Gondomar

Gondomar: Ambassador to James I
Author(s): Charles H. Carter

Source: The Historical Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1964), pp. 189-208
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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THE HISTORICAL
VOL. VIl
JOURNAL
No. z
I964
I. GONDOMAR:
By
AMBASSADOR
CHARLES
H.
TO JAMES
CARTER
Tulane Unziversity
ennobled as Count of Gondomarin
I6I3 to i6221 and
continued thereafter in a sort of emeritus status as Spain's leading, almost
only, expert on English affairs until his death in i626.
In this tense, crisis-ridden time of uneasy peace prior to the Thirty Years'
War and during the opening years of that war, when its course and its
eventual extent were still much in doubt, what was going to happen in Europe,
and to Europe, was very much in the hands of the relatively few men who
guided or influenced affairs of state in a few key capitals. None were more
important than such men in Spain and England, widely recognized as the
heads of 'the two protectorats' over Catholic and Protestant Europe. Gondomar must certainly be counted among these few.
He must also be numbered among the deepest-dyed villains of English
historical tradition. There has probably never been a more able diplomat sent
to England, nor a more influential one-nor one more passionately hated by
so many Englishmen. Neither can one imagine anyone being more thoroughly
misrepresented in his own time and after, the much abused James I not
excepted. It is the purpose of the present essay to try to put the conventional
(mistaken and misleading) historical conception of the man and his actions
into somewhat more accurate perspective.2
DON
DIEGO
i6I7,
served as Spanish ambassadorto England from
SARMIENTO
DE ACURA,
1 He was absent from England on a rather active 'sick leave' from July i 6 i 8 to May i 62o.
The following article rests primarily on several years' work in the original manuscripts of
Gondomar's own dispatches to kings, ministers, etc., letters and dispatches to him, and documents of the Council of State based upon or deriving from Gondomar's reports or otherwise
relating to him. The main part of this material, in the Seccion de Estado at Simancas, is too
voluminous for a complete list to be attempted here, but some 37 legajos which can be cited
succinctly (2560-63,2571-73,2590-2603,2849,7023-35,
7037-38) provide more than ample
documentation for the more general statements made in this essay. There is a small amount of
Gondomar correspondence at the Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, and a great deal in 'State
Papers, Spain' at the Public Record Office (SP94, vols. 9-33 cover the reign of James I). In
addition, use has been made of S. R. Gardiner's notes and transcripts (Add. 31,111-2),
and
corroborative evidence has been used in large quantities from the archives of the Spanish
Netherlands at the Archives Generales du Royaume de Belgique.
Whenever adequate documentation for a given point in the essay exists in published form,
however, reference is made to the printed, rather than the manuscript, document, for the
convenience of the reader who may wish to consult actual texts. Most frequent reference of
this sort is to Documnentosine'ditospara la historia de Espaiia (new series), vols. i-iv: Correspondencia oficial de Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuna, Conde de Gondomar, ed. Antonio Ballesteros
Beretta, Madrid, 1936-45, hereafter referred to as DIE.
Where specific manuscript sources are cited (in addition to the general references above) the
2
I90
C. H. CARTER
Gondomar had not been in England long before rumour and 'common
knowledge' had him, by use of diverse diabolical tricks, in complete control of
the king (he was not), with complete access to all James's thoughts and plans
(he did have, in a way, but it was not much use to him), covering the ground
with spies (he could not have afforded it even had he wanted to play spymaster), the guiding spirit of a 'Spanish party' at the English Court (a
misleading name for an English faction with aims of their own), and the
powerful paymaster in control of highly placed hirelings receiving Spanish
pensions (none of which is true except the cost to Spain).
This contemporary popular notion of Gondomar and his activities is
preserved for us intact in the dramatical, tract and pseudo-historical literature
of the time.3 The most conspicuous element of the picture found therein is the
alleged sway the ambassador held over James, making him privy to the king's
innermost secrets and allowing him to exercise satanical powers of control
over the king's very thoughts and actions.
The manner of presenting this picture sometimes varied, as in Thomas
Middleton's play 'A Game at Chess', in which the key pieces are the White
King (a strangely sympathetic role for any of these writers to give James) and
the Black Knight, a wicked man in the service, of course, of the Black King.
But this contemporary literature generally took the form of fantasies showing
Gondomar performing his necromancy 'in the guise of Machiavelli' or, as
Thomas Scott put it in the subtitle for The Second Part of Vox Populi,
'Gondomar appearing in the likeness of Matchiavell in a Spanish Parliament,
wherin are discovered his treacherous & subtile Practises, to the ruine as well
of England, as the Netherlands'.
The frequent application to Gondomar of this label, 'Machiavelli', serves
handily to characterize the nature of the more extreme treatment given him,
which got not only into accepted tradition but into formal historical literature.
The contemporary meaning of this noun form was roughly that of its adjectival form today, but its force was greater. Its connotation was not just that of
partial disapproval but of absolute condemnation.
Ordinary usage of 'Machiavellian' today, as represented in the catch phrase
'the end justifies the means', seems mainly concerned with employment of
following abbreviations are used: Add., Additional Manuscripts, British Museum; BNM,
Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid; Est., Secci6n de Estado, Archivo General de Simancas; PEA,
Papiers d'1?tat et de l'Audience, Archives Generales du Royaume de Belgique, Brussels.
3 See Thomas Middleton's play, 'A Game at Chess'; Richard Dugdale, 'A narrative of the
wicked plots carried on by Seignior Gondamore for advancing the Popish Religion and Spanish
Faction. Heartily recommended to all Protestants', reptd. Harleian Miscellany, III, 3I 3-26;
William Prynne, Hidden works of darkness (London, I645); Thomas Scott, Vox populi, or
newes from Spayne (York?, I620), and The second part of vox populi (York, I624); Anthony
Weldon, History of the court and character of King Yames and of the intrigues and tragical events
of his life. . first published in 1615, London, I8I7; and Arthur Wilson, The history of Great
Britain, being the life and reign of King James the First (London, I653). One finds touches of
this contemporary tradition even in works sympathetic to James, such as Godfrey Goodman,
Bishop of Gloucester, The court of James I, ed. J. S. Brewer, 2 vols. (London, I839).
GONDOMAR:
AMBASSADOR
TO JAMES I
I9I
undesirablemeans,with an implicit acceptanceof the possibilitythat the end

