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Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
DEBUNKING CELLULAR
TELEPHONE TRACKING:
HOW TO WIN YOUR CASE AND
MAKE THE PROSECUTOR CRY
Ubiquitous Usage
Over 80% of the U.S. population uses cell
phones.
http://ezinearticles.com/?Prepaid-Cell-Phones:-The-NewGrowth-Industry&id=6192322
Be Aware
What we WILL NOT cover:
Motions to Suppress
US v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012)
Attachment of GPS to vehicle was a search via
4th Amd
US v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012)
D had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
inherent location data broadcast from cellular
phone
Warrant Issues
18 USC 2701-2711
18 USC 2703(d)
Rule 41 Warrants
Court Orders - Real Time Tracking
2012, Aaron J. Romano, PC
Historical Data v.
Real Time Tracking
NOT TRUE!!!
2012, Aaron J. Romano, PC
CONTRACT
v.
PREPAID /
PAY AS YOU GO
2012, Aaron J. Romano, PC
EXPERTS
Law Enforcement
Sprint University
The Hired Gun
No-drop coverage by
passing a call from one
cell site to the next
strongest signal.
Therefore, coverage
must overlap.
Typical Case:
CLIENTS STORY
S.O.D.D.I.
Defenses
Who had the phone?
Prove the defendant had
phone at the time.
Was it a shared phone?
Investigation Tips
Call the telephone numbers on the detail sheets
Determine if people in the records know the
defendant should they testify?
Determine if people in the records had contact
with the defendant via telephone that day/night
Examine clients phone contacts if available
Nicknames for telephone numbers
http://www.cellular-
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/10/09/1142021/-Prepaid-Phone-Users-Unpollable-Add-4-5-to-Obama-in-All-Polls#
Only you can make the decision about how to challenge the evidence
pretrial v. trial.
There is no doubt that cell phone site tracking is an innaccurate
method of locating the handset.
Do you want to raise it by way of a Daubert hearing?
U.S. v. Evans Granted
State v. Davis Denied
This could be a good opportunity to get discovery and a trial run at the
Governments expert.
If you dont think the judge will keep out the cell site evidence,
however, you may not want to reveal your strategy pre-trial.
Should you retain your own expert, or simply destroy theirs?
2012, Aaron J. Romano, PC
Cross-Exam of Expert
Pretrial Motion
Trial
Be Nice
Use expert to
showcase your
expertise
Get him to agree with
softball questions
Educate the Jury
Be the teacher
Use demonstrative
evidence
General to Specific
The
cellular
aspect
relates to
the system
of cell sites
or towers,
which cover
cells (areas
of coverage
overlap of
neighboring
sites).
Cells:
Sector A North
Sector B
Southwest
Sector C Southeast
2012, Aaron J. Romano, PC
Area of Coverage 1
Cell Site
Assume:
Omni-Directional
Tower
Radius 10mi - 35mi
10 mile
radius
Area = r
314 sq. mi. = 3.14 x (10x10)
MATH 101
Area of a circle: A=r
Radius = 10 Miles
3.14 x 10 x 10 =
314 sq. miles
Even if it is a three-sided
site and the direction is
known 314/3 =
104.67 sq. miles
MATH 102
Acres:
Which is the
equivalent of
1,792,000 acres!
Weather conditions
Angle of antennae on site
Height of the site
How high site is above sea
level
Fractional percentage of
channel assignments of site
Number of cell phone
providers utilizing a site
Number of cell phone
providers within a call region
Performance of maintenance
on sites
Wattage output of site
Site Traffic
INVESTIGATE SITES
Urban cell sites may
not be towers at all
The term cell tower
conveys the image
that it towers over
its surroundings and
therefore is obstaclefree
Strongest Signal
Handset making or
receiving a call
Cell Sites:
The opinion
offered will be
the caller is in
the red zone.
Is it reliable?
2012, Aaron J. Romano, PC
Closest Site
1. Cell site out of service
maintenance
2. Cell site handling the
maximum number of
calls already
3. Cell site is obstructed
4. Cell sites antenna is
facing in the wrong
direction.
5. STRONGEST SIGNAL
Cell Site #1
Coverage Area #1
Cell Site #2
Coverage Area #2
to
which
site
will the
handset
connect?
Assume: HANDSET IS
STATIONARY
VARIABLES ARE CONSTANTLY CHANGING
Handset
10 mi.
Assume:
Omni-Directional
Site
Radius 10mi - 35mi
Equidistant Sites
10 mi.
314 sq. mi.
314 sq. mi.
10 mi.
2012, Aaron J. Romano, PC
A=r
Use Formula for
Area of Coverage
X 4= 1,256 sq.
miles
Smarter Investigation?
Examine the Assumptions
Anticipating challenge to coverage area
No data to support conclusions
Location Determination
Handset Accuracy
Determinations, (usually
via a GPS chip in the
phone): usually accurate
within 50 feet.
Network Accuracy
Determinations (usually
using trilateralization):
accuracy can be within
100 feet.
2012, Aaron J. Romano, PC
Network Accuracy
Time Difference Of
Arrival (TDOA) to each
of 3 cell sites translates
to a circular distance
from each
Angle of Arrival (AOA)
uses TDOA from at least
2 towers & direction of
signal
2012, Aaron J. Romano, PC
AN AARON
ROMANO TRIAL
TIP
This would be a good time to lean
over to the prosecutor and
whisper, My client has agreed to
accept a dismissal.
Congratulations!
You have now made the prosecutor cry
Cherry Biometrics
Michael Cherry & Manfred Schenk
http://www.cherrybiometrics.com/
Contact Information
www.AttorneyAaronRomano.com
(860) 286-9026
Aaron J.286-9028
Romano, PC
Fax:2012,
(860)
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
JUDICIAL
MIDDLESEX
DISTRICT
v.
AT MIDDLETOWN
OF
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE
ADMISSION OF CELLULAR TELEPHONE TOWER PING EVIDENCE
I.
Introduction
Pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Connecticut Constitution, and State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 (1997), the defendant,
by and through undersigned counsel, hereby respectfully moves this
court to preclude the admission of cellular telephone tower ping evidence.
II.
Argument
A. Cell Phone Records are Not Relevant Evidence
As the proponent of the cell tower evidence, the State first must prove the
preliminary fact that a ping registered at a particular tower from a specific cell phone at
a particular time is relevant. The appropriate rules for determining the preliminary fact of
relevancy for this issue are found in Conn. Code Evid. 4-1. Relevant evidence is
defined as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
material to the determination of the proceeding more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence. Conn. Code Evid. 4-1.
Crude COO positioning considers the location of the base station to be the
location of the caller. This is not very accurate, as the majority of mobile network cells
are projected from an antenna with a spread of 120 (i.e. three mounted on a mast to give
complete coverage) giving a signal coverage area with the base station at one corner,
rather than the center. Omni-directional cells may be used in rural locations (which
typically have large ranges and hence uncertain locations for phones within them) and in
cities (where they may have ranges of a few hundred meters to several miles depending
on the coverage). The underlying issue is that mobile phone networks are optimized for
capacity and call handling rather than locating phones. (emphasis supplied). A cell
phone is a radio - an extremely sophisticated radio, but a radio nonetheless. To send and
receive calls, text messages, or e-mail, cell phones communicate with radio towers,
known as cell towers. The cell towers are distributed throughout a coverage area; cell
phone users are often in range of more than one.
The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) adopted by 80 percent
of the worlds telecommunications administrators, including the United States, relies on
the fact that the phones constantly measure the signal strength from the closest 6 base
stations and lock on to the strongest signal (the reality is slightly more complex than this
and includes parameters that each individual network can optimize, including signal
quality and variability. Most networks seek to optimize for minimum power
consumption, but the overall effect approximates to each phone trying to find the
strongest signal at any given moment. However, it is the momentary strength of the
signal that causes the cell phone to interface with a particular cell tower. All networks
generate 'splash maps' predicting signal coverage when planning and managing their
networks. These maps can be processed to analyze the area which will be dominated by
each base station and to approximate each area by a circle (the actual area of coverage
may not be exactly where predicted... and in any case will be an irregular shape, rather
than a circle). The accuracy of network-based techniques varies, with cell tower
identification i.e., the evidence offered in the earlier trials without objection as the
least accurate and triangulation as the most accurate.
What has not been provided to the defense is the data necessary to triangulate the
location where the cell phone really was. Since the end of 2005, the telephone carriers
have been required to comply with a Federal Communications Commission regulation
called e911.
Signal), TDOA (Time Differential of Arrival) and/or AOA (Angle of Arrival), all of
which have importance in determining the true whereabouts of the cell phone.
As noted, supra, cell phones attempt to connect with the strongest signal at a
given moment, not the closest. At least hypothetically, a strong emitting tower would
attract signals from farther away, depending on the location of the cell phone. The
attempt to use the pings off the transmitters upon which the State is relying in trying to
pinpoint defendants location, is strongly opposed. The federal telephonic standard for
The FCC regulation is attached at the end of this points and authorities.
The Court should note that the only time when cell carriers must exercise the
ability to pinpoint a cell phone location is when a subscriber calls 911. In
other words, the cell companies have the computers to do the math of
comparing multiple signal strengths, locations, elevations, etc. to find someone
in an emergency, but they only are obligated to participate in tracking if the call
source is a 911 Call. Assuming that the State has turned over all the cell
phone information provided them by the carriers, the data provided does not
answer the question, Where was the cell phone when juxtaposed against it was
first pinged?
4
locating a cell phones point of origin is triangulation. 2 CFR Part 9.5, which required
compliance to be implemented by the phone companies on December 31, 2005.
validity is whether the scientific principle has gained general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community. See State v. Reid, 254 Conn. 540 (2000). As to the second factor,
relevance demands that the scientific evidence, no matter how valid, must be applicable
to the facts at issue. Hayes v. Decker, 263 Conn. 677 (2003). Upon objection by the
opposing party, the proponent of the scientific evidence bears the burden
of
demonstrating its admissibility. State v. Torres, 85 Conn. Conn. App. 303 (2004).
The States methodology in asserting defendants presence within a short distance
of the accident scene based on a cell tower ping is a misapplication of information
creating a half truth. At best, the ping off the cell tower means that defendant may
have been there or may not have been there.
The methodology used by the State the Cell of Origin methodology to
determine location is not accepted in the scientific community because it is inaccurate
and prone to error based on numerous variables. It is not accepted as accurate by the
regulatory bodies that oversee cellular telecommunciations, as Congress and the FCC
have mandated a program relying on 6 separate points to be measured and fed through
computers to be available to triangulate (perhaps sextengulate?) the location of the
cell phone.
Accepting thus far without any foundation that a cell tower location equals a
cell phones location raises a question of admissibility, not just one of weight. One can
say that a scale is inaccurate, and the Court could respond, That goes to weight rather
than admissibility, counsel [the pun was inadvertent], but if someone attempts to weigh
himself by standing on a hay stack, his opinion of his weight should not be admitted since
the haystack was not created for the purpose of weighing people. In the latter scenario,
presumably the Court asks: Can you explain to me how your standing on a haystack
allows you to form an opinion about how much you weigh?
The cell towers were not manufactured to act as surveillance tools. They were
created to move packets of information as swiftly as possible and at the cheapest possible
power output and cost possible from one cell tower to another, to allow companies to
maximize their profits without wasting (from their perspective) transmission power and
excessive bandwidth. It may be facile to point out that with GPS (global positioning
satellite) technology, we can find our location not just to degrees latitude and longitude,
but to minutes and seconds of those degrees, where a century ago navigators literally
relied upon the ancient astrolabe, quadrant, sextant and an extremely accurate and durable
time piece to compute over several hours for information we now get in less than 30
seconds, and which we can effortlessly repeat.
The FCC has forced the phone companies to reallocate their cell towers to assist
police. To that end, a standards committee agreed that six (6) cell towers would be
sufficient to accurately track down the 911 callers location. Based on that data, a phone
company computer quickly processes a great deal of trigonometry
to inform a police
As the Court and counsel may recall from their school days, a navigator, using a sextant,
undertakes a series of observations, all of which involve the creation and measurement of
artificial triangles. He then takes the figures measured by the sextant from his observations,
performs several trigonometric equations that results in his deriving the ships latitude. Cell
towers, in effect, are the telecommunications era version of a sextant. Pinging off one (1) cell
tower without at least a second (although the federal government insists on six) cell tower
being used as a reference point precludes the application of trigonometry.
that the State has suggests that a belief that a cell tower operates as a RADAR. It does
not. 2
The evidence and methodology purported by the State and used to substantiate the
conclusion that a ping off a cell tower is indicative of the defendants location is faulty
and misleading. To permit its admission would be a clear violation of the defendants
constitutional rights.
III.
Conclusion
The cellular ping is a linchpin in the States already weak case, and it cannot be
RADAR measures the distance to an object by transmitting a short pulse of radio signal
(electromagnetic radiation), and measuring the time it takes for the reflection to return. The
distance is one-half the product of round trip time (because the signal has to travel to the target
and then back to the receiver) and the speed of the signal. Since radio waves travel at the speed
of light (186,000 miles per second or 300,000,000 meters per second), accurate distance
measurement requires high-performance electronics.
In most cases, the receiver does not detect the return while the signal is being transmitted.
Through the use of a device called a duplexer, the radar switches between transmitting and
receiving at a predetermined rate. The minimum range is calculated by measuring the length of
the pulse multiplied by the speed of light, divided by two. In order to detect closer targets one
must use a shorter pulse length. N.B.: Cell towers are not designed as Radars.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Practice Book 10-12 through 10-17, and 11-1, this 23rd day of August
2010, the undersigned hereby certifies that this document complies with all format
provisions and further certifies that a copy of the foregoing was delivered in hand to all
counsel of record: Russell Zentner, Esq., Office of the States Attorney- Part A, One
Court Street, Middletown, CT 06457-3374.
