G.R.

No.

Case Title

107852

Aruelo vs. CA

160465

Estrella vs.
COMELEC

113219
101428

Mateo vs. CA
Vital-Gozon vs.
CA
Acena vs. Civil
Service
Commission
Cua vs.
COMELEC
Filipinas
Engineering and

90780
L-8051921
L-31455

Issue/Doctrine/Princi
ple
Whether laws
governing election
protests be construed
strictly against any of
the candidates for an
elective post.
Whether 3 is the
majority number of
COMELEC sitting en
banc to reach a
decision.

Whether or not
Filipinas, the losing

SC Ruling
No. Laws governing election protests should be liberally construed to the end
that the popular will, ex pressed in the election of public officers, will not, by
purely technical reasons, be defeated. An election protest does not merely
concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an office. Over and above
the desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to determine the
true choice of the people.
No. Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. (a) When sitting en banc, four (4)
Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of
transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members of the
Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution,
order or ruling. Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was lifted
from Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides: SECTION 7.
Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be
the majority vote of all its members and not only those who participated and
took part in the deliberations. Under the rules of statutory construction, it is to be
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. Since the above-quoted constitutional
provision states all of its members, without any qualification, it should be
interpreted as such.

The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not
issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its

Machine Shop
vs. Ferrer

104639

Province of
Camarines Sur
vs. CA

49677

Trade Union of
the Philippines
and Allied
Services vs.
National
Housing
Corporation

bidder, has a cause of

action under the
premises against the
COMELEC and
ACME, the winning
bidder, to enjoin them
from complying with
their contract.
Whether Titi Dato was
a permanent employee
of petitioner Province
of Camarines Sur at
the time he was
suspended on March
16,1976
Whether or not the
employees of NHC
have the right to form
union

inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the
said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by
the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be
imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal
by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said
order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
The S.C Agrees with Petitioners contentions. Dato, being merely a temporary
employee, is not entitled to his claim for back wages for the entire period of his
suspension. The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility
later on is of no moment as his having passed the supervising security guard
examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a
permanent one. What is required is a new appointment since a permanent
appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment these are two
distinct acts of the appointing authority
The court held that the workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the
right to form unions or employees' organizations. The right to unionize or to
form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in
both the governmental and the private sectors. The right to unionize is
recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX B which provides that "(t)he
right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees." The
government is in a sense the repository of the national sovereignty and, in that
respect, it must be held in reverence if not in awe. It symbolizes the unity of the
nation, but it does perform a mundane task as well. It is an employer in every
sense of the word except that terms and conditions of work are set forth through
a Civil Service Commission. Generally, formed unions do not bargain for wages
because these are fixed in the budget but they do acquire a forum where, among
other things, professional and self-development is (sic) promoted and
encouraged. They also act as watchdogs of their own bosses so that when graft
and corruption is committed, generally, it is the unions who are no longer afraid
by virtue of the armor of self-organization that become the public's own allies
for detecting graft and corruption and for exposing it.

L-69137

85279
L-44061
L-23721

Luego vs. Civil

Service
Commission

SSS Employees
Association vs.
CA
Salazar vs.
Mathay
Corpus vs.
Cuaderno

Whether or not the

Civil Service
Commission is
authorized to
disapprove a
permanent
appointment on the
ground that another
person is better
qualified than the
appointee and, on the
basis of this finding,
order his replacement
by the latter

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not
empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the
appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with
the Civil Service Laws. Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an
attestation; such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil Service
merely as a check to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws. Hence, the
Civil Service Commissions resolution is set aside.

Whether officers
holding highly
technical positions
may be removed at
any time for lack of
confidence by the
appointing power.

No. Under the constitution, No public officer or employee in the Civil Service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. In the
interest of service, reasonable protection should be afforded to civil servants in
positions that are by their nature important, such as those that are highly
technical. The Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be
for cause as provided by law at least demands that dismissal for alleged loss
of confidence be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate to show that
said ground exists. In the case, although there are charges against the petitioners,
the same were not substantiated, thus the abovementioned provision should be
followed.

*** Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed

by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he
does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide.

1. Positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive service

2. Primarily confidential positions
> These positions end upon loss of confidence because their terms of office lasts
only as long as confidence in them endures and thus their cessation involves no
removal.
3. Highly technical posts
> These are positions that require special skills and qualifications 4. Policy
determining positions
- What positions
compose the noncompetitive or
unclassified service
under R.A. No. 2260?
L-3881

Delos Santos vs.

Mallare

Whether the position

of City Engineer is
protected by the
constitutional mandate
that No public officer
or employee in the
Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended
except for cause as
provided by law,
thus, cannot be ceased
at any time.

