Project funded by the European

Union

The Traffic Crisis in Lebanon

Lebanon is suffering a stifling traffic congestion crisis, especially in Beirut and its
suburbs, where administrative and economic establishments are concentrated
and population density reaches extreme levels. Most Lebanese commute daily by
land in private cars and on narrow roads, which causes major traffic jams.
Besides reducing the productivity of Lebanons working cohorts and damaging all
citizens psychological health, these traffic jams also cause a frantic rise in real
estate prices in economically developing regions, which affects Lebanese
peoples right to housing, especially in areas close to their workplaces.
While progress has recently been made with regards to the road network,
Lebanon is still lagging in the provision of public transport as well as in
encouraging parallel modes of transport, such as trains and sea transports.
Furthermore, the role of traffic law in this regard remains extremely limited.
The main causes of the traffic crisis
Among the most important causes of the traffic crisis are:
1. Problems related to administrative and economic organization
Lebanon is experiencing great administrative and economic centralization in
Beirut and its suburbs in Mount Lebanon. The population density in these regions
reaches as high as 50,000 residents in a single square kilometer. Additionally,
because of this centralized organization, people living outside Beirut and its
suburbs must enter the region, sometimes daily, to complete transactions or
conduct

certain

business,

which

increases

the

population

density

and

exacerbates the traffic crisis. Hence, around 750,000 cars 1 commute to Beirut
each day, worsening the deadlock on the roads. Of course, the solution to this
issue is tied to increasing decentralization and balanced development.
2. Problems related to overlap in the powers of government bodies
Another cause of the traffic crisis is the dispersion of responsibilities and the
overlap in and imprecise delimitation of the powers exercised by the organs and
institutions concerned with traffic matters and public transport. These bodies are
1 http://newspaper.annahar.com/article/238818

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the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, the Ministry of Interior (i.e. the
security forces), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry
of

Tourism,

the

Council

for

Development

and

Reconstruction,

and

the

municipalities.
The Ministry of Interior is responsible for road safety, overseeing vehicles, and
granting taxi permits.2 The Ministry of Public Works and Transport is in charge of
all sea and land transport matters and oversees the Rail Transport and Public
Transport Authority of Beirut.3 The municipalities, on the other hand, have
jurisdiction over all public works on the municipal level. Their powers include
safekeeping stops and waiting stations for buses operating on the line,
overseeing all kinds of loans for realizing specific projects after they have been
studied, and planning, assessing, and expanding roads. They also establish,
manage (directly or via intermediaries), or aid in the implementation of local
public transport works and projects. 4
Notably, there is no unified operative framework linking these administrations
together, which allows disputes and conflicts, especially political ones, to occur
between them.
In accordance with Decree No. 5540 of September 17, 1966, the state
established the Land Transport High Council in order to coordinate the ministries
and organs concerned with transportation matters. However, this council, since
its establishment, has only convened in a limited manner and has remained
ineffective. Therefore, there has been no coordination between the ministries
and organs concerned with transportation matters. As no appropriate strategies
have been developed for regulating and overseeing transportation, each organ
has worked to implement its own plans and programs in this area and to
progress individually without any serious coordination with the other parties.
2 http://www.cdr.gov.lb/Plan/Transport/Arabic%20Report.htm#_Toc124999154
3 Decree No. 1611 of July 26, 1971, http://www.transportation.gov.lb/topic.aspx?
zoneid=27&head=MOT&contentid=63
4 Law of Municipalities: Legislatorial Decree No. 118 of June 30, 1977, and its
amendments

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Union

Additionally, the non-binding nature of the councils decisions deprives it of

effectiveness.5
To overcome this issue, in 2005 the Ministry of Public Works and Transport
established a general transportation authority whose function is to guarantee
constant funding to the transport sector in order to distance it from capricious
political interventions. The functions of this authority include regulating
transport, determining the process for obtaining licenses, and establishing a
database retaining all data on transport sector workers, in addition to working to
ease the drivers living conditions by exempting them from customs tariffs and
the registration and roadworthy (mecanique) fee and providing interest support
on car loans. However, this proposal is still being studied. 6 Note also that the bus
sector is currently not subject to any law to regulate the haphazard work within
it.
3. Problems related to developing public transport and regulating its work
Public transport is the provision of means of (shared) transportation, which may
be owned by the state, public officials, or the private sector, to all citizens. Such
transport is considered a vital social service like health and education, and the
state has a duty to provide it to citizens within the scope of its general social
responsibilities. Since the end of the Lebanese Civil War, the successive
governments have proposed a number of projects and studies, most of which
aim

