sciences, 2007).
423
23
Initial research includes the following: John Polkinghorne and Michael Welker,
eds., The End of the World and the Ends of God: Science and Theology on Eschatology
(Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 2000); John Polkinghorne, The God of
Hope and the End of the World (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002); Ted
Peters, Robert John Russell, and Michael Welker, eds., Resurrection: Theological and
Scientific Assessments (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002);
Robert John Russell, Eschatology and Physical Cosmology: A Preliminary Reflection,
in The Far Future Universe: Eschatology from a Cosmic Perspective, George F.R. Ellis,
ed. (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2002), 266315; idem, Cosmology
and Eschatology, in Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, Jerry Walls, ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, in press).
424
appendix
Typology of the Approaches to Divine Action
425
Bottom-up
This causality refers to the way the lower levels of organization affect
the way more complex levels behave. Here God might act at the most
elementary domains of an organism to achieve specific results which are
manifest at the level of ordinary human experience. Quantum physics
seems the most promising candidate for further inquiry into divine
action through bottom-up causality.
Actually, most scholars want to combine most, or even all four, types
of causality when it comes to human agency in the world and to Gods
action in human life and history. The challenge, however, is to conceive
of God as acting in the processes of biological evolution or physical
cosmology long before the arrival of any kind of complex biological
organism (let alone humanity). Here bottom-up causality may be the
only approach available.
It should be noted that these four approaches can be appropriated by
scholars from a diversity of philosophical perspectives as can be seen
in the chapters on divine action in the CTNS/VO series. However two
additional approaches to divine action involve more explicit dependence
on a specific overall philosophical system, even while using one or more
of the preceding approaches:
Process Theology
This provides a metaphysical basis for a non-interventionist interpretation of divine action. Every actual occasion is influenced by God, who
provides the subjective lure, by efficient causality from the past (prehension) and by the innate creativity of the occasion itself (its mental
pole or interiority). Entities at all levels of organization are capable
of experiencing Gods action as the (non-interventionist) subjective lure
without violating the regularities reflected in the laws of science.
Contemporary Catholic Theology
Much of contemporary Catholic theology has been influenced by a
recovery of Thomistic views of divine action. Here a basic distinction
is made between God acting as the primary cause of all events, creating them ex nihilo and holding them in existence, and God granting
to all events a degree of natural or secondary causality (while still acting through these secondary causes), as reflected in the laws of nature
426
appendix
428
SUBJECT INDEX
430
subject index
Humean 60, 63
primary 10, 36, 151 n. 17, see also
divine action
top-down, see top-down causation
and science 4
secondary 10, 122, see also divine
action
Whiteheadian account of 154
whole-part, see top-down causation
see also principle of sufficient reason;
whole-part constraint / influence
Center for Theology and the Natural
Sciences 2, 407
chance 35, 23942
in biology 256, 1569
and divine action 183, 2401, 374
as intersection of causal chains 27,
117, 239
in quantum events, see quantum
indeterminacy
chaos theory 4, 2829, 31, 37, 41,
1047, 264
role in biology 224
chaotic systems 1047, 1145, 117,
154, 259
as deterministic 2667
indeterminacy of 2656
and quantum effects 289
Christ 41, 46, see also Jesus; Logos;
Wisdom; Word
Christian Anthropic Principle 1378,
3445
