CONSTITUTION

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Sec. 5 hereof. No
law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the
security of tenure of its Members.
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or
toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public
interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six
months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.

5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with
the Civil Service Law.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40527 June 30, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HERMOGENES MARIANO and HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch V, respondents.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General
Nathanael P. Pano, Jr., Solicitor Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, Provincial P.C.
Kliachko and Assistant Provincial Fiscal C. G. Perfecto for petitioner.
Eustaquio Evangelista for respondent Hermogenes Mariano.

MUOZ PALMA, J:
This petition for certiorari postulates a ruling on the question of whether
or not civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over the offense of estafa of goods valued at not more than six
thousand pesos and allegedly committed by a civilian. 1
On December 18, 1974, the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed
an Information (Criminal Case No. SM-649) accusing private respondent

herein Hermogenes Mariano of estafa alleged to have been committed as

follows:
That on or about and during the period from May 11 and June 8, 1971, in
the municipality of San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Hermogenes Mariano, being then appointed as Liaison Officer by the then
incumbent Municipal Mayor, Constantino Nolasco, acting for and in behalf
of the municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and authorized to
receive and be receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC for the use
and benefit of said municipality, received from the said USAID/NEC the
following items, to wit:
150 ft. electric cable valued
at $15 or P100.50
525 ft. cable power valued at
$577-50 or P3,859.35
250 ft. electric cable at
$125.00 or P837.50
with a total value of $717.50 or P4,797.35, involving the duty of making
delivery of said items to the said Municipal Mayor, but the said accused
Hermogenes Mariano once in possession of the said items and far from
complying with his aforesaid obligation and in spite of repeated demands,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of
confidence and with deceit, misappropriate, misapply and convert to his
own personal use and benefit the said items valued at $717.50 or
P4,797.35, belonging to the said USAID/NEC, to the damage and prejudice
of the said owner in the said sum of $717,50 or P4,797.35. (pp. rollo).
On February 19, 1975, Hermogenes Mariano thru his counsel Filed a
motion to quash the Information on the following grounds:
1. That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction of the offense
charged or of the person of the defendant;
2. That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
3. That it contains averments which , if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification. (p. 19, rollo)

In his motion to quash, Mariano claimed that the items which were the
subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for
which Mayor Constantino A. Nolasco of San Jose del Monte, province of
Bulacan, was indicted before a Military Commission under a charge of
malversation of public property, and for which Mayor Nolasco had been
found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for ten (10)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months with
perpetual disqualification plus a fine of P19,646.15 (see pp. 23-24, rollo),
and that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco had already been
decided by the Military Tribunal, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan had
lost jurisdiction over the case against him. (pp. 19-20, Ibid)
On March 14, 1975 respondent Judge issued an Order granting the motion
to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction reasoning as follows:
Considering that the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of
the malversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the same subject
matter in its concurrent jurisdiction with this Court, the case involving the
subject properties had already been heard and decided by a competent
tribunal, the Military Commission, and as such this Court is without
jurisdiction to pass upon anew the same subject matter. (pp. 30-31, rollo,
emphasis supplied)
Respondent Judge did not rule on the other grounds invoked in the motion
to quash.
The people now seeks a review of the aforesaid Order and presents the
sole issue of jurisdiction of respondent Court over the estafa case filed
against respondent Mariano.
"Jurisdiction" is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. 2 The word
"jurisdiction" is derived from two Latin words "juris" and "dico" "I speak
by the law" which means fundamentally the power or capacity given by
the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and determine certain
controversies. 3 Bouvier's own definition of the term "jurisdiction" has
found judicial acceptance, to wit: "Jurisdiction is the right of a Judge to
pronounce a sentence of the law in a case or issue before him, acquired
through due process of law;" it is "the authority by which judicial officers
take cognizance of and decide cases." 4
In Herrera vs. Barretto, September 10, 1913, 25 Phil. 245, 251, this Court,
in the words of Justice Moreland, invoking American jurisprudence,
defined "jurisdiction" simply as the authority to hear and determine a
cause the right to act in a case. "Jurisdiction" has also been aptly
described as the right to put the wheels of justice in notionand to proceed
to the final determination of a cause upon the pleadings and evidence. 5

"Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a

particular offense and impose the punishment for it. 6
The conferment of jurisdiction upon courts or judicial tribunals is derived
exclusively from the constitution and statutes of the forum. Thus, the
question of jurisdiction of respondent Court of First Instance over the case
filed before it is to be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing
for or defining its jurisdiction. That, We find in the Judiciary Act of 1948
where in its Section 44 (f) it is provided:
SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original
jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two
hundred pesos, (emphasis supplied)
The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized
with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day
to two (2) years and four (4) months. 7 By reason of the penalty imposed
which exceeds six (6) months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have
been committed by the accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the
original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
The above of course is not disputed by respondent Judge; what he claims
in his Order is that his court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the
military commission and because the latter tribunal was the first to take
cognizance of the subject matter, respondent court lost jurisdiction over it
.That statement of respondent court is incorrect.
In People vs. Fontanilla, this Court speaking through then Justice now
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, categorically reiterated the settled rule that
the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action. 8 In the case at bar, it is rightly
contended by the Solicitor General that at the time Criminal Case No. SM649 was filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, that
was December 18, 1974, the law in force vesting jurisdiction upon said
court was the Judiciary Act of 1948, the particular provision of which was
not affected one way or the other by any Presidential issuances under
Martial Law. General Order No. 49 dated October 4, 1974, which repeals
General Order No. 12 and the latter's amendments and related General
Orders inconsistent with the former, redefines the jurisdiction of military
tribunals over certain offense, and estafa and malversation are not among