itself might be justifiable. But in usage of the time a 'Machiavelli' was not
only willing to use 'bad' means to gain his end, he habituallydid so and
probablypreferredit that way, in keeping with his evil, diabolicalnature.
This latter was almost a necessaryassumption,for not only were the means
evil; the end to be gained was evil too. One in fact gets a strong impression
from contemporaryusage of the term that it was actually the 'evil' end a
person sought, not the means he used to gain that end, which identifiedhim
as a 'Machiavelli';it merelyfollowedthat the meanswould be evil as well, for
that was the way a 'Machiavelli'naturallywent about his business.
In the eyes of their English enemies, the end sought by Spain and her
ambassadorwas twofold, encompassingthe twin epitomes of political and
religiousevil: the enslavementof all men under a UniversalMonarchy,and
the destruction of the Reformed Faith and the subjugation of all True
Believersunderthe despoticyoke of the RomanAnti-Christ.This evil design
of the PapisticalSpaniards,a vast conspiracyagainstthe free and the Godly,
was being advancedright in Englandby an ambassadorwho was Spanish, a
papist, and apparentlysuccessful. Since the end was patently evil, both he
and the means he employed must, by very definition, be diabolical. So
Gondomarwas 'the Spanish Machiavelli'.
This picture was rather far from the mark, as will be seen. One might,
therefore,ask two questions:what explainsits readyacceptanceand its gross
inaccuracy?As to its acceptance,it had a readyaudiencefilledwith hatredfor
Spain and the Roman Church,and was often quite effectivelydone. Scott's
SecondPart of Vox Populi,for example,an imaginaryaccountof the ambassador'sdiabolicalworkingsagainstthe good cause duringhis leave of absence
in Spain(i6i8-20), 'Faithfullytranslatedout of the Spanishcoppie by a wellwiller to Englandand Holland', is a masterpieceof false propagandaand was
apparentlywidely acceptedat the time as a true account.
The questionof accuracyremains. In orderto make any sense out of this
literature(and the unwritten rumour and diatribe which accompaniedit),
especiallyin view of its exaggerations,errorsof fact, andludicrousexcesses,it is
necessaryto bear in mind both why it was written and by whom. As to the
'why', the fact that it was consciously intended as propaganda,designed
to stir up anti-Spanish and anti-Catholic hatreds, goes far to explain its
nature.
The question of who, from among the more determinedopponentsof the
Spanish ambassadorand of James's 'Spanish policy', wrote these works is
equally importantregardingthe relationof statementto reality. Spain and
the RomanChurchhad no moreimplacableenemiesin England,or anywhere,
thanArchbishopAbbot, Lord ChancellorEllesmereand theirfollowersin the
PrivyCounciland elsewhereat Court. But these men were in close touch with
affairs and knew perfectly well what the Spanish themselves recognized
I92
C. H. CARTER
clearly: that Spain's position in Europe was most tenuous, especially in view
of the great latent power of France; that she would be doing well just to hold
on to her present territorial position; and that thoughts of conquering the
world for Spain and the Church were the work of idle dreamers.
Given their familiarity with the facts, it is perhaps predictable that these
men would not be the authors of the far-fetched propaganda vehicles in
question. These things were written, not by the George Abbots and the
Thomas Ellesmeres, but instead by the William Prynnes, the Thomas Scotts,
the Richard Dugdales, the Thomas Alureds, and others of that sort: men who
were hostile to the Crown, excluded from Court or at least with no access there,
lacking close contact with affairs and first-hand information about them. In
sum, they were in no position to have any accurate notion of what was going
on, or in fact of what these matters were really all about.
Yet modern literature, some of which is touched on later in this essay, has
tended to accept and rehearse a good bit of the version of facts and eventsdistorted, exaggerated, even imaginary-which they presented.4 If one doubts
how uncritical this acceptance has been, one need only note the occasional
citations one encounters of even such a transparent fraud as Dugdale's
'Narrative of the wicked plots carried on by Seignior Gondamore for advancing the Popish Religion and Spanish Faction', which claims to be translated
4 There is little modern literature written specifically about Gondomar. F. H. Lyon, El
conde de Gondomar (in English) (Oxford, I9I0), is a compendium of silly traditions. Don
Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, marqu6s de Villa-Urrutia, 'La embajada del Conde de
Gondomar', a I9I3 address to the Royal Academy of History in Spain, published in his Los
embajadores de Espania en Paris de 1 883 a 1889 (Madrid, I927), is mostly a not-very-competent
plagiarism of Lyon's unsatisfactory book, with some unacknowledged text taken almost
verbatim from Gardiner as well, with frequent errors in translation, the whole twisted into a
eulogy of Gondomar as untenable as the usual condemnations. Ciriaco Perez Bustamente,
Espaiioles e Ingleses en Aue'rica durante el siglo XVII. El Conde de Gondomar y su intervencion
en el proceso, prision y muerte de sir Walter Raleigh (Santiago, 1928), provides a detailed and
quite useful filling-in of the man's antecedents and early career, but is of little value on the
subject of the title, this part being based almost entirely on a chance sequence of about ioo
V.) which are quite inadequate by themconsecutive folios of documents (BNM 6949/99-I90
selves. Francisco Javier Sainchez Cant6n, Don Diego Sarmiento de Acunia, Conde de Gondomar,
1567-1 626 (Madrid, I935), is a potentially excellent work whose form frustratingly precludes
the fulfilling of its potential. Prepared as an inaugural address for the Academy of History, it
is what makes the man
paradoxically skips over Gondomar's English embassy-which
historically significant in the first place-because that subject had already been treated in
Villa-Urrutia's address mentioned above. Sinchez Cant6n seems not to accept that travesty
but does not refute it before the same august body; instead he bows deeply (but one doubts
sincerely) in the direction of Villa-Urrutia and diplomatically avoids Gondomar's diplomacy.
The worst of the usual travesties are rather handily epitomized by Martin A. S. Hume in 'Un
gran diplomatico espafiol. El Conde de Gondomar en Inglaterra', Nuestro Tiempo, II (1902),
Hume's other works (e.g. The Court of Philip IV, New York, 1927) carry on the
397-4I4.
same tradition. That this sort of thing is still with us is shown in such recent works as William
McElwee, The Wisest Fool in Christendom (London, I958). Among modern works in English
the present writer has seen nothing that comes even close to an accurate treatment except for
the excellent chapter (entitled 'A Game at Chess' after Middleton's play) in Garrett Mattingly,
G. P. V. Akrigg's Jacobean Pageant (Cambridge,
Renaissance Diplomacy (Boston, 1955).
Mass., I962) appeared after the above was written but its chapter on Gondomar is no
exception: he is even indexed wrongly under his maternal name, which is misspelled.
GONDOMAR:
AMBASSADOR
TO JAMES I
I93
from a 'relation' by Gondomar himself-though the Spanish did not even

