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Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 15, Number 2, April 1977,

pp. 202-207 (Article)
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DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.0062

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Notes and Discussions

FORMS IN T H E P H I L E B U S
In a recently published monograph, 1 Roger Shiner argues that there is no textual
evidence in the Philebus incompatible with the thesis of revisionism, i.e., the view
that Plato in his later dialogues a b a n d o n e d the "choristic" ontology of the middle
dialogues, which held that Forms exist in an intelligible world of their own apart from
the world of sensible particulars. Shiner c o n c e d e s that little or no positive evidence
in favor of revisionism can be found in the Philebus-- for this evidence, he thinks, we
must look to the other late dialogues--but his weaker claim is nevertheless vital to
the revisionist thesis, since the Philebus contains passages which seem prima facie to
endorse the theory of T r a n s c e n d e n t Forms. I shall argue that Shiner does not
succeed in neutralizing this prima facie a p p e a r a n c e of endorsement, and therefore
that his defense of revisionism fails.
T h e crucial portion of the text is Philebus 55-62, in which Plato rates different
kinds of knowledge according to their purity. He concludes that the purest kind is
the art of dialectic, which is pre-eminent in virtue of its object. That is, by dialectic
we have "the cognition of that which is, that which exists in reality, ever unc h a n g e d . . . " (58a, Hackforth translation). Such knowledge is contrasted with the
study of "the universe around us, how it came to be, how it does things and how
things happen to i t . . . " (59a). This latter study is inferior because it "has nothing to
do with that which always is, but only with what is coming into being, or will come, or
has c o m e " (59a). No precise or exact truth can be attached to things "none of which
are at this present, or ever were, or ever will be free from change" (59b), and we
cannot "get a p e r m a n e n t grasp on anything that is entirely devoid of permanence"
(59b). Thus,
we find fixity, purity, truth and what we have called perfect clarity, either in those things that are
always unchanged, unaltered and free of all admixture, or in what is most akin to them; everything
else must becalled inferior and of secondary importance. (59c)
Surely, we want to say, Plato is here reiterating the theme of the middle dialogues:
the Forms, as unchangeable objects of the knowledge obtained by dialectic, are
contrasted with the transitory-- and therefore inferior-- objects of sense. Admittedly
the Forms receive no explicit mention in these passages, but the text could only with
difficulty be read as referring to anything else. It is to provide just such an alternative
reading that Shiner sets as his main task. He concedes that these passages indeed
espouse a sort of ontological dualism, but he argues that nothing in the Philebus
implies that this is a dualism between sensible particulars and T r a n s c e n d e n t Forms.
Rather, the only sort of ontological dualism to which the text commits Plato is that of
concepts and their instantiations in sensible particulars. Concepts, on this interpretation, are real, objective entities, in no way mind-dependent, which yet have no
Knowledge and Reality in Plato's Philebus (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1974).

[2021

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

203

separate existence as " p a r a d i g m s existing in a t r a n s c e n d e n t world of their own,