those enumerated therein. 9 In other words the Military Commission is not

vested with jurisdiction over the crime of estafa. 9*
Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost
jurisdiction over the estafa case against respondent Mariano with the
filing of the malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before the Military
Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct
offenses and in the case now before Us the accused in one is different
from the accused in the other. But more fundamental is the fact that We
do not have here a situation involving two tribunals vested with
concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime so as to apply the rule that
the court or tribunal which first takes cognizance of the case acquires
jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the other. 10 The Military Commission as
stated earlier is without power or authority to hear and determine the
particular offense charged against respondent Mariano, hence, there is no
concurrent jurisdiction between it and respondent court to speak
of. Estafa as described in the Information filed in Criminal Case No. SM649 falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed Order dated March 14, 1975, is set
aside and respondent Judge is directed to proceed with the trial of
Criminal Case No. SM- 649 without further delay.
SO ORDERED.

Union Bank of the Philippines and Desi Tomas. v.

People, G.R. No. 192565, Feb. 28, 2012
Crim Pro Jurisdiction
Facts:
Union bank filed two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin against spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The
first complaint was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13,
1998. The second complaint was filed on March 15, 2000 and was raffled in
the
MeTC,
Branch
47,
Pasay
City.
In both cases, Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against
Forum Shopping. Then, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183
of the RPC (perjury) "by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any
other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or
agency". The Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted

and used in Pasay City, while the Information against Union Bank and Tomas
was filed in Makati.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the venue was
improperly laid and that the facts do not constitute an offense. On the first
ground, Tomas argued that since it is the Pasay City Court where the
Certificate was submitted and used, it should have the jurisdiction over the
case against her. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling
that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate was notarized there
and the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury. Her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
When the case was elevated to the RTC-Makati City, the petitioners
prayed that the ruling of the MeTC-Makati City be annulled and set aside on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion. They also cited the rulings in US vs.
Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which state that "venue and jurisdiction should
be in the place where the false document was presented".
The petition, however, was found to have no merit as a recent
jurisprudence, Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy. In the Sy Tiong Shiou case, the high court
ruled that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality where the perjury was committed, or where any of its essential
ingredients occured. The petitioners then filed this petition to the Supreme
Court to address the seeming conflict between the rulings in Illusorio v.
Bildner and Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy.
Issue: Where is the proper venue of perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC - the
place, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized or where
the Certification was presented to the trial court?
Held: The place where the Certificate was notarized, the MeTC-Makati City,
is the proper venue for the criminal action.
The criminal act charged was for the execution of an affidavit that
contained a falsity. Art. 183 of the RPC is the applicable provision for this
case; and following so, the jurisdiction and venue should be determined on
the basis of this article which penalizes one who makes an affidavit upon any
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath
in cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is
the making of an affidavit, so, the criminal act is consummated when the
statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly
authorized person.'
The SC finds the ruling in Sy Tiong as more in accord with Art. 183 of
the RPC. The Court ruled that the crime of perjury committed through the
making of a false affidavit under Art. 183 of the RPC is committed at the time
the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time
that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is

committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither

criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is
given.
If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sown statement is
submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is
submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all
cases, the determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the
Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

In Cases Involving Title To Real Property, Assessed Value

Of Lot Must Be Alleged To Determine Jurisdiction
December 7, 2014 by The Lawyer's Post
Elenita, the owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 82,972 square
meters, entrusted to Maura the Transfer Certificate of Title over the land, in
her belief that Maura was a real estate agent. Maura then subdivided the lot
into several lots, denominated as Lots 625-A to 625-O under the name of
Elentia and her husband Felicisimo. Through a falsified deed of sale bearing
the signatures of Elenita and Felicisimo, Maura sold Lot 625-K to Laura, which
then caused the cancellation of the TCT and a new one, TCT No. 134932,
issued. Laura then sold the lot after several months to Editha, who then had
TCT No. 134932 issued, and a new issued in her name, TCT No, 137466.
When Edelina and Felicisimo learned of the sale, they demanded Editha to
surrender possession of Lot 625-K, now TCT No. 137466. Editha refused, so
Elenita and Felicisimo filed an action for cancellation of TCT No. 137466
before the RTC of Balanga, Bataan. Summons was served on Edithas mother,
Anita.

For failure to file an answer, the spouses moved that Editha be declared in
default. Through counsel, Editha opposed the motion to declare her in
default and moved that case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over her
person. She alleged that she had long been a resident of Japan after
marrying a Japanese national, and comes only to the Philippines once every
two years. The summons was not personally served on her but only thru
substituted service to her mother. Her brother Charlie testified and presented
her passport and an envelope she sent him to prove Editha is in Japan;
nevertheless, the trial court denied her opposition, declared her in default
and proceeded to trial.
By Decision dated July 1, 2005, the RTC declared Editha a buyer in good faith
and dismissed the complaint. The spouses then appealed the case to the
Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the RTC decision. According to
the CA, Editha was a buyer in good faith; the fact that she bought the
property for only P4,000.00 from Lorna who also sold it after only several
months should have put her in notice; further the decision by the RTC in the
case of Pp vs. Maura Passion, the spouses had sufficiently established the
fraudulent transfer of the lot;
Editha thus appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging lack of merit of the CA
decision, as well as lack of jurisdiction over her person.
The Supreme Court:
Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg.
(BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by
Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129. Section 1 of RA 7691,
amending BP Blg. 129, provides that the RTC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction on the following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00),
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x
Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first
level courts, thus:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law [BP Blg. 129] is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the
value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, before proceeding
any further with any other issues raised by the petitioner, it is essential to
ascertain whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
case based on the above-quoted provisions.
xxx
An action involving title to real property means that the plaintiffs cause of
action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the
legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition
of the same. Title is the legal link between (1) a person who owns property
and (2) the property itself. Title is different from a certificate of title
which is the document of ownership under the Torrens system of registration
issued by the government through the Register of Deeds. While title is the
claim, right or interest in real property, a certificate of title is the evidence of
such claim.

