NYSRAP Vs Cuomo OPINION 10192015 PDF

Case 14-36, Document 330-1, 10/19/2015, 1621732, Page1 of 57
1436cv(L);14319cv
NewYorkStateRifle&PistolAssn,Inc.,etal.v.Cuomo,etal.
ConnecticutCitizensDefenseLeague,etal.v.Malloy,etal.
In the
United States Court of Appeals
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for the Second Circuit
AUGUSTTERM2014
Nos.1436cv(Lead);1437cv(XAP)
NEWYORKSTATERIFLEANDPISTOLASSOCIATION,INC.,WESTCHESTER
COUNTYFIREARMSOWNERSASSOCIATION,INC.,SPORTSMENS
ASSOCIATIONFORFIREARMSEDUCATION,INC.,NEWYORKSTATE
AMATEURTRAPSHOOTINGASSOCIATION,INC.,BEDELLCUSTOM,
BEIKIRCHAMMUNITIONCORPORATION,BLUELINETACTICAL&POLICE
SUPPLY,LLC,BATAVIAMARINE&SPORTINGSUPPLY,WILLIAMNOJAY,
THOMASGALVIN,ROGERHORVATH,
PlaintiffsAppellantsCrossAppellees,
v.
ANDREWM.CUOMO,inhisofficialcapacityasGovernoroftheState
ofNewYork,ERICT.SCHNEIDERMAN,inhisofficialcapacityas
AttorneyGeneraloftheStateofNewYork,JOSEPHA.DAMICO,in
hisofficialcapacityasSuperintendentoftheNewYorkStatePolice,
DefendantsAppelleesCrossAppellants,
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GERALDJ.GILL,inhisofficialcapacityasChiefofPolicefortheTown
ofLancaster,NewYork,LAWRENCEFRIEDMAN,
DefendantsAppellees,
FRANKA.SEDITA,III,inhisofficialcapacityasDistrictAttorneyfor
ErieCounty,
Defendant.
OnAppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourt
fortheWesternDistrictofNewYork
No.14319cv
THECONNECTICUTCITIZENSDEFENSELEAGUE,THECOALITIONOF
CONNECTICUTSPORTSMEN,JUNESHEW,RABBIMITCHELLROCKLIN,
STEPHANIECYPHER,PETEROWENS,BRIANMCCLAIN,ANDREW
MUELLER,HILLERSPORTS,LLC,MDSHOOTINGSPORTS,LLC,
PlaintiffsAppellants,
v.
DANNELP.MALLOY,inhisofficialcapacityasGovernoroftheState
ofConnecticut,KEVINT.KANE,inhisofficialcapacityasChief
StatesAttorneyoftheStateofConnecticut,DORAB.SCHRIRO,inher
officialcapacityasCommissioneroftheConnecticutDepartmentof
EmergencyServicesandPublicProtection,DAVIDI.COHEN,inhis
officialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheStamford/Norwalk
JudicialDistrict,GeographicalAreasNos.1and20,JOHNC.SMRIGA,
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inhisofficialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheFairfieldJudicial
District,GeographicalAreaNo.2,MAUREENPLATT,inherofficial
capacityasStatesAttorneyfortheWaterburyJudicialDistrict,
GeographicalAreaNo.4,KEVIND.LAWLOR,inhisofficialcapacity
asStatesAttorneyfortheAnsonia/MilfordJudicialDistrict,
GeographicalAreasNos.5and22,MICHAELDEARINGTON,inhis
officialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheNewHavenJudicial
District,GeographicalAreaNos.7and23,PETERA.MCSHANE,inhis
officialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheMiddlesexJudicial
District,GeographicalAreaNo.9,MICHAELL.REGAN,inhisofficial
capacityasStatesAttorneyfortheNewLondonJudicialDistrict,
GeographicalAreaNos.10and21,PATRICIAM.FROEHLICH,GAILP.
HARDY,inherofficialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheHartford
JudicialDistrict,GeographicalAreasNos.12,13,and14,BRIAN
PRELESKI,inhisofficialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheNew
BritainJudicialDistrict,GeographicalAreaNos.15and17,DAVID
SHEPACK,inhisofficialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheLitchfield
JudicialDistrict,GeographicalAreaNo.18,MATTHEWC.GEDANSKY,
inhisofficialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheTollandJudicial
District,GeographicalAreaNo.19,STEPHENJ.SEDENSKYIII,inhis
officialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheDanburyJudicialDistrict,
GeographicalAreaNo.3,
DefendantsAppellees.
OnAppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourt
fortheDistrictofConnecticut
ARGUED:DECEMBER9,2014
DECIDED:OCTOBER19,2015
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Before:CABRANES,LOHIER,andDRONEY,CircuitJudges.
Before the Court are two appeals challenging guncontrol

legislationenactedbytheNewYorkandConnecticutlegislaturesin
the wake of the 2012 mass murders at Sandy Hook Elementary
School in Newtown, Connecticut. The New York and Connecticut
laws at issue prohibit the possession of certain semiautomatic
assault weapons and largecapacity magazines. Following the
entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the central
claims in both the Western District of New York (William M.
Skretny, Chief Judge) and the District of Connecticut (Alfred V.
Covello,Judge),plaintiffsinbothsuitsnowpresstwoargumentson
appeal. First, they challenge the constitutionality of the statutes
under the Second Amendment; and second, they challenge certain
provisionsofthestatutesasunconstitutionallyvague.Defendantsin
the New York action also crossappeal the District Courts
invalidation of New Yorks sevenround load limit and voiding of
twostatutoryprovisionsasfaciallyunconstitutionallyvague.
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We hold that the core provisions of the New York and

