DOMESTIC AND INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION

RULE 99 ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS

RULE 100 RESCISSION AND REVOCATION OF ADOPTION
1. ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously
referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), G.R. No. 143989,
July 14, 2003
(re: development of Philippine adoption laws; nature of adoption
proceedings; exception to rule on the non-applicability of dura lex
sed lex)
Facts:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up
as their own. The trial court granted the petition for adoption, and
ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo
to Jose Melvin Lahom.
Years later, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite her pleas
and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their
surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and
activities and that respondent was indifferent towards petitioner
and would only come to see her once a year.
Prior to the institution of the case, RA No. 8552, the Domestic
Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the
law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Section
19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads: "Adoption, being in the
best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for
causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code."
The trial court dismissed the petition.
Issue:
WON the subject adoption may still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 and WON the
adopters action had prescribed.
Ruling:

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the

time of the commencement of the action. The controversy should
be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition
was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552
that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted
in 1975. By then, the new law had already abrogated and repealed
the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to
rescind a decree of adoption. So the action for rescission of the
adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had
come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of R A8552, an action to set aside
the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of
the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to
revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The
exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that
could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect
or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption
has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not
naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created
by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's
determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and
welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption
decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of
action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it
has been exercised.
However, an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like
denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his
estate.
2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ZENAIDA
ELEPANO, Presiding Judge of RTC Kalookan, Branch 128 and
CORAZON SANTOS PUNSALAN, G.R. No. 92542, October 15,
1991

(re: nature and purpose of adoption)

Facts:
The private respondent Corazon Santos Punsalan filed a verified
petition for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, Branch CXXVIII praying that after due notice and hearing, the
minors Pinky Gonzales Punsalan, the daughter of her full blood
brother, and Ellyn Mae Punsalan Urbano, the daughter of her full
blood sister, be declared her daughters by adoption for all intents
and purposes. However, private respondent filed a "MOTION FOR
TAKING OF DEPOSITION" on the ground that she received an urgent
call from the United Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland requiring
her to report for work, so much so that she will not be able to
testify at the hearing of her petition yet to be scheduled by the
respondent judge. The respondent judge granted the motion and
ordered that notice of the taking of the deposition be furnished to
the OSG (the only known oppositor in the case). The private
respondent's deposition was taken.
Despite
notice,
no
representative from the OSG appeared to oppose the taking of the
deposition.
The OSG, however, subsequently filed an "Opposition to the
Deposition", averring that Section 1 of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court
allows deposition by leave of Court after jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or property subject of the action.
Since the jurisdictional requirement of publication has not been
complied with, the OSG goes on to argue, the lower court had not
yet acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. The respondent judge
denied the said Opposition. The respondent judge granted the
petition for adoption
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Issue:
WON the jurisdictional requirement of publication should be
complied first to allow the deposition taking in adoption
proceedings.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.

While it is true that in an action in personam, personal service of

summons within the forum or voluntary appearance in the case is
essential for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, in an adoption case which involves the status of a
person, there is no particular defendant to speak of since the action
is one in rem. In such case, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is a non-essential condition for the taking of a deposition
for the jurisdiction of the court is based on its power over the res,
to render judgment with respect to such "thing" (or status, as in
this case) so as to bar indifferently all who might be minded to
make an objection against the right so established. (Banco Espanol
Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Greg Alba vs. de la Cruz, 17 Phil.
49).
Indeed, publication of the scheduled hearing for the petition for
adoption is necessary for the validity of a decree of adoption but
not for the purpose merely of taking a deposition. In taking a
deposition, no substantial rights are affected since depositions may
or may not be presented or may even be objected to when formally
offered as evidence at the trial of the main case later on.
In the instant case, We find no abuse of discretion committed by
the respondent judge in allowing the taking of private respondent's
deposition. Due to urgent and compelling reasons beyond her
control, private respondent could not be present to testify at the
trial of the main case for adoption. The OSG, however, was notified
of the scheduled taking of the deposition, as well as of all the
hearings of the petition for adoption, but the OSG chose not to
attend ALL the said hearings, without explanation. The OSG,
therefore, has no reason to invoke lack of procedural due process.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind
adoption statutes is to promote the welfare of the child and every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that
objective. (Santos et al. vs. Aranzanso, et al. 16 SCRA 353). In the
instant case, the record shows that private respondent's adoption
of the minors shall redound to the best interests of the latter.
3. ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN and MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL
(Branch X) PRESIDED OVER BY HON. JUDGE HERMINIO C.
MARIANO, G.R. No. L-30576, February 10, 1976
(re: construction of adoption laws; applicability of dura lex sed lex)

Facts:

a) Sometime in May, 1967, a child, less than a week old (only 3

days old) 7 was given to petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan
and his wife Maria Lucy Christensen, for them to adopt, by Atty.
Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The child was later on baptized as
Colin Berry Christensen Duncan with the aforementioned espouses
appearing in the records of said baptism as the parents of said
child;

b) Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez on the other hand, received the

infant from the child's unwed mother who told the former never to
reveal her (the mother's) identity because she wanted to get
married and did not want to destroy her future. The mother
instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez to look for a suitable
couple who will adopt the child. The mother did not provide for the
maintenance and support of her child;

c) In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September,

1967, Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, as the de facto guardian
or loco parentis of the child subject of the adoption petition, gave
the written consent required by law;

d) Learning, from the testimony of witness Atty. Corazon de Leon

Velasquez that the natural mother of the child sought to be
adopted was still alive, the court then pressed upon the witness to
reveal the identity of said mother. The witness refused to divulge
the same on the ground that there existed an attorney and client
relationship between them. She had been instructed by her client
not to reveal the latter's identity. She could not now violate such
privilege communication.