In the present controversy, before the relief prayed for by the respondents in
their complaint can be granted, the issue of who between the two
contending parties has the valid title to the subject lot must first be
determined before a determination of who between them is legally entitled
to the certificate of title covering the property in question.
From the Complaint, the case filed by respondent is not simply a case for the
cancellation of a particular certificate of title and the revival of another. The
determination of such issue merely follows after a court of competent
jurisdiction shall have first resolved the matter of who between the
conflicting parties is the lawful owner of the subject property and ultimately
entitled to its possession and enjoyment. The action is, therefore, about
ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful owner of the subject lot,
jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value of such lot.
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must
allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the
interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. In
the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the
value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in
the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that would
show the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the hearings,
respondents counsel informed the court that they will present the tax
declaration of the property in the next hearing since they have not yet
obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessors Office. However, they did not
present such copy.
To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to
real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over
the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged
in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the
MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all
proceedings in the RTC are null and void.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013, EDITHA PADLAN,
PETITIONER, VS. ELENITA DINGLASAN AND FELICISIMO DINGLASAN,
RESPONDENTS.
Obiter Dictum
[Latin, By the way.] Words of an opinion entirely unnecessary for th
e decision of the case. A remark made or opinion expressed by a jud

ge ina decision upon a cause, "by the way", that is, incidentally or c
ollaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court or up
on a pointnot necessarily involved in the determination of the cause
, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such
are not bindingas precedent.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4316

May 28, 1952

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. HIGINIO MACADAEG, HON. POTENCIANO PECSON, HON. RAMON
SAN JOSE, as Chairman and Members, respectively; of the Seventh
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, and ANTONIO GUILLERMO, alias,
SLIVER, as an interested party, respondents.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Esmeraldo
Umali for petitioner.
Hon. Higinio B. Macadaeg, Hon. Potenciano Pecson and Hon. Ramon R. San
Jose in their own behalf. Antonio V. Raquiza and Marcelino N. Sayo for
respondent Antonio Guillermo.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an action of prohibition against the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty
Commission, composed of Honorables Higinio Macadaeg, Potenciano Pecson,
and Ramon R. San Jose, Judges of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to
restrain and prevent it from taking jurisdiction and cognizance of a petition
for amnesty filed by respondent Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver, who was
convicted and sentenced by this Court on May 19, 1950, for murder in G.R.
No. L-2188. * The grounds upon which the petition are based are (1) that this
Court has already expressly ruled in its judgment of conviction of said case
that said Antonio Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty,
because the murders of which he was convicted were committed "not in
furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal
strife between two rival guerilla units," and (2) that the Seventh Guerilla
Amnesty Commission can take cognizance only of cases pending appeal in
the Supreme Court on October 2, 1946 (date of Administrative Order No. 1 of

the President), at that time. The respondents filed answers independently of

each other, and with the exception of Judge Ramon R. San Jose, they oppose
the petition, alleging (1) that the decision of this Court does not prevent the
respondent Antonio Guillermo from invoking his right to the provisions of the
amnesty, because said right was not an issue at the trial on the case against
him, and the pronouncement of this Court thereon is not final and conclusive
and is merely an obiter dictum, and (2) that under a liberal interpretation of
the administrative orders implementing the President's Amnesty
Proclamation, the respondent Commission has jurisdiction of said petition.
The record discloses that the original information against respondent Antonio
Guillermo was filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte
on September 16, 1946, and as amended information, on July 15, 1947. The
Court of First Instance rendered judgment on March 29, 1948. Thereupon,
Guillermo presented an appeal to this Court, and this Court rendered its
judgement on May 19, 1950. On June 5, 1950, Guillermo's Counsel filed a
motion for reconsideration, but this motion was denied on July 13, 1950. On
June 20, 1950, even before his motion for reconsideration was acted upon,
respondent Guillermo filed a motion with this Court for the suspension of the
proceedings and the reference of the case to the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty
Commission, but this motion was denied by this Court on July 13, 1950.
Antonio Guillermo filed his petition for amnesty for respondent Commission
on July 8, 1950. On August 2, 1950, the records of the case against Guillermo
were remanded to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for
the execution of the judgment, and on October 17, 1950, the respondent
Commission required the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte to
forward the records of the case to it, and on November 9, 1950, it is set the
case for hearing over the opposition of the Solicitor General. It was at this
stage that this action of prohibition was filed in this Court.
The first ground upon which the opposition to the petition is based, namely,
that the holding of this Court that the respondent Guillermo is not entitled to
the benefits of the amnesty proclamation, is merely an obiter dictum, is
without any legal foundation, and must be dismissed. An obiter dictum is an
opinion "uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if
turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects"
(Newmanvs. Kay, 49 S.E. 926, 931, 57 W. Va. 98, 68 L.R.A. 908, 4 Ann. Cas.
39 citing United States ex rel. Johnston vs.Clark County Court, 96 U.S. 211,
24 Ed. 628), or the opinion of the court upon any point or principle which it is
not required to decide (29 Words & Phrases 15), or an opinion of the court
which does not embody its determination and is made without argument or
full consideration of the point, and is not professed deliberate determinations
of the judge himself (29 Words & Phrases 13.). A cursory reading of the
decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-2188 **against respondent Antonio
Guillermo discloses that the ruling of the Court that the said respondent is
not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty is not an obiter dictum, but is a