Connecticut laws prohibiting possession of semiautomatic assault
weapons and largecapacity magazines do not violate the Second
Amendment, and that the challenged individual provisions are not
void for vagueness. The particular provision of New Yorks law
regulating load limits, however, does not survive the requisite
scrutiny. One further specific provisionConnecticuts prohibition
on the nonsemiautomatic Remington 7615unconstitutionally
infringes upon the Second Amendment right. Accordingly, we
AFFIRMinpartthejudgmentoftheDistrictCourtfortheDistrictof
Connecticut insofar as it upheld the prohibition of semiautomatic
assault weapons and largecapacity magazines, and REVERSE in
partitsholdingwithrespecttotheRemington7615.Withrespectto
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the judgment of the District Court for the Western District of New
York, we REVERSE in part certain vagueness holdings, and we
otherwise AFFIRM that judgment insofar as it upheld the
prohibition of semiautomatic assault weapons and largecapacity
magazinesandinvalidatedtheloadlimit.
DAVIDTHOMPSON,CharlesJ.Cooper,Peter
A.Patterson,Cooper&Kirk,PLLC,
WashingtonDC,ANDBrianT.Stapleton,
MatthewS.Lerner,GoldbergSegallaLLP,
WhitePlains,NY,StephenP.Halbrook,
Fairfax,VA,forPlaintiffsAppellants.
BARBARAD.UNDERWOOD,SolicitorGeneral
oftheStateofNewYork(AnishaS.
Dasgupta,ClaudeS.Platton,Officeofthe
SolicitorGeneral,onthebrief),forEricT.
Schneiderman,AttorneyGeneralforthe
StateofNewYork,NewYork,NY,for
DefendantsAppelleesCrossAppellants
AndrewM.Cuomo,etal.
MAURAB.MURPHYOSBORNE,Assistant
AttorneyGeneraloftheStateof
Connecticut(PerryZinnRowthorn,
MichaelK.Skold,GregoryT.DAuria,
OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,onthebrief),
forGeorgeJepsen,AttorneyGeneralofthe
StateofConnecticut,Hartford,CT,for
DefendantsAppelleesDannelP.Malloy,etal.
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JOSA.CABRANES,CircuitJudge:
Before the Court are two appeals challenging guncontrol
legislationenactedbytheNewYorkandConnecticutlegislaturesin
the wake of the 2012 mass murders at Sandy Hook Elementary
School in Newtown, Connecticut. The New York and Connecticut
laws at issue prohibit the possession of certain semiautomatic
assault weapons and largecapacity magazines. Following the
entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the central
10
claims in both the Western District of New York (William M.
11
Skretny, Chief Judge) and the District of Connecticut (Alfred V.
12
Covello,Judge),plaintiffsinbothsuitsnowpresstwoargumentson
13
appeal. First, they challenge the constitutionality of the statutes
14
under the Second Amendment; and second, they challenge certain
15
provisionsofthestatutesasunconstitutionallyvague.Defendantsin
16
the New York action also crossappeal the District Courts
17
invalidation of New Yorks separate sevenround load limit and
18
voiding of two statutory provisions as facially unconstitutionally
19
vague.
20
We hold that the core provisions of the New York and
21
Connecticut laws prohibiting possession of semiautomatic assault
22
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Amendment, and that the challenged individual provisions are not
24
void for vagueness. The particular provision of New Yorks law
25
regulating load limits, however, does not survive the requisite
26
scrutiny. One further specific provisionConnecticuts prohibition
27
on the nonsemiautomatic Remington 7615unconstitutionally
infringes upon the Second Amendment right. Accordingly, we
AFFIRMinpartthejudgmentoftheDistrictCourtfortheDistrictof
Connecticut insofar as it upheld the prohibition of semiautomatic
assault weapons and largecapacity magazines, and REVERSE in
part its holding with respect to the Remington. With respect to the
judgmentoftheDistrictCourtfortheWesternDistrictofNewYork,
weREVERSEinpartcertainvaguenessholdings,andweotherwise
AFFIRM that judgment insofar as it upheld the prohibition of
semiautomatic assault weapons and largecapacity magazines and
10
invalidatedtheloadlimit.
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BACKGROUND
I.
PriorAssaultWeaponLegislation
13
NewYorkandConnecticuthavelongrestrictedpossessionof
14
certain automatic and semiautomatic firearms that came to be
15
known as assault weapons. In 1993, Connecticuts General
16
Assembly adopted the states first assaultweapon ban, which
17
criminalizedthepossessionoffirearmscapableoffullyautomatic,
18
semiautomatic or burst fire at the option of the user, including 67
19
specificallyenumeratedsemiautomaticfirearms.1
20
The following year, after five years of hearings on the harms
21
thoughttobecausedbycertainfirearms,theU.S.Congressenacted
22
legislation restricting the manufacture, transfer, and possession of
1993Conn.Pub.Acts93306,1(a)(J.A.,No.14319cv,at943).
certain semiautomatic assault weapons.2 The 1994 federal statute
defined semiautomatic assault weapons in two ways. First, it
catalogued18specificallyprohibitedfirearms,including,asrelevant
here, the Colt AR15. Second, it introduced a twofeature test,
whichprohibitedanysemiautomaticfirearmthatcontainedatleast
two listed militarystyle features, including a telescoping stock, a
conspicuously protruding pistol grip, a bayonet mount, a flash
suppressor, and a grenade launcher. The federal statute also
prohibited magazines with a capacity of more than ten rounds of
10
ammunition, or which could be readily restored or converted to
11
accept more than 10 rounds.3 The federal assaultweapons ban
12
expiredin2004,pursuanttoitssunsetprovision.4
13
Following the passage of the federal assaultweapons ban,
14
both New York, in 2000, and Connecticut, in 2001, enacted
15
legislation that closely mirrored the federal statute, including the
16
twofeature test for prohibited semiautomatic firearms.5 Unlike the
17
federal statute, however, these state laws contained no sunset
ViolentCrimeControlandLawEnforcementActof1994,Pub.L.No.
103322,tit.XI,subtit.A110102(b),108Stat.1796,1997.
2
Id.110103.
Id.110105.
SeeActofAug.8,2000,ch.189,10,2000N.Y.Laws2788,2792(J.A.,No.
1436cv,at92330);2001Conn.Pub.Acts01130,1(J.A.,No.14319cv,at949
60).Likethefederalstatute,the2000NewYorkstatutealsorestrictedthe
possessionofcertainlargecapacitymagazines.
5
provisionsandthusremainedinforceuntilamendedbythestatutes
atissuehere.
On December 14, 2012, a gunman shot his way into Sandy
Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut and murdered
twenty firstgraders and six adults using a semiautomatic AR15
type rifle with ten largecapacity magazines. This appalling attack,
inadditiontootherrecentmassshootings,providedtheimmediate
impetusforthelegislationatissueinthisappeal.6
II.
TheNewYorkLegislation
10
New York enacted the Secure Ammunition and Firearms
11
Enforcement Act (SAFE Act) on January 15, 2013.7 The SAFE Act
12
expandsthedefinitionofprohibitedassaultweaponsbyreplacing
13
the prior twofeature test with a stricter onefeature test. As the
14
name suggests, the new test defines a semiautomatic firearm as a
15
prohibitedassaultweaponifitcontainsanyoneofanenumerated
16
list of militarystyle features, including a telescoping stock, a
17
conspicuouslyprotrudingpistolgrip,athumbholestock,abayonet
18
mount,aflashsuppressor,abarrelshroud,andagrenadelauncher.8
SeeDefendantsBr.,No.1436cv,at1011;DefendantsBr.,No.14319
cv,at11&n.3.
6
ActofJan.15,2013,ch.1,2013N.Y.Laws1,amendedbyActofMar.29,
2013,ch.57,pt.FF,2013N.Y.Laws290,389.
7
Theprohibitedfeaturesdependonwhetherthesemiautomaticweapon
isarifle,pistol,orshotgun,thoughthelistsoverlapsignificantly:
8
Assaultweaponmeans
This statutory definition encompasses, and thereby bans, the
semiautomatic weapon used by the massshooter at Sandy Hook.
New York law makes the possession, manufacture, transport, or
disposal of an assault weapon a felony.9 Pursuant to the SAFE
(a)asemiautomaticriflethathasanabilitytoacceptadetachable
magazineandhasatleastoneofthefollowingcharacteristics:(i)afolding
ortelescopingstock;(ii)apistolgripthatprotrudesconspicuously
beneaththeactionoftheweapon;(iii)athumbholestock;(iv)asecond
handgriporaprotrudinggripthatcanbeheldbythenontriggerhand;
(v)abayonetmount;(vi)aflashsuppressor,muzzlebreak,muzzle
compensator,orthreadedbarreldesignedtoaccommodateaflash
suppressor,muzzlebreak,ormuzzlecompensator;(vii)agrenade
launcher;or
(b)asemiautomaticshotgunthathasatleastoneofthefollowing
characteristics:(i)afoldingortelescopingstock;(ii)athumbholestock;
(iii)asecondhandgriporaprotrudinggripthatcanbeheldbythenon
triggerhand;(iv)afixedmagazinecapacityinexcessofsevenrounds;(v)
anabilitytoacceptadetachablemagazine;or
(c)asemiautomaticpistolthathasanabilitytoacceptadetachable
magazineandhasatleastoneofthefollowingcharacteristics:(i)afolding
ortelescopingstock;(ii)athumbholestock;(iii)asecondhandgripora
protrudinggripthatcanbeheldbythenontriggerhand;(iv)capacityto
acceptanammunitionmagazinethatattachestothepistoloutsideofthe
pistolgrip;(v)athreadedbarrelcapableofacceptingabarrelextender,
flashsuppressor,forwardhandgrip,orsilencer;(vi)ashroudthatis
attachedto,orpartiallyorcompletelyencircles,thebarrelandthat
permitstheshootertoholdthefirearmwiththenontriggerhandwithout
beingburned;(vii)amanufacturedweightoffiftyouncesormorewhen
thepistolisunloaded;or(viii)asemiautomaticversionofanautomatic
rifle,shotgunorfirearm....
N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(22)(emphasissupplied).
Id.265.02(7),265.10.
10
Acts grandfather clause, however, preexisting lawful owners of
banned assault weapons may continue to possess them if they
registerthoseweaponswiththeNewYorkStatePolice.10
The SAFE Act also bans magazines that can hold more than
ten rounds of ammunition or that can be readily restored or
converted to accept more than ten rounds.11 Although New York
had restricted possession of such magazines since 2000, the SAFE
Act eliminated a grandfather clause for magazines manufactured
beforeSeptember1994.
10
The SAFE Acts largecapacitymagazine ban contains an
11
additional, unique prohibition on possession of a magazine loaded
12
withmorethansevenroundsofammunition.12(Forthepurposeof
13
thisdefinition,aroundisasingleunitofammunition.)Asoriginally
14
enacted, the SAFE Act would have imposed a magazine capacity
15
restriction of seven rounds. Because very few sevenround
16
magazines are manufactured, however, the law was subsequently
17
amended to impose a tenround capacity restriction coupled with a
18
sevenroundloadlimit.Thus,asamended,thestatutepermitsaNew
19
Yorkgunownertopossessamagazinecapableofholdinguptoten
Id.265.00(22)(g)(v).
10
Id.265.00(23)(a).
11
Id.265.37.
12
11
rounds, but he may not fully load it outside of a firing range or
officialshootingcompetition.13
III.
TheConnecticutLegislation
Several months after New York passed the SAFE Act, and
after extensive public hearings and legislative and executive study,
ConnecticutadoptedAnActConcerningGunViolencePrevention
and Childrens Safety on April 4, 2013, and later amended the
statute on June 18, 2013.14 Like its New York analogue, the
Connecticutlegislationreplacedthestatestwofeaturedefinitionof
10
prohibitedassaultweaponswithastricteronefeaturetest,15using
11
a list of militarystyle features similar to New Yorks, including a
12
telescoping stock, a thumbhole stock, a forward pistol grip, a flash
13
suppressor, a grenade launcher, and a threaded barrel capable of
14
accepting a flash suppressor or silencer.16 Unlike its counterpart in
Id.265.20(a)(7f).
13
2013Conn.Pub.Act133,asamendedby2013Conn.Pub.Act13220.
14
Conn.Gen.Stat.53202a(1)(E).
15
Id.53202a(1)(E),53202b(a)(1),53202c(a).LikeNewYorksSAFE
Act,Connecticutsstatutedifferentiatesamongsemiautomaticrifles,pistols,and
shotguns:
16
Assaultweaponmeans...[a]nysemiautomaticfirearm...thatmeets
thefollowingcriteria:
(i)Asemiautomatic,centerfireriflethathasanabilitytoaccepta
detachablemagazineandhasatleastoneofthefollowing:(I)Afoldingor
telescopingstock;(II)Anygripoftheweapon,includingapistolgrip,a
thumbholestock,oranyotherstock,theuseofwhichwouldallowan
12
New York, the Connecticut legislation additionally bans 183
particular assault weapons listed by make and model, as well as
copies or duplicates of most of those firearms.17 The Connecticut
individualtogriptheweapon,resultinginanyfingeronthetriggerhand
inadditiontothetriggerfingerbeingdirectlybelowanyportionofthe
actionoftheweaponwhenfiring;(III)Aforwardpistolgrip;(IV)Aflash
suppressor;or(V)Agrenadelauncherorflarelauncher;or
(ii)Asemiautomatic,centerfireriflethathasafixedmagazinewith
theabilitytoacceptmorethantenrounds;or
(iii)Asemiautomatic,centerfireriflethathasanoveralllengthof
lessthanthirtyinches;or
(iv)Asemiautomaticpistolthathasanabilitytoaccepta
detachablemagazineandhasatleastoneofthefollowing:(I)Anability
toacceptadetachableammunitionmagazinethatattachesatsome
locationoutsideofthepistolgrip;(II)Athreadedbarrelcapableof
acceptingaflashsuppressor,forwardpistolgriporsilencer;(III)A
shroudthatisattachedto,orpartiallyorcompletelyencircles,thebarrel
andthatpermitstheshootertofirethefirearmwithoutbeingburned,
exceptaslidethatenclosesthebarrel;or(IV)Asecondhandgrip;or
(v)Asemiautomaticpistolwithafixedmagazinethathasthe
abilitytoacceptmorethantenrounds;or
(vi)Asemiautomaticshotgunthathasbothofthefollowing:(I)A
foldingortelescopingstock;and(II)Anygripoftheweapon,includinga
pistolgrip,athumbholestock,oranyotherstock,theuseofwhichwould
allowanindividualtogriptheweapon,resultinginanyfingeronthe
triggerhandinadditiontothetriggerfingerbeingdirectlybelowany
portionoftheactionoftheweaponwhenfiring;or(vii)Asemiautomatic
shotgunthathastheabilitytoacceptadetachablemagazine;or(viii)A
shotgunwitharevolvingcylinder....
Id.53202a(1)(emphasissupplied).
Id.at53202a(1);seealsoPlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at5;Defendants
Br.,No.14319cv,at14.Ofthese183specificallyenumeratedprohibited
17
13
law makes it a felony to transport, import, sell, or possess
semiautomaticassaultweapons,anditalsocontainsagrandfather
clause permitting preexisting owners of assault weapons to
