7KH3DUDGR[RI3ULPH0DWWHU

'DQLHO:*UDKDP

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 25, Number 4, October

1987, pp. 475-490 (Article)
3XEOLVKHGE\-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
DOI: 10.1353/hph.1987.0063

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v025/25.4graham.html

Access provided by Universidad Complutense de Madrid (2 Sep 2015 13:11 GMT)

The Paradox of Prime Matter

DANIEL

W. G R A H A M

TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF Aristotle hold that he posited the existence o f prime m a t t e r - - a purely i n d e t e r m i n a t e s u b s t r a t u m u n d e r l y i n g all material c o m p o s i t i o n a n d p r o v i d i n g the ultimate potentiality for all material
existence. A n u m b e r o f revisionary interpretations have a p p e a r e d in the last
thirty years which d e n y that Aristotle h a d a concept o f p r i m e matter, provoking an even l a r g e r n u m b e r o f vigorous defenses claiming that he did
have the c o n c e p t ? T h e traditionalists are clearly in the majority, but some
obstacles stand in the way o f a general acceptance o f p r i m e m a t t e r as an
Aristotelian concept. I n a recent contribution to the debate, William Charlton, an o p p o n e n t o f p r i m e matter, has pointed out that the o p p o s i n g parties
have r e a c h e d a stalemate in large m e a s u r e because most o f the relevant texts
are a m b i g u o u s ; consequently, "the question w h e t h e r or not [Aristotle] believed in p r i m e m a t t e r really comes d o w n to the question how far, if at all, it
is d e m a n d e d by his p h i l o s o p h y as a whole. "~
It seems to m e that C h a r l t o n is right to shift the focus o f the debate f r o m
questions o f textual exegesis to questions o f systematic relevance. H o w e v e r ,
within the context o f Aristotle's general theory o f change, the challenge
implicit in his s t a t e m e n t can be met, for the concept o f p r i m e m a t t e r a n d its
associated doctrine is the p r o d u c t o f a series of ontological and scientific

i Friedrich Solmsen, "Aristotle and Prime Matter," Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (a 958):
243-52 and A. R. Lacey, "The Eleatics and Aristotle on Some Problems of Change," ibid. 26
(1965): 451-68; reply to H. R. King's argument against prime matter, "Aristotle Without Prime
Matter," ibid. 17 (1956): 37o-89; H. M. Robinson, "Prime Matter in Aristotle," Phronesis 19
(1974): 168-88 and C. J. F. Williams, Aristotle De Generatione et Corrpuptione, Oxford (1982),
Appendix reply to an appendix rejecting prime matter in W. Charlton's Aristotle's Physics Books
I - H (Oxford, 197o). See also Alan Code, "The Persistence of Aristotelian Matter," Philosophical
Studies 29 0976): 357-67, who defends the traditional interpretation of matter against Barrington Jones, "Aristotle's Introduction of Matter," Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 474-5 ~ See also
Russell M. Dancy, "Aristotle's Second Thoughts on Substance," Philosophical Review 87 (1978):
372-413 9
William Charlton, "Prime Matter: A Rejoinder," Phronesis 28 (1983): a97-2a a, 197.
[475]

476

JOURNAL

OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

~5:4

OCT 1987

commitments made by Aristotle. At the same time, opponents of prime

matter have a legitimate basis for criticizing the tradition, for there is something fundamentally wrong with the doctrine. Given Aristotle's assumptions
and commitments, the doctrine of prime matter is not only dialectically
inevitable but also systematically incoherent. In this paper I shall not defend
the existence of a doctrine of prime matter in Aristotle's philosophy, although my argument will provide an incidental justification for it by exhibiting its function within Aristotle's system. My aim here is to explain what is
wrong with the doctrine of prime matter. (1) I shall examine a problem
concerning prime matter--a problem of which Aristotle was aware and
which he thought he had solved. (2) I shall argue that he did not solve the
problem, for the doctrine of prime matter entails a paradox for his system.
(3) I shall reply to some objections, and (4) I shall offer a tentative diagnosis
of how Aristotle could have come to embrace a paradoxical position.
1.

According to Aristotle's theory of change, there is a substratum which underlies every change (Ph. 1. 7.19oa33ff). When a thing changes its features,
we call that accidental change and identify the substratum as substance.
When a thing comes into being or ceases to be, we call that substantial
change 3 and identify the substratum as matter. 4 The most simple bodies of
the Aristotelian cosmos are the four traditional "elements": earth, air, fire,
and water. 5 The elements are characterized by the contrary powers hot, cold,
wet, and dry. Each element has one member of the contrary pair hot-cold,
and one of the contrary pair wet-dry (Gen. Corr. 2.2-3). For Aristotle, it is a
fact that the elements are transformed into one another; for instance, water
evaporates to become air. Aristotle understands this change to be a kind of
substantial change. Accordingly, there must be a corresponding substratum
for the several contraries and this is prime matter.
In his treatise on substantial change, On Generation and Corruption, Aristo3 Aristotle uses the terms qualified and unqualified coming-to-be for accidental and substantial change. His terms are based on a syntactic criterion: do we say 'x comes to be F'
(qualified) or 'x comes to be' simpliciter (unqualified) in describing the change? See Ph. 1. 7.
t9oa31-33, Gen. Corr. 3, 317a32ft., 319 al 1-14.
4 Gen. Corr. a. 4, 32oa~-5: the substratum o f substantial change is matter in the primary
sense, t h o u g h any substratum o f change (i.e., including substance) can be called matter.
5 Aristotle is u n h a p p y with the traditional name 'element' (stoicheion) for earth, air, fire and
water, and often refers to t h e m as "the so-called elements" (Gen. Corr. 1 . 6 . 3 ~ b l f ; ~.a.3~8b3 a,
3~9aa6). He p r e f e r s to call t h e m 'perceptible bodies' (aisth~ta sOmata) because they are themselves complexes o f matter and form and hence not elementary (329a24ff). He sometimes calls
the elements 'simple bodies' (hapla sOmata), e.g., Cael. 1.1.268b~6-3o; here the epithet has
reference to the elements' simple m o v e m e n t rather than their composition (cf. Cad. 3.3.3o2b7f).