ruling of the Court on an issue expressly raised by the party appellant on

facts or evidence adduced in the course of the trial of his case. It is not an
opinion uttered by the way; it is a direct ruling on an issue expressly raised
by a party. It was not unnecessary to make that ruling; the ruling was
absolutely essential to a determination of a question of fact and of law
directly in issue. It was not made without argument or full consideration of
the point; it was deliberately entered by the Court after arguments on both
sides had been heard. This Could not have avoided determining the issue
without the peril of rendering an incomplete decision.
Hereinbelow we quote portions of the decision of this Court, from it which it
can readily be seen that it had before it evidence of the claim of amnesty
expressly raised before the Court, and its ruling that appellant was not
entitled thereto.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Apparently realizing the inconsistency and untenability of that position

appellant also contends that granting for the sake of argument that the
accused was the author of the crime, there is proof "that the ill-starred
seven were charged of (with) being spies for the Japanese.
The insincerity and weakness of this last-ditch plea is manifest.
Appellant does not claim that he killed the seven victims because he
had proof and believe that they were spies for the Japanese. He merely
says that they were charged (by Sagad) with being spies for the
Japanese.
xxx

xxx

xxx

At any rate, the amnesty proclamation now invoked is not applicable.

We are satisfied from the proofs that the massacre in question was
committed not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the
course of a fracticidad strife between two rival guerrilla units. That was
to hinder and not a further the resistance against the Japanese enemy.
It was a shame: and it would be adding insult to injury to stigmatize
the memory of the unfortunate victims of such lust for power of and
supremacy as spies and traitors to their country, in the absence of the
competent proof as they really were. We spurn the baseless suggestion
as rank injustice.
A more serious contention is, May not respondent Guillermo raise the issue
before the corresponding guerrilla amnesty commission in view of our ruling
in the case of Viray vs. Crisologo, et al.*** G. R. No. L-2540, in which we held
that the fact that the defendant has declined to take advantage of the
amnesty proclamation at the beginning of his trial before a court martial

does not preclude him from invoking it after he was found guilty and
convicted. The express holding of this Court is that case is as follows:
In our opinion the fact that respondent Crisologo had declined to take
advantage of the amnesty proclamation at the beginning of his trial
before the court martial does not now preclude him from invoking it,
specially after he was found guilty and convicted. Before his trial he
may and he must have entertained the idea and the belief that the
killing was justified and was done in the performance of his duties as
an official according to the criminal law, and that consequently there
was no need for amnesty. However, after the court martial had
disagreed with him and disabused him of his belief, he realized the
necessity of invoking amnesty. There is nothing in the law that stands
in his way toward seeking the benefits of a law which in his opinion
covers and obliterates the act of which he had been found criminally
responsible.
We hold that the above cited is not applicable to the case at bar, for in that
case the defendant did not invoke the benefits of the amnesty at the time of
the trial or on appeal, and only did so after he had been adjudge guilty and
convicted, while in the case at bar he did so. It is true that the appellant
Guillermo did not expressly plead amnesty, but the facts and circumstances
surrounding the commission of the act charged against him as an offense
were disclosed at the trial, from which facts and circumstances he later
predicated the issue, before this Court, that he was entitled to the benefits of
the amnesty. It may be true that the appellant Guillermo did not expressly
plead amnesty as a defense at the trial of his case. But the rules on the
criminal procedure do not include to be expressly pleaded. (Section 1, Rule
113, Rule of Court.) Even without an express plea of amnesty, a defendant
may submit evidence that the commission of the act imputed to him falls
within the provisions of the amnesty proclamation, without a previous formal
announcement of such a defense before or during the trial. And even without
such express plea, if the court finds that the case falls under the provisions
of the amnesty proclamation, it is the duty of the court to declare the fact, if
the fact justify such a finding, and extend the benefits of the amnesty to him.
. . .; and the accused, during such trial, may present evidence to prove
that his case falls within the terms of this amnesty. If the fact is legally
proved, the trial judge shall so declare and this amnesty shall be
immediately affective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be
released or discharged. (Proclamation No. 8, September 7, 1946, 42
Off. Gaz., No. 9 p. 2073.)
That the respondent herein Guillermo did not submit evidence to that effect
is inferred from the claim of his counsel in the case against him that "there is
proof that the ill starred seven were charged with being spies for the