Yes. There are three specified classes of positions in the Civil Service policydetermining, primarily confidential and highly technical. They are excluded
from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees
appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. The office of city engineer is
neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical. A city
engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any its
subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. The position of city
engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he
supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior
degree.
Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to remain in office as City Engineer of
Baguio with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until
he resigns or is removed for cause.

83896

Civil Liberties
Union vs.
Executive
Secretary

Does the prohibition

in Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987
Constitution insofar as
Cabinet members,
their deputies or
assistants are
concerned admit of
the broad exceptions
made for appointive
officials in general
under Section 7, par.
(2), Article I-XB?

104732

Flores vs.
Drilon

Whether the proviso

violates the
constitutional
proscription against
appointment or
designation of elective
officials to other
government posts.

L-8321

Quimson vs.
Ozaeta

Double compensation

No. Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition

against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government
subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional
Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII,
specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during
their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all other
appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law
or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down
the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.
YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall
be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective
official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman
and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks
to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his
appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his
constituents.
According to law, under certain circumstances, the President may authorize
double compensation in some cases, such as government officials acting as
members with compensation in government examining boards like the bar
examinations, or department secretaries acting as members of Board of Directors
of government corporations, and in such cases the prohibition against double

93867

Brillantes vs.
Yorac

Designation by the
President

compensation is not observed The Supreme Court held that the appeal should
not be reversed with costs. The SC also added He (Quimzon) should have
known that his appointment had to go over or through several obstacles and
hazards, but he took the risk and began serving as agent-collector before his
appointment was approved. We are afraid that he has no one to blame but
himself.
Designation made by the President of the Philippines should be sustained for
reasons of "administrative expediency," to prevent disruption of the functions of
the COMELEC. The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the
Philippines was moved only by the best of motives when she issued the
challenged designation. But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain
her act because it conflicts with the Constitution. Hence, even as this Court
revoked the designation in the Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation
in the case at bar.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the
Commission on Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its
members. That guaranty is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman
of the Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the
Philippines.

Guarantee of tenure
100113

Cayetano vs.
Monsod

Practice of law

It means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it

95061

Lindo vs.
COMELEC

Rules on
promulgation of a
decision in election
protest cases.

embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a
creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice.
Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. The decision of the court
shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the
parties. It shall become final five (5) days after promulgation. No motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially
announced, made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for
filing, coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel.

199082
118861
112060

104848

Arroyo vs. DOJ

Relampagos vs.
Cumba
Edding vs.
COMELEC

Gallardo vs.
Tabamo

Whether or not the

Commission on
Elections
(COMELEC) has
jurisdiction to issue
Writs of Certiorari
against the
interlocutory order of
the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in
election cases.
Whether the Trial
court has jurisdiction

The settled rule is that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the
trial court of its jurisdiction over a case and resolve pending incidents. Where
the motion for execution pending appeal was filed within the reglementary
period for perfecting an appeal, as in the case at bench, the filing of a notice of
appeal by the opposing party is of no moment and does not divest the trial court
of its jurisdiction to resolve the motion for immediate execution of the judgment
pending appeal because the court must hear and resolve it for it would become
part of the records to be elevated on appeal. Since the court has jurisdiction to
act on the motion at the time it was filed, that jurisdiction continued until the
matter was resolved and was not lost by the subsequent action of the opposing
party.
There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has
no legal standing to initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of the

over the subject matter Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in the law to prevent any citizen from
of Special Civil
exposing the commission of an election offense and from filing a complaint in
Action no. 465?
connection therewith. On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, initiation of complaints for election offenses may be donemotu
propio by the Commission on Elections or upon written complaint by any
citizen, candidate or registered political party or organization under the party-list
system or any of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission. 28 However,
such written complaints should be filed with the "Law Department of the
Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election
Supervisors or Regional Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial
Fiscal or City Fiscal." 29 As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not
seriously concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He
merely sought a stoppage of the public works projects because

95346

Galido vs.
COMELEC

of their alleged adverse effect on his candidacy. Indeed, while he may have had
reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he committed a serious
procedural misstep and invoked the wrong authority.
Whether or not a
The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests
COMELEC decision
involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not
may, if it sets aside the appealable, does not preclude recourse to this Court by way of a special civil
trial courts decision
action of certiorari. Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution, which
involving marked
petitioner cites, it is stated, Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or
ballots, be brought to
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional) Commission may
the Supreme Court by be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
a petition for certiorari thirty days from receipt thereof. We resolve this
by the aggrieved
party.
issue in favor of the petitioner. We do not, however, believe that the respondent
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. The COMELEC has the
inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law
and justice, and apply established jurisprudence, in support of its findings and
conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its
discretion