unseen by mortal eye. ''2 This ontological distinction b e t w e e n c o n c e p t s and instances
is sufficient, Shiner supposes, to a c c o u n t for the parallel epistemological distinction
b e t w e e n knowledge of sensible things and knowledge of the unchangeable. This
latter sort of knowledge is simply knowledge of the definitions of a priori c o n c e p t s
and as such is timeless and eternal, being a m a t t e r of logical or c o n c e p t u a l - - a s
o p p o s e d to empirical--inquiry. Shiner thus allows that the Philebus shows Plato to
believe that there are timeless c o n c e p t u a l truths which constitute the highest, most
perfect kind of knowledge, but he maintains that this no m o r e c o m m i t s Plato to a
belief in t r a n s c e n d e n t entities than it does Aristotle, who also upholds the p r i m a c y of
c o n c e p t u a l knowledge.
This invocation of Aristotle is significant, since, although Shiner does not specifically discuss the sort of ontological status c o n c e p t s are supposed to have in the
Philebus, the only possibility, so far as I can see, is to m a k e Plato an i m m a n e n t realist
along Aristotelian lines. T h a t is, Shiner admits that "Plato u n d o u b t e d l y thought a
kind of knowledge required a kind of object," and that "this is a version of . . .
Realism," so that c o n c e p t s must be objects having some kind of ontological status. 3
Now, if c o n c e p t s are real entities in their own right, instantiated in sensible particulars without being identified with these instances (e.g., what I a m wearing is an
instance of the c o n c e p t "shirt" and not the c o n c e p t itself), and yet having no
existence a p a r t f r o m sensible particulars, there seems no alternative but to c o n c l u d e
that c o n c e p t s are i m m a n e n t in particulars.
Implicit in Shiner's interpretation of the Philebus, then, is the view of Plato as an
i m m a n e n t realist. 4 One c o n s e q u e n c e of an i m m a n e n t realist ontology which Shiner
does not mention, but which Plato would surely have found distasteful, is that
i m m a n e n t forms exist only b e c a u s e and insofar as particulars exist to facilitate their
instantiation. T h e i m m a n e n t form, or concept, of horseness has ontological status
only insofar as horses themselves exist. Should horses b e c o m e extinct, the c o n c e p t
as well would cease to have ontological status. T o maintain otherwise would be
effectively to a d m i t that the c o n c e p t of horseness is not really i m m a n e n t in, b e c a u s e
not really ontologically d e p e n d e n t on, horses at all. Aristotle, at least on Ross's
account, never succeeds in formulating a consistent view on this issue in his own
version of i m m a n e n t realism. On the one hand, a c c o r d i n g to Ross, Aristotle holds
that "no specific f o r m ever begins or ceases to be; it only c o m e s to be actualized in
fresh individuals. ''s On the other hand, " f o r m is eternal only by virtue of the neverfailing succession of its e m b o d i m e n t s . ''6 T h e first view reflects Aristotle's desire to
preserve the eternality of objects of c o n c e p t u a l knowledge, and the second view
2 Ibid., p. 63.
3 Ibid., pp. 63, 61. Shiner subsequently says (p. 64) that concepts are "objects" only in a general and
aseptic sense. By his prior admission, however, the sense cannot be so general and aseptic as to exclude all
ontological import whatsoever but only so as to exclude that particular interpretation in which "object" is
equivalent to "Transcendent Form."
4 A few commentators, of course, have supposed that Plato always held Forms to be immanent in
particulars, even in the middle dialogues; but Shiner correctly points out the implausibility of such an
interpretation, arguing, for example, that the model-copy imagery of the Republic is appropriate only
where Forms exist separately from particulars.
5 W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen, 1949), p. 178.
6 Ibid., p. 175.