10
SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
v.
AT MIDDLETOWN
Defendant.
DEFENDANTS MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE
ADMISSION OF CELLULAR TELEPHONE TOWER PING EVIDENCE
Pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, Article First, Sections Eight, Nine, and Ten of the Connecticut Constitution,
and State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 (1997), the defendant,
by and through
undersigned counsel, hereby respectfully moves this court for an order precluding the admission
of cellular telephone tower ping evidence. The defendant submits a memorandum of law
contemporaneously herewith in support of the foregoing motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
BY THE DEFENDANT
By_________________________________
Aaron J. Romano, Esq. Juris No. 415829
45 Wintonbury Avenue, Suite 107
Bloomfield, CT 06002
Tel: (860) 286-9026
Fax: (860) 286-9028
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Practice Book 10-12 through 10-17, and 11-1, this 23rd day of August 2010, the
undersigned hereby certifies that this document complies with all format provisions and further
certifies that a copy of the foregoing was delivered in hand to all counsel of record: Russell
Zentner, Esq., Office of the States Attorney- Part A, One Court Street, Middletown, CT 064573374.
DOCKET NO.
SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
JUDICIAL
MIDDLESEX
v.
AT MIDDLETOWN
DISTRICT
OF
Defendant.
O R D E R
AND NOW, to wit, this
day of
BY THE COURT:
__________________________
J.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
v.
OF MIDDLESEX
Defendant.
DEFENDANTS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE
ADMISSION OF CELLULAR TELEPHONE TOWER PING EVIDENCE
Pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, Article First, Sections Eight, Nine, and Ten of the Connecticut Constitution, and
State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 (1997), the defendant,
counsel, hereby respectfully moves this court to preclude the admission of cellular telephone tower
ping evidence.
I.
FACTS
On or about August 23, 2010 the Defendant filed a Motion in Limine to preclude admission
of cellular telephone tower ping evidence, as well as a memorandum of law in support thereof.
On or about October 4, 2010 and October 5, 2010, a Porter hearing was held to determine if the
States supposition, that the location of a single cell phone tower indicated the location of the
defendant, was based on valid scientific principles. The State presented expert witnesses Gary
Pellegrino, Alexis Eon, telephone records, and a calculation of distance between two different towers
and the lex loci delicti. The Defendant presented expert witness Manfred Schenck. As per the
request of the Court, the Defendant now submits this brief in support of his pending motion.
II.
ARGUMENT
The Court is the vanguard against the admission of junk science, both to protect the
constitutional rights of the defendant and to uphold the sanctity of the judicial process itself. In
response to the undeniable concern that defendants may be subject to the deleterious effects of
illegitimate theories masquerading as concrete scientific methodologies, the Connecticut Supreme
Court formulated guidelines for the admission of scientific evidence. The test articulated in State
v. Porter, 241 Conn 57 (1997) applies not only to scientific evidence, but to innovative scientific
techniques as well. Hayes v. Decker, 263 Conn. 677 (2003). Porter, supra, is applicable in
situations in which the ordinary juror must sacrifice his independent judgment in deference to the
expert or that creates an aura of mystic infallibility surrounding scientific techniques, experts
and fancy devices employed. State v. Hasan, 205 Conn. 485 (1987).
Upon objection by the opposing party, the proponent of the scientific evidence bears the
burden of demonstrating its admissibility. State v. Torres, 85 Conn. Conn. App. 303 (2004). An
analysis pursuant to Porter is fundamentally a two part inquiry: (1) Is the evidence scientifically
valid, and (2) Can the reasoning be applied to the facts of the present case? Porter, supra at 63-64.
The primary factor in determining scientific validity is whether the scientific principle has gained
2
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. See State v. Reid, 254 Conn. 540 (2000).
As to the second factor, relevance demands that the scientific evidence, no matter how valid, must
be applicable to the facts at issue. Hayes v. Decker, 263 Conn. 677 (2003).
Notably, although it is the States burden to prove the validity of the scientific evidence on
which it relies, the State never articulated precisely what scientific principle it was attempting to
utilize. The Defendant is forced to presume that the State was attempting to establish an unassailable
correlation between the location of the cell phone tower a call pinged off of and the defendants
location, thereby permitting the State to propound that the defendants exact location could be
determined from the location of a single cell phone tower. This deceptively facile premise is not
based on any scientific principles and distorts the actual use of cell phones, which is to be
communication, not tracking, devices. Porter Hearing N.T. 10/22/10 at p. 121.
The States postulation implies that the only factor upon which utilization of a particular cell
phone tower depends on is the distance between the cellular handset and the cellular tower. This is
simply untrue. Not only is location of the cell tower not indicative of the callers location, the ability
of a cell phone handset to ping off a cell tower depends on a multitude of factors, completely
independent from distance, including but not limited to:
when asserting its claim that the defendants location could be derived from the tower locations.
4
Rather, the State blithely professed its baseless conclusion and expected the Court to unquestioningly
accept the same. When asked by defense counsel, the States expert, Mr. Pellegrino, acknowledged
that all of the factors articulated above could impact the communication of the cellular handset with
a particular cellular tower, but was unable to testify as to the specific effects in this case, as neither
he nor the State possessed the requisite information. Porter Hearing N.T. 10/22/10 at pp. 87-92.
Instead of valid scientific evidence, the State presented the Court with Verizon Billing
Records for a target phone number and propagation maps, ultimately not admitted into evidence, that
the State had requested Verizon prepare for the purposes of this litigation. Billing records are
generated for the sole purpose of business record keeping. Id. at p. 123. They are not maintained
as a tracking log of the user of a particular cellular handset. Id. Similarly, the positioning and usage
of cellular towers is not determined in an effort to aid the State in the tracking of a defendant; they
are situated so as to best insure that calls go through. Id. at p. 95. Moreover, the propagation maps
submitted by the State portrayed only the select number of cell towers- those that the State requested.
There are potentially hundreds of cell towers in that given area, many with overlapping coverage.
Id. at p. 61. What the State does not want to admit is that cellular towers are a flexible resource,
designed for telephone companies seeking profit, not for the police to determine location. Cell
phones were not intended to be used as tracking tools, and so any attempt to use them as such in the
manner expressed by the State is inherently corrupt. The States use of maps and numbers cannot
disguise the fact that there is no objective scientific data to support its erroneous contention.
The States position is entirely undermined by the expert testimony presented at the Porter
hearing. As expounded by both Mr. Schenk and the States expert, the location of a cell tower does
not correlate with the location of the cell phone user. Id. at pp.104, 144. Even the States own expert
5
was forced to contradict the States conclusion given the unreliable methodology the State employed:
Attorney Romano: Okay. So, what were talking about here when you talked about
the tower communicating with the cell phone, and the tower records themselves,
were not talking about a closest tower, were talking about this cell tower with the
best signal, right?
Mr. Pellegrino: Thats correct. Porter Hearing N.T. 10/22/10 at p. 104.
As Mr. Schenk testified, a cell tower signal can reach 31.2 miles; that is a total area of
twenty eight hundred square miles in which a caller could feasibly be located. Id. at pp. 129-130.
Twenty eight hundred square miles is more than half the size of the Connecticut1, and a larger area
than either that of the states of Delaware2 and Rhode Island3. Therefore, for the State to allege that
a persons location can be determined with any sort of specificity from the location of a single cell
tower is preposterous. When asked by defense counsel about the potential rate of error for the
tracking scheme proposed by the prosecutor, Mr. Schenk replied that he was unable to answer that
question. When asked to state the reason he was unable to answer, Mr. Schenk responded: Well
because nobody has done it whatever. So, nobody has measured as to what the potential error is
because its, because a tracking, one particular signal source is inherently inaccurate and not
possible. Porter Hearing N.T. 10/22/10 at p. 132.
Although there is the possibility that cell towers could be used to determine a range of
location if a trilateralization calculation is done, the State failed to even do that. Trilateralization
requires three cell towers and would still only result in an approximate, not an exact, location.
However, the State did not utilized three towers. Id. at p.123. Instead, the State would like the Court
to accept that location can be determined using just one cell tower. There is a reason that no
commercial industries, such as the trucking industry, use the system proposed by the State to
determine location. Id. at p.132. This is because it is inescapably inaccurate. If the method
proposed by the State worked, other areas, not merely law enforcement, would employ the technique
as a reliable tracking method.
The only accurate way to determine location is through the use of a Global Positioning
System (GPS). Id. at pp. 121-122. Unlike cellular phones, GPS operates using satellites. Pursuant
to FCC regulations, cell phones are now required to contained GPS chips as part of an E911
initiative. Id. at p. 83. This is so that emergency responders can accurately locate a caller in distress.
If the methodology proposed by the State was at all accurate, there would be no need for the
government to require GPS chips in phones. Id. at p. 85. A methodology that has been determined
by independent government agencies not to be able stake a callers life on, should not now be
accepted as reliable enough to risk a defendants liberty.
III.
CONCLUSION
The State would like the Court to accept that a Defendants location can be determined based
on the location of a single cellular tower. This proposition is based on junk science and is in fact
entirely refuted by valid scientific principles and the prevailing technological industry standards.
Simply put, a cellular phone is a communication device, not a tracking device. Any attempt to use
7
it as such distorts both science and law. The supposition propounded by the State should not be
permitted by the Court and any evidence regarding cell phone tower pings is appropriately
excluded.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
BY THE DEFENDANT
th
By_________________________________
Aaron J. Romano, Esq. Juris No. 415829
45 Wintonbury Avenue, Suite 107
Bloomfield, CT 06002
Tel: (860) 286-9026
Fax: (860) 286-9028
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Practice Book 10-12 through 10-17, and 11-1, this 18th day of October 2010, the
undersigned hereby certifies that this document complies with all format provisions and further
certifies that a copy of the foregoing was delivered in hand/via first class united states mail/via
facsimile to all counsel of record: Russell Zentner, Esq., Office of the States Attorney- Part A, One
Court Street, Middletown, CT 06457-3374 (860) 343-6427.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
v.
OF MIDDLESEX
Defendant.
DEFENDANTS REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE
ADMISSION OF CELLULAR TELEPHONE TOWER PING EVIDENCE
Pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, Article First, Sections Eight, Nine, and Ten of the Connecticut Constitution, and
State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 (1997), the defendant,
counsel, hereby respectfully submits his reply brief in response to the States Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to Defendants Motion in Limine to Preclude Admission of Cellular Tower Ping
Evidence.
The States memorandum unequivocally demonstrates its inability to grasp the purpose of
the Porter hearing as well as the flawed logic upon which it attempts to base a baseless conclusion.
The Defendant will address the States contentions in the order each is presented in the States
memorandum.
The State devotes a large portion of its brief expounding on the qualifications of its expert
witnesses. The Defendant does not dispute Mr. Pellegrinos academic qualifications, despite the
noticeable absence of any higher level degrees in mathematics and/or the sciences. The Defendant
merely demonstrated through basic cross-examination that Mr. Pellegrinos generalizations regarding
cell tower routing were substantially undermined by his inability to answer any specific questions
relating to the cell towers and cellular handset in question. Porter Hearing N.T. 10/4/10 at pp. 87-92.
Further, Mr. Pellegrino agreed with the Defendants ultimate conclusion, and the very purpose in
holding the Porter hearing- that signal strength, which determines the cell tower that is utilized, is
not itself determined by proximity of the cell tower to the caller. Id. at p 104. The States
proposition ignores the realistic possibility that the nearest available cell tower may be five, ten or
twenty miles away from the cell phone that is placing the call. The States postulation only works
when a nearby tower is available. The availability of towers depends on a multitude of factors, as
articulated by the defendant, and beyond volume, which is the only factor aside from distance that
State concedes impacts tower selection.
Additionally, the State argues fervently for the validity of the Verizon records. This is a
wasted effort as the Defendant has never put the accuracy of the business records in dispute, and
moreover, the business records themselves have no bearing on the Porter hearing. The purpose of
having a Porter hearing was to address the scientific validity of the tracking method proposed by the
State, not the record keeping abilities of a telecommunications carrier. All the billing records do
2
demonstrate is that the State only considered the location of a single cell phone tower in deriving the
unsubstantiated conclusion that the location of the cell tower equated to the location of the
defendant.
The observation that the State deems most important, the principle of cellular
itself...generally accepted within the wireless industry has nothing to do with the evidence that the
State is attempting to admit. The principle to which the State is referring, as clearly stated in its
question is: The principal [sic] you described where I make a phone call and the, describe again the
principal [sic], I make a phone call, the tower picks it up, the tower, strong signals pick it up and then
it goes to the switching center and it looks for the number that Im trying to call. That whole
procedure you described, is that a principal [sic] thats generally accepted within the wireless
industry? Porter Hearing N.T. 10/4/10 at p. 26. The principle that the States Attorney describes
is the principle of cellular communication itself- which is completely distinct from the cellular
tracking that the State posits. There is no debate regarding how a cell phone works as a
communication device. The Porter hearing was necessary to determine if the cellular phone, a
communication device, could be used as a tracking device in the manner alleged by the State. The
answer is that as proposed by the State, it cannot. Even the principle as articulated, however
inarticulately posed by the States Attorney, describes cellular tower selection as dependent on signal
strength, which is not dependent solely on distance between the caller and the tower. The State
cannot simply ignore the postulations of its own expert and substitute distance for signal strength
to arrive at a conclusion that is presumptively illogical.
The State aptly notes that use of a particular tower indicates that a caller was within the
coverage area of that tower. States Brief at p. 8. However, as demonstrated by defense expert
3
Manfred Schenk, the coverage area of a tower can be twenty eight hundred square miles. Porter
Hearing N.T. 10/4/10 at pp. 129-130. That is hardly an exact location, irrespective of the States
misguided attempts to attribute any measure of definitiveness to its assertion. The State presents Mr.
