2

G.R No.
168184
REPUBLIC VS RUBY LEE TSAI
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:
On 3 December 1996, respondent filed an application for the confirmation and
registration of Lot No. 7062 under PD 1529. Respondent stated that on 31 May 1993,
she purchased the subject property from Manolita Gonzales Vda. deCarungcong
(Carungcong), through Wendy Mitsuko Sato, Carungcongs daughter and attorney in
fact. Respondent declared that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property
for more than 30 years.
Except for the Republic, there were no other oppositors to the application. The
Republic opposed respondents application on the following grounds: (1) that respondent
and her predecessors-in-interest failed to present sufficient evidence to show that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
On 21 September 1998, the trial court granted respondents application for
registration. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
denied Republics motion.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE:
Whether the trial court can grant the application for registration despite the lack
of proof of respondents open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier
RULING:
The petition has merit.
The SC notes that in respondents original application before the trial court, she
claimed that she was entitled to the confirmation and registration of her title to the
subject property under PD 1529. However, respondent did not specify under what
paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529 she was filing the application. But going over
respondents application and the evidence she presented before the trial court, it
appears that respondent filed her application under Section 14(1) of PD 1529.
A mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not
sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be
shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on 12June 1945 or earlier. This provision
is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529.
In this case, respondent failed to comply with the period of possession and
occupation of the subject property, as required by both PD 1529 and CA 141. The SC
agree with the Republic that respondents evidence was not enough to prove that her
possession of the subject property started since 12 June 1945 or earlier because
respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the
name of her predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1948. In view of the lack of
sufficient showing that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest possessed the
subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier,
respondents application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under
PD 1529 and CA 141 should be denied.
Finally, the SC note that respondent also failed to prove that the subject property
has been declared alienable and disposable by the President or the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land
is alienable and disposable.
The SC GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE Decision of the Court of Appeals
as well as the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City. Further, the
SC DENIES respondent Ruby Lee Tsais application for confirmation and registration of
Lot No. 7062.
G.R No. 169599

REPUBLIC VS JUANITO MANIMTIM
On December 3, 1991, the respondents filed with the RTC two applications for
registration and confirmation of their title over two (2) parcels of land, designated as Lot
3857 and Lot 3858 located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City. The respondents alleged
that they are the owners of the subject parcels of land; that they have acquired the
subject parcels of land by purchase or assignment of rights; and that they have been in
actual, open, public, and continuous possession of the subject land under claim of title
exclusive of any other rights and adverse to all other claimants by themselves and
through their predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial.
In support of their applications, the respondents submitted blueprint plans of Lot
3857 and Lot 3858, technical descriptions, certifications in lieu of lost geodetic
engineer's certificates, declarations of real property tax, official receipts of payment of
taxes, real property tax certifications, and deeds of absolute sale.
On February 19, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the respondents' twin application on the ground that it
is a public land. On May 20, 1992, Moldex Realty, Inc. (MOLDEX) opposed the
applications on the ground that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land designated
as Lot 4, technically described in TCT No. T-20118 and that the metes and bounds of Lot
3857 and Lot 3858 overlapped its lot by about 14,088 square meters. MOLDEX,
therefore, prayed that the overlapping portion be excluded from the applications.
The RTC rendered its Judgment granting the respondents' application for
registration of Lot 3857 but deferred the approval of registration of Lot 3858 pending the
segregation of 4,243 square meter portion thereof which was found to belong to
MOLDEX. The CA reinstated its former decision approving the registration of LOT and
denied LOT 3858.
Whether or not the land in dispute is alienable and disposable
RULING:
The Court agrees with the OSG that the respondents failed to sufficiently prove
that they are entitled to the registration of the subject lands.
Under Section 14(1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3)
that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. These the
respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.
The respondents failed to establish that the subject lots were disposable and
alienable lands. The records failed to show that the respondents by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject lands, under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The respondents' best evidence to prove
possession and ownership over the subject property were the tax declarations issued in
their names. Unfortunately, these tax declarations together with their unsubstantiated
general statements and mere xerox copies of deeds of sale are not enough to prove
their rightful claim. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by
any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for
taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessorsin-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership.
The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the CA is reversed and set aside and
another judgment entered denying the application for land registration of the subject
properties.
G.R. No. L-25914 March 21, 1972