88919

People vs.
Inting

93419-32

People vs.
Delgado

83938-40

People vs.
Basilia

Whether the
preliminary
investigation
conducted by a
Provincial Election
Supervisor involving
election offenses have
to be coursed through
the Provincial
Prosecutor before the
Regional Trial Court
may take cognizance
of the investigation
and determine
whether or not
probable cause exists?
Whether or not the
Regional Trial Court
(RTC) has the
authority to review the
actions of the
Commission on
Elections
(COMELEC) in the
investigation and
prosecution of
election offenses filed
in said court.
Whether or not
Commission on
Elections has
authority to deputize
the chief state

The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary

investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the
Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This
power is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in
bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest
conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true
will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of
every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to
investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to
their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the
respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed
the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

Yes, Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that
aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide
election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a
public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code
before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly
authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election
offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information
in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case.

Yes. The Petition must be granted. There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested
with power and authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute such
offenses in court under Section 265.We note that while Section 265 of the Code
vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigation of election offenses

129417

COMELEC vs.
Silva

105628

Sarmiento vs.
COMELEC

108886

Reyes vs. RTC

of Oriental
Mindoro

prosecutors,
provincial and city
fiscals and their
assistants, under
Sections 2 (4) and (8),
Article IX-C of the
1987 Constitution
Whether the orders of
dismissal should be
appealed is for the
COMELEC to Decide
or for Chief State
Prosecutor whom it
has merely deputized
to represent
Whether the
challenged resolution
(SPC) as having been
issued with grave
abuse of discretion in
that, the commission,
sitting en banc took
cognizance of and
decided the appeals
without first referring
them to any of its
division
Whether the
petitioner's failure to
file a motion for
reconsideration of the
decision can be
dispensed with.

and to prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the same time authorizes the
Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1 987 Constitution clearly
envisage that the Comelec would not be compelled to carry out all its functions
directly and by itself alone.
The authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the
COMELEC. Art. IX-C, 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power
and function to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations
of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices. The COMELEC is empowered to conduct
preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of
helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing information in court.
This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
Section 16 of R.A. 7166, it provides: "All pre-proclamation cases pending
before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term
of the office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall
be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest
by the aggrieved party. However, proceedings may continue when on the basis
of the evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that the petition
appears meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the proceeding to
continue or when an appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in
a petition for certiorari.

No. A motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is required for
the filing of a petition for certiorari is clear from the provisions of the
Constitution regarding the powers and functions COMELEC. Conformably to
these provisions of the Constitution all election cases, including preproclamation controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division.
Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for

132922

Telecommunicat
ions &
Broadcast
Attorneys of the
Phils. vs. GMA
Network, Inc.

COMELEC can
supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or
utilization of all
franchises or permits
for the operation of
transportation and
other public utilities,
media of
communication or
information.

103956

Adiong vs.
COMELEC

Whether or not the

Commission on
Elections (COMELEC)
may prohibit the
posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile"
places, public or
private, and limit
their location or
publication to the
authorized posting
areas that it fixes

reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. Petition is dismissed for lack of

merit.
It is argued that the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC
under Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution does not include the power to prohibit. In
the first place, what the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by Art.
IX-C, 4 of the Constitution, among other things, is the use by media of
information of their franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the
COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or air time for
political ads. In other words, the object of supervision or regulation is different
from the object of the prohibition. It is another fallacy for petitioners to contend
that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. This may have
force if the object of the power were the same. Petition is dismissed
The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether
public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and
void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental
right of free speech enshrined in the Sec. 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. It is difficult to
imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be
guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away. We
have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect
when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equally vital right of suffrage. There is another problem involved. Considering that the period of
legitimate campaign activity is fairly limited and, in the opinion of some, too short, it becomes
obvious that unduly restrictive regulations may prove unfair to affected parties and the
electorate. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. In sum, the prohibition on
posting of
decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution
No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only
in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is
DECLARED NULL and VOID.

102653

National Press
Club vs.
COMELEC

Whether Section 11
(b) of Republic Act
No. 6646 is
constitutional.