Japanese." Not only that, he expressly raised that issue in this Court on
appeal. May he rise this issue again before the guerrilla amnesty
commission, and thus have this administrative body reverse or change the
finding of this Court?
Under the circumstances of the present case, we hold that he should no
longer be permitted to do so in view of "the general rule common to all
civilized systems of jurisprudence that the solemn and deliberate sentence of
the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or state of
facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the
question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed it
has been well said that this more maxim is more than a rule of law, more
even than an important principle of public policy; and that it is a fundamental
concept in the organization of every jural society." (Pealosa vs. Tuason, 22
Phil., 303, 310; section 44, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
It is also argued, in support of the claim that this Court had no jurisdiction to
make the ruling that respondent Guillermo is not entitled to amnesty, that
the guerrilla amnesty commissions are the first ones to pass upon petitions
for amnesty, that regular judicial tribunals can not rule upon such an issue
(of amnesty) unless it has first been resolved by a commission, and that
these are not judicial tribunals but administrative bodies acting as arms of
the executive in carrying out the purposes of the amnesty proclamation,
which is merely a form of executive clemency. It is true that the grant of
amnesty originates in an exclusive act. But the proclamation was issued
under expressly authority in the Constitution [Article VII, section 10 (6)], was
expressly sanctioned by the Congress (Resolution No. 13 dated September
18, 1946), and has the nature, force, effect, and operation of a law. That the
cognizance of applications for amnesty is vested in the guerrilla amnesty
commissions are mere screening bodies is not denied, but there is nothing in
the proclamation to support the contention that the authority to decide any
claim for amnesty is to be exercised but said commissions alone, to the
exclusion of the courts. Neither can it be denied that any one charged before
the courts may claim as a defense, waive the filing of an application therefor,
and submit evidence thereof in the trial of his case. In this latter case it
would be a cumbersome procedure, indeed, if said defense were first
required to be submitted to commission for decision, latter to be reviewed by
a court. The only sensible interpretation of the law is that while
all applications should be passed upon by commissions, an accused may,
instead of filing an application, choose the alternative remedy of just raising
the issue in a court of justice in the trial of his case. And if this second
alternative is chosen, the applicant should be declared estopped from
contesting the decision, as well as the authority of the court that adversely
passed upon his claim.

But there are further and other considerations, also weighty and important,
that attend respondent Guillermo's petition for amnesty. He is not one filed
during the pendency of this case in the Court of First Instance it is a petition
filed after final judgment of conviction in this Supreme Court. It does not
appear in the record that during the one and a half-year period (September
16, 1946, to March 29, 1948) that this case was being coursed and tried in
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, that he ever filed an application for
amnesty. Neither does it appear that the provincial fiscal has ever reported
Guillermo's case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission for Ilocos Norte,
pursuant to the direct mandate of the amnesty proclamation. Nor did
Guillermo ever claim amnesty as his defense at the time of the trial. May we
not justly infer from these positive circumstances that, during all the time the
case was pending and up to the filling of appellant's brief in the Supreme
Court, amnesty was never thought of as a defense, either by the accused
himself or by the fiscal, or by the judge trying the case? As a matter of fact,
this Court found that the issue of amnesty raised in this Court of Appeal was
a "last-ditch plea." Guillermo only thought of amnesty on June 20, 1950, after
this Court had found him guilty, overruling his defense of amnesty, and
before his motion for reconsideration was denied. We are therefore,
constrained to hold that his present petition is not entirely free from a
reasonable suspicion as to its ends and purposes. It seems to us to be a last
desperate attempt by technicality to avert or delay the execution of the
judgment of conviction rendered against him. Of course, no court of justice
would countenance such ill-advised attempt.
The second ground upon which the petition for prohibition is based is that
the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of respondent Guillermo's application. We also find this
contention to be correct. Administrative Order No. 11, which creates the
guerrilla amnesty commission, expressly assigns to the Seventh "cases from
the different provinces and cities now pending appeal in the Supreme Court."
(Emphasis ours.) Said administrative order was promulgated on October 2,
1946, on which date the criminal case against respondent Guillermo was still
pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. His case was a case in
the province (Ilocos Norte) assigned to the Second Guerrilla Amnesty
Commission. Respondents cite administrative Order No. 217 of the
Department of Justice dated December 1, 1948 to support their claim that
the Seventh has jurisdiction of the application, because of that date
Guillermo's case was already pending in the Supreme Court. This department
order was issued, as it expressly states, "in view of the appointments of new
Judges of First Instances," not for the purpose of setting forth cases
cognizable by each of the different commissions, which the President had
already done. Besides, it can not be interpreted to modify the President's
administrative order apportioning the cases among the amnesty
commissions.

In resume of our conclusions, we state (1) that the finding of this Court that
Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty, is not an obiter
dictum but a pronouncement on a material issue, and is final and conclusive
against him and may not, under the principle of res judicata, be again raised
in issue by him in any tribunal, judicial or administrative; (2) that having
voluntarily raised the issue in this Court during the consideration of his case,
he is now estopped from contesting the judgment, of the jurisdiction of the
court that rendered the adverse ruling; (3) that this petition is an ill-advised
attempt of doubtful good faith, to arrest or delay the execution of a final
judgement of conviction; and (4) that the respondent Commission has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application for amnesty.
Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is hereby granted, and the preliminary
injunction issued by this Court on November 24, 1950, made absolute, with
costs against respondent Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver.
Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 143286

April 14, 2004

PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA and PACITA

VILLANUEVA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA
RETUYA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks the reversal of the Court of
Appeals Decision dated 31 January 2000 as well as its Resolution dated 25
April 2000 in CA-G.R. No. CV-46716. The assailed Decision dismissed
petitioners appeal of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55,
Mandaue City ("trial court").
On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Napisa Retuya ("Eusebia") filed a complaint
before the trial court against her husband Nicolas Retuya ("Nicolas"), Pacita
Villanueva ("Pacita"), and Nicolas son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva

("Procopio"). Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of

several properties listed in paragraph 2 of the complaint ("subject
properties"), claiming the subject properties are her conjugal properties with
Nicolas. Eusebia also prayed for accounting, damages and the delivery of
rent and other income from the subject properties.
Antecedent Facts
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas
Retuya, having been married to the latter on October 7, 1926. Out of
the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children, namely, Natividad,
Angela, Napoleon, Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya resided at
Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage they acquired real
properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and
Consolacion, Cebu, more particularly described as follows:
1. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under
tax dec. No. 24951;
2. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under
tax dec. No. 24952;
3. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under
tax dec. No. 24953;
4. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under
tax dec. No. 24954;
5. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under
tax dec. No. 24956;
6. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under
tax dec. No. 24957;
7. A parcel of land located at Pulpugan, Consolacion, Cebu under
tax dec. No. 24958;
8. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by
tax dec. No. 01042;
9. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by
tax dec. No. 01043;

10. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by

tax dec. No. 01046;
11. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City, covered by
tax dec. No. 01041;
12. A parcel of land located at Nawanao-Subangdaku, Mandaue
City covered by tax dec. No. 01488;
13. A parcel of land located at Baklid, Mandaue City, covered by
tax dec. No. 00492;
14. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by
tax dec. No. 01044;
15. A residential house located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered
by tax dec. No. 01050;
16. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by
tax dec. No. 01048;
17. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by
tax dec. No. 01051;
18. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by
tax dec. No. 01047;
19. A parcel of land located at Banilad, Mandaue City covered by
tax dec. No. 02381;
20. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by
tax dec. No. 01049;
21. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by
tax dec. No. 01045;
22. A parcel of land located at Tipolo, Mandaue City covered by
tax dec. No. 01450 (in the name of Pacita Villanueva).
Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of land
situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban
Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary
shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City.
Some of these properties above-mentioned earn income from coconuts
and the other lands/houses are leased to the following:

a) Mandaue Food Products Company for Lot 121-F, Lot 121-G

and Lot 121-H under TCT No. 11300 at an annual rental
of P10,800.00;
b) Barben Wood Industries, Inc. for Lot 148 covered by TCT No.
l731 for an annual rental ofP21,600.00;
c) Metaphil, Inc. parcel of land consisting of 2,790.51 sq.
meters at the rate of P2,700.00 annually for the first five (5)
years, and P3,240.00 for the second years;
d) Benedicto Development Corp. for a portion of Lot 148
covered by TCT No. 1731 for a period of 20 years at an annual
rate of P3,500.00 renewable for another 20 years after April 1,
1995 at an annual rate of P4,000.00;
e) Benedicto Development Corporation for a portion of Lot No.
148 covered by Certificate of Title No. 1731 over an area of 6,000
sq. meters for an annual rental of P9,500.00 for a period of 2
years from June 1, 1982;
f) Visayan Timber and Machinery Corp. over a parcel of land at
Nawanaw, Mandaue City, for a period of 2 years from June 1,
1987 and renewable for another 12 years at an annual income
ofP4,000.00;
g) House lessees listed in Exhibit "13" with total monthly rentals
of P1,975.00 a month for the 24 lessees or P24,700.00 annually.
(Exhs. "7" to "13")
In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his legitimate
family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein
defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then,
was the only person who received the income of the above-mentioned
properties.
Defendant, Pacita Villanueva, from the time she started living in
concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no properties of
her own from which she could derive income.
In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore, cannot
walk anymore and they have to raise him up in order to walk. Natividad
Retuya knew of the physical condition of her father because they
visited him at the hospital. From the time defendant Nicolas Retuya
suffered a stroke on January 27, 1985 and until the present, it is
defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas illegitimate children who

has been receiving the income of these properties. Witness Natividad

Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate because at this time their father
Nicolas was already senile and has a childlike mind. She told
defendant, Procopio that their father was already incapacitated and
they had to talk things over and the latter replied that it was not yet
the time to talk about the matter.
Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay Captain for
reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached, hence, the
said official issued a certification to file action. Written demands were
made by plaintiff, through her counsel, to the defendants, including the
illegitimate family asking for settlement but no settlement was reached
by the parties.
Further, plaintiffs witness, Natividad Retuya, testified that the parcel of
land covered by tax declaration marked Exhibit "T" was the property
bought by her father from Adriano Marababol for at the time of
purchase of the property, defendant Pacita Villanueva had no means of
livelihood (TSN, p. 6).
The trial court rendered its Decision on 16 February 1994 in favor of Eusebia.
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is
rendered in favor of the plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya and against
defendants Procopio Villanueva, Nicolas Retuya and Pacita Villanueva:
1. Declaring the properties listed in paragraph 2 of the amended
complaint as conjugal properties of the spouses plaintiff Eusebia
Retuya and the defendant Nicolas Retuya;
2. Ordering the transfer of the sole administration of conjugal
properties of the spouses Eusebia Retuya and Nicolas Retuya in
accordance with Art. 124 of the Family Code to the plaintiff
Eusebia Napisa Retuya;
3. Ordering defendant Procopio Villanueva to account and
turnover all proceeds or rentals or income of the conjugal
properties from January 27, 1985 when he took over as
administrator thereof and until he shall have ceased
administering the same in accordance with the judgment of this
Court;
4. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to reconvey the
parcel of land situated at Tipolo, Mandaue City now in the name
of defendant Pacita Villanueva under tax dec. No. 01450 and

transfer the same into the names of the conjugal partners

Eusebia N. Retuya and Nicolas Retuya;
5. Ordering the City Assessors Office of Mandaue City to cancel
tax declaration No. 01450 in the name of Pacita Villanueva and
direct the issuance of a new title and tax declaration in the
names of Eusebia Napisa Retuya and Nicolas Retuya;
6. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to reconvey that
certain building of strong materials located at Tipolo, Mandaue
City under tax dec. No. 01450 into the names of Eusebia Retuya
and Nicolas Retuya;
7. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the
sum of P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation in the sum of P5,000.00 plus the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals.
Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Thereafter, Eusebias heirs substituted
her pursuant to the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 7 April 1997.
The Court of Appeals eventually upheld the Decision of the trial court but
deleted the award of attorneys fees, ruling in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 16, 1994 is AFFIRMED with
the modification that the award of attorneys fees of P50,000.00 is
deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 23 February 2000 which the
Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 11 May 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court applied Article 116 of the Family Code, which reads:
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed conjugal unless the contrary
is proved.

