Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
PDVSA N
TITULO
IRS12
MAR.99
GENERAL REVISION
20
L.T.
O. A.
H. M.
OCT.95
APPROVED
21
L.T.
A. N.
J. R.
REV.
FECHA
E PDVSA, 1983
DESCRIPCION
FECHA MAR.99
PAG. REV.
APROB. Salvador Arrieta
APROB. APROB.
FECHA MAR.99
ESPECIALISTAS
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 1
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
Indice
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 OBJECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13
Active Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chemical Means of Extinguishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Class A Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Class B Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Class C Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Halocarbon Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Inert Gas Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Inherent Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lethal Concentration 50% (Lc50) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lowest Observable Adverse Effect Level (Loael) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
No Observed Adverse Effect Level (Noael) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Normally Occupied Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Physical Means of Extinguishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
6.1
6.2
Risk Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Considerations for Halon Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
7
13
7.1
7.2
7.3
13
18
19
20
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 2
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
INTRODUCTION
PDVSA adopted as a basic philosophy the elimination of the use of halon in new
installations. Aditionally, in existing facilities, adequate replacement fire
protection system shall be evaluated. Where this is not practical, all necessary
efforts should be made to minimize atmospheric discharges of halon.
OBJECTIVE
This guide establishes the criteria that shall be applied to select halon alternative
fire protection system in new and existing installations.
SCOPE
This guide covers the halon substitute agents, nonhalon based replacement
system and its final disposal.
REFERENCES
1.
Sheinson R.S., Eaton Hg., Black B., Brown R., Burchel H., Maranghides A.,
Mitchel C., Salmon G., Smith WD.; Halon 1301 Replacement Total Flooding
Fire Testing, Intermediate Scale. Halon Options Technical Working
Conference, May 35, 1994, Albuquerque.
2.
Moore TA., Dierdorf DS., Skaggs SR.; Intermediate Scale (645 ft3) Fire
Suppression Evaluation of NFPA 2001 Agents. 1993 Halon Alternatives
Technical Working Conference, May 1113, 1993, Albuquerque.
3.
4.
The Oil Industry International Exploration & Production Forum; Inert Gas
Fire Extinguishing Agents, p. 8, Report No. 6.60/259, June 1997, London.
5.
The Oil Industry International Exploration & Production Forum; Inherent Fire
Safety Design Principles, p. 21, Report No. 6.48/231, December 1995,
London.
6.
7.
8.
9.
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 3
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
10. Butler J.H., Elkins J. W., Hall B. D., Cummings S. O., and Mintzka S. A.,
Adecrease in the Growth Rates of Atmospheric Halon Concentrations. Vol
359, p. 403. Nature. October 1992.
11.
Atmospheric
Chlorine:
CFCs
and
Alternative
Fluorocarbons.
Http://www.afeas.org/atm_cl.html. EPA report, March 1998.
DEFINITIONS
5.1
Active Protection
Active design solutions require devices to monitor a process variable and function
to mitigate a hazard. Active solutions are sometimes referred to as engineering
controls. Examples are the use of a pressure safety valve or rupture disk to
prevent vessel overpressure or an interlock of a high level sensing device to a
vessel inlet valve and pump motor to prevent liquid overfill of the vessel.
5.2
5.3
Class A Fires
Fires in ordinary combustible materials such as wood, cloth, paper, tapes,
diskettes, rubber, and many plastics. These typically produce deep seated fires.
5.4
Class B Fires
Fires in flammable liquids, solvents, glycols, methanol, oils, greases, tars,
oilbase paints, lacquers, and flammable gases
5.5
Class C Fires
Fires that involve energized electrical equipment where the electrical
nonconductivity of the extinguishing media is of importance. Examples are fires
resulting from overheated cable insulation or fire in an energized transformer or
switchgear.
5.6
Halocarbon Agent
A clean agent that contains as primary components one or more of the elements
fluorine, chlorine, bromine, or iodine. Examples are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
hydrochlorofluorocarbons
(HCFCs),
perfluorocarbons
(PFCs),
and
fluoroiodocarbons (FICs).
5.7
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 4
Men Principal
5.8
Indice manual
Indice norma
Inherent Safety
Designs that eliminate or mitigate the hazard by using materials and process
conditions that are less hazardous.