Schenk lack of familiarity with the specific towers at issue as some sort of failing on Mr. Schenks
part. States Brief at p. 12. As an initial matter, such a supposition avoids the legal reality that it is
the States burden to prove the validity of the methodology it is employing, not the Defendants
burden to prove why the methodology is technology unsound, although it is apparent in this case.
That State even admits, through the testimony of its expert, that an exact location cannot be
determined based on the location of a cell tower. Porter Hearing N.T. 10/4/10 at p. 74. Yet, the State
wants to draw its ultimate conclusion, that the defendants location can be determined based on a
methodology that it admits is not accurate.
The State would like to scorn the importance of distinguishing between GPS and the cellular
tracking method proposed by the State, however the essence of the argument is found in the
comparison of accuracy. GPS is now required in cellular phones because cellular phones without
GPS chips remain simply communication devices. With the addition of GPS they are now activated
as location devices. Barring a GPS chip, there is no possible way that a cell phone, as a
communication instrument, can function as a reliable tracking device. If this were not the case, there
would be no reason for the FCC to require that cellular phone be equipped with GPS chips for the
purpose of emergency location. Porter Hearing N.T. 10/4/10 at p. 83.
Accepting, but not at all conceding, that the location of cellular towers could accurately
indicate location, a trilateralization calculation would have to be done. This requires three cellular
towers and was not performed by the State. Porter Hearing N.T. 10/4/10 at p. 123. The States
4
proposition is that single cellular tower correlates with a defendants location. The methodology
proposed by the State is not accepted, not within the cell phone community and not by the United
States Government. It should not now be accepted by this Court.
The testimony by Verizon representative Alexis Eon had absolutely no relevance to the Porter
hearing. Porter Hearing N.T. 10/4/10 at pp. 146-185. As previously articulated, the purpose of the
Porter hearing is to examine scientific methodologies, not to review billing records. Ms. Eon is a
keeper of records; she has no background in pattern recognition and/or cellular technology. The
question is not one of interpreting call detail records, States Brief at p. 10, but whether a
defendants location can be construed from the location of a cell tower.
The States argument regarding Mr. Schenks testimony reveals exactly how confused the
State is as to the very use of cellular devices as tracking implements. The State postulates: Mr.
Schenk testified, in much detail, regarding the theory and principle behind both GPS and E911
technology. Both technologies are inapposite to this Hearing because the State is not asserting that
either technology was used. States Brief at p. 11. This is precisely what is so problematic with the
evidence that the State is attempting to introduce. If the State had based its conclusion of the
defendants proximity to the home invasion on either GPS and/or E911 technology, there would not
be a debate regarding junk science. Instead, the State hazards, without any scientific basis, that
tower location and handset location are interchangeable variables within the schema of cellular
communication.
Finally and in a desperate effort to discredit the defense expert, the State implies that Mr.
Schenks lack of affiliation with either Verizon wireless and/or CALEA represents a weakness.
States Brief at p. 11. Rather, Mr. Schenk is a pattern recognition scientist, with degrees in higher
5
education, trained to work for the military on trident nuclear submarines and NASA on the Apollo
lunar lander. Porter Hearing N.T. 10/4/10 at pp. 112-113. As the Defendant noted in his brief, the
only context that attempts to use this sort of tracking system is criminal prosecutions. All other
commercial industries and scientific communities eschew this practice because it is unreliable in
practice and unsound in technique. Even police departments employ GPS technology with their own
employees. Any affiliation with either organization would only serve to detract from Mr. Schenks
credibility and objective assessment of the offered evidence.
Although the State may consider most pertinently that Mr. Schenk conceded that a
particular cell tower was used to connect a particular call. Similarly, the State considers it pertinent
that Mr. Schenk testified that billing records have to accurate to bill customers properly. States Brief
at p. 12. This characterization perverts the truth-seeking mission of Porter hearing. It is irrelevant
whether a call was re-routed or billing records are accurate. The focus of the inquiry is not
whether a specific tower was used; the proper focus of the inquiry is whether the State can
legitimately assert that the use of that particular tower correlates with the defendants location.
The State begins to touch upon the actual issue towards the end of its brief when it comments
that the importance of cell tower location is that the caller must be in the coverage range of the
tower. States Brief at p, 14. However, as explained by Mr. Schenk, the coverage area of a given
tower can be twenty eight hundred square miles. Porter Hearing N.T. 10/4/10 at pp. 129-130.
Attempting to pinpoint a location within that radius cannot be done with the methodology proposed
by the State.
The States conclusion that the cell phone user traveled from the Middletown area, to the
Hartford area, back to the Middletown area, over to the Middlefield area and then back to the
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Middletown area, States Brief at p. 17, cannot possibly be substantiated by the methodology the
State proposes. A linear progression cannot be inferred from the location of individual cell towers.
As defense counsel elicited from the States expert, an individual could be traveling straight in one
direction, with cell phone calls registering from one tower, enter a valley in which a different tower
is used, exit the valley, at which point the initial tower is again utilized. It might conceivably seem
as though that person made a u-turn if only cell tower location was examined, when in fact that
person had never altered course. Porter Hearing N.T. 10/4/10 at p. 97.
The State may be able to establish that a specific cell tower was used at a specific time. What
they have not been able to establish is that there is any scientific evidence that equates tower location
with caller location. Until the State can satisfy the first prong of the Porter test, that the evidence is
scientifically valid, the question of relevance is moot.
To address the States contention that this is an issue of weight, not admissibility, the
Defendant takes this opportunity to reiterate the argument he raised in his Motion in Limine.
Accepting thus far without any foundation that a cell tower location equals a cell phones
location raises a question of admissibility, not just one of weight. One can say that a scale is
inaccurate, and the Court could respond, That goes to weight rather than admissibility, counsel
[the pun was inadvertent], but if someone attempts to weigh himself by standing on a hay stack, his
opinion of his weight should not be admitted since the haystack was not created for the purpose of
weighing people. In the latter scenario, presumably the Court asks: Can you explain to me how
your standing on a haystack allows you to form an opinion about how much you weigh?
The State would present the Court with a bald conclusion regarding location without ever
delving into how this conclusion was obtained. The cell towers were not manufactured to act as
7
surveillance tools. The State has been unable demonstrate how they are able to now be used as such
with any measure of scientific validity.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
BY THE DEFENDANT
th
By_________________________________
Aaron J. Romano, Esq. Juris No. 415829
45 Wintonbury Avenue, Suite 107
Bloomfield, CT 06002
Tel: (860) 286-9026
Fax: (860) 286-9028
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Practice Book 10-12 through 10-17, and 11-1, this 18th day of October 2010, the
undersigned hereby certifies that this document complies with all format provisions and further
certifies that a copy of the foregoing was delivered in hand/via first class united states mail/via
facsimile to all counsel of record: Russell Zentner, Esq., Office of the States Attorney- Part A, One
Court Street, Middletown, CT 06457-3374 (860) 343-6427.
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No. 10 CR 747-2,3
Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow
I.
to Lopez, Evans, and co-defendant Jerry Zambrano, who has pleaded guilty and is expected
to be a government witness at trial. Cell site records reflect the location of the cell tower and
antenna face used at the start and end of a cellular telephone call. These records are
commonly used by law enforcement to analyze the past use of a cellular phone and thereby
obtain information about a subjects whereabouts, activities, and patterns of behavior.
The governments position is that the cell site records themselves are business records
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). In the event the parties do not stipulate to that fact,
the government intends to call a witness from Sprint Nextel to testify that the cell site records
produced to the government during the investigation are business records kept in the ordinary
course of Sprint Nextels business, that the records are made at or near the time of the
activity, and that Sprint Nextels regular business practice was to keep the records.
After admitting the cell site records themselves into evidence, the government intends
to call FBI Special Agent Joseph Raschke as a witness. Agent Raschke is expected to testify
about exhibits that he prepared based in part on the cell site records. These exhibits are maps
reflecting: (1) the location of cell towers used by phones connected to Lopez, Evans, and
Zambrano during various points of the conspiracy; (2) a comparison of the locations of some
of the cell towers to other locations relevant to this case, including the location of the
kidnapping, the location of where the victim was held, and the location of pay phones used
to make ransom calls; and (3) estimated ranges around the cell towers used by phones
2
investigation in this case have been produced to the defendants. Finalized versions to be
used as trial exhibits will be turned over when completed.
With respect to Agent Raschkes map containing information about the location of
cell towers, Agent Raschke will testify that, in creating the maps, he used the cell site records
themselves and Google Maps or a similar program to determine the locations of the cell
towers that phones connected to Lopez, Evans, and Zambrano used during the kidnapping.
In addition to illustrating the location of the cell towers, some of the charts will also compare
the cell tower locations to other locations relevant to this case, such as the location of pay
phones used for ransom calls, the location of the kidnapping itself, or the location where
evidence presented at trial will show that Minor A was held captive.
This portion of Agent Raschkes testimony is not expert testimony because Agent
Raschke is merely creating maps with locations of cell towers compared to other locations.
Such testimony would be appropriate lay opinion testimony. See United States v. Lee, No.
07-3985, 07-4642, 07-4687, 2009 WL 2219273, at *6 (3d Cir. July 27, 2009) (allowing lay
person to testify about map prepared using GPS program because program relies on a tool
used in everyday life, and requires no specialized training or knowledge.); United States v.
Thompson, No. 09-4154, 2010 WL 3529305, at 858 (3d Cir. Sept. 13, 2010). Indeed, some
court have taken judicial notice that the mapping tools are accurate. See United States v.
Stewart, No. 3:07cr51, 2007 WL 2437514, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2007); United States
v. Lente, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317 n.7 (D.N.M. 2010), reversed on other grounds, 647
F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2011).
For some of the maps, however, Agent Raschke will estimate the ranges of the cell
towers used by phones connected to Lopez, Evans, and Zambrano. Agent Raschke is
expected to testify, based on his training and experience in cell site and cellular record
analysis, that he can estimate ranges around cellular towers based on the proximity of the
towers to other towers in the area. Agent Raschkes maps will illustrate that, on a number
of occasions, pay phones used to make ransom calls were within the estimated ranges of cell
towers phones connected to Lopez and Zambrano used to make or receive calls shortly
before or after ransom calls.
Because part of Agent Raschkes testimony that involves expert testimony under Rule
704, on the date of the filing of this motion, the government has provided defense counsel
with a letter disclosing Agent Raschke as an expert witness on cellular record analysis. A
copy of the letter provided to defense counsel is attached as Exhibit A. This is appropriate
expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because: (1) Agent Raschke will be
testifying based on specialized knowledge and his training and experience; (2) the testimony
will be technical and will aid the trier of fact to determine issues in this case, namely, various
defendants locations at or around the time of ransom calls and other significant events; (3)
the analysis is based on sufficient facts or data, namely the cell site records; (4) the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods, as will be established by Agents Raschkes
testimony; and (5) Agent Raschke has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
4
of the case. Accordingly, the government seeks a pre-trial ruling as to the admissibility of
the exhibits that Agent Raschke is preparing and as to his testimony.
II.
exclusively for the court and should not be considered by the jury in arriving at a verdict as
to guilt or innocence.). Mention of the potential penalties faced by defendants would serve
only the improper purpose of jury nullification. See, e.g., United States v. Reagan, 694 F.2d
1075, 1080 (7th Cir. 1982) (The authorities are unequivocal in holding that presenting
information to the jury about possible sentencing is prejudicial. (quoting United States v.
Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1384 (10th Cir. 1980)).
The government is not suggesting through this motion that evidence of penalties faced
by co-defendant Jerry Zambrano should be barred in the event Zambrano testifies as a
government witness. Instead, the government seeks an order precluding defense counsel
from mentioning or introducing evidence regarding any of the range of penalties defendants
may face if convicted.
III.
allowing both Minor A and his father to be present during the trial in this case. Federal Rule
of Evidence 615 provides that at a partys request, courts must order witnesses excluded so
that they cannot hear other witnesses testimony. Rule 615 recognizes numerous exceptions,
including for a person authorized by statute to be present. Fed.R.Evid. 615(d). Section
3771(a)(3) provides a statutory basis for Minor A and his father to be present at trial in this
case. That statute states that crime victims have [t]he right not to be excluded from any such
public court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence,
determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other
6
defense counsel as necessary, materials setting forth potential impeachment material for some
witnesses in this case. In an abundance of caution, the government has produced various
materials that do not constitute admissible impeachment, including criminal history reports
of some government witnesses. Of course, the mere fact that the government has produced
to the defense a fact or an allegation does not render it admissible at trial. By this motion,
the government moves this Court to preclude defense counsel from introducing at trial,
Arrests
The government will disclose to defense counsel the rap sheets and criminal histories
of witnesses it may call at trial (and it will continue to do so if that list changes). Some of
these witnesses have been arrested on prior occasions. Evidence of a prior arrest should be
precluded in accordance with the strictures of Rules 609 and 608. Federal Rule of Evidence
609 allows for the admission of a witnesss felony conviction for purposes of impeachment
under certain specified circumstances. Under the Rule, [f]or the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of
a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted .
. . Fed. R. Evid. 609. By its express terms, Rule 609 permits evidence only of convictions,
not arrests.
Nor are arrests admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). Rule 608(b) provides that
specific instances of past conduct may be inquired into on cross-examination if and only if
they concern the witnesss character for truthfulness.1 Courts have not construed Rule 608(b)
to permit cross-examination on prior arrests absent special facts bearing on the witnesss
character for the specific trait of truthfulness. By way of example, one of the witnesses the
Even then, these past instances may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b).
government intends to call at trial has a prior arrest for retail theft. The fact of the arrest, and
any questions about the conduct underlying the arrest, should be barred because retail theft
is not a crime involving dishonesty. See, e.g., Clarett v. Roberts, 657 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.
