ESSAY

1.
An audit team from the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Contaminada
committed serious infractions through the indiscriminate grant of petitions for annulment of
marriage and legal separation. In one year, the judge granted 300 of such petitions when the
average number of petitions of similar nature granted by an individual judge in his region was
only 24 petitions per annum. The audit revealed many different defects in the granted petitions:
many petitions had not been verified; the required copies of some petitions were not furnished to
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor; docket fees had
not been fully paid; the parties were not actual residents within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court; and, in some cases, there was no record of the cross-examinations conducted by the public
prosecutor or any documentary evidence marked and formally offered. All these, viewed in their
totality, supported the improvident and indiscriminate grant that the OCA found. If you were
the counsel for Andy Malasuerte and other litigants whose marriages had been improperly and
finally annulled, discuss your options in administratively proceeding against Judge
Contaminada, and state where and how you would exercise these options. (2013)
(1) Judge Contaminada may be charged with gross ignorance of the law and procedure under Section
8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The serious infractions committed by Judge Contaminada were in
cases involving petitions for nullity and annulment of marriage and legal separation, the most
disturbing and scandalous of which was the haste with which she disposed of such cases. For the one
year alone, Judge Contaminida granted a total of 300 petitions of this nature. The audits likewise
showed that she acted on these petitions despite the fact that it was not verified; that the OSG or the
OPP were not furnished a copy of the petition; that the petition did not recite the true residence of the
parties, which should be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court; or that the docket fees have not
been fully paid and jurisdiction over the person of the respondents have not been acquired. Judge
Contaminada had blatantly disregarded of the provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC (Proposed Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages ) and 0211-11-SC (Proposed Rule on Legal Separation). She is thus found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and procedure. No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the
laws and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge
must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge
displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence
of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge
owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of
Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judges hands.
Moreover, the reprehensible haste with which she granted petitions for nullity and annulment of
marriage and legal separation, despite noncompliance with the appropriate rules and evident
irregularities in the proceedings, displayed her utter lack of competence and probity, and can only be
considered as grave abuse of authority. The administrative proceeding is instituted by filing of a
verified complaint before the Supreme Court supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein and documents which may substantiate said allegations.
(2) Another option would be to file for disciplinary action with the Supreme Court for violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. The actions of Judge Contaminada clearly run against the standards set by
the Canon on Competence under the Code of Judicial Conduct. While not all infractions by a judge
constitute gross ignorance of the law, Judge Contaminadas blatant disregard for the rules and the
indiscriminate granting of annulment and legal separation judgements without sufficient legal basis
speak of his glaring lack of competence as a member of the judiciary.
2.

Judge Horacio would usually go to the cockpits on Saturdays for relaxation, as the owner of the
cockpit is a friend of his. He also goes to the casino once a week to accompany his wife who loves
to play the slot machines. Because of this, Judge Horacio was administratively charged. When
asked to explain, he said that although he goes to these places, he only watches and does not
place any bets. Is his explanation tenable? Explain. (2005)
No. Judge Horacio can be held administratively liable for going to cockpits because he openly and
deliberately disregarded and violated Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Verily, it is plainly
despicable to see a judge inside a cockpit and more so, to see him bet therein. Mixing with the crowd
of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors is unbecoming a judge and undoubtedly impairs the respect
due him. Ultimately, the Judiciary itself suffers therefrom because a judge is a visible representation of
the Judiciary. Most often, the public mind does not separate the judge from the Judiciary. In short, any
demeaning act of a judge or court personnel demeans the institution he represents. For going to casino,
the Judge may be administratively liable also for violating Paragraph 22 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, which provides: "The judge should be studiously careful himself to avoid the slightest
infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others." Even granting arguendo that
respondent did not gamble or personally play the slot machine, his mere presence in a casino
constituted a violation of Circular No. 4 and, more specifically, Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics. Thus, under the amended Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a violation of a circular issued by
this Court, such as Circular No. 4, is a less serious charge (Sec. 4.4), while gambling in public is a
light charge (Sec. 5). If found guilty of a less serious charge the respondent may be punished with a
penalty of fine of not less than P10,000 but not exceeding P19,999 (Sec. 10-B.2); and for a light
charge, he may be punished with a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P9,999 (Sec. 10C.1). All told, the Court may impose on respondent Judge a fine of P12,000. (CITY GOVERNMENT
OF TAGBILARAN vs. JUDGE AGAPITO HONTANOSAS, JR, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1169, January 29,
2002