204

H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

reflects his realization that this eternality is sustained only by the continued existence of particulars, which implies that a termination of this "eternality" is conceivable.
Now, I find it difficult to believe that Plato could h a v e failed to see this conseq u e n c e of i m m a n e n t realism, and equally difficult to believe that he could have
e m b r a c e d it. T h e ontological d e p e n d e n c e of forms u p o n particulars would have
b e e n intolerable, not only for the a u t h o r of the middle dialogues, but for the author
of the Philebus as well, judging by the tenor of the passages already cited. Fortunately, the a r g u m e n t against regarding the Philebus as a s t a t e m e n t of i m m a n e n t realism
does not rest entirely on such general considerations; there is also specific and
compelling textual evidence, to which I now turn.
In Philebus 61 the task is set of trying to d e t e r m i n e the recipe for the mixture of
pleasure and knowledge which constitutes the good life. T h e conclusion finally
r e a c h e d is that all kinds of knowledge, but only certain kinds of pleasure, belong in
such a mixture. In the course of arriving at this conclusion, Plato considers the
suggestion that only the highest kind of knowledge should be admitted to the
mixture. W h a t is of interest to us is not the ultimate rejection of this suggestion, but
the m a n n e r in which the suggestion is posed, revealing as it does ontological assumptions incompatible with i m m a n e n t realism. Thus, in 61e the point once again is made
that there are different kinds of knowledge, "one having regard to the things that
c o m e into being and perish, the other to those that do not c o m e into being nor perish,
but are always, u n c h a n g e d and unaltered." In order to s e e w h e t h e r this latter type of
knowledge alone suffices as the knowledge-ingredient of the mixture, Socrates asks
P r o t a r c h u s to
imagine a man who understands what Justice itself is, and can give an account of it conformable to his knowledge, and who moreover has a like understanding of all else that is. . . . Will
such a man be adequately possessed of knowledge, if he can give his account of the divine
Circle and the Divine Sphere themselves, but knows nothing of these human spheres and
circles of ours, so that, when he is building a house, the rules that he uses, no less than the
circles, are of the other sort? (62a-b)7
P r o t a r c h u s replies, "I a m m o v e d to mirth, Socrates, by this description we are giving
of ourselves confined to divine knowledge" (62b). Socrates then asks whether we are
to "throw in alongside of our other ingredients the art of the false rule and false
circle, with all the lack of fixity and purity it involves" (62b). P r o t a r c h u s admits that
we must "if we are going to find the way h o m e when we want it" (62b).
W h a t does this passage tell us a b o u t the ontology of the Philebus? First of all, we
are given Justice itself, the Divine Circle, and the Divine Sphere as examples of the
objects of "divine knowledge," i.e., knowledge of those things that neither c o m e into
being nor perish. In passing immediately and without qualification f r o m the example
of Justice to the examples of the Divine Circle and Sphere, Plato can reasonably be
t a k e n to imply that there is no relevant difference b e t w e e n the examples; there is, in
7Shiner critizes Hackforth for prejudicing the issue by capitalizing "Justice" in 62a. There is in any case,
as I shall argue, ample independent justification for regarding Plato as referring here to a Transcendent
Form. My criticism of Hackforth is that, for the sake of consistency, he should have capitalized "Divine
Circle" and "Divine Sphere" as well, since they are here treated on a par with Justice; and I have therefore
emended the quotation accordingly.

N O T E S AND DISCUSSIONS

205

other words, no suggestion here of the doctrine of mathematical intermediaries? In