continue to possess their firearms if properly registered with the
state.18
The June 2013 amendment to the Connecticut legislation
criminalizes the possession of [l]arge capacity magazine[s] that
canhold,orcanbereadilyrestoredorconvertedtoaccept,more
thantenroundsofammunition.19UnlikeitsNewYorkcounterpart,
10
however, the Connecticut legislation contains no additional load
11
limitrule.
12
IV.
ProceduralHistory
13
Plaintiffsacombinationofadvocacygroups,businesses,and
14
individual gun ownersfiled suit against the governors of New
15
York and Connecticut and other state officials, first in the Western
16
District of New York on March 21, 2013 and then in the District of
17
Connecticut on May 22, 2013. In both actions, plaintiffs sought
18
declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged infringement of their
weapons,allbutonearesemiautomaticweapons.Thesinglenonsemiautomatic
firearmistheRemingtonTacticalRifleModel7615,apumpactionrifle.
DefendantsBr.,No.14319cv,at58.
Conn.Gen.Stat.53202d(a)(2)(A).
18
Id.53202w(a)(1).Aswithprohibitedfirearms,prebanownersof
prohibitedmagazinescanretainthemifregisteredwiththestate.Id.53
202x(a)(1).
19
14
constitutional rights. Specifically, plaintiffs contended that the
statutes prohibitions on semiautomatic assault weaponsand large
capacity magazines violate their Second Amendment rights, and
that
unconstitutionally vague. In the New York action, plaintiffs also
challenged the sevenround load limit as a violation of the Second
Amendment.20
numerous
specific
provisions
of
each
statute
are
Following plaintiffs motions for preliminary injunctions,
parties in both suits crossmoved for summary judgment. On
10
December 31, 2013, Chief Judge Skretny of the Western District of
11
NewYorkgrantedinpartanddeniedinpartthecrossmotionsfor
12
summary judgment.21 Specifically, the District Court found that
13
New Yorks ban on assault weapons and large capacity magazines
14
burdened plaintiffs Second Amendment rights, but did not violate
15
the Second Amendment upon application of socalled intermediate
16
scrutiny.22TheCourtalsoheld,however,thatthesevenroundload
17
limitdidnotsurviveintermediatescrutiny.TheCourtfurtherfound
18
that three specific provisions were unconstitutionally vague, and
PlaintiffsbroughtadditionalclaimsforviolationoftheCommerce
Clause(intheNewYorkaction)andtheEqualProtectionClause(inthe
Connecticutaction).TheDistrictCourtsdismissedtheseclaims,whicharenotat
issueonappeal.
20
NewYorkStateRifle&PistolAssn,Inc.v.Cuomo(NYSRPA),990F.
Supp.2d349(W.D.N.Y.2013).
21
SeepostSectionV.dV.eforfurtherdiscussionofintermediatescrutiny
analysis.
22
15
hencevoid,23butdeniedplaintiffsmotionregardingtheremaining
provisionschallengedforvagueness.24Insum,ChiefJudgeSkretny
upheld as constitutional, upon intermediate scrutiny, the core
provisions of New Yorks SAFE Act restricting semiautomatic
assault weapons and largecapacity magazines, but struck down
certainmarginalaspectsofthelaw.
On January 30, 2014, Judge Covello of the District of
Connecticut granted defendants motion for summary judgment in
itsentirety.25LikehiscounterpartinNewYork,JudgeCovelloheld
ThethreevoidedprovisionsofNewYorksSAFEActwere(1)the
prohibitiononpistolswithadetachablemagazinethatareasemiautomatic
versionofanautomaticrifle,shotgunorfirearm,N.Y.PenalLaw
265.00(22)(c)(viii);(2)theidentificationofthemisspelledmilitarystylefeature
muzzlebreak,id.265.00(22)(a)(vi),whichdefendantsconcedehasno
acceptedmeaningandwasintendedtoreadmuzzlebrake,seeDefendantsBr.,
No.1436cv,at22;and(3)anerroneousandifclauseappearinginN.Y.Penal
Law265.36,whichtheDistrictCourtfoundtobeincompleteandentirely
indecipherable.NYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat376.Defendantsdonotchallenge
onappealtheDistrictCourtsrulingonthisthird(andif)provision.
23
Asrelevanthere,theDistrictCourtdismissedplaintiffsvagueness
claimsastothefollowingprovisions:(1)theprohibitionofmagazinesthatcan
bereadilyrestoredorconvertedtoacceptmorethantenammunitionrounds,
N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(23)(a);(2)theprohibitiononsemiautomaticshotguns
withafixedmagazinecapacityinexcessofsevenrounds,id.265.00
(22)(b)(iv);and(3)theexclusionfromrestrictionofsemiautomaticshotgunsthat
cannotholdmorethanfiveroundsofammunitioninafixedordetachable
magazine,id.265.00(22)(g)(iii).TheCourtalsorejectedfouradditional
vaguenesschallengesthatplaintiffsdonotpursueonappeal.SeeNYSRPA,990F.
Supp.2dat37478.
24
Shewv.Malloy,994F.Supp.2d234(D.Conn.2014).
25
16
that the Connecticut legislation burdened plaintiffs Second
Amendment rights, applied intermediate scrutiny, and concluded
that the prohibition on semiautomatic assault weapons and large
capacity magazines was fully consistent with the Second
Amendment.Healsodismissedallofplaintiffsvaguenessclaims.26
Plaintiffs thereafter appealed. In the New York action only,
defendants crossappeal the District Courts judgment insofar as it
invalidated the SAFE Acts sevenround load limit and voided as
unconstitutionally vague the SAFE Acts prohibitions on the
10
misspelled muzzle break27 and semiautomatic version[s] of an
11
automaticrifle,shotgun,orfirearm.28
12
DISCUSSION
13
Theseappealspresenttwoquestions:first,whethertheSecond
14
Amendment permits the regulation of the assault weapons and
15
largecapacity magazines at issue here; and second, whether the
16
challenged provisions of the statutes provide constitutionally
17
sufficientnoticeoftheconductproscribed.
Becausebothjudgesresolvedthepartiesmotionsforsummary
judgment,theysimultaneouslydeniedasmootplaintiffsrespectivemotionsfor
preliminaryinjunctions.
26
N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(22)(a)(vi);seeantenote23andaccompanying
27
text.
Id.265.00(22)(c)(viii);seeantenote23andaccompanyingtext.
28
17
We review de novo a district courts order granting summary
judgment,construingtheevidenceinthelightmostfavorabletothe
nonmoving party.29 As relevant here, we also review de novo the
district courts legal conclusions, including those interpreting and
determiningtheconstitutionalityofastatute.30PursuanttoFederal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate
where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movantisentitledtojudgmentasamatteroflaw.
V.
SecondAmendmentChallenge
10
We conclude that the core challenged prohibitions of assault
11
12
Amendment. Guided by the teachings of the Supreme Court, our
13
ownjurisprudence,andtheexamplesprovidedbyoursistercircuits,
14
we adopt a twostep analytical framework, determining first
15
whether the regulated weapons fall within the protections of the
16
Second Amendment and then deciding and applying the
17
appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny. Only two specific
18
provisionsNew Yorks sevenround load limit, and Connecticuts
19
prohibition on the nonsemiautomatic Remington 7615are
20
unconstitutional.
21
Delaneyv.BankofAmericaCorp.,766F.3d163,167(2dCir.2014).
29
UnitedStatesv.Stewart,590F.3d93,109(2dCir.2009).
30
18
a. HellerandMcDonald
The Second Amendment provides that [a] well regulated
Militia,beingnecessarytothesecurityofafreeState,therightofthe
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.31 Our
analysis of that amendment begins with the seminal decision in
DistrictofColumbiav.Heller.32InHeller,theSupremeCourt,basedon
an extensive textual and historical analysis, announced that the
Second Amendments operative clause codified a preexisting
individual right to possess and carry weapons.33 Recognizing,
10
however, that the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
11
unlimited,Helleremphasizedthattherightwasnotarighttokeep
12
and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and
13
for whatever purpose.34 Instead, the Second Amendment protects
14
only those weapons in common use by citizens for lawful
15
purposeslikeselfdefense.35
16
Havingestablishedthesebasicprecepts,Hellerconcludedthat
17
the District of Columbias ban on possession of handguns was
18
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.36 The Supreme
U.S.Const.amend.II.
31
554U.S.570(2008).
32
Id.at592(emphasissupplied).
33
Id.at626.
34
Id.at624(citingUnitedStatesv.Miller,307U.S.174,179(1939)).
35
Heller,554U.S.at635.
36
19
Court noted that handguns are the most popular weapon chosen
by Americans for selfdefense in the home, where, the Court
observed,theneedfordefenseofself,family,andpropertyismost
acute.37
Heller stopped well short of extending its rationale to other
firearms restrictions. Indeed, Heller explicitly identified as
presumptively
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentallyill,...lawsforbiddingthecarryingoffirearmsinsensitive
10
places such as schools and government buildings, [and] laws
11
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
12
arms.38 Most importantly here, Heller also endorsed thehistorical
13
tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual
14
weapons.39
lawful
such
regulatory
measures
as
15
Aside from these broad guidelines, Heller offered little
16
guidance for resolving future Second Amendment challenges. The
17
Court did imply that such challenges are subject to one of the
18
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
19
constitutional rights, though it declined to say which,40 accepting
Id.at62829.
37
Id.at62627&n.26.
38
Id.at627(internalquotationmarksomitted).
39
Id.at628.
40
20
thatmanyapplicationsoftheSecondAmendmentwouldremainin
doubt.41
That doubt persisted after McDonald v. City of Chicago, in
which the Supreme Court invalidated municipal statutes banning
handguns in the home.42 McDonald was a landmark case in one
respectthe Court held for the first time that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the
states.43Otherwise,McDonalddidnotexpanduponHellersanalysis
and simply reiterated Hellers assurances regarding the viability of
10
many guncontrol provisions.44 Neither Heller nor McDonald, then,
11
delineated the precise scope of the Second Amendment or the
12
standardsbywhichlowercourtsshouldassesstheconstitutionality
13
offirearmsrestrictions.
14
15
Id.at635.
41
561U.S.742(2010).See,e.g.,JosephBlocher,NewApproachestoOld
QuestionsinGunScholarship,50TULSAL.REV.477,478(2015)(Hellerand
McDonaldprovokedasmanyquestionsastheyanswered,creatingaresulting
void[that]invitesandpracticallydemandsmorescholarship.).
42
SeegenerallyLAURENCEH.TRIBE,AMERICANCONSTITUTIONALLAW1317
(3ded.2000)(describingtheprocessbywhichAmendmentsinitiallydesignedto
limitthepowersofthefederalgovernmentcametobeappliedtoactionsofthe
states).
43
561U.S.at786(opinionofAlito,J.).
44
21
b. AnalyticalRubric
LackingmoredetailedguidancefromtheSupremeCourt,this
Circuit has begun to develop a framework for determining the
constitutionality of firearm restrictions.45 It requires a twostep
inquiry.
First, we consider whether the restriction burdens conduct
protectedbytheSecondAmendment.46Ifthechallengedrestriction
does not implicate conduct within the scope of the Second
Amendment, our analysis ends and the legislation stands.
10
Otherwise,wemovetothesecondstepofourinquiry,inwhichwe
11
mustdetermineandapplytheappropriatelevelofscrutiny.47
12
This twostep rubric flows from the dictates of Heller and
13
McDonaldandourownprecedentsinKachalskyandDecastro.48Italso
14
broadly comports with the prevailing twostep approach of other
15
courts, including the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,
16
Tenth,Eleventh,andD.C.Circuits,49andwiththeapproachusedin
17
otherareasofconstitutionallaw.50
SeeKachalskyv.Cty.ofWestchester,701F.3d81(2dCir.2012);United
Statesv.Decastro,682F.3d160(2dCir.2012).
45
Kachalsky,701F.3dat93.
46
Seeid.
47
Seeantenote45.
48
SeeGeorgiaCarry.Org,Inc.v.U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngrs,788F.3d1318,
1322(11thCir.2015);UnitedStatesv.Chovan,735F.3d1127,1136(9thCir.2013);
49
22
c. FirstStep:WhethertheSecondAmendmentApplies
As an initial matter, then, we must determine whether the
challenged legislation impinges upon conduct protected by the
Second Amendment. The Second Amendment protects only the
sortsofweaponsthatare(1)incommonuse51and(2)typically
possessed by lawabiding citizens for lawful purposes.52 We
considereachrequirementinturn.
i. CommonUse
Thepartiescontestwhethertheassaultweaponsatissuehere
10
arecommonlyowned.Plaintiffsarguethattheweaponsatissueare
11
owned in large numbers by lawabiding Americans. They present
12
statistics showing that nearly four million units of a single assault
13
weapon,thepopularAR15,havebeenmanufacturedbetween1986
NatlRifleAssnofAm.,Inc.v.BureauofAlcohol,Tobacco,Firearms&Explosives,700
F.3d185,194(5thCir.2012);UnitedStatesv.Greeno,679F.3d510,518(6thCir.
2012);Hellerv.DistrictofColumbia(HellerII),670F.3d1244,1252(D.C.Cir.2011);
Ezellv.CityofChicago,651F.3d684,70203(7thCir.2011);UnitedStatesv.Chester,
628F.3d673,680(4thCir.2010);UnitedStatesv.Reese,627F.3d792,80001(10th
Cir.2010);UnitedStatesv.Marzzarella,614F.3d85,89(3dCir.2010).
Decastro,682F.3dat167;seeHeller,554U.S.at595;Kachalsky,701F.3dat
50
94.
51
Id.at625.Inaddition,theweaponsmustactuallybeusedlawfully.Id.
Becausethelawsatissuerestrictthemerepossessionofassaultweapons,and
nothoworwhytheyareused,weneednotconsiderthatadditionallimitation.
52
23
and March 2013.53 Plaintiffs further assert that only 7.5 percent of
assaultweapon owners are active law enforcement officers,54 and
that most owners of assault weapons own only one or two such
weapons, such that the banned firearms are not concentrated in a
small number of homes, but rather spread widely among the gun
owning public.55 Defendants counter that assault weapons only
represent about two percent of the nations firearms (admittedly
amounting to approximately seven million guns).56 Moreover,
defendantsarguethatthestatisticsinflatethenumberofindividual
10
civilian owners because many of these weapons are purchased by
11
law enforcement or smuggled to criminals, and many civilian gun
12
ownersownmultipleassaultweapons.
13
14
This much is clear: Americans own millions of the firearms