use this form of diplomatic reporting.
Although Gondomar was surely one of the ablest diplomats who ever lived
he is something of a disappointment as a villainous arch-intriguer. The usual
traditions about him notwithstanding, he had little use for spies, partly
because he did not trust anyone who would betray secrets for money and
partly because few spies, properly so-called, had access to information
important enough to interest him. He made exceptions in special cases where
he had no other access, as in the case of the Anglo-French marriage negotiations at the beginning of his embassy, when he procured an agent in the
French resident's household who made all of Buisseaux's correspondence
available to him, and there were always functionaries around the Court (such
as James's Master of Ceremonies, Lewis Lewkinor) who volunteered petty
intelligence and presumably were paid for it. But with all of this taken
together his accounts still show that he averaged only about ?350 per year for
spies-a rather contemptible figure.5
The ambassador did, however, have English support. One of the main
foundations of Gondomar's diplomatic success was the group of well-wishers
whom he referred to as the bien intencionados,and especially those with whom
he was in most intimate contact, his confidentes.The most important of these
latter, until his death in mid-i614, was Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton.
Second only to Northampton in this group was his nephew Thomas Howard,
Earl of Suffolk, after 26 December I613 father-in-law to James's favourite,
Somerset, and after 9 July i614 Lord High Treasurer. Also important were
Charles Howard, Earl of Nottingham, Lord High Admiral since before the
Armada campaign; Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel; Suffolk's son-in-law
Lord Knollys; and the Howards' protege, Sir Thomas Lake, Secretary of
State from i6i6 to I6I9.
For obvious reasons these people and their supporters were and are often
referred to as the 'Howard party', perhaps even more often (for reasons which
have seemed equally obvious but which do not stand up under examination) as
the 'Spanish party'. This latter appellation has considerably obscured the
important and very real difference between the aims of the Spanish and those
of the Howard faction.
It is true that these people were 'pro-Spanish', but in the rather special
sense that they favoured an alliance with Spain over the one with France which
their Scottish rivals for political influence favoured and over the open (though
undeclared) war which the more zealous English Puritans wanted to wage
against Spain in the Indies and elsewhere. But perhaps the best method of
definition, so far as foreign policy is concerned, is by a modern analogy: if one
were to label those who today advocate a general war against Russia as the
' See, for example, the scattered accounts in DIE, i-iv,
example, Lewkinor to Gondomar, 7 Jan. i6zi, Est. 7031/24
passim. For Lewkinor see, for

and v.
194
C. H. CARTER
'anti-Russian party' and those who advocate a peaceful relationship and an

attempt to maintain a status quo 'co-existence' as the 'Russian party' then
one would closely approximate the nature of what passed for an 'anti-Spanish
party' and a 'Spanish party' in England in the reign of James I.
The same group was also referred to pejoratively as the 'Catholic party',
with perhaps even less relevance. Most of them were, it is true, Catholicsbut so were a good many other Englishmen. The members of the 'Catholic
party' preferred that Catholics, including themselves, not be persecuted, but
one searches in vain for religious zeal among them. They were not of course
supporters of the policies, either foreign or domestic, of the more rabid
Puritans-which somehow get treated as synonymous with the 'interests of
England'-but neither were they a fifth column working for, or even hoping
for, another Enterprise of England.
As to the extent of the partiality of the Howard clan and their followers
toward Spanish interests and the militant 'Catholic cause', the witnesses in
the best position to know are their contemporaries on the Catholic, Spanish
Habsburg side, because they felt the sting of their opposition. Shortly after
the Gunpowder Plot, for example, when extradition of some of the Catholic
plotters from their refuge in the Spanish Netherlands was being sought, the
ambassador from Brussels reported that Northampton and Nottingham were
'those of the Council who insist the most' on it, against the advice of several
other Councillors; during the negotiations for the Treaty of London an
earlier Flemish envoy had found the Earl of Suffolk and Robert Cecil both
'very partial to the Dutch' 6
The ambassador's reference to Cecil in this connexion is more relevant than
would appear at first glance, for although James's chief minister (until his
death in i 6I2) was neither a Howard nor a member of that faction, he was a
Spanish pensioner, along with other highly placed English officials, a practice
which requires a moment's attention.
There had of course been no resident Spanish ambassador in England
during the latter part of Elizabeth's reign. Regular diplomatic relations were
resumed after James's accession with the arrival of the extraordinary embassy
come to negotiate the Treaty of London, headed by Don Juan Bautista de
Tassis, conde de Villamediana. In negotiating the peace, and looking forward
to future needs, Villamediana dispensed a good deal of largesse, in both cash
and promises. When he left he submitted a memorandum to Pedro de Zu'-niga,
the first holder of the newly re-established permanent embassy, recommending that a regular pension list be set up and suggesting particular names and
amounts they should be offered.7
6
Hoboken to Albert, London, I2 June i6o6, PEA 365/73 v.; Arenberg to Albert, i8 June
cited by Gardinerin Add. 3 ',III /I.
7 S. R. Gardiner, History of England...
1603-1642, IO vols. (London, I901),
I, 2I4.
Gardiner's transcript of this memo (of 8/I8 July I605) is at Add. 3", III6 ff.
I603,
GONDOMAR:
AMBASSADOR
TO JAMES I
195
This list of pensioners was duly set up, with some alterations in membership
and stipends. The top-level pensions, for such as the Earl of Dorset, Lord
High Treasurer, and the Lord Admiral Nottingham, were raised from Villamediana's suggested figure of 3000 felipes (1750) per year to 4000 felipes
(,iooo); Robert Cecil's originally suggested 3000 felipes was doubled (to
, I 500), giving him half as much again as any of the others, an apt recognition
of his predominant position in the government. Counting the smaller fry,
Villamediana's originally suggested total of 29,000 felipes (U7250) was swollen
to 36,500 felipes (L9125) per year.8
Inasmuch as Villamediana had recommended a pension of 3000 ducats for
Robert Cecil and the latter ended up with double that amount, one may
reasonably assume that Cecil himself forced the Spanish to raise the 'ante'.
But that does not mean that he struck a traitorous bargain with them, for there
was nothing unusual in an Englishman taking such money, nor in the Spanish
giving it fairly readily.
The English Court had a longstanding reputation as a place where it
required money to open doors, and the only change in this situation after
James's accession was that it required even more money than before, largely
owing to the openhandedness of Dutch agents from the very beginning of the
London treaty talks, which pushed prices upward. As one discontented
ambassador observed, 'In this country, if one wants to negotiate a matter one
has to put up the money'.9
On the Spanish side, the giving of pensions and other money payments was
common practice, though it seems impossible now to discover its exact extent.
One observer in Madrid, generally reliable, reported, 'Those princes of Italy,
the most take from the King of Spain; the Duke of Saxony takes from him...
and even the Queen of England, I have heard, took 30,ooo ducats (750oo)'*10
Be the latter as it may, the Spanish themselves, pension or not, considered
Cecil barely less hostile to their interests than Elizabeth herself had been."
The truth of the matter is that Spain found herself with pension obligations
she had assumed which did her little good but which she could not put an end
8 For this first established list see Add. 3 1,1 I 1/10-I I. Gardiner uses the same ratio of four
ducats (including the felipe) to the pound applied here: the ducat was sometimes of I I reales
but generally of io, while the pound sterling was generally considered worth 40 reales.
9 Arenberg to Albert [London], 27 June I603, in H. Lonchay, J. Cuvelier and J. Lef6vre,
eds., Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVII' siecle, 6 vols.
I, 298 ('il faut y mettre le prix').
(Brussels, 1923-37),
10 Simon Contarini, Relazione, printed in translation in Luis Cabrera de C6rdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas en la Corte de Espaina desde 1599 hasta 1614 (Madrid, I857), pp.
563-83, as 'Relacion que hizo a la Republica de Venecia Simon Contareni [sic], al fin del afio
I605, de la embajada que habia hecho en Espafna'; p. 58I.
11 See, for example, Add. 3I,III/5;
and Sarmiento to Lerma, London, 5 Oct. I6I3, DIE,
For modern opinions in the same vein see J. Cuvelier, 'Les pr6liminaires du
III, 125.
traite de Londres (29 aofut I604)', Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, II (I923), 294; and
J. Willaert, 'Negotiations politico-religieuses entre l'Angleterre et les Pays-Bas catholiques
VI, 572.
Revue d'histoire ecclesiastique, VI-IX (905-8),
(1598-I625)',
I96
C. H. CARTER
to. A conspicuous example is the pension originally offered to Cecil (Earl of

