This is a MODEL filing; NO attorney has reviewed it, including Mr. Turley.

It is modeled after the successful filing by Speaker Boehner against implementation of ObamaDontCare.
https://jonathanturley.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/house-v-burwell-d-d-c-complaint-filed.pdf
It contains the magic language that appears to have passed [Federal Court] judicial muster.
It is uploaded for easy-reference, and it is being submitted to Congressional Staff to expedite fact-checking.
It contains hyperlinks that corroborate claims, information that would probably be included within a brief.
It presents a layered analysis of how deftly the POTUSs brain-trust has planned-out this entire roll-out.
That the phrase political commitment appears in the INARA suggests the POTUS helped compose it.
This serves to undermine the cred of Senator Corker, plus the Senatorial leadership that capitulated.
Critique is invited URGENTLY, for time-pressure exists, and ancillary documents must be composed.
Provide Feedback to 215=333-4900.
ALLEGATIONS
The Constitution Vests the Congress, Not the Executive, with the Authority to Legislate and to
Approve Treaties, Including the Authority to Oversee the Activities of the Executive Branch.
Passage of Authorizing Legislation Reflects Congressional Intent.
Congress had yet to see two confidential side agreements pertaining to the deal.
The JCPOA is a Treaty, neither an Executive Agreement nor a Political Commitment.
The INARA was Passed After the Administration Provided False Assertions.
Obama has Ignored Violations of the Pre-Implementation JCPOA, Imperiling inter-alia Israel.
The JCPOA Violates the NPT.
ARGUMENT
The Plaintiff, the United States House of Representatives, Has Standing to File this Litigation
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
Count I
The JCPOA Remains Unsigned by All Parties and, Thus, the JCPOA Cannot be Implemented.
Count II
If Deemed Actionable Despite Being Unsigned,
Defendant Obama Should have Referred the JCPOA to Congress as a Treaty and,
Thus, The JCPOA Should be Subject to Ratification under Article II, 2, Clause 2.
Count III
If Deemed to be Exempt from Being Subject to Ratification as a Treaty,
The JCPOA Compromises the Commitment of the United States to Israels security and,
Further, the JCPOA Undermines Support of the United States for Israels Right to Exist
Count IV
If Deemed to be Exempt from Undermining Israels Basic Security Needs,
Defendant Obama Improperly Implemented the INARA for Two Reasons
--The Statute was Passed in a Fashion That Failed to Comport with Congressional Intent, and the
Statutes Notification Requirements Have Yet to Have Been Satisfied
And, Thus, Defendant Obama Cannot Invoke the Existence of INARA
to Justify Any Claim that the JCPOA has received Congressional Approval.
Count V
If Deemed to Having Been Properly Approved Pursuant to the INARA,
The JCPOA Should be Construed as Having Violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Count VI
If Any Component of the JCPOA is Deemed Unapproved,
The Entire Document Cannot be Implemented.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES,

Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-_____

Plaintiff,
vs.
BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA,
in his official capacity as
President of the
United States of America
Defendant
___________________________________________ _________________________________________
COMPLAINT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This case arises out of unconstitutional and unlawful actions taken by the Administration of President
Barack Obama (the Administration) in respect to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA]
that is to be implemented on December 15, 2015. In challenging this action, this case addresses
fundamental issues regarding the limits of Executive power under our constitutional form of
government, and the continued viability of the separation of powers doctrine upon which the whole
American fabric has been erected [Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)]. This lawsuit
thus raises issues of exceptional importance, not only to the plaintiff, the United States House of
Representatives, but also to the entire nation.

One fundamental tenet of our divided-power system of government is that all legislative power is vested in
Congress, and Congress alone [U.S. Const. art. I, 1 (All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.)].
This legislative power may be exercised only through the single, finely wrought, and exhaustively
considered process [Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439-40 (1998)] that is familiar to us all,
namely, the passage of identical bills by the House of Representatives and the Senate (bicameralism),
followed by delivery to the President for his signature or veto (presentment) [U.S. Const. art. I, 7, cl. 2
(Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a
Law, be presented to the President of the United States.)].

Beyond the Presidents role in the presentment process, the Constitution does not permit the Executive
Branch to enact laws, or to amend or repeal duly enacted laws, including by adopting rules or taking other
unilateral actions that have such an effect. Furthermore, the Constitution does not permit either the
Executive Branch or Congress to enact laws that contravene Constitutional delegation of powers,
antecedent Treaty obligations, and/or black-letter statute. Finally, the Constitution does not permit the
Executive Branch to label its actions unilaterally as political commitments immune to Congressional
or Judicial oversight.

The Administration has made no secret of its willingness, notwithstanding Article I of the Constitution, to
act without Congress when Congress declines to enact laws that the Administration desires. Not only is
there no license for the Administration to go it alone in our system, but such unilateral action is directly
barred by Article I. Despite such fundamental constitutional limitations, the Administration repeatedly has
abused its power by using executive action as a substitute for legislation, invoking phantom declarations
p.r.n.

This suit challenges the abuse-of-power (no matter how it may be presented rhetorically) inherent in its
pact with the Islamic Republic of Iran; discrete causes-of-action are presented both sequentially and
serially, allowing for the unambiguous appreciation of the totality of the Administrations fatally-flawed
construct. {Because the fundamental defect is derivative of presidential fiat, the caption excludes naming
both key cabinet secretaries [e.g., State, Defense and Energy] and negotiators [e.g., Ms. Wendy Ruth
Sherman].}

The House now brings this civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief to halt these
unconstitutional and unlawful actions which usurp the Houses Article I legislative powers . Because this
litigation is likely to succeed andabsent interdictionirreversible damages will transpire, this filing
encompasses pleadings that have been established as carrying precedential power regarding the threshold
standing consideration [United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, et al., District Of Columbia
District Court, Case No. 1:14-cv-01967 docket://gov.uscourts.dcd.1-14-cv-01967]. Because that decision of

September 9, 2015 pends in the appellate courts, it has served as the template by which judicial efficiency
can be maximized, namely, by satisfying key components of what has been viewed judicially and
rhetorically as the unchallenged dictum. Furthermore, Congressional intent must be honored when
assessing legislation [King v. Burwell U.S. 576].
PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff United States House of Representatives (House) is the legislative body

constituted by Article I, 2 of the United States Constitution.

