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And will
not end well.
The hope in Afghanistan was that several years of tough action by Western
troops would break the Taliban and shape a country that could be handed
back to the Afghans. The reality, though, seems to have been that all sides
knew Western troops would eventually leave.
Exact breakdowns of where the money went in Afghanistan are difficult to
make not least because Western personnel rotating through the country
often failed to keep proper records, according to SIGAR. But it is clear that a
very large amount probably the vast majority went to the Western
military effort. According to the Washington think tank the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, by 2014 the war cost $2.1 million for
every U.S. service member on the ground.
Huge amounts of equipment from mine-hardened patrol vehicles to new
patterns of camouflage clothing were rushed into production. By 2010, a
U.S. or NATO soldier suffering catastrophic injuries in Afghanistan could
expect a better standard of medical care than that available at any major
Western city trauma center.
For all the talk of strengthening the Afghan forces, their kit was always much
more basic troops without body armor, often in civilian-style pickup trucks.
This weekend, the New York Times reported Afghanistans most decorated
helicopter pilot complaining that new U.S.-delivered attack helicopters were
all but useless unable to reach the mountaintops often occupied by
Taliban, often suffering jammed guns and other mechanical failures.
According to SIGAR, Afghan security forces are seriously lacking in coldweather gear a must for soldiers based in mountainous regions where
winter can last for seven months.
Several commanders, particularly U.S. General Stanley McChrystal, tried to
focus on building Afghan capacity and winning hearts and minds. For most of
the troops and more junior leaders in warfare, however, Afghan forces were
rarely more than a distraction, danger or joke. Given the number of times
Afghan troops turned on NATO members, thats hardly surprising. And while
the New York Times might only just have discovered the alarming habit of
Afghan forces having sex with teenage boys, the phrase man love Thursday
had long been the topic of horrified conversation among Western soldiers not
easily shocked.
The problem, though, is that if Western troops dont stay in Afghanistan
forever and they probably will not the Afghan forces are almost the only
show in town. And if Afghan forces cant hold, power will be transferred to the
kind of warlords who preceded them, Taliban or otherwise.
Even the work done on strengthening the Afghan government may simply
have created something unsustainable. SIGAR estimates that the Afghan
government costs $8 to $10 billion a year to run but can raise no more
than $2 billion itself in revenue. That leaves it more dependent on outside
support than probably any other nation.
Its not all bad news. Even SIGAR never prone to put a gloss on things
unnecessarily points to reduced maternal mortality rates, at least modestly
improved access to education, and a new government under President Ashraf
Ghani that seems genuinely keen to assert its authority and tackle corruption.
The U.S. forces that remain there may still be able to make a difference.
Indeed, it is easy to forget now that many, many fewer only a handful of
special operators and intelligence agency paramilitaries worked with local
groups to oust the Taliban from much of the country within weeks after
September 11.
Their departure, though, would not mean the end of the fight for Afghanistan.
It might only be the beginning.
This article originally appeared on Reuters.com on October 1, 2015.
PS21 is a non-governmental, non-ideological, non-national organization. All
views expressed are the authors own.