thatthechallengedlegislationprohibits.
15
The same is true of largecapacity magazines, as defined by
16
theNewYorkandConnecticutstatutes.Thoughfewerstatisticsare
17
availableformagazines,thosestatisticssuggestthatabout25million
18
largecapacity magazines were available in 1995, shortly after the
19
federalassaultweaponsbanwasenacted,andnearly50millionsuch
J.A.,No.14319cv,at146.
53
J.A.,No.1436cv,at162.
54
PlaintiffsReplyBr.,No.1436cv,at67.
55
SeeJ.A.,No.1436cv,at1091;J.A.,No.14319cv,at2251.
56
24
magazinesor nearly two largecapacity magazines for each gun
capableofacceptingonewereapprovedforimportby2000.57
Even accepting the most conservative estimates cited by the
parties and by amici, the assault weapons and largecapacity
magazines at issue are in common use as that term was used in
Heller. The D.C. Circuit reached the same conclusion in its well
reasoneddecisioninHellerII,whichupheldtheconstitutionalityofa
DistrictofColumbiaguncontrolactsubstantiallysimilartothoseat
issuehere.58
10
To be sure, as defendants note, these assault weapons and
11
largecapacity magazines are not as commonly owned as the
12
handgunsatissueinHeller,whichwerethemostpopularweapon
13
chosenbyAmericansforselfdefenseinthehome.59Butnothingin
14
Heller limited its holding to handguns; indeed, the Court
15
emphasized that the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to
16
all instruments that constitute bearable arms, not just to a small
17
subset.60
18
J.A.,No.14319cv,at578.
57
HellerII,670F.3dat1261(findingthattheAR15andmagazineswith
capacitiesexceedingtenroundswereincommonuseasdefinedbyHeller).
58
59
Id.at582(emphasissupplied).
60
25
ii. TypicalPossession
Wemustnextdeterminewhetherassaultweaponsandlarge
capacitymagazinesaretypicallypossessedbylawabidingcitizens
for lawful purposes.61 While common use is an objective and
largelystatisticalinquiry,typical[]possess[ion]requiresustolook
into both broad patterns of use and the subjective motives of gun
owners.
The parties offer competing evidence about these weapons
typicaluse.Plaintiffssuggestthatassaultweaponsareamongthe
10
safest and most effective firearms for civilian selfdefense.62
11
Defendants disagree, arguing that these weapons are used
12
disproportionatelyinguncrimes,ratherthanforlawfulpursuitslike
13
selfdefenseandhunting.63
14
Even if defendants are correct,64 however, the same could be
15
said for the handguns in Heller. Though handguns comprise only
16
about onethird of the nations firearms, by some estimates they
Id.at625.
61
J.A.,No.14319cv,at75366(declarationofballisticsresearcher).
62
SeeDefendantsBr.,No.14319cv,at3846;seealsoJ.A.,No.14319cvat
136574,16991715(affidavitsofchiefsofpoliceopiningthatassaultweapons
maynotbewellsuitedforselfdefense,especiallyinanurbanenvironment);J.A.,
No.14319cv,at13951413.
63
Plaintiffstakeissuewiththeresearchmethodology,andpointto
studiesunderminingtheconclusionofdisproportionateuse.SeePlaintiffsReply
Br.,No.1436cv,at1517;seealsoJ.A.,No.1436cv,at46465,48990.
64
26
accountfor71percentto83percentofthefirearmsusedinmurders
and 84 percent to 90 percent of the firearms used in other violent
crimes.65 That evidence of disproportionate criminal use did not
prevent the Supreme Court from holding that handguns merited
constitutionalprotection.
Looking solely at a weapons association with crime, then, is
insufficient. We must also consider more broadly whether the
weapon is dangerous and unusual in the hands of lawabiding
civilians.Hellerexpresslyhighlightedweaponsthataremostuseful
10
in military service, such as the fully automatic M16 rifle, as
11
weapons that could be banned without implicating the Second
12
Amendment.66 But this analysis is difficult to manage in practice.
13
Because the AR15 is the civilian version of the militarys M16
14
rifle,67 defendants urge that it should be treated identically for
15
SecondAmendmentpurposes.ButtheSupremeCourtsverychoice
16
of descriptor for the AR15the civilian versioncould instead
17
imply that such guns are traditionally have been widely accepted
18
aslawful.68
PlaintiffsReplyBr.,No.1436cv,at1518;seealsoHeller,554U.S.at698
(Breyer,J.,dissenting)(discussingsimilarstatisticssuggestingthathandguns
appeartobeaverypopularweaponamongcriminals).
65
554U.S.at627(internalquotationmarksomitted).
66
Staplesv.UnitedStates,511U.S.600,603(1994).
67
Id.at612.
68
27
Ultimately, then, neither the Supreme Courts categories nor
the evidence in the record cleanlyresolves thequestion of whether
semiautomatic assault weapons and largecapacity magazines are
typicallypossessedbylawabidingcitizensforlawfulpurposes.69
Confrontingthisrecord,ChiefJudgeSkretnyreasonablyfoundthat
reliableempiricalevidenceoflawfulpossessionforlawfulpurposes
waselusive,70beyondownershipstatistics.71Weagree.
IntheabsenceofclearerguidancefromtheSupremeCourtor
strongerevidenceintherecord,wefollowtheapproachtakenbythe
10
District Courts and by the D.C. Circuit in Heller II and assume for
11
the sake of argument that these commonly used weapons and
12
magazinesarealsotypicallypossessedbylawabidingcitizensfor
13
lawful purposes.72 In short, we proceed on the assumption that
14
theselawsbanweaponsprotectedbytheSecondAmendment.This
15
assumption is warranted at this stage, because, as explained post
16
Section V.e, the statutes at issue nonetheless largely pass
17
constitutionalmuster.73
69
NYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat365.
70
Onasubstantiallysimilarrecord,JudgeCovellooftheDistrictof
Connecticutcametothesameconclusion,findingonlythattherelevantweapons
werepresumably[]usedforlawfulpurposes.Shew,994F.Supp.2dat246
(emphasissupplied).
71
SeeHellerII,670F.3dat126061(quotingHeller,554U.S.at625).
72
Thoughweassumewithoutdecidingthatthebulkofthechallenged
legislationisentitledtoSecondAmendmentprotection,wedecideasmuchwith
73
28
d. SecondStep:LevelofScrutiny
Having concluded that the statutes impinge upon Second
Amendment rights, we must next determine and apply the
appropriate level of scrutiny.74 We employ the familiar levels of
respecttoConnecticutsprohibitionoftheRemingtonTactical7615,anon
semiautomaticpumpactionrifle.SeeDefendantsBr.,No.14319cv,at58.
HelleremphasizesthatthetheSecondAmendmentextends,primafacie,
toallinstrumentsthatconstitutebearablearms.Heller,554U.S.at582.Inother
words,itidentifiesapresumptioninfavorofSecondAmendmentprotection,
whichtheStatebearstheinitialburdenofrebutting.SeeEzell,651F.3dat70203
([I]fthegovernmentcanestablishthatachallengedfirearmslawregulatesactivity
fallingoutsidethescopeoftheSecondAmendment...thentheanalysiscanstop
there....(emphasissupplied));cf.Virginiav.Black,538U.S.343,369(2003)
(Scalia,J.,concurringinpart,concurringinthejudgmentinpart,anddissenting
inpart)(definingprimafacieevidenceasthatwhich,ifunexplainedor
uncontradicted,issufficienttosustainajudgmentinfavoroftheissuewhichit
supports(quotingBlacksLawDictionary1190(6thed.1990)).BecausetheState,
focusedonsemiautomaticweapons,seepostnote112,hasfailedtomakeany
argumentthatthispumpactionrifleisdangerous,unusual,orotherwisenot
withintheambitofSecondAmendmentprotection,thepresumptionthatthe
Amendmentappliesremainsunrebutted.
Tobesure,Helleralsonotedthatcertainpresumptivelylawful
regulatorymeasuresostensiblyfalloutsideoftheSecondAmendmentsprima
facieprotections.Id.at627n.26.Nonetheless,liketheD.C.CircuitinHellerII,we
concludethattheseparticularrestrictionsarenotentitledtoapresumptionof
validity.HellerII,670F.3dat1260(emphasissupplied).
WeemphasizethatourholdingwithrespecttotheRemington7615at
bothstepsofouranalysisreflectstheStatesfailuretopresentanyargumentat
allregardingthisweaponorotherslikeit.Wedonotforeclosethepossibility
thatstatescouldinthefuturepresentevidencetosupportsuchaprohibition.
Plaintiffsefforttoavoidthetwostepframeworklaidouthereis
unavailing.Theyarguethattheapplicationofmeansendsscrutinyinthiscase
74
29
scrutinyanalysisintroducedinthefamousFootnoteFourofUnited
States v. Carolene Products Co.,75 and begin by asking which level of
judicialscrutinyapplies.
Though Heller did not specify the precise level of scrutiny
applicable to firearms regulations, it rejected mere rational basis
review as insufficient for the type of regulation challenged there.76
wouldbeanexerciseinfutility.PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at13(quoting
Kachalsky,701F.3dat89n.9);PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at12(same).Wereject
thatargument.Asplaintiffsthemselvesconcede,thisCourtmadeveryclearin
KachalskythatHellersreluctancetoannounceastandardofreviewshouldnot
beinterpretedasasignalthatcourtsmustlooksolelytothetext,history,and
traditionoftheSecondAmendmenttodeterminewhetherastatecanlimitthe
rightwithoutapplyinganysortofmeansendscrutiny.701F.3dat89n.9.On
thecontrary,Hellerindicatedthatthetypicalstandardsofscrutinyanalysis
shouldapplytoregulationsimpinginguponSecondAmendmentrights,butthat
D.C.shandgunbanwouldfail[u]nderanyofthestandardsofscrutiny.554
U.S.at628.
304U.S.144,152n.4(1938);seeHeller,554U.S.at628n.27.
75
554U.S.at628n.27.Atthesametime,Hellersapprovalofcertain
presumptivelylawfulregulatorymeasures,id.at627n.26,hasbeenconstrued
bysometoruleoutstrictscrutinyaswell.Indeed,JusticeBreyersdissentstates,
withoutoppositionfromtheCourtsopinion,thatthemajorityimplicitly,and
appropriately,reject[ed]th[e]suggestion[toapplystrictscrutinytogun
regulations]bybroadlyapprovingasetoflaws...whoseconstitutionalityunder
astrictscrutinystandardwouldbefarfromclear.Id.at688(Breyer,J.,
dissenting).ChiefJudgeSkretnycitedthisinterpretationwithapprobation.
NYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat366.Uponcloserinspection,however,wethinkit
likelythattheHellermajorityidentifiedthesepresumptivelylawfulmeasures
inanattempttoclarifythescopeoftheSecondAmendmentsreachinthefirst
placethefirststepofourframeworkbutnottointimateaviewastowhether
strictscrutinyappliesinthesecondstep.
76
30
Atthesametime,thisCourtandoursisterCircuitshavesuggested
that heightened scrutiny is not always appropriate. In determining
whether heightened scrutiny applies, we consider two factors: (1)
how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment
rightand(2)theseverityofthelawsburdenontheright.77Laws
that neither implicate the core protections of the Second
Amendment nor substantially burden their exercise do not receive
heightenedscrutiny.
i. TheCoreoftheRight
10
By their terms, the statutes at issue implicate the core of the
11
Second Amendments protections by extending into the home,
12
where the need for defense of self, family and property is most
13
acute.78 Semiautomatic assault weapons and largecapacity
14
magazines are commonly owned by many lawabiding Americans,
15
andtheircompleteprohibition,includingwithinthehome,requires
16
ustoconsiderthescopeofSecondAmendmentguaranteesattheir
17
zenith.79Atthesametime,theregulatedweaponsarenotnearlyas
18
popularly owned and used for selfdefense as the handgun, that
SeeEzell,651F.3dat703.
77
Heller,554U.S.at628.Thisconclusionispredicatedonourearlier
assumptionthatthecommonlyusedfirearmsatissuearealsotypicallyusedfor
selfdefenseorotherlawfulpurposes,andthustheprohibitionsimplicatethe
SecondAmendmentright.SeeanteV.c.ii.
78
79
31
quintessentialselfdefenseweapon.80Thusthesestatutesimplicate
SecondAmendmentrights,butnottothesameextentasthelawsat
issueinHellerandMcDonald.
ii. TheSeverityoftheBurden
In Decastro, we explained that heightened scrutiny need not
applytoanymarginal,incrementalorevenappreciablerestrainton
the right to keep and bear arms.81 Rather, heightened scrutiny is
triggered only by those restrictions that (like the complete
prohibition on handguns struck down in Heller) operate as a
10
substantial burden on the ability of lawabiding citizens to possess
11
and use a firearm for . . . lawful purposes.82 Our later decision in
12
Kachalsky confirmed this approach, concluding that some form of
13
heightened scrutiny would be appropriate for regulations that
14
imposeasubstantialburdenonSecondAmendmentrights.83
15
Thepracticeofapplyingheightenedscrutinyonlytolawsthat
16
burdentheSecondAmendmentrightsubstantiallyis,aswenoted
17
in Decastro, broadly consistent with our approach to other
18
fundamental constitutional rights, including those protected by the
19
First and Fourteenth Amendments.84 We typically require a
80
Decastro,682F.3dat166.
81
Id.(emphasissupplied).
82
701F.3dat93.
83
Decastro,682F.3dat16667(emphasissupplied).
84
32
thresholdshowingtotriggerheightenedscrutinyoflawsallegedto
implicatesuch constitutional contextsas takings,votingrights, and
freespeech.85Thoughwehavehistoricallyexpressedhesitan[ce]to
import substantive First Amendment principles wholesale into
SecondAmendmentjurisprudence,86wereadilyconsultprinciples
from other areas of constitutional law, including the First
Amendmentindeterminingwhetheralawsubstantiallyburdens
SecondAmendmentrights.87
The scope of the legislative restriction and the availability of
10
alternatives factor into our analysis of the degree to which the
11
challenged law burdens the right.88 No substantial burden
12
existsand hence heightened scrutiny is not triggeredif
13
adequate alternatives remain for lawabiding citizens to acquire a
14
firearmforselfdefense.89
15
The laws at issue are both broad and burdensome. Unlike
16
statutes that merely regulate the manner in which persons may
Id.
85
Kachalsky,701F.3dat91(emphasisinoriginal).
86
Decastro,682F.3dat167.
87
UnitedStatesv.Chester,628F.3d673,682(4thCir.2010).
88
Decastro,682F.3dat168;seealsoHellerII,670F.3dat1262(drawingthe
comparisontoFirstAmendmentspeechrestrictions,wherebysevereburdens
thatdontleaveopenamplealternativechannelstriggerstrictscrutiny,while
restrictionsthatleaveopenamplealternativechannelsaremerelymodest
burdensandrequireonlyamildformofintermediatescrutiny).
89
33
exercise their Second Amendment rights, these laws impose an
outrightbanstatewide.90Theabsoluteprohibitioninstitutedinboth
states thus creates a serious encroachment on the Second
Amendment right.91 These statutes are not mere marginal,
incrementalorevenappreciablerestraint[s]ontherighttokeepand
bear arms.92 They impose a substantial burden on Second
Amendment rights and therefore trigger the application of some
formofheightenedscrutiny.
Heightened scrutiny need not, however, be akin to strict
10
scrutiny when a law burdens the Second Amendment
11
particularlywhenthatburdendoesnotconstraintheAmendments
12
core area of protection.93 The instant bans are dissimilar from
13
D.C.sunconstitutionalprohibitionofanentireclassofarmsthat
14
is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [the] lawful
15
purpose of selfdefense.94 New York and Connecticut have not
16
banned an entire class of arms. Indeed, plaintiffs themselves
Chovan,735F.3dat1138.
90