2.

Defendant Barack Hussein Obama is, and has been since January 20, 2009, the President

of the United States of America; as President, defendant Obama is responsible for all actions taken by the
departments (in his cabinet) that he heads; he is also responsible for all actions taken by all people therein.
3.

{Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the caption if it is deemed appropriate to file

specific allegations against particular members of the Obama Administration after completing the discovery
process; this may include (but is not limited to) Negotiator Wendy Ruth Sherman and the Secretaries of
State (John Forbes Kerry), Defense (Ashton Baldwin Carter) and Energy (Ernest Jeffrey Moniz).}
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1345. This case arises

under the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and is brought by the United States, i.e., the
United States House of Representatives, which is a component of the United States government.
5.

On December __, 2015, the United States House of Representatives adopted, by a vote of

_______, H. Res. ___, which provides that

the Speaker is authorized to initiate or intervene in one or more civil actions on behalf of
the House of Representatives in a Federal court of competent jurisdiction to seek any
appropriate relief regarding the failure of the President to act in a manner consistent with
his official duties under the Constitution and laws of the United States with respect to
implementation of any provision of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA].
6.

Section ___ of H. Res. ___ [passed on December __, 2015 by a vote of ___] provides that

[t]he Office of the General Counsel of the House of Representatives, at the direction of the Speaker, shall
represent the House in any civil action initiated, or in which the House intervenes, pursuant to this
resolution, and may employ the services of outside counsel and other experts for this purpose.

7.

This Court has authority to issue a declaratory judgment, and to order injunctive and

other relief that is just and proper, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2201 and 2202, and Rules 57 and 65 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
8.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) and (e), and 5 U.S.C.

703.

ALLEGATIONS
The Constitution Vests the Congress, Not the Executive, with the Authority to Legislate and to
Approve Treaties, Including the Authority to Oversee the Activities of the Executive Branch
9.

Article I, 1 of the Constitution provides that All legislative Powers herein granted shall

be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.
10.

Article I, 7, Clause 2 of the Constitution provides that Every Bill which shall have

passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States; If he approves, he shall sign it.
11.

Article II, 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution provides that the president shall have Power,

by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur.
12.

If a treaty is deemed valid, there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute

[implementing it] under Article 1, 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the
Government [Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920)].
13.

Both the United States (a nuclear-weapon state) and Iran (a non-nuclear-weapon

state) are signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT], administered by
the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] that was initially adopted on June 12, 1968; Article V
states, in pertinent part, Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in
accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate
international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be
made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.Non-nuclear-weapon States Party
to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or

agreements, through an appropriate international body.Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty

so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Passage of Authorizing Legislation Reflects Congressional Intent
14.

The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 [INARA] became Public Law 114-17

on May 22, 2015, after having passed the Senate by a vote of 98-1 on May 7, 2015 and the House by a vote
400-25 on May 14, 2015; it amended-by-addition the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.).
15.

The INARA states, in pertinent-part [emphasis added], that:

(a)Not later than 5 calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran
relating to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the appropriate
congressional committees and leadershipthe agreementincluding all related
materials and annexes.
(b) The Secretary of State shall preparea report assessing
(i) the extent to which the Secretary will be able to verify that
Iran is complying with its obligations and commitments under the
agreement;
(ii) the adequacy of the safeguards and other control
mechanisms and other assurances contained in the agreement with
respect to Irans nuclear program to ensure Irans activities permitted
thereunder will not be used to further any nuclear-related military or
nuclear explosive purpose, including for any research on or
development of any nuclear explosive device or any other nuclearrelated military purpose; and
(iii) the capacity and capability of the IAEA to effectively
implement [sic] the verification regime required by or related to the
agreement, including whether the IAEA will have sufficient access to
investigate suspicious sites or allegations of covert nuclear-related
activities and whether it has the required funding, manpower, and
authority to undertake the verification regime required by or related to
the agreement.
(c)The period for congressional reviewshall be 60 calendar days if an
agreement, including all materials required to be transmitted to Congressis transmitted
between July 10, 2015, and September 7, 2015.
(d)[I]t is critically important that Congress have the opportunity, in an orderly
and deliberative manner, to consider and, as appropriate, take action affecting the
statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress.
(e)[A]ction involving any measure of statutory sanctions relief by the United
States pursuant to an agreement subject to subsection (a) or the Joint Plan of Action
may not be taken if, during the period for review, the Congress adopts, and there is
enacted, a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress does not favor the
agreement.
(f)Following submission of an agreementto the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the
Department of Defense shall, upon the request of any of those committees or leadership,
promptly furnish to those committees or leadership their views as to whether the
safeguards and other controls contained in the agreement with respect to Irans nuclear
program provide an adequate framework to ensure that Irans activities permitted
thereunder will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common
defense and security.
(g)It is the sense of Congress that