5.9
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 5
Men Principal
Indice manual
Halon
Replacement
6.0
Fire Protection
Need Assessment
(Risk Analysis)
6.1
Evaluation
Complete
No
Fire
Protection
Required
Yes
Consider
NonHalonbased
Replacement System
6.2
Install
Non Halon
System
Yes
NonHalon
System
Performance
Okay
No
Install Gaseous
Subtitute Agents
7.1
Evaluation
Complete
Indice norma
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 6
Men Principal
6.1
Indice manual
Indice norma
Risk Analysis
The risk analysis stipulated in Figure 1 shall address both the likelihood and the
consequence of the fire hazard. The fire likelihood should take into account
historical incident data when available. Sources or such information can be
PDVSA experience or PDVSAs insurance underwriters. When such information
is not readily available, the approach should use failure analysis concepts. Fault
tree analysis is an effective technique for assessing the likely frequency of fires.
A suggestive fault tree is provided in Figure 2. By assigning failure rates to the
various events, the top event frequency can be estimated.
The consequence analysis of the potential fire shall consider the following factors:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The risk level associated with the estimated frequency and consequences shall
be assessed using approved PDVSA IRS02.
Depending on the results of the risk assessment, refer to Figure 1 and continue
the stipulated logic sequence.
Fig 2. FAULT TREE
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 7
Men Principal
6.2
Indice manual
Indice norma
6.2.1
Inherently safer designs eliminate or mitigate the hazard by using materials and
process conditions that are less hazardous. The most important principles of
inherent safety principles are summarized below (Ref. 6):
S Intensification. Using small quantities of hazardous substances or eliminating
them if possible.
S Substitution. Replacing a material with a less hazardous substance
S Attenuation. Using less hazardous conditions or a less hazardous form of a
material. Selecting a process with a lower risk potential
S Limitation of Effects. Designing facilities that minimize the impact of a release
of a hazardous material or energy
S Simplification. Designing facilities that make operating errors less likely.
Reducing number of leak sources (flanges, valves, instrument connections,
etc.), and minimizing the ignition sources.
S Tolerance. Make equipment robust and that are forgiving of errors that are
made, processes that go to bad quality, not to an uncontrolled reaction or
condition. Design with sufficient material corrosion properties and toughness
factors.
Examples of these principles can help reduce the need for fixed extinguishing
systems are given in the following sections.
a.
Intensification
The process designer shall seek practical opportunities to reduce inventories of
hazardous materials:
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 8
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
Substitution
When possible, the designer should explore less hazardous materials for the
process. For example,
S Use of lower risk equipment such as non hydrogen evolving batteries
S Use of non combustible materials for enclosures and the equipment and fluids
housed within the enclosure (cast resin transformers in place of oilfilled
transformers)
c.
Attenuation
This measure reduces risk by using the least severe values in process parameters
that are allowed in the process or a less hazardous form of the material.
S Reduce to the minimum the potential pressure differential between different
parts of the same equipment (such as a heat exchanger).
d.
Limitation of Effects
Appropriate selection of the location where the equipment will be placed and the
separation between the equipment and vulnerable areas is an effective way to
limit the effects of an accidental release.
The site or location of the storage tanks shall consider ways to minimize knockon
effects on nearby facilities and offsite effects to the public in the event of release.
S To avoid offsite effects, the toxic and flammable materials shall be stored as far
as possible from the site fence.
S Buffer zones between hazardous materials storage and offsite should be
calculated and respected whenever possible.
S appropriate distance must be maintained between the hazardous material
unloading, storage and process areas.
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 9
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
S Reduce number of junction boxes and other items that can cause ignition
S Limit number of internal combustion machines to those strictly essential and
locate them out of classified areas diverting the exhaust to an area where it
cannot be an ignition source.
S Avoid installation of hot fluid piping close to flammable fluid piping.
S Locate daily service fuel tanks outside machinery enclosures.
S Locate offices, control rooms, emergency electrical generator, fire fighting
pumping systems upwind of hydrocarbon process or storage areas.
S Locate open fire equipment such as process heaters upwind of hydrocarbon
process or storage areas.
S Locate flare and vent systems downwind of hydrocarbon process or storage
areas.
S Install power electrical cables and instrument cable in different cable trays.
S Limit the enclosure volume of the areas where accumulation of hydrocarbons
is possible.