PALAWAN AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL CO., INC. vs DIRECTOR OF LANDS
Sometime on April 19, 1920, the Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company,
Inc. filed Sales Application No. 4782 over a parcel of public land consisting of 1,024
hectares located in Palawan. Sometime in December, 1930, the Palawan Agricultural
and Industrial Company, Inc. requested the Director of Lands that it be permitted to
reduce the area applied for to 680 hectares because the portion it originally applied for
were squatted and claimed by other. On November 13, 1933, the Director of Lands
wrote a letter to the Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Company, Inc. advising the latter
that it had recommended to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce an appraisal of
P18.00 per hectare for the land it had applied for sale. On November 27, 1934, the
Director of Lands issued Notice of Auction Sale over the land applied for consisting of
764.0683 hectares. According to the records, the auction sale set for February 27, 1935
did not take place because of the request of the applicant for postponement. On June 5,
1936, the applicant wrote to the Director of Lands praying that its Sales Application No.
4782 be not cancelled, in view of the demand of the Director of Lands that the sales
application be cancelled for lack of interest and that the company may be given time to
comply with the condition required by the Bureau of Lands.
Said application, relies upon section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended
by Republic Acts Nos. 1942 and 2061, upon the ground that, through its predecessor in
interest, appellant had been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and lawful
possession of the land since 1912, under a bonafide claim of acquisition and ownership.
The Director of Lands opposed the application, alleging that it involves a public
land covered by appellants sales application No. 4782 dated April 9, 1920; that the land
was not awarded to appellant, it having refused to pay the value thereof as determined
by an appraisal committee in July, 1950; and that appellant has no valid title to be
confirmed, its possession being, not that of an owner, but, merely, that of a (sales)
applicant of a position of the public domain. The CFI Palawan dismissed the application
for registration and confirmation of title.
Whether or not the land in dispute is alienable
RULING:
It is obvious from the foregoing facts that appellant's possession of the land in
question was merely that of a sales applicant thereof, to whom it had not been awarded
because of its refusal to pay the price fixed therefor by the Bureau of Lands. Under CA
141 and RA 1942, it is essential that the applicant hold the land under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, and appellant herein had never made such claim, except in
its present application for registration, filed on February 14, 1961. All of its acts prior
thereto, including its real estate tax declarations, characterized its possession of the land
as that of a "sales applicant," and, consequently, as one who expects to buy it, but
has not as yet done so, and is not, therefore, its owner. Moreover, the elimination of the
qualifying expression "except as against the Government," found in said section 48(b) as
originally enacted, bolsters up the view taken by the lower court. Indeed, it suggests that
the "bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership," under the amendment by Republic Act
No. 1942, must be adverse to the whole world, including the Government.
The possession and occupation by the applicant company of the land sought to
be registered, is not the possession and occupation contemplated by CA 141 and RA
1942. If this were the case, there will be many instances where the government will be
defrauded. If confirmation or registration of title can be done, as it is being done now by
the applicant company, a possessor and occupant of a public agricultural land under the
administration of the Bureau of Lands who has applied for the purchase of the same will
just sit on his right, making the application pending for more than 30 years while he
possesses and occupies the land, declare the same for taxation purposes, pay the
corresponding taxes religiously and consistently, and then after a lapse of 30 years, will
abandon his sales application and convert it to an application for judicial confirmation or
registration of title. Such situation is not the one contemplated by our legislators when
they passed RA 1942, for had it been their intention, our legislators would have been a
party to an act of defrauding our government.
G.R No. 167995

JULITA IMUAN vs JUANITO CERENO et al
During his lifetime, Pablo de Guzman (Pablo) contracted two marriages.
Petitioners are Pablo's grandchildren by his first marriage, while respondent Juanito
Cereno (Juanito) is his son-in-law by his second marriage. On July 15, 1936, Pablo died
intestate leaving two parcels of land, one of which is the land in question. After Pablo's
death in 1936, his second wife Juana and their children continued to be in possession of
the parcel of land in question, where they lived since they were married in 1919.
On January 24, 1970, Juana executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of respondents-spouses, Soledad,
Juana
and
Pablo's
daughter,
and
her husband Juanito conveying the subject property. The deed was duly registered with
the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan. Subsequently, Tax Declaration No.
23803 was issued in the names of respondents-spouses who religiously paid the taxes
due on the property. Since then, respondents-spouses enjoyed exclusive, open and
uninterrupted possession of the property.
Sometime in January 1999, petitioners entered and took possession of Lot 3533
by building a small nipa hut thereon. Respondents then filed before the MTC of
Mangaldan, Pangasinan an ejectment case against petitioners.
On April 5, 1999, petitioners filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a Complaint for
annulment of document, reconveyance and damages against respondents alleging that:
(1) the estate of their grandfather Pablo has not yet been settled or partitioned among
his heirs nor had Pablo made disposition of his properties during his lifetime; (2) it was
only through their tolerance that Juana and his children constructed their house on Lot
3559; (3) the sale of the disputed property made by Juana to respondents-spouses
Cereno and the issuance of tax declarations in the latter's names are null and void.
Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of Laches.
RULING:
Petitioners are guilty of laches.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon
grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace
of society.
Juana sold the property to the Spouses Cereno in 1970 and since then have
possessed the property peacefully and publicly without any opposition from petitioners.
While petitioners claim that they knew about the sale only in 1980 yet they did not take
any action to recover the same and waited until 1999 to file a suit without offering any
excuse for such delay. Records do not show any justifiable reason for petitioners'
inaction for a long time in asserting whatever rights they have over the property given
the publicity of respondents' conduct as owners of the property.
The petition is DENIED.
G.R No. 185477