Petition was dismissed by the trial court;

The principal reason given for the dismissal of the petition was
that ... the consent given in this petition Exhibit "J" is improper and
falls short of the express requirement of the law. 3

Rationalizing its action respondent Judge said:

Art. 340 (of the Civil Code) provides that the written consent of the
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
2. The guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.
"Under the law aforementioned, it will be noted that the law is
couched in mandatory terms by the word SHALL be necessary, and
it enumerates the persons who will give the consent to the
adoption in the order as follows: parents, guardian, or the person in
charge of the person to be adopted.
It is admitted by witness Velasquez that she knew the identity of
the mother who gave her the child. This being the case, the proper
person who is supposed to give the parental consent to the
adoption should first be, in the order of preference, the parent or
the mother herself. 4

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent court,

dated June 27, 1968, dismissing petitioners' petition to adopt the
minor, Colin Berry Christensen Duncan.

Issues:

1. WON the person who gave the consent for adoption, which in
this case is Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the proper person
required by law to give such consent.

2. WON Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the undisputed custodian

of the abandoned waif may be considered as the guardian under
Art. 340 or the person standing in loco parentis of said infant
contemplated in Art. 349 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:

1.) Going by the set of facts in this case, only one of two persons
particularly described by law may be considered here as legally
capable of giving the required written consent. They are:

Under Art. 340 of the Civil 'Code, the "parent, guardian or person in
charge of the person to be adopted" while the other one is that
mentioned in Section 3, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, describing
it as each of the known living parents "who has not abandoned
such child." The father's consent here is out of the question as the
child is illegitimate and unrecognized.

Since the person whose written consent to the adoption (Atty:

Corazon de Leon Velasquez) is assailed by the trial court as being

unauthorized and had consequently caused the rejection of the

petition, this Tribunal will now look into her alleged authority or lack
thereof to give the controverted consent.

Sometime in May of 1967, the child subject of this adoption

petition, undisputedly declared as only three days old then, was
turned over by its mother to witness Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez. The natural and unwedded mother, from that date on to
the time of the adoption proceedings in court which started in midyear of said 1967, and up to the present, has not bothered to
inquire into the condition of the child, much less to contribute to
the livelihood, maintenance and care of the same. In short, this
parent is the antithesis of that described in the law as "known
living parent who is not insane Or hopelessly intemperate or has
not abandoned such child." We are convinced that in fact said
mother had completely and absolutely abandoned her child. This
Court has previously declared that abandonment imports any
conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose
to forego all parental claims to the child. 12 Applying this legal
yardstick, the unidentified mother of the child in this case can be
declared, as she is hereby declared, as having abandoned her child
with all legal consequences attached thereto.

Having declared that the child was an abandoned one by an

unknown parent, there appears to be no more legal need to require
the written consent of such parent of the child to the adoption.

2. It seems to Us that when the 3-day old baby was left to and
placed in the hands of Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the
helpless infant was in dire need of someone who could give it
protection and sustain its delicate and fragile life. Atty. Velasquez
was under no legal compulsion to accept the child and to extend to

it the protection and care it badly needed. Since there had been no
showing that the identity of the natural mother was made known to
the trial court or to the herein petitioners, nor had said mother seen
fit to present herself before the court despite the public notice
given to the proceedings as required by law, there clearly appears
only one person who could be considered as the guardian
exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child. Since there
was no guardian ad litem appointed by the court and the child not
being in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home or any
benevolent society, there could not have been anyone other than
Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be called
the guardian of said infant.

Dura lex sed lex

The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient
Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the
hard and harsh decision it rendered. While this old adage generally
finds apt application in many other legal cases, in adoption of
children, however, this should be softened so as to apply the law
with less severity and with compassion and humane understanding,
for adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children,
particularly those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a
silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide
homes, love, care and education for unfortunate children, who
otherwise may grow from cynical street urchins to hardened
criminal offenders and become serious social problems, should be
given the widest attitude of sympathy, encouragement and
assistance. The law is not, and should not be made, an instrument
to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy. As often as
is legally and lawfully possible, their texts and intendments should
be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist
with a modicum promise of a useful and constructive existence.

If we are now to sustain the decision of the court below, this

Tribunal will be doing a graver injustice to all concerned particularly
to said spouses, and worse, it will be imposing a cruel sanction on
this innocent child and on all other children who might be similarly
situated. It is Our view that it is in consonance with the true spirit
and purpose of the law, and with the policy of the State, to uphold,
encourage and give life and meaning to the existence of family
relations.