Salisbury after I605) as a bribe, which he accepted as a lucrative windfall,
and which came to be treated as an indefeasible perquisite of the position of
chief minister. When Somerset succeeded to Salisbury's predominant position
in government he made certain that he succeeded to his pension as well. He
married into the Howard family and gave every sign of being willing to go
along with that faction's policies (which coincided nicely with Spain's at that
time), but he first held out for Salisbury's 6ooo ducats per year. The Spanish
yielded to his demands ;12 as early as i6i8 they agreed that Buckingham in
turn should succeed to this perquisite.13
In the matter of pensions, the Howards themselves fail miserably to live
up to their money-grabbing reputation. Suffolk refused from the beginning
to accept one14(though his wife, whose reputation seems only too well founded,
readily enough accepted kiooo per year). Nottingham-conqueror of the
Invincible Armada in '88 and still Lord Admiral of England-accepted in the
beginning but apparently lost interest in the matter, for his name soon drops
from the lists.'5 Northampton, leader of the clan, stayed on the list, but
actual payment of his annual stipend was years overdue-a fact which was of
little concern to him. He told Gondomar from time to time that he would
indicate someone else the money might be given to; at the time of his death he
had not even done this.'6
The pensions were often of little consequence even among the lesser fry
whose more limited means did not allow them to turn down a windfall with
the ease of a Howard. Sir William Monson was Admiral of the Channel Fleet,
and the thought of the commander whose job it would be to oppose another
Armada being in the pay of Spain might seem shocking; but a decade after
his pension had begun the Spanish still knew little about him or his attitude
toward them. When he first met him Gondomar was pleasantly surprised to
find that the Admiral was at least not openly hostile.17
The Spanish went to great lengths to cultivate Queen Anne (who was a
Catholic) and, to wield greater influence over her, they cultivated her confidante Mrs Drummond as well. The latter was a pensioner from the start; it
was not until almost the time of the queen's death that it began to dawn on the
Spanish that her influence on affairs was not worth mentioning. Thomas Lake,
secretary to the king, then Secretary of State, was a Spanish pensioner, but he
12
Somerset never actually saw the money, for by the time cash could be found to pay him
he had fallen, was in prison, and seemed in danger of his life; Gondomar preferred paying his
debts but withheld payment of this one, his concern transparently sincere, to avoid compromising Somerset further. Sarmiento to Lerma, London, I7 March I6I4, DIE, IV, 33;
same to Philip III, London, I5 Nov. I6I7, DIE, i, I30.
13 Gondomar to Ciriza, London, 30 June
I6I9,
DIE, II, I78.
14 Gardiner, England, I, 2I4-I5.
'5 Add. 3I,III/7.

16 Gondomar to Ciriza, London, 30 June I6I9,
17
DIE, II, I79.

Sarmiento's relation of his voyage to and his reception in England in
I6I3,
DIE,
III,
85.
GONDOMAR:
AMBASSADOR
TO JAMES I
I97
was a long-time protege of the Howards and followed their lead, not that of
Spain.
In sum, the fact that there were Spanish pensioners at the English Court had
very little effect on English policies or actions. In some cases, as that of Mrs
Drummond, the pension was merely spent in a place where it could do no
good, one way or another. The most influential of those 'well-inclined'
toward Spain were too wealthy to take the pensions very seriously-Suffolk
declined from the beginning, and Northampton never bothered about
collecting. Lesser men such as Lake looked to the Howards as their patrons,
not the Spanish.
But the most conspicuous failure was in the case of those potentially or
actually hostile to Spain. It was Spain's original intention to buy their
friendship, but the result turned out to be just the reverse. The pensions did
not buy friendship: matters simply reached a point, very quickly, where
refusal to grant expected pensions would create more than normal hostility.
Spain, far from being in control of hirelings who otherwise might have been
expected to oppose Spanish interests, was rather in the position of a hapless
diner who must 'bribe' a surly waiter with tips to avoid getting soup spilled
on him.
And this, so far as Gondomar was concerned, was the rub. It was easy
enough to grant pensions-put another name on the list-but payment was a
more difficult matter. For a person to be on Gondomar's pension list and
'in the pay of the King of Spain' did not mean that in practice he was
actually paid, for Gondomar seldom had the money. He seldom had enough
money, in fact, to pay his own expenses-he was one of the London moneylenders' best customers, including an account with Burlamaqui-and payment of Spanish pensions at the English Court was always well in arrears.
This caused him many anxious moments, for the disgruntled pensioners,
whose good will the pensions were intended to buy, frequently threatened to
become openly hostile to retaliate for the delay.18
In the net reckoning it is safe to say that, even aside from the actual
expense involved, Spanish pensions at the English Court caused the Spanish,
including their ambassador, more headaches and hostility than any advantage
18 See, for example, Gondomar's embassy account of I July I6I9, DIE, II, i82-9;
Sarmiento to Philip III, London, 5 Oct. I613, ibid., iii, 122; same to Ciriza, London, 3 Jan. I6I8,
ibid., 1, zoi.
One who threatened him most frequently, interestingly enough, was Lady
Suffolk, wife of a leader of the 'Spanish party'. Regarding the general practice of pensions the
king of Spain was in fact in an odd position: he had many obligations of this sort in many
countries, but even when he 'paid' them, no matter how late, it was often not in cash but by a
warrant drawn on his generally empty treasury. Rather than go through the long, expensive
process of collecting these in full the recipients would sell them at their discounted market
rate, usually 4 to i ; the king was blamed, with some justice, for having paid only a quarter of
what he had promised; as a result many friends were lost and many enemies were made, but
the greatest irony lies in the fact that the king's treasury would eventually have to pay off the
notes at face value all the same. See, for example, Gondomar to Ciriza, London, 13 March
I6I9,
ibid.,
ii,
I26-7.
I98
C. H. CARTER
that ever accrued from them. At least Gondomar was convinced of it: he
frequently recommended to Madrid that the money would be much better
spent on warships to put down English pirates in the Indies.
But if the practical implications of the Spanish pensions were either nil or
negative, what of the moral implications? How much confusion there has
been over the whole question of the servants of one king accepting money
from another, and especially over how much treachery to the King of England
this implies, is amusingly illustrated by an episode of i6I3, at the time of
Gondomar's first coming to England. The current list of Spanish pensioners
at the English Court formed a part of his instructions, and John Digby,
James's ambassador to Madrid, managed to get his hands on it. Gardiner'9
describes Digby as shocked at this discovery, then draws a number of strange
conclusions based on the assumption that James, too, was surprised to fiild
that there were such highly placed Englishmen accepting pensions from the
King of Spain.
The fact is that John Digby, who was perhaps James's most dutiful
servant and would never have withheld this information from his sovereign,
may well have been shocked but was even more embarrassed by the duty of
sending it. For although the pension list was of course in code, he had also
managed to obtain the key to the code names the Spanish were then using;
one of the pensioners was listed as 'Leandro'; and 'Leandro' proved to be
the Spanish designator for the King of England.20
A good many of the specific errors about Gondomar and his activities,
however, can claim a much more recent and a much more honourable origin
historiographically than those deriving from hostile contemporary writings:
the classical work of S. R. Gardiner. These slips of almost a century ago can
be found continued at all levels, even in D. H. Willson's splendid biography
of James.
For example, a key part of Gondomar's original mission was to do what he
could to block completion of the negotiations going on for a match between
Prince Charles and a sister of Louis XIII. Professor Willson's account states
that 'His [Gondomar's] first impression when he arrived in London in I613
was that the French marriage could not be prevented. But he hinted in his
insinuating way that the King could easily obtain better terms in Mad-rid
than in Paris.'21 The situation was not that simple-much to Gondomar's
despair.
Spain's objective was to prevent a French marriage alliance in a second
direction that would nullify Spain's own French marriage alliance then being
rather shakily concluded, but for Spain to alienate France and lose the latter
alliance (still very much in doubt) in the course of preventing a counterweight
19 Gardiner, England,
20
21
II, 2I6 ff.

See Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, pp. 26OI .
D. H. Willson, King3ames VI and I (London, 1956), p. 365.
GONDOMAR:
AMBASSADOR
TO JAMES I
I99
to it would be to gain nothing but a hostile neighbour. The 'Spanish faction'

importuned Gondomar constantly to interpose himself in the matter, not
least because a French marriage would be a victory for their Scottish rivals at
Court, but he refused to touch it for fear of French reaction.
The crux of the matter was that if he mentioned a Spanish marriage to
James without formal instructions to do so the French would see his action
not as a serious offer (which they probably would have accepted as legitimate
competition for the Prince) but simply as malicious wrecking of their diplomacy. Since he did not have the necessary instructions Gondomar spent his
time not in hinting at a Spanish marriage but in constantly begging Madrid to
send them so he could at least mention it.22
This version of Gondomar's activities in the matter can be traced to the
place from which a number of such errors originate:23 the very fount from
which we get so much of our detailed, documented knowledge of the subject,
the monumental researches of Samuel Rawson Gardiner. How mistakes of
this sort occurred in Gardiner's work can be illustrated by reference to another
of them, the still-accepted belief that James dissolved the Addled Parliament
in I6I4 only after consulting with Gondomar-when in fact the ambassador
had intentionally kept away from James for weeks and they did not see each
other until several days after the dissolution.
The explanation of Gardiner's error lies in the nature of some of the documents among the vast quantity he consulted. It was the custom of the Spanish
Council of State to read ambassadors' reports or summaries or minutes of
them and then discuss the subject matter in Council. Gardiner drew heavily
on this material; sometimes he saw the original dispatches but often all that
was available to him were the minutes, which generally were third-person
summaries of the ambassador's first-person reports of his activities (and of
course of other matters), involving much compression and frequent omission
of details, passages, or even entire sections which dealt with matters not felt
relevant to the particular subject the Council was being called to discuss.
In the case in question here Gardiner saw and used the minutes (only) of
Gondomar's dispatches of 30 June and , 3 and 4 July I6I4, dealing with the
recent dissolution of Parliament. It is possible, though not necessary, to
understand these minutes to say that James saw Gondomar just prior to the
dissolution. This was Gardiner's early opinion, and on the basis of this reading
he credited the assumed interview, in an article in i 867, with James's decision
to dissolve.24
His interpretation was about the same two years later in the first edition of
22
See Gondomar's correspondence in DIE from his arrival in London to c. i6i6, passim.
Though Professor Willson independently derived the impression referred to above from
the reports of the Venetian ambassadors.
24
'On certain letters of Diego Sarmiento de Acufta, Count of Gondomar, giving an account
of the affair of the Earl of Somerset, with remarks on the career of Somerset as a public man'
Archaeologia, vol. xii (London, I867).
23
200
C. H. CARTER
that portion of his great history of England in the period,25 but in the work's
later editions his account is much more guarded, more precise, and more
accurate. He continues to give Gondomar's influence the main credit for
James's decision, but only through the agency of a go-between (John Digby)
sent by James and involving only some platitudinous assurances of the vaguest
sort on the ambassador's part. The famous and often-recounted audience
which occurred about this time (the only one which did) Gardiner now has
placed properly at 'a few days after the dissolution'.26
In doing so Gardiner continues to cite the same document, which he had
published in i869;27 one doubts that he ever had the opportunity to see the
dispatches themselves, fuller and more precise, on which these minutes were
based, which makes all the greater the honour due him for his judicious
revision, for the dispatches themselves spell out clearly what actually
happened: Digby came to see Gondomar on Friday, 3 June (OS), receiving
only platitudinous expressions of Spanish good will; James consulted his
Lord Privy Seal, Northampton, on Saturday night in Greenwich; Parliament
was dissolved on Tuesday the 7th; but James, who had not seen the Spanish
ambassador for some time, did not send for him until the following Saturday,
i i June, and the audience was not held until Monday I 3th, six days after the
dissolution. Though historians still sometimes assert that he did, Gondomar
obviously did not use his diabolical presence to sway James's mind: he was
not even there.28
Given the enormous amount of new material Gardiner uncovered, it would
be worse than petty to 'blame' him for such errors. It is lamentable that
nearly a century has passed without their being corrected, but it is even more
Prince Charles .and the Spanish marriage, 2 vols. (London, I869).
England, II, 247, 250.
27 Among the documents appended to his edition, in both Spanish and English, of Father
Francisco de Jesus, Narrative of the Spanish marriage treaty (Camden Society, vol. ioi)
(Westminster, I869), pp. 286-93.
28 See DIE, Iv, 157 ff. Gondomar's reliability as a source of fact is of obvious importance to
the question at hand. In support of his narrative Professor Willson frequently cites passages
in Gardiner which are based mainly or entirely on Gondomar's dispatches or minutes of them,
and he himself sometimes rests his account on Gondomar's own testimony (e.g. Ch. I 8, note 9;
Ch. I9, notes 5, 8, io). Yet he says (p. 363): 'There was a great deal of bombast about him, but
it was bombast that carried conviction; and his boastings not only imposed upon James, but
upon the ambassador himself, upon his government, and upon historians who have taken his
dispatches at their face value.' The present writer has, to date, seen several thousand folios of
his dispatches, minutes of them, consultas on them, answers to them, etc., as well as parallel
accounts of the same events, etc., written by independent observers. As with any source of
information, it is necessary to make certain allowances: for example, Gondomar constantly
refers to Prince Charles as 'a pearl 'but this need not be judged for its accuracy as a description
nor as a measure of Gondomar's enthusiasm for the lad; he was simply trying to sell Madrid on
the marriage itself. Gondomar's dispatches are, in fact, much more reliable than the highly
respected Venetian diplomatic correspondence because, among other things, (i) he had access
to more and better information than the Venetian envoys, and (2) the Venetians got much of
their information from him (directly or indirectly), which he falsified freely. A convenient
sample of the quality of his dispatches may be had in his report on the Addled Parliament,
DIE, IV, 143 if.
26
26
GONDOMAR:
AMBASSADOR
TO JAMES I
20I
regrettable to witness the distortion through unfounded extension of this judicious scholar's work. One of the more conspicuous examples of this (one
involving another error of detail on Gardiner's part) is the affair of Donia Luisa
de Carvajal. Dofia Luisa was a Spanish lady-a family connexion of Lerma's
-of great religious zeal who had arrived in England about eight years before
Gondomar, seeking martyrdom in the service of the counter-reformation in
England. She busied herself in the job of conversion, preaching at times in
Cheapside, going so far as publicly declaring the illegitimacy of the late Queen
Elizabeth. She had been arrested in the past for these activities, but was
released through Spanish influence, having come very early under the protection of the Spanish ambassador.
From the beginning Dofia Luisa was a nuisance, or worse, to the authorities
in general; in time she became a particular thorn in the side of Abbot as well
as Ellesmere and others of their faction. To strike at her would not only give
them satisfaction in itself (for she was a genius at making herself obnoxious)
but would provide a means of striking at Spain and at her ambassador, now
Gondomar, especially since in recent times she had become, in a sense, a
member of the ambassadorial household.
Gondomar had in fact been in England only a few months when an
opportunity presented itself to the Archbishop, who took the lead in the
matter. Abbot procured a warrant for her arrest and she was seized at a little
house she maintained in Spitalfields, on a charge of having set up a nunnery
there. Gondomar was unable to procure her release by the Council and took
the next step necessary, registering a protest with the King, demanding her
release. James had no sympathy for the case-he was currently exercised in
the extreme by the recent publication of Suarez's Defensor Fidei, and was in a
mood to associate all Catholic agitators with the doctrine of tyrannicide-but
was nevertheless inclined not to apply the full force of the anti-Catholic laws.
The sequel, beginning with James's reply to Gondomar's messenger, is
described by Gardiner as follows:
He was, however,disposedto be merciful, and would give ordersfor the immediate
release of the lady, on condition of her engaging to leave England without delay.
The next morning a formal message was brought to Sarmiento, repeating the
proposalwhich had thus been made. There are probablyfew men who, if they had
been in Sarmiento'splace, would not have hesitateda little before rejectingthe offer.
To refuse the King's terms would be to affront the man upon whom so much