THE PARADOX OF PRIME MATTER

477

tle notes two problems for an account o f substantial change: (1) if the substratum out o f which a substance comes to be is not itself a substance,
accidents will i n h e r e in non-substance; (2) if the substratum is nothing at all,
something has c o m e to be out o f nothing. 6 Problem (1) is a general problem
for any substantial c h a n g e and is easily solved; I shall ignore it. Problem (2)
does not arise for the change o f substances (call them complex substances)
above the level o f the elements. For in a given case o f substantial change o f a
complex thing, a n o t h e r thing can be identified as its substratum. A bronze
statue comes to be out o f bronze. Bronze is less thing-like than a bronze
statue, but it is nevertheless thing-like, so that in this case we find a substratum for change.
But in the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f elements (henceforth "elemental change")
problem (2) is not resolved, for no substratum is verifiable (cf. Gen. Corr.
1.4). T h e contraries that, by being present in prime matter, constitute the
elements, are ex hypothesi basic and the matter they reside in is irreducible.
(Why Aristotle analyzes the elements in this way I shall explain later.) For
every f e a t u r e F, p r i m e m a t t e r is not-F. But because it is devoid o f all characteristics o f its own, p r i m e m a t t e r is indistinguishable f r o m p u r e indeterminacy. Aristotle identifies p u r e indeterminacy with the concept o f nothingness o f the Presocratic (specifically: Eleatic) tradition (Gen. Corr. 1.3.317b2831). T h e r e is evidence that indeterminacy is just what Parmenides had in
mind as the p a r a d i g m case o f nothingness, 7 and Aristotle seems to accept the
paradigm. H e also shares with the Eleatics an a b h o r r e n c e o f ex nihilo creation. How t h e n can Aristotle escape the charge that his elements are
created out o f nothing? For it appears that the something which Aristotle
posits as u n d e r l y i n g elemental change is really no thing at all. I shall call this
difficulty the p a r a d o x o f p r i m e matter, s
In a preliminary discussion in the GC, Aristotle advances a distinction
that provides a tentative solution to the problem: "Perhaps the solution is
that their m a t t e r is in one sense the same but in a n o t h e r sense different. For
that which underlies them, whatever its nature may be qua underlying them,
is the same: but its actual being is not the same" (1.3.319b~- 4, O x f o r d tr.). 9
Aristotle confirms the solution later in the treatise: " O u r own doctrine is that
although t h e r e is a m a t t e r o f the perceptible bodies (a matter out o f which
the so-called 'elements' come-to-be) it has no separate existence, but is always

6 Gen. Corr. 1.3. 317b5-13, b2o-33.

7 See A. P. D. Mourelatos, "Determinacy and Indeterminacy, Being and Non-Being in the

Fragments of Parmenides," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp. vol. 2 (1976): 45-59.
8 This preliminary characterization of the problem will be replaced by a more precise one.
9 Translations are my own except as noted.

478

JOURNAL

OF T H E H I S T O R Y

OF P H I L O S O P H Y

25:4

OCT

x987

bound up with a contrariety" (2.1.3~9a24-96, Oxford tr.). In other words,

prime matter escapes the charge of being nothing by its status as part of a
compound of form and matter. Some form always attaches to it in fact, and
hence no pure nothingness is involved in elemental change. Some feature
imparts determinacy to the underlying matter. Nothing comes to be out of
pure indeterminacy, for there is always some preexisting determinant, even
in the case of elemental change, namely the forms of hot or cold, wet or dry.
Aristotle's solution to the problem of prime matter is to point out that it is
never found actually separate from the powers that make up the elements. In
effect, he is willing to concede that prime matter per se is nothing, but he is
not willing to concede that prime matter is ever found by itself. To bolster
his position he refers ~~to his discussions of matter elsewhere, alluding to his
exposition of the concept in Physics 1.6- 9. But that passage does not support
his point. Rather, a study of his doctrine there reveals the impossibility of his
solution to the paradox of prime matter.
2.

In Physics 1 Aristotle is faced with a challenge to a philosophical study of

nature. The Eleatics have raised the problem that the notion of change is
incoherent, for how can what-is come to be from what-is-not? The Eleatic
formulation suggests that change involves something coming to be from
nothing, an implication that appears to be absurd.
Consider an analysis (call it A1) that will avoid the devastating implications of the Eleatic challenge. We begin with an umproblematic case of
change: Socrates becomes educated. Suppose also, for purposes of comparison, Socrates is pale. We might describe two successive states of affairs, S~
and S~ which obtain at times t~ and t~, respectively.
AI:

S~
uneducated
pale
Socrates

S~
educated
pale
Socrates

We notice that one element changes in the description and two remain the
same. The first item in the list has a negative, or more precisely, privative
description in S~ and a positive description in S,. What items are relevant to
explaining the change? The ordinary-language report of the change suggests the answer. We say, "Socrates, who was uneducated, has now become
educated" or "the uneducated man became educated." Paleness does not