each case we have a straightforward example of a F o r m o r - - a s Shiner prefers to
s a y - - a concept. T h e question then is, Are these concepts transcendent, or are they
immanent in their instances? If Plato were an immanent realist, he would have to say
that we arrive at the c o n c e p t of a circle by a process of abstraction from sensible
circles; such is indeed the view of Aristotle. On this view, the c o n c e p t is not something other than sensible circles, but rather is what remains of these circles when all
that is extraneous to the c o n c e p t itself (and for Aristotle this would include both
sensible and intelligible matter) is r e m o v e d by abstraction. On such an a c c o u n t of
the relation between the c o n c e p t and its instances, the situation we are asked by
Plato to imagine, in which someone has knowledge of the c o n c e p t but is completely
ignorant of the instances--i.e., knows the Divine Circle but not sensible circles--is
unintelligible.
If, on the other hand, the Divine Circle is taken to be a T r a n s c e n d e n t Form,
related to sensible circles as a model is to its copies, the situation we are asked to
imagine is at least intelligible, if not likely. I say "not likely" because we would e x p e c t
knowledge of sensible circles to precede knowledge (and possibly to serve as a
needed stimulus for recollection) of the Divine Circle itself. Plato, however, is not
claiming as a serious possibility that there could be people of high intelligence who
possess no m u n d a n e knowledge whatsoever; he is merely trying to show, by means of
a humorous illustration, that mundane knowledge does indeed have value. In any
case, however bizarre is the supposition that there could be someone who had
knowledge of the Divine Circle but no knowledge of the "false" circles found in sense
experience, it is not even bizarre, it is nonsensical to distinguish the Divine Circle
from sensible circles as two different sorts of circle, if the former exists only as
instantiated in the latter.
In general, knowledge of immanent forms c a n n o t be had apart from knowledge of
what they are immanent in, and that Plato could even suppose for the sake of
argument that someone might exist who possesses only the highest knowledge, and
no knowledge of sensible particulars, shows that he c a n n o t be regarding these
objects of the highest knowledge as being i m m a n e n t in, and discovered by abstraction from, sensible particulars.
T h e discussion of knowledge and its object in Philebus 55-62 thus seems to
constitute solid evidence that Plato retained to the e n d - - f o r the Philebus is almost
certainly one of the latest dialogues--a belief in the existence of T r a n s c e n d e n t
Forms. Shiner, however, has a strategy by which he attempts to neutralize what
seems to be the obvious ontological implications of this discussion of knowledge. His
line of argument, in its essentials, is this: T h e Republic, in which the ontological
doctrine of transcendent realism is given its classic expression, links this doctrine to
an epistemological doctrine in which knowledge is only of Forms, and all else is a
matter of opinion. In Philebus 55-62, however, the knowledge of the philosopher,
though the highest kind, is nevertheless regarded as only one kind of knowledge
among many. Since this view is incompatible with the earlier doctrine of epistemological exclusiveness, there is reason to suppose that Plato has revised his earlier
ontological views as well.
s Even if we did suppose that the Divine Circle and Sphere were mathematical intermediaries, Shiner's
ease for immanent realism would not be helped, since such intermediaries are themselves transcendent
entities of a sort, though not full-fledgedForms.

206

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

For a number of reasons, this argument clearly will not do. First of all, a departure
from the epistemology of the Republic so as to allow, e.g., carpentry as a genuine
branch of knowledge is perfectly compatible with the retention of an ontology of
Transcendent Forms. Shiner evidently thinks otherwise, stating as he does that such
a view of knowledge coupled with the theory of Transcendent Forms makes for
"impossible bed-mates, "9 but he gives no justification for this claim. Of course, this
charge of incompatibility is true--indeed, trivially true--if we accept his earlier
claim l~ that the doctrine of epistemological exclusiveness is an essential element of
the theory of Transcendent Forms. But the problem then concerns the aptness of
this characterization of the theory, and I see nothing which compels us to tie the
ontological claim of transcendent realism to this particular epistemological view.
In any case, the epistemological differences between the Republic and the Philebus are, for our purposes, of minimal consequence. No great concession is made in
allowing sensible particulars to be objects of an inferior sort of knowledge, as
opposed to being objects merely of opinion. On either distinction, the contrast
between such objects and Forms is preserved. Furthermore, Philebus 59 shows that
while Plato is willing to allow that we can have an inferior sort of knowledge of
changeable objects (since he denies of such objects only that they are associated
with "knowledge that gives perfect truth" [59b], which implies that they are in fact
objects of some kind of knowledge) he also allows in the same passage that those arts
which concern themselves with such changeable objects, e.g., cosmology, belong to
the realm of opinion (59e). There is admittedly a difficulty in understanding how
Plato can consistently hold that objects of knowledge, even of an inferior kind of
knowledge, are yet confined to the realm of opinion. Clearly, opinion cannot here
serve, as it did in the Republic, to characterize those objects of which there could be
no knowledge whatsoever. It of course continues as before to mark off the same class
of objects-- viz., those objects which are subject to change-- now doing so, however,
no longer on the basis that such objects cannot be known at all, but rather on the
basis that they cannot be known in the truest and most perfect manner. There are
obvious reasons why Plato should want to retract the extreme position of the
Republic and allow knowledge other than that of Forms; not to do so is to ignore and
to leave inexplicable the distinction which, as is acknowledged in the Theatetus, we
are able to draw between knowledge and belief within the scope of ordinary experience. What is confusing is that Plato should continue, in Philebus 59, to characterize
the whole realm of changeable objects, within which a legitimate distinction between knowledge and opinion can be maintained, as itself a realm of opinion.
Probably this is explained simply as a terminological vestige of the Republic. Whatever difficulty we may have in explaining Plato's use of the term "opinion" here, the
fact that he continues to use language reminiscent of his earlier epistemological
views, even at the risk of inconsistency, indicates that he retains a fundamental
sympathy for these views and tells against Shiner's contention that Plato's outlook in
the Philebus has undergone radical change either in epistemology or ontology.
Finally, the compatibility of the theory of Transcendent Forms with an extension
of the application of the term "knowledge" to cover sensible objects is shown by a
9 Shiner, p. 60.
1oIbid., p. 23.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