2011) (Retail theft lacks an element of an act of dishonesty that is common to crimes of this
type. As such, [t]his circuit generally does not count retail theft as a crime of dishonesty
for purposes of Rule 609(a)(2).) (quoting Kunz v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 675 (7th Cir.
2008)).
Thus, unless defendants can demonstrate that the conduct underlying any arrest
implicates a witnesss character for truthfulness (an inquiry that should be done outside the
presence of the jury), defendants should be precluded from inquiring into the conduct.
B.
To the extent they are known, the government has disclosed, and will continue to
disclose to defense counsel, bad acts by its witnesses known to the government. Under
Rules 611 and 608(b), defendants are permitted to inquire into specific bad acts of the
witness only if these acts are probative of truthfulness. So the Court can make the
appropriate rulings, the government requests that defense counsel identify the prior conduct
about which they intend to cross-examine a given witness and demonstrate how that conduct
is probative of truthfulness. This should occur outside the presence of the jury and before a
witness testifies at trial, to prevent jury nullification and/or undue prejudice.
10
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully requests that the above
motions in limine be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
GARY S. SHAPIRO
Acting United States Attorney
By: /s/ Jason A. Yonan
JASON A. YONAN
SAMUEL B. COLE
Assistant U.S. Attorneys
219 S. Dearborn Street, 5th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 353-5300
Dated: July 25, 2012
11
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No. 10 CR 747-3
Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow
and analysis for defendant as well as co-defendants Jose Lopez and Jerry Zambrano. Since
the government filed its motion, a change of plea date was scheduled for Lopez, and it does
not appear he is going to trial in this case. The vast majority of cell site evidence and
analysis the government intended to admit in this case related to the use of cellular phones
by Lopez and Zambrano. If Lopez is not a defendant at trial, the government does not intend
to seek admission of most of that evidence in a trial solely against defendant, although it
reserves the right to do so based on how the trial progresses. Instead, the cell site evidence
and analysis the government seeks to admit against defendant is discussed below.
First, as the government stated in its motion, much of FBI Special Agent Joseph
Raschkes testimony will be not be expert testimony at all. In particular, as part of his
testimony, Agent Raschke will review maps he created that contain information about the
location of cell towers and other locations relevant to this case. One such chart will contain
the location of the victims home near where the kidnapping took place compared to the
location of a cell tower that defendants phone used shortly before the kidnapping. A draft
of that chart has been produced to the defendant. In connection with the chart, Agent
Raschke is expected to testify that the cell tower defendants phone used is the cell tower
closest to the location of the kidnapping. That is not based on any expert testimony or
specialized knowledge, but instead based on Agent Raschkes review of the cell site records
produced in this case and on a review of other cell towers in the area. Agent Raschke may
also include in his chart the distance between the tower and the location of the kidnapping,
which again is not based not on any specialized knowledge but instead on the mapping
program tools he used to create the map.
Agent Raschke will also testify concerning maps illustrating cell phone towers that
defendants phone used on April 23, 2010, and April 24, 2010, compared to other locations
in this case, including the location where the victim was held and a cell tower that a Cricket
phone used for a ransom call from that location. Drafts of such charts have been produced
to the defendant. Again, this is not expert testimony.
2
Only three parts of Agent Raschkes testimony regarding the charts is expert
testimony based on specialized knowledge. First, Agent Raschke will testify that a cell
phone uses a cell tower that: (1) is in the vicinity of where the cell phone is being used; and
(2) operates on the particular cell phone network of the cell phone service provider. Contrary
to defendants claim, Agent Raschke will not testify that a cell phone always uses the tower
closest to it. Instead, as the government previously disclosed, Agent Raschke will testify that
a number of factors determine what cell tower a cell phone uses, including the location and
proximity of the tower and network traffic.
Second, Agent Raschke will also estimate coverage ranges around cell towers that
defendants phone used. As the government disclosed to defendant, Agent Raschke
estimated network coverage ranges around the cells towers based on comparing the distance
between other towers in the area and using his training and experience on network operation,
network coverage, and network set-up, which is detailed below.
Agent Raschkes
estimations have been produced to the defendant as part of many of the charts that the
government has turned over.
Specifically, with respect to the maps regarding the location of where the victim was
held, the government intends to show that, during the time period relevant to this case,
defendants phone primarily used two cell towers near the location where the victim was
held. Agent Raschke is expected to testify that the location where the kidnapping victim was
held lies in the coverage overlap area between these two towers. Agent Raschke is expected
to testify that a cellular phone will often use two different cell towers when the location in
which the phone is used lies in an area where the towers overlap in coverage.
Third, Agent Raschke is expected to testify that the calls from defendants phone, and
the call from the Cricket cell phone, could have come from the location where the victim was
held ransom in this case. This testimony is based entirely on the charts already produced
which include the location of the cell towers, the estimated tower ranges, and the location
where the victim was held. So, the government has already fully disclosed the substance of
Agent Raschkes testimony and his methodology and defendants objections to the amount
of the governments disclosures should be overruled.
To the extent defendant objects to Agent Raschkes testimony as unreliable, such
objection should be overruled as well. To determine reliability, the court should consider
the proposed experts full range of experience and training, as well as the methodology used
to arrive at a particular conclusion. United States v. Pansier, 576 F.3d 726, 737 (7th Cir.
2009). Agent Raschkes experience in cellular phone analysis and investigation is extensive.
His curriculum vitae, which was provided to the defendant, shows that:
*
Agent Raschke has received over 350 total hours of instruction in the use of
cellular phones in investigations, including:
---
--
One week of FBI Training in 2009 related to cellular historical and real
time analysis;
Two weeks of training in 2009 regarding cellular telephone network
theory in emerging technology support;
One week of training in 2009 with FBI wireless intercept tracking
team/cellular technology training, which included in-person training
--
Agent Raschke has been qualified as an expert witness in historical cell site
analysis on four occasions in the Cook County Circuit Court in September
2010, May 2011, November 2011, and February 2012.
phone to connect with a cell site, it would have to be within the cell sites coverage area.
Id. at *3. The government seeks to have Agent Raschke provide similar testimony in this
case. The court in Benford found that such testimony was sufficiently relevant and reliable
under Daubert. Id. at *4.
Finally, there can also be no dispute that Agent Raschkes testimony and charts are
relevant. His testimony and charts will be relevant to determining defendants whereabouts
during the kidnapping and ransom in this case and will also corroborate testimony expected
from other government witnesses about defendants actions and whereabouts.
II.
improper impeachment related to bad acts by government witnesses under Federal Rules of
Evidence 608(b) and 611. In his response, defendant states that he does intend to question
one potential government witness about the fact that he was a drug dealer. Defendant asserts
that such testimony is relevant to the witness bias and motive to testify against defendant.
Without knowing more about defendants reasoning for presenting this testimony, the
government is unable to determine whether it would object to this line of questioning.
Accordingly, the government submits that, before engaging in this questioning, defendant
should have to identify outside the presence of the jury the prior conduct he intends to
explore on cross-examination and demonstrate how that conduct is probative of matters
relating to bias or motive.
Respectfully submitted,
GARY S. SHAPIRO
Acting United States Attorney
By:
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No. 10 CR 747
Judge Joan H. Lefkow
records reflecting the location of cell towers and antennas used during certain cellular phone
calls. The government also intends to call FBI Special Agent Joseph Raschke as an expert
witness to testify regarding exhibits he prepared based on the historical cell site records. Id.
Specifically, the government expects Agent Raschkes exhibits to reflect: (1) the location of the
cell towers used by certain individuals involved in this case; (2) a comparison of the locations of
certain cell towers to other locations the government believes are relevant to this case; and (3)
estimated ranges of certain cell towers utilized by phones connected to certain individuals
involved in this case. Id.
The defense objects to the admission of records related to historical cell site information
and to Agent Raschkes testimony. Defendant submits that the government has provided
insufficient detail of its expert testimony under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G).
And, the government has not established that its proposed expert testimony meets the strictures
of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589
(1993). As such, Defendant requests a Daubert hearing prior to the admission of testimony
related to cell site information and estimated ranges.
The government has provided the defense with an expert disclosure letter detailing Agent
Raschkes testimony.1 The letter states that Agent Raschke will identify the location of cell
towers used by certain individuals in this case, and their relation to other locations the
government believes are relevant. Agent Raschke will also testify based on his training and
experience, about why a cellular phone may use one or more towers during the duration of a
particular call, including because of things like the proximity of the tower and the level of use of
towers in the area. Id. Furthermore, Agent Raschke will provide testimony that he estimated
the ranges around the cell towers based on his training and experience performing cell site
historical analysis. (Exhibit A, p. 2). The letter states that Agent Raschkes estimated ranges
are based on the proximity of the towers to other towers in the area, and the estimated network
range for each tower. Id. No other detail regarding the relevance of the location of the cell
towers or of the methodology or reasoning for the estimated cell tower range is provided.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) requires the government to provide a
summary of any expert testimony it intends to use and must describe the witnesss opinions, the
bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witnesss qualifications. While the government has
given a list of subjects about which Agent Raschke will testify, it has not met the requirements of
Rule 16. First, the government has not provided the defense with certain of Agent Raschkes
opinions, for instance, why a particular phone may use one or more towers during a particular
call.2 The letter merely states that Agent Raschke will testify about the topic, but omits any
expert opinion. Second, and more critically, the government has provided no bases or reasons
for Agent Raschkes expert testimony regarding the estimated ranges of cell towers. The
government has merely stated that Agent Raschke is capable of estimating ranges, and described
that ranges are based on certain factors. No reasoning is found anywhere in the governments
letter. The defense submits, therefore, that the letter cannot be considered a proper expert
disclosure as it lacks the required information under Rule 16.
The governments motion in limine regarding Agent Raschkes testimony is similarly
lacking in detail. This lack of detail in the governments disclosure and motion runs afoul of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Supreme Courts pronouncements in Daubert. Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if: (1) the experts knowledge will aid the trier of fact; (2) if the testimony is based on
sufficient facts or data; (3) if the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(4) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. The
government has not established that Agent Raschkes testimony meets these requirements. As
noted above, the government has not so much as provided the methodology for Agent Raschkes
The governments tendered discovery includes charts created by Agent Raschke illustrating the estimated ranges of
certain cell towers. The defense assumes that these charts constitute Agent Raschkes opinion on the estimated range of the
towers. No methodology is provided, however, as to how these estimates were reached.
opinions, let alone whether such methodology has been reliably applied to the facts of this case.
Without such information, this Court cannot determine that Agent Raschkes testimony is
admissible and the governments motion in limine should be denied.
Furthermore, the governments proposed testimony does not meet the requirements of
Daubert. In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that district courts are the gatekeepers to the
admissibility of scientific evidence under Rule 702. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 597 (1993). The Court required that such scientific evidence be both relevant and
reliable. Id. This gatekeeping responsibility, as well as the relevance and reliability
requirements, were subsequently extended to all expert testimony in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999).
Beginning first with the testimony regarding the locations of cell towers and their
relation to purportedly relevant locations, it appears that the government has made the
assumption that a cell phone call must necessarily utilize the nearest tower and that the
individual making the call must therefore be within a certain geographic range. But the
government has provided no basis or methodology for this theory. Without providing any
support, the location of cell phone towers, especially in comparison to purported relevant
locations, is irrelevant. The government cannot simply admit evidence regarding the cell phone
tower used during a certain call and leave the jury with the inference that the tower used is the
tower nearest to the phone. Rather, the government must demonstrate that this is, in fact, how
cell phones work. Nothing in its disclosure letter or motion in limine provides any detail
regarding how the evidence is relevant or reliable. Rather, the evidence is highly prejudicial
because the jury will intuitively assume that the nearest tower is the tower used by a cell phone.
The government has also provided no methodology for Agent Raschkes estimate ranges
of cell towers. In Daubert, the Supreme Court laid out non-exhaustive general criteria for
assessing the reliability and validity of an experts testimony including whether the experts
methodology in question can or has been tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication, the methodologys known or potential error rate and the existence and maintenance
of standards controlling its operation, and whether the methodology has attracted widespread
acceptance within a relevant scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-4. By not detailing
any methodology that Agent Raschke will employ, this Court can make no finding as to whether
the methodology is reliable.
The government has only stated that Agent Raschke can estimate cell tower ranges based
on his experience and training. For the above reasons, such an assertion is insufficient. This
Court should deny the governments motion in limine seeking pre-trial determination as to the
admissibility of Agent Raschkes testimony and his exhibits.
In light of the above, the Defense requests that Agent Raschkes historical cell site data
be precluded from admission and that Agent Raschke be prohibited from testifying.
Alternatively, the defense requests a Daubert hearing on the issue of the admissibility of
historical cell site data and estimated ranges, as the testimony is neither reliable nor relevant.3
Since receiving the governments expert disclosure, counsels research has not uncovered a circuit court
case in which the admission of historical cell site data, along with the governments theory that cell phone calls
always utilize the nearest cell tower, was held to meet Daubert standards. Furthermore, the defense has found no
circuit court case stating that estimating cell tower ranges meets Daubert standards. Counsel have uncovered district
court cases, including United States v. Benford, 2010 WL 2346305 (N.D. Ind. June 8, 2010), in which similar
evidence was held admissible. But, Benford appears to utilize a different methodology than the government has
here.
Counsel have researched these issues and have also been in contact with an expert in the field of historical
cell site data and have learned that the governments theories are unsupportable. Counsel have learned that cell
phones do not necessarily utilize the nearest cell tower and that the actual determination of which cell tower is used
is complex and hinges on a multitude of factors. Furthermore, counsel have learned that the governments charted
II.
by Defendant. However, as the government has noted, it is proper for the defense to elicit
evidence of penalties faced by any cooperating government witnesses.