1o 317bt3s

THE

PARADOX

OF PRIME

MATTER

479

enter into such a report, and we may fairly conclude that it is irrelevant to
accounting for the change. As to what does enter into the report, we note
that there are two adjectives, one privative and the other a corresponding
positive adjective, and a noun. This survey suggests that in the case before us
the change consists in a change of features in a thing which remains the
same. Call the privative adjective a description of a privation, and call the
thing a substratum.
What is interesting in the foregoing anlaysis relative to the Eleatic challenge is that it provides the basis for an answer to that challenge. T h e
change in question is a case of what-is (what is educated) coming to be out of
what-is-not (what is uneducated, i.e., not educated). But what we have is a
counterexample to the implicit inference from (a) 'What-is comes to be from
what-is-not' to (b) 'Something comes to be from nothing'. For in this case
what-is has not come to be out of nothing but out of something else, namely
a certain man. T h e r e was a something present all the time, something underlying the change, namely the substratum. Now we are in a position to see
that the Eleatic challenge involves a fallacy: to make the move from (a) to (b)
in the present case is to confuse privation and substratum. For in (a) 'what-isnot' refers to the privation, whereas in (b) 'nothing', which is taken as synonymous with 'what-is-not' refers to the substratum.
My analysis A1 embodies a hypothesis concerning the interpretation of
Aristotle's analysis o f change in Physics 1.7. Privation is to be understood as what
is referred to by a privative adjective in a report of a change and substratum as
what is referred to by the subject of the sentence. T h e analysis is motivated by
the Eleatic challenge as Aristotle understands it and is successful in replying to
it (see Ph. 1.8). However, it is not e n o u g h for Aristotle to reveal the fallaciousness of the Eleatic challenge in general. He must show that the challenge is not
valid for the description of any type of change. So far we have considered only
an example of accidental change. What of substantial change? Here is a case in
which it is not clear whether there is a substratum and hence whether the same
move can be m a d e to d e f e n d against the Eleatic objector.
Consider a n o t h e r analysis o f change, A~. A lump o f bronze is taken and
cast into the shape o f a man. T h e bronze is used as a statue. A state description of the change might be as follows:
A2:

S~
unformed
brown
bronze

S~
formed
brown
bronze

By applying a m e t h o d similar to that of A 1 we may determine that we have a

privation, u n f o r m e d , a corresponding positive feature, formed, and a substra-

480

JOURNAL

OF T H E H I S T O R Y

OF P H I L O S O P H Y

25:4

OCT

1987

rum, bronze. T h e f e a t u r e b r o n z e is irrelevant to the change. W h a t is intriguing

a b o u t A2 is that it m a y be t h o u g h t o f as a model for instances o f substantial
change. T h e c o m i n g to be o f a natural substance, says Socrates, may be u n d e r stood to be similar to the imposition o f s h a p e on a previously u n s h a p e d stuff.
W h e t h e r we have in m i n d the m o l d i n g into h u m a n f o r m of a n i m a t e ectoplasm
or the c o m m u n i c a t i o n to a seed-material o f the b r e a t h o f life, we are able to give
s o m e account o f h u m a n creation in t e r m s o f the b r o n z e statue analogy. I f the
analogy gives a reliable p a r a d i g m for the creation o f living things, the Eleatic
challenge is m e t f o r cases o f substantial change.
I take A~ to r e p r e s e n t the extension o f Aristotle's analysis o f change to
substantial c h a n g e in Physics 1. 7 . T h e s u b s t r a t u m o f substantial change is
called matter by analogy to the c r a f t s m a n ' s material a n d the positive feature
form by analogy to the s h a p e the c r a f t s m a n imposes. H a v i n g generalized the
concepts privation, f o r m , a n d s u b s t r a t u m to apply to all instances o f change,
Aristotle r e g a r d s t h e m as necessary conceptual c o m p o n e n t s o f any true
analysis o f change. H e achieves not merely a negative expos6 o f a logical
fallacy b u t a positive t h e o r y o f change. An essential c o m p o n e n t o f that
theory is a t h e o r y o f matter.
F r o m Aristotle's analysis a n d e x a m p l e s we may infer several principal
theses o f his t h e o r y o f matter. 1' (a) Matter is s o m e t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t e . In the
case o f both the u n e d u c a t e d m a n a n d the u n f o r m e d bronze, t h e r e is a
d e t e r m i n a t e e l e m e n t to which the privation attaches. T h e r e is a dialectical
reason for asserting this proposition: without it, Aristotle cannot answer the
Eleatic challenge. T h e challenge can be directed to substantial change as well
as accidental change, a n d Aristotle m u s t be able to appeal to a s u b s t r a t u m
that is a real b e i n g for substantial as well as for accidental change. Accordingly, m a t t e r m u s t be s o m e t h i n g . But if it were not s o m e t h i n g in particular,
the Eleatic could object that Aristotle's postulation o f m a t t e r was ad hoc a n d
his claim that t h e r e is a s u b s t r a t u m for every change was question-begging. '~
Aristotle seems to c o n f i r m the view that m a t t e r is in some way d e t e r m i n a t e
w h e n he says that m a t t e r "is a l m o s t - - i n d e e d in a sense it is--substance [or
real being: ousia]" (192a6). O n e o f the characteristics o f substance is thisness,

" It has been suggested to me that the Ph. a analysis is merely an analysis of predication
and not of physical change. I see no basis in the text for invoking this distinction, Indeed
Aristotle here as in other places seems to take for granted that language (when properly
understood) directly mirrors reality.
'~ At this point the traditionalist wishes to say: what is important about matter is not its
actual nature but its potentiality. Yet Aristotle in Ph. a clearly presupposes that the Eleatic
challenge can be met without appeal to the potentiality-actuality distinction, which provides an
alternative solution (191b27-29). Accordingly I wish to examine how matter provides the basis
for a solution independently of any other scheme, I shall deal with potentiality below,