207

passage in the Phaedrus. Describing the ascension of the soul to that place b e y o n d
the heavens where "true being dwells" and "all true knowledge is knowledge thereof"
(247c, Hackforth translation), Plato says that while the soul
is borne round she discerns justice, its very self, and likewise temperance, and knowledge, not the
knowledge that is neighbor to Becoming and varies with the various objects to which we commonly
ascribe being, but the veritable knowledge of Being that veritably is. (247d -e)
Surely there can be no d o u b t that the Phaedrus, especially in this very passage,
endorses an ontology of T r a n s c e n d e n t Forms; and yet Plato here admits, using
essentially the same distinction between true and inferior knowledge that he later
uses in the Philebus, that there can be a sort of knowledge which is nevertheless not
"the veritable knowledge of Being."
For these reasons, Shiner fails to reconcile Philebus 55-62 with the thesis of
revisionism. Despite Shiner's arguments, then, I conclude that the Philebus provides
substantial evidence that Plato never gave up the theory of T r a n s c e n d e n t Forms.
ROBERT FAHRNKOPF

University o f British Columbia

ON T H E I N T E L L E C T A N D T H E R A T I O N A L SOUL
T o w a r d the middle of the fifteenth century, in the city of Dham~r, in Yemen, a
Jewish scholar turned his thoughts to creating a synthesis of the philosophic tradiditions to which he was an heir. This thinker, .H8t.er ben Shel8m8 (also k n o w n as
Mansflr ibn Suleim~n), had read al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, al-Ghazzali, the I k h w a n al-Safa'
and other Moslem philosophers. He had also read Maimonides, Saadia, and Halevi,
and had studied Jewish law and midrashic literature..HSt.er then synthesized these
traditions. His theories of the intellect and the rational soul are good examples of this
synthetic skill. 1
In his philosophic Responsa and in his c o m m e n t a r y to the T o r a h entitled S i ~ j al'Uqhl, .HSt.er sets forth the definition of the intellect and its function as followsF
What is the human intellect and what is its function? The answer: The human intellect is an
absolute perfection whose root is in the Agent Intelligence [huwa karnfil mah..d min 'a41al-'aql
al-fa '~l]. 3 Its function is the encompassing of the forms in its essence, according to its essence,
For .Hbt.er's background see my The Commentary of R. H.bt.er ben Shelbmb to the Thirteen Principles of Maimonides, Etudes sur le juda'fsmem6di6val, vol. 6 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973),pp. 3-16. Hereafter
cited as Commentary.
21 hope to publish .Hbt.er'sphilosophic Responsa, or more properly his Questions and Answers, for he
wrote both the questions and the answers. The text of Siraj remains to be edited. Responsum #39 deals
with the intellect and is cited in Commentary, p. 27, as is the quotation from Sirej, whichis from"Shoftim"
a A very unfortunate mixture of terms has occurred here due to two factors: (1) the term 'aql can be
translated as "intelligence" or as "intellect"; (2) the term 'aql, used in the alfarabian-avicennian context of
emanated beings, is usually rendered "Intelligence" but, in the parallel neoplatonic context, it is usually