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SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF STRUCTURAL

ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS: THE NEED FOR FURTHER REFORM


ON REFORMERS
Mehmet Ali KARADEMİR & Didem
BÜYÜKARSLAN

International Political Economy

Abstract

In our essay we discuss on the highly criticized structural adjustment loans (SALs)
provided by the World Bank and IMF to the developing and least developed countries
especially focusing on the period after 1970s and early 1980s. We mention academic
discussion about the weaknesses and responsibilities of both borrower nations and the
multilateral institutions after providing an introduction with the historical chronology of
transformation especially in adjusted regions. We try to look through the subject from
various angles although they are all the proves of the failure. however the criticized points and
responsible side at each –or the weak points- is different from the rest. Besides discussing on
the reasons of the failure we try to focus on to different basic region that were distinguished in
applications –Asia and Latin America- as well as discussing the situation Africa in minor in
order to see the consequences from to opposite angles in order to mace a decision on the
responsibility issue.
Introduction:
‘Stabilize, privatize, and liberalize’ quotes a an international political economy professor
and mentions that those ‘became mantra of a generation of technocrats…’ talking about the
economic executives in 1990s who ambitiously imposed Washington Consensus ideas to
developing world.1 In fact, the aggressive liberalization had started at early 1980s –even
1970s- in a transition process from Keynesian interventionist approach through a ‘market
fundamentalist’ movement that aims the exploitation of or minimizing the restrictions on the
free movement of the market itself. However through the 1980s –accelerated and enhanced by
debt crisis- and early 1990s liberalization and privatization started to be regarded as the
unique way for development and the only measure of development was the economic growth
(GDP).
Furthermore the Bank and IMF were highly politicized and associated with western ‘core’
policies.2 By the way they aimed to converge ‘west &east’ or ‘north & south’ life style
politically and economically, in other words, they targeted the modernization of developing
country in terms of economic policies and especially imposing U.S. government type. They
thought that by the help of liberalization the overall welfare would converge and the measures
would equalize. Fed by the ‘consensus’ rules the structural adjustment programs asked states
to provide stabilization by strict fiscal policies and to shift through a more open market
especially by liberalizing the trade and capital flow. Forcing them to reduce public investment
–and even trying to democratize them or interfering other sovereign issues- those international
monetary institutions prevented autonomous development programs.
More interestingly some of the –maybe the most of- developing countries were willing to
implement those adjustment programs. ‘such was the enthusiasm for reform in many of these
countries that Williamson’s original list of do’s and don’ts came to look remarkably tame and
innocuous…’ as an impressive statement especially to describe the moods of transition
economies and Latin Americas.3 Most of the developing economies liberalized their financial
markets and reduced trade barriers more than needed; some of them even signed free trade
agreements.
However some events through and after mid 1990s created confidence crisis in World
Bank conditional loans. One of the most important one is the unexpected success of ‘Asian
Miracle’ which were not, by many means, ‘good boys’ for institutions that they did not
implemented the adjustment programs and succeeded though. The other examples from the
top can be listed as the ‘African failure’ and more significantly ‘Mexican Crisis’ in 1994
which was the only complete success of World Bank SALs. That leads some scholars to claim
that ‘‘empirical evidence for huge gains from free market policies is, at best, fuzzy’’4.
However we will discuss the regional consequence on detail especially for Asia and Americas
later in this paper. Thus we will first focus on the reasons why the SALs failed?, what were
the consequences on social and economic issues? And who were to blame for the failure? in
the next section.