THE PARADOX OF PRIME MATTER

481

o r d e t e r m i n a c y , w h i c h Aristotle ascribes to m a t t e r in Physics x. 'a O f c o u r s e

m a t t e r is relatively i n d e t e r m i n a t e - - r e l a t i v e , that is, to the c o m p o u n d o r the
f o r m - - b u t t h a t d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t it is c o m p l e t e l y i n d e t e r m i n a t e o r n o t h i n g in the Eleatic sense. M a t t e r can be no p a r t i c u l a r thing, i.e., no c o m p l e x
substance, w i t h o u t b e i n g n o t h i n g at all.
(2) C e r t a i n f e a t u r e s o f t h e m a t t e r o f case A2 have e x p l a n a t o r y value. W e can
a c c o u n t f o r the c h a n g e in s h a p e o f the b r o n z e in terms o f the p r o p e r t i e s o f
b r o n z e - - i t s ductility, malleability, m e l t i n g point, etc. T o say that certain features o f m a t t e r h a v e e x p l a n a t o r y value is n o t to say that all f e a t u r e s do. I n d e e d ,
typically t h e r e will be m a n y f e a t u r e s o f m a t t e r which are irrelevant to explaining a given c h a n g e . I n the case o f the b r o n z e statue, the b r o w n color o f the
b r o n z e is irrelevant, as is the pale c o m p l e x i o n o f the m a n w h o c h a n g e s f r o m
u n e d u c a t e d to e d u c a t e d . M o r e o v e r , even the c o n t o u r s o f the l u m p o f b r o n z e
b e f o r e it was cast are i r r e l e v a n t to e x p l a i n i n g its c h a n g e o f shape. All that is
r e l e v a n t is the fact t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l s h a p e was not that o f a statue.
(3) It is in virtue o f t h a t subset o f p r o p e r t i e s that have e x p l a n a t o r y value
that s o m e s t u f f is t h e m a t t e r relative to c h a n g e . It is because b r o n z e has a
certain m e l t i n g p o i n t t h a t it has a s s u m e d the s h a p e o f a m a n a n d can be
used as a statue. I n g e n e r a l , m a t t e r is a d e t e r m i n a t e kind o f s t u f f that is a p t
f o r d e t e r m i n a t e kinds o f c h a n g e . Aristotle defines m a t t e r as w h a t persists in
a c h a n g e . B u t m a t t e r is n o t j u s t a n y characteristic that persists, f o r m a n y
incidental characteristics m a y e n d u r e t h r o u g h a c h a n g e , f o r e x a m p l e the
b r o w n c o l o r o f b r o n z e w h i c h b e c o m e s a statue. Aristotle a d d s the restiction
mY kata symbeb~kos: "I d e f i n e m a t t e r as the first s u b s t r a t u m o f each t h i n g f r o m
which, by its persisting as a n essential i n g r e d i e n t o f the c h a n g e (enhyparchontos mY kata symbeb~kos), s o m e t h i n g c o m e s to be" ( 1 9 1 b 3 1 - 3 ~ ) . T h e m a t t e r
relative to a c h a n g e m u s t be the p r o p e r subject o f the f e a t u r e s which c h a n g e
so that its o w n p r o p e r t i e s e x p l a i n its aptness f o r c h a n g e .
C o n s i d e r n o w a state d e s c r i p t i o n o f a case o f elemental c h a n g e . S u p p o s e
that s o m e w a t e r e v a p o r a t e s a n d is t r a n s f e r r e d into air:

~s 7.19ob24_26" Contrary to his usual practice (see note 4 above), Aristotle conflates substantial individuals and stuffs (man and gold) in the passage. In fact, Aristotle consistently uses
hyl~ to in Ph. I refer to sustratum in general (see D. Graham, "Aristotle's Discovery of Matter,"
Archiv fi~r Geschichte der Philosophie 66 [a 984]: 37-5 l, 49). One might object that his confusion
here nullifies the claim that matter is significantly like ousia. However, the point of the argument is that matter, whether substance or stuff, is the source of determinacy in contrast to the
privation. Furthermore, it is not clear that when Aristotle says that matter is countable (arithm~t~,
19ob25) he means that instances of matter can be counted--which is clearly false for stuffs
unless they are already individuated by some prior form. He may simply be saying that we can
count matter as a principle distinct from privation. Thus there is no obviously fallacious reasoning behind his identifying matter as substance-like.

482

J O U R N A L OF THE H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

A3:

S~
cold
moist
prime matter

25:4 OCT 1987

S~
warm
moist
prime matter

Cold has been exchanged for warm, or, u n d e r another description, notwarm has been exchanged for warm. Aristotle notes that although both
air and water are translucent, the translucence itself cannot be the subject
of a change f r o m air to water: if it were the change would reduce to
alteration (Gen. Corr. 1.4.319b21-24). This observation supports our
analysis of the bronze case and tells us what the subject is not. But we still
wish to know what it is. Do the principles of change e n u m e r a t e d above
suggest a positive account of the subject, prime matter? If (1) holds,
prime matter must be a real something. But Aristotle has given us no
grounds to think that it is. He attributes no properties to prime matter
apart from the simple powers. As far as we know, prime matter per se is
completely characterless, and hence it has no principle of determinacy in
its own nature and cannot qualify as ousia. Since it has no characters of its
own, prime matter cannot fulfill (2) by having a subset of features which
explain elemental change. A n d since (1) and (2) are not fulfilled, prime
matter cannot (3) be identified as the proper subject of the change by
virtue of the features it has in its own nature.
Does Aristotle's solution resolve the problem of prime matter? We are
now in a position to see that it cannot. According to Aristotle's solution,
prime matter is something because it is always characterized by some pair of
basic powers. But Aristotle's theory of change entails that the matter in
question itself be something, and relative to a change of powers, the matter
is prime matter itself devoid 0fthe powers. In the state description above, one
power remained the same, but this will not help to characterize prime matter
since the persistence of moistness is no more relevant to explaining a change
from coldness to hotness than paleness is to explaining education or brownness is to explaining the production of a statue. Aristotle is right to claim
that prime matter is never f o u n d without the simple powers, but it is equally
t r u e - - a n d equally irrelevant--that bronze is never found without some
shape. T h e point is that the presence of some shape or other in the bronze
cannot account for the kind of determinacy that bronze has qua bronze. We
must explain the aptness of bronze to receive different shapes by investigating those characteristics that constitute bronze. T h e shape itself will be incidental to bronze qua b r o n z e - - a n accident or supervenient characteristic.
Bronze is a real something, and moreover a something that is apt to receive
shapes, in virtue of characteristics that constitute bronze qua bronze, not due
to supervenient characteristics that themselves need to be accounted for.