Christian practice, see practices of the
church
classical field theory 393
classical mechanics, see mechanics,
classical
classical theism, see theism, classical
coarse-graining 3156
coherence, see decoherence
cognitive neuroscience 74
collapse of wave function, see wave
function, collapse of
communication, human 779, see also
Gods communication
compatibilism vs. incompatibilism,
see free will
complex systems 31, 57, 6079, 99101
in biology 224
and teleology 1545
complex systems theory 116
complexity 183
biological 1423
levels of 23, 143
see also hierarchy
subject index
deterministic laws, see laws of nature
developmental biology, see biology,
developmental
difference vs. sameness 5, 7
directionality
in biology 256
see also teleology
discernment 331
dissipative systems 62
divine action 14, 34, 97, 1113,
1178, 173, 175, 183, 200, 227,
375
bottom-up 13, 38, 265, 35360,
see also quantum divine action
and chance 2401, 371
compatibilist 41920
as conservation 234, 378
as cooperation 284
direct 1258, 2345, 23940, 245,
248, 24950
evidence for 260, 2967, 339, 3447,
3534, 355
in evolution, see evolution, divine
action in; evolution and design;
teleological argument
extraordinary 13, 271, 288, 307,
32839, 338, 382
and free will, see free will
as governance 2345, 284, 383
immanent 86, 268, 329
incompatibilist 41920
indirect 1258, 2345, 23945, 245,
248, 320
interventionist 17, 36, 37, 55, 1234,
231, 260, 263, 333, 354
in human brains 378, 56, 2934,
331, 342
medieval conceptions of 1, 10, 263
and metaphysics 1445, 1612,
1656, 1702, 177, 1846, 264
non-interventionist 9, 556, see also
NIODA
non-interventionist objectively special
(NIODA), see NIODA
ordinary 13, 31928
panentheistic 2213
personal 1369, 227, 260, 3601
and prayer 2701, 297
as primary cause 12, 1012, 112,
1202, 12835
problem of, see problem of divine
action
special 12, 127, 130, 1315, 2323,
237, 248, 2701, 362, 375
subjectively special 131, 237
431
432
subject index
evil 346
moral 387
natural 15, 387
see also pain; problem of evil;
suffering; theodicy
evolution 58, 322, 336
divine action in 1413, 360
evolution, theory of 1724, 1413,
15559, 17981, 229
and chance 1569
development of 1724
direction of 256, 1416
and design 1413, 155, 322
and ends 16370
and teleology, see teleology in biology
see also modern synthesis
evolutionary biology, see evolution,
theory of
existence of God, see design; teleological
argument
explanatory gaps, see gaps, epistemic
experience of God, see religious
experience
feedback mechanism 26
feminist theology 48
fine-tuning 35, 345, see also anthropic
principle
first cause, see creation; divine action
flow
of energy 22
of information 6870, 84, 87
flowing time, see special relativity
foundationalism 4
free-process defense 35, 388
free processes in nature 284
free will 12, 13, 14, 38, 48, 174, 2059,
239, 2425, 300, 303, 3237, 332, 346,
3823
compatibilist 2069
counterfactual 2069
and divine action 45, 12, 14, 378,
2435, 2934, 3001, 345
incompatibilist 242, 386
and indeterminacy 35, 2069,
23945
libertarian 2069
and pain 335
and quantum divine action 3857
and quantum theory 2423, 3856
freedom of God, see divine freedom
gap 3467
causal 12, 81, 106, 354, 386
subject index
epistemic 34, 261, 354
ontological 83, 84, 1037, 205, 354
between nothing and something
115
general providence 3735, 383
via quantum mechanics 35760,
3735, 3834
see also providence
genetic information, see DNA
genetics, population 17, 19
geology 229
God 43, 173, 178, 179
action of, see divine action
as creator, see creation
doctrine of 419, 423
existence of 118, 219, see also
design; teleological argument
of the gaps 34, 50, 81, 834, 248,
249, 261, 285, 307, 354
goodness of 119
love of 119, 121, 127, 136
as morally ambiguous 1823
as necessary condition 13031
omnipotence of 46, 48
omnipresence of 40, 55, 285, 378
omniscience of 2467
as one cause among others 261, 267,
355, 382
as personal agent 867
personal relationship with 247
power of 119
as primary cause 10, 129, see also
divine action
and time 14
as self-limited 93, 386, see also