Measures of Failure, Success, and Consequences


It is already very obvious that the SALs failed to succeed any progress in the targets as it is
accepted by the very self of the World Bank so far. The implementers could not even catch
their 1990 levels in economic size or activities even after more than ten years and many other
chaotic consequences both in terms of economic and social welfare forced the Bank to revise
and ‘reorient’ its regulations. As stated by Rodrik (2006) it is not the point to discuss success
or validity of Washington Consensus anymore; it is to define the alternative to replace it
completely. However we will discuss the advices in the conclusion more detailed.
As it is clear that the SALs were not success stories we should define the weak points and
failures. While observing the critiques we came across a variety of discussion all of which
were interesting. The most interesting point is that it was even criticized by the orthodox
liberals some of whom were the executives or researchers sponsored by WB itself. However
their discussion was that the Bank couldn’t use the bullwhip effective enough and that was the
reason for the failure. That is a kind of orthodox liberal view which usually puts blame on the
borrower states’ domestic policies but that time the arrow was directed to World Bank
applications that failed to force governments to reform. The other critiques were as we well
now were affected by the basic international relation theories such as Realism, Marxism (and
sub-theories) and Liberalism. And subject they discussed frequently is social and economic
consequences of the adjustment programs and the reasons of those consequences.
Failure in implementation came to be matter of discussion among orthodox liberals
frequently and as you may also reckon, the blame were to put on the shoulder of ‘advisee’
who failed to implement the regulations and as a small difference, on the Bank Government
which could not use the bullwhip efficiently. However the so called empirical research found
no regression among the success of SALs and World Bank intervention or preparation
process. The one thing to be careful about the claim is that the measure of success here is the
level of implementation instead of consequences and the other point is that the Bank-related
factors are not taken individually to the regression modeling.
Other than the ‘usual suspects’ of liberals –such as domestic political stability, identity of
governments, power distribution in domestic context, domestic regimes, or willingness to
implement the reform packages etc- the weaknesses discussed here are related to the Bank.
The strongest idea is that the Bank was not efficient in discriminating the recipients of loans.
According to that point World Bank devoted more resources to the failed programs especially
to salvage them as well as the amount of administrative resources spent for those failed (35%)
programs.5 Another issue which was related to the Bank was the disbursing the full amount
even if the adjustment programs were not implemented completely or even partially. They
also blamed World Bank of being inconsistent in ‘punishing the non-reforming countries’. By
the effects of those mentioned reasons 35% of the adjustment programs failed to be
‘adjusted’ however that didn’t attribute any responsibility to Bank on the negative
consequences of the programs although the domestic regulations are still the those who ‘fell
short’6; even those who implemented the reforms most efficiently.
However it is stated that ‘‘the evidence that macroeconomic policies, price distortions,
financial policies… have predictable, robust and systemic effects on national growth rate is
quite weak’’.7 That provides a strong opposition to the ‘empirical study’ that allocates the
responsibility of failure to the domestic policies although the concept of success is different in
each. A quotation from the World Bank report ‘…Learning from a Decade of Reform’ states
that ‘‘When you get right down to business, there aren’t too many policies that we can say
with certainty deeply and positively affect growth’’. The exact idea of that quotation derives
attention of both World Bank and scholars to other points to discuss.
As the ‘check list’ of liberalization didn’t work the measures of Washington consensus was
started to be questioned. The imposed or even forced-regulations to those who needed the
western capital were criticized to be too straight; too standard to fit the modes of different
states. Furthermore the ‘Augmented Washington Consensus’ or by other name, ‘Monterrey