depended. Sarmiento did not hesitate for a moment. The lady, he said, had done
no wrong. If the King wished it she would no doubt be readyto leave England at
the shortest notice. But it must be clearly understood that in that case he, as the
ambassadorof his Catholic Majesty, would leave England at the same time. The
answer produced an immediate effect. That very evening Donna Luisa was set at
liberty, and Sarmientowas informedthat her liberationwas entirely unconditional.
There is nothing in Sarmiento's account of the matter which would lead us
to suppose that he acted from any deep design. But it is certain that the most
C. H. CARTER
202
consummateskill could not have served him better. From henceforththe two men
knew each other; and when the time arrivedwhen James would be looking round
him for the support of a strongerarmthan his own, he would bethinkhimself of the
Spanish strangerin whom he had so unexpectedly found a master.29
As it happens, Gardiner was mistaken on a minor detail of this affair.
Gondomar had indeed complained to James, who was in the country at the
time, and James in turn had sent the message he said (and there is no reason
not to believe him) he had already intended to send, ordering the Council to
release her on the condition that she leave the country. This message was
forwarded by the Council to Gondomar on the following day, as Gardiner's
account indicates. But Gondomar's refusal to accept the terms of her release,
and his ultimatum, threatening to leave the country with her if she were
forced to go, were made to the Council, not to James. It was the Council, not
James, who relented and ordered the lady's release without any provision for
her leaving the country.
It was some time before Gondomar heard of the matter from James again,
when the King indicated he had only recently learned that she had still not
left the country. James expressed surprise at having heard so, Gondomar
offered a vague excuse about her health being too poor for travel, and the
matter ended there. Any chance of its coming up again and affecting relations
between the two men, one way or another, was conveniently avoided by her
death shortly after.30
As in other cases, such as that already mentioned of Gondomar's involvement in the dissolution of the Addled Parliament, Gardiner's account of the
incident contains errors of minor detail which greatly alter the seeming nature
of the episode-not because of any limitations on his part as an historian but
because of limitations in his sources, as a comparison of the documents he
cites and the original versions of Gondomar's reports shows clearly (e.g: the
episode took quite a while longer than Gardiner thought; the lady was not
released as quickly as his sources suggest). And, as in other cases, one must
note that his conclusions, the inferences he drew from the imperfect evidence
available to him, were after all comparatively guarded. These inferences,
however, have been extended further and further by others in subsequent
retellings, with no new evidence for support. As F. H. Lyon, for example,
tells it,
James sent him a message offering to release Dofia Luisa at once on condition that
she should leave Englandas quickly as possible [correct,except that James intended
that the ultimatum be delivered by the Council]. Sarmiento coolly [incorrect: he
29
Gardiner,England,ii,
222-3.
On her backgroundsee ibid., pp. 22I-2;
and Ballesteros,
DIE, iII, I27-8 n. Lady Georgiana Fullerton, The life of Luisa de Carvajal (London, I873),
which is based on Mufioz's eulogy, is useful for details but of little further value to political
history.
30 For the text of the ambassador's own reports of the episode, which were unavailable to
Gardiner and provide the basis for correcting his account, see DIE, iII, 145 ff.
GONDOMAR:
AMBASSADOR
TO JAMES I
203
was furious] replied [incorrect: he replied to the Council] that... he would leave
England too...James climbed down and ordered Donia Luisa be set at liberty
[incorrect:he neither climbed down nor orderedher release; he did not even know
it had been done].3'
Others carry this even further. Gardiner at least sees the incident for what
it was and does not assign any 'deep design' to the ambassador's actions. But
Villa-Urrutia, uninhibited by the lack of evidence, embroiders with gusto on
Gardiner, and even on Lyon's baseless overextensions (Villa-Urrutia's text is
almost a direct steal from Lyon's book): when Sarmiento received James's
reply that she had to leave the country,
anotherambassador,less expert and less spirited,would have been satisfiedwith this
solution, describing it to his government as a diplomatic triumph; but our Don
Diego looked higher and further, and understood that he could never attain anything in the long run with James if he did not subdue him in this; so he decided to
give battle, and answered the King that...he would leave with her. That same
afternoon they freed Dofia Luisa without conditions, and from that time on the
King was at the mercy of the ambassador.32
The fact is, of course, that not only was this single incident of no particular
decisiveness in the development of the two men's relationship, but whatever
influence or whatever degree of 'domination' the ambassador had over the
King was the result of a long and intimate association and of many incidents in
which the ambassador took a firm stand. This is not to say of course that
Gondomar never won his point, using those methods often ascribed to him as
'bluff and bluster'. On occasion in fact he succeeded with these methods most
resoundingly. One of the more famous examples of this sort took place on
Gondomar's first landing in England, before the two men had even met face
to face: the incident of the flags at Portsmouth.
Gondomar conceived of his mission to England, although it was a diplomatic one, as a warlike operation in an enemy country. In conformity with
this view, the motto which he took to guide his actions (and which he repeated
frequently in his writings) was a maxim taken from the battlefield: aventurar
la vida y osar morir-risk your life and dare to die. Or, to phrase it in the sense
in which he used it most effectively: if you have no resource but boldness, be
bold; attack is never a better strategy than in the face of defeat. As Spain's
diplomatic efforts in England had become increasingly ineffectual in recent
years the first application the new ambassador meant to make of this precept
was to establish himself (and through himself his king and country) as one not
to be taken lightly, as one not to be pushed around, as one to be reckoned with.
The incident in question came about because the Spanish warships bringing
Gondomar to England had entered Portsmouth harbour without lowering
their colours, contrary to custom, and after some hesitation the ranking naval
31 See F. H. Lyon, op. cit. pp. 22-3.
32
Villa-Urrutia, op. cit. p. 97.
204
C. H. CARTER
officer in port at the moment demanded that the colours be struck. Feeling
that his sovereign's prestige was involved, Gondomar managed, however, to
obtain time to send a message to James who was hunting not far away. He
described the situation to the King, declaring that the flotilla had entered
Portsmouth in a spirit of friendship and should be treated accordingly; he
insisted that he could not strike his sovereign's colours with honour, and
asked only that the English attack be delayed until he could go back aboard so
he could take part in the fight himself and, if that was the way it must end,
go down with the ships he felt responsible for.
Although the Spanish ships of course had little chance of surviving such an
engagement, there seems not the slightest reason to doubt the ambassador
sincerely intended to die fighting rather than yield to what he felt to be a
dishonour-the Spanish in the period in fact show remarkable readiness to
die honourably in the service of their king. Yet, the ambassador did hope to
get the order rescinded by the king. In this he had little to count on except
James's love of peace; the event proved that he had gauged his man correctly.
James had no intention of starting a war over a bit of cloth hanging from a
masthead. He sent word immediately that the Spanish flag could stay at the
masthead until the winds allowed the Spanish ships to leave, even in the
presence of the captain's flagship.33
There were a good many such cases in which Gondomar took a firm stand
and the king acceded to his demands, and since Gondomar got his way this
could, perhaps, be called 'domination'. On the other hand, when he was angry
about Gondomar's activities or those of Spain, James was capable of calling
the ambassador in for a full-fledged dressing down, sometimes going so far, as
in the case of Spain's conduct in the Cleves-Jiilich controversy, as openly
threatening war.34 And this 'firmness' on James's part did not only take the
form of berating Gondomar to his face in the heat of momentary passion.
Wheri Gondomar tried to guide James's judgement in one domestic matter,
for example, James instructed Buckingham to ignore the ambassador's
repeated attempts to interfere, adding, 'If Spain trouble me with suits of
this nature both against my justice and honour, their friendship will be more
burdensome than useful to me... . 35
Incidents such as that at Portsmouth on the one hand or royal threats of
war on the other are not only obviously extreme examples, but are also
unusual-any 'relationship' could hardly last as long as this one did if made
up, to any extent, of such episodes-and are thus by very definition not
typical of these men's contacts with each other. The voluminous manuscript
evidence on the subject confirms what one would suppose: that the true
33 See above, note I17.
E.g. CSP Venetian, XIII, 398, 566.