(A) United States sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human

rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under an
agreement.
(B) Issues not addressed by an agreement on the nuclear
program of Iran, including fair and appropriate compensation for
Americans who were terrorized and subjected to torture while held in
captivity for 444 days after the seizure of the United States Embassy in
Tehran, Iran, in 1979 and their families, the freedom of Americans held
in Iran, the human rights abuses of the Government of Iran against its
own people, and the continued support of terrorism worldwide by the
Government of Iran, are matters critical to ensure justice and the
national security of the United States, and should be expeditiously
addressed.
(C) The President should determine the agreement in no way
compromises the commitment of the United States to Israels security,
nor its support for Israels right to exist; and
(D) To responsibly implement [sic] any long-term
agreement reached between the P5+1 countries and Iran, it is critically
important that Congress have the opportunity to review any agreement
and, as necessary, take action to modify the statutory sanctions regime
imposed by Congress.
(h)Qualifying legislation introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
(i)The term agreement means an agreement related to the nuclear program
of Iran that includes the United States, commits the United States to take action, or
pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take action,
regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and
regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint comprehensive plan
of action entered into or made between Iran and any other parties, and any additional
materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements,
implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings, and
any related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the agreement or to
be entered into or implemented in the future.
(j)The term Joint Plan of Action means the Joint Plan of Action, signed at
Geneva November 24, 2013, by Iran and by France, Germany, the Russian Federation,
the Peoples Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and all
implementing materials and agreements related to the Joint Plan of Action, including the
technical understandings reached on January 12, 2014, the extension thereto agreed to on
July 18, 2014, the extension agreed to on November 24, 2014, and any materially
identical extension that is agreed to on or after the date of the enactment of the INARA of
2015.
16.

On September 10, 2015, the Senate failed to take action on a disapproval resolution based

upon the INARA by a vote of 58-42 and, thus, qualifying [or, in this case, disqualifying] legislation was not
introduced in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Congress had yet to see two confidential side agreements pertaining to the deal
17.

On July 28, 2015, SoS Kerry said the texts of two confidential side agreements pertaining

to the deal would not be submitted for Congressional review because he (and other American negotiators)

had not seen them because they had been concluded independently by Iran and the IAEA; they pertain to
the Possible Military Dimensions of Iran's Nuclear Program and the long-term plan with the IAEA and,
as a result, Republicanssupported by Ambassador Nicholas Burns, former under-secretary of State for
political affairsprotested. [http://thehill.com/policy/defense/250246-gop-raises-pressure-over-iran-side-deals ]
18.

Olli Heinonen, former IAEA Deputy Director-General for safeguards and a senior fellow

at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, said the United States, as an
IAEA board-member, can access these documents either by requesting that Iran divulge them directly or
request their release within the IAEA: If a board-member asks [for] it and others resist the distribution
this can be overcome by a vote.[A s]imple majority is enough, and no vetoes exist in the IAEA system.
[http://www.businessinsider.com/secret-part-of-the-iran-agreement-2015-7?r=US&IR=T#ixzz3hVReKYZ0 ]

19.

The details in one document that relates to inspection procedures allows for a 24-day

delay between issuance of a request for an inspection and the ability to achieve one; whereas Obama has
argued that, even with 24 days, nuclear material for use in a bomb is not something you hide in a closet,
Heinonen said Twenty-four days is a long time because, while the type of environmental sampling
inspectors will use to search for traces of activity can be used to detect whether a certain amount of
enriched uranium was present, such technology does not guarantee that levels that violate the agreement
would be detected. [ibid]
20.

On September 21, 2015, the IAEA admitted that, when this secret regimen was followed,

Iranians collected its own nuclear testing samples; others view such compliance monitoring as
unprecedented and hopeless (regarding confirmation of compliance) because it diverges from normal
inspection procedures between the IAEA and a member country by essentially ceding the IAEAs
investigative authority to Iran.
[http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/09/21/iran-gives-samples-from-parchin-military-site-to-nuclear-inspectors/ and
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/24/iaea-monitoring-irans-nuclear-compliance-a-hopeless-task ]

21.

Implementation of the IAEA-Iranian protocol, predictably, has already allowed for Iran to

have collected its own environmental samples at the historically off-limits Parchin military base without the
presence of international inspectors and without a procedure that mandated use of a verifiable chain-ofcustody to detect nuclear development; the White House was nevertheless pleased, and the IAEA chief

insisted this met strict agency standards, even as nuclear security experts urged the IAEA and P5+1 powers
to reveal more details about the Parchin inspection. [ http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/21/us-iran-nucleariaea-idUSKCN0RL0Z020150921,

http://en.mehrnews.com/news/110328/Samples-taken-at-Parchin-with-no-IAEA-

inspectors-present,

http://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-refuses-iaea-access-to-parchin-base/,

http://unitedwithisrael.org/un-nuclear-watchdog-accepts-samples-from-irans-self-inspection-of-parchin-military-site/?
utm_source=MadMimi&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Jordan%27s+King+will+%27Defend
%27+Jerusalem+from+Israel%3B+Iran+SelfInspection+Accepted+by+UN&utm_campaign=20150922_m127462161_Jordan%27s+King+will+%27Defend
%27+Jerusalem+from+Israel%3B+Iran+SelfInspection+Accepted+by+UN&utm_term=UN+Accepts+Nuclear+Samples+from+Iran+Self-Inspection,
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/423960/iran-dont-trust-never-trust-and-verify-henry-f-cooper-peter-vincent-pry?
target=topic&tid=3613,

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/424370/iran-nuclear-deal-inspection?

target=topic&tid=3613,

http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/detail/parchin/,

http://www.newenglishreview.org/blog_direct_link.cfm/blog_id/62368#.VgCFEjBGO4g.yahoomail,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iaea-chief-defends-controversial-iran-inspection-technique/, and
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2015/09/nuke_the_iranian_nukepact_.html#First%20Bullet ]

22.

Ongoing interest in the other document (regarding the Possible Military Dimensions of

Irans nuclear program) prompted Iran to issue an ultimatum on November 26, 2015; focusing on it would
preclude implementing the pact. [http://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/iran-deal-and-possible-military-dimensions/ and
Iran Issued Ultimatum: Stop Examining Military Dimensions of Nuclear Program or Deal Is Off ]

23.