Consensus’ (2002) was also blamed of being straight, which tries to deal with human capital
and institutional regulations as well as economic growth –although it again gives the priority
to economic growth as the initiative of social welfare. The policy regulations of the Bank
were so insisting that its one of the most prior exposition ‘privatization’ was ridiculously
proposed for the bank itself as ‘privatization of World Bank’.
Alternatives were proposed by scholars to be implemented. Thus it was the only way of
liberalizing or of developing to implement the exact expectations of the ‘consensus’. The
Bank is asked to broaden its objectives of development and offer different implementations
for each target. By the help of tailoring the reform efforts according the undergoing context of
the countries they could address the real weakness In front of the development which was not
succeeded by the standard lists. However the aim of the revised regulations, which targets
institutional reforms that would provide both growth and development of social welfare of
states, were approved by the scholars.
The social consequences of the adjustment, which was highly criticized led to shift from a
modernist approach to a post-modern way of thinking in the utterances of the World Bank
governor –although not in the operation yet. What were those social consequences? One of
the most important one is the impression on the labor markets. It is believed to be that many
aspects of trade and financial market liberalization leads to unemployment in domestic market
(short-term capital flows, high interest rates, privatization are some of those aspects).
Deagriculturalizing and domestic firms’ bankruptcy because of cheap import are other
consequences which were criticized separately as well as related to labor market issues.
Besides the expectations of structural adjustment led countries to reduce the public
investment on health, education, environment etc which was also related to gender
inequalities (putting the burden of reduced government budget on women). ‘Race to the
Bottom’ theory implies that the competitive arena created by the ambitious liberalization led
to unemployment of unskilled labor both in DCs and LDCs however DCs could compensate it
although LDCs fell short in increasing the social welfare. Moreover the real wage and overall
output in developing countries decreased after implementing the structural adjustment
programs.
Other part of the social institutions that was criticized was focused on directly the
institutions. The basics of those were named as ‘institutional mismatch’ which criticizes the
rigidity of structural adjustment as leading the governments to regulate policies and
institutions for liberal economy although the infrastructure is not ready for that. The other was
named as ‘institutional overshooting’ that implies the fact that South pays more with higher
standards to attract foreign investment and to receive benefit from open market such as;
higher interest rates.8 This was the part of the World Bank critique separately, in terms of
institutional issues. However further discussion insists both on governmental and the Bank’s
responsibility on that issue other than ‘race to the bottom’ infers.
The Bank and domestic government are criticized not to make reforms on institutions. As
usual the Bank’s responsibility is to put it forward as a condition for lending. The
governments are to create or regulate appropriate institutions in order to provide efficiency of
policy regulations. In fact the institutional reforms are meant to be more important than the
policy regulation as Rodrik expresses ‘‘policies, do not exert any independent effect on long-
term economic performance once the quality of domestic institutions is included in the
regression’’.
The interference on sovereignty and prevention of autonomous development, which is
related to and inferred from the sub-topics we mentioned above, is the most frequently
criticized general aspect of SALs. As we mentioned above the Bank forced the sovereign
states to obey the imposed rules which were the exposition of North’s interests or at least their
ways. This attitude led to the failure most as the techniques that were implemented in DCs
didn’t fit the LDCs because of the weak points –of both the Bank and domestic governments.
We will see how are the observations from different regions now which are the basic
representatives of different implementations and will be able to discuss the current regulations
being illuminated by the differences of consequences too.