T H E P A R A D O X OF P R I M E M A T T E R

483

Aristotle's solution is based on an error of analysis. He has cast supervenient

characteristics in the role of constitutive characteristics.
But perhaps there is a defense for Aristotle in his doctrine of potentiality.
Even t h o u g h prime matter does not have any actual constitutive properties,
it has the potentiality to be any of the elements. This potentiality is unique in
prime matter and is sufficient to distinguish it from pure indeterminacy. To
this I reply that having potentiality must be a consequence of having some
actual constitutive properties. Because bronze has a certain melting point, it
is able to be cast as a statue. T h e potentiality for being shaped depends upon
some actual characteristics o f bronze. I f we understand potentiality in this
way, it is a legitimate and illuminating concept. But if we do not require that
potentiality be based on some actual property, we make the concept an ad
hoc posit which can only serve to beg questions. This is Moli~re's caricature
of potentiality: Why does this substance put one to sleep? Because it has a
dormitive power.
T h e problem with taking potentiality to be an independent property can
perhaps be b r o u g h t out by the kind of a r g u m e n t W. D. Ross used to clarify
problems of value theory. Imagine substances X and Y which are identical in
all properties except that X has a potentiality to G and Y does not. Does it
seem plausible that such a state of affairs should obtain? I think not. If we
should, e.g., find two samples of the same metal, one of which would conduct electricity, one of which would not, we would immediately look for
some cause of the difference--impurities, crystalline structure, etc. But we
would treat the potentiality as a product of some actual chemical or physical
differences. A n d in general we u n d e r s t a n d potentialities to be consequential
properties, not i n d e p e n d e n t features.
Aristotle himself recognizes the need to put restrictions on the ascription
of potentiality to subjects: "We must decide when each thing exists potentially and when it does not, for it does not exist potentially at just any time.
For instance, is earth potentially a man or not? Probably not until it has
already become a seed, and perhaps not even then" (Met. 9.7. lo48637-8a3).
T h e reason for saying that not everything is potentially a man is that not
everything is in such a state or has such properties, that by a normal process
of development it may grow into a man. T h e properties in question must be
constitutive properties of the matter. Moreover, Aristotle's principle that
actuality is prior to potentiality seems to entail that a thing's potentially being
F depends u p o n its actually being G. But since prime matter per se is not
actually anything, it follows that it cannot potentially be anything either.
T h e r e is a n o t h e r serious problem for prime matter that also arises from
its lack of determinacy. One of the conditions for saying that there is a
substratum for change is that we be able to identify the substratum. But by

484

JOURNAL

OF T H E H I S T O R Y

OF P H I L O S O P H Y

25:4

OCT

I987

hypothesis we h a v e no m e a n s o f identifying p r i m e m a t t e r by itself. T h i s

p r o b l e m can be p u r s u e d f r o m either the s t a n d p o i n t o f epistemology or the
s t a n d p o i n t o f metaphysics. Aristotle recognizes an epistemological distinction between qualified a n d unqualified c o m i n g to be in Gen. Corr. 1.4, w h e r e
he notes that no c o n t i n u i n g s u b s t r a t u m is perceived in cases o f unqualified
c o m i n g to be. But curiously, he is interested in the p h e n o m e n o n only as a
criterion o f what kind o f c h a n g e we are dealing with. T h e epistemological
p r o b l e m is this: how could we ever know that p r i m e m a t t e r c o n t i n u e d in a
change? For in the first place, o n e c a n n o t perceive a continuity o f substrat u m for any substantial change; a n d in the second place p r i m e m a t t e r has no
perceivable characteristics a p a r t f r o m those o f the elements it underlies.
H e n c e it c a n n o t be perceived by itself even b e f o r e or after a change. T h e
p r o b l e m is a difficult one, but the metaphysical version is even m o r e pressing: what would it even m e a n to say that a given piece o f p r i m e m a t t e r at
time t, was identical to a piece o f p r i m e m a t t e r at t,? It would seem that
t h e r e is no possible g r o u n d for establishing continuity, since by hypothesis
p r i m e m a t t e r does not h a v e any characteristic o f its own. ~4 We could not
t h e n a p p e a l to Leibniz's Law or to any o t h e r principle o f identity to establish
that the p r i m e m a t t e r we started with was the same as that which we e n d e d
with. T h u s , not only would p r i m e m a t t e r be epistemologically inaccessible,
the whole notion o f a characterless s u b s t r a t u m that retains its identity is
incoherent.
.

T h e most recent contribution to the p r i m e m a t t e r debate is an article by

Sheldon C o h e n which, if it is correct, would not only d e f e n d the existence o f
p r i m e matter, b u t save the c o n c e p t f r o m the c h a r g e o f incoherence. 1~ It will
be c o n v e n i e n t to reply to his s t a t e m e n t here, since he explicitly rejects certain key points in the a r g u m e n t I a m following a n d provides a t h o u g h t f u l
alternative to views critical o f p r i m e matter. C o h e n ' s basic a r g u m e n t for
p r i m e m a t t e r is that it is not devoid o f characteristics and so it is not in any
d a n g e r o f b e i n g nothing. His strategy is the right one: if there is any way to

~4 Panayot Butchvarov pointed out the metaphysical problem to me, See his Being Qua
Being (Bloomington, 1979), 165-69 .