Illustrating the importance of these two documents is the fact that SoS Kerry explicitly

demanded their acquisition prior to demurring, and even Iranian legislators clamored to review them; also,
David Albright, the founder and the president of the Institute for Science and International Security, averred
the secrecy is undermining the IAEAs credibility. [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/iran-must-disclose-pastnuclear-military-activities-final-deal-says-kerry/,
http://217.25.54.55/en/News/81765499/,

and

http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/06/243892.htm,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/18/us-iran-nuclear-parchin-

idUSKCN0RI05M20150918]

24.

On September 10, 2015, the House passed a resolution stating that the President had not

fulfilled his obligations under the INARA because Congress had yet to see two confidential side
agreements pertaining to the deal, documents the administration had averred it did not possess, by a vote of

245 to 186; the resolution also stated that the 60-day clock for Congress to approve the deal had not yet
started.
25.

Immediately after this vote, then-Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) said House

Republicans will use every tool at our disposal to stop, slow and delay this agreement from being fully
implemented, including suing Obama to keep him from carrying out the deal, an option that is very
possible.

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/09/10/senate-set-to-vote-on-iran-nuclear-

deal/]

The JCPOA is a Treaty, neither an Executive Agreement nor a Political Commitment

26.

On November 19, 2015, Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs in the

Department of State, claimed the JCPOA constitutes a political commitment rather than either a treaty
or an executive agreement. [see Letter to Congressman Michael Richard Pompeo, attached hereto as
Exhibit A http://pompeo.house.gov/uploadedfiles/151124_-_reply_from_state_regarding_jcpoa.pdf ]

27.

In addition to claiming this characterization comported with a long-standing practice of

addressing sensitive problems in negotiations that culminate in political commitments, Frifield wrote that
no involved party had signed it and claimed its success would depend upon verification rather than whether
it is legally-binding; also, she claimed full transparency had been maintainedincluding provision of all
documents to Congressbut she did not explicitly address either aforementioned document [see 17,
supra].
28.

This posture comports with that adopted by Iran in August, noting that Iranian President

Hassan Rouhani discouraged his nations parliament [Majlis] from voting on the pact to avoid placing legal
burdens on the regime: If the JCPOA is sent to [and passed by] parliament, it will create an obligation for
the government. It will mean the president, who has not signed it so far, will have to sign it.Why should
we place an unnecessary legal restriction on the Iranian people? [ http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middleeast/2015/08/29/Rowhani-Iran-nuke-deal-doesn-t-need-parliament-approval.html ]

29.

The JCPOA is a long-term diplomatic pact rather than a short-term commercial

agreement and, thus, it harbors the major characteristics of a treaty; this view was articulated by Alan

10

Dershowitz,

Esquire.

[http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/08/05/alan-dershowitz-iran-deal-treaty-

column/31160415/]

The Supreme Court has rarely spoken on the distinction between treaties and other forms
of agreement, but when it has, it has raised serious questions about the presidents power
to enter into long-term deals with foreign powers without the consent of Congress. Here
is what it said in Gibbons v. Ogden, [G]eneral and permanent commercial regulations
with foreign powers must be made by treaty, but the particular and temporary
regulations of commerce may be made by an agreement of a state with another, or with a
foreign power, by the consent of Congress. Although the Gibbons case dealt with the
relationship between the federal government and the States, its language suggests that the
president alone may not have the power to avoid congressional oversight by simply
declaring an important deal with foreign powers to be an executive agreement rather than
a treaty. [Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. 1 (1824)]
The INARA was Passed After the Administration Provided False Assertions
29.

The Administrations stated-intent to maintain sanctions against Iranian development of

conventional arms was not only explicitly noted in the INARA [see 15(g)(A)], but it was also explicitly
restated as recently as one week prior to announcement of the accord on July 14; during congressional
testimony on July 7, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Defense Secretary Ashton Baldwin
Carter and (retiring) Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair General Martin Edward Dempsey both explicitly claimed
sanctions against conventional arms (and explicitly ICBMs) would be maintained. [watch @ 1:12,
http://www.c-span.org/video/?326952-1/defense-secretary-carter-general-dempsey-testimony-us-strategyisis].
30.

The JCPOA relieves sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council, among

them #1929 that relates to ICBMs; also, the JCPOA allows Iran to develop nuclear weaponry after it
expires.
Obama has Ignored Violations of the Pre-Implementation JCPOA, Imperiling inter-alia Israel
31.

Despite being subject to a travel-ban, Major General Qassem Soleimani, Commander of

Irans paramilitary Quds Force, traveled to Moscow in July, 2015; in August, U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, Samantha Power, said all states were obliged to enforce the ban and characterized these
media-reports as very concerning but, as recently as on October 6, efforts to confirm whether these
reports were factual remained incomplete while the impact of this visit was emerging, with particular
regard to Syria. [http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/07/us-russia-iran-soleimani-idUSKCN0QC1KM20150807,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-raises-concerns-about-iranians-apparent-visit-to-

11

moscow/2015/08/13/35a75a32-41e1-11e5-8e7d-9c033e6745d8_story.html,

and

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/06/us-mideast-crisis-syria-soleimani-insigh-idUSKCN0S02BV20151006 ]

31.

Iran has renewed S-300 anti-aircraft missile system deliveries from Russiaa deal that

became possible again after Iran reached the JCPOA deal with the P5+1 group of countries over its nuclear
energy program back in Julyand Russia and Iran are in talks over deliveries of the Russian-made
weaponry as Tehran is interested in Moscows entire range to replace its outdated military equipment; the
S-300 missile system would represent a qualitative upgrade in the capacity of the country's air defenses,
affording Iran the capability to intercept cruise missiles and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
[http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/11/25/439144/Iran-Russia-in-talks-over-major-arms-deal ]
32.