to

develop

public

transport,

but

these

proposals

have

not

been

implemented. A government study indicates that Lebanon presently has means

of public transport (autobuses, microbuses, and taxis) to accommodate around
291,000 passengers, whereas these means had the capacity for no more than
78,000 passengers at the beginning of 1994. 7 However, these means remain
limited, unregulated, and asymmetrical. Hence, the statistics indicate that
private modes of transport still prevail. According to the study on the effect of
overreliance on cars published on the Lebanese Center for Active Citizenships
5 https://www.lp.gov.lb/Temp/Files/4dce1ca3-1db6-4806-8eea-5e47ae81c405.pdf
6 http://www.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=975&folder=articles&lang=ar
7 https://www.lp.gov.lb/Temp/Files/4dce1ca3-1db6-4806-8eea-5e47ae81c405.pdf

Project funded by the European

Union

website, 1.75 million car trips are made daily within the greater Beirut region,
68% by private cars, which is a very high percentage. 8
In 1994, the state flooded Lebanon with thousands of taxi plates without
adequately planning for this enormous number or determining the course and
capacity of the lines of each transport individually. 9 Remarkably, a large number
of taxi plates were cast out into the market without any study of transportation
volume or economic needs having been conducted. That the distribution of the
plates was not organized by region caused them to accumulate in Beirut and its
suburbs.
Regarding the extent to which these transports satisfy peoples needs, there is
no clear and balanced policy covering all regions. In some areas and on some
lines, supply massively exceeds demand, whereas in other areas it is unable to
meet needs. Lebanon is one of the few countries that permit taxis and other
kinds of public transport to roam in all areas of the country without any planning
or regulatory checks. There is currently around 38,000 taxis in Lebanon, whereas
the demand for these vehicles does not exceed 18,000. 10
Regarding buses, the number of Rail Transport and Public Transport Authority
buses operating in past years has fallen from 200 to less than 100. Remarkably,
there are no designated stops for buses: they stop where the road begins and
ends. They operate from around 5:30 in the morning to 9:00 at night. Of
particular note in this area is the Karosa scandal of 1998, when the government
bought 200 autobuses without considering the conditions booklet or the size of
the vehicle printed therein. The autobuses accommodated around 50 persons,
which meant that they were too big to pass through secondary roads, and of the
buses were inoperative or broke down immediately after being put into service,

8 https://lcaclebanon.wordpress.com/tag/lebanese-center-for-activecitizenship/page/3/
9 http://www.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=975&folder=articles&lang=ar
10 https://lcaclebanon.wordpress.com/tag/lebanese-center-for-activecitizenship/page/3/

Project funded by the European

Union

not to mention the number of transgressions that followed this scandal. 11 Also
notable is the importation of diesel buses in 1998, which occurred without the
government having developed any law to regulate their operation. Before long
there were 4000 unchecked diesel buses in Lebanon. Furthermore, they were not
obligated to undergo mechanical inspection because law 6603 of January 4,
1995, which regulated this inspection, remain mere ink on paper.
Regarding trams,12 in 1965 the state replaced the tramlines that existed at the
time with a fleet of French-made buses, most of which were destroyed by the war
and were never replaced.
Regarding trains, the post-war governments have not allocated the Rail Transport
and Public Transport Authority any budget to reactivate its work. Similarly, they
have not removed all the encroachments on the railroad that trace back to the
war. The legal texts that allow the aforementioned authority to make any
purchasing deal have been ineffective because it must obtain the Ministry of
Finances approval whenever it wants to conclude a deal exceeding LE 1,000,000
in value.13 In 2005, it was decided that a 35-kilometer line connecting the Port of
Tripoli to the Lebanese-Syrian border (in the Aabboudiye region) would be
established. At the border, the line would connect to the Syrian rail network, thus
forming a continuous link to the Syrian-Iraqi and Syrian-Turkish borders.
However, in the wake of the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and the
deterioration of the relationship between Lebanon and Syria, this project was not
implemented. Recently, the Directorate General of Transport presented a study
asserting that the Beirut-Tabarja line could be restored for no more than
$250,000,000 and with an average return of 14% per annum, which would allow
the investment cost to be recuperated in just 7 years. However, the project thus