S Minimize the areas where corrosive products are present.
Buffer zones and minimum distance between equipment to avoid knockon
effects shall be estimated using atmospheric dispersion and consequence
analysis simulations of credible worstcase release scenarios as described in the
PDVSA document IRS02.
Adequate emergency access shall be considered in the design stage as a way to
limit the consequences of emergencies:
S
S
S
S
S
Simplification /Tolerance
The designer should simplify the system to avoiding possibilities for human error.
S
S
S
S
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 10
Men Principal
S
S
S
S
6.2.2
a.
Indice manual
Indice norma
Fixed Systems
New
The decision to install a new fire protection systems shall be based on the results
of an extensive risk analysis (see 6.1) to determine, firstly, if a protection system
is needed, and secondly, to study any alternatives to halon. Such alternatives shall
include consideration of inherently safer design options as discussed in. When the
need for a halon replacement extinguishment system is confirmed, it is necessary
to take into account the following recommendations:
1.
Very early fire detection systems with alarm and a cut off of power system.
Automatic CO2 extinguishing systems under the false floor.
Preaction sprinkler systems, wetpipe fire sprinkler in the room, or in the
absence of such systems, portable CO2 or water monitors.
2.
Motor control rooms, telecommunication rooms, switch gear room, and
general electrical and electronic equipment:
Very early fire detection system with alarm and cut off of power system and
automatic discharge of CO2. In this case, provisions shall be taken for the
case of personnel present in the moment of the discharge. A preset alarm
with retarding action is recommended to be used in the evacuation of the
area or building before the system enter in uses.
3.
Other infrequent applications such as floating roof tanks, turbines, vents,
etc.:
Apply the PDVSA Standards of the Risk Engineering Manual in each
particular case. Following these Standards, halon will be substituted by
foam in the case of tanks and by CO2 in the case of turbines and vents.
4.
Explosion prevention and suppression:
In PDVSA installations halon is not used for this particular application.
However, it is normal practice to install gas detection systems with alarm at
20% of LFL (Lower Flammable Limit) and selective shutdown of equipment
and/or plant at 40% of LFL, as it is specified in the PDVSA standards of the
Risk Engineering Manual.
b.
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 11
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
Wet type sprinkler systems utilizing, recessed, quick response heads and
if necessary, a CO2 system protecting the subfloor
Advantages
These water based systems are very economical and easy to install, easy
to maintain, quick response heads will offer faster response (up to 3 times
as fast) than standard heads and the recessed feature will eliminate the
potential for mechanical damage, environmental friendliness of water, no
agent storage space required, except for that of CO2.
Disadvantages
Potential water damage to sensitive energized equipment, need for fire
pump and water tank.
2.
3.
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 12
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
2.
Adopt the Door Fan Test for the protected environment instead of
discharging the halon system to test its efficacy. The Door Fan Test allows
determination of whether the system will achieve and maintain the minimum
specific concentration for fire extinguishing and is currently the best
alternative available to find leaks in a closed area and evaluate its integrity.
3.
Evaluate the reliability of the fixed systems, carrying out pressure test of the
piping systems that confirm the absence of obstructions and that simulate
the maximum flow through them.
4.
Ensure the distribution and discharge of the extinguishing agent, such that
it is uniformly distributed in the protected environment. This must be done
using computerized programs provided by the system design manufacturer.
5.
Review the fire detection systems that trigger the halon system to determine
its actuation speed. In cases of low detection speeds, consider the redesign
of the detection system to install one faster and more efficient, in order to
allow a manual intervention before the halon system is discharged.
6.
Revise the type of activation of the system and evaluate the characteristics
of the protected asset, in order to determine the need for automatic
activation. In so far possible, manual activation shall be adopted over
automatic activation to prevent false discharges
6.2.3
Portable Extinguishers
In case of existing halon portable fire extinguishers they will be replaced as
indicated below:
a.
b.
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 13
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
c.
d.
7.1
7.1.1
a.
FM200 is the trade name for HFC227ea. The agent is a halocarbon and is
a complex chemical mixture of hydrogen, carbon, and fluorine. Its full name is
heptaflouropropane. As is true with most halocarbons, it extinguishes primarily
by interfering with the production of free radicals, necessary for sustaining a fire,
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 14
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
and by absorbing heat. The chemical is included on the EPAs SNAP list, is UL
listed and FMRC approved under several manufacturers for both engineered and
preengineered systems, and meets the requirements of NFPA 2001.