Reiterating a pattern of explicit threats dating back through the decades, indeed since

1979, a senior figure in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards threatened that Iran will destroy Tel Aviv in
ten minutes; thus, allowing for the enhancement of Irans military capacity (both offensive and
defensive) threatens Israels survival. [https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/17144-iranthreatens-to-destroy-israel-in-less-than-10-minutes ]

The JCPOA Violates the NPT

32.

The United States is partyindeed, it paves the roadto a pact that would allow Iran

to develop a nuclear bomb; not only would there be unfettered ability for this to occur after the time-frame
of the pact expires, but this eventualityarguablycould transpire prior thereto (if it is not now
occurring).
33.

Indeed, Representative Michael Richard Pompeo, who serves on the House Select

Committee on Intelligence, observed that the absence of a signed-document releases Iran from
responsibility to abide by its tenets:
For the State Department to try to defend the unsigned and non-binding Iran nuclear
agreement by calling it a political commitment is about as absurd as the terms of the
deal itself.Instead of forging an agreement with Iran that will protect Americans and
prevent the worlds largest state sponsor of terror from obtaining a nuclear weapon, the
Obama administration caved to Iranian bullies and serial nuclear cheaters. Unsigned, this
agreement is nothing more than a press release and just about as enforceable. Further, it
fails to address to whom Americans should look to uphold this agreement once the
Ayatollah dies, or to whom the Iranians must turn once President Obama passes from the
stage. Placing our trust in the ability of these nuclear weapon-driven, radical extremists
will not ease tensions, but will only get Americans killed. Congress must stand ready,
willing, and unified in combating aggression by a regime [that] continues to view
America as the Great Satan and [that] has been emboldened by this deal.

12

ARGUMENT
The Plaintiff, the United States House of Representatives, Has Standing to File this Litigation
33.

Recognizing modern precedent for the House to achieve standing when challenging

exercise of Executive Fiat [United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, et al., District Of Columbia
District Court, Case No. 1:14-cv-01967 docket://gov.uscourts.dcd.1-14-cv-01967], it is emphasized that
this pleading has been drafted to ensure it is readily apparent that it meets key-criteria to withstand
challenge; indeed, it is noted that the last-minute characterization of the pact as a political commitment
[in the letter remitted to Rep. Pompeo on November 19, 2015] has fortuitously been anticipated in the
District Courts Memorandum, even as it was presaged in the IMARA [see reference to political
commitment in 15(i)].
34.

The end of the aforementioned Memorandum, focusing on judiciability, is on-point

with regard to the instant filing; it articulates intuitive parallels that extend from initial impression, to
rhetorical presentation, and then extending to core considerations [emphasis added, footnotes relocated as
endnotes]:
That the Court has jurisdiction over this case does not end the inquiry. It must also
consider whether there is any reason it should not hear the case, i.e., whether the case is
justiciable. That, in turn, presents two questions: (1) whether the claim presented and the
relief sought are of the type which admit of judicial resolution; and (2) whether the
structure of the federal government renders the issue presented a political question, that
is, not justiciable because of the separation of powers among the Legislative, Executive
and Judicial Branches established by the Constitution. Powell, 395 U.S. at 516-17. {28}
The first question is easily answered: the claims for which the House has standing
involve pure questions of constitutional interpretation, amenable to resolution by this
Court. It would be difficult to say that there are no manageable standards for
adjudicating the issues raised. Familiar judicial techniques are available to construe the
meaning of the Constitution. Powell, 395 F.2d at 594; see also Powell, 395 U.S. at 54849.
([A] determination of petitioner Powells right to sit would require no more than an
interpretation of the Constitution. Such a determination falls within the traditional role
accorded to courts to interpret the law, and does not involve a lack of respect due [a]
coordinate [branch] of government, nor does it involve an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). In short,
centuries of precedent demonstrate the Judiciarys ability to adjudicate the Secretaries
compliance with the Constitution. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803).
The Secretaries pin their hopes on the second question, arguing that to allow this suit to
proceed would upset the finely wrought balance among the branches and that the case
presents issues not suitable for resolution by an Article III court. Mem. at 16, 18. {29}

13

The argument is not persuasive. Whatever the merits of the parties interpretations of the
differing appropriation legislationan issue not to be addressed at this stage of litigation
the Complaint makes clear that this is not a dispute over statutory semantics. To the
contrary, the constitutional violation alleged is that, despite an intentional refusal by
Congress to appropriate funds for Section 1402, the Secretaries freely ignored Article
I, 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution and sought other sources of public money. The
Complaints Non-Appropriation Theory presents a question of constitutional
interpretation for the Judiciary, which provides the primary means through which
[constitutional] rights may be enforced. Davis, 442 U.S. at 241.
The Secretaries separation-of-powers argument, properly addressed here, is unavailing.
It consists of two principal parts: (1) the history of non-litigiousness between the political
branches, recounted in Raines, and (2) a page-long series of quotes from Justice Scalias
dissent in Windsor. See Mem. at 16-18. The first part is unconvincing: the refusal by
several presidents to sue Congress over the Tenure of Office Act hardly answers the
question presented by the pending motion. See 521 U.S. at 826. The refrain by either
branch from exercising one of its options does not mean that the option was unavailable;
there will never be a history of litigation until the first lawsuit is filed. The second part is
not precedential: for all of its eloquence, Justice Scalias opinion remains a dissent joined
by only two other Justices. It does not convince the Court to dismiss this case.
The Court concludes that prudential considerations do not counsel avoidance of this
dispute. The Court is familiar with the standards for constitutional review of Executive
actions, and the mere fact that the House of Representatives is the plaintiff does not
turn this suit into a non-justiciable political dispute. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 549
(Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the
Constitution at variance with the construction given the document by another branch.
The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts
avoiding their constitutional responsibility.) (collecting cases). Despite its potential
political ramifications, this suit remains a plain dispute over a constitutional
command, of which the Judiciary has long been the ultimate interpreter. See Marbury,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
The Court is also assured that this decision will open no floodgates, as it is inherently
limited by the extraordinary facts of which it was born. The Secretaries note that this
case is a novel tactic by the House and entirely without precedent. Mem. at 2, 25.
The House agrees that this case is the result of an historic vote by plaintiff House of
Representatives. Oppn at 1. The rarity of these circumstances itself militates against
dismissing the case as non-justiciable. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (The integrity
of the political process would be at risk if difficult constitutional issues were simply
referred to the Court as a routine exercise. But this case is not routine.).
*
{28} In addition to their justiciability argument rooted in separation of powers, the
Secretaries argue unpersuasively that the Court should exercise its discretion under the
Declaratory Judgment Act and dismiss this case because the House has a variety of
legislative means available to counter the Executive Branch. Mem. at 26. As discussed
above, the constitutional violation of which the House complains has the collateral effect
of disarming the most potent of those legislative means.
{29} The Secretaries also cite the 19th-century history of non-litigiousness between the
political Branches, which was surveyed in Raines, 521 U.S. at 826-27. The Court has
carefully considered all of Raines and finds it distinguishable. While there is no precedent
for this specific lawsuit, the rights of the House as an institution to litigate to protect its
constitutional role has been recognized in other contexts in the 20 th century and its