III.
during the trial. However, the defense submits that a blanket pre-trial ruling permitting those
individuals to attend any part of the trial they wish is premature. The defense would request that
the Court permit the defense to object or seek to exclude Minor A or his father should an issue
regarding their presence arise; i.e., should a risk arise that either Minor A or his fathers
testimony would be materially altered if the individuals heard each others testimony at the trial.
18 U.S.C. 3771(a)(3).
IV.
improper impeachment or evidence, including evidence of prior arrests or evidence of other bad
acts not probative of truthfulness. The defense does not intend to engage in any improper
questioning or elicit improper evidence. Moreover, the defense does not intend to use any
witnesss arrest history or other bad acts in an improper manner under Rule 608(b).
However, the defense does intend to question Jerry Zambrano, the governments
cooperating witness and co-defendant, about the fact that he is a drug dealer. Such evidence is
relevant and probative for several reasons unrelated to Rule 608(b), including Zambranos bias
cell tower ranges, purportedly setting geographic boundaries for the utilization of cell site towers are unsupported by
fact and do not rest on sound methodology.
against Evans and his motive to testify. While the defense does not wish to fully divulge the
details of its defense to the charges, it should suffice to say that evidence of drug dealing
between Zambrano and Defendant Evans is relevant to show why the two individuals were in
communication with one another aside from their alleged participation in a kidnapping.
Furthermore, Zambrano has claimed in statements to the FBI that Evans stole a large quantity of
marijuana from him. The fact that Zambrano possessed a large quantity of marijuana will reveal
to the jury that Zambrano was a drug dealer. But more importantly, evidence of such an incident
is relevant to demonstrate Zambranos bias as a witness and his motivation to implicate Evans in
a kidnapping. As the Seventh Circuit has long said, [b]ias is always relevant, and parties should
be granted reasonable latitude in cross-examining target witnesses. United States v. Manske,
186 F.3d 770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999) quoting United States v. Frankenthal, 582 F.2d 1102, 1106 (7th
Cir. 1978).
Zambranos drug dealing is also admissible as reverse 404(b) evidence. While Rule
404(b) is generally used to show a defendants prior bad acts for proof of something other than a
defendants propensity to commit a crime, a defendant can seek to admit evidence of a witnesss
crime if it tends to negate the defendants guilt. United States v. Seals, 419 F.3d 600, 606 (7th
Cir. 2005) citing United States v. Della Rose, 403 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir. 2005). Furthermore,
reverse 404(b) evidence is held to a lower standard than normal 404(b) evidence because there
is no risk of prejudice to a defendant. Id. citing United States v. Stevens 935 F.2d 1380, 1404 (3rd
Cir. 1991). Under 404(b), evidence of Zambranos drug dealing is admissible to show his
motive to testify, his knowledge of Defendant, and the reason for communications between
Zambrano and Evans. The defense submits, therefore, that it should be permitted to explore the
drug dealing history of Zambrano. Such evidence is relevant and is not barred by Rule 608(b),
404(b) or any other Rule of Evidence.4
Respectfully submitted,
s/ Patrick W. Blegen
PATRICK W. BLEGEN, One of the
Attorneys for Defendant, Antonio Evans.
The defense does not intend to argue that Zambrano is not to be believed simply because he is a drug
dealer. Such an argument would be counter-productive as the evidence of Zambranos drug dealing will also reveal
that Evans was involved with drugs.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that foregoing was served on August 3, 2012, in accordance with
Fed.R.Crim.P.49, Fed.R.Civ.P.5, LR 5.5, and the General Order on Electronic Case Filing (ECF)
pursuant to the district courts system as to ECF filers.
s/ Patrick W. Blegen
BLEGEN & GARVEY
53 West Jackson Boulevard, Suite 1437
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 957-0100
EXHIBIT A
EXHIBIT A
vs.
ANTONIO EVANS
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
The two co-defendants, Jerry Zambrano and Jose Antonio Lopez, pleaded guilty on April 27,
2012 and August 7, 2012 respectively. (See Dkt. #95, #115.)
and analysis are admissible. After the hearing, Evans moved for disclosure of expert evidence
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. (Dkt. #122.) For the reasons set forth herein, the
governments motion in limine (dkt. #97) will be granted in part and denied in part and Evanss
motion (dkt. #122) will be denied as moot.
LEGAL STANDARD
The admission of lay witness testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 701,
which limits lay opinion testimony to that which is (1) rationally based on the witnesss
perception; (2) helpful to clearly understanding the witnesss testimony or to determining a fact
in issue; and (3) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702. Fed. R. Evid. 701. The admission of expert opinion testimony is governed
by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert. See Bielskis v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d
887, 893 (7th Cir. 2011). Rule 702 states that a witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill experience, training or education may testify in the form of opinion or
otherwise provided that (1) the experts scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (2) the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (3) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods; and
(4) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Fed. R.
Evid. 702. To admit expert testimony under this rule, the court must determine that (1) the
witness is qualified; (2) the experts methodology is scientifically reliable; and (3) the testimony
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Myers v. Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co., 629 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2010).
In Daubert the United States Supreme Court set out four factors the court may consider
when assessing the reliability of an experts methodology, including (1) whether the theory is
based on scientific or other specialized knowledge that has been or can be tested; (2) whether the
theory has been subjected to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error and the
existence of standards controlling the theorys operation; and (4) the extent to which the theory
is generally accepted in the relevant community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 59394; see also Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999).
The Rule 702 inquiry is a flexible one. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. As such,
[d]eterminations on admissibility should not supplant the adversarial process; shaky expert
testimony may be admissible, assailable by its opponents through cross-examination. Gayton v.
McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 616 (7th Cir. 2010). The proponent of the testimony bears the burden of
proving that the proffered testimony meets these requirements, and the Seventh Circuit grants the
district court wide latitude in performing its gate-keeping function. Bielskis, 663 F.3d at 894
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
BACKGROUND
The government has obtained what it alleges are the call data records for the phone
registered to Evans during the time of the alleged conspiracy. The data contained in these
records includes the date and time of calls originating from Evanss phone, the duration of each
call, and the originating and terminating cell tower (also known as cell site) used by the phone to
place the call. Using these records, Special Agent Raschke testified that he could apply the
granulization theory to estimate the general location of Evanss phone during the time calls were
using his training and experience, Special Agent Raschke predicts where the coverage area of
one tower will overlap with the coverage area of another.
Applying this methodology, Special Agent Raschke testified that he could estimate the
general location of Evanss cell phone during an 18 minute period (from 12:54 p.m. to 1:12 p.m.)
on April 24, 2010, during which time Evanss phone used two cell towers to place nine calls.
According to Special Agent Raschke, based on his estimate of the coverage area for each of the
antennas, the calls made from Evanss phone could have come from the location where the
victim was held for ransom. In support, the government proposes to admit summary exhibit 6,
which is a map of the two towers used by Evanss phone and a drawing of the estimated
coverage overlap of the two towers. The building where the victim was held falls squarely
within the coverage overlap of the two towers. (See Govt Summ. Ex. 6.) In addition to this
exhibit, the government also proposes to introduce maps indicating the location of cell towers
used by Evanss phone in relation to other locations relevant to the crime (Govt Summ. Exs.
15),2 maps showing the topography of the area between the two towers indicated in summary
exhibit 6 (Govt Summ. Ex. 78), and a listing of the total number of calls placed by Evanss
phone during the relevant time period that originated or terminated with one of the two towers
(Govt Summ. Ex. 9).3
Government summary exhibit 1 also contains a line from the location of one of the cell towers
used by Evanss phone to the location where the victim was kidnnapped, demonstrating the close
proximity of the two locations.
3
The government has also moved to admit the call data records under the business record
exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Assuming the proper foundation is laid, these
records are likely admissible. See United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d. 384, 389 (D. Md. 2012)
(stating that historical cell site location records are created by cellular providers in the ordinary course of
business).
ANALYSIS
I.
Admissibility of maps containing cell tower locations and other locations relevant to
the crime
As an initial matter, the government argues that a portion of Special Agent Raschkes
testimony is admissible under Rule 701, specifically, his testimony concerning maps he created
indicating the location of certain cell towers used by Evanss phone during the course of the
conspiracy in relation to other locations relevant to the crime. (See Govt Summ. Exs. 15.) The
court agrees that using Google Maps to plot these locations does not require scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge and that these exhibits are admissible through lay opinion
testimony under Rule 701.
The relevancy of these exhibits, however, is primarily based on the premise that a cell
phone connects to the tower in its network with the strongest signal, and the tower with the
strongest signal is usually the one closest to the cell phone at the time the call is placed.
Although this is the general rule, there are a variety of factors that determine the tower to which
a cell phone will connect. See Aaron Blank, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using
Historical Cellular Site Data to Track the Location of a Cellular Phone, 18 RICH. J. L. & TECH.
3, at *7 (Fall 2011) (identifying factors that affect a towers signal strength to include the
technical characteristics of the tower, antennas and phone, environmental and geographical
features and indoor or outdoor usage); Matthew Tart et al., Historic cell site analysis - Overview
of principles and survey methodologies, 8 DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 1, 186 (2012) (In a perfectly
flat world with equally spaced and identical masts, a mobile phone user would generally connect
to the closest mast. In the real world, however, this is not necessarily the case.). Indeed,
Special Agent Raschke himself testified that topography, physical obstructions and the signal
strength of other towers can impact whether a cell phone connects to the tower closest to it.
Lay witness testimony is admissible under Rule 701 when it is rationally based on [a]
witnesss perception or based on a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life. Fed. R.
Evid. 701 & advisory comm. notes (2000 amends.); see also United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d
548, 554 (7th Cir. 2002) (Lay opinion testimony is admissible only to help the jury or the court
to understand the facts about which the witness is testifying and not to provide specialized
explanations or interpretations that an untrained layman could not make if perceiving the same
acts or events. (quoting United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641 (8th Cir. 2001)).
Understanding how the aforementioned factors affect a cell phones ability to connect a
particular tower, however, cannot be said to be within the perception of the untrained layman.
Rather, this type of understanding demands scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge of cellular networks and results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered
only by specialists in the field. Fed. R. Evid. 701 & advisory comm. notes (2000 amends.);
Conn, 297 F.3d at 554 (Expert opinion . . . brings to an appraisal of those facts . . . that the lay
person cannot be expected to possess.)4 Special Agent Raschke may therefore provide lay
(continued...)
7
opinion testimony concerning (1) the call data records obtained for Evanss phone and (2) the
location of cell towers used by Evanss phone in relation to other locations relevant to the crime;
but if he wishes to testify concerning (1) how cellular networks operate, i.e., the process by
which a cell phone connects to a given tower or (2) granulization theory he must first meet the
demands of Rule 702 and Daubert.5
II.
Admissibility of testimony concerning how cellular networks operate and the theory
of granulization under Rule 702 and Daubert
A.
Special Agent Raschke testified that he has been a member of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for 14 years and currently serves on the agencys Violent Crimes and Fugitive Task
Force. He has received over 350 hours of training and instruction in the use of cellular phones
and investigations and spends approximately 70 percent of his time in his current position
analyzing cell phone records. He has instructed approximately 700 officers in basic techniques
for utilizing cell phones in investigations and has been qualified as an expert in the use of
historical cell site data in five state court cases in the past two years. (See Govt Ex. CV.)
(...continued)
solely on a persons special training or experience is properly classified as expert testimony, and therefore
it is not admissible under Rule 701.)
5
On this point, the court respectfully disagrees with those courts that have allowed law
enforcement officers to provide lay opinion testimony as to how cellular networks operate or the use of
call data records to determine the location of a cell phone. See, e.g., United States v. Feliciano, 300 F.
Appx. 795, 801 (11th Cir. 2008) (allowing officer to provide lay opinion testimony based on his
particularized knowledge garnered from years of experience in the field, but relying on Tampa Bay
Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213, 1223 (11th Cir. 2003) for a position
that has been called into doubt in this district, see Chen v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 415, 419
(N.D. Ill. 2004)); United States v. Henderson, No. CR 10-117 BDB, 2011 WL 6016477, at **45 (N.D.
Okla. Dec. 2, 2011) (allowing agent to provide lay opinion testimony that cell phone records identif[y]
the cell tower that was nearest to the location of the cell phone at the time a particular call was made or
received).
Special Agent Raschke testified that he has received training from Sprint-Nextel on how their
cellular network operates and is familiar with the operation of this and similar networks. He also
stated that he has successfully used historical cell site data on a number of occasions to locate
people (both dead and alive) in the course of other FBI investigations.
Based on this testimony, the court is satisfied that Special Agent Raschke is qualified to
testify as an expert concerning the operation of cellular networks and granulization theory. See
United States v. Allums, No. 2:08CR30 TS, 2009 WL 806748, at **23 (D. Utah Mar. 24,
2009) (holding that FBI agent was qualified to provide expert testimony on historical cell site
analysis where he underwent two official FBI training courses on how cell technology and cell
networks function, five training courses on radio frequency theory, and was obtaining a masters
degree in geospatial technology); see also United States v. Schaffer, 439 F. Appx. 344, 347 (5th
Cir. 2011) (finding that lower court did not err in allowing FBI agent to provide expert testimony
where agent taught courses on historical cell site analysis, his students had qualified as experts,
and he had used the technique without error on at least 100 occasions).
B.