FM200 has a ODP of 0, an atmospheric lifetime of 32 years and a GWP of 0.7.
This particular agent has the most extensive health and safety test toxicity
information of any available Halon 1301 substitute. In fact, it has been designated
as the replacement for the propellant (which is also identified as an ODC) in
pharmaceutical metered dose inhalers similar to those used for asthma
treatment. Thus, it is safe for the environment and for humans.
The agents design concentration is between 7% and 8% (versus 4.2% for Halon
1301) and is effective in suppressing Class A, B, and C fires. This, coupled with
the fact that the average weight by volume is 1.7 times that of Halon 1301, results
in the requirement for more total agent when compared with Halon 1301 and the
need for increased storage space. The average increase in storage capacity is
approximately 12/3 times the amount required for Halon 1301. A FM200
system typically is designed with a system design pressure of 360 psi, which is
similar to that of a low pressure Halon 1301 system.
The agent is approved for use in occupied areas, however, the byproducts of
extinguishment are more hazardous than those formed with extinguishment using
Halon 1301. This is due to the fact that the agent does not include bromine.
Therefore, it is recommended that the space in which it is used be evacuated prior
to discharge, however, based on the agents NOAEL level, occupants can
technically remain in the area for up to a minute after discharge.
The decomposition products of FM200 can be damaging to electrical
components, but it occurs with all hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). FM200 is no
more damaging than Halon 1301 as it produces only HF in amounts equivalent
to the HF and Hbr produced by Halon 1301. There are ways to minimize HF
production including early fire detection and quick agent discharge.
FM200 also has the potential of causing temperature related damage, but only
if the agent impinges directly on equipment. The average temperature decrease
in a room is 10_F. Nozzles should be positioned to prevent direct equipment
contact with the discharging agent. It should be noted that the nature of the
nozzles causes a radial discharge at ceiling level with the agent settling down
on equipment.
There has been no evidence of significant water condensation in tests using
FM200 .
Tests performed with FM200 on live electrical equipment have been
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 15
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
successful. Testing by the Modular Protection Corporation1 indicates that for low
energy levels consistent with those found in electrical equipment the
extinguishing concentration must be increased to 8%. This 8% value is the
minimum test concentration, which did not result in reignition. A safety factor,
20% is typical, would increase concentrations to 9.6%, exceeding the NOAEL.
Ideally, all agents needed at a facility could be stored in a single bulk storage area.
However, the poor flow characteristics of FM200 prohibit pipe runs of over 150
feet as well as elevation changes associated with multiple stories. Therefore,
FM200 must be stored in close proximity to the areas they protect.
1.
Advantages
Agent cost FM200 and recycled Halon 1301 is basically the same but requires
approximately 1.67 times the storage space of Halon 1301, extensive health and
safety test information available, possibility of using existing Halon 1301 system
piping hardware (if low pressure system exists)
2.
Disadvantages
The Modular Protection Corporation has performed the only tests on live electrical equipment. All results presented for live electrical equipment are from their testing.
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 16
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
Advantages
Requires approximately 1.67 times the storage space of Halon 1301, design
concentrations (6% to 9.2%) well below NOAEL (40%), possibility that existing
Halon 1301 pipe network may be reused (if low pressure Halon 1301 system
exists).
2.
Disadvantages
Inergen is the trade name for IG541. It is a mixture of two inert gases, nitrogen
and argon, with CO2. Inergen extinguishes fires by reducing the oxygen level
to under 15% which is the minimum oxygen concentration to support combustion
in most circumstances. This is equivalent to a 37.5% Inergen concentration.
CO2 is added to increase the respiration rate of occupants remaining in the room.
This technique has come under question but nonetheless the agent has been
deemed safe for use in occupied areas although evacuation is required within 30
seconds of discharge if agent concentration exceeds 42% and before the agent
concentration reaches 52%.
The agent is on the SNAP list, is UL, and is recognized by NFPA 2001. As typical
of inert gas agents, Inergen has no ODP or GWP and is, therefore, safe from
future regulations. The UL listing is for engineered and preengineered systems.