4. HERBERT CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses

RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, G.R. No.
105308, September 25, 1998
(re: construction of adoption laws; substantial compliance rule;
parental consent in adoption proceedings; meaning of
abandonment)
Facts:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her
husband's extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the
petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United
States. The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to
Anna,
reserving
the
rights
of
visitation
to
Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3
minor children. Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was
already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption,
holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written consent of the
natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of
the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held
that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert
elevated the case to the Court.
Issue:
WON the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written
consent of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has
abandoned them.
Ruling:
Yes.

Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for

adoption, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption
has remained a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the
Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by the
child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not insane
or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the
natural parent for the decree of adoption to be valid unless the
parent has abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or
hopelessly
intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which
parents owe their children."
In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that
would forego his parental duties and relinquish all parental claims
over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical
abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent,
he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care
and support for his children. The Court find pieces of documentary
evidence that he maintained regular communications with his wife
and children through letters and telephone, and send them
packages catered to their whims.
Meaning of Abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the
parent to forego parental duties and relinquish parental claims to
the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso,
supra), or the withholding of the parents presence, his care and
the opportunity to display voluntary affection.
5. MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR,
G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994
(re: effect of non-observance or non-conduct of adoption
proceedings)
Case:

This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29,
1992.
Facts:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various
properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982.
Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died
intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On
September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and
Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively)
instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of
Vicentes estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar before the
RTC of San Pablo City. They alleged that,
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they
ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary,
petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do so,
that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who predeceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extrajudicial, were without issue and/or without descendants
whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised
and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them
by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir.
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged
that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and
capable of administering his estate.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's
heirship to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that
she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary evidence, among
others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth; (2) Baptismal Certificate; (3)
Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the
GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter; and (4) School
Records. She also testified that the said spouses reared and
continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other
hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial
evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their

marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was
even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetriciangynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria BenitezLirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age,
categorically declared that petitioner was not the biological child of
the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the
petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents petition for letters
and administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate
daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the
Family Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on
May 29, 1992 by the Court of Appeals declaring that Marissa
Benitez is not the biological daughter or child by nature of the
spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore,
not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition
to the petition for the appointment of an administrator of the
intestate of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently,
denied; said petition and the proceedings already conducted
therein reinstated; and the lower court is directed to proceed with
the hearing of the petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in accordance with law and the Rules. In
juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in
applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
Issue:
WON the appellate court erred in finding that Marissa Benitez is not
the biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the
deceased Vicente O. Benitez.
Ruling:
No. The petitioners evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her
biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the
evidence on record is strong and convincing that she is not, but
that said couple being childless and desirous as they were of
having a child, the late Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from
somewhere while still a baby, and without he and his wife's legally
adopting her treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved her

as their own true child, giving her the status as not so, such that
she herself had believed that she was really their daughter and
entitled to inherit from them as such.
The evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never
became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child. Isabel's
own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted that his
sister had already been married for ten years and was already
about 36 years old and still she has not begotten or still could not
bear a child, so that he even had to refer her to the late Dr.
Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent obstetriciangynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who treated his
sister for a number of years. There is likewise the testimony of the
elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez
Lirio, who then, being a teacher, helped him (he being the only boy
and the youngest of the children of their widowed mother) through
law school, and whom Vicente and his wife highly respected and
consulted on family matters, that her brother Vicente and his wife
Isabel being childless, they wanted to adopt her youngest daughter
and when she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt elsewhere,
that Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel wanted a baby girl as
she feared a boy might grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and that
Vicente finally brought home a baby girl and told his elder sister
Victoria he would register the baby as his and his wife's child.
Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old and too weak to
travel and come to court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of her
testimony by the presiding judge of the lower court had to be held
at her residence in Paraaque, MM. Considering, her advanced age
and weak physical condition at the time she testified in this case,
Victoria Benitez Lirio's testimony is highly trustworthy and credible,
for as one who may be called by her Creator at any time, she would
hardly be interested in material things anymore and can be
expected not to lie, especially under her oath as a witness. There
were also several disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule,
Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who testified in this
case and declared that they used to see Isabel almost everyday
especially as she had drugstore in the ground floor of her house,
but they never saw her to have been pregnant, in 1954 (the year
appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born, according to her birth
certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and that it is also true with
the rest of their townmates. Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel
Chipongian's personal beautician who used to set her hair once a
week at her (Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that she did not

see Isabel ever become pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never
delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby Marissa in her
crib one day she went to Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she
was surprised and asked the latter where the baby came from, and
"she told me that the child was brought by Atty. Benitez and told
me not to tell about it".
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with
child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be
hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never
became pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered a baby
at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a
baby as if it were her own, especially at the rather late age of 36
(the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was
allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true mother of
that baby.
Petitioners birth certificate with the late Vicente O. Benitez
appearing as the informant is highly questionable and suspicious.
For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who was already 36 years old at the
time of the child's supposed birth, was truly the mother of that
child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should the
child not have been born in a hospital under the experienced,
skillful and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist Dr.
Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by
Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and
even life? How come, then, that as appearing in appellee's birth
certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home in
Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a
midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a
practice in recent times for people who want to avoid the expense
and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register the child as
their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez,
though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble if
not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through court
proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife as the parents
of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to
legally adopt the child when she grew a little older but did not
come around doing so either because he was too busy or for some
other reason. But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or
her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a
valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an

adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts
of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth
certificate, which is a public document.
6. RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON,
BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE DE LEON and IRMA L. VELOSO,
G.R. No. L-43955-56, July 30, 1979
(re: how to prove adoption; applicability of the rule on evidence of
pedigree)
Facts:
Dr. Mariano Lazatin died intestate, he was survived by his wife,
Margarita de Asis and his two adopted twin daughters, Nora de
Leon and Irma Lazatin. One month after Mariano's death, Margarita
de Asis, commenced an intestate proceeding. Mariano, Oscar,
Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming to be admitted illegitimate children of
Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz, intervened. Subsequently, one
Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another admitted
illegitimate (not natural) child. Two months after or on April 11,
1974, the widow, Margarita de Asis, also died, leaving a &
holographic will executed on May 29, 1970, providing, among
others, for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent
Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo
Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to
Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta.
Clara. During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit
box at the People's Bank and Trust Company which either she or
respondent Nora L. de Leon could open. Five days after Margarita's
death, respondent Nora L. de Leon, accompanied by her husband,
respondent Bernardo de Leon, opened the safety deposit box and
removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers
and those of her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry
belonging to her and to her mother. Respondent Nora L. de Leon
claims that she opened the safety deposit box in good faith,
believing that it was held jointly by her and her deceased mother.
Her sole reason for opening the box was to get her stock
certificates and other small items deposited therein. When she was
to close the deposit box, the bank personnel informed her that she
needed an authority from the court to do so, in view of her
mother's death. Private respondents then filed a petition to probate
the will of the late Margarita de Asis. Days after having learned that
respondent Nora L. de Leon had opened this safety deposit box,

petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in the probate

court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will subsequent
to that submitted for probate and demanding its production. He
likewise prayed for the opening of the safety deposit box.
Respondent Nora L. de Leon admitted that she opened the box but
there was no will or any document resembling a will therein. Upon
the order of the probate court, the safety deposit box was opened,
at which time it was found to be empty, because prior thereto
respondent Nora L. de Leon had already removed its contents.
Seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner
intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate
of the late Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin as an admitted illegitimate child.
Under the same date, Ramon filed a petition in the estate
proceedings of Margarita de Asis to examine private respondents
on the contents of the safety deposit box, Whereupon, the probate
court ordered respondent Nora L. de Leon to deliver the properties
taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of Court.
Subsequently, however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P,
Mariano Lazatin, and 2341-P, Margarita de Asis) were transferred to
the sala of respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr. Petitioner Renato
to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in the
estate of Margarita de Asis, as an adopted child, on the basis of an
affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr.
Mariano M. Lazatin, the petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr.
Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was later
modified on August 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted
by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis.
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an
adopted son in the estate of Margarita de Asis at which hearings
petitioner presented no decree of adoption in his, favor. Instead,
petitioner attempted to prove, over private respondents' objections,
that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; he
had been supported by them until their death; formerly he was
known as "Renato Lazatin" but was compelled to change his
surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give
consent to his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and his
wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of
Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to the Mercy
Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased spouses,
where they continuously resided up to the present. Photographs
were also intended to be presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph
of Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of petitioner;
photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis and petitioner when he
was a boy; document showing that petitioners real name is

"Renato Lazatin."
Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents'
objections to the admission of petitioner's evidence but when
petitioner could not present evidence on the issue of his alleged
legal adoption, respondent court discontinued the hearing on the
ground that Renato and Ramon Sta. Clara do not prove or have no
tendency to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding where
the adoption of the parties above named were taken up by any
court. Neither do the evidence tend to establish the presence of
any record of a proceeding in court where the adoption of the
above named persons was held. The evidence, however, tends to
prove a status of a recognized natural child which, however, is not
the legal basis for which Renato and Ramon seek to intervene in
this proceedings.
Issue:
WON Renatos petition successfully established his status and WON
his evidence is admissible to prove his pedigree.
Ruling:
Court ruled in the negative. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding
in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an
adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in
this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and
entirely artificial.
To establish the relation, the statutory
requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption
is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but
must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence.
The destruction by fire of a public building in which the adoption
papers would have been filed if existent does not give rise to a
presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an
adoption proceeding to be presumed. On the contrary, the absence
of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its
non-existence. Where, under the provisions of the statute, an
adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court
constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be
established. Petitioners evidences fail to show that at one time or
another a specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an
adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses an order
approving his adoption as a child of the latter. No judicial records of