,5 "Aristotle's Doctrine of Material Substrate," Philosophical Review 93 (1984): 17x-94.

Cohen considers three grounds for rejecting prime matter: (a) it is characterless, (b) it has no per
se characteristics, and (c) it is not a distinct type of stuff even if it has per se characteristics (181).
My position falls under (c) with the specific interpretation that prime matter has no essential or
defining characteristics. I hold that Aristotle ascribes characteristics, including per se characteristics or Aristotelian Properties to prime matter; but because of (c), it is difficult to see how he can
be justified in assigning any characteristics.

THE

PARADOX

OF PRIME

MATTER

485

save prime matter from the charge of incoherence, it must be by showing

how prime matter is a something.
Cohen recognizes that one common reason for construing prime matter
as characterless is the assumption that it is the matter of all things. He rejects
this interpretation of prime matter and hence removes one strong reason for
believing that matter is characterless. Cohen is right in rejecting this interpretation of prime matter, for this is a view that derives from medieval and
modern theories and not from Aristotle. Aristotle's notion of matter is hierarchical: there is a matter for the elements, which in turn serve as matter for
chemical compounds, which provide the matter for homogeneous tissues,
which in turn compose heterogeneous parts, of which biological substances
are composed. There is no reservoir of purely potential matter that can
immediately be transformed into some organized object.
On the other hand, as one descends down the chain of being in the
direction of prime matter, there is a continual loss of determinacy and content at each level. The behavior of complex substances is a function of their
high-level attributes, which are, quite literally, emergent properties inhering
only in high-level kinds of matter. For instance, life is a characteristic that
can be realized only in a certain kind of body which possesses organs (De An.
2.1.412a27-b6 ). The real question is whether there is anything left when
one reaches the ontological cellar. Cohen does address this question, and he
offers some specific answers.
1.

2.
3.

Contrasting the four elements with the fifth element, Cohen suggests
that the four elements possess the potentiality for rectilinear motion
(178).
Prime matter is essentially spatially extended. (179)
Prime matter is capable of motion and rest. (ibid.)

Attributes (l) and (3) are problematic because they are potentialities. But
as I have argued, potentialities presuppose actual attributes of some kind.
For Aristotle, a potentiality is a consequential attribute that follows from
some actual attribute. What, then, are those actual attributes? We do not
know. Contemporary philosophers of science account for dispositional properties on the basis of underlying structural properties. For instance, salt has
the dispositional property (potentiality) of being soluble in water; this property can be explained by the crystal structure of NaC1, the ionic bonding,
the structure of H20, etc. Obviously Aristotle cannot take this line, because it
undermines the claim that the four elements are the ultimate bodies of the
(sublunar) universe. Whatever the attributes in question, they cannot be
structural (i.e., formal) attributes.
But perhaps there are mysterious attributes that do account for the po-

486

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY o r PHILOSOPHY 2 5 : 4 OCT 198 7

tentialities f o u n d in p r i m e matter. I think that this is unlikely to be the case.

F o r to a d m i t this possibility would be to m a k e a characteristically un-Aristotelian move. I suggest that it is not an accident that Aristotle a t t e m p t e d to
solve the p a r a d o x o f p r i m e m a t t e r in the way that he did. T h e reason for
s t o p p i n g the regress o f matters w h e r e he did was precisely to rule out any
inaccessible a n d mysterious attributes. By claiming that p r i m e m a t t e r is
n e v e r f o u n d without s o m e contraries he was a t t e m p t i n g to k e e p mysterious
attributes a n d substrata f r o m b e i n g built into his system. W h a t is r e m a r k a b l e
a b o u t Aristotelian science is its accessibility to rational cognition. A l t h o u g h
with the a d v a n t a g e o f hindsight we can find no e n d o f unsolved p r o b l e m s
a n d areas f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h in Aristotle's science, he himself tends to look
at n a t u r e as an o p e n b o o k that can be d e c i p h e r e d with the aid o f the f o u r
causes a n d s o m e basic rational principles. Despite Locke's derogations o f
substance as a s o m e t h i n g - I - k n o w - n o t - w h a t , Aristotle's substance is not unknowable. O f course m a t t e r is the most problematic o f Aristotle's concepts in
this context, b u t even m a t t e r is knowable by analogy (Ph. 1. 7.191a7-1~) a n d
by virtue o f p a r t a k i n g o f f o r m . Aristotle would r a t h e r refuse to allow p r i m e
m a t t e r to be scrutinized t h a n to a d m i t the possibility o f u n k n o w a b l e attributes.
W h a t t h e n o f (2)? Can the attribute o f being e x t e n d e d save p r i m e matter?
R o b e r t Sokolowski has discussed this p r o b l e m at some length? 6 By examining a series o f texts in the physical works he finds that p r i m e m a t t e r is
indeed e x t e n d e d . H e t h e n asks the question w h e t h e r extension is an essential attribute o f matter:
Does matter then acquire an essence, since it has something said of it in itself?. This is
not the case for Aristotle; he does not consider extension as an attribute of matter.
Extended matter is not matter plus extension; extension is not conceived as a predicate which is received by something prior to and more fundamental than itself, a sort
of unextended matter. For Aristotle, matter is intrinsically spatial, but when we have
said this much about it, we have not said anything about what it is. Spatiality or
extension does not reveal the nature of underlying matter. It tells us nothing about
it . . . . No material predicates could be applied if it were not extended, but extension
itself is not a predicate in Aristotle's understanding of matter. (286)
Sokolowski is g e n e r o u s to p r i m e m a t t e r in d e f e n d i n g it against objections
that extension is not intrinsic to it. But even so, he recognizes that extension
is not the essence o f p r i m e matter. I n a sense, the attribute o f being ext e n d e d has the same limitations as the attribute o f being potentially some-

,6 ,,Matter, Elements and Substance in Aristotle," Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (1970):
963-88, esp. 277ff.