Ezell,651F.3dat705,708.
91
Decastro,682F.3dat166.Thelegislationatissueisthuseasily
distinguishedfromaNewYorkstatuteimposingagunlicensingfeeof$100per
year,whichwefoundtobenomorethanamarginal,incrementaloreven
appreciablerestraintonSecondAmendmentrights.Kwongv.Bloomberg,723
F.3d160,167(2dCir.2013).TheregulationinKwonginvolvedneitherthe
outrightprohibitionofweaponsincommonusenoranydirectlimitationonthe
exerciseofSecondAmendmentrightswithinthehome.
92
93
94
34
acknowledge that there is no class of firearms known as
semiautomatic assault weaponsa descriptor they call purely
political in nature.95 Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that the legislation
does prohibit firearms of a universally recognized type
semiautomatic.96 Not so. Rather, both New York and Connecticut
banonlyalimitedsubsetofsemiautomaticfirearms,whichcontain
one or more enumerated militarystyle features. As Heller makes
plain,thefactthatthestatutesatissuedonotbananentireclassof
arms makes the restrictions substantially less burdensome.97 In
10
both states, citizens may continue to arm themselves with non
11
semiautomatic weapons or with any semiautomatic gun that does
12
notcontainanyoftheenumeratedmilitarystylefeatures.Similarly,
13
while citizens may not acquire highcapacity magazines, they can
14
purchaseanynumberofmagazineswithacapacityoftenorfewer
15
rounds. In sum, numerous alternatives remain for lawabiding
16
citizens to acquire a firearm for selfdefense.98 We agree with the
PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at17;PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at16.
95
PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at31.
96
See554U.S.at628.
97
Decastro,682F.3dat168.Plaintiffsrelatedargumentthatthe
availabilityofunbannedfirearmsisirrelevantunderHeller,seePlaintiffsBr.,
No.1436cv,at32restsonamisapprehensionoftheSupremeCourtslogic.To
besure,Hellerdidindicatethat[i]tisnoanswertosay...thatitispermissible
tobanthepossessionofhandgunssolongasthepossessionofotherfirearms
(i.e.,longguns)isallowed.554U.S.at629.ButHellerwentontoexplainthat
handgunsareprotectedasthemostpopularweaponchosenbyAmericansfor
selfdefenseinthehome.Id.Ofcourse,thesamecannotbesaidoftheweapons
atissuehere.Hellerexplicitlyendorsedprohibitionsagainstanyweaponsnot
98
35
D.C.Circuitthattheprohibitionofsemiautomaticriflesandlarge
capacity magazines does not effectively disarm individuals or
substantiallyaffecttheirabilitytodefendthemselves.99Theburden
imposedbythechallengedlegislationisreal,butitisnotsevere.100
Accordingly,weconcludethatintermediate,ratherthanstrict,
scrutiny is appropriate. This conclusion coheres not only with that
reached by the D.C. Circuit when considering substantially similar
guncontrol laws, but also with the analyses undertaken by other
courts, many of which have applied intermediate scrutiny to laws
10
implicatingtheSecondAmendment.101
11
e. ApplicationofIntermediateScrutiny
12
Though intermediate scrutiny may have different
13
connotations in different contexts,102 here the key question is
14
whether the statutes at issue are substantially related to the
typicallypossessedbylawabidingcitizensforlawfulpurposes,including,for
example,shortbarreledshotguns.Id.at625.Ourconsiderationofavailable
alternativesforselfdefensethussquareswithHellersfocusonprotectingthat
corelawfulpurposeoftheSecondAmendmentright.Id.at630.
HellerII,670F.3dat1262.
99
Seeid.
100
See,e.g.,Chovan,735F.3dat1138;NatlRifleAssnofAm.,700F.3dat
207;Chester,628F.3dat683;Reese,627F.3dat802;Marzzarella,614F.3dat97.
101
ErnstJ.v.Stone,452F.3d186,200n.10(2dCir.2006)(notingthat
intermediatescrutinycarriesdifferentmeaningsdependingontheareaoflawin
whichitarises,andthenapplyingthesamedefinitionofintermediatescrutiny
usedhere).
102
36
achievementofanimportantgovernmentalinterest.103Itisbeyond
cavil that both states have substantial, indeed compelling,
governmentalinterestsinpublicsafetyandcrimeprevention.104We
need only inquire, then, whether the challenged laws are
substantially related to the achievement of that governmental
interest.Weconcludethattheprohibitionsonsemiautomaticassault
weaponsandlargecapacitymagazinesmeetthisstandard.
i. ProhibitiononAssaultWeapons
To survive intermediate scrutiny, the fit between the
10
challenged regulation [and the government interest] need only be
11
substantial, not perfect.105 Unlike strict scrutiny analysis, we need
12
not ensure that the statute is narrowly tailored or the least
13
restrictive available means to serve the stated governmental
14
interest.106Moreover,wehaveobservedthatstateregulationofthe
15
right to bear arms has always been more robust than analogous
16
regulationofotherconstitutionalrights.107Solongasthedefendants
103
Id.at97;seealsoSchallv.Martin,467U.S.253,264(1984)(The
legitimateandcompellingstateinterestinprotectingthecommunityfromcrime
cannotbedoubted.(internalquotationmarksomitted)).
104
Kachalsky,701F.3dat97(internalquotationmarksomitted).
105
Id.
106
Id.at100.Statesarepermittedtorestricttherighttobeararmsby
felonsandthementallyill,whileequivalentrestrictionsontherighttospeechor
religiousfreedomsamongthosepopulationswouldunquestionablybe
unconstitutional.Id.
107
37
produce evidence that fairly support[s] their rationale, the laws
willpassconstitutionalmuster.108
In making this determination, we afford substantial
deference to the predictive judgments of the legislature.109 We
remain mindful that, [i]n the context of firearm regulation, the
legislature is far better equipped than the judiciary to make
sensitive public policy judgments (within constitutional limits)
concerning the dangers in carrying firearms and the manner to
combat those risks.110 Our role, therefore, is only to assure
10
ourselves that, in formulating their respective laws, New York and
11
Connecticuthavedrawnreasonableinferencesbasedonsubstantial
12
evidence.111
13
Bothstateshavedonesowithrespecttotheirprohibitionson
14
certainsemiautomaticfirearms.112Atleastsincetheenactmentofthe
CityofLosAngelesv.AlamedaBooks,Inc.,535U.S.425,438(2002)
(plurality).
108
Kachalsky,701F.3dat97(quotingTurnerBroad.Sys.,Inc.v.Fed.
CommcnsCommn,520U.S.180,195(1997)(bracketsomitted)).
109
Kachalsky,701F.3dat97(quotingTurnerBroad.Sys.,Inc.v.Fed.
CommcnsCommn,512U.S.622,665(1994))(opinionofKennedy,J.)).
110
TurnerBroad.Sys.,520U.S.at195.
111
ThoughConnecticutsbanonsemiautomaticfirearmspasses
intermediatescrutiny,itsprohibitionofasinglenonsemiautomaticweapon,the
Remington7615,doesnot.Focusedasitwasontherationaleforbanning
semiautomaticweapons,Connecticutfailstosetforththerequisitesubstantial
evidencewithrespecttothepumpactionRemington7615.Id.at195;seealso
112
38
federal assaultweapons ban, semiautomatic assault weapons have
beenunderstoodtoposeunusualrisks.Whenused,theseweapons
tendtoresultinmorenumerouswounds,moreseriouswounds,and
more victims.113 These weapons are disproportionately used in
crime,andparticularlyincriminalmassshootingsliketheattackin
Newtown.114 They are also disproportionately used to kill law
enforcementofficers:onestudyshowsthatbetween1998and2001,
assaultweaponswereusedtogundownatleasttwentypercentof
officerskilledinthelineofduty.115
10
The record reveals that defendants have tailored the
11
legislationatissuetoaddresstheseparticularlyhazardousweapons.
12
Thedangersposedbysomeofthemilitarystylefeaturesprohibited
13
by the statutessuch as grenade launchers and silencersare
14
manifest and incontrovertible.116 As for the other enumerated
antenote73.Accordingly,weholdthatthissingularprovisionofConnecticuts
legislationisunconstitutional.
SeeDefendantsBr.,No.1436cv,at48(quotingJ.A.,No.1436cv,at
113
73334).
Seeid.at49(citingJ.A.,No.1436cv565,727,729).
114
SeeJ.A.,No.1436cv,at1261(citingViolencePolicyCenterstudy).
115
Indeed,plaintiffshavenotseriouslyattemptedtoargueeitherhereor
beforetheDistrictCourtthatsuchfeaturesareprotectedbytheSecond
Amendmentatall,muchlessthattheirprohibitionshouldfailintermediate
scrutiny.SeeNYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat36970(Plaintiffsdonotexplicitly
arguethattheActsregulationoffirearmswith[grenadelaunchers,bayonet
mounts,orsilencers]violatestheSecondAmendment.);cf.Nortonv.SamsClub,
145F.3d114,119(2dCir.1998)(Issuesnotsufficientlyarguedinthebriefsare
consideredwaivedandnormallywillnotbeaddressedonappeal.);United
116
39
militarystyle featuressuch as the flash suppressor, protruding
grip, and barrel shroudsNew York and Connecticut have
determined, as did the U.S. Congress, that the net effect of these
militarycombatfeaturesisacapabilityforlethalitymorewounds,
moreserious,inmorevictimsfarbeyondthatofotherfirearmsin
general, including other semiautomatic guns.117 Indeed, plaintiffs
explicitly contend that these features improve a firearms
accuracy, comfort, and utility.118 This circumlocution is, as
Chief Judge Skretny observed, a milder way of saying that these
10
featuresmaketheweaponsmoredeadly.119
11
The legislation is also specifically targeted to prevent mass
12
shootings like that in Newtown, in which the shooter used a
13
semiautomatic assault weapon. Plaintiffs complain that mass
14
shootingsareparticularlyrareeventsandthus,evenifsuccessful,
15
the legislation will have a minimal impact on most violent
Statesv.Amer,110F.3d873,879(2dCir.1997)(findingthatdefendantforfeited
oneofhisconstitutionalargumentsbyfailingtoraiseitbeforetheDistrictCourt).
J.A.,No.1436cv,at73334.
117
PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at20;PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at1920.
118
119
40
crime.120Thatmaybeso.Butguncontrollegislationneednotstrike
atallevilsatthesametimetobeconstitutional.121
Defendants also have adduced evidence that the regulations
will achieve their intended end of reducing circulation of assault
weapons among criminals.122 Plaintiffs counterwithout record
evidencethat the statutes will primarily disarm lawabiding
citizens and will thus impair the very publicsafety objectives they
weredesignedtoachieve.123Giventhedearthofevidencethatlaw
abidingcitizenstypicallyusetheseweaponsforselfdefense,seeante
10
Section V.c.ii, plaintiffs concerns are speculative at best, and
11
certainlynotstrongenoughtoovercomethesubstantialdeference
12
we owe to predictive judgments of the legislature on matters of
13
public safety.124 The mere possibility that some subset of people
14
intentonbreakingthelawwillindeedignorethesestatutesdoesnot
15
makethemunconstitutional.
PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at4849;PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at48
120
49.
NatlRifleAssnofAm.,700F.3dat211(quotingBuckleyv.Valeo,424
U.S.1,105(1976)).
121
SeeDefendantsBr.,No.14319cv,at7175(citing,interalia,research
byProf.ChristopherS.Koper,evaluatingtheimpactofthefederalassault
weaponsban,J.A.,No.14319cv,at1404).
122
123
46.
Kachalsky,701F.3dat97(quotingTurnerBroad.Sys.,520U.S.at195
(bracketsomitted)).
124
41
Ultimately, [i]t is the legislatures job, not ours, to weigh
conflicting evidence and make policy judgments.125 We must
merely ensure that the challenged laws are substantiallyeven if
not perfectlyrelated to the articulated governmental interest. The
prohibitionofsemiautomaticassaultweaponspassesthistest.126
ii. ProhibitiononLargeCapacityMagazines
The same logic applies a fortiori to the restrictions on large
capacity magazines.127 The record evidence suggests that large
capacitymagazinesmaypresentevengreaterdangerstocrimeand
10
violencethanassaultweaponsalone,inpartbecausetheyaremore
11
prevalentandcanbeandareused...inbothassaultweaponsand
12
nonassault
13
disproportionately used in mass shootings, like the one in
weapons.128
Largecapacity
magazines
are
Id.at99.
125
Cf.HellerII,670F.3dat1263([T]heevidencedemonstratesabanon
assaultweaponsislikelytopromotetheGovernmentsinterestincrime
control....).Again,ourholdingislimitedinsofarasitdoesnotapplyto
ConnecticutsprohibitionofthenonsemiautomaticRemington7615.
126
Amiciarguethatlargecapacitymagazinesareentirelyoutsideof
SecondAmendmentprotectionfortheindependentreasonthatsuchmagazines
constitutefirearmaccessoriesratherthanprotectedarms.SeeBr.ofAmici
CuriaeLawCenterToPreventGunViolenceandNewYorkersAgainstGun
Violence,No.1436cv,at813;Br.ofAmiciCuriaeLawCenterToPreventGun
Violence,ConnecticutAgainstGunViolence,andClevelandSchoolRemembers,
No.14319cv,at1014.Becauseweconcludethattheprohibitionoflarge
capacitymagazineswouldsurvivetherequisitescrutiny,weneednotreachthe
meritsofthisadditionalargument.
127
J.A.,No.14319cv,at1400.
128
42
Newtown, in which the shooter used multiple largecapacity
magazinestofire154roundsinlessthanfiveminutes.129Likeassault
weapons, largecapacity magazines result in more shots fired,
persons wounded, and wounds per victim than do other gun
attacks.130 Professor Christopher Koper, a firearms expert relied
uponbyallpartiesinbothstates,statedthatitisparticularlythe
ban on largecapacity magazines that has the greatest potential to
preventandlimitshootingsinthestateoverthelongrun.131
We therefore conclude that New York and Connecticut have
10
adequately established a substantial relationship between the
11
prohibition of both semiautomatic assault weapons and large
12
capacity magazines and the importantindeed, compellingstate
13
interest in controlling crime. These prohibitions survive
14
intermediatescrutiny.
15
iii. SevenRoundLoadLimit
16
Thoughthekeyprovisionsofbothstatutespassconstitutional
17
musteronthisrecord,anotheraspectofNewYorksSAFEActdoes
18
not: the sevenround load limit, which makes it unlawful for a
DefendantsBr.,No.14319cv,at11,3839.
129
HellerII,670F.3dat1263(internalquotationmarksomitted);seealso
130
J.A.,No.14319cv,at1410.
131
43
person to knowingly possess an ammunition feeding device where
suchdevicecontainsmorethansevenroundsofammunition.132
Asnotedabove,thesevenroundloadlimitwasasecondbest
solution. New York determined that only magazines containing
sevenroundsorfewercanbesafelypossessed,butitalsorecognized
thatsevenroundmagazinesaredifficulttoobtaincommercially.Its
compromisewastopermitgunownerstousetenroundmagazines
iftheywereloadedwithsevenorfewerrounds.133
On the record before us, we cannot conclude that New York
10
has presented sufficient evidence that a sevenround load limit
11
would best protect public safety. Here we are considering not a
12
capacityrestriction,butratheraloadlimit.NothingintheSAFEAct
13
will outlaw or reduce the number of tenround magazines in
14
circulation. It will not decrease their availability or in any way
15
frustratetheaccessofthosewhointendtousetenroundmagazines
16
for mass shootings or other crimes. It is thus entirely untethered
17
fromthestatedrationaleofreducingthenumberofassaultweapons
18
andlargecapacitymagazinesincirculation.134NewYorkhasfailed
19