HERMINIO GUTIEREZ VS FLORA MENDOZA-PLAZA
The petitioner is the descendant of Ignacio Mendoza by his first marriage and the respondent is
his descendant by his second marriage. On 8 March 1940, Ignacio executed a deed of
donation inter vivos, whereby the subject property was donated to the children
(respondents) whom he begot with Ignacia, his second wife. Ignacia accepted the
donation in the same instrument on behalf of her children. The deed was likewise duly
notarized, but the same was not recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
On 27
April
2006,
respondents
filed
a
Complaint
for Accion
Reivindicatoria, Publiciana and Quieting of Title against petitioners in the RTC of
Tanauan City. Respondents alleged that after the execution of the deed of donation inter
vivos, the subject property was assigned to Flora and her sister Felisa, who then
possessed and occupied the same as owners. On or about late January or early
February of 2006, petitioners took possession of the southern portion of the subject
property and constructed a house of strong materials therein, despite the vigorous
objection and opposition of the respondents.
Petitioners accordingly denied the above material averments in their
Answer, asserting that Ignacio and his first wife, Juana, had been in possession of the
subject property as early as 1900. After the death of Juana, Dominador, Victoria and
Ignacio took over possession of the subject property. When Dominador and Victoria
died in 1940 and 1943, respectively, their heirs, including petitioners, occupied and
possessed the subject property openly, peacefully and publicly. Petitioners likewise
disputed the genuineness and authenticity of the deed of donation inter vivos,
considering that for more than 65 years the said document was not registered with the
office of the Register of Deeds to cause its transfer to respondents. Respondents
presence on and occupancy of a portion of the subject property were allegedly a mere
tolerance on the part of petitioners. Thus, the title and rights of petitioners over the
subject property were absolute and legal by virtue of succession.
The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents. The CA affirmed said
decision.
Whether or not the respondents acquired the property through prescription
RULING:
Yes the respondents acquired the property through prescription.
Prescription as a mode of acquisition requires the existence of the following: (1)
capacity to acquire by prescription; (2) a thing capable of acquisition by prescription; (3)
possession of the thing under certain conditions; and (4) lapse of time provided by
law. Acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary, in which case the possession must
be in good faith and with just title; or extraordinary, in which case there is neither good
faith nor just title. In either case, there has to be possession, which must be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
Respondents who can trace their title to the subject property by virtue of the deed
of donation inter vivos. Petitioners on the other hand, cannot adequately explain how
they entered and possessed the subject property to become owners thereof. More
importantly, petitioners cannot even rebut the testimony of Mercedes Mendoza that she
was present when Victoria entreated their father Ignacio to allow her (Victoria) to
construct a house on a portion of the subject property. Ignacio gave permission
to Victoria, but only on the condition that she would have to leave when his children by
his second marriage would need the property. Thus, the possession of the property
by Victoria was only by virtue of the mere tolerance thereof by Ignacio and the children
of his second marriage. As such, the alleged possession by petitioners, which they
claim to trace to Victoria, was also by mere tolerance on the part of respondents. In light
of the foregoing, petitioners cannot claim any better right to the subject property as
against respondents.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is DENIED. The Amended Decision is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 147951