3.
May a judge be disciplined by the Supreme Court based solely on a complaint filed by the
complainant and the answer of respondent judge? If so, under what circumstances? What is the
rationale behind this power of the Supreme Court? (1996)
A judge may be disciplined by the Supreme Court based solely on the basis of the complaint filed by
the complainant and the answer of the respondent judge, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The
Supreme Court has held that when the facts alleged in the complaint are admitted or are already shown
on the record, and no credible explanation that would negate the strong inference of evil intent is
forthcoming, no further hearing to establish such facts to support a judgment as to culpability of the
respondent is necessary (In Re: Petition for dismissal of Judge Dizon).

4.
After being diagnosed with stress dermatitis, Judge Rosalind, without seeking permission from
the Supreme Court, refused to wear her robe during court proceedings. When her attention was

called, she explained that whenever she wears her robe she is reminded of her heavy caseload,
thus making her tense. This, in turn, triggers the outbreak of skin rashes. Is Judge Rosalind
justified in not wearing her judicial robe? Explain. (2009)
(1) Pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Article [VIII] of the Constitution and in order to heighten public
consciousness on the solemnity of judicial proceedings, all Presiding Judges of all Trial Courts shall
wear black robes during sessions of their respective Court. In the case at bar, Judge Rosalinds nonwearing of her robe due to her medical condition is not excusable. To be exempt from non-wearing of
robe, she must first secure a Courts permission. She cannot simply exempt from complying with
requirement.
(2) No, Judge Rosalind is not justified in not wearing her judicial robe. Administrative Circular No. 25
dated 9 June 1989 (Circular No. 25), provides: Pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Article [VIII] of the
Constitution and in order to heighten public consciousness on the solemnity of judicial proceedings,
Presiding Judges of all Trial Courts are directed to wear black robes during sessions of their respective
Courts. Otherwise, she would be held administratively liable for violation of a lawful order of the
Supreme Court requiring judges to wear their judicial robe.
5.
Court of Appeals (CA) Justice Juris was administratively charged with gross ignorance of the
law for having issued an order temporarily enjoining the implementation of a writ of
execution, and for having issued another order for the parties to maintain the status quo in
the same case. Both orders are obviously without any legal basis and violate CA rules. In his
defense, Justice Juris claims that the challenged orders were collegial acts of the CA Division to
which he belonged. Thus, he posits that the charge should not be filed against him alone, but
should include the two other CA justices in the Division. Is the contention of Justice Juris
tenable? Explain. (2009)
(1) As to the orders being collegial acts of the CA Division, Justice Juris could not be held liable
alone. Collegial Division members share any decision on what proceedings to adopt in the conduct of
its business. They act by consensus or majority rule. Moreover, error or mistake of a judge or a justice,
as basis for disciplinary action must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith. It is only
when he acts fraudulently or corruptly or with gross ignorance that he may be administratively held
liable. He cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as
long as he acts in good faith. In this case there is no showing of Justice Juris acting in bad faith
together with the collegiate division.
(2) No, such contention is untenable. The Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, particularly Sec. 5,
Rule VI thereof, provides that all members of the Division shall act upon an application for TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction. However, if only the ponente is present, then the latter shall act alone
upon the application. Thus, if it was the Division that issued the assailed orders, then all its members
should be held liable. Likewise, if Justice Juris acted alone, then he must bear sole liability. In the case
at bar, Justice Juris seemed to have acted alone.

MCQ

1. Which of the following statements is false? (2005)

a) All administrative cases against Justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts fall
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
b) Administrative cases against erring Justices of the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan, judges,
and lawyers in the government service are not automatically treated as disbarment cases.
c) The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio, or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against erring lawyers including those in the government service.
d) The filing of an administrative case against the judge is not a ground for disqualification/inhibition.
e) Trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by justices of
appellate courts and judges of lower courts.
2. Administrative proceedings against Judges of all courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan shall be
A. private and confidential
B. public but subdued
C. private but transparent
D. public
(2011)
3. What is the method of national inquiry into the conduct of Supreme Court magistrates?
(A) Administrative investigation
(B) Disqualification
(C) Impeachment
(D) Disbarment
(2011)