to present evidence that the mere existence of this load limit will
20
convince any wouldbe malefactors to load magazines capable of
21
holdingtenroundswithonlythepermissibleseven.
N.Y.PenalLaw265.37;seeantenotes1213andaccompanyingtext.
132
SeeDefendantsBr.,No.1436cv,at1516.
133
Seeid.at55.
134
44
To be sure, the mere possibility of criminal disregard of the
laws does not foreclose an attempt by the state to enact firearm
regulations. But on intermediate scrutiny review, the state cannot
get away with shoddy data or reasoning.135 To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the defendants must show reasonable
inferences based on substantial evidence that the statutes are
substantiallyrelatedtothegovernmentalinterest.136Withrespectto
theloadlimitprovisionalone,NewYorkhasfailedtodoso.
VI.
VaguenessChallenge
10
WeturnnowtoplaintiffssecondchallengetotheNewYork
11
and Connecticut lawstheir claim that provisions of both statutes
12
are unconstitutionally vague. The New York defendants cross
13
appealChiefJudgeSkretnysrulingthattwoprovisionsoftheSAFE
14
Actarevoidbecauseofvagueness.
15
a. LegalStandards
16
Grounded in due process principles, the voidforvagueness
17
doctrine provides that [n]o one may be required at peril of life,
18
liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
19
statutes.137 The doctrine requires that a penal statute define the
AlamedaBooks,535U.S.at438.
135
TurnerBroad.Sys.,520U.S.at195(emphasissupplied).
136
Crampv.Bd.ofPub.Instruction,368U.S.278,287(1961);seealsoCunney
v.Bd.ofTrusteesofVill.ofGrandView,N.Y.,660F.3d612,620(2dCir.2011).
137
45
criminaloffensewithsufficientdefinitenessthatordinarypeoplecan
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does
notencouragearbitraryanddiscriminatoryenforcement.138Statutes
carrying criminal penalties or implicating the exercise of
constitutional rights, like the ones at issue here, are subject to a
more stringent vagueness standard than are civil or economic
regulations.139 However, the doctrine does not require meticulous
specificity of statutes, recognizing that language is necessarily
markedbyadegreeofimprecision.140
10
Because plaintiffs pursue this preenforcement appeal
11
before they have been charged with any violation of law, it
12
constitutes a facial, rather than asapplied, challenge.141 Under
13
the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v.
14
Salerno, to succeed on a facial challenge, the challenger must
15
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
Kolenderv.Lawson,461U.S.352,357(1983).
138
Vill.ofHoffmanEstatesv.TheFlipside,HoffmanEstates,Inc.,455U.S.489,
49899(1982).
139
Thibodeauv.Portuondo,486F.3d61,66(2dCir.2007)(quotingGrayned
v.CityofRockford,408U.S.104,110(1972)).
140
SeeRichmondBoroGunClub,Inc.v.CityofNewYork,97F.3d681,68586
(2dCir.1996).
141
46
would be valid.142 As a result, a facial challenge to a legislative
enactmentisthemostdifficultchallengetomountsuccessfully.143
Seekingtoavoidthisprohibitivelyhighbar,plaintiffsurgeus
to follow the different approach that a plurality of the Supreme
CourttookinCityofChicagov.Morales.144Inthatcase,threeJustices
held that a criminal law lacking a mens rea requirement and
burdeningaconstitutionalrightissubjecttofacialattack[w]hen
vaguenesspermeatesthetextofsuchalaw.145ThisCourt,however,
has determined that, because the test set forth by the Morales
10
pluralityhasnotbeenadoptedbytheSupremeCourtasawhole,we
11
are not required to apply it.146 We have previously declined to
12
specify a preference for either test,147 and we need not do so here,
13
becausethechallengedprovisionsaresufficientlycleartosurvivea
14
facialchallengeundereitherapproach.
15
16
481U.S.739,745(1987)(emphasissupplied).
142
Id.
143
527U.S.41(1999);seealsoPlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at5254;
PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at5256.
144
527U.S.at55.
145
UnitedStatesv.Rybicki,354F.3d124,13132(2dCir.2003)(enbanc).
146
Id.at132n.3.
147
47
b. Application
i. Canbereadilyrestoredorconvertedtoaccept
Both the New York and Connecticut statutes criminalize the
possession of magazines that can be readily restored or converted
to accept more than ten rounds of ammunition.148 In both suits,
plaintiffsallegethatthephraseisunconstitutionallyvaguebecause
whetheramagazinecanbereadilyrestoredorconverteddepends
upon the knowledge, skill, and tools available to the particular
restorer,andthestatutesaresilentonthesedetails.149
10
This statutory language dates at least to the 1994 federal
11
assaultweaponsbanandlaterappearedinNewYorks2000law.As
12
Chief Judge Skretny noted, there is no record evidence that it has
13
given rise to confusion at any time in the past two decades.150 This
14
Courtfoundasimilarphraseinanothergunlawmayreadilybe
15
convertedto be sufficiently definite as to provide clear[]
16
warn[ing] of its meaning.151 Plaintiffs reliance on a Sixth Circuit
N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(23),265.02(8),265.36;Conn.Gen.Stat.53
202w(a)(1).
148
149
60.
150
U.S.v.16,179MolsoItalian.22CaliberWinleeDerringerConvertibleStarter
Guns,443F.2d463,46465(2dCir.1971)(rejectingavaguenesschallengeina
civilforfeiturecontext,andfindingthatthephraseclearlymeantagunwhich
canbeconvertedbyarelativelysimpleoperationtakingonlyafewminutes).
151
48
case that interpreted a different phrasemay be restored without
themodifierreadilyisinapposite.152
Plaintiffs purported concernthat this provision might be
unfairly used to prosecute an ordinary citizen for owning a
magazinethatonlyagunsmithequippedwithtechnicalknowledge
and specialized tools could readily convert153is implausible.
Shouldsuchaprosecutioneveroccur,thedefendantcouldbringan
asappliedvaguenesschallenge,groundedinthefactsandcontext
of a particular set of charges. That improbable scenario cannot,
10
however, adequately support the facial challenge plaintiffs attempt
11
tobringhere.
In sum, we affirm the judgments of both District Courts
12
13
findingthatthisphraseisnotunconstitutionallyvague.
14
ii. CapacityofTubularMagazines
15
The New York plaintiffs contend the SAFE Acts tenround
16
magazine restriction154 is vague insofar as it extends to tubular
17
magazines,thecapacityofwhichvariesaccordingtothesizeofthe
18
particular shells that are loaded. This challenge fails as a threshold
19
matter for the reasons stated by the District Court: the provision is
PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at58;PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at5859;
seePeoplesRightsOrg.,Inc.v.CityofColumbus,152F.3d522,537(6thCir.1998).
152
SeePlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at5859;PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at
153
5859.
N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(23).
154
49
only potentially vague when applied to a specific (nonstandard)
use, and hence is neither vague in all circumstances (as required
under Salerno) nor permeated with vagueness (as required by the
Moralesplurality).Moreover,likethereadilyconvertedlanguage,
this capacity restriction was also included in the 1994 federal
assaultweapons ban, without any record evidence of confusion
duringtheensuingdecades.
iii. CopiesorDuplicates
Plaintiffs challenge the Connecticut statutes definition of
10
assaultweapontoincludecertainspecifiedfirearmsandanycopies
11
or duplicates thereof with the capability of the listed models.155
12
They argue that the provision provides inadequate notice of which
13
firearmsinparticularareprohibited.
14
Wereviewthestatutorylanguagewithinitscontext,relyingif
15
necessary on the canons of statutory construction and legislative
16
history.156Inthecontextofthelegislationasawhole,thiscopiesor
17
duplicates language is not unconstitutionally vague. All firearms
18
thatthestatuteprohibitsbymodelnamealsoexhibitatleastoneof
19
theprohibitedmilitarystylefeatures.157Hence,thestatuteprovides
Conn.Gen.Stat.53202a(1)(B)(D).
155
CommackSelfServiceKosherMeats,Inc.v.Hooker,680F.3d194,213(2d
Cir.2012).
156
TheConnecticutlegislationprohibitedonlyasinglefirearm,the
Remington7615,whichlackedmilitarystylefeatures.Becausewehavealready
heldthatConnecticutsbanontheRemington7615isunconstitutional,seeante
157
50
two independent means by which an individual may determine if
his firearm is prohibited: he may consult the list of illegal models
and,ifstillconcernedthatthefirearmmaybeanunlawfulcopyor
duplicate, he may crossreference the list of prohibited military
stylefeatures.
In this manner, the Connecticut legislation avoids the
deficiencyofanassaultweaponsbanstruckdownbyasisterCircuit
as unconstitutionally vague in Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of
Columbus.158InSpringfield,themunicipalordinanceatissuedefined
10
assault weapons simply by naming 46 individual models and
11
extending the prohibition toweaponswith slight modifications or
12
enhancements to the listed firearms. The Sixth Circuit explained
13
thattheordinancewasinvalidbecauseitoutlaw[ed]certainbrand
14
names without including within the prohibition similar assault
15
weaponsofthesametype,functionorcapability[and]...without
16
providing any explanation for its selections [of prohibited
17
firearms].159TheSixthCircuitfounditsignificantthattheordinance
18
offerednoexplanationfordraftingtheordinanceintermsofbrand
19
name rather than generic type or category of weapon.160 In the
20
instant case, by contrast, Connecticut has provided not only an
notes73and112,plaintiffschallengetothecopiesorduplicatesprovisionis
mootregardingcopiesorduplicatesoftheRemington7615itself.
29F.3d250,252(6thCir.1994).
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
51
itemizedlistofprohibitedmodelsbutalsothemilitarystylefeatures
test, which functions as an explanation of the generic type or
categoryofweaponoutlawed.
We therefore agree with Judge Covello that the copies or
duplicate provision of the Connecticut statute at issue here is
sufficientlydefinitetosurviveavoidforvaguenesschallenge.
iv. Version
We apply similar logic to our analysis of New Yorks
prohibition of semiautomatic pistols that are semiautomatic
10
version[s]of an automatic rifle, shotgun or firearm.161 In this case,
11
Chief Judge Skretny held that the provision was unconstitutionally
12
vague, reasoning that an ordinary person cannot know whether
13
anysinglesemiautomaticpistolisaversionofanautomaticone.162
14
The District Court also expressed concern that the lack of criteria
15
mightencouragearbitraryanddiscriminatoryenforcement.163
16
We disagree. The SAFE Acts terminology has been used in
17
multiple state and federal firearms statutes, including the 1994
18
federal assaultweapons ban, as well as in government reports,
19
judicialdecisions,andpublishedbooks.164Plaintiffshaveshownno
N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(22)(c)(viii).
161
162
Id.
163
164
52
evidence of confusion arising from this longstanding formulation.
Though plaintiffs are correct that, as a general proposition,
repetition does not save a vague term, in the particular
circumstances presented hererepeated use for decades, without
evidence of mischief or misunderstandingsuggests that the
language is comprehensible. Further, the SAFE Act provides
additionalnoticeofprohibitedconductbyrequiringthecreationofa
website listing unlawful weapons and containing additional
information.165 If, in fact, as the District Court fears, this language
10
results in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, those charged
11
under the statute can and should seek recourse in an as applied
12
challenge.Wecannotconclude,however,thattheprovisionisvague
13
in all circumstances or permeated with vagueness on its face. We
14
thereforereversesomuchoftheDistrictCourtsjudgmentasholds
15
NewYorkPenalLaw265.00(22)(c)(viii)voidbecauseofvagueness.
16
v. MuzzleBreak
17
Finally, Chief Judge Skretny also struck down as
18
impermissiblyvagueaprovisionofNewYorksSAFEActthatlisted
19
among prohibited militarystyle features such muzzle attachments
20
as a flash suppressor, muzzle break, muzzle compensator, or
21
threadedbarreldesignedtoaccommodateaflashsuppressor,muzzle
N.Y.PenalLaw400.00(16a)(b).TheNewYorkStatePolicealso
maintainsatelephonelinetoanswerthequestionsofgunowners.See
DefendantsReplyBr.,No.1436cv,at26.
165
53
break, or muzzle compensator.166 All parties agree that a muzzle
brake is a firearm attachment that reduces recoil. However, the
SAFEActmisspelledthetermasmuzzlebreak.Onthebasisofthis
misspelling, the District Court held the references to muzzle
breakstobeunconstitutionallyvague,reasoningthatanordinary
person cannot be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids.167
Thisis,inourview,anoverstatement.Becausethemisspelled
homophone muzzle break has no accepted meaning, there is no
10
meaningful risk that a party might confuse the legislatures intent.
11
Further,itsplacementwithinalistofmuzzleattachmentsmakesthe
12
misspelled termsmeaning even clearer. What is more,becausethe
13
adjacentstatutorytermmuzzlecompensatorissynonymouswith
14
muzzle brake, and thus independently covers the prohibited
15
conduct, this issue is of little moment. Nonetheless, vagueness
16
doctrinerequiresonlythatthestatuteprovidesufficientlydefinite
17
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
18
understanding and practices.168 This provision has done so.
19
Accordingly,wereversesomuchoftheDistrictCourtsjudgmentas
20
holds New York Penal Law 265.00(22)(a)(vi) unconstitutionally
21
vague.
N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(22)(a)(vi)(emphasissupplied).
166
NYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat377(quotingCunney,660F.3dat620).
167
UnitedStatesv.Farhane,634F.3d127,139(2dCir.2011)(internal
quotationmarksomitted).
168
54
1
2
3
CONCLUSION
Tosummarize,weholdasfollows:
(1)
ThecoreprohibitionsbyNewYorkandConnecticutof
assault weapons and largecapacity magazines do not
violatetheSecondAmendment.
(a)
We assume that the majority of the prohibited
conduct falls within the scope of Second
Amendment protections. The statutes are
appropriately evaluated under the constitutional
10
standard of intermediate scrutinythat is,
11
whether they are substantially related to the
12
achievement of an important governmental
13
interest.
14
(b)
Becausetheprohibitionsaresubstantiallyrelated
15
totheimportantgovernmentalinterestsofpublic
16
safety
17
constitutionalmuster.
and
crime
reduction,
they
pass
18
We therefore AFFIRM the relevant portions of the
19
judgmentsoftheWesternDistrictofNewYorkandthe
20
District of Connecticut insofar as they upheld the
21
constitutionalityofstateprohibitionsonsemiautomatic
22
assaultweaponsandlargecapacitymagazines.
23
24
(2)
We hold that the specific prohibition on the non