Rule 702 instructs that when a qualified expert provides testimony regarding general
principles, without trying to apply those principles to the facts of the case, the experts testimony
need only (1) address a subject matter on which the factfinder can be assisted by an expert; (2)
be reliable; and (3) fit the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory comm. notes (2000
amends.). Here, testimony concerning how cellular networks operate would be helpful because
it would allow the jury to narrow the possible locations of Evanss phone during the course of
the conspiracy. Although Special Agent Raschke is not an engineer and has never worked for a
9
network provider, he has received extensive training on how cellular networks operate and is in
regular contact with network engineers. He also spends a majority of his time analyzing cell site
records, which requires a thorough understanding of the networks themselves. The court
concludes that his testimony on this subject is reliable. Finally, it is undisputed that a phone
registered to Evans used certain cell towers to place a number of calls during the course of the
conspiracy and, as such, Special Agent Raschkes testimony on this topic fits squarely within the
facts of this case.6
C.
Special Agent Raschke testified that using a theory of granulization he can estimate the
range of certain cell sites based on a towers location to other towers. This in turn allows him to
predict the coverage overlap of two closely positioned towers. Special Agent Raschke testified
that he has used this theory numerous times in the field to locate individuals in other cases with a
zero percent rate of error. He also testified that other agents have successfully used this same
method without error. No evidence was offered, however, beyond Special Agent Raschkes
Evanss proposed expert, Manfred Schenk, contested Special Agent Raschkes opinion
regarding which cell towers get recorded in the call data records. According to Schenk, the only cell
tower that gets recorded is the tower that ultimately services the call (i.e., the tower assigned by the
mobile switching center, not the tower that the phone initially connects to before being routed to the
mobile switching center.) This factual disagreement goes to the weight not the admissibility of Special
Agent Raschkes testimony. See, e.g., Traharne v. Wayne Scott Fetzer Co., 156 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (Factual inaccuracies are to be explored through cross-examination and go toward the
weight and credibility of the evidence not admissibility. (citing Walker v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d
581, 58689 (7th Cir. 2000)). The same is true for the line connecting the location of the kidnapping to
the cell tower used by Evanss phone on April 23, 2010 contained in summary exhibit 1. Evans is free to
solicit on cross examination factors other than proximity that may have caused Evanss phone to connect
with that particular tower.
10
testimony, to substantiate the FBIs successful use of granulization theory or its rate of error in
the field.
Despite Special Agent Raschkes assurances, the court remains unconvinced that
granulization theory is reliable. First, in determining the coverage overlap of the two towers
used by Evanss cell phone on August 24, 2010, Special Agent Raschke assumed that Evanss
cell phone used the towers closest to it at the time of the calls. But as previously discussed, there
are a number of factors that could have caused Evanss phone to connect to these towers even
though another tower was closer. For example, a building could have obstructed the phones
access to the closest tower7 or the call could have been rerouted due to network traffic. Special
Agent Raschke acknowledged these factors but did not fully account for them in his analysis.
Rather, he relied on his training and experience to estimate the coverage overlap between the
two. Estimating the coverage area of radio frequency waves requires more than just training and
experience, however, it requires scientific calculations that take into account factors that can
affect coverage. Special Agent Raschke presented no scientific calculations and did not consider
a variety of relevant factors. Although the call data records upon which he relied are undisputed,
the link between those records and his conclusions is deficient. See United States v. Mamah,
332 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2003) (It is critical under Rule 702 that there be a link between the
facts or data the expert has worked with and the conclusion the experts testimony is intended to
Special Agent Raschke testified that he has driven this area many times and there are no
buildings that would obstruct cell phone access to nearby towers. It is unclear when he drove this area
and whether he drove it with the specific purpose of determining whether any such obstructions exist. Cf.
Allums, 2009 WL 806748, at *1 (finding methodology reliable where agent drove around cell towers
using a cell phone from defendants provider and device called a Stingray to determine the approximate
range of coverage for each tower).
11
support. . . . The court is not obligated to admit testimony just because it is given by an expert.
(internal citation omitted)).
Second, the granulization theory remains wholly untested by the scientific community,
while other methods of historical cell site analysis can be and have been tested by scientists.
See, e.g., Matthew Tart et al., Historic cell site analysis - Overview of principles and survey
methodologies, 8 DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 1, 193 (2012) (reviewing techniques for collecting
radio frequency data for historic cell site analysis and concluding that [a]rea [s]urveys around
the location of interest . . . provide the most accurate and consistent method for detecting
servicing [c]ells at a location). The Seventh Circuit has stated that [a] very significant Daubert
factor is whether the proffered scientific theory has been subjected to the scientific method.
Chapman v. Maytag Corp., 297 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2002). This is because the scrutiny of
the scientific community . . . increases the likelihood that the substantive flaws in methodology
will be detected. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593; see also Charles Alan Wright et al., 29 FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE - EVIDENCE 6266 (1st ed.) ([J]udicial interference with the jurys
power to weigh [expert] evidence may be warranted where expert testimony is based on
emerging scientific theories that have not gained widespread acceptance within the scientific
community.). Granulization theory has not been subject to scientific testing or formal peer
review and has not been generally accepted in the scientific community. These factors weigh
against a finding of reliability.
Given that multiple factors can affect the signal strength of a tower and that Special
Agent Raschkes chosen methodology has received no scrutiny outside the law enforcement
community, the court concludes that the government has not demonstrated that testimony related
12
to the granulization theory is reliable. As such, testimony concerning this theory, along with the
estimated range of coverage for each of the towers indicated on summary exhibit 6, will be
excluded under Rule 702 and Daubert. Because summary exhibits 7 through 9 do not contain
estimated ranges of coverage, they will be admitted.
Enter:___________________________
JOAN HUMPHREY LEFKOW
United States District Judge
13
SrPERI)F. (erRT GA 9
141002'008
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OOCKET NO.
SUPERlOR CO'CRT
OFFICE
STATE
~F
FlE CLERK
J.D. OF MIDDLESEX
v.
SUPER-lOR C00RT
GEOGRAPHICAL AREA #9
A T MIDDLETOWN
NOVEMBER 1, 2010
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The matter pres,:ntly before the court is the admissibility of the state's proposed cellular
II
signal transmission and tower evidence C'cell-site data"). This matter arises from an alleged home
. invasion that occurred c'n September 29,2008 at 462 Main Street, Middlefield, Connecticut On
October 23,2008,
with the follo\\1ng crimes: (1) conspiracy~ (2) home invasion; (3) burglary in the first degree
badEy injury; (4) burgla::-y in the tust degree ~ at night; (5) assault in the tirst degree; (6) kidnaping
in the fIrst degree - physical injury; and (7) accessory to larceny in the second degree.
The defendant's motion in limine, dated August 23, 2010) objected to admission ofthe cellsite data evidence alld demanded a Porter hearing. The court granted this motion and a Porter
hearing was held on October 5,2010. Both the state and the defense offered testimony afexpert
witnesses} entered exhitits, and thereafter filed briefs with the court articulating their respective
positions. These briefs are dated October] 8, 2010. Oral argument was heard by the court on
OCT.Ober 27, 2010.
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DISCUSSION
The state seeks to admit data which, it contends. would reveal the general vicinity of where
a ceO phone was located at a particular point in time by identifying which cell tower conummicated
with the cell phone while it was turned on.' The defendant argues that the proffered evidence is
neither reliable nor rek:ant, and that the coun, in perfonnance of its gatekeeper function must not
permit it to be presented to the jury. The state takes the contrary position, emphasizing that they
invasion, on
Septembe~
29, 2010 at 1:33 am. The state argues that this is evidence of the
defendant's general vicinity tending to disprove his alibi defense, dated July 19, 2009, wherein the
defendant claims to have been at 96 Hendricxscn Avenue, Hartford, Connecticut on the night in
question.
"[WJhether the proffered ev'idence \\,111 'assist the trier of fact' ... entails a two part inquiry:
whether the reasoning 01' methodology underlying the [scientific theory Or technique in question]
is scientifically valid ane
facts in issue. In other wmds, before it may be admitted, the trial judge must find that the proffered
scientific evidence is beth reliable and relevant." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omined.) State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 63-64, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert denied, Porter v.
The state ",rill attempt at lrial to prove that the target cell phone at issue belonged to the defendant.
2
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Connecticut, 523 U.S. 1058, 118 S. Ct. 1384, 140 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1998). The Supreme Court
adopted a non-exclusive list of factors for judges to consider in determining whether scientific
evidence should be admitted: "(1) whether it can be, and has been, tested; (2) whether the theory
or technique has been subjected to peer review and pUblication; (3) the known or potential rate of
enor, including the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation:
and (4) whether the technique is, in fact, generally accepted in the relevant scientific community."
Id., 64.
The court also emphasized that "it is proper for trial judges to serve as gatekeepers for
in scientific fact, but instead is based on conjecture and speculation, it cannot in any meaningful
way be relevant to resolving a disputed issue." rd., 74. "So long as the methodology underlying
a scientific opinion has tle requisite validity, the testimony derived from that methodology meets
the Daubert threshold for admissibility, even if the judge disagrees with the ultimate opinion arising
from that methodology, and even
if there are
conclusions. Thus, a judge should admit scientific testimony when there are good grounds for [the]
expert's conclusion, even if the judge thinks that there are better grounds for some alternative
conclusion." (Emphasis in original; internal quotatior, marks omitted.) Id., 81-82.
In the present case, the court tinds that the state's cell-site data evidence meets the threshold
for admissibility under Purfer and must not be excluded on that basis. What this dala might reveal
about the defendant's general vicinity on September 29,2009 is relevant to this case, especially in
light of his alibi defense, Further, as explained in detail below, the state's presentation at the
11 i
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141005:008
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j Porter
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hearing
S\i{ti ~, .... .f
Alt,ltough the derellJant presented evidence that the cell-site data is dependant on a number of
I
I,
factors, this alone does not render the methodology underlying such evidence unreliable or
:I
ilrelevant. It is merely information that the jury must consider when weighing the evidence during
their deliberations.
The state's firs t witness at the Porter hearing, Gary Pellegrino, is the president of
Commt1ow Resources, a consultant for the v:ireless industry, and has over forty years ofexperience
in telecommunications, working at Bell Atlantic and Verizon Wireless, among others. R.T.
10/4/2010 p. 5. l\1r. Pellegrino also helped to develop the first standard for the Comnnmications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, which interconnects switching systems with real time
infonnation to lawful a1.;.thorized agencies." R.T. 10/4/2010 p. 6
Mr. Pellegrino testified that the "mobile switching center" is the brains of the wireless
device: and that there are many "cell-sites," or towers, that communicate with the mobile switching
center. R.T. 10/412010 p. 7_ \Vhen a call is made from a ceUularphone, the system authenticates
the user and looks for the best serving tower, closest to the mobile phone by signal strength, to
cormect the caJl. R.T. 10/4/2010 p. 8. Every time a call is placed from a mobile device, a record
is created at the moment ':he caller hits the send button and again at the time the call is ended. R. T.
10/4/2010 p. 18. This record is called the "call detail record" and contains much information,
including the target num')er, which is the Verizon phone in question, the call direction, meaning
whether it was incoming or outgoing, the date and time the call was made, the duration of the cali,
and the first and last serving cell-sites. (State's Exhibit 1). Pellegrino testified that these records
are derived from the ';autcmatic message accounting records." These are Verizon' s billing records,
11/.1 ,!010
12,
\1'
nx
~ln
141 006/(108
JJ 656
11
II
,!
which are kept ill r~~l t, r. - and are their highest priority in terms of accuracy and record-keeping.
R. T. 10/4/2010 p. 2) Pellegrino further testified that the manner in which cellular telephones
comm.....'l.i;::';Jh:: with mo'Jile switching centers and towers, and the recoId-keeping practices he
,I
\ I
de::.crioed, are all generally accepted m the telecommunications industry. R. T. 10/4/2010 pp. 25-26,
The state also c(tlled Alexis Eon, a seventeen year employee ofVerizon WiFeless~ whose
[I
Ms. Eon
corroborated the testimony given by Mr. Pellegrino v.itb regard to creation and content ofthe call
detail record and noted lhat this record is kept in the ordinary course of business. R. T. 10/4/2010
p.
147-148~
162-169.
~:he
also testified about the specific cellular phone at issue in this case.
Referencing the "subscr:.ber record'; (State's Exhibit 2), she noted the telephone number assigned
to the mobile phone at issue and pointed out that this phone was a prepaid device. RT. 10/4/201 0
pp. 150-151. Ms. Eon te;;;tified that the device in question was activated on September 9, 2008 and
turned. off on January 31,2009, RT. 10 /4/2010 p.lSl. She also testified that the phone number
on the subscriber record matched the target number on the call detail record. R.I. 10/412010 p.
160, 166. Finally, Ms. Eon testified as to the locations ofcertain cellular towers, most notably that
oftower 146, which is locatedat393 Jackson Hill Road, Middlefield, Connecticut. R.T.I0/4/2010
p.180,
The court, having reviewed the credible evidence, exercises its gatekeeper function and
finds that the evidence i:; both reliable and relevant for the following reasons. The process by
which a cell tower receive:s signal, and the process by which that infoTIllation is recorded, is reliable
and constitutes the genenuly accepted practice throughout the telecommunications industry. This
,L.L
" . L ' ..
,il.l)
S[PERII)R (CrRT GA 9
14I00i.(I08
methodology is the very science upon which cellular communication and billing are based. The
fact that this methodology has not received peerreview, or been studied for potential rates oferror,
is not fatal. These comiderations are only a few of many that the court must take into account
when deciding whetheno admit evidence under Porter. Further, the Supreme Court has stated that
"general acceptance in 1he relevant scientific conununity will continue to be the significant, and
often the only, issue.... [I]n many cases, its presence may alone be sufficient to admit the
evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. 84-85. Finally,
this data is relevant to tr,e extent that the call detail record indicates that the cell phone in question
was within range of a cellular tower in Middlefield, located approximately one half mile from the
site ofthe home invasion, on September 29,2010 at 1:33 am. Accordingly, the court finds that this
evidence '\\ill assist the trier of fact.