such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be

presented. Petitioner merely proceeds from a nebulous assumption
that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and 1932.
The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as
provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence
that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been
treated as a child to establish such adoption. 9 Even evidence of
declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended
to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of
the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of
his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not
sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. 10 Nor does the fact that
the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and
referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily
establish adoption of the child.
The court further ruled that pedigree testimonies, although
hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are natural
expression of persons who must know the truth but before a
declaration of a deceased person can be admitted to prove
pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship of the declarant, by either of
blood or affinity to the family in question, or a branch thereof, must
ordinarily be established by competent evidence.
Secondary evidence may also be admissible where the adoption
proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the
introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct
order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents;
although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion
of the court. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first
established that such adoption paper really existed and was lost.
This is indispensable. Petitioner's supposed adoption was only
testified to by him and is allegedly to be testified to a brother of the
deceased Mariano M. Lazatin or others who have witnessed that
the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption
was really made, the records thereof should have existed and the
same presented at the hearing or subsequent thereto or a
reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be the
case, adduced.
Thus, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot
properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de
Asis, as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one

to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an

interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an
heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.
7. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE RODOLFO
TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba,
Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A.
CLOUSE, G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994
(re: joint adoption by husband and wife)
Facts:
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US
Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a former Filipino who became a
naturalized US citizen on August 19, 1988, filed a petition to adopt
Solomon Alcala, a twelve (12) year old minor who is Evelyn's
youngest brother. They got married on June 4, 1981. Since 1981 to
1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon
Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of
private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His
mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption
due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the
Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the
petition for adoption.
Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law and that the adoption
will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, the trial
court granted the petition. Republic, through the Office of
the Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower court
erred in granting the petition for the spouses are not qualified to
adopt under Philippine Law.
Issue:
WON Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt;
Ruling:
No. Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise
known
as
"The
Family Code
of
the

Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred

from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own

illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other.

(3) An alien, except:

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and

wife, a condition that must be read along together with
Article 184.

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a

relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his
or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks
to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may
adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules
on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is
not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the
exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he
is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the
United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph
Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate
child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents
spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph
Alcala on February 21, 1990, privaterespondent Evelyn A. Clouse
was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship
when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may
appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O.
209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her
younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition foradoption cannot be
granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which
mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in
the following cases:

Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is

mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to
be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses.
We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage
adoption and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote that objective. 11 Adoption is geared more towards the
promotion of the welfare of the child and enhancement of his
opportunities for a useful and happy life. 12 It is not the
bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the child that should
be the principal criterion in adoption cases. 13 Executive Order 209
likewise upholds that the interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted should be the paramount consideration. These
considerations notwithstanding, the records of the case do not
evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the adoption of the
minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are
aliens.
Petition is GRANTED.
8. ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN and MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL
(Branch X) PRESIDED OVER BY HON. JUDGE HERMINIO C.
MARIANO, G.R. No. L-30576, February 10, 1976
(re: parental consent in adoption proceedings)
Facts:
A child, less than a week old (only 3 days old) 7 was given to
petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and his wife Maria Lucy
Christensen, for them to adopt, by Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez.
The child was later on baptized as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan.

Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez on the other hand, received the

infant from the child's unwed mother who told the former never to
reveal her (the mother's) identity because she wanted to get
married and did not want to destroy her future. The mother
instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez to look for a suitable
couple who will adopt the child. The mother did not provide for the
maintenance and support of her child.
In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September, 1967,
Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco
parentis of the child subject of the adoption petition, gave the
written consent required by law.
The Court dismissed the petition due to the fact that it fell short of
the express requirement of the law that the written consent of the
parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted
shall be obtained. Since it is admitted by Atty. Velasquez that she
knew the identity of the mother who gave her the child, the proper
person who is supposed to give the parental consent to the
adoption should first be, in order of preference, the parent or the
mother herself. However, Atty. Velasquez could not reveal the
identity of the mother because it would violate the privileged
communications between attorney and the client.

and care it badly needed. Since there had been no showing that the
identity of the natural mother was made known to the trial court or
to the herein petitioners, nor had said mother seen fit to present
herself before the court despite the public notice given to the
proceedings as required by law, there clearly appears only one
person who could be considered as the guardian exercising patria
potestas over such abandoned child. Since there was no guardian
ad litem appointed by the court and the child not being in the
custody of an orphan asylum, children's home or any benevolent
society, there could not have been anyone other than Atty. Corazon
de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the guardian
of said infant. It was she who had actual. physical custody of the
infant and who, out of compassion and motherly instinct, extended
the mantle of protection over the hapless and helpless infant which
otherwise could have suffered a tragic fate, like being thrown into
some garbage heap as had often happened to some unwanted
illegitimate babies. The least this Court could do to recognize and
acknowledge her good Samaritan deed is to extend, as it hereby
extends, to her the recognition that she was a de facto guardian
exercising patria potestas over the abandoned child.

Issue:

WON the person who gave the consent for adoption, which in this
case is Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the proper person
required by law to give such consent.

Ruling:

Yes. When the 3-day old baby was left to and placed in the hands of
Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the helpless infant was in dire
need of someone who could give it protection and sustain its
delicate and fragile life. Atty. Velasquez was under no legal
compulsion to accept the child and to extend to it the protection

The Court is convinced that, in fact, said mother had completely

and absolutely abandoned her child. This Court has previously
declared that abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental claims
to the child.
The ancient Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its
hands of the hard and harsh decision it rendered. While this old
adage generally finds apt application in many other legal cases, in
adoption of children, however, this should be softened so as to
apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane
understanding, for adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate
children, particularly those born out of wedlock, than for those born
with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to
provide homes, love, care and education for unfortunate children,
who otherwise may grow from cynical street urchins to hardened

criminal offenders and become serious social problems, should be

given the widest attitude of sympathy, encouragement and
assistance. The law is not, and should not be made, an instrument
to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy.