kenosis
as self-sacrificing 119, 331
as source of order 122
sovereignty of 36
transcendence of 81, 1335
as vulnerable, see kenosis
as watchmaker 35
see also Christ, Spirit, Trinity
God-centered minds 338
and divine action 3379
God-world relation 39, 43, 2213
Gods relation to nature, models of,
see models of Gods relation to
nature
Gods action, see divine action
Gods communication 536, 77, 80,
83, 87, 915, 2934, 32932, see also
revelation
Gods forgiveness 119
433
434
subject index
subject index
Aristotelian, see Aristotelian thought;
hylomorphism
comparative 1789
dual-aspect monism 1078
Eastern 218, see also philosophy
emergentist monist 5779
Neo-Thomist 390
Newtonian 2745
and physics 21013
Platonic 5
process, see process thought
relation to epistemology 989
role in theology-science relations
34
and teleology, see teleology and
metaphysics
see also atomism; mechanism;
naturalism; pantheism;
panentheism; physicalism; vitalism
methodology
scientific 1567, 230
theological 1923
mind
as cause, see mental causation
as emergent 76, 324
mind-body / brain relation 56, 68,
737, 867, 195, 100, 195, 221
as analogous to divine action 867,
195, 221
in hierarchy of complexity 737
mind-body problem, see dualism;
physicalism; monism, dual-aspect
miracle 79, 81, 127, 141, 2312, 260,
327, 3324, 3357
see also divine action; special,
extraordinary
models of Gods relation to nature
17, 3442, 47
as designer 35, see also design
as designer of self-organizing
processes 356, 42, 46
as determiner of indeterminacies
36, see also quantum divine action
as embodied in world 39
models in science and religion 8
modern synthesis 1922
molecular biology 17
monism
dual-aspect 1078
emergentist 57, 5779
vs. pluralism 176
Spinozistic 2145, 2212
moral insight 332
moral responsibility 2912, 323
435
436
subject index
subject index
20001, 209, 23950, 2579, 2816,
3424, 3512, 35360, 3739, 38196
criticism of 28, 104, 115 n. 4, 118,
255, 298300, 3067
evaluation of 295303
evidence / justification for 308,
3603
in evolution 360
and free will 13, 2934, 30001, 303,
3823, 3857
global vs. episodic 2402, 348,
3768, 3825
and theodicy 382, 3879, see also
theodicy and divine action
as ubiquitous 3756
quantum effects 3712
amplification of 278, 104, 2569,
302, 3167, 3178, 35960, 3701
dampening of 257
in mutations 267, 37, 258
quantum entanglement 217, 224, 368,
3934, 401
quantum event 3713, 3901
quantum indeterminacy 4, 12, 278,
36, 1034, 117, 279, 316, 3189,
3247, 403
and measurement 3713
see also Copenhagen interpretation
quantum measurement 104, 2512,
198200, 3012, 3167, 325, 375
quantum mechanics / quantum
theory 4, 1034, 167, 189, 193, 196,
2123, 224, 3169
Aristotelian view of 202
and chaotic systems 259
and free will 2059, see also free will
and indeterminacy
interpretations of, see interpretations
of quantum mechanics
and macroscopic world 3579
role of observer / subjectivity
in 198204
and theology 1913, 2216
quantum nonlocality, see nonlocality
quantum potential 402
regime of law 2869
randomness, see chance
realism 4
critical 4, 9, 112, 124, 3689
redeemer 245
redemption 38990, 4223
reductionism 18, 99100, 144,
199201, 284
437
438
subject index
kin 19
species level 1920
self-limitation 489, 386, see also
kenosis
self-organization 24, 42, 99, 114, 122
and teleology 1545, 166
self-sacrificing love, see kenosis
sovereignty of God, see God
space 379
concept of 4
space-time 4
special providence 7880, 108, 260,
362, 375, 383, see also providence
special relativity 37981
block-universe interpretation of
3801
flowing-time interpretation of
3801
see also quantum field theory
speed of light 363
Spirit of God 51, 54, 108, 118, 119,
120, 136, see also Holy Spirit
spirituality, see religious experience
spiritual insight 32932
strange attractor 1023, 105
statistics
Boltzmannian 3589
Bose-Einstein 3589, 3734
Classical 373
Fermi-Dirac 3579, 3734
Stoicism 5
strange attractor 1023, 105
structuring cause 63
suffering 13, 3347
problem of 356
see also, evil; pain; problem of evil;
theodicy
supernatural 14, 81, 125
