Govt of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, G.R. No.

153675, April 19, 2007

This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
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prospective extradite in an extradition proceeding.
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong
signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June
20, 1997.
The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by
the Philippine Department of Justice
The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muoz
Facts: Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts
of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent." He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense
of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were
issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each
charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for
the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest
against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge
Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law
granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr.
inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by
respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee.
Held: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of
the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee.
This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and
should be granted bail.
Ratio:
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right
of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.

Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a
full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the
escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping
with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to
life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the
grant is satisfactorily met.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno, proposed that a new standard
which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but
higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of
the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is
not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not,
the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
Summary of Time Inc. v. Hill
Citation: 385 U.S. 374
Relevant Facts: In 1952, James Hill, his wife and their five children were taken hostage in their home
in Pennsylvania. The family was released after their 19 hour ordeal, unharmed. The suspects were
later arrested in a clash with police, and from that clash, two of the suspects were killed. The following
year, Joseph Hays published a novel about the Hill hostage crisis. The novel was turned into a play,
and then a Life Magazine article was later printed that discussed the myriad inconsistencies regarding
the Hills experiences during the ordeal. Hill argued that Life Magazine deliberately misrepresented
his written story, and as a result, Hill sought damages from Life. Hill received an adverse ruling, and a
new trial was ordered. Subsequent to an unsuccessful New York Court of Appeals decision, the
matter was taken up by the Supreme Court after having granted certiorari to Time Inc.
Issues: The legal question presented was whether a publication that presents misrepresentations
about the subject of its coverage is still protected under the First Amendments guarantees of free
speech, or can it be held liable?
Holding: The Court reversed the lower court decision and found in favor of Time Inc.
Reasoning: The Court found that the lower court erred by not instructing the jury that Times liability
could only be found if there was proof that it had acted in a knowing and reckless manner to publish
false statements about the Hill family. If there was no finding of the publishers malicious intent

which there wasnt the publisher was in fact protected by the First Amendment. The Court
subsequently remanded the matter for a retrial with appropriate jury instruction.
Dissent: Justices Fortas, Clark, and Chief Justice Warren dissented, and asserted that, since Hill was
a private rather than public official he lacked the funds and viewership necessary to put forth a
vigorous defense against the claims made against him.
Hudgens vs. National Labor Relations Board
Brief Fact Summary. Striking union members picketed in front of a retail store that was located within
a shopping mall. The general manager of the mall threatened the picketers with arrest for trespassing
if they would not leave.Synopsis of Rule of Law. A private shopping mall is not the functional
equivalent of a town and, therefore, not a state actor subject to the requirements of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).
Facts. Butler Shoe Co. warehouse workers went on strike and decided to picket the nine retail
locations in Atlanta. One of those stores was located within the North DeKalb Shopping Center, owned
by the Petitioner, Hudgens (Petitioner). After the picketers had been marching for about half an hour,
the general manager of the shopping center threatened to have the strikers arrested if they did not
leave.
Issue. Can a private shopping mall prohibit picketing of its tenants by members of the public?
Held. Yes. Because a shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town, it may restrict First
Amendment rights based solely on the content of the speech.
Discussion. The majority overrules the holding of Logan Valley and reasserts the holding of Lloyd. A
mall may look like and function as a small town would, yet it does not have all of the attributes of a
town. So, it is not restricted by the prohibition on content-based speech review that a state actor would
be under in the same circumstances.