11 http://www.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=975&folder=articles&lang=ar
12 http://www.yabeyrouth.com/pages/index160.htm
13 http://www.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=975&folder=articles&lang=ar

Project funded by the European

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far has not entered the realm of serious discussion. 14 Finally, since 2005 a
number of civil movements to resurrect the railway lines have occurred. 15
4. Problems related to developing alternative means of transport
Note firstly that the number of registered cars is climbing and the state does not
regulate their use. The statistics for 2013 indicate that approximately 1,300,000
registered cars, including 900,000 private cars, 16 operate within Lebanon. On
October 17, 1973, the Ministry of Interior issued Decree No. 292/AD, which
subjected the driving of private cars to an odds and evens system. The aim of
this system was to reduce traffic and conserve petrol. However, the system did
not operate for long because of great opposition from a number of unions.
In contrast to cars, alternative means of transport remain limited.
On one hand, the roads are not designed for other kinds of private transport such
as bicycles. As a result, there are almost no bicycles. Furthermore, the Ministry of
Interior and the municipalities have implemented a three-stage plan to curb
motorcycles.17 This matter often takes on class dimensions.18
Although Lebanon borders the sea and its major cities are stretched along the
coast, the relevant authorities have not attempted to develop the local maritime
transport sector in order to facilitate the fast and effective transportation of
goods and passengers at low logistical costs.
5. The weak application of traffic law

14 http://www.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=877&lang=ar
15 http://www.annahar.com/article/247312
16 The numbers are taken from The Effect of Overreliance on Cars, published in
2013 on the Lebanese Center for Active Citizenships website
17 Radwan Mortada, The Security Forces Muscles Against Motorcycles, alAkhbar, June 5
18 Karim Al-Mufti, Phobia of Motorcycles in Lebanon, The Legal Agenda, Issue 3,
January 3, 2012

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Union

The traffic law issued in 2012 encompassed behaviors that are likely to cause
traffic jams, such as obstructing traffic flow by suddenly and randomly stopping
and not obeying signs (see, for example, articles 40, 41, and 42 and articles 22,
58, 75, and 317). On the other hand, it did not include any provisions that allow
for car driving to be curbed or for exceptional measures to be taken in order to
combat traffic jams. Furthermore, the application of this law remains irregular
and dependent on circumstances for a number of reasons, including:
The police charged with applying traffic law remain unqualified to perform this
function. Traffic matters are not considered a field of specialization within the
Internal Security Forces. This means that an officer working in traffic can be
abruptly transferred to bodyguard duties or to the Central Anti-Drug Bureau, and
vice versa. In many cases, the result is untrained traffic police ignorant of the
most basic public safety standards and unfamiliar with traffic law. To address this
situation, article 414 of the new traffic law stipulates that it establishes within
the Internal Security Forces a traffic unit concerned with traffic control, ensuring
public safety, regulating traffic movement, and applying traffic law on public
roads. This article is considered a cornerstone underpinning the laws success,
but thus far the unit has not been established.
The National Council for Road Safety and the National Committee for Road Safety
stipulated in this law, whose powers include developing and applying a general
road safety policy and developing traffic law, have not been established. 19
The fines and punishments that the law stipulates seem unsuited to the
economic conditions. It is expected that citizens will develop means of escaping
these fines, such as acts of nepotism.
The citizens awareness of the importance of following specific road rules also
remains inadequate. This strengthens opposition to the application of the law
and increases recourse to nepotism and influence peddling. Of course, the failure
to implement traffic law is likely to cause the habitual violations of these
prohibitions to continue.

19 The conditions for establishing these bodies, as well as their powers, are
specified in articles 355 and 360 of the Traffic Law.

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6. The absence of a clear and well-advised plan to develop, maintain, and

illuminate the roads evenly, especially in Beirut and its suburbs
A number of bumps and potholes are spread chaotically across the roads and
streets. Furthermore, signs are distributed in an ill-advised manner. These
problems stem from the multiplicity of the bodies with jurisdiction in this area, as
explained earlier.

This edition has been produced in the framework of the European Union funded
project "A Citizens Agenda: Towards Institutionalizing Public Participation in
Political Decision Making" implemented by International Alert, in partnership with
Legal Agenda and Frame Beirut. The content of this publication are the sole
responsibility of the Legal Agenda and can in no way be taken to reflect the
views of the European Union.