Regional focus: implementers vs. Interventionists


As a result of monetarist economic policies in the core countries in the late 1970s and early
1980s, global interest rates dramatically higher and triggered a debt crisis in the developing
world. They restructure their economies to correct ``disequilibrium'' under the control of the
world's two most powerful international financial institutions (IFIs), World Bank and the
IMF. One of the most important targets, the stabilization phase of adjustment focuses on
demand restraint policies, usually affected by large reductions in government expenditure by
using tools such as subsidy removals, public sector employment as cuts, and the introduction
of user fees.
Structural adjustment involves a re-organization of the real exchange rate by using
devaluation, privatization, liberalization of interest rates and tax reform, reductions for
import/ export barriers (removal/reduction of tariffs, quotas, and taxes) in order to improve
the economy's relative trading position.
Over the ten last year period (1958-68), the Bank lending growth was not increasing
significantly but the expansion of its lending to Latin America was even more substantial
than most of its previous performance. The whole period extending from 1958 to 1977 stands
out as a "golden era" for Latin America for its access to the Bank's resources. After 1977, the
Bank's growth in Latin America became very limited due to the previous year expansion
policy. In 1981-84 period, when overall Bank lending in real terms expanded at the rate of
19.8 per cent per year, whereas it’s lending to Latin America grew only at 3.5 per cent per
year. Those data explain clearly the reason of the very limited grow after the “golden era”.
Regarding to the explosion of the debt crisis in 1982, the Bank repeatedly offered
optimistic assessments about the ability of the developing countries to continue to accumulate
and service their external debt but when the crisis emerged the Bank was slow to react and
that reduced its seriousness.
The recession and the related debt crisis that hit Latin America very seriously made Bank
operations become weak in that region. The sharp contraction of investment affected the
World Bank's project-based operations in a contradictory way. The region's aggregate
negative net transfer of resources and following decline in domestic credit availability, who
have forced countries to postpone development projects.
The change in sectoral strategies also explains the decline of Latin America and the decline
in total Bank lending. It is for sure that such "structural adjustment" and "sector" loans that
are most appropriate for countries suffering from strong shortages of foreign exchange. The
Bank also diversified into industry, especially for development finance companies and small-
scale enterprises. Latin American industry was discriminated against in the beginning of the
period, but at the end it was getting more than its fair share, mostly as a consequence of the
growing importance of Bank lending through development finance companies in developing
countries.
Third World governments, especially in Latin America, were administratively determining
prices and sending signals that produced inefficient investment decisions by both public and
private firms. Government prices give harm to the allocation of resources by consumers,
savers, producers and investors.
The global recession reduced the demand for investment capital and the structural
adjustment lending is also limited by the overall size of the Bank. To allow for Bank lending
expanding to $45-50 billion over three years, the Bank management has negotiated a General
Capital Increase during 1985. The new wave at some quarters of the Bank is the idea that
"policy reform" and "external financing" are two alternative ways of obtaining a given growth
objective: if there is more of one, there is less need for the other.
Only five countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have received structural
adjustment loans: Jamaica has received three, while Bolivia, Guyana, Panama and Costa Rica
have signed one each. However, the results were so far from being supporting.
The abundance of SALs in Latin America is due to the limits on both supply and demand,
but the Bank has been hesitating to increase lending to some countries due to their poor credit
ratings. The Bank has also been cautious about adding further debt to countries whose debt
service ratios were already poor. Some Latin American countries have preferred to avoid
loans that would subject their macroeconomic policies to World Bank supervision; actually
anxious to rid themselves of the IMF, they have no willing to continue with outside
intervention. Latin America countries have preferred to adopted the Special Action Program
(SAP) instead of being controlled by the IMF
The Bank's approach to policy making ought to be much more experimental and country-
based than the existing one. Unless it expands its staff enormously, which seems unlikely, the
Bank will not have enough trained professionals to deal at an operational level with the huge
and specific development problems of each of its member countries, especially Latin America
countries; who is a region who need a lot of intention. Consequently, the pursuit of the present
course towards policy-based loans can only lead the Bank to a subordinate role to the IMF.
This suggests that the Bank’s cooperation may be important to Latin America for restructure
the formers structural adjustment programs, provided that a set of sensible proposals is put
forward for negotiation.
The Bank's decision to increase balance of payments responded to the current needs of
many developing countries. A number of additional reforms should be considered to lead the
program effectively.
Contrarily to the other regions of the world, East and Southeast Asia looks like they had
benefited from the globalization quite well.
When we look to the liberal economy process and the specific of that region, it’s easy to
say that this was not a miracle but was rather a burst of growth. The region is separated onto
two deferent part; the ``first-tier'' East Asian NICs (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan) and the ``second-tier'' Southeast Asian NICs (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand).
Most of the Asian NICs, and especially those of Southeast Asia, are generally a part of
``Chinese network of capital'' which links it to the important markets of China. Historical
links with Japan made also the growing trade with most dynamic post-war economies .The
Asian NICs also benefited from very important financial help of US military and economic
aid. By the 1980s the ``second-tier NICs'' received massive Japanese foreign direct investment
(FDI) because of their regional specifics and their low wages advantages.
In Thailand the declining rate of profit in manufacturing led to open a new door for
capital, but at first caused to capital changing between sectors. .As a short history of its crisis,
the baht informally pegged to the US dollar to ignore the risks of rapid and unpredictable
currency depreciation brings along. Unfortunately, this prevention caused to an overvalued
baht. The decrease in export competitiveness, expulsing current account deficit actually gave