WON jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption has been

complied with.
Ruling:
No.

9. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR

ROSSANA E. CRUZ.
ROSALINA E. CRUZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
No. L-20927, July 26, 1966
(re: jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption)
Facts:
The petitioner, Rosalina E. Cruz, of 39 years of age, is the childless
wife of Francisco de la Cruz and is a resident of Zamboanga.
Francisco de la Cruz gave his consent to the adoption by his wife, in
an affidavit attached to the petition, and also testified thereabout.
The minor child sought to be adopted was born on 26 December
1959 and recorded in the local civil registrar's office as Rossana
Esperat Bucoy ; but said child was baptized on 19 September 1960
as Rossana E. Cruz , already following the surname of the would-be
adopting parent, who reared and took care of the girl since birth,
and who has developed a strong maternal love for her. The child's
parents by nature, Lucilo Bucoy and Ana E. Bucoy, that aside from
their written consent, they testified in court on their consent to the
adoption.

The name of a person as recorded in the civil register, and not his
baptismal name, is, for legal purposes, his real name, baptismal
names having never been legally recognized, nor the practice of
using baptismal names sanctioned by the law (Chomi vs. Local Civil
Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004). It follows, therefore, that the use
of the baptismal name of the child to be adopted, instead of its
name in the civil register, would countenance or permit that which
has always been frowned upon.
A proceeding in adopting is a proceeding in rem (Ellis, et al. vs.
Republic, L-16922, 30 April 1963; Van Matre vs. Sankey 148 III. 536;
36 NE 628) in which notice is made through publication (Sec. 4 of
former Rule 100, now Section 4 of Rule 99) to protect the interests
of all persons concerned (3 Moran 534, 1963 Ed.). Said interests will
not be protected if the notice by publication does not carry the true
name of the child to be adopted because the persons to be served
by the notice have the right to expect the use of the child's
officially recorded name. The defect, in the present case, amounts
to a failure of service by publication, and the court a quo acquired
no jurisdiction over the case (Cf. Yuseco vs. Republic, L-13441, 30
June 1960).

The court, in an order on 11 January 1962, set the petition for

hearing and directed the publication of the order once a week for
three consecutive weeks in the "Zamboanga Times".

For the foregoing reasons, the appealed decision is hereby

reversed; and the petition for adoption dismissed, but without
prejudice to reinstituting the proceedings in conformity with law

The child's name in the petition for adoption, and as published in

the newspaper, is Rossana E. Cruz, her baptismal name, instead of
Rossana E. Bucoy her name in the record of birth; thus oppositorappellant Republic of the Philippines claims that "the lower court
erred in taking cognizance of the instant petition for adoption
despite the fact that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by
reason of a substantial defect in the petition and the published
order of hearing".

10. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO,
G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996
(re: jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption)

Issue:

Facts:
On September 21 1988, spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P.
Caranto filed a petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then
fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent
Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private

respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C.

Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody. Private
respondents prayed that judgment be rendered: declaring the child
Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and
purpose, dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of
the child; and that the surname of the child be legally changed to
that of the petitioners and that the first name which was mistakenly
registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to "MICHAEL."

error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child from
"Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any
confusion, because both names "can be read and pronounced with
the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The
purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that
those who have any objection to the adoption can make their
objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of
notice in this case.

The case was heard during which private respondent Zenaida

Caranto, Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the
minor testified. Also presented was Carlina Perez, social worker of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development, who endorsed
the adoption of the minor, being of the opinion that the same was
in the best interest of the child.

11. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992
(re: jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption)

The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the

correction of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He
argued that although the correction sought concerned only a
clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the
petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in
the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Solicitor
General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention
that the correction of names cannot be effected in the same
proceeding for adoption. As additional ground for his appeal, he
argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for
adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the
name given was "Michael," instead of "Midael," which is the name
of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
Issue:
Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption even
if the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor
child?
Ruling:
Yes. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petition for adoption.
The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in
the name of the child sought to be adopted. In this case the
correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for
the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name
would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor General admits that the

Facts:
Dissatisfied with the decision of CA on February 20, 1990 which
affirmed in toto the decision of RTC of Legaspi City granting the
petition of private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat,
petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for
review on certiorari.
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to
adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living
with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the RTC of
Legaspi City.
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the
petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. The order was duly
published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the Solicitor
General, of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the
social worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order was posted
on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had
required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition.
Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been
proved at the hearing, the testimonies of herein private
respondent, together with that of her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles,
and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development were taken and admitted in the proceedings.
On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
minor child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents,

