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jurisdiction upon the land registration court. The demands of statutory construction
and the due process is very compelling.
ad litem (ad II-tern or -t;}m). [Latin "for the suit"] (I8c)For the purposes of the
suit; pending the suit.See guardian ad litem under GUARDIAN.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was accused of committing the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No.
7659. Petitioner, however, lamented the failure of the law to provide for definite
meaning of the terms combination and series" in the key phrase "a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word
pattern in Sec. 4. These blunders, according to petitioner, reduced the Plunder
Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and denied him
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA
7659, is constitutional.
SUPREME COURTS RULING:
The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2
is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable
certainty and particularity.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;[6] much
less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and
every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of
its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not
necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative
will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State,
and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
The centrepiece of LGC is the system of decentralization[26] as expressly mandated
by the Constitution.[27] Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGC expressly
provides that [a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be
liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit.
Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted
in favor of the local government unit concerned,[28] Devolution refers to the act by
which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.[29]
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the
LGC and the powers granted to local government units under Section 16 (the
General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi)
and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the
validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to
an injustice. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.
Petitioner and his son-in-law were convicted of murder and of two counts of
frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of two others.
Thereafter they were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained
after their bonds had been cancelled. Petitioner appealed and successfully got a
judgment of acquittal. By this acquittal he filed for a claim for compensation as
contemplated in Sec. 3 (a), Rep. Act No. 7309 at the Board of Claims of the
Department of Justice but was denied. On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice
affirmed the Board's ruling. Petitioner having failed to clinch a favourable decision
resorted to the Supreme Court for a reversal of the Secretarys decision.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to the claim of compensation in accordance
with Sec. 3 (a), Rep. Act No. 7309.
SUPREME COURTS RULING:
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is
acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to
petitioner's professed canon of construction that when the language of the statute
is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in
question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read:
"The following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person
who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal."
This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992, and
provide for the necessary implementing details. It also endorses reforms and
measures to ensure the conduct of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the number of positions to be voted
for by providing therein that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large, but by
district . . . .
WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 7166, and
approved by the President of the Philippines on November 26, 1991, adopting
among others, the recommendation of the Commission on Elections
aforestated;
been apportioned into two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the
members of their Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in
the coming May 11, 1992, elections, although under par. (d), the single-district cities
and all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise singledistricts, will have to continue electing at large the members of their Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned. But
beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all have to be elected by district.
By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to apportion the single-district
cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.
Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities
and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which
remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A.
7166. They will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992,
elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full
implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166. That is the true import of par.
(d). consequently, as We view it, where he stands, petitioner must fall.
2. Salenillas vs. CA
G.R. 78687
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor
of the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The Enciso spouses sold
the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas, the spouses
daughter and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Later, or on
December 4, 1975, the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor
of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan
of P2, 500.00.
Having failed to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding was instituted
by the Bank and against the mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction
held on February 27, 1981.
The private respondent won the bid and ultimately a Sheriffs Final Deed" was
issued to him on July 12, 1983.
When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17,
1983, to place the property in the possession of the private respondent, the
petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the same and instead
offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. Petitioners made a
formal offer to repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition
and formal offer, the trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of
possession prayed for the private respondent. The petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied.
Whether or not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property
under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question
is in the affirmative, whether or not their right to repurchase had already prescribed.
Sec. 119.
Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow,
or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons
are bestowed the right to repurchase the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other
legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the
respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those
classes of repurchasers because they acquired the property not through inheritance
but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-inlaw of the Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner
Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such,
and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so
because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The cases pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other
hand, present facts that are quite identical to those in the case at bar. Both cases
involved properties the titles over which were obtained either through homestead or
free patent. These properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and,
upon failure of the owners to pay their indebtedness, the mortgages were
foreclosed. In both instances, the Court ruled that the five-year period to repurchase
a homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the
day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale
is executed thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not
otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged
property sold at a public auction to the private respondent on February 27, 1981,
with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of the
petitioners to repurchase the first on November 17, 1983, and the second, formally,
on August 31, 1984 were both made within the prescribed five-year period.
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act
No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early
retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for
involuntary separation due to reorganization.
Those qualified to avail of its benefits are the appointive officials and employees of
the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The
benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two
(2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are
excluded from the coverage of this Act.
Believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, Petitioner
Lydia Chua filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration
(NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation
benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service
commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission
yielded negative results.
The Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is
unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for
voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of
said law. While the application was filed after expiration of her term, we can give
allowance for the fact that she originally filed the application on her own without the
assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be
granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years the
minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4)
successive governmental projects.