The trial court ruled that the documents and other evidence Eusebia
presented constitute "solid evidence" which proved that the subject
properties were acquired during her marriage with Nicolas. This made the
presumption in Article 116 applicable to the subject properties. Thus, the trial
court ruled that Eusebia had proved that the subject properties are conjugal
in nature. On the other hand, the trial court found that petitioners failed to
meet the standard of proof required to maintain their claim that the subject
properties are paraphernal properties of Nicolas. The trial court added that
Pacita presented no "factual solidity" to support her claim that she bought
Lot No. 1522 exclusively with her own money.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals concurred with the findings of the trial court. The
appellate court found that Pacita failed to rebut the presumption under
Article 116 of the Family Code that the subject properties are conjugal. The
appellate court dismissed Pacitas defense of prescription and laches since
she failed to have the issue included in the pre-trial order after raising it in
her answer with her co-petitioners.
The Issues
Petitioners Nicolas, Pacita and Procopio contend that both the trial and
appellate courts erred in ruling in favor of Eusebia. They seek a reversal and
raise the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
DECLARATION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PROPERTIES LISTED IN
PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE COMPLAINT ARE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF
NICOLAS RETUYA AND EUSEBIA RETUYA ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT ONE
OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION IN EUSEBIAS COMPLAINT.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE
PRESUMPTION THAT PROPERTIES ACQUIRED DURING THE EXISTENCE
OF THE MARRIAGE OF NICOLAS RETUYA AND EUSEBIA RETUYA ARE
CONJUGAL.
3. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING
INSTEAD THE PRESUMPTION UNDER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE
IN FAVOR OF CO-OWNERSHIP BETWEEN NICOLAS RETUYA AND PACITA
VILLANUEVA.
4. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OVER LOT NO. 152 IS ALREADY
BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES.3

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.
First Issue: On the Alleged Failure
To Claim that the Properties are Conjugal
Petitioners contention that Eusebias complaint failed to state that the
subject properties are conjugal is absolutely without basis. A cursory reading
of the complaint readily shows that the complaint maintains that the subject
properties are conjugal.4 The first sentence of the second paragraph of the
complaint states:
2. The plaintiff Eusebia Retuya and defendant Nicolas Retuya are
husband and wife and conjugal owners of real properties and all
improvements thereon situated in Mandaue City and Consolacion,
Cebu more particularly described as follows: (Emphasis added)
The same claim is restated and repleaded throughout the complaint.
Petitioners should know better than to clutter their appeal with useless
arguments such as this.
The other issues petitioners raise contest in essence the finding that the
subject properties are conjugal in nature. Apart from this, the only other
issue raised is whether prescription or laches bars Eusebias complaint. We
shall resolve first the issue of prescription and laches.
Second Issue: Prescription and Laches
We agree with the Court of Appeals observation that while petitioners did
raise the issue of prescription and laches in their Answer,5 they failed to have
the same included in the pre-trial order for consideration during the trial.
Now, petitioners wish to raise the issue on appeal by relying on Section 1,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Petitioners are mistaken.

The determination of issues during the pre-trial conference bars the

consideration of other questions, whether during trial or on appeal.6 Section
1 of Rule 9 covers situations where a defense or objection is not raised in a
motion to dismiss or an answer. What we have before us is the exact
opposite. Here, petitioners in fact raised in their answer the defense of
prescription and laches. However, despite raising the defense of prescription
and laches in their answer, petitioners failed to include this defense among
the issues for consideration during the trial. The non-inclusion of this defense
in the pre-trial order barred its consideration during the trial. Clearly, Section
1 of Rule 9 does not apply to the present case.
Pre-trial is primarily intended to insure that the parties properly raise all
issues necessary to dispose of a case.7The parties must disclose during pretrial all issues they intend to raise during the trial, except those involving
privileged or impeaching matters.8 Although a pre-trial order is not meant to
catalogue each issue that the parties may take up during the trial, issues not
included in the pre-trial order may be considered only if they are impliedly
included in the issues raised or inferable from the issues raised by necessary
implication.9 The basis of the rule is simple. Petitioners are bound by the
delimitation of the issues during the pre-trial because they themselves
agreed to the same.10
Petitioners argue that in past instances we have reviewed matters raised for
the first time during appeal. True, but we have done so only by way of
exception involving clearly meritorious situations.11 This case does not fall
under any of those exceptions. The fact that the case proceeded to trial, with
the petitioners actively participating without raising the necessary objection,
all the more requires that they be bound by the stipulations they made at the
pre-trial.12 Petitioners were well aware that they raised the defense of
prescription and laches since they included it in their answer. However, for
reasons of their own, they did not include this defense in the pre-trial.
Able counsels represented both parties. We see no claim that either counsel
erred or was negligent. This could only mean that petitioners counsel chose
to waive, or did not consider important, the defense of prescription and
laches. Petitioners are bound by their counsels choice. Other than arguing
that it is allowable to raise the issue for the first time on appeal, we have no
explanation from petitioners why they suddenly decided to change their
mind. Parties are not allowed to flip-flop. Courts have neither the time nor
the resources to accommodate parties who choose to go to trial haphazardly.
Moreover, it would be grossly unfair to allow petitioners the luxury of
changing their mind to the detriment of private respondents at this late
stage. To put it simply, since petitioners did not raise the defense of
prescription and laches during the trial, they cannot now raise this defense
for the first time on appeal.13

Third Issue: Whether the Subject Properties Are Conjugal

We proceed to the crux of this petition.
We reiterate the basic rule that a petition for review should only cover
questions of law.14 Questions of fact are not reviewable. The exceptions apply
only in the presence of extremely meritorious circumstances.15 None exists in
this case. We note with disfavor that most of the issues raised in this petition
are factual. We caution the petitioners that this practice of deluging the
Court with factual issues in defiance of well-settled rule, in the hope of
having them reviewed, is unacceptable.
The only issue proper for resolution is the question of whether the subject
properties are conjugal. Petitioners claim that the subject properties16 are
exclusive properties of Nicolas except for Lot No. 152, which they claim is
Pacitas exclusive property. This issue is easily resolved. The Family Code
provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between
Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family
Code.17 Article 10518 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family
Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or
other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during
the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal.19 The burden of
proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal.20This is counterbalanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have
been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed
conjugal.21 Petitioners argue that Eusebia failed to prove this pre-requisite.
We disagree.
The question of whether the subject properties were acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia is a factual issue. Both the trial and
appellate courts agreed that the subject properties were in fact acquired
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.22 The tax declarations23 covering
the subject properties, along with the unrebutted testimony of Eusebias
witnesses, establish this fact. We give due deference to factual findings of
trial courts,24 especially when affirmed by the appellate court. A reversal of
this finding can only occur if petitioners show sufficient reason for us to
doubt its correctness. Petitioners in the present case have not.
Moreover, on whether Lot No. 152 is conjugal or not, the answer came from
petitioners themselves. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October
1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23
November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996.
Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October
1957.25 The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage
of Nicolas and Eusebia.

Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not
conjugal. The presumption in Article 116, which subsists "unless the contrary
is proved," stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. The
burden of proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on
the party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and
convincing.26 Petitioners failed to meet this standard.
Petitioners point out that the deed of sale, the transfer certificate of title and
the tax declaration of Lot No. 152 are all in the name of Pacita. Petitioners
maintain that this can only mean that Pacita is the real owner of Lot No. 152.
We disagree. The totality of the evidence reveals that this was merely just
one of the several schemes Nicolas employed to deprive Eusebia of their
conjugal property. Ironically, petitioners themselves submitted in evidence a
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch IV, in Civil Case
No. R-960227 involving the acquisition of Lot No. 152.
The decision in Civil Case No. R-9602 stated that Tranquiliana Marababol
Remulta testified that the one who offered to buy the lot from her was none
other than Nicolas Retuya.28 Tranquiliana narrated that at first she refused to
sign the deed of sale because the buyer placed in the deed was Pacita and
not Nicolas, her understanding being that the buyer was Nicolas. We find
that the trial court in the present case correctly took into consideration the
decision in Civil Case No. R-9602.29 Considering that the decision in Civil Case
No. R-9602 has become final and executory, its findings of fact involving the
sale of Lot No. 152 to Nicolas and Pacita are conclusive and binding on
petitioners who introduced in evidence the decision.
Petitioners also point out that all the other tax declarations presented before
the trial court are in the name of Nicolas alone. Petitioners argue that this
serves as proof of Nicolas exclusive ownership of these properties.
Petitioners are mistaken. The tax declarations are not sufficient proof to
overcome the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All property
acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name the
property is registered, is presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise. 30 The
presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of title of
the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses
only.31 Article 116 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one
or both of the spouses."
In some of the documents that petitioners presented, Nicolas misrepresented
his civil status by claiming that he was single. Petitioners point to this as
proof of Nicolas desire to exclude Eusebia from the properties covered by

the documents.32 Petitioners further claim that this supports their stand that
the subject properties are not conjugal. This argument is baseless. Whether a
property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will of one of
the spouses. No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the
character of conjugal property. The clear intent of Nicolas in placing his
status as single is to exclude Eusebia from her lawful share in the conjugal
property. The law does not allow this.
Petitioners point out that Pacita had the means to buy Lot No. 152. Even if
Pacita had the financial capacity, this does not prove that Pacita bought Lot
No. 152 with her own money. To rebut the presumption that Lot No. 152 is
conjugal, petitioners must prove that Pacita used her own money to pay for
Lot No. 152. Petitioners failed to prove this.
Petitioners further argue that since Nicolas and Pacita were already
cohabiting when Lot No. 152 was acquired, the lot cannot be deemed
conjugal property of Nicolas and Eusebia. Petitioners keep belaboring this
point in their petition and memorandum.
Petitioners argument is flawed.
The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period,
does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.33 Otherwise, the law
would be giving a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and
immoral. What petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas and Pacitas
cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of Eusebia, the legal spouse. The
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that
Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from 7
October 1926, the date of Nicolas and Eusebias marriage, until 23
November 1996, the date of Eusebias death, are still presumed conjugal.
Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that any of the subject
properties was acquired outside or beyond this period.
Finally, petitioners reliance on Article 148 of the Family Code34 is misplaced.
A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of "actual
joint contribution" by both the live-in partners before the property becomes
co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution. The presumption of
equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of
their proportionate contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint
contribution is proven first. Simply put, proof of actual contribution by
both parties is required, otherwise there is no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal sharing. Petitioners failed to show proof of actual
contribution by Pacita in the acquisition of Lot No. 152. In short, petitioners
failed to prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her own money, or that
she actually contributed her own money to acquire it.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated 31 January 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 46716 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.