James to Buckingham (n.p., n.d.), J. 0. Halliwell, ed., Letters of the Kings of England,
2 vols. (London, I848), II, 149-50.
34
35
GONDOMAR:
AMBASSADOR
TO JAMES I
205
nature of their relationship lay between the more dramatic extremes. On this
subject the present writer has seen only one accurate statement in print:
The real key to Gondomar'ssuccess in England lay in his relation to James I. It
was not a simple one; certainlyit was not, as has sometimes been represented,just
the dominanceof a weakcharacterby a strongone; much less, the gulling of a fool by
a knave. James was a complex character in whom elements of weakness were
surprisinglymixed with traits of real strength; Gondomar,at least, never made the
mistake of underratinghim. Nor did he achieve his influence at a stroke, or storm
the king's favorwith a mixture of bullying and flattery. It wag a work of years. In
part it was because Gondomarwas able to make James like him....3,
And like him James did. There is nothing strange about this, for Gondomar
was good company, with a sense of humour compatible with James's, a wellinformed, interesting, often witty conversationalist, and sharing many of
James's personal interests. Gondomar, for his part, seems to have had a real
personal liking for James. They became intimate friends and, although the
ambassador never forgot that James was a king, they joked and laughed anld
hunted together, called themselves 'the two Diegos', and drank from the same
bottle.
Their intimate relationship seems to have caused historians at least as much
disapproving concern as the more flamboyant incidents mentioned above. In
the case of Professor Willson, by far the finest biographer of James, the usual
disgust is coupled with surprise (for he has a higher opinion of James's
abilities than most writers) as he recounts how 'by some subtle art, Sarmiento
contrived to convey an impression of candour and frankness and to convince
the King of his personal integrity. It is astonishing that James, an experienced
and sophisticated ruler, should have been deluded by such blandishments'
(p. 364).
One must demur on two important points. For one, the first part of the
statement is misleading for it suggests that the impression was a false one. The
truth is that Gondomar was as completely honest with James as security and
other obvious considerations would allow. This was not, to be sure, just for
the sweet sake of honesty, but because he recognized early that James was rno
fool and that this was the most effective way of dealing with him. It was
commonly understood that James 'ama gli uomini di virtui'37 and Gondomar,
far from following the policy of deceit his enemies accused him of, made
almost a fetish of dealing with James at every opportunity with 'la lianeza de
Castilla la Vieja',3 the sincere frankness considered traditional in Old
Castile.
This could not, of course, take the form of divulging full and true
"I Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. z62.
37 Relazioni degli stati europei lette al senato dagli ambasciatori veneziani nel secolo decimosettimo, eds. N. Barozzi and G. Berchet, vol. I (England) (Venice, I868), p. I72. See also
Godfrey Goodman, The Court of King Yames I, I, i8.
38 See, for example, Sarmiento to Lerma, 25 Jan. I614,
DIE, III, 249.
206
C. H. CARTER
information to the king on all matters. Diplomacy just does not work that
way, especially between states at least nominally at the head of opposing international factions. But he practised this llaneza as frequently and consistently
as he could in all sorts of business with the king, and nowhere was it more
effective than in his making it unequivocally clear that he was first and last,
regardless of all else, the servant of the Spanish Crown, even when it meant
that his actions would anger James and risk losing his friendship. This was a
loyalty and consistency that James could well envy, for (with the exception of
John Digby and a very few others) this was the sort of servant he himself
needed but sorely lacked. It was this sort of 'personal integrity' on Gondomar's part that the king was convinced of-and rightly so, for it was very
real. Surrounded as he was by intriguing, self-seeking courtiers, it is small
cause for surprise that James should have appreciated this quality in the
servant of another.
Which brings us to the second point in Professor Willson's statement with
which one must disagree: the assumption that James really was deluded by
the blandishments of this able, forceful agent of James's principal opponent in
foreign affairs. Gondomar's embassy was a long one, and during this extended
period the two men were together frequently, both on official business and as
a part of a personal friendship that was sometimes rather close. This adds up
to a very large number of occasions on which they discussed important matters
involving the two crowns. In both formal negotiations and informal discussions of these things, mutual reassurances of good faith and serious intent
became a regular part of their talks.
There were variations in detail as different occasions demanded, but these
assurances developed soon into a repetitive formula-on both sides. This was
especially true after the proposed Anglo-Spanish marriage alliance became the
major topic of discussion. By the time the Bohemian crisis had arrived, and
with it the most crucial period of these negotiations, Gondomar's assurances
of the sincerity of Spain's desire for the match and James's declarations of
eagerness to comply with Spanish wishes in all things had become so routine
as to have achieved near-ritual status.
Rather than being a one-sided matter of beguiler and victim, this was a
serious diplomatic duelling match between two very able opponents; deceptive
blandishments there certainly were, in profusion, but their exchange was a
thoroughly mutual affair. In this very serious contest being played for high
international stakes there were most definitely two players, and each had too
high a regard for his opponent to feel any very lasting complacency about how
the game was going. Contemporary 'observers' (who of course observed
very little of what actually passed between the two men) stated with certainty
that James indeed was deluded by Gondomar's blandishments, and most
historians since have agreed. Gondomar, for his part, only wished he could be
sure it was so: as often as not it seemed that James was deluding him.
GONDOMAR:
AMBASSADOR
TO JAMES I
207
There is of course no denying that James did sometimes reveal his plans,
intentions, and various state secrets to Gondomar. Perhaps the most famous
of these indiscretions was in the case of Raleigh's gold-seeking expedition to
the Orinoco. Spain of course claimed the area, and though the two nations
used differing and conflicting standards to establish a 'legitimate' claim to an
area, if the Spanish had already established a settlement on the spot in
question as they said they had (correctly, as it turned out), then this fulfilled
even the English standard and there would be much justice, even by English
standards (if applied), to objections to the enterprise.
But James was in a quandary. He wanted to keep the peace with Spain, but
he was under great pressure to let Raleigh make the trip. So he took the
middle course of making Raleigh sign a promise not to violate any Spanish
settlements, which Raleigh claimed did not exist there anyway. When
Gondomar registered a protest, trying to get James to stop the expedition,
James, in a moment of weakness, showed him the terms of Raleigh's charter
and the promise itself, in which all responsibility for any violations of Spanish
settlements was accepted by Raleigh.
Although this indiscretion was much reviled by the English, when Raleigh
did attack the Spanish settlement of San Thome the Spanish, for all their
outrage, accepted the thesis that James and the English as a nation could not
be held to blame. Raleigh lost his head (as he had agreed he should) but James
kept his peaceful relations with Spain in spite of the provocation.
A couple of years later when the Roger North expedition to the Amazon was
projected, Gondomar raised the same objections. Once more the indiscreet
king naively showed him the secret promise Captain North had signed not to
violate Spanish territory. When North returned, his promise broken, Gondomar demanded justice and North was thrown into prison. Once again the
peace was kept-an increasingly important matter to James now, as he wanted
no war until he had exhausted all possible means of recovering the Palatinate
by negotiation-but Madrid noticed a certain resemblance between this and
the Raleigh affair, and pointed it out to Gondomar.39
Two further years later, Count Mansfeld raised a body of troops in England
and proposed to land them in northern France, by agreement with that
government, and march them directly to the Lower Palatinate. Under the
rules of the game at that time this was legitimate enough, but both Madrid
and Brussels were afraid that this was a collusive deception in which the
French planned to join their forces to Mansfeld's and in which the object was
not to recover the Lower Palatinate for Frederick V but to recover the County
of Artois for France. Spain's resident in London, Jacques Bruneau at that
time, of course protested, demanding that James not allow the force to leave
England. But James had extracted promises from Mansfeld that he would
march directly to the Palatinate without violating the territory of the Spanish
39 Philip III to Gondomar, Madrid, io June i620, Est. 2573.
2o8
C. H. CARTER
Netherlands, and additional promises from the subordinate commanders not