There are other grounds raised by the defendant-appellee in this motion for
reconsideration. The Court, however, does not believe that they were well taken.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the motion for reconsideration filed in this case, is, as it
is hereby, denied.
No. Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow
past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that
respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943
without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and
no longer open to attack.
It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated
again and again, consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other
litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro,
supra).
Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is
directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
6. Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. 72005
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
During the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of
the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas
bond. 3 The latter in turn posted a counter bond in the sum of P1, 400, 000.00 thru
petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were
released.
The focal issue that emerges is whether an order of execution pending appeal of a
judgment maybe enforced on the said bond.
SUPREME COURTS RULING:
Yes. Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might recover from the
surety on the counterbond, it is necessary (1) that the execution be first issued
against the principal debtor and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in
whole or in part; (2) that the creditor make a demand upon the surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment, and (3) that the surety be given notice and a summary
hearing on the same action as to his liability for the judgment under his
counterbond.
The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be
charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers
not only a final and executory judgement but also the execution of a judgment
pending appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining
order issued on September 25, 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against
petitioner.
Private respondent Grildo S. Tugonan was charged with frustrated homicide. After
trial he was found guilty and sentenced to one year of prision correccional in its
minimum period. The RTC appreciated in his favor the privileged mitigating
circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed private respondents conviction but
reduced his sentence by imposing on him an indeterminate penalty of 2 months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as
maximum.
After the case was repromulgated private respondent applied for probation but was
recommended for denial by the Chief Probation and Parole Officer Isias B.
Valdehueza on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he
could have then applied for probation, private respondent waived the right to make
his application.
The RTC set aside the Probation Officers recommendation and granted private
respondents application for probation in its order of April 23, 1993. Hence this
petition by the prosecution.
Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for
probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, private
respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.
The ruling of the RTC that [h]aving not perfected an appeal against the Court of
Appeals decision, [private respondent] is, therefore, not covered by [the
amendment in] P.D. 1990 is an obvious misreading of the law. The perfection of the
appeal referred in the law refers to the appeal taken from a judgment of conviction
by the trial court and not that of the appellate court, since under the law an
application for probation is filed with the trial court which can only grant the same
after it shall have convicted and sentenced [the] defendant, and upon application
by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal. Accordingly, in
Llamado v. Court of Appeals,10 it was held that the petitioner who had appealed his
sentence could not subsequently apply for probation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the order of April 23, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental (Branch 21) granting probation to private
respondent Grildo S. Tugonon is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
8. Cecilio S. De Villa vs. CA
G.R. No. 87416
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the court with
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 wherein the questioned check was drawn
against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank .
After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct examination,
petitioner moved to dismiss the Information, and after having failed to clinch a
favourable decision, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA and again met
the same fate. Undaunted petitioner ran for succour in the High Court.
It will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case.
As the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:
Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are
either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are
within the coverage of said law.
For every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central
Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for
the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange
Tax Law.
On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for
refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid basing on section 2 of Republic Act
601, which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines
of . . . stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making
application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules
and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof."
The auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the
reduced amount fixed on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not
exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of the
auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors"
mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the
Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of
dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax
imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601) so as to entitle it to
refund under section 2 thereof.
Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him,
that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the
Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a
crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so.
Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.
The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of
private respondent, without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the
appropriate prosecution agency.
Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an
omnibus order dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the
grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth
and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use
of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of
the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not
apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
The berthing facilities of Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan were constructed
and improved and are operated and maintained solely by and at the expense of
Iligan Express Corporation, a private corporation.
It is where several ocean-going vessels of private respondent docked every now and
then and were assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Customs which were paid
by private respondent under protest.
Private respondent filed cases before the Bureau of Customs for refund of the
berthing fees paid under protest. The Collector of Customs of the City of Iligan
denied the protest, prompting private respondent to appeal to the Commissioner of
Customs who, however, affirmed the decision of the Collector of Customs.
Private respondent then resorted to the Court of Tax Appeals. Consolidating the
protests, the tax court, thereafter rendered a decision on July 28, 1978 in favour of
private respondent
Sec. 2901.Definition. Berthing charge is the amount assessed against a vessel for
mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulk-head-wharf, river or channel marginal
wharf at any national port in the Philippines; or for mooring or making fast to a
vessel so berthed, or for coming or mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river or
canal under the jurisdiction of any national port of the Philippines: Provided,
however, That in the last instance, the charge shall be fifty (50%) per cent of rates
provided for in cases of piers without cargo shed in the succeeding sections. The
owner, agent, operator or master of the vessel is liable for this charge.
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
August 2, 1991
SUMMARY OF FACTS: