The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy

Springer
The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy

Author(s): Miguel Angel Centeno
Source: Theory and Society, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jun., 1993), pp. 307-335
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/657736
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308
commonly described as technocrats. They appear in practically every
country that has undergone some form of transformation in the past
decade, ranging from Taiwan to the PRC (People's Republic of China)
from Mexico and Brazil to Poland and the former Soviet Union.2 What
role will this new elite play in establishing policy priorities when democracy and economic efficiency clash?
One school of scholars contends that technocratic elites do not necessarily pose a danger to democracy. This tradition, exemplified by the
work of James Burnham and also apparent in the "End of Ideology"
discussion, sees the development of a technocratic ideology based on
instrumental reason as a means to end social conflict, thereby facilitating democratic practices.3 Other analysts including Daniel Bell,
Donald Price, and John Galbraith contend that the technocratic elite
would either prove unable to challenge political leadership or would be
transformed by its participation in governance.4 A very different perspective is that of the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer, Marcuse) and
that of Jurgen Habermas.s These authors are also concerned with the
elaboration of and domination by an instrumental rationality, but they
do not view it with the enthusiasm of Burnham. Marcuse believed that
technical and scientific rationalities had formed a new means of social
control that delegated the individual subject to the status of functional
object. Habermas contrasts technical and instrumental action, which is
informed by purposive or means rationality, with communicative
action, which is "primitive"or "pre-rational,"and through which values
are shaped and shared. In this process, the technocratic model of
objective necessity replaces the decisionistic model of politics, which
leads to the "scientification of politics" and inevitably produces an
authoritarian political framework.6
Will the application of the "administrative rationality" promised by
"modernizing"elites bring relief from domination by arbitrary and corrupt hierarchies, or will it impose an even more authoritarian rule? Do
we need to create an autonomous guardian to manage the double transition successfully? And, if so, can we trust our new Leviathans? The
first step toward the resolution of this debate is a clarification of what is
meant by technocracy. In the pages below I offer a working definition
of the concept that emphasizes the process of technocratic policymaking. To establish a link between technocracy and a probable set of
outcomes, the second section of the article identifies the specific circumstances favorable to technocratic rule. This is not only a simple
functional response to increasing technical and scientific complexities,
309
but it also reflects changes in legitimation strategies and institutional
distributions of power. The final section discusses the extent to which
technocracy limits democratic participation, and analyzes the possible
contradictions between the two great revolutions of the late twentieth
century.
Defining technocracy
Few terms in political sociology are used as loosely as is technocracy.7
Although persons with technological and administrative expertise are
obviously critical to modern states, the concept of "technocrat"
remains vague and has limited descriptive, much less predictive, value.
This has not prevented, however, the use of the terms (with positive or
negative connotations depending on the author's opinions of the persons or governments being analyzed) to describe a variety of personnel
in a wide range of political regimes. If the terms technocrat and technocracy are to have any scholarly value, the characteristics that are
used as definitional criteria (e.g., education, professionalization, depoliticization) must play a significant role in the type of policies advocated and followed by the relevant personnel or political entities. The
categorization of personnel or regimes as "technocratic" not only
should imply a set of definitional attributes, but also should indicate
probable forms of behavior.
Beginning with Plato's Philosopher Kings, through Bacon's New Atlantis and the works of Saint-Simon, Comte, Weber, Veblen, and Mannheim, writers concerned with the political role of expertise have debated
the relative benefits of government as the "administration of things"
versus the representation of interests.8 Post-war theorists have elaborated more concrete definitions of the concept and have analyzed the specific roles of technical experts in the political process. More recent work
on technocracy has largely moved away from normative judgments
regarding its virtues and vices and has been more concerned with clarifying the concept as well as determining its applicability.9
The most common perspective on technocracy is a variant of elite
theory that asks whether or not an "oligarchy of technicians" controls
the administrative, economic, and political arms of a given state."' The
definition of a technocrat in this approach is usually limited to one's
education. This generally includes the sector of state personnel that has
received scientific, technical, or managerial training in elite institutions,
such as the French grandes ec6les, Todai in Japan, the UK's "Oxbridge,"
310
and the American Ivy League." A related approach defines technocrats by their professional career path and functions: appointed versus
elected, technical problem solving versus constituency representation.'2 Thus technocrats are defined as one sub-group of bureaucrats
that possesses specialized knowledge.
In these definitions, the extent of power is also critical as "the
experts' role becomes technocratic only when it is inserted at high
levels of responsibility in a public or private apparatus of power."'3
This last point serves to differentiate between what Meynaud calls
technicians, those who through training and expertise are given the
management of a part of the administrative apparatus, under the
direction of other elites, and technocrats, who do enjoy autonomy
within their areas of expertise and may influence non-technical decisions.14Technocrats share the special claim to knowledge of all technical experts, but while technicians focus on expertise that is "narrowbut
deep," the technocrats emphasize one that is "broad but shallow."'5
That is, they are not so committed to a specific discipline or speciality
as to a basic familiarity with a scientific/technical discursive rationality.
Moreover, the functions of the two groups are very different: "Technocratic roles are concerned with the organization of technical processes and functions and with the mediation between different elements."'6 The French civil service, for example, has institutionalized
these differences through the grand corps where the elite generalists
serve to manage the much more technical work of specialists. Similarly
in Mexico, the current leading elite may be clearly distinguished from
the mass of tecnicos who actually produce the scientific data and
analyze results.
Although such definitions may serve a descriptive purpose, their use
for the analysis of the behavior of individuals is limited. They require
the acceptance of the largely unproven assumption that technical
education or job functions foster a strong alliance between graduates
or colleagues and that they encourage a specific attitude toward policy
making.'7 The most critical task for the analysis of technocracy must be
the identification of a specific and common perspective on policymaking, which is determined by the social, educational, political, and
professional background that these persons share. Without such an
ideological congruence, technocrats will remain relatively passive
actors in a process dominated by other persons and institutions.
Without such a link between identity and ideology, the significance of
technocracy is severely limited.
311
Can we define a technocratic ideology? Technocrats would probably
deny allegiance to any particular dogma other than the pursuit of systemic efficiency. They would claim that their recommendations deal
only with means to achieve ends that are defined in political arenas outside of their control. If technocrats recognize and support ideology, it is
a rejection of ideological constraints. They espouse the use of valuefree, objective criteria for making decisions, the creation of "depoliticized solutions to all organizational environmental problems."'1 Describing the behavior of Indian public-enterprise managers one observer noted that "As long as the economy could run in an efficient,
disciplined and rational manner, the managers ... never made any
normative statements about either capitalism or socialism."19
Max Weber identified the critical contradiction of such a perspective.
Although the choice of means may be justified on a rational basis, the
definition of values, goals, and needs necessarily involves subjective
criteria.2' To make the final determination regarding the ends of policy,
thereby defining the criteria by which more specific decisions will be
made, the expert would have to venture beyond rational choice and the
scientific method, and make a value statement that would be indefensible on objective grounds and that would necessarily reflect his subjective ideological bias. Recent work on technocratic policymaking in
Latin America indicates that "Economic policies are not simply shaped
by technical prescriptions ... [but] are also conditioned by the team's
views of society and politics."21
There may be a certain natural affinity between technocracy and
market capitalism. This link originates in the emphasis both phenomena place on productive efficiency. Capitalism legitimizes itself partly by
reference to the apparent efficiency of its economic mechanism. This is
precisely the type of argument that is most conducive to technocratic
support. The capitalist logic of non-zero sum games resolved by "invisible hands" and yielding equilibria has an intrinsic appeal to those who
would abolish conflict through optimization and efficiency. Certainly in
most of Latin America, technocrats have been associated with relatively orthodox versions of free-market capitalism. During the past two
years in Eastern Europe, the new technocrats have been clearly associated with market economics as well. Note, however, that central planning and the more productionist and economic determinist versions of
Marxism may also obtain the support of a technocratic elite that seeks
to maximize efficiency by reference to a "scientific"method.22
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Even if technocrats cannot escape the constraints of their value orientation, this does not imply that all such persons share the same ideology, much less that such an ideology is a natural product of the type of
roles technocrats play in the state. Indeed, as Alfred Stepan points out,
technocratic elites often have chameleon-like qualities that allow them
to serve various political masters.23 This may be the result of either
pragmatic adaptation to the ruling ideology or the fact that, within a
technocratic pool, adherents of various political beliefs may be found,
leading over time to a circulation of technical elites. Ideological divisions within a technocratic elite may stem from differences in philosophy or theoretical preferences (free market monetarists vs. statist structuralists), from disciplinary or institutional conflicts (industrial specialists vs. agriculturalists), from differences in functional training and
approaches (environmental experts vs. civil engineers), or simply from
"turf"battles.
Rather than sharing an ideology, technocrats may be seen as sharing a
mentality or cognitive framework. This involves a unique way of analyzing social problems, formulating solutions, and implementing policy
that places bounds on the agenda of discussion. Technocrats share a
form of analyzing the means or instruments utilized in attaining social
ends and an implicit set of criteria for evaluating political success.
Thus, rather than an ideological system that offers authoritative decisions on every policy decision, the technocratic mentality concentrates
on shaping patterns of problem recognition, option generation, and
agenda placement that largely determine the eventual final choice of
outcomes.24
We can understand this perspective not as an ideology of answers or
issues, but an ideology of method: a belief in the ability to arrive at the
optimal answer to any discussion through the application of particular
practices.25What the technocrats offer is often not a new set of political
values, but a new methodology of understanding social problems; one
that is explicitly "realistic and efficient." In the case of Pinochet Chile,
for example, the technocratization of decision making served as a
"guarantee that the government would pursue a rational economic
model.... Government decisions were to be inspired by 'technical and
scientific' principles and not by the political and ideological postulates
of the past."26
Borrowing from Lukes's discussion of power, we could speak of ideological battles as a struggle over answer (1-dimensional) or at most over
313
questions (2-dimensional).27 Technocracies focus on the much more
important struggle over the methods to determine the validity of
answers and questions (3-dimensional).28 This third dimension encompasses a faith in the applicability and superiority of professional and
technical methodologies and paradigms. This faith is accompanied by
the assumption that rationality is beyond dogmatism, and that scientific
analysis knows no ideology. The adjective prefered by technocratic
leaders and administrators is "pragmatic," indicating that they will
follow Deng Xiaoping's oft-quoted advice to concentrate on the quality,
not the color, of the cat.
Technocratic legitimacy is based on the appeal to scientific knowledge.
This claim accompanies an implicit, and often explicit, rejection of
"politics" as inefficient and possibly corruptive. While the politicians'
state is an "empty vessel" into which their constituencies pour their
needs and aspirations, the technocrat sees the state as embodying a
unit that is greater than the mere sum of its parts.29In the words of one
of the leading proponents of administrative reform in Mexico, a
responsible leader would be: "A person ... who is fundamentally
concerned with understanding which are the problems facing the
population as a whole and not only on the level of individuals.3? A
techocrat's task is to assure that the higher rationality of this whole is
protected from the undue influence of particular interests. (Technocrats may be seen, therefore, as the elite equivalent of what Nicos
Poulantzas perceives as the critical role for the capitalist state, serving
to create a "rationality"that mitigates conflicts inside the bourgeoisie.)
Constituency demands cannot be satisfied if they contradict theoretically efficient solutions. So, for example, Brazil's Mailson Ferreira da
Nobrega, who served as Finance Minister in the last years of Sarney
administration, defended his qualifications by noting that "I'm free to
act because I'm not linked politically or ideologically to any group."31
In imposing the domination by an instrumental rationale and scientific
method, technocracies are similar to theocratic regimes or states that
have explicit, dominant political ideologies. In all these cases, legitimacy comes not from the barrel of a gun or from the ballot box, but
from adherence to the dictates of a "book." Whether that document
contains the word of god, a theory of history, or the econometric
functions that describe equilibria, those best able to interpret its
message and implement its laws cannot take opposition or popular
participation into account.
314
Given the discussion above, I define technocracy as: The administrative
and political domination of a society by a state elite and allied institutions that seek to impose a single, exclusive policy paradigm based on the
application of instrumentally rational techniques. This definition is an
ideal type. Ideal types are logically controlled, precise, and unambiguous conceptions of certain historical realities, but are often removed
from the specifics of empirical cases.32 Certainly this definition represents an extreme and pure instance, yet it has been too easy to dismiss the relevance of the concept simply because no perfect examples
exist. Ideal types are not meant as theoretical absolutes to be proved or
disproved in toto, but rather should be used as frameworks for categorizing a wide variety of empirical cases depending on their congruence
with the model. It is more productive to view technocracy as a continuum than as a phenomenon that either is or is not present.33
Placement along such a spectrum could be based on a combination of
the following: a) The penetration of technocratic elites into the upper
reaches of the state administration; b) The extent to which institutions
where such persons predominate have become the dominant organizations in the regime's most important policy areas; and c) The degree to
which policies produced by these elites and institutions reflect a bias
toward technocratic methods and interpretations.All three measures are
necessary, and none, in and of itself, is sufficient for the creation and
identification of a technocratic state. The focus of my argument is that
the development of technocracy depends on the integration of all three.
So, for example, technocrats are partly defined by their institutional
position and their ideological preferences. Similarly, the analysis of
policy institutions cannot be separated from that of their personnel,
nor can it be done in an ideological vacuum. Finally, the definition of
systemic ideologies must demonstrate how these determine and are
expressed through leading elites and organizations.
Although a precise taxonomic categorization is beyond the purview of
this article, some examples of how such a classification scheme would
work might prove useful. The first criterion dealing with personnel is
not very exclusive, as such elites have come to play significant roles in
practically all countries. In some cases, these persons work in alliance
with elected officials (U.S. Congressional staffs). In other democracies,
this alliance has been institutionalized through a civil service (permanent under-secretaries in the U.K.). In the cases of Japan and France,
the line between technocrats and politicians has been blurred, but
clearly expertise plays a major role in determining access to key posts.
315
Mexico represents perhaps the most extreme case of rule by a technocratic elite, in that these persons have managed increasingly to control
both bureaucratic and political institutions. Exceptions to the trend in
technocratization of personnel include the rapidly disappearing personalistic or "gangster" regimes. Even in some of these, however,
foreign technocrats who represent international institutions have come
to dominate the financial apparatus (e.g., Ivory Coast and Zaire). Another exception may include the fundamentalist Islamic states, but even
in Iran the influence of economic experts has been increasing.
The second condition requiring the dominance of techocratic institutions somewhat reduces the number of regimes that could reasonably
be classified as technocracies. Despite the autonomy of such agencies
as the Federal Reserve, for example, the dominance of the U.S. bureaucracy is doubtful at best. The French grand corps d'etat is perhaps the
most powerful and independent civil service in Europe, but political
parties retain considerable influence. Under Pinochet, the Ministries of
Economic Affairs and Finance did enjoy considerable autonomy, but
the military retained ultimate veto power. The influence of MITI and
the Finance Ministry in Japan and the Economic Planning Board of
Korea comes closer to that required by the definition above, but again
their powers are or were constrained by the Liberal Democratic Party
and the military, respectively. The question in such cases is whether one
can actually define a boundary between political and bureaucratic institutions. Those countries where this distinction is practically nil, such as
Singapore, Taiwan, and Mexico, are the best candidates for meeting his
second criterion.
The third condition for classification as a technocracy is the most difficult dimension to measure. Given that the technocratic mentality as
defined above is independent of content, one cannot classify regimes
by reference to policy preferences such as free trade, monetary control,
or private-sector share of GNP. The PRC and Taiwan, for example,
share some technocratic policy styles. The presence or absence of
democratic institutions also fails to provide a perfect indicator. Japan,
for example, is much more technocratic than Ceausescu's Romania.
Applying this condition, we might find that some regimes are technocratic in particular policy areas, but more responsive, populistic, or
"political" in others. Such divisions may be systematic. For example,
monetary policy or the design of public infrastructure may be more
susceptible to technocratic control. But, even in these, such control is
not assured, since decisions in both policy domains are often shaped by
316
interest-group pressures and the demands of patronage politics. Measures of responsiveness to popular pressures, willingness to accept compromises, and degrees of commitment to a single definition of longterm social welfare require in-depth regional or national specialization
that frustrates comparative research.
Considering all three conditions, the best examples of technocratic rule
may be found along both sides of the Pacific Rim. Countries such as
Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Chile, and Mexico appear to combine
the elite and institutional controls described above with a willingness
and ability to impose their versions of modernizing "revolutions from
above." To understand this trend and its implications for the new
regimes of eastern Europe, it is important to turn to the conditions that
promote technocratic power.
Origins of technocratic power

A critical problem in the discussion on technocracy is that most treatments employ a static approach. That is, they treat technocracy as a
phenomenon to be analyzed at one point in time while neglecting the
causes for its development. For example, the elite theorists measure the
extent of educational expertise in the political and administrative
personnel at one particular time, ignoring the critical question of how
technocrats achieve power, or how the functional roles that they fill
become so critical. When they do delve into the origins of technocratic
power, most of the studies subscribe to functionalist arguments which
state that social complexity requires technical expertise.
I focus on five factors that support the development of technocratic
control: Complexity of tasks undertaken by the regime; Legitimation of
the regime by reference to performance criteria; Institutional autonomy
of state organizations associated with experts;Regime stability; and Position within a World System. Although I focus on how each of these
factors contribute to the rise of technocratic states, it is important to
remember that such regimes also support the further development of
the conditions that created them. That is, if technocratic regimes originally arise from the complexity of state responsibilities, they also tend
to increase further the technical sophistication required to participate
in decision-making. Similarly, technocratic regimes tend to emphasize
those performance criteria that strengthen their legitimacy. The rise
and stabilization of technocratic regimes is therefore not a simple linear
317
progression, but also includes a significant degree of feedback and
exponential growth.
The case of Mexico after 1982, for example, indicates that the rise of a
technocratic elite is not a simple response to technological change, but
rather the result of the interaction between environmental and institutional forces. These included increasing economic complexity and the
support of powerful external actors such as the international creditors.
These encouraged the development of new modes of decision making
that challenged the regime's corporatism and populism. However, the
Mexican technocrats were not passive actors in their own project. They
also participated in their ascent by establishing their institutional
autonomy and, thereafter, by encroaching on the domains of their
organizational competitors. Moreover, while the new elite emphasized
its particular expertise, it also used the very same patronage systems
that it previously had criticized as anachronistic and corrupt.34
Complexity
Task complexity means the expertise and training required to understand the problems and formulations offered, and not the degree of difficulty in accomplishing them. Policy complexity clearly favors technocratic influence as it will require personnel with specific skills not easily
acquired on the job. Obviously, technocrats will only begin approaching the paramount levels of power as their particular skills are needed
by a society. As Weber predicted, the increasing complexity of social
structures requires new forms of knowledge. These new forms favor
formal vs. informal information and require a group of experts able to
coordinate and integrate data in some manner. (An interesting corrollary of this principle would be that increasing complexity might also
lead to increases in the symbolic or rhetorical aspects of politics. As
policies become increasingly incomprehensible to the voting public,
appeals for their support become increasingly detached from issues
and focus on either "character"or allegiances to some vague notion of
"tradition.")
Other analyses of technocratic power that focus on technological
development propose that the complexity of scientific technique supports the increasing power of technical institutions.35 For example, the
increasing technical complexity of the tasks faced by the Mexican
government has been cited as the dominant reason for the elite shift in
318
which the traditional politicos were replaced by a young group of
experts who possess specialized skills and knowledge.36 The growth of
the economic functions of the state after 1970 and the central importance of managing the debt after 1982 did encourage the empowerment of those with the requisite expertise, or at least presented an
opportunity for them to do so.
It is important to recognize that perceptions of complexity cannot be
purely objective, but may be dictated by political considerations. The
technical determination thesis assumes the inevitability of the advance
of technology in its present form; it assumes that scientific or technical
rationales are inherently value free and are completely divorced from
power considerations. Is it not feasible, however, that the personnel
involved are responsible for constructing a system that considers them
indispensable, or, at the very least, that they participated in its creation?37 Clearly, some expertise is necessary to operate a statistical
office or build a bridge. It is not so obvious, however, that one need be
familiar with econometrics to be able to discuss economic policy or be
an engineer in order to judge the merits of a new airport site.
The transformation of a "political"decision into a "technical"one may
have less to do with the inherent complexity of the issue and more to
do with the interests of those who benefit from the exclusion of those
no longer able to participate. While technical influence will rise in
response to technological change, technocratic control will be a function of the ability of an elite or set of institutions to limit participation
to those fluent in the expert languages. Recent work on the transformation of corporate control in the United States, for example, demonstrates that changes in the definition of efficiency criteria and the type
of expertise required to achieve it were partly a function of the skills
possessed by each succeeding group of executives.38
The mystique of expert knowledge can also serve as a powerful obstacle to those who may wish to challenge the system. One Mexican president, for example, described the power of the Finance Ministry as
stemming from such an image, one "...full of esoteric complications and
led by a sage and remote wisdom ... omnipresent and invisible."39Those
who wish to challenge the policies of such experts must engage them
using the same professional discourse. The opposition to Pinochet in
Chile found that it had to accept the neo-liberal challenge that economic policy could only be decided by experts, by elaborating
sophisticated scholarly studies.4" Thus, while the acceptance of
319
technical complexity does not necessarily imply the victory of a single
policy or perspective, it does imply that the debate will be between
differing groups of techocrats. Or, as Chile's Alejandro Jadresic describes the change in strategy within the opposition: "If you wanted to
take part in the economic debate then you had to know what you were
talking about."41
Legitimation through performance criteria

Depending on its stage of political, social, and economic development,
a modem state faces different challenges to its stability. The personnel
and organizations best suited to deal with the specific sources of
instability will naturally attain some predominance over those institutions whose administrative domain is tranquil. Thus, the specialized
expertise of the technocrat will only provide a potential entry into the
power circle if such abilities are perceived as relevant to the main issues
facing society.
Of course, there is fine balance here, as perceived inability to resolve
these issues will reduce the organization's claim to resources or control
over the issues. Conversely, however, too much success in resolving a
social problem could reduce the agency's relative importance. Thus, in
times of social unrest or political violence, the military or those agencies in charge of security would be able to exercise institutional leadership. In cases where economic performance or administrative management becomes the critical issues facing the state, the finance and budget ministries may rise to the top of the institutional hierarchy. So, for
example, the transition away from the monopoly of the Goumindang in
Taiwan and the rise of the technocrats first promoted by President
Chiang Ching-Kuo could only occur once the regime felt secure. The
rise of Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes in the Southern Cone of
Latin America represent a special case where both economic performance and "internal security" were perceived as critical areas leading
to a partnership between the military and the financial and planning
sectors. If, however, the political environment is relatively stable and
the state can once again "afford"to question certain issues, or the state
has attained a high degree of managerial efficiency, both sets of institutions will gradually lose their ability to dictate policy. For example,
recent challenges to Japan's LDP from the left may be partly explained
by the very success that its economic policies have achieved.
320
As the responsibility of the state expands, it shifts its claims of legitimacy from those based on representation of some ideal (be it nationalistic identity, democratic representation, or revolutionary legacy) to
those based on its ability to provide certain services, which inevitably
increase the complexity of its functions. In the case of capitalist societies, technocracy may also represent a possible solution to the contradiction noted by Claus Offe between accumulation and legitimation by
basing the latter on the former.42In this case, the state derives its legitimacy not through responsiveness to popular demands or through
adherence to some symbolic national ideology, but by demonstrating a
capacity to foster and maintain economic efficiency. Emphasis on economic growth and the management of a large state industrial sector
could therefore foster the rise of both technocratic personnel and institutions to a monopolistic control of the state.
Politicians who accept the new criteria of governmental legitimacy will
be judged "responsible," while those who challenge the institutional
autonomy or who question the basic assumptions will be judged as
either naive or opportunistic. In the transitions toward market economics in Latin America during the 1980s and in Eastern Europe after
1989, the politicians who resisted the social costs of adjustment and
restructuring have been consistently derided as "populists" who refused to understand the needs of the market.43 Or, in the words of
Polish Senator Adrzej Szczypiorski: "[Walesa and the workers] do not
realize that in contemporary Western life real power is held by managers and professionals."44
In analyzing this shift in the legitimacy claims of the state, it is imperative to avoid the trap of using the characteristics of an ideal-type technocrat to define a self-conscious ideology devoid of any real referent.
As Gouldner points out (The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology,
p. 269), instrumental rationality is not a "disembodied wraith," but is
linked to the status concerns and very real needs of those with technocratic power. As in the case of technological complexity, we must
remain cognizant of whom the new forms of legitimation favor and
support. Such claims favor those who perceive themselves as uniquely
qualified and inherently deny others a voice in their own governance.
Examples of such claims to legitimacy include the Pinochet campaign
during the plebecite of 1988, which focused on the economic accomplishments since 1973, the last campaign by Lee Kuan Yew as
321
leader of Singapore's People's Action Party, and South Korean President Roh's defense of the regime in the face of labor and middle-class
demands. In Mexico, following the student massacre of 1968 and the
failure of President Luis Echeverria's populism after 1973, the regime
relied less on the "revolutionary mantle" that had sustained it for nearly
50 years and increasingly depended on its ability to promote economic
growth. Similar patterns may be observed in the PRC during Deng's
"open-door" policy.
Institutional autonomy
Technocrats function within a bureaucratic or organizational environment. That is, their careers are established within the state apparatus
and, therefore, their professional success and political influence are
closely linked to the relative power of the institutions they represent.
No matter his or her success in a particular agency, a technocrat's ability to influence policy will be frustrated if his or her institution is not a
relevant player. So, for example, a brilliant economist at the Central
Bank is influential only if this institution has control over monetary
policy and is not a mere government printing press. A technocracy,
therefore, implies not only the domination by a particular type of elite,
but also the autonomy and influence of their institutions.
Without such autonomy, experts will often be frustrated with the compromises and delays associated with political bargaining. They may feel
that, for the long-term security of the state, certain issues should be
removed from the political arena so that policies are not "perverted"by
short-term political considerations. Moreover, given that politicians
must always keep in mind the next election or the possibility of the next
party "palace coup," they are often willing to sacrifice their control over
a policy in order to assure that their opponents are similarly deprived
of such influence.
Such arguments are often used to defend the independence of Central
Banks. For example, in one of the last significant policy moves of his
regime, Pinochet was able to separate the Chilean Central Bank from
the direct control of the president and cabinet. In the words of one of
the main proponents of the plan, "Having an institution on the margin
of the political situation would help guarantee stability."45What is perhaps most interesting is that this move was welcomed by the economic
experts of the Aylwin team.46
322
These strategies will be supported by the logic of complexity and the
new claims to legitimacy detailed above. The state might grant increasing autonomy to particular institutions in the management of their area
of expertise that, over time, translates into significant control over a
wide sector of national policy. As technocratic institutions gain greater
autonomy, they both are freed from political control and can establish
the unquestioned hegemony of their participated perspectives. This, in
turn, allows them to define the policy agenda in such a manner that all
challenges must be made on their own terms.
What resources allow technocratic institutions to establish this autonomy? Technocratic institutions often have significant control over state
finances and overall planning, which allows them to influence the
actions of other agencies through setting of funding priorities and
budgetary "incentives."47Examples of such institutional powers include
the oil ministries in petroleum exporters and financial ministries in
debtor countries. Another significant resource in public administrations is access to personnel recruitment and placement. While technocratic organizations rarely have direct control over this function, they
may establish the criteria by which future personnel are selected and
thereby indirectly create a support base for their policies. Shared educational and professional experiences may also support the cohesion of
technocratic networks allowing such elites to "seed" other agencies
with their followers. Many of the members of the first Salinas cabinet,
for example, had spent the majority of their careers in the leading technocratic institutions.
Note that the relationship between such organizations and the other
state agencies may not necessarily be explicit or instrumental (e.g.,
"support us and we will increase your budget or hire members of your
clique"). Rather, other institutions, knowing that the budget is decided
within a particular agency and also knowing that such an agency
prefers that proposals include a particular type of analysis or language,
will adapt their own perspectives to conform with those of the dominant agency. For example, organizations may respond to crises by
adopting rationalistic/bureaucratic forms that grant them legitimacy
and independence from other dominant corporate actors.48 Historical
analysis of the development of state institutions suggests that they may
do so even when such forms are not directly responsive either to efficiency considerations or to the immediate demands of politically mobilized interest groups.49The bureaucratic equivalent of self-censorship,
as in the case of the literature and sciences in the former Soviet
323
Union, can lead to a homogeneity of perspectives even in the absence
of direct control.
Control of information is another critical resource for technocrats. The
organizational unit that establishes control over the assumptions used
by other government actors can indirectly dictate policy outcomes.
Technocratic institutions are often in charge of formulating the decision premises and alternatives used by the state apparatus and can
thereby impose their model of both problem and answer definitions.5'
The Office of Management and Budget in the United States, for example, may derive as much of its influence from its leading role in producing economic forecasts and projections as from its control over the
budget. Such organizations may also be responsible for managing relations with external actors or the identification of threats. This is particularly important because the organizations that are in charge of resolving the critical problems facing the state are almost invariably the
most powerful.5' It therefore follows that the actual definition of the
problems would play a major role in setting the state's agenda, and the
subsequent distribution of power within it.
The Mexican case provides perhaps the best example of such institutional dominance. The new Secretariat of Programming and Budget
(SPP), founded in 1977, was able to gain a monopoly over the distribution of government funds and further diminish the already limited
influence of the dominant party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional,
PRI) over the bureaucracy. Moreover, because of its control over
resources, it was also able to eclipse its bureaucratic rival, Internal
Affairs (Gobernacion). After 1982, and especially after the election of
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, SPP "alumni" have come to dominate the
higher reaches of the bureaucracy.52
Regime stability
Regime stability refers to the political, social, and economic stability of
the state and society, the extent to which decisions made will generate
conflict, the number of players involved in the formulation and implementation of the policies, and the extent to which future scenarios can
be identified. It is a measure of the degree to which the political sectors
of a society, and particularly those with access to the means of violence,
feel confident that the status quo is not under immediate threat.
324
Political uncertainty or sensitivity can either support or hinder technocratic advancement within a particular policy domain. Some issues may
be so "hot,"in that they involve irreconcilable differences among large
sectors of the population, that it is impossible to technocratize them.
An obvious example of such a situation is the abortion debate in the
United States, which has resisted such a "scientific fix." Similarly, the
debates on welfare or "means testing" are so embedded within ideological frames or interest-group politics as to make a technocratic solution impossible. Conversely, technocratization may serve to de-politicize a divisive issue. The influence of external experts such as the teams
led by Jeffrey Sachs in Bolivia, Poland, and the former Soviet Union
may be partly explained by the need to create an "economist ex
machina" who can select those social and economic sectors to bear the
burden of adjustment and re-structuring.
Technocratic regimes may also arise as a response to a general societal
crisis that would heighten the appeal of technocracy's apparent emphasis on order, rationality, and apolitical criteria. Not surprisingly, the
allure of technocratic rule is positively correlated with the appearance
of systemic crisis. Much of Saint-Simon's work is a reaction to the
French Revolution, and many of the American writings appear during
the most chaotic period of capitalist economic cycles. For instance,
Howard Scott's "Technocracy, Inc." (a somewhat marginal movement
in the United States) enjoyed its popularity boom during the worst
years of the Depression. It is not accidental that the two developedcapitalist regimes with the most widely recognized technocratic elements, Japan and France, both elaborated their state structures during
the trauma of the post-war and post-colonial eras. In Latin America,
technocratic regimes assumed power in states where the social fabric
was considered to be weakening due to uncontrolled forces of political
and economic conflict (i.e., Brazil in 1964, Peru in 1968, and Chile in
1973). In a case such as Poland, where no party can claim the support
of more than a small minority, the appeal of expert guidance combined
with the demagogic appeal of a strong leader may also be considerable.
In general, however, technocrats can only flourish in those regimes that
have established a relatively stable political environment either through
consensus or repression, or within those issues removed from the ideological arena. That is, technocrats need someone to do their "dirty
work" for them, and to assure that their policies will be implemented
without "unproductive" resistance. Technocrats will, therefore, often
have to establish alliances with either politicians willing to "sell" their
ideas or a military able to enforce the requisite "discipline" (see below).
325
Worldsystem
Just as powerful agencies are able to impose their models throughout
the bureaucracy, dominant nation-states also partly determine the
structure of regimes in their periphery. This isomorphism may be
voluntary or coerced. In some cases (e.g., the former Soviet Union in
Eastern Europe or the United States in Latin America), the model of
governance will be directly imposed through the use of violence or the
threat thereof. Far more interesting, however, are those cases where
coercion does not appear to be involved. In these, the dominance of a
model is established through control of resources such as financial
assistance or diplomatic recognition. For example, as nations enter the
international market, their economic or financial agencies may wish to
copy the organizational structures of their more powerful counterparts
or they may be forced to do so, by the dictates of these agencies, in
return for aid and support (e.g., the International Monetary Fund may
impose a specific organizational model on countries requesting loans).
In the late 1950s and 1960s, for example, "international institutions
and other bi-lateral aid programs made demands to create or strengthen existing planning capabilities and to prepare long term plans,"53and
this greatly assisted the rise to power of those government personnel
best able to accomplish these goals. Intra-nationally, these agencies are
usually among the most powerful and may in turn require that other
elements of the central bureaucracy also adapt the new "rational"
structures. The international media may be another critical actor in this
process. The admiring tones with which North American and European newspapers describe the "new economic discipline" of the "techno-yuppies" who have replaced the "wild-eyed revolutionaries" of
Latin America have, at times, strengthened the relative position of
these regimes both nationally and internationally.54
Market pressures on a global level may also support the rise of technocratic governance. For example, public and private creditors' approval
is vital for a country's economic health. These institutions, in turn, will
support those internal candidates who not only share the same economic perspectives, but perhaps most importantly, speak the same
language, both literally and metaphorically. Certainly the need to
attract capital will support those personnel and institutions that can
most easily obtain the confidence and approval of those who can provide financial resources. Note that this does not necessarily imply ideological congruance of the two, much less the loss of administrative
326
autonomy. As discussed above, the technocrats do not necessarily have
to represent one ideological niche or the other, they simply share a
familiarity with a certain language and rationale. The graduate degrees
from U.S. universities do not necessarily make the Latin American
technocrats less nationalistic, patriotic, or independent. They enable
these persons to present arguments that their fellow alumni at the
World Bank and the money center banks understand and consider
legitimate.55
Technocracy and democracy

What are the political implications of the empowerment of a technocratic elite and the imposition of their mentality on policymaking? It
seems that the very same characteristics that promote technocratic
control also make it inimical to democratic rule. The empirical evidence certainly supports a pessimistic perspective. The experience with
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s indicated
that economic development did not necessarily lead to greater democratization. Although these same cases also showed that the absence of
democracy was no guarantee of economic efficiency, in the 1980s only
those regimes that were able to limit popular participation could impose economic adjustment programs. In Latin America, for example,
the relative economic successes of Mexico and Pinochet Chile sharply
contrasted with the failures of pre-1991 Argentina and Brazil, despite
the considerable support both of the latter regimes enjoyed after the
departure of the military. In analyzing the boom in the Asian Pacific
Rim (including both the Communist PRC and the more market-oriented "dragons") the relative isolation of economic policymakers from
both political and market pressures is critical.56Whatever the merits of
such analytical correlations, it is likely that technocrats who are armed
with considerable confidence in their own abilities will be tempted to
postpone democratic participation until their countries "can afford it."