superposition 201, 204, 252, 3712,
384, 393, 395, 401
supervenience 668, 171
systems
chaotic, see chaotic systems
complex, see complex systems
dissipative 22, 1145
dynamical 22
far from equilibrium 22, 35, 99101
feedback 321
nature of 3134
nonlinear 22, 119
nonlinear thermodynamic 28, 37
self-organizing 223, 62, 99101,
115, 321, see also self-organization
system-of-systems 55, 7075, 83
t=0 320
teleological argument 1426, 162
critiques of 1559, 1635
and divine action 166, 168, 1702,
176
and evolution 1426
as inconclusive 143
stages of 1445
teleological categories 143, 150, 171
teleology / teleologies 11, 1413
as apparent only 1559
Aristotelian 1468, 1504, 173
in biology 11, 1416, 1549, 179,
3223
Buddhist 154
and chance 1569, 161
and divine action 1416, 153, 156,
15960, 172, 1814
East Asian 154
Hegelian 154
Hindu 154
and intention 1478, 15960
and laws of nature 161
levels of 14950
meaning of 14950
and metaphysics 1445, 1612,
1656, 1702, 177, 1846
and open vs. closed processes 149,
159
Paylean 142, 154, see also design
process 154
as real 156, 16570
rejection of 153
types of 1545, 1612
see also directionality; end; meaning;
purpose
teleonomy 1567, 171
temporality 167
theism, classical 81, 182, 186, 21923,
225, 233
see also pantheism; panentheism
theistic evolution 362
theodicy 45, 13, 174, 270, 393, 4223
Augustinian 389
and divine action 45, 14, 45, 195
n. 5, 279, 3067, 3345, 352, 3879
see also death; evil; free-process
defense; pain; problem of evil;
suffering
theological determinism 244
theology 171 n. 32
from below 1923
Catholic 425
feminist 48
subject index
kenotic, see kenosis
mystical 92, 176
natural 34, 90
nature of 1134
panentheist, see panentheism
process, see process thought
Protestant 230
revealed 90
Trinitarian 6, 13, 80, 3924, 423
theology-science relation 12, 80,
172, 2236, 192, 197, 210, 21213,
22933, 233, 259, 268, 2867, 299,
3056, 3467, 357, 3634, 373, 3879,
38994
methods in 3678, 40912, 413,
4145
models of relations between, see
models in science and religion
progress in 41318
role of philosophy in 17, 14
theology of creation, see creation
theology of nature 34, 367
thermodynamics
non-equilibrium 101
classical 18
Thomism / Neo-thomism 36, 112
time 379
nature of 10
top-down causation 10, 24, 2932,
61, 827, 1023, 1356, 264, 27881,
3078, 3089, 33942, 3445, 347,
424
in biological systems 317
in computers 317
mental 323, 325
in physical systems 3146
physical mediation of 313
in quantum systems 3167
top-down divine action 3840, 47,
2923, 3445, 424
439
2, 4076
NAME INDEX
Abraham 227
Alston, William 238, 414, 415
Aquinas, Thomas 10, 51, 101, 121, 234,
235, 237 n. 11, 243
Aristotle 6, 51, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150,
151, 152, 153, 154, 163, 164, 166, 168,
169, 173, 174, 176, 202, 263, 274, 275,
286
Augustine 51, 86 n. 78, 269 n. 9
Ayala, Francisco J. 20, 149 n. 15
Ayer, A. J. 178, 211 n. 28
Cain, Steven 76
Calvin, John 243
Campbell, Donald 61, 64, 68, 386
Campbell, Neil 309, 386
Capra, Fritjof 197, 215, 216
Catterson, Troy 185 n. 35
Chiao, Raymond Y. 197, 379, 380, 395,
414
Christ, Jesus 118, 119, 136, 260, 269,
291, 296, 302, 303, 331, 334, 337, 338,
392, 393, 423
442
name index
Kppers, Bernd-Olaf
414
165, 167
Pailin, David 91 n. 85
Paley, William 142, 155, 166, 168
Pannenberg, Wolfhart 14, 338, 390,
393
Parmenides 6
Paul, the Apostle 271
Pauli, Wolfgang 100
Peacocke, Arthur 7, 9, 11, 38, 39,
40, 41, 101, 106 n. 14, 128 n. 25, 160
n. 25, 184, 185
Peirce, C. S. 144 n. 7
Penrose, Oliver 341
Penrose, Roger 204, 324
Peters, Ted 387 n. 87, 390, 415, 419
name index
Plato 5, 6, 41, 51, 152, 173, 222, 277,
278
Polanyi, Michael 65
Polkinghorne, John C. 7, 9, 10, 41, 84
n. 75, 185, 196, 212, 250 n. 32, 255,
265, 266, 267, 268, 270, 284, 293, 301,
302, 307, 346, 375, 380, 388, 389, 390,
393, 414, 415, 419, 421
Pollard, William G. 250 n. 31, 300,
307, 382
Pope John Paul II 408, 414
Popper, Karl 64
Postle, Dennis 216
Prigogene, Ilya 22, 62
Puddefoot, John 68, 69
Quick, Oliver
56, 57
443
358 n. 16
Zajonc, Arthur
402, 403