the signals of breaking about the crisis.
The decrease of the yen compared to the dollar from 1995 put some pressure on the ``first-
tier'' NICs as Japanese exports became more competitive. As part of helped by the US
economical liberalization efforts in the 1990s, the South Korean government abandoned its
control over large-scale investments that had been used to prevent excess competition
domestically. This resulted in excess capacity in such key sectors as cars, ships, steel,
petrochemicals and semi-conductors.
In Indonesia the structural adjustment process has been even more challenging due to the
political crisis that they had. Structural adjustment in Indonesia also followed by exchange
rate flexibility, state expenditure reductions, financial sector restructuring, wage discipline,
and privatization/.This, for sure, make the connection more open between economics and
politics.
In Korea, industrial bankruptcies were also driven by excessive and short-term foreign
borrowing by banks and firms, as a result of capital account liberalization in the 1990s, a
problem also seen in Thailand. Two of the most desirable factors in developing countries are;
reduce the level of unemployment and make economies more variable so that they are better
able to resist to external shocks which led to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and an
important increase in the current account deficit. An important key for the SAP was to benefit
of Korean powerful labor unions to improved their labor market flexibility'. The strong
resistance of Korean labor to such demands was met by bringing it to the table in tri-partite.
As in Thailand, the economic situation in Korea deteriorated more rapidly than expected in
1998, with a nearly 7% decline in GDP. Much of this deficit was the result of increased
spending in support of financial sector restructuring, along with support for small and medium
sized enterprises and export promotion.
Mexico's experience with SAPs was not so different from other examples. They were
using import substitutions as a strategy against the debt crisis. Mexico applied SAPs for six
years in 90s. Contrarily to assumption this resulted in a change to import oriented
industrialization. From the late-1980s the share of foreign direct to portfolio investment in
Mexico declined dramatically. Mexico was able to attract foreign investment because it had
previously met all the IMF conditions, and, as in many of the Asian NICs, the Mexican
government pegged the peso to the US dollar.
Problems of dependency are likely to be much more in Thailand and Indonesia, which
have relatively basic levels of technology development and will be increasingly dominated by
the decisions of transnational companies.
In Latin America it was a kind of disappointment for the structural adjustment policies of
authoritarian governments which was partly responsible for the shift towards electoral
democracy in East and Southeast Asia as the structural adjustment may lead to democratic
reversals, rather than democratization.
As a result of the contraction in private capital markets and the expansion in its own
lending, the World Bank has become a more significant source of funds for Latin America.
However, the Bank has had difficulty paid funds because the region's financial crisis has
reduced the availability of investment projects and of counterpart funds. SALs and sector
loans have not, by the way, played as constructive and important a role in Latin America as
their potential allows. They have been restricted by several limits regarding their funding and
the content of the accompanying conditionality. In order to facilitate the adjustment process,
the Bank should intensity its efforts to increase the flow of private capital to developing
countries through selective expansion of its co financing, guarantee and insurance schemes. In
addition, the Bank should consider decentralizing its operation in order to place staff in closer
touch with governments and thereby improve the quality of policy dialogues. For their part,
the developing countries should more take care in the appointment of their Executive and
Alternative Directors, to insure a greater quality and continuity of expertise and leadership.
Is the Bank changing?:
Having faced the negative effects of the structural adjustments especially in Americas and
Sub-Saharan Africa; the World Bank decided to reform itself –or they were forced to do so.
Prior to the transformation is the collapse of the system in Latin America and most other
‘adjusted areas’. Thus it was understood that a fixed list of ‘do’s and don’ts can work well
everywhere however this realization could not achieve an operational acceptance although the
need for institutional reform led the Bank through revision of the Washington consensus.
Thus the institution gave priority to the creation or reformation of the institutes that would
provide the security and efficiency of the liberal market conditions. Some aspects like
‘security of property rights’ came to be important predictors in terms of investment and
development. Market fundamentalism lost its priority to ‘institutions fundamentalism’ and
privatization also lost insistence by the acceptance of the ‘market failure’. States’ importance
(willingness to develop and logical intervention esp.) gained importance.
Moreover the most important differentiation in the concept was the broadening the
objectives of development shifting from being focused on economic growth. The
consequences especially in Africa led the executives to think more deeply in social welfare.
Therefore the restrictions on public investments were relaxed in some occasions, being
affected by the cross-border activists. The radical reduction in the welfare and increasing
poverty levels provided international forums through the late 1990s and protests against those
multilateral organizations aimed ‘‘to erode the intellectual and political underpinnings of
current order’9 and they were successful in it to some extend that World Bank proposed an
accelerated move to create a dialog and collaboration mood with NGOs seriously –especially
with those so called reformists. Thus they understood that growth in itself was not enough to
measure the development although most interestingly the existing measure also didn’t show
any remarkable positive consequence.
Getting in to a new start through ‘fifty years enough’ campaigns the newly proposed order
included the social welfare , reduction gender discrimination and income inequality led by the
adjustment programs and other independent variables too. The importance of GDP, which
was the temple of ‘growth’, is replaced by HDI (human development index) that included the
availability of public social services and purchasing power of the population to the measure.
Investment on human capital by proper and available education, life expectancy at birth etc
gained priority in estimating the level of development and growth. The replacement of
‘material aspects’ with ‘non-material aspects’ can be regarded as post-modern movement in
the new order. However those proposals stayed as a positive start for a long time and no
significant operational action occurred till recently. Furthermore the economic growth
maintained priority in action as it was regarded to be the initiative for the proposed ‘holistic’
development.