The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or

regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the
operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental
purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out in the
Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right
to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such
media facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and forums
among candidates." Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern mass
media, especially electronic media, cannot be totally disregarded. Realistically,
the only limitation upon the free speech of candidates imposed is on the right of
candidates to bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements
commonly repeated in the mass media ad nauseam. Frequently, such repetitive
political commercials when fed into the electronic media themselves constitute
invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. It might be supposed that it is
easy enough for a person at home simply to flick off his radio of television set.
But it is rarely that simple. For the candidates with deep pockets may purchase
radio or television time in many, if not all, the major stations or channels. Or
they may directly or indirectly own or control the stations or channels
themselves. The contemporary reality in the Philippines is that, in a very real
sense, listeners and viewers constitute a "captive audience." The paid political
advertisement introjected into the electronic media and repeated with minddeadening frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so much to inform
and educate as to condition and manipulate, not so much to provoke rational and
objective appraisal of candidates' qualifications or programs as to appeal to the
non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience. The right of the
general listening and viewing public
to be free from such intrusions and their subliminal effects is at least as
important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves through modern
electronic media and the right of media enterprises to maximize their revenues
from the marketing of "packaged" candidates. WHEREFORE, the Petitions
should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement

90878

Sanidad vs.
COMELEC

Whether section 19 of
of Comelec
Resolution 2167
violates the
constitutional
guarantees of the
freedom of expression
of the press.

98355

Osmea vs.
Commissioner
on Audit

Whether Commission
on Audit has no
authority to declare
the abattoir contract
void

as to costs.
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 violates the constitutional guarantees of
the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution even
with the Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time which provides a forum for
expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the
public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in
newspapers or to specific radio or television times. Since plebiscite issues are
matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and
to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by
access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The
people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly
burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be
exercised.
The Commission has the authority since it has the power, authority and duty to
examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned of held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities.
The prohibition contained in Sec. 85 of PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code) is
explicit and mandatory. Fund availability is, as it has always been, an
indispensable prerequisite to the execution of any government contract involving
the expenditure of public funds by all government agencies at all levels. Such
contracts are not to be considered as final or binding unless such certification as
to funds availability is issued. Antecedent of advance appropriation is thus
essential to government liability on contracts.This contract being violative of the
legal requirements, the same contravenes Sec. 85 of PD 1445 and is null and
void.
Moreover, neither the petitioner nor HFCCI questioned the ruling of COA
declaring the invalidity of the abattoir contract, thereby resulting in its finality
even before the civil case was instituted. Petitioner could have brought the case
to the Supreme Court on a petition within thirty days from receipt of a copy of
the COA decision in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. A
decision of the Commission or of any of its Auditor not appealed within the

period provided by law, shall be final and executory.

Therefore, the settlement of the supposed obligation of the City of Cebu arising
out of a void contract becomes a personal liability of petitioner who is directly
responsible
Whether the subsequent comprise agreement entered into between the City of
Cebu, through its Mayor, Tomas Osmea is null and void.
It is null and void since the Compromise Agreement entered into between the
City of Cebu, through its Mayor, Tomas Osmea is void being merely a
derivative of a previously void Abattoir Contract, and thus becomes a personal
liability of the officer who entered into it
92279
75959
103309

Sambeli vs.
Province of
Isabela
Orocio vs.
Commission on
Audit
Bustamante vs.
Commissioner
on Audit

L-61676

Saligumba vs.
COA

L-171115

Guevarra vs.
Gimenez
Philippine
Airlines vs.
COA

91890

Whether the COA

committed grave
abuse of discretion in
denying the
petitioners claim for
transportation
allowance
Whether the Supreme
Court can review the
decision of the COA
in its decision in this
case.

The disallowance of the petitioners claim for transportation allowance is within

the power of the Commission on Audit as it is provided in Const. Sec. 2., Article
XII-D, 1973 Constitution. The use of government motor vehicle and the claim
for transportation allowance are mutually exclusive.

Whether Pedro M.
Gimenez, as Auditor
General of the
Philippines, and

This duty implies a negation of the power to refuse and disapprove payment of
such expenditures, for its disapproval, if he had authority therefor, would bring
to the attention of the aforementioned administrative officer the reasons for the
adverse action thus taken by the General Auditing office, and, hence, render the

Supreme Courts power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and
not to administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel. Even if the
SC have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters, they cannot
do so on factual issues. Their power to review is limited to legal issues.

Ismael Mathay, as
Auditor of the Central
Bank of the
Philippines can
approve and pass in
audit two (2) bills of
petitioner Guillermo
B. Guevara for
professional services
rendered by him to
said Bank.
112399
201716
133495

R.A. no.
8249
R.A. no.
1379

Bagatsing vs.
Committee on
Privatization
Abundo vs.
COMELEC
Borja, Jr. vs.
COMELEC

Jurisdiction of
the
Sandiganbayan
AN ACT
DECLARING
FORFEITURE
IN FAVOR OF
THE STATE
ANY
PROPERTY
FOUND TO
HAVE BEEN
UNLAWFULL
Y ACQUIRED

imposition of said duty unnecessary. The writ prayed for is granted and
respondents herein are hereby ordered to pass in audit and approve the payment
of the amounts claimed by petitioner herein, after deducting therefrom the sum
of P6,000 already collected by him. It is so ordered.