14

institutional standing was most specifically foreseen, if not decided, in Raines, 521 U.S.
at 829-30 and Arizona Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664-65.
35.

This case involves Constitutional Interpretation; it is not a dispute over statutory

semantics. It alleges violations of Article I, 1; Article I, 7, clause 2; and Article II, 2 Clause 2. It
necessitates that a federal court interpret the Constitution at variance with the construction given the
JCPOA by another branch, recognizing that the alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot
justify the courts avoiding its constitutional responsibility; it remains a plain dispute over a constitutional
command, of which the Judiciary has long been the ultimate interpreter; and it is rare, historic, and
unprecedentedalbeit inherently limited by the extraordinary facts of which it was born.
36.

Therefore, the integrity of the political process would be at risk if difficult constitutional

issues (such as those raised in this instant case) were simply referred to the Court as a routine exercise;
indeed, neither Burwell nor this case can be perceived as routine.
37.

This complaint can be dismissed neither under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)

(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction nor under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted; all key-facts have been referenced and this complaint contains sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face, namely, blocking sanctions
relief.
38.

Standing requires (1) the House to have suffered an injury in fact that is both (a) concrete

and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, as opposed to conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is
traceable to the defendants actions; and (3) the injury is redressable by a favorable decision of the court.
39.

This complaint encompasses both constitutional and statutory subject matter jurisdiction;

the former obtains because the case arises under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority, and the latter obtains because of the ability
to identify a relevant statute (INARA), notwithstanding its challenged applicability.
40.

This complaint encompasses explicit claims that the Administration has not functioned in

good-faith, both with regard to adherence to the INARA and with regard to its independent conduct; it is
recognized, therefore, that such stated-concerns could be construed (mistakenly) as primarily political,
but it is claimed that the primary concern is tethered to explicit violations born of what the Administration
both has said (via representations to Congress) and done (via interactions with Iranians, mutually exclusive

15

of whatever other participants in the byplay with Iran may have said and/or done, before or after July 14,
2015).
41.

This complaint alleges injury that is personal, particularized, concrete, and otherwise

judicially cognizable; it is not abstract, derivative merely of an effort of the House to seek empowerment.
42.

{Parenthetically, it is instructive that this Memorandum cites Coleman v. Miller, for it is

contemplated that the Senate could join this litigation either by invoking the nuclear option to overcome
an anticipated filibuster or by invoking Coleman via a filing of at least 34 individual senators who had
become disenfranchised (due to having been denied the opportunity to defeat this treaty) after the
Administration referred the JCPOA to Congress in a fashion that did not comport with its being processed
as a treaty; recalled is the fact that 39 senators voted on April 28, 2015 to support an amendment that
characterized the JCPOA as a treaty, noting also that two additional Republican Senators (Cruz and Paul)
had not been present to vote. [http://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/ron-johnson-iran-amendment-fails117442]}
43.

In Burwell, standing was conferred when the Executive allegedly had been unfaithful

to the Constitution, while standing was not conferred when the Executive allegedly had been unfaithful
to how a statute had been implemented administratively; in the instant case, standing should be conferred
because the Executive allegedly was unfaithful to the Constitution (inter alia because the statute, itself,
could not nullify the power of the Senate to address whether the JCPOA should be ratified as a Treaty, for
it comported with the key characteristics thereof, both intuitively and by precedent) and standing should
be conferred because the Executive was unfaithful to how an explicit statute entailed complete provision of
specified data to Congress prior to its implementation (notwithstanding the fact that the statute was flawed).
44.

In Burwell and in the instant case, additional efforts to undermine standing are inapposite;

among them are the facts that Congress-People hold power in-trust on behalf of constituents in a
representative democracy, the House (or the Senate) can act as an injured entity just as might a person,
and that Congress has an interest in monitoring the sequelae of legislation passage above that of the public.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
Count I
The JCPOA Remains Unsigned by All Parties and,
Thus, the JCPOA Cannot be Implemented.

16

45.

The House incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 44, above, as if set forth

fully herein.
46.

Regardless of how it is construed (as a Treaty, as an Executive Agreement, or as a

Political Commitment), the JCPOA has not been signed by any of the parties involved in its creation; thus,
it is impossible to discern the Iranian party and/or parties responsible for its implementation and
longitudinal duty to ensure fealty thereto, even as it is contemplated to be binding upon the United States.
47.