There are no published COlUlecticut decisions on point for the issue ofwhether cell-site data
is admissible under Porrer. The court is aware, however, that this evidence has been admitted by
other judges of the
Supl~rior
hav(~
Benford. United. States District Court for the Nor1hem District ofIndiana, No. 2:09 CR 86 (June
8, 2010, Moody, J.) (holding that cell-site evidence presented through expert testimony is
sufficiently relevant and reliable Wlder Dauberr, which was the standard adopted by the
Connecticut Supreme Court in Porter); United Stales v. Allums, United States District Court for
the District of Utah, No. 2:08 CR 30 (March 12, 2009, Stewart, J) (finding that cell-site
methodology was sufficiently reliable under Daubert, despite the fact that a number of factors,
including weather, may cause a cell tower at a much longer distance from the cal1er to pick up the
srPEREIR
corRI
GA 9
[4]008:008
signal); United Slales v. Afendoza-Morales, United States District Court for the District ofOregon,
No. 05-98-01-RE (December 12,2007, Redden, J.) (finding that evidence regarding cell phone
tower locator systems that locate approximately where an outgoing call was made, was admissible
under Daubert).
The court acknoY'.rI.edges testimony by the defendant's expert, Manfred Schenk, which noted
that cell-site data is dependant upon a number of variables-wattage output of the tower, weather,
typography, anterma height-that may ultimately cause a call signal to be transferred to a tower.
R.T. 10/4/20 lOp. 126. This testimony, however, does not impact the reliability or relevance of the
methodology underlying cell-site evidence. These issues go to the weight ofthe evidence, and not
to its admissibility. The factors that may affect cell-site evidence are a proper topic for
cross-
examination, not a grOlUlds for keeping the evidence out altogether under Porter.
III
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to exclude the cell-site evidence is
denied.
SO ORDERED
BY THE COLTRT,
~,
~~
VflES!,
PETER EMMETT
JUDGE
()~~ L)~O\O
NO: CR09-630158
SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF HARTFORD
v.
AT HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT
ROGEAU COLLINS
A P P E A R A N C E S :
3
1
ATTY. ROMANO:
THE COURT:
ATTY. GARCIA:
5
6
THE COURT:
call.
THE COURT:
ATTY. ROMANO:
10
11
ATTY. GARCIA:
12
THE COURT:
I just --
Okay.
15
THE COURT:
16
ATTY. ROMANO:
19
Correct.
14
18
ATTY. GARCIA:
17
Could be.
It could
Okay.
it, okay.
20
ATTY. GARCIA:
Okay.
21
ATTY. ROMANO:
22
23
THE COURT:
25
ATTY. ROMANO:
27
24
26
Thank you.
Okay.
13
I know.
All right.
Recess.
4
1
(Recess.)
THE COURT:
ATTY. GARCIA:
THE COURT:
THE CLERK:
THE COURT:
Okay.
ATTY. GARCIA:
10
Certainly.
He should be excused.
certainly.
11
ATTY. ROMANO:
12
THE COURT:
Yes.
We have to
13
14
15
MR. POSNIAK:
16
THE COURT:
Close friend.
Okay.
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18
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20
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MR. POSNIAK:
22
THE COURT:
23
happened.
Appreciate that.
Were all very sorry that this
24
MR. POSNIAK:
Yes.
25
THE COURT:
26
27
I hope.
Thank
5
1
MR. POSNIAK:
THE COURT:
Thank you.
If you have anything in the jury
Thank you.
THE CLERK:
No.
THE COURT:
Okay.
THE CLERK:
David Andrews.
THE COURT:
Very good.
All right.
Let me
10
11
admissibility.
12
13
Offer of proof.
ATTY. GARCIA:
site information.
14
THE COURT:
15
ATTY. GARCIA:
There will be --
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ATTY. ROMANO:
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ATTY. GARCIA:
19
THE COURT:
Okay.
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ATTY. GARCIA:
Thank you.
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24
860-922-0 --
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THE COURT:
So three numbers.
26
ATTY. GARCIA:
27
THE COURT:
Yes.
6
1
2
ATTY. GARCIA:
THE COURT:
ATTY. GARCIA:
Dean.
THE COURT:
ATTY. GARCIA:
Who?
Adrian Dean, who is the co-
10
THE COURT:
Yes.
11
ATTY. GARCIA:
12
13
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15
THE COURT:
All right.
16
17
18
numbers?
19
ATTY. GARCIA:
He will be testifying to
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THE COURT:
24
ATTY. GARCIA:
Theyre
25
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27
7
1
THE COURT:
I get it.
ATTY. GARCIA:
scheduling.
THE COURT:
ATTY. GARCIA:
Okay.
Were
I had anticipated
10
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12
and why.
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THE COURT:
Okay.
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ATTY. GARCIA:
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THE COURT:
numbers.
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ATTY. GARCIA:
24
THE COURT:
I got it.
25
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ATTY. GARCIA:
27
THE COURT:
I have it.
Sure.
8
1
2
3
THE COURT:
besides time --
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THE COURT:
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ATTY. GARCIA:
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THE COURT:
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ATTY. GARCIA:
What I
9 to 12.
Approximately 9 to midnight.
What else?
As a component of the records or
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9
1
So I think it would be
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Detective Kovanda.
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nature.
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THE COURT:
Want to respond?
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ATTY. ROMANO:
25
THE COURT:
Yeah.
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27
Its my
What should -- I
10
1
educate me.
ATTY. ROMANO:
THE COURT:
5
6
Okay.
Middletown?
ATTY. ROMANO:
10
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attempting to do that.
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concede that.
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A cellular network is
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overlap.
Cellular networks
THE COURT:
ATTY. ROMANO:
So the
10
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case.
23
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towers.
25
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So the question
So what
That just
12
1
So while
10
with that one because its the closest one, there may
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many variables.
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There may be
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THE COURT:
held device.
ATTY. ROMANO:
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THE COURT:
Yeah.
24
ATTY. ROMANO:
And
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1
the FCC, calls were being made 9-1-1 calls that were
Prior
10
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it, you know, you can buy a telephone and it says GPS
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THE COURT:
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ATTY. ROMANO:
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down there.
15
1
2
3
THE COURT:
Yeah.
Get
to the point.
ATTY. ROMANO:
GPS unit.
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THE COURT:
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ATTY. GARCIA:
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18
are nine towers that come into play, towers that are
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THE COURT:
ATTY. GARCIA:
this.
cell phones.
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THE COURT:
Okay.
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ATTY. GARCIA:
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that you hit and can discuss how calls are handed out
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THE COURT:
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ATTY. GARCIA:
He will readily
Okay.
The States position is the
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this nationwide.
all.
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THE COURT:
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ATTY. ROMANO:
13
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the jury --
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THE COURT:
anything.
ATTY. ROMANO:
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resulted in an acquittal.
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discount that --
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THE COURT:
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ATTY. ROMANO:
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1
2
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THE COURT:
Theres been no
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ATTY. ROMANO:
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THE COURT:
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in the courts.
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ATTY. ROMANO:
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truck.
then a location --
6
7
If
THE COURT:
example.
ATTY. ROMANO:
THE COURT:
Right.
Im aware of my responsibilities as
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constitutional rights.
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ATTY. ROMANO:
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area.
But if I
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I submit
So what we
So
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towers were used and these are where those towers are
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THE COURT:
Okay.
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ATTY. GARCIA:
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THE COURT:
We
And so an effective
Okay.
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ATTY. ROMANO:
Okay.
THE COURT:
ATTY. ROMANO:
ATTY. GARCIA:
THE COURT:
We ready?
All right.
back.
(Recess.)
10
ATTY. GARCIA:
11
THE COURT:
12
ATTY. GARCIA:
13
16
Yes.
I just wanted to provide the
14
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THE COURT:
Okay.
I guess we
are?
ATTY. ROMANO:
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encompassed --
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THE COURT:
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ATTY. ROMANO:
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It was denied.
And it would have encompassed the
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THE COURT:
Right.
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ATTY. ROMANO:
25
THE COURT:
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ATTY. ROMANO:
27
THE COURT:
Okay.
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1
do, right?
ATTY. ROMANO:
record exception.
THE COURT:
Very good.
ATTY. ROMANO:
on there.
10
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confusion.
14
THE COURT:
15
ATTY. ROMANO:
16
THE COURT:
Yes.
17
All right.
18
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ATTY. ROMANO:
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ATTY. GARCIA:
21
22
then.
23
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THE COURT:
Okay.
25
ATTY. ROMANO:
26
27
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1
the jury.
THE COURT:
Okay.
it.
5
6
All right.
ATTY. ROMANO:
THE COURT:
ATTY. ROMANO:
Okay.
So its 4-2, 4-3.
Ill assume
10
THE COURT:
Yeah.
11
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THE COURT:
One of the
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your presence.
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next witness.
ATTY. GARCIA:
All right.
The State
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1
D a n
testifies as follows.
THE COURT:
All right.
10
order, okay.
11
ATTY. ROMANO:
12
THE COURT:
Yes.
13
14
15
ahead.
16
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ATTY. GARCIA:
Go
18
19
Good morning.
20
21
Sprint Nextel.
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1
network information.
those records.
3
4
technology?
10
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years.
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networks?
27
Yes.
27
1
2
3
that your bill is paid, your phone would then go into just
10
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need.
12
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15
the cell site or the cell tower, that the phone is currently
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of our customers.
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voice mail.
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And
Yes.
28
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3
4
5
And are those records that you then use for purposes
Yes.
10
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12
Yes.
We do.
13
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cell phone?
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Yes.
24
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fair to say?
Yes.
10
Yes.
11
12
It could.
13
Yes.
14
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It could.
Yes.
17
ATTY. GARCIA:
18
THE COURT:
19
20
If I may approach?
Yes.
BY ATTY. GARCIA:
Q
21
22
documents, sir?
23
Yes.
I do.
24
25
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30
1
sites.
few of our cell sites from that large cell site list.
ATTY. GARCIA:
THE COURT:
10
ATTY. GARCIA:
11
THE COURT:
12
THE CLERK:
David Andrews.
13
THE COURT:
Mr. Andrews.
14
15
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We didnt tell
All right.
Youre a
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locations of the cell sites for the New York market and
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Even
31
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Yes.
Yes.
10
Yes.
11
ATTY. GARCIA:
12
15
as well then.
13
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It is.
THE COURT:
All right.
BY ATTY. GARCIA:
Q
16
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located at.
22
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indicate?
A
exact cell site and sector for the cell site for that call.
26
27
Yes.
32
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Yes.
site.
Q
indicate?
A
10
itself?
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data.
22
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25
If you
cell site.
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1
particular tower?
Yes.
indicate?
8
9
10
11
12
Yes.
13
14
15
16
cell site, this will tell you which sector youre looking
17
at.
18
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indicate?
A
23
24
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26
State's Exhibit 74, could you describe what that record is,
27
sir?
34
1
2
3
4
detail records?
860-922-0723.
indicate?
10
11
phone call.
12
13
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15
particular call.
Q
16
17
indicate?
18
The
19
this Sprint subscribers phone number and that that call was
20
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23
number, if at all?
24
25
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35
1
2
3
that indicate?
A
This stands for mobile role number and this will tell
This is the date and the time that the call came on
8
9
10
11
Yes.
12
13
there?
14
Just the date and the time that the call ended.
15
16
seconds?
17
Yes.
18
19
20
It is.
in seconds.
21
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27
Sprint network.
36
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
Yes.
11
12
They are.
13
14
records would show call detail records, but from the Nextel
15
network.
16
17
18
19
20
21
These
22
Yes.
It is.
23
24
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26
phone is activated.
27
37
1
merely buy minutes and then have them deducted as you use
them?
Thats correct.
With a
Okay.
No.
10
11
12
Yes.
13
14
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16
17
18
No.
19
20
21
Adrian Dean.
22
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24
860-838-7346.
25
26
27
Okay.
38
1
The
testified to 0723?
Yes.
And what is the time and date that that call was
placed?
2009.
10
11
Okay.
12
13
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15
16
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18
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21
22
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24
860-922-0723.
25
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page 4 of 7?
A
Okay.
39
1
2
Yes.
I believe you
Yes.
10
11
voicemail?
12
Yes.
13
14
15
16
17
18
more of the technical term for the push to talk phone number
19
20
21
Yes.
22
23
Yes.
24
25
26
when you use the push to talk function on these phones, like
27
40
1
can listen.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Yes.
11
12
phone calls?
13
Yes.
14
15
16
it, could again explain how this column relates to the phone
17
calls?
18
Yes.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
go to the cell site list to figure out which cell site was
26
27
41
1
2
3
phone number that was called for each individual phone call.
4
5
Yes.
9
10
11
12
860-726-5447.
13
14
Yes.
15
16
account?
17
18
19
20
Yes.
21
22
174*313*13714.
23
24
25
26
27
77.
42
1
2
Okay.
7346 and States Exhibit 78, which I just handed you, the
Yes.
There is
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Yes.
18
19
20
21
ATTY. GARCIA:
22
Your Honor?
23
24
25
26
27
THE COURT:
Sure.
BY ATTY. GARCIA:
Q
Yes.
43
1
Yes.
seconds?
Yes.
10
Yes.
Thats correct.
11
12
13
14
Yes.
15
16
17
Thats correct.
18
ATTY. GARCIA:
19
20
this time.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. ROMANO:
21
22
Yes.
23
Okay.
I do.
Great.
24
25
these straight.
26
27
Yes.
44
1
Good morning.
Number 74.
Okay.
860-922-0723.
Excellent.
Now I think --
ATTY. ROMANO:
10
Honor?
11
THE COURT:
Sure.
12
ATTY. ROMANO:
13
14
THE COURT:
Thank you.
15
16
Sure.