A democratic technocracy would have to count on conditions that,
even under the best of circumstances, would be difficult to maintain.
These include: a) A wide social consensus regarding the objectives of
state policy and the means through which these could be achieved; b) A
willingness on the part of the population to endure individual sacrifices
for the long term good of the collective; and c) Relatively quick success in
its policies.
327
The first condition would not only assure electoral support and the
participation of the population in the implementation of the policy, but
would also guarantee that while elections could lead to personnel
changes, the overall strategy of the government would remain constant.
Because it legitimates itself as objective and promises to provide solutions free from doubt, technocratic rule cannot coexist with the implicit
uncertainty of a free political market. Technocratic policymaking
focuses on instrumental action that is purposive and not conducive to
debates regarding values or ends. The point in these cases is not the
cooperative definition of a communal goal, but the authoritative command required to achieve it. Instrumental action appears to require
authoritarian and bureaucratic frameworks and these, in the final
instance, are not conducive to large-scale popular participation.58
Technification also restricts the number of legitimate contenders by
reducing the scope of political conflict and raising the level of expertise
required to participate in debates.57 The claimed methodological
objectivity of technocratic governance makes its proposals self-evident
and its opponents appear to be irrational (at best) or self-interested (at
worst) adherents of a normative order with no legitimate claim for
attention. This attitude has been perhaps best expressed by Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, who summed up his political
philosophy by declaring: "Every time anybody wants to start anything
which will unwind or unravel this orderly, organized, sensible, rational
society, and make it irrational and emotional, I put a stop to it without
hesitation."59
The end of the Cold War appears to have momentarily assured an
almost global consensus regarding the virtues of the market. A technocratic regime seeking to impose a neo-liberal economic order and logic
can practically count on an ideological monopoly. But even in those
countries where one would expect the longest of "honeymoons," where
the population would be most willing to accept change in any form,
attempts to impose such economic desciplines have encountered
substantial opposition. The experience of the Mazowiecki administration in Poland demonstrates how fragile such a political consensus can
be in the face of economic hardship. Notwithstanding the commitment
of Vaclav Klaus to radical privatization, the Czechoslovak state has
been unable to proceed with many of its economic reforms. Boris
Yeltsin may also find that Gorbachev's hesitancy and caution in pursuing perestroika were not simply a function of his commitment to
communism or his lack of conviction, but an accurate reflection of
what could be reasonably accomplished.
328
The second condition required by a techocratic democracy helps
explain the difficulties faced by the new Eastern European regimes.
The population must not only agree to the general goals of the government, but must also be willing to accept whatever sacrifices are required to achieve them. In a world of limited resources, however, optimization and rationalization necessarily imply the rejection of some
demands by sectors of the population and, at the very least, considerable postponements in the satisfaction of perceived needs and wants.
Yet states are not firms. A private enterprise, for example, may eliminate product lines, decrease certain inputs, and abandon whole
markets, and still be considered successful if these are positively reflected on the bottom line. States cannot assume such an objective set
of criteria, nor can they simply ignore the costs of the new policies.
Recent changes in the Mexican agricultural sector serve to indicate the
problems associated with such decisions. Almost all sources agree that
the communual ejidos are vastly inefficient and that the importation of
grain from the United States and the commercialization of agriculture
would benefit consumers. However, what about the 10 million individuals who depend on the current agrarian structure for their livelihood
and whose votes have represented a large part of the PRI's support?
Even assuming that a "modernized" Mexican agriculture could absorb
half of this population, the other 5 million would find it difficult to
enter the industrial economy, and, subsequently, would not support the
party that deprived them of their livelihood.
The third condition for the co-existence of democracy and technocracy
is some type of success. A democratic technocracy cannot sustain prolonged crises of confidence in its abilities. This is, of course, true of all
political bodies, but its particularly salient for technocracies.6r Precisely because it legitimates itself as a meritocracy, a technocracy is also
under much greater pressure than other regimes to perform efficiently
on a consistent basis.
But, even under the best of management, states, much like firms, are
not in complete control of their environments. A decline in the price of
a commodity, a natural disaster, or more mundane lags and bottlenecks
in production can drastically reduce the effectiveness of any leadership.
A long-term disruption in oil supplies that drastically reduced economic performance, for example, could easily derail the process of
democratization in the export-led economies of Asia. In Mexico, President Salinas's gamble with a Free Trade Agreement means that the shift
329
of a few votes in the U.S. Congress could lead to a decline in investment
and a subsequent drop in popular support. Again, this situation is not
unique to technocratic regimes, but in the face of an economic downturn, the Mexican technocratic elite would be hard-pressed to retain
power.
The challenges of creating a consensus, apportioning sacrifice, and sustaining confidence will strain the alliance technocrats may have established with popularly elected politicians. As these politicians face constituency demands that require the satisfaction of particular interests or
the proposals of alternative policies, they find it increasingly difficult
both to defend the technocratic policies and to retain their elected
positions. Issue by issue, they will insist on exceptions, amendments,
and stipulations that allow them to demonstrate their political effectiveness. At this point, the technocrats will have two options: either to
lose their power or to call upon allies who can free them from the constraints of politics.6'
It is this last possibility that haunts the efforts of new regimes in Latin
America and Eastern Europe. These governments face the daunting
obstacle of having to reform their economies and impose new economic rationales. But although these new policies may produce longterm benefits (in itself a challengeable assumption), they will also involve dramatic short-term costs for significant parts of their populations. The coup by Fujimori in Peru may be partly explained by the
social, political, and economic chaos of that country, but it also reflects
an inherent impatience with democratic processes and a disdain for the
corruption of electioneering and politics. The extent of Fujimori's
popular support and that for the attempted military coup in Venezuela
reveals that such impatience may be undermining the social bases for
democracy. Similarly, in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern
Europe, the apparent gridlock between those who wish to reform the
economy and those resisting the losses inherent in such a process has
led many to advocate an initial period of authoritarian rule during
which the transition to a market economy can be imposed. The relative
success of South Korea and the PRC stand in stark contrast to the
political fragmentation of Poland and the territorial dismemberment of
the Soviet Union.