If the JCPOA remains construed as a nebulous document with the weight of a press-

release, then the impending implementation thereofwhich entails release from Congressionally-passed
sanctionswould injure, and would continue to injure, the House; defendant Obamas unconstitutional
actions would, inter alia, be permitted to usurp the Houses legislative authority.
48.

WHEREFORE, the House prays that the Court (i) declare that the JCPOA does not

constitute a document that can be implemented legally in the United States, (ii) enjoin defendant Obama
from implementing the JCPOA on or after December 15, 2015, (iii) enjoin defendant Obama from inter
alia dropping statutory sanctions against Iran, and (iv)enjoin defendant Obama from changing,
specifically regarding Iran, the status quo until/unless any pact with Iran (either concluded bilaterally or in
conjunction with others) is properly referred to Congress and approved in accordance with Article I of the
Constitution.
Count II
If Deemed Actionable Despite Being Unsigned,
Defendant Obama Should have Referred the JCPOA to Congress as a Treaty and,
Thus, The JCPOA Should be Subject to Ratification under Article II, 2, Clause 2.
49.

The House incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 48, above, as if set forth

fully herein.
50.

The JCPOA is a Treaty; it is agreed that it is not an Executive Agreement.

51.

If the JCPOA is somehow deemed to have been Congressionally approved without

having been ratified by the Senate, then the impending implementation thereofwhich entails release from
Congressionally-passed sanctionswould injure, and would continue to injure, the House; defendant
Obamas unconstitutional actions would, inter alia, be permitted to usurp the Houses legislative authority.
52.

WHEREFORE, the House prays that the Court (i) declare that the JCPOA is a Treaty

and that the JCPOA does not merely constitute a political commitment, (ii) enjoin defendant Obama from

17

implementing the JCPOA on or after December 15, 2015, (iii) enjoin defendant Obama from inter alia
dropping statutory sanctions against Iran, and (iv)enjoin defendant Obama from changing, specifically
regarding Iran, the status quo until/unless any pact with Iran (either concluded bilaterally or in conjunction
with other countries) is properly referred to the Senate and ratified in accordance with Article II, 2,
Clause 2 of the Constitution.
Count III
If Deemed to be Exempt from Being Subject to Ratification as a Treaty,
The JCPOA Compromises the Commitment of the United States to Israels security and,
Further, the JCPOA Undermines Support of the United States for Israels Right to Exist
53.

The House incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 52, above, as if set forth

fully herein.
54.

The JCPOA compromises the commitment of the United States to Israels security and,

specifically, its support for Israels right to exist; this contravenes the sense of Congress (per the
INARA).
55.

It also contravenes the spontaneous, verbally-expressed sense of Congress, as reflected

in its unabashedly enthusiastic reaction to the (this is a bad deal) speech delivered on March 3, 2015 by
Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to a Joint Session of Congress (that some have characterized as
a summary of the State of the World); Congress interrupted to applaud 39 times, and 23 of these were
standing ovations. [http://mondoweiss.net/2015/03/netanyahus-consisted-standing#sthash.HwAeC2fp.dpuf]
56.

If the JCPOA is implemented despite its known ability to empower Iran to destroy Israel,

Congressional intent would be violated and the impending implementation thereofwhich entails release
from Congressionally-passed sanctionswould injure, and would continue to injure, the House; defendant
Obamas unconstitutional actions would, inter alia, be permitted to usurp the Houses legislative authority.
57.

WHEREFORE, the House prays that the Court (i) declare that JCPOA compromises

Americas commitment to Israels security and support for Israels right to exist, (ii) enjoin defendant
Obama from implementing the JCPOA on or after December 15, 2015, (iii) enjoin defendant Obama from
inter alia dropping statutory sanctions against Iran, and (iv)enjoin defendant Obama from changing,
specifically regarding Iran, the status quo until/unless any pact with Iran (either concluded bilaterally or in
conjunction with others) is properly referred and approved in accordance with Article I of the Constitution.

18

Count IV
If Deemed to be Exempt from Undermining Israels Basic Security Needs,
Defendant Obama Improperly Implemented the INARA for Two Reasons
The Statute was Passed in a Fashion That Failed to Comport with Congressional Intent, and the
Statutes Notification Requirements Have Yet to Have Been Satisfied
And, Thus, Defendant Obama Cannot Invoke the Existence of INARA
to Justify Any Claim that the JCPOA has received Congressional Approval.
58.

The House incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 57, above, as if set forth

fully herein.
59.

Defendant Obama constantly misinformed Congress (and the Public) that the JCPOA

would not address conventional arms, as reflected both in the INARA and in Congressional Testimony.
60.

Defendant Obama constantly withheld documents from Congressional review during the

60 days after he submitted the JCPOA under the INARA, despite the facts that their disclosure was
mandated by the INARA and that he could have acquired these documents from the IAEA.
61.

If the JCPOA remains construed as having received Congressional approval pursuant to

the INARA, then the impending implementation thereofwhich entails release from Congressionallypassed sanctionswould injure, and would continue to injure, the House; defendant Obamas
unconstitutional actions would, inter alia, be permitted to usurp the Houses legislative authority.
62.

WHEREFORE, the House prays that the Court (i) declare that the JCPOA did not receive

Congressional approval via the INARA, (ii) enjoin defendant Obama from implementing the JCPOA on or
after December 15, 2015, (iii) enjoin defendant Obama from inter alia dropping statutory sanctions against
Iran, and (iv)enjoin defendant Obama from changing, specifically regarding Iran, the status quo
until/unless any pact with Iran (either concluded bilaterally or in conjunction with others) is properly
referred and approved in accordance with Article I of the Constitution.
Count V
If Deemed to Having Been Properly Approved Pursuant to the INARA,
The JCPOA Should be Construed as Having Violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
63.

The House incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 62, above, as if set forth

fully herein.
64.