BY ATTY. ROMANO:
Q
Okay.
17
18
19
20
21
22
that.
23
Okay.
24
Okay.
25
26
Oh, it is?
27
Yes.
45
1
ATTY. GARCIA:
THE COURT:
ATTY. ROMANO:
Yes.
If there can be a
10
11
12
13
Thats so stipulated?
14
ATTY. GARCIA:
15
THE COURT:
16
17
18
Yes.
Yes.
proven, as a fact.
BY ATTY. ROMANO:
Q
19
20
that correct?
21
Yes.
22
Okay.
23
ending in 7346?
24
Correct.
25
Okay.
26
Yes.
27
Thats 7246?
46
1
Yes.
All right.
detail records dating back from March 6 from all the way to
Yes.
10
11
Yes.
12
13
14
15
Okay.
16
17
18
19
20
21
9:07 p.m. until the end of that day, March 9th of 2009, I
22
only show one phone call between those two numbers, which
23
24
Okay.
25
ATTY. ROMANO:
26
THE COURT:
27
BY ATTY. ROMANO:
Courts indulgence.
47
1
duration?
Yes.
6
7
10
11
12
13
Okay.
14
15
page, the larger exhibit for 7346, we see calls that are 4
16
17
duration.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
48
1
Okay.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Okay.
and 860-726-5447.
Q
20
21
treated differently?
22
23
24
25
26
27
49
1
Are the cell towers that are used the same cell
technology difference?
6
7
8
All right.
10
11
and you describe one being on Nextel network and one being
12
13
14
15
16
17
Yes.
18
is, I would imagine on the IDEN type of phone and the other
19
20
Thats correct.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
We -- the multiple
50
1
making a call.
technology.
access.
10
11
12
13
14
15
The phone switches are made by the same venders and our
16
17
Thats
18
19
20
correct?
21
22
signal.
23
All right.
24
25
26
27
51
1
tower is using.
Okay.
puts out a signal or are you saying the phone, you described
when you power up the phone, that the phone begins searching
Yes.
Okay.
9
10
11
No.
12
13
signal strength.
14
Okay.
15
16
17
18
Okay.
19
correct?
20
Yes.
21
All right.
They do.
Do you have any information about the
22
23
numbers?
24
No.
25
Okay.
26
27
52
1
2
All right.
familiarity with it, that they are all equipped GPS chips
Thats correct.
Okay.
10
they try and reach out and find you for an emergency, that
11
12
13
14
emergency procedures.
15
Okay.
16
17
18
911, correct?
19
20
21
And I guess the problem with that was the cell tower
22
23
24
25
26
27
53
1
itself, right?
Yes.
Okay.
Greater than?
Okay.
10
11
Yes.
12
13
14
Yes.
15
All right.
16
17
18
signals, correct?
19
It can, yes.
20
21
22
direction, correct?
23
Correct.
24
25
26
Correct.
27
All right.
54
1
facing you cant really pinpoint where the person is, can
you?
Thats correct.
9
10
11
Yes.
12
13
individual, right?
14
15
Now all phones are equipped with that GPS chip for
16
17
Yes.
18
19
chip, were not talking about a GPS function that one may
20
21
22
23
24
25
No.
Right.
26
Lets
27
assume that you go into a store, you buy the simplest phone
55
1
Okay.
direction, okay?
Okay.
8
9
10
11
12
All right.
13
Yes.
14
15
Yes.
16
Okay.
17
18
19
Yes.
20
21
22
23
Okay.
All right.
24
25
26
27
56
1
All right.
correct?
10
11
12
13
14
Okay.
15
16
17
areas, correct?
18
Sure.
19
20
21
right?
22
23
All right.
24
25
26
27
57
1
Yes.
All right.
Thats true.
All right.
10
No.
11
12
13
is?
14
15
area, show where our cell side or cell sites are located at
16
17
site.
18
19
sites?
20
Yes.
21
22
right?
23
Yes.
24
Okay.
25
those towers?
26
No.
27
58
1
No.
No.
these records?
No.
10
11
12
Yes.
13
All right.
14
15
16
17
Yes.
18
19
20
Correct.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
that you can provide the jury with any information as to the
59
1
No.
Not specifically.
Generally then?
Yes.
do that?
10
11
12
13
14
15
Okay.
16
towers or lets talk about the cell tower sites that the
17
18
19
towers?
20
No.
21
22
23
No.
24
25
26
No.
27
60
1
Okay.
Okay.
companies, correct?
It could be.
10
11
12
Yes.
13
Okay.
14
15
16
No.
17
Okay.
18
19
20
21
22
Its different
23
24
those seven cell phone towers that the prosecutor gave you
25
26
27
No.
61
1
2
Yes.
outdoors, correct?
7
8
9
Thats correct.
Okay.
10
11
12
13
Yes.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
62
1
Sure.
Yes.
No.
No?
No.
10
Please explain?
11
12
13
14
15
Okay.
16
17
18
19
20
21
towers and the data that you have with respect to the dates
22
and times that the prosecutor gave you, do you have any
23
24
No.
25
Okay.
26
27
63
1
Thats correct.
Yes.
10
Correct.
11
12
13
14
general?
15
Strike that.
16
there are always things outside of our lives that are going
17
18
19
I guess.
20
All right.
21
22
23
24
25
26
Okay.
27
64
1
All right.
Your Honor, could we have the easel and then have some
10
THE COURT:
Sure.
11
minutes to set up, the jury hasnt been out here that
12
13
14
15
16
retire.
17
18
THE COURT:
19
(Recess.)
20
THE COURT:
21
ATTY. ROMANO:
22
All set?
Yes.
24
ATTY. GARCIA:
Yes.
26
27
Dont
Recess.
23
25
We will
I do.
ATTY. ROMANO:
sure.
Okay.
Great.
65
1
THE COURT:
Okay.
All right.
THE COURT:
All right.
continue cross-examination.
6
7
Were ready.
BY ATTY. ROMANO:
Q
10
11
Okay.
12
So for
13
14
have what looks like a V, okay, its two straight lines and
15
16
the black line that goes into a V and then it continues on.
17
Okay.
18
Okay.
On the bottom,
19
car and the car is traveling from the right hand side to the
20
21
22
Okay.
23
24
valley, goes down into the valley and then comes out and it
25
26
27
66
1
view?
Okay.
4
5
okay.
Q
Exactly.
Okay.
and handsets, that was one of the issues that you brought up
Yes.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
They might.
17
Okay.
18
19
20
first by cell phone tower 1, you agree with me, thats the
21
one.
22
23
24
25
26
Okay.
27
67
1
Yes.
Okay.
valley.
Okay.
10
11
12
13
14
15
Okay.
to.
Well assuming that over here the coverage area
16
17
18
Well it could.
19
20
21
22
down and youre going down into the valley, youre loosing
23
24
25
26
27
okay.
Q
Okay.
68
1
It could be.
Okay.
They might.
10
All right.
11
12
13
14
two, and up and now theyre back at cell tower one, you
15
understand that?
16
Yes.
17
All right.
18
wrote that down on paper, one, two, one, that might appear
19
20
paper alone.
Just on
21
22
23
24
25
straight line?
26
27
Exactly, you couldnt say for sure that the phone was
69
1
hypothetical, right?
for sure.
10
11
The phone may have never moved and that could happen
12
13
happen.
14
All right.
15
16
17
Thats correct.
18
19
discussed, correct?
20
Yes.
21
22
23
do we?
24
For this case it shows much more then just one or two
25
cell sites being used, so you can show once you have more
26
27
70
1
3
4
5
6
Sure.
Correct.
10
11
use, right?
12
Correct.
13
All right.
14
approach?
15
16
17
18
THE COURT:
Sure.
BY ATTY. ROMANO:
Q
Okay.
eye, right?
19
Yeah.
It does.
20
21
22
23
Okay.
24
25
26
27
71
1
Okay.
Yes.
next circle out, we can tell that number two is the next
10
Yes.
11
Okay.
12
13
Yes.
14
15
16
Yes.
17
All right.
18
towers for H.
19
20
21
22
ATTY. GARCIA:
23
24
25
26
27
THE COURT:
BY ATTY. ROMANO:
Okay.
72
1
choose?
4
5
number one.
Q
Okay.
right?
Yes.
Okay.
10
11
12
13
14
Okay.
15
16
17
All right.
18
19
20
21
22
23
Okay.
24
25
26
right?
27
73
1
2
Correct.
All right.
that might prevent the handset from choosing three, you came
Well lets do
10
11
direction.
12
with?
13
14
and its --
15
No.
16
Oh, okay.
17
18
19
--
20
21
22
Theres a chance
23
that number three may get some energy over there to the
24
25
could be used.
26
27
hypothetical, correct?
74
1
I dont know.
Okay.
I dont know.
Well --
10
11
12
13
14
And you dont have a propagation map for all the cell
15
16
17
Yeah.
18
19
20
21
22
23
hypothetical.
24
Right.
This is a
25
26
tower, we dont know what those variables are for this case
27
too?
75
1
Thats correct.
All right.
Now
weve got the handset in the middle and weve got four
10
signal.
11
12
No.
13
14
15
about, you mentioned that some cell phone towers, you said
16
17
18
Average maximum.
19
20
right?
21
It could be.
22
Okay.
23
24
25
7 miles.
26
27
No.
76
1
2
Okay.
hypothetical?
Okay.
ATTY. ROMANO:
THE COURT:
ATTY. ROMANO:
the easel?
THE COURT:
11
ATTY. ROMANO:
12
THE COURT:
14
Sure.
10
13
Lets
Whats that?
I am going to have to over there.
Thats okay.
BY ATTY. ROMANO:
Q
15
16
17
18
Okay.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
ATTY. GARCIA:
Now we would
77
1
2
3
ATTY. ROMANO:
All right.
BY ATTY. ROMANO:
Q
Yes.
10
All right.
11
12
13
14
right?
15
16
17
18
19
20
Yes.
21
22
Yes.
23
24
Yes.
25
26
27
Sure.
78
1
Okay.
direction, right?
Okay.
Okay.
10
11
12
13
14
Okay.
15
16
Yes.
17
Okay.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
You could.
27
All right.
79
1
Again, yes.
We do not.
correct?
Airplanes, correct?
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Okay.
19
20
records, correct?
21
22
Right.
23
24
cetera, correct?
25
26
27
80
1
2
3
4
carriers.
Q
Okay.
legislation
ATTY. GARCIA:
question.
Counsel is testifying.
ATTY. ROMANO:
THE COURT:
Government set up --
Overruled.
10
ATTY. ROMANO:
11
THE COURT:
12
ATTY. ROMANO:
13
14
15
Its cross-examination.
The question the U.S.
Okay.
Ill rephrase, I was going to
strike it.
BY ATTY. ROMANO:
Q
16
17
they abandoned --
18
ATTY. GARCIA:
19
Objection.
evidence.
20
ATTY. ROMANO:
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Go ahead.
BY ATTY. ROMANO:
Q
right?
81
1
Merely --
ATTY. GARCIA:
THE COURT:
8
9
10
and a conclusion.
Objection.
Overruled.
BY ATTY. ROMANO:
Q
locate someone for 911 based on the cell tower, was it?
A
11
12
know.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
correct?
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Okay.
27
82
1
Right.
had?
No.
8
9
10
ATTY. ROMANO:
No further questions.
11
12
13
Yes.
14
15
16
It can.
17
18
19
20
Yes.
21
22
23
24
story.
25
26
27
Okay.
83
1
No.
No.
Im not.
person strikes a tower the only thing you could really say
10
11
Yes.
12
13
information?
14
Yes.
15
16
17
ATTY. GARCIA:
18
ATTY. ROMANO:
19
20
21
22
exhibit?
23
24
25
summary?
26
27
I dont know.
ATTY. ROMANO:
No further questions.
84
1
ATTY. GARCIA:
THE COURT:
3
4
5
No further.
All right.
ATTY. ROMANO:
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:
ATTY. ROMANO:
Thank you.
Thank you.
Your Honor, may I address the
10
Court briefly.
11
12
ATTY. GARCIA:
13
THE COURT:
14
No objection.
Okay.
15
ATTY. ROMANO:
16
THE COURT:
Four.
17
18
jury go?
19
Ill bring you back and well talk about the schedule
20
in a minute.
21
22
Okay.
23
24
THE COURT:
25
26
27
Certainly
85
1
2
3
I mean.
ATTY. GARCIA:
Honor.
THE COURT:
ATTY. ROMANO:
witness.
9
10
THE COURT:
Yes.
ATTY. GARCIA:
They know
11
12
13
the other.
14
THE COURT:
Yeah.
15
16
longer, okay.
17
18
THE COURT:
Have a seat.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
about that.
26
27
very happy.
86
1
didnt pick the jury but the lawyers told me what the
or ahead.
10
11
ATTY. GARCIA:
12
THE COURT:
Yes.
13
picture, okay.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
87
1
morning, okay.
THE COURT:
ATTY. ROMANO:
Anything else?
Thank you for your courtesy, Your
Honor.
ATTY. GARCIA:
10
So have a nice
THE COURT:
No.
11
12
adjourned.
13
14
15
16
17
(Adjourned.)
So were
NO:
CR09-630168
SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF HARTFORD
v.
AT HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT
ROGEAU COLLINS
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
_______________________________
Lori Van Buren
Court Recording Monitor
Defendant.
AND you are further commanded to bring with you and produce at the same time and place
the incoming and outgoing call history and the incoming/outgoing text message details of phone
number (860) 728-92 , under the name of
(account holder:
),
between January 1, 2012 and the present,
to be used in evidence in the trial thereof.
HEREOF FAIL NOT, UNDER PENALTY OF THE LAW.
To any proper officer or indifferent person to serve and return.
Dated at Bloomfield, Connecticut, on October 16, 2012.