to obey if Mansfeld gave orders in violation of his pledge. James confidentially
revealed these documents to Bruneau. But by that time, after two successes,
the trick had worn too thin. It was obviously the Raleigh gambit all over
again.40
It was this sort of business that Gondomar had to put up with. He was able
to exercise considerable influence over James, partly by his intuitive genius at
forcing an issue at just the right time, partly because he made it a set policy to
deal openly with James (who was never in doubt that Gondomar served his
own sovereign first of all, and respected him for it), partly because of a real
mutual friendship, perhaps most of all because the courses they sought to
pursue (though not the ultimate goals they hoped to attain) happened to
coincide.
But one thing we can be certain of: James's conduct with Gondomar was
clearly not that of a puppet on a string. The contemporary critics of both
claimed that James was putty in the hands of the ambassador, the Spanish
Machiavelli, and historians since have repeated the tale. But Gondomar
himself knew better. Toward the end of his embassy some French envoys in
London, having failed to bring James into a war contemplated against Spain
in the Alps, claimed they had found the king to be 'completely Spanish' and
referred to him publicly as 'Don Jacques', a name the English Puritans quickly
picked up (for cautious jocular use among themselves). Gondomar enjoyed
the joke, but soberly told his sovereign that it would please him greatly if
James more truly merited the 'Don '.41
40
See, for example, Bruneau to Philip IV, London,
Est. 256I (unfoliated).

41 Gondornarto Philip III, London, 8 Feb.
I62I,
28
November and 8 December
1624,
Est. 7031/43-44.
Since this article was submitted for publication, the relationship between James and Gondomar has been the subject of extensive discussion-one might say amicable debate-between
D. H. Willson and myself. Though it does not involve fundamentals, an area of honest
disagreement remains-but I shall not attempt to state Professor Willson's position here, as he
is preparing an essay on the subject himself. I look forward to its appearance, and expect to
draw shamelessly on it in the preparation of my career biography of Gondomar, now in
progress. Meanwhile, I have dealt with other of Gondomar's activities in The secret diplomacy
of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625 (New York: Columbia University Press, I964).

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Gondomar: Ambassador to James I

Author(s): Charles H. Carter

served as Spanish ambassadorto England from

undesirablemeans,with an implicit acceptanceof the possibilitythat the end

from a 'relation' by Gondomar himself-though the Spanish did not even

passim. For Lewkinor see, for

'anti-Russian party' and those who advocate a peaceful relationship and an

to. A conspicuous example is the pension originally offered to Cecil (Earl of

'5 Add. 3I,III/7.

DIE, II, I79.

II, 2I6 ff.

to it would be to gain nothing but a hostile neighbour. The 'Spanish faction'

On her backgroundsee ibid., pp. 22I-2;

Villa-Urrutia, op. cit. p. 97.

E.g. CSP Venetian, XIII, 398, 566.

Netherlands, and additional promises from the subordinate commanders not

See, for example, Bruneau to Philip IV, London,

Est. 256I (unfoliated).

November and 8 December

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