The JCPOA violates Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

because it allows the United States (a nuclear-weapon state) to permit Iran (a non-nuclear-weapon
state) to obtain nuclear weapons by two pathways.

19

65.

Specifically, during the lifetime of the JCPOA, the United States has essentially approved

international control over implementation of unprecedented and inadequate IAEA inspection safeguards
(e.g., self-inspection instead of anywhere/anytime inspection) allowing for surreptitious nuclear weapon
development; furthermore, following expiration of the JCPOA, the United States has approved the
unimpeded capacity of Iran to obtain nuclear weapons.
66.

If monitoring of Irans compliance with the JCPOA is to be outsourced to the IAEA, then

the impending implementation thereofwhich entails release from Congressionally-passed sanctions

would injure, and would continue to injure, the House; defendant Obamas unconstitutional actions would,
inter alia, be permitted to usurp the Houses legislative authority.
67.

WHEREFORE, the House prays that the Court (i) declare that the JCPOA violates the

NPT, (ii) enjoin defendant Obama from implementing the JCPOA on or after December 15, 2015, (iii)
enjoin defendant Obama from inter alia dropping statutory sanctions against Iran, and (iv)enjoin
defendant Obama from changing, specifically regarding Iran, the status quo until/unless any pact with Iran
(either concluded bilaterally or in conjunction with others) is properly referred and approved in accordance
with Article I of the Constitution.
Count VI
If Any Component of the JCPOA is Deemed Unapproved,
The Entire Document Cannot be Implemented.
68.

The House incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 67, above, as if set forth

fully herein.
69.

Because neither the JCPOA nor the INARA contains a severability clause, the entire

INARA must be applied to the entire JCPOA; anything contradictory or inapplicable when comparing these
two documents voids approving the JCPOA by employing the INARA.
70.

If the JCPOA is implemented despite any component thereof to be deemed enforceable

(recalling also that this document has not been signed by any of the involved parties), then the impending
implementation thereofwhich entails release from Congressionally-passed sanctionswould injure, and
would continue to injure, the House; defendant Obamas unconstitutional actions would, inter alia, be
permitted to usurp the Houses legislative authority.

20

71.

WHEREFORE, the House prays that the Court (i) declare that at least one component of

the JCPOA violates the United States Constitution and/or at least one statute (including, in particular, the
INARA), (ii) enjoin defendant Obama from implementing the JCPOA on or after December 15, 2015, (iii)
enjoin defendant Obama from inter alia dropping statutory sanctions against Iran, and (iv)enjoin
defendant Obama from changing, specifically regarding Iran, the status quo until/unless any pact with Iran
(either concluded bilaterally or in conjunction with others) is properly referred and approved in accordance
with Article I of the Constitution.

Addendum:
It is noted that the letter from the State Department to Congressman Pompeo [Exhibit A] contains a
classic grammatical error that may misconvey the actual dynamics of what occurred during protracted
deliberations. Ms. Frifield wrote: The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran, the P5 + 1
and the European Union. When the dynamics of more than two entities are being depicted, the correct
preposition is among. This may reflect the mindset that commitments were being perceived and
portrayed in retrospect as having been bilateral when, recalling press reports, differing perspectives and
priorities existed among the players. Specifically, some have argued that the United States was functioning
from a position of strength while acting eager for a pact, whereas Iran was functioning from a position of
weakness while acting passively throughout. In any case, most observers concluded that the ultimate
outcome was driven by the POTUS and, therefore, undermining its implementation could yield revelations
that other entities harbored doubt as to its wisdom.

21

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the House respectfully prays that this Court:
A.

Enter declaratory relief as follows:

(i)

With respect to Count I, declare that the unsigned JCPOA cannot be

implemented due to the inability to identify responsible parties;

(ii)

With respect to Count II, declare that the JCPOA cannot be

implemented because, as an unratified Treaty, its approval would violate Article II, 2,
Clause 2 of the Constitution;
(iii)

With respect to Count III, declare that the JCPOA cannot be

implemented pursuant to the INARA because it compromises the commitment of the

United States to Israels security and, specifically, its support for Israels right to exist;
(iv)

With respect to Count IV, declare that the JCPOA cannot be

implemented pursuant to the INARA because Congress (and the public) received both
misleading and incomplete information from the Administration;
(v)

With respect to Count V, declare that the JCPOA cannot be

implemented pursuant to the INARA because the JCPOA violates the NPT; and
(vi)

With respect to Count VI, declare that that at least one component of

the JCPOA violates the United States Constitution and/or at least one statute (including,
in particular, the INARA).
B.

Enter injunctive relief as follows, with respect to Counts I, II, III, IV, V and VI:
(i)

Enjoin defendant Obama from implementing the JCPOA on or after

December 15, 2015;

(ii)

Enjoin defendant Obama from inter alia dropping statutory sanctions

against Iran; and

(iii)

Enjoin defendant Obama from changing, specifically regarding Iran,

the status quo until/unless any pact with Iran (either concluded bilaterally or in
conjunction with others) is properly referred and approved in accordance with Article I of
the Constitution.

22

C.

Grant the House such other and further relief as may be just and proper under the

circumstances.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jonathan Turley
JONATHAN TURLEY
DC Bar No. 417674
2000 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20052
(202) 285-8163
jturley@law.gwu.edu
Of Counsel: KERRY W. KIRCHER, General Counsel
DC Bar No. 386816
WILLIAM PITTARD, Deputy General Counsel
DC Bar No. 482949
TODD B. TATELMAN, Assistant Counsel
VA Bar No. 66008
ELENI M. ROUMEL, Assistant Counsel
SC Bar No. 75763
ISAAC B. ROSENBERG, Assistant Counsel
DC Bar No. 998900
KIMBERLY HAMM, Assistant Counsel
DC Bar No. 1020989
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
219 Cannon House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-9700
Counsel for Plaintiff
United States House of Representatives
November 21, 2014

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