Even in those regimes where the romance of democracy retains its
luster, the appeal to the efficient solutions proposed by experts often
implies the exclusion of large parts of the population and their required
330
acceptance of the inevitability of the policies. The utopian visions of
Burnham, or, for that matter, of the Bolsheviks, assumed that there
existed a single truth, a unique and universal solution to problems, a
perfect and optimal policy. But, by whose standards will these be
judged? Whose benefits will be maximized? Who will lose for the good
of the whole? Philosopher kings cannot submit their decisions to
popular judgment, even through "electronic town halls."In the face of a
population unwilling to accept their Solomonic judgments, they may
choose to ignore such "short-sighted" opposition. While advanced
degrees may help our modern Leviathans construct societies in which
our lives will be longer and less nasty, there is no reason to suspect that
such expertise will keep them from making our existence even more
brutish.
Acknowledgments
Helpful comments on a variety of earlier versions were made by Steven
Brint, Frank Dobbin, Gene Burns, Walter Wallace, Marion Levi,
Emmanuel Lazega, Deborah A. Kaple, and the Editors of Theory and
Society.
Notes
1. See Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, editors, The Politics of Adjustment
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Stephen Haggard, Pathways
from the Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 254-270; and Adam
Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991).
2. For the Chinese cases see Li Cheng and Lynn White, "Elite Transformation and
Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan," China Quarterly (March 1990):
1-35. For Brazil, see David Bruce, "Brazilian Technocrats and Economic Development Policy," Public Administration and Development (April-June 1985):
169-175. For Mexico, see Miguel Angel Centeno and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Marriage of Finance and Order," Journal of Latin American Studies, Spring 1992. For
the Soviet Union, see T. H. Rigby, Political Elites in the USSR (Brookfield, Vt.:
Gower, 1991). For France, see Ezra Suleiman, Elites in French Society (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979).
3. James Burhnam, The Managerial Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1960).
4. The Coming of Post Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1976); The New
Industrial State, 4th ed. (New York: NAL, 1985); The Scientific Estate (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).
331
5. Max Horkheimer, Critique of Instrumental Reason (New York: Seabury Press,
1974); Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964);
and Jirgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970).
6. R. McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jiirgen Habermas (Boston: MIT Press, 1978),
12.
7. The term appears to have been used first in 1919 by an American, William Smyth,
who advocated a new system of government in which experts would be responsible
for all critical political and economic decisions. Perhaps the only term as loosely
defined as "technocracy" is its opposite, "populism," which has been used to
describe regimes from Cardenas Mexico to Vargas Brazil and Peronist Argentina.
See Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: NLB, 1977),
143-144.
8. For a summary of this debate, see W. H. G. Armytage, The Rise of the Techocrats
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965); and Krishan Kumar, Prophecy and
Progress (New York: Penguin, 1978).
9. For a summary of this literature, see John G. Gunnell, "The Technocratic Image
and the Theory of Techocracy," Technology and Culture 23/3 (July 1982):
392-416; Richard B. Day, Ronald Berner, and Joseph Masciulli, Democratic
Theory and Technological Society (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988); and
Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park: Sage
Publications, 1990).
10. For a discussion of this point, see Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976); Steven Brint, "Rethinking
the Policy Influence of Experts," Sociological Forum 5/3 (1990): 361-385.
11. Perhaps the most extreme example of such an educational concentration was in
Taiwan where 9 of the 14 appointees chosen by President Lee Teng-Hui (Cornell
PhD) had doctorates from American universities. Only one of the 14 did not possesses a Ph.D.
12. Jean Meynaud, Technocracy (New York: Free Press, 1964).
13. Magali Sarfatti-Larson, "Notes on Technocracy," Berkeley Journal of Sociology
XVII (1972-73): 5.
14. See also Nora Mitrani, "Reflexions sur l'operation Technique, les Techniciens et les
Technocrates," Cahier Internationaux de Sociologie XIX (1955): 157-170. For a
summary of differences between technocracy and more generic bureaucracy see
David Ashcroft, "Technocracy: A Discussion," Reseaux (1979): 35-36, 57-65.
15. Guillermo Kelley, "Politics and Administration in Mexico: Recruitment and Promotion of the Politico-Administrative Class," Technical Paper Series # 33, (Austin
Texas: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas, 1981), 4.
16. Sarfatti-Larson, "Notes on Technocracy," 14-15 [emphasis in the original]. See
also Carlos Estevam Martins, "Technocratic Rule or Technocratic Counsel,"
Berkeley Journal of Sociology Vol. XVII ( 1972-1973): 35-58.
17. Recent work on ideological convergence among U.S. professionals includes
Everett C. Ladd, Jr., "The New Lines are Drawn," Public Opinion 3 (1978):
48-53; John Ehrenreich and Barbara Ehrenreich, "The Professional-Managerial
Class," Radical America 11 (1977): 7-31; Steven Brint, "The Political Attitudes of
Professionals," Annual Review of Sociology 1 (1985): 389-414; Robert Wuthnow
and Wesley Shrum, "Knowledge Workers as a New Class," Work and Occupations
10/4 (1983): 471-487. Robert Putnam has done the most extensive empirical work
on the presence of a "techocratic ethos" among high civil servants, and he finds
that although technical training is clearly an increasingly important factor in elite
332
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
recruitment, those with social science backgrounds "display a distinctively un-technocratic mentality," and he believes that one cannot speak of a coherent technocratic sector ideology in Western European regimes. See "Elite Transformation in
Advanced Industrial Societies," Comparative Political Studies (October 1977). The
only systematic study of ideology of scientific personnel is Howard P. Greenwald,
"Scientists and Technocratic Ideology," Social Forces 58/2 (December 1979):
630-650. This study shows a negative correlation between the espousal of technocratic beliefs and closeness to power and concludes with considerable skepticism
about the formation of technocratic rule. On conformity regarding basic propositions and methodological preferences in one scientific community see J. R. Kearl,
et al., "A Confusion of Economists?" American Economic Review 69/2 (May
1979): 28-37. See also Warren Ilchman, Alice Stone Ilchman, and Philip
K. Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge and the Developing Nations (Berkeley:
Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1968).
Wolf Heydebrand, "Technocratic Corporatism," in Richard Hall and Robert
Quinn, Organizational Theory and Public Policy (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), 97.
For an interesting discussion of the many possible definitions of rationality in
policy making, see Hans Peter Dreitzel, "Social Science and the Problem of Rationality: Notes on the Sociology of Technocrats," Politics and Society 2/2 (Winter
1972): 165-182.
Quoted in John Waterbury, "Managerial Careers and Interests," mimeo, Princeton
University, January 1992, 37.
JuirgenHabermas, Toward a Rational Society, 63.
Catherine M. Conaghan, et al., "Business and the 'Boys': Politics of Neoliberalism
in the Central Andes," Latin American Research Review (1990): 27. See also Julie
M. Taylor, "Technocracy and National Identity: Attitudes Towards Economic
Policy," in Monica Peralta-Ramos, From Military Rule to Liberal Democracy in
Argentina (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988).
See Don K. Rowney, Transition to Technocracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1989).
23. State and Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 57.
24. For some fascinating examples of the expression of these technocratic "mentalities," see Li Cheng and Lynn White, "China's Technocratic Movement and the
World Economic Herald," mimeo, Princeton University, October 1990.