The design concentration for Inergen is 38%. This value is significantly higher
than Halon 1301s design concentration of 4.2%. In addition, it takes over 2 times
the amount of agent by weight to protect the same volume space with Halon 1301.
This equates to approximately 11 times the storage space of Halon 1301.
Inergen systems are designed with a typical system pressure of 2,175 psi, which
is substantially higher than that of a high pressure Halon 1301 system (600 psi).
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 17
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
Inergen offers advantages over HFCs and PFCs in corrosivity. Inergen results
in no corrosive decomposition products. Inergen also does not produce a
measurable temperature drop or water condensation.
Preliminary tests with Inergen have yielded test concentrations of 4142% for
extinguishing of live electrical fires. Test results have not yet been finalized or
published but the preliminary figures yield design concentrations exceeding the
42% NOAEL.
Inergen, relative to Halon 1301 and even FM200, is not very costly. This is
due to the simple chemical composition of Inergen. Inergen is sold by the cubic
foot and not by the pound.
Inergen is the only agent, which lends itself well to long pipe runs that would be
associated with central bulk storage location. Inergen can be transported as
many as three typical stories vertically as well as a substantial distance
horizontally.
The largest drawback of Inergen is the large amount of agent needed for
extinguishment. The agent requires substantially more storage space than Halon
1301.
1.
Advantages
Disadvantages
FE13TM is the trade name for HFC23. The agent is chemically known as CHF3..
The agent is on the SNAP list, listed by UL, and approved by FMRC and NFPA
2001 recognized. The product extinguishes fire by interfering with the chemical
chain reaction and absorbing heat.
The agent weighs approximately 1.95 times Halon 1301, and it has a volume 2.8
times larger than Halon 1301. The design concentration is 18%. Therefore, larger
storage space is required. As with FM200 and CEA410, FE13TM has flow
characteristics similar to Halon 1301 and may be able to reuse existing Halon
1301 piping hardware.
One advantage of the agent is its high NOAEL, 30%. Compared to its design
concentration, 18%, there is considerable design flexibility before the NOAEL
limits are reached. Another attribute that distinguishes itself from the other agent
options is its effectiveness in cold environments up to 40F.
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 18
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
Advantages
Design concentration (18%) is well below NOAEL (30%), agent is effective in cold
temperature up to 40F possibility that existing Halon 1301 pipe network may be
reused.
2.
Primary Disadvantage
7.2
7.2.1
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 19
Men Principal
a.
Indice manual
Indice norma
Advantages
Wider range of sensitivity detection, addressable system and components, which
offers the capability of pinpointing fire location, more cost effective when
compared to air type system when protecting relatively small areas less than
8,000 ft@ (or less than 20 detectors), continuously supervises all system
components and wiring.
b.
Disadvantages
Not retrofit friendly and system components are not compatible with other
manufacturers, application in high air velocity areas such as clean rooms is
questionable.
7.2.2
a.
Advantages
More sensitive than laser detection type system, retrofit friendly, detector and air
network can be tied into any control panel type, more cost effective than laser
detection system when protecting larger areas greater than 8,000 ft@ (or greater
than 20 laser detectors).
b.
Disadvantages
Air aspirator or pump life expectancy is only 7 years, system cannot supervise air
network (i.e., ductwork and ports) for trouble conditions.
7.3
PDVSA
PDVSA IRS12
REVISION
FECHA
MAR.99
Pgina 20
Men Principal
Indice manual
Indice norma
this higher concentration exceeds the NOAEL, requiring evacuation of the space
within 30 seconds of discharge. Leaving equipment energized also results in an
increased extinguishing time, which translates into increased HF production.
It should be also pointed out that providing this feature can be very difficult and
costly due to varying electrical equipment type and age along with the supply of
electricity.
8.1
The venting of halon into the atmosphere for final disposal is totally prohibited.
8.2
Thought must be given to recycling those volumes of halon that have been
decommissioned, and the two options mentioned below shall be taken into
account:
a.
b.
Send to the supplier or, if not possible, to the manufacturer, for final disposal
Option b. (above shall be the preferred choice). In case that redistribution of halon
is decided, the redistribution of halon within IPPN may be accomplished by
implementing a halon Management Plan comprising of the following steps:
S Depositing the halon inventory from the converted systems into a halon bank,
to draw upon for critical systems.