semiautomaticRemington7615fallswithinthescopeof
55
Second Amendment protection and subsequently fails
intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, we REVERSE that
limited portion of the judgment of the District of
Connecticut. In doing so, we emphasize the limited
nature of our holding with respect to the Remington
7615,inthatitmerelyreflectsthepresumptionrequired
by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller
that the Second Amendment extends to all bearable
arms, and that the State, by failing to present any
10
argumentatallregardingthisweaponorotherslikeit,
11
has failed to rebut that presumption. We do not
12
foreclose the possibility that States could in the future
13
presentevidencetosupportsuchaprohibition.
14
(3)
New Yorks sevenround load limit does not survive
15
intermediatescrutinyintheabsenceofrequisiterecord
16
evidence and a substantial relationship between the
17
statutoryprovisionandimportantstatesafetyinterests.
18
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the Western
19
District of New York insofar as it held this provision
20
unconstitutional.
21
(4)
No challenged provision in either statute is
22
unconstitutionallyvague.Accordingly,weAFFIRMthe
23
judgments of the District of Connecticut and the
24
Western District of New York insofar as they denied
25
vagueness challenges to provisions involving the
26
capacity of tubular magazines, copies or duplicates,
56
or a firearms ability to be readily restored or
converted.WeREVERSEthejudgmentoftheWestern
District of New York insofar as it found language
pertaining to versions and muzzle breaks to be
unconstitutionallyvague.
57