Conclusion and Advices:


We can obviously observe a trend in which the interventionist liberalism increases and looses
dominance in international economy and restarts to gain its importance, starting from the
post-war period through structural adjustment era and rapid crisis in Latin America, Asia as
well as Russia and Turkey till recently. Sociology’s dominance over discussion of
development in developing and poorest countries ( Sarah Babb 2005) also shows the similar
trend with interventionist approach. The chaotic mood of limitless liberalization gives their
dominance back gradually. However their suggestions could not still gain an important
ground policies yet (maybe after the discussions on the Global Financial Crisis 2007-08). Up
until the early 2000s it is clearly proved that the SALs were failure from many vantage points.
First of all, they prevent the autonomous development programs as well as they do not
provide any tailored offer for different needs and interests. We can resemble the institution to
a shoe maker which produces a color and a unique size of a pair of shoes to fit each foot
around. Let alone the interests of the states they do not even consider about needs –whether it
is cold or hot to wear their shoes- not even their size. In a context where there are few other
alternatives around which are no efficient in capacity or not available because of the
monopoly created by the Bank and the Fund and their cross conditionality, most of the
countries are obliged to wear the shoes produced by them accepting the case to lose their foot
health by a small size or falling to the ground with a loose one. If they are lucky or have a
bargaining power they may have a more proper one if not able to have the certain solution for
themselves. Trying to create a uniform policy environment all over the universe was not
logical, of course, and expecting the same performance and capabilities from each by artificial
regulations could not be feasible. Transforming the ‘structural adjustment programs’ into
‘comprehensive development framework’ as a more ‘holistic’ approach as Pender states
(2001) the Bank increased the amount of variety of sizes and identified itself as the ‘image
advisor’ (knowledge bank) and the customer as the ‘owner of the process’ and gives a minor
decision right on the size however ‘if you don’t wear the color I advice you, I won’t sell the
shoes’ is the threatening mood between the lines.
A logical solution for the straightness of the programs in terms of conditionality comes
from Dani Rodrik who puts priority to the analytical preparation for each target country. He
advices three step action: first to figure out the most significant constraints in front of the
growth, than prepare a creative policy design that targets the point and finally institutionalize
the process10. That was the basic idea that inspired the World Bank report ‘Learning from a
Decade of Reform’ which revised the Washington Consensus and gave importance to the
institutional reform although it couldn’t gain the flexibility that purposed by Rodrik (2006).
Supporting idea is discussed by Sarah Babb too (2005) as one of the most problematic issues
in the liberalization process is the ‘political mismatch’ that can be understood both as the
conflict between the old and new institutions and as the conflict between the existing
institutions and the new policy reforms. As a complex system, human’s social life can’t be
standardized as well as it can not be treated by medicines; each state has different sickness
and the significance of each sickness is distinguished. Therefore they should be treated with
great consciousness and ‘conscience’ as careful as a doctor who is responsible on human life.
One of the other issues, to be discussed in this section is the insistence of limitless
liberalization separate from the subject we mentioned above. The uncontrolled liberalization
of trade and especially financial industry led developing countries to deteriorate their
domestic output and social welfare – the increasing unemployment, reduction in public
investment etc. the income inequality was one of the data which implies the corrupted nature
of the order that is imposed. Therefore the states should be left more autonomous in their
policy regulations at least to compensate the losses of the poor that are led by the
liberalization of the market.
The government should be more interested in public investment in social services and give
up ‘race to the bottom’ mode to attract foreign investment that leads the countries to lose level
of welfare by the real wage decrease, deterioration of equality and social institutions. As it is
observed in empirical works, the liberalization process adopted by the adjustment regions
dramatically coincides a corruption in the quality of democracy although the theoretical or
technical aspects of democratization are met highly on the contrary. Moreover the
liberalization process –though it led the wage decrease in DCs as well as LDCs especially of
those unskilled labor and reduction social institutions- costs much higher in LDCs as they
couldn’t compensate the losses in terms of social welfare. The reason is that, LDCs were the
recipients of the aid and who needed capital, while DCs were donors. Therefore we can easily
infer from the order’s regulation to the benefits of the donors that the institutions were highly
politicized and associated with the North. However the –most crucial maybe- the problem is
the Bank’s and other institutions’ meeting the expectations of being ‘‘international’’.
References:
1) Dani Rodrik- Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion 2006

2) John Pender- From ‘Structural Adjustment’ to ‘Comprehensive Development Framework’: Conditionality


Transformed? 2001

3) Rodrik- Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion 2006

4) Rodrik- Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion 2006

5)Dollar&Swensson- What Explains the Success or Failure of SAPs? 1998

6) Rodrik- Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion 2006

7) Rodrik- Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion 2006

8)Babb- Social Consequences of Structural Adjustments 2005

9) Sarah Babb- Social Consequences of Structural Adjustment 2005

10) Rodrik- Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion 2006