Whether or not Capco Yes, the three-term limit for elective local official refers to the right to be elected
Jr. is eligible to run for as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. In relation to this it is
mayor.
not enough that a person has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position. Therefore, the
succession by operation of law by Capco does not count as a term in counting
the three-term limit rule.

Acts constitute of
unlawful acquisition
of public officer

Section 1. Definitions. (a) For the purposes of this Act, a "public officer or
employee" means any person holding any public office or employment by virtue
of an appointment, election or contract, and any person holding any office or
employment, by appointment or contract, in any State owned or controlled
corporation or enterprise. (b) "Other legitimately acquired property" means any
real or personal property, money or securities which the respondent has at any
time acquired by inheritance and the income thereof, or by gift inter vivos before
his becoming a public officer or employee, or any property (or income thereof)
already pertaining to him when he qualified for public office or employment, or

BY ANY
PUBLIC
OFFICER OR
EMPLOYEE
AND
PROVIDING
FOR THE
PROCEEDING
S THEREFOR.

R.A. no.
6770

Ombudsman
Act of 1989

the fruits and income of the exclusive property of the respondent's spouse. It
shall not include:
1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is
concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or held by, the respondent's
spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other person.
2. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to
another person or persons on or after the effectivity of this Act.

Appointive Power of
the President

AN ACT
PROVIDING
FOR THE
FUNCTIONAL
AND
STRUCTURAL
ORGANIZATI
ON OF THE
OFFICE OF
THE
OMBUDSMAN
, AND FOR
OTHER
PURPOSES

139 SCRA
252

Orap vs.
Sandiganbayan

Issue: whether the

Tanodbayan has

3. Property donated to the respondent during his incumbency, unless he can

prove to the satisfaction of the court that the donation is lawful.
Section 4. Appointment. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the
Special Prosecutor, shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least
twenty-one (21) nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a
list of three (3) nominees for each vacancy thereafter, which shall be filled
within three (3) months after it occurs, each of which list shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation. In the organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman for filling up of positions therein, regional, cultural or ethnic
considerations shall be taken into account to the end that the Office shall be as
much as possible representative of the regional, ethnic and cultural make-up of
the Filipino nation.

The Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman but also as a prosecutor as

well.

power to conduct
preliminary
investigations, file
informations and
prosecute criminal
cases against judges
and their appurtenant
judicial staff.
193459

Gutierrez vs.
The House of
Representatives
Committee on
Justice

164316

Office of the
Ombudsman vs.
Madriaga
Khan vs. Office
of the
Ombudsman

125296

One-Year Bar Rule

For violations of the

Anti-graft and Corrupt
Practices Act
(Republic Act 3019),
the Office of the
Ombudsman exercises
jurisdiction over
public officials/
employees of GOCCs.
Exception: It ONLY
extends to GOCCs
with original charters.

As an ombudsman, his investigatory power is limited to those complaints

initiated against officers and personnel of administrative agencies, as defined in
Section 9(a) of PD no. 1607 which puts the courts, judges and their appurtenant
judicial staff outside the Tanod bayan's investigatory power.
But as a prosecutor where the tanodbayans power as defined in section 17 and
19 of P.D. 1607 confers upon him through the chief special prosecutor and the
special prosecutors, the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations
therefor, and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein.
What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in
a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no
longer rekindle the candle. The Supreme Court held that the whole import of
the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule in consideration of the
impeachable officers is that when the impeachable officer is made to undergo
such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if
Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once.
There is no repeat ride for one full year.

The Philippine Airline was originally chartered by special law as distinguished

from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Although the
government later on acquired the controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains
that the latter did not have an "original charter" and its officers/employees could
not be investigated and/or prosecuted by the Ombudsman. The definition of
public office/ officer as quoted from Mechem in the 2002 case of Laurel vs
Desierto was reiterated in this case:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer. The most important characteristic
which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the
creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of

some of the sovereign functions of government to be exercised by him for the

benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country,
either legislative, executive, or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be
exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature,
the individual is not a public officer.
160261
133715

Francisco vs.
House of
Representatives
Villavert vs.
Desierto

Whether the Supreme

Court has the
jurisdiction to review
from a decision or
final resolution or
order of the
Ombudsman in
administrative cases

Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of

the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared
violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and
consent.
In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the
Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court
of Appeals under Rule 43