and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses
Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be
changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the Department
of Social Welfare and Development, Regional Office, Region V,
Legaspi City, and the Local Civil Registrar of Tiwi, Albay, with copies
of this decision.
Issues:
1. WON CA erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot be applied
retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles;
and
2. WON CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which
granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses
Bobiles.
Ruling:
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida
C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was
Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of
the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court
rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in
the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code,
took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint
adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the
petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed
solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in
violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint
adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be
applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the
latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the
mere filing of her petition for adoption. We are not persuaded.
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the
non-inclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a
jurisdictional defect, hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on
that score. It could not be taking exception only on the ground of

non-joinder since petitioner must be aware that non-joinder is not a

ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. We
further apprehend that this objection has been raised for the first
time on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we shall clarify
petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated assignment
of errors.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of
appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification
that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does
not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term
expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right
reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary
State action, or an innately just and imperative right which
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not only legal
or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had
the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining
her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was
exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon
her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have
the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law
in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced
or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding
No. 1386, the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in
accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of
substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. We do not find in the present case
such facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.
The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of
applicable local and foreign jurisprudence. For that purpose, we
start with the premise that Article 185 of the Family Code is
remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a
retrospective construction in the sense that they may be applied to

pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions.

However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps
completed before their enactment.
Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they
arise, and procedural statutes are generally retroactive in that they
apply to pending proceedings and are not confined to those begun
after their enactment although, with respect to such pending
proceedings, they affect only procedural steps taken after their
enactment.
The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect
pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act
excludes them from its operation, is not so extensive that it may be
used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into
effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at
the time the question of procedure arises.
The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural,
aspect of a case is substantive in nature and is subject to a more
stringent rule. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to
comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time.
As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and
substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it
was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully
disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether
in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance.
On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that
the Family Code should not apply retroactively, the Court of
Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by granting
the adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only,
her husband not being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a
tenable position and, accordingly, reject the same.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners
in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent,
attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an
integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife

in adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his written consent

read as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

2.
That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually
desire to adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a
minor being six (6) years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial
Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also in the Philippines;
3.
That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of
said minor child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations court, now the Regional Trial Court in Legaspi City, Albay
in the Philippines;
4.
That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am
giving my lawful consent to this adoption of said minor child, JASON
CONDAT;
5.
That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I
have continuously reared and cared for this minor child, JASON
CONDAT since birth;
6.
That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a
kind of maternal and paternal love for the boy as our very own,
exercising therein the care, concern and diligence of a good father
toward him;
7.
That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF
CONSENT for whatever it is worth in the premises as to the matter
of adoption of this minor child, JASON CONDAT, by my wife
ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and by me, DIOSCORO C. BOBILES,
in any court of justice; (Emphasis supplied.) 18
xxx
xxx
xxx
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory
testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner.
Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his
foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an
affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the
petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit.
Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal
requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher
considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child

must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence

to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.

grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official

will not be disturbed.

We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law

should not apply to this case and, for that matter, in our
jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as
well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the
adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights
and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. The modern
tendency of the courts is to hold that there need not be more than
a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the
validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a
narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat its
intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where
every material requirement of the statute was complied with.

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the

decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His
adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the
petition for adoption 26 and the trial court dispensed with the trial
custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the
child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy.
Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the
children of the adopters.

In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to
bring the judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that
every slight defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a reason
may be found for declaring invalid an act consummated years
before, but rather to approach the case with the inclination to
uphold such acts if it is found that there was a substantial
compliance with the statute. The technical rules of pleading should
not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is
deemed more important that the petition should contain facts
relating to the child and its parents, which may give information to
those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a
pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer
jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute,
alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction.
In determining WON to set aside the decree of adoption the
interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount
consideration. The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration
in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its
adoption by another, and the courts to which the application for
adoption is made is charged with the duty of protecting the child
and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before it, it has
authority to make rules to accomplish that end. Ordinarily, the
approval of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court.
This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the best
interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents
over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of

The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the
petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As
found and aptly stated by respondent court: "Given the facts and
circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the
foregoing doctrine, We are of the opinion and so hold that the
decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way
towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of
his opportunities for a useful and happy life."
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests
and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family in the person of the adopted, as
well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys
of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the
adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
12. MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA
TAMARGO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON
L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR
BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992
(re: parental authority during trial period)
Facts:

On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of

age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. Accordingly, a complaint for damages was
filed against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of
the tragic incident.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses
Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc.
This petition for adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that
is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
Respondent spouses Bundoc, reciting the result of the foregoing
petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, the spouses Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents
from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then
actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption.
The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action. The CA dismissed the appeal
having been filed out of time. Hence, this petition
Issue:
WON the natural parents of Adelberto are liable for the damages
sustained by Jennifer Tamargo.
Ruling:
This principle of parental liability is a specie of vicarious liability or
the doctrine of imputed negligence where a person is not only
liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed
by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he
is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical
consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents their
parental authority which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child.