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Case 14-36, Document 330-1, 10/19/2015, 1621732, Page1 of 57

United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

Case 14-36, Document 330-1, 10/19/2015, 1621732, Page2 of 57

Case 14-36, Document 330-1, 10/19/2015, 1621732, Page3 of 57

Case 14-36, Document 330-1, 10/19/2015, 1621732, Page4 of 57

Before the Court are two appeals challenging guncontrol

We hold that the core provisions of the New York and

Case 14-36, Document 330-1, 10/19/2015, 1621732, Page5 of 57

Case 14-36, Document 330-1, 10/19/2015, 1621732, Page6 of 57

Before the Court are two appeals challenging guncontrol

the wake of the 2012 mass murders at Sandy Hook Elementary

School in Newtown, Connecticut. The New York and Connecticut

laws at issue prohibit the possession of certain semiautomatic

assault weapons and largecapacity magazines. Following the

entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the central

claims in both the Western District of New York (William M.

Skretny, Chief Judge) and the District of Connecticut (Alfred V.

appeal. First, they challenge the constitutionality of the statutes

under the Second Amendment; and second, they challenge certain

the New York action also crossappeal the District Courts

invalidation of New Yorks separate sevenround load limit and

voiding of two statutory provisions as facially unconstitutionally

We hold that the core provisions of the New York and

Connecticut laws prohibiting possession of semiautomatic assault

weapons and largecapacity magazines do not violate the Second

Amendment, and that the challenged individual provisions are not

void for vagueness. The particular provision of New Yorks law

regulating load limits, however, does not survive the requisite

scrutiny. One further specific provisionConnecticuts prohibition

on the nonsemiautomatic Remington 7615unconstitutionally

Case 14-36, Document 330-1, 10/19/2015, 1621732, Page7 of 57

infringes upon the Second Amendment right. Accordingly, we

Connecticut insofar as it upheld the prohibition of semiautomatic

assault weapons and largecapacity magazines, and REVERSE in

AFFIRM that judgment insofar as it upheld the prohibition of

semiautomatic assault weapons and largecapacity magazines and

certain automatic and semiautomatic firearms that came to be

known as assault weapons. In 1993, Connecticuts General

Assembly adopted the states first assaultweapon ban, which

semiautomatic or burst fire at the option of the user, including 67

The following year, after five years of hearings on the harms

legislation restricting the manufacture, transfer, and possession of

Case 14-36, Document 330-1, 10/19/2015, 1621732, Page8 of 57

certain semiautomatic assault weapons.2 The 1994 federal statute

defined semiautomatic assault weapons in two ways. First, it

here, the Colt AR15. Second, it introduced a twofeature test,

two listed militarystyle features, including a telescoping stock, a

conspicuously protruding pistol grip, a bayonet mount, a flash

suppressor, and a grenade launcher. The federal statute also

prohibited magazines with a capacity of more than ten rounds of

ammunition, or which could be readily restored or converted to

accept more than 10 rounds.3 The federal assaultweapons ban

Following the passage of the federal assaultweapons ban,

both New York, in 2000, and Connecticut, in 2001, enacted

legislation that closely mirrored the federal statute, including the

twofeature test for prohibited semiautomatic firearms.5 Unlike the

federal statute, however, these state laws contained no sunset

Case 14-36, Document 330-1, 10/19/2015, 1621732, Page9 of 57

On December 14, 2012, a gunman shot his way into Sandy

Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut and murdered

twenty firstgraders and six adults using a semiautomatic AR15

type rifle with ten largecapacity magazines. This appalling attack,