THE

PARADOX

OF PRIME

MATTER

487

thing: it seems to r e q u i r e s o m e f u r t h e r specification as a g r o u n d . T o be

potentially F seems to r e q u i r e that the subject be actually G, w h e r e G is some
structural p r o p e r t y which m i g h t be apt to b e c o m e F. Similarly, to be ext e n d e d seems to p r e s u p p o s e having s o m e attribute G which itself can be
distributed t h r o u g h space. T h u s , it m a k e s sense to say that N e w t o n i a n matter is essentially e x t e n d e d because it has mass. It makes sense to say o f the
e l e m e n t h y d r o g e n that it is potentially water because it has a certain valence
which in t u r n is the manifestation o f its atomic structure. But it does not
m a k e sense to say that p r i m e m a t t e r is essentially e x t e n d e d or essentially the
potency to be o n e o f the f o u r elements if we cannot ascribe to it some basic
attribute as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f which it has those o t h e r attributes.
I f Aristotle h a d w a n t e d to d e f e n d p r i m e m a t t e r by saying that it was
essentially e x t e n d e d , he could have said so. I n fact, what he does is to say
that p r i m e m a t t e r is n e v e r f o u n d by itself. I n s t e a d o f stressing the substantiality o f p r i m e matter, he e m p h a s i z e s that it is insubstantial. It would be
interesting to d e v e l o p an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f p r i m e m a t t e r along the lines
suggested by Cohen, which m i g h t well p r o v i d e a c o h e r e n t a n d attractive
account; b u t it would constitute a revisionary proposal, not Aristotle's considered r e s p o n s e to the p r o b l e m o f Gen. Corr. a.3. Aristotle goes so far as to
indicate why p r i m e m a t t e r could not have a character o f its own. H e argues
that if t h e r e were a single ( i n d e p e n d e n t ) m a t t e r o f the elements, it would
d e t e r m i n e t h e m all either to be heavy or light (Cael. 4.5.3x2b~o-a3). But
since s o m e are h e a v y a n d s o m e light, this cannot be. O n e o f the candidates
for i n d e p e n d e n t m a t t e r he n a m e s is megethos--extension. T h u s it a p p e a r s
that the d i s p a r a t e c h a r a c t e r o f the f o u r elements effectively rules out a
c o m m o n n a t u r e for p r i m e matter: for they have no physical attributes in
c o m m o n a n d thus the m a t t e r c a n n o t have any physical attributes. W e r e
extension a physical attribute constitutive o f matter, it would limit the potentiality f o r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the elements. 17
We get a glimpse o f the d i f f e r e n c e between Aristotelian p r i m e m a t t e r
and essentially e x t e n d e d m a t t e r by c o m p a r i n g Aristotle with Descartes. For
Descartes, m a t t e r is essentially e x t e n d e d . Since m a t t e r has its own essence, it
can exist i n d e p e n d e n t o f any higher-level substances. I n fact, Descartes

,7 The most interesting kind of revisionary account would be one attributing not just
extendedness but a certain quantity of extension to prime matter. This quantity could then
form the basis of a law of conservation of matter. Note, however, how difficult the law would be
for Aristotle to conceive; since two elements are heavy and two are light, and of each pair one is
extremely heavy/light while the other is moderately heavy/light, the quantity in question have to
be determined independently of weight. Thus Aristotle would have to come up with a concept
of mass; yet the modern notion of mass as a measure of inertia would be extraordinarily difficult
to handle in Aristotelian physics.

488

J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 5 : 4

OCT

1987

speaks as if bodies were modifications o f an infinitely e x t e n d e d matter and

thus d e p e n d e n t s o f matter, whereas for Aristotle prime matter is unthinkable apart f r o m the elements. Descartes tends to reify extension '8 and to
think o f it as an adequate g r o u n d for all physical properties, for which
extension holds the promise o f a quantitative derivation. Aristotle, on the
o t h e r hand, sees the basic powers exhibited by the elements as tactile characteristics, and hence as qualities-which cannot be explained quantitatively
(Gen. Corr. ~.2). T h u s Descartes differs f r o m Aristotle in two f u n d a m e n t a l
ways: for Descartes the relation between body and matter is something like
that between part and whole while for Aristotle it is that between a composite substance and its substratum; and for Descartes the relation is determined quantitatively while for Aristotle it is d e t e r m i n e d qualitatively and
categorially. By assigning m a t t e r an essence o f its own, Descartes constitutes
it as an i n d e p e n d e n t type o f substance. By assigning it an essence from what
Aristotle would call the category o f quantity, he grounds physics in quantitative determinations. A n d finally by avoiding strong vertical f o r m - m a t t e r
distinctions in b o d y - - a n d also by ruling out p h e n o m e n a l properties as nonphysical--he saves himself f r o m having to explain properties emerging
f r o m a characterless substratum.
O f course Descartes does not banish p h e n o m e n a l or secondary qualities-he simply assigns them to the realm o f soul. This paves the way for a radical
dualism o f substance types. Because o f the dualism we do not call Descartes
a materialist. But for Aristotle his move is a materialistic move, and the
resulting t h e o r y is m u c h too materialistic to be satisfactory. From an Aristotelian perspective, Cartesian m a t t e r seems to be given a life of its own apart
f r o m form, and the Aristotelian focus on middle-sized biological objects
disappears into a mechanistic materialism on the one side, opposed by a
detached idealism o f soul on the other. In Descartes the tenuous unity o f
Aristotelian naturalism dissolves into the philosophical extremes Aristotle
o p p o s e d in the Presocratics and Plato.
4.
Why did Aristotle treat p r i m e m a t t e r as something indeterminate in itself?.
O u r previous discussion provides some grounds for an answer. In the first
place, we have no knowledge o f any characteristics which accompany that
:s See Louis E. Loeb, From Descartes to Hume (Ithaca, 1981 ), 93, who claims that Descartes
tends to identify material substance with extension rather than with the subject of extension.
However, I think that ultimately the most plausible reading makes extension an essential property of an underlying subject; see Richard J. Blackwell, "Descartes' Concept of Matter," in E.
McMullin, ed., The Concept of Matter in Modern Philosophy (Notre Dame, 1963), 6o-64. It is not
surprising that Descartes should focus on the essence rather than the subject since the subject
without the essence would be something like a bare particular.