25. This ability to determine the appropriate methodology for decision making is close
to what Michel Foucault calls the "politics of truth," by which one abandons the
struggle for "right answers" in order to concentrate on the much more important
battle for determining how "right" is defined and verified. See Power/Knowledge
(New York: Pantheum, 1980): 132-133.
26. Patricio Silva, "Technocrats and Politics in Chile," Journal of Latin American
Studies 23/2 (May 1991): 393.
27. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan Press, 1974).
28. Perhaps the best guidelines for understanding the technocratic mentality will originate in the use of the concepts provided by Bourdieu: the definition of a techocratic
doxa and habitus, those implicit rules that go without saying while directing a large
part of daily life. Instead of determining a conscious ideology to be pursued, such
an approach would identify the symbolic capital utilized by technocrats. See
Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1977). Another interesting approach is the analysis of the values attached to linguistic opposites. Donald McCloskey's assault on the homogeneity found in current
333
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
American economics includes an illustrative list of the divisions of the world

according to scientific modernism: fact vs. opinion, vigorous vs. sloppy, things vs.
words, cognition vs. intuition, etc. See "The Rhetoric of Economics," Journal of
Economic Literature Vol. XXI (June 1983): 481-517. Sarfatti-Larson suggests a
similar technique in her utilization of methodology borrowed from Levi-Strauss to
analyze the technocratic world view and the manner by which it is shaped by dominant myths ("Notes on Techocracy").
In this way, the technocratic model resembles that identified by Stepan as Organic
Statism. It also resembles a Huntingtonian institution designed to manage the instability of a transition.
Alejandro Carrillo Castro, La reforma administrativa en Mexico, Vol. III (Mexico
City: Porrua, 1982), 165 [my emphasis].
New York Times, 1/6/88, D1.
H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber(New York: Oxford University
Press, 1978), 59.
David Collier and Ruth Collier, "Who Does What, To Whom, and How: Towards a
Comparative Analysis of Latin American Corporatism" in James Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University Press, 1977),
493.
See Miguel Angel Centeno, "The New Cientificos: Technocratic Politics in Mexico,
1970-1990," Doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1990.
Jaques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), and
Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978).
John K. Galbraith similarly assigns critical importance to the creation of a "technostructure" (The New Industrial State). One could also place much of the "postindustrial" society literature within this group. See Daniel Bell, The Coming of PostIndustrial Society; and Alain Touraine, The Post Industrial Society (New York:
Random House, 1971). A related structural approach from a neo-Marxist perspective similarly treats technocracy as a functional response to particular contradictions between the dual goals of accumulation and legitimation. Technocracy both
resolves the "management" problem involved in the increased state intervention
associated with later stages of capitalism, and provides the legitimation for state
policies on the basis of technical rationality. (See Claus Offe, "The Theory of the
Capitalist State and the Problems of Policy Formation," Leon Lindberg, et al.,
Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism [Lexington: Lexington Books,
19751.) See also Jiirgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, and Legitimation
Crisis (Boston: Beacon, 1975); and Goran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class
Do When It Rules (London: NLB, 1978). For a review of left perspectives on postindustrialism, see Boris Frankel, The Post Industrial Utopians (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1987).
Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico's Development (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1963).
A similar critique applied to technological determinism (a term used by Thornstein
Veblen) may be found in historical writings on the Industrial Revolution, such as
Steven Marglin, "What Do Bosses Do," Review of Radical Political Economics 6/2
(Summer 1974): 33-60, and Dan Clawson, Bureaucracy and the Labor Process
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980).
Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).
Jose Lopez Portillo, Mis Tiempos (Mexico City: Fernandez Editores, 1988), 286.
334
40. Patricio Silva, "Technocrats and Politics in Chile," 403.
41. Newsweek, 11/12/90, 58.
42. Claus Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State," German Political Studies
1 (1974): 31-57. A similar perspective may be found in the work of James
O'Connor.
43. See Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, editors, The Macroeconomics of
Populism in Latin America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
44. WashingtonPost, 7/11/90, A29.
45. New York Times, 10/23/1989, D3.
46. New York Times, December 11, 1989, D1.
47. See J. Pfeffer and G. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations (New York:
Harper & Row, 1974); J. Pfeffer, Power in Organizations (Marshfield, Mass.:
Pitman Publishing, 1981); and C. Perrow, "Departmental Power and Perspectives
in Industrial Firms," in M. Zald, editor, Power in Organizations (Nashville:
Vanderbilt University Press, 1970).
48. See J. W. Meyer and R. W. Scott, Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983); Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, "The Iron
Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 147-160.
49. See P. S. Tolbert and L. G. Zucker, "Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal
Structure of Organizations: The Diffusion of Civil Science Reform, 1880-1935,"
Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 22-39.
50. See G. R. Salancik and J. Pfeffer, "A Social Information Processing Approach to
Job Attitudes and Task Design," Administrative Science Quarterly 23 (1978):
224-253. This control over information is often cited in critiques of the power of
Congressional staffs.
51. See James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw Hill,
1967); M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (London: Tavistock, 1964); and
David Hickson, C. R. Hinnings, C. A. Lee, R. E. Schneck, and J. M. Pennings, "A
Strategic Contingencies Theory of Intraorganizational Power," Administrative
Science Quarterly 16 (1971): 216-229.
52. See Centeno, "The New Cientificos," Chapter 5.
53. Guy Benveniste, The Politics of Expertise (Berkeley: Glendessary Press, 1972), 41.
54. New York Times, 11/13/91, 1, and Newsweek, 11/12/90, 58.
55. Similarly, attendance at Moscow State or the Patrice Lumumba Institute did not
necessarily make the African elite more Marxist. It did enable such a leadership to
frame aid requests within the accepted scientific dogma.
56. See Stephen Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1990), 254-270.
57. For a discussion of the question of isolation, see Stephan Haggard and Robert
Kaufman, "Economic Adjustment in the New Democracies," in Joan Nelson,
editor, Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment (New Brunswick,
N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989). See also Frederic C. Deyo, editor, The Political
Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
58. Martins, Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 45.
59. Financial Times, Special Survey, 22 November 1982, 1. Quoted in Nigel Harris,
The End of the Third World(Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books, 1986), 61.
60. For a discussion of the critical importanrce of confidence in democratic rule, see
Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1977).
335
61. The case of Japan offers an excellent hypothetical example of this dilemma. To
maintain its hold on power, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) depends on the
support of the vastly over-represented farmers. To obtain this support, the LDP
has to protect an agricultural sector whose inefficiency is legendary. The Japanese
regime has three hypothetical choices. First, it can continue the inefficiency of the
market in exchange for political support, thereby frustrating those who might wish
to not only improve the food delivery system, but also to improve relations with the
United States. This is by far the most likely scenario. A second scenario is that it
can impose a more efficient agricultural production system that, while reducing
prices in the shops, could lead to the collapse of the LDP political machine and certainly the fall of one or more of the factions. Third, and most unlikely, an alliance of
politicians and technocrats could impose efficiency without giving up power by
relying on repression instead of electoral support.

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The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy

Origins of technocratic power

Legitimation through performance criteria

Technocracy and democracy

American economics includes an illustrative list of the divisions of the world

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