The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with
its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in
the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise
the child who is in their custody and control. The parental
dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can
be overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the
parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air
rifle occurred when parental authority was still lodged in
respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had
then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages.
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting
happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given
to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no
actual or physically custody over the adopted child. To hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they could not have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses,
Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit
for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the
trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being
already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
13. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONOR VALENCIA,
as Natural mother and guardian of her minor children,
BERNARDO GO and JESSICA GO; and THE HON. AGAPITO
HONTANOSAS, Judge of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CEBU, Branch XI, G.R. No. L-32181, March 5, 1986
(re: adoption strictly personal between adopter and adoptee)
Facts:

Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children,

Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed with the Court of First Instance of
Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of
birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City
of Cebu. The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition
alleging that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil Registry
pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in
relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a
summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those
harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of a name
that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and not
changes or corrections involving civil status, nationality, or
citizenship which are substantial and controversial. Finding the
petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued
an order directing the publication of the petition. Leonor also filed
her reply to the opposition admitting the present petition seeks
substantial changes involving the civil status and nationality or
citizenship of respondents, but alleged that substantial changes in
the civil registry records involving the civil status of parents, their
nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1) the proper suit is
filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the
allegations of the petition or to disprove the same; that
respondents have complied with these requirements by filing the
present special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court and that they have caused reasonable notice to be given to
the persons named in the petition and have also caused the order
for the hearings of their petition to be published for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu also filed its motion to
dismiss averring that the petition seeks to change substantial
corrections and not merely clerical ones as they do involve
citizenship and status of the minors and their mother. Lower court
denied their motions and ordered the lower court to make the
necessary correction. The Republic of the Philippines appealed by
way of petition for review.
Issue:
WON the lower court erred in ordering the correction the
petitioners citizenship and civil status of her minor children.
Ruling:

The court ruled in the negative. Corrections involving matters such

as civil status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship may be
allowed provided the proper suit is filed. The persons who must be
made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are- (1) the civil registrar,
and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty
of the court to- (l) issue an order fixing the time and place for the
hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are
likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and
(2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition
for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth
even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court can no longer be described as "summary". The fact that the
Civil Registrar opposed the petition sought to be corrected and was
actively prosecuted, such proceedings became adversary in nature.
The court was of the opinion that the petition filed by the
respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the
requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that
actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as that
proper suit or appropriate action. To follow the Solicitor Gens
argument that Rule 109 is not the appropriate proceeding without
any advice as to what the correct proceeding is or if such
proceeding exist at all would result in manifest injustice.
14. PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS vs. GREGORIA
ARANZANSO and DEMETRIA VENTURA, G.R. No. L-23828,
February 28, 1966
(re: adopted child as intestate heir of adopter)
Facts:
A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8
years old, was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI
of Manila. It was alleged that both parents of the minors have long
been unheard from and could not be found in spite of diligent
efforts to locate them; that since the war said minors have been

abandoned; and that for years since their infancy, said children
have been continuously been in petitioners care and custody. The
consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem
appointed by the Court. After due publication and hearing, the
adoption court granted the petition for the adoption.
Subsequently eight years later Juliana Reyes died intestate.
Simplicio Santos filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the former, stating among other things that the surviving
heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos.
He also asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased,
filed an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator,
asserting among others that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora
Santos is void ab initio for want of the written consent of their
parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the
deceased and mother of Paulina opposed also the petition of
Simplicio and adopted the pleadings filed by Aranzanso.
The Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to
make a collateral attack against the adoption decree on the ground
of failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a
jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab initio.
Issue:
WON a decree of adoption could be assailed collaterally in a
settlement proceeding.
Ruling:
No. Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if
child was abandoned, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.
Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports any
conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose
to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the
child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe to their
children.

Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an

inferior tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be
established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal
cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order. Hence,
the CA erred in reviewing under a collateral attack, the
determination of the adoption court that the parents of the adopted
children had abandoned them
15. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and MAXIMO WONG, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992
(re: name of the adopted child)
Facts:
Private respondent, at two and a half years old was together with
his sister was adopted by Spouses Wong, naturalized Filipinos.
Private Respondent sought to have his Chinese surname changed
to that of his natural Filipino parents upon reaching the age of
twenty-two. He alleged that the use of the surname Wong
embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the
same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a
Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to
erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is
being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his
business and social life. The lower courts decision granting the
petition was affirmed by the appellate court.
Before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General argued that the
reversion of petitioner to his old name violates Arts.341and 365 of
the Civil Code which require an adopted child to use the surname of
the adopter, and would identify him with his parents by nature,
thus giving the impression that he has severed his relationship with
his adoptive parents.
Private Respondent contended that he did as the law required, I.e,
upon adoption he used the surname of the adopter. However, being
already emancipated, he can now decide what is best for and by
himself. His adoptive mother consented to the petition for change
of name and made it clear that it would not affect the legal
adoption.
Issue:

WON an adopted child can change his surname from that of his
adopter to that of his natural parents.
Ruling:
YES. While it is true that under Art. 365 of the Civil Code, an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must
nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of
the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of
adoption proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a status, which is,
that of parent and child. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is

to effect this new status of relationship between the child and

his/her adoptive parents, the change of name which frequently
accompanies adoption being more an incident than an object of the
proceeding.
The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in
determination of an application for adoption. Under
circumstances, there could be no possible confusion as to
Private Respondents legal status or adoptive paternity and
successional right.

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