THE

PARADOX

OF PRIME

MATTER

489

m a t t e r o f elemental change. F u r t h e r m o r e , if prime matter were supposed to

have certain constitutive characteristics o f its own, there would be a d a n g e r
that it might turn out to be an entity which existed i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the
contrary powers. A n d if it did exist independently, prime matter would
prove to be a substance m o r e basic than the elements, which contradicts
Aristotle's intuition that the elements are basic. Moreover, prime matter
would be m y s t e r i o u s - - i t would constitute a substance o f which we could
have no acquaintance. T h e s e scientific and epistemological considerations
provide a strong p r e s u m p t i o n against reifying p r i m e matter. But as we have
seen, there is a m o r e compelling metaphysical p r e s u m p t i o n against prime
matter. For o n the given interpretation prime matter would prove to be
i n d e p e n d e n t o f higher-level entities and in virtue o f its ultimacy would be a
serious c o m p e t i t o r for the title o f primary s u b s t a n c e - - t h r e a t e n i n g to collapse Aristotle's idealistic metaphysics into a materialism.
F r o m a n o t h e r point o f view the p a r a d o x o f prime matter may be seen to
result f r o m a tension in Aristotle's criteria o f reality. On the one h a n d reality
is a function o f d e t e r m i n a c y and concreteness: to be is to be a 'this', a
particular thing? 9 O n the o t h e r h a n d reality consists in being a subject for
predications, but n e v e r a p r e d i c a t e ? ~ As one approaches the limits o f being
in descending t h r o u g h the chain o f being to simple substance, the substances
become m o r e real or at least no less real as subjects; at the same time they
become less real as d e t e r m i n a t e particulars. At the point where one meets
prime m a t t e r the divergence has become complete. Prime matter is both an
ultimately real substratum and an ultimately unreal particular.
T h e problem c o n c e r n i n g p r i m e m a t t e r is a p a r a d o x in the strong logical
sense that it yields a contradiction (see appendix). T h e incompatible premises that generate the contradiction seem to be deeply-rooted principles o f
Aristotle's world view. O n e way to block the contradiction would be to revise
Aristotle's scientific assumptions; but this e x p e d i e n t would not ultimately
resolve the tension in Aristotle's criteria o f reality. We must contemplate a
m o r e radical revision o f principles to save Aristotle not only f r o m the paradox o f p r i m e matter, but f r o m the causes o f the p a r a d o x ? ~
Brigham Young University

,9 Met. 5.8.1o17b24-26, 7.3.xo~9a27f.

so Met. 5.8.1ot7b~3f; 7.3.1o~9alf; Cat. 5.2al 1-13.

2, My interpretation of Aristotle's concept of matter is developed further in Graham, "Aristotle's Discovery" (note t3). Versions of this paper were read at the Iowa Philosophical Society
(Nov., 1981), the Conference on Aristotle's Metaphysicsand Epistemology(Florida State U.,Jan.,
1983) and the 17th World Congress of Philosophy (Montreal, Aug., 1983), at which I received
helpful suggestions. I also received constructive criticisms from two anonymous referees. The
themes of this paper are dealt with further in my Aristotle's Two Systems (Oxford, 1987).

Appendix
Deduction of
T h e Paradox o f Prime Matter
1. T h e r e is a substratum for every change. (Ph. :-7- 19oa33f, b l - 3 )
2. In a change the new state o f affairs comes to be directly from the
substratum and indirectly from the privation. (Ph. :.9.192a3:f; 8.
19xba5f)
. A substratum is real (0us/a). (Cat. 5 . 2 b 1 5 - : 7 ; cf. Ph. :.9.192asf)
4. A Privation is not real. (Ph. 1.9.192a5f)
"~1765 " In a change the new state of affairs comes to be directly from something real and only indirectly from something not real. (2,3) (Ph. x.8.
191b13-16)
6. T h e r e is substantial change. (fact)
9". 7- T h e r e is a substratum for substance. (1,6) (Ph. a.7.19obl-3)
8. T h e substratum for substance is matter. (def.) (Gen. Corr. 1.4.32oa2f)
9". 9. Matter is real. (3,8) (ousian pOs [einai] t~n hyl~n: Ph. 1.9.192a5f)
:o. T h e r e is elemental change. (fact) (Cael. 3.6)
11. T h e elements are the most basic substances. (fact) (Cael. 3.3)
.'a2. T h e r e is a substratum for elemental change. (1,1o) (Gen. Corr. 1.3.
3 1 9 b 2 - 4 ; 2.1.3~9a24-~6)
.'.13. T h e substratum for elemental change is matter. (8,11,12) (Gen. Corr.
~.l.329a24f)
14. T h e substratum for elemental change is prime matter. (def.) (cf. ibid.,
329a29 f)
.'.x 5. Prime matter is real. (9,13,14)
16. Prime matter has no characteristics of its own. (cf. a l) (ibid., 329a25 f)
17. What has no characteristics is not real. (assumption) (m~den: ibid.,
x.3.317b27-3x)
9"a8. Prime matter is not real. (16,17)

[490]