ARSENIO OLEGARIO VS PEDRO C. MARI
As early as 1916, Juan Mari, the father of respondent, declared his ownership over a
parcel of land in Nancasalan, Mangatarem for tax purposes. He took possession of the same
by delineating the limits with a bamboo fence, planting various fruit bearing trees and bamboos
and constructing a house thereon. After a survey made in 1950, Tax Declaration No. 8048 for
the year 1951 specified the subject realty as a residential land with an area of 897 square
meters. The subject realty was transferred to respondent, Pedro Mari, by virtue of a deed of sale.
Meanwhile, in 1947, Wenceslao Olegario, the husband of Magdalena Fernandez and
father of petitioner Arsenio Olegario, filed a new tax declaration for a certain 50-square meter
parcel of land. Then on May 14, 1961, Wenceslao Olegario executed a "Deed of Quit-Claim of
Unregistered Property" in favor of Arsenio Olegario transferring to the latter inter alia the
aforementioned 50-square meter property.
Sometime around 1988, respondent filed with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Regional Office in Pangasinan a protest against the petitioners because of
their encroachment into the disputed realty. After investigation, said office decided in favor of the
respondent and found the latter to be the owner of Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356 which
covers the land of petitioner. Petitioners did not appeal and the said decision became final and
executory.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the petitioners acquired the property through prescription.
2.Whether or not the petitioners claim of laches is correct.
RULING:
1. The petition has no merit. Possession, to constitute the foundation of acquisitive
prescription, must be possession under a claim of title or must be adverse. Acts of a
possessory character performed by one who holds the property by mere tolerance of the owner
are clearly not in the concept of an owner and such possessory acts, no matter how long
continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
Respondent's predecessor, Juan Mari, had declared the disputed realty for tax purposes
as early as 1916. The tax declarations show that he had a two storey house on the realty. He
also planted fruit bearing trees and bamboos thereon. The records also show that the 897square meter property had a bamboo fence along its perimeter. All these circumstances clearly
show that Juan Mari was in possession of subject realty in the concept of owner, publicly and
peacefully since 1916 or long before petitioners entered the disputed realty sometime in 1965.
On the other hand, petitioners did not acquire ownership despite 25 years of occupying
the disputed lots. Firstly, they had no just title. Petitioners did not present any document to show
how the titles over Lot Nos. 17526 and 17533 were transferred to them, whether from
respondent, his predecessor, or any other person. Petitioners, therefore, could not acquire the
disputed real property by ordinary prescription through possession for 10 years. Secondly, it is
settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with the
element of hostility towards the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer
title by prescription or adverse possession. In other words, possession, to constitute the
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title, that is, it must be
adverse.
2. Petitioners cannot find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the lapse of time
or delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
had earlier abandoned or declined to assert it.
In the instant case, the second and third elements are missing. Petitioners had notice
and knew all along the position of the respondent and his predecessor Juan Mari - they were
standing pat on his ownership over the subject realty. This stand of respondent and his
predecessor was recorded and clearly visible from the notification survey cards. From 1968, the
date of the cards, until 1989 there was nothing to indicate any change in the position of any of
the parties. Moreover, that respondent had not conceded ownership and possession of the land
to petitioners is clear also from the fact that Pedro Mari continued to declare the entire 897square meter property in his name and pay taxes for the entire area after his father transferred
the property to him.
On the other hand, it was petitioners who suddenly changed their position in 1989 by
changing the area of the property declared in their name from 50 square meters to 341 square
meters and specifying the details to make it appear that the tax declaration for the 50-square
meter property pertained to Lot No. 17526. As previously discussed, it was only at this point, in
1989, that it can be clearly stated that petitioners were making their claim of ownership public
and unequivocal and converting their possession over Lot No. 17526 into one in the concept of
owner. Upon discovery of this clear and unequivocal change in status of petitioners position
over the disputed land respondent immediately acted. He filed in 1990 the complaint for
recovery of possession and nullification of tax declaration. Hence, no laches in the instant case.
The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-57461 September 11, 1987

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
Manila Electric Company filed an amended application for registration of a parcel
of land located in Taguig, Metro Manila on December 4, 1979. On August 17, 1979,
applicant acquired the land applied for registration by purchase from Ricardo Natividad
who in turn acquired the same from his father Gregorio Natividad as evidenced by a
Deed of Original Absolute Sale executed on December 28, 1970. Applicant's
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property under the concept of an owner for
more than 30 years. The property was declared for taxation purposes under the name of
the applicant and the taxes due thereon have been paid.
On May 29, 1981 respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the registration
of the property in the name of the private respondent. The Director of Lands interposed
this petition.
Whether or not a corporation may apply for registration of title to land
RULING:
If the land was already private at the time Meralco bought it from Natividad, then
the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations holding alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease does not apply.
Petitioner, however, contends that a corporation is not among those that may
apply for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Public
Land Act. As ruled in the Acme case, the fact that the confirmation proceedings were
instituted by a corporation is simply another accidental circumstance, "productive of a
defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of
the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings. Considering that it is
not disputed that the Natividads could have had their title confirmed, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny private respondent the right to register
its property which was validly acquired.
The petition is DENIED and the questioned decision of the respondent Judge is
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 112567 February 7, 2000

THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU vs. COURT OF APPEALS
On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cario, filed with the CFI
Laguna, a petition for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of 43,614
square meters, more or less, forming part of a bigger tract of land surveyed as Psu108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. Private respondent declared that
subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa Lauchangco, who died on
February 15, 1911, and later administered by him in behalf of his five brothers and
sisters, after the death of their father in 1934. In 1949, private respondent and his
brother, Severino Cario, became co-owners of Lot No. 6 by virtue of an extra-judicial
partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the heirs of Teresa
Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole
ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent. The trial court granted
private respondent's petition which was affirmed by the CA.
Whether or not the land in dispute is a public domain.
RULING:
The Petition is impressed with merit. The petition for land registration at bar is
under the Land Registration Act. Pursuant to said Act, he who alleges in his petition or
application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the Spanish
times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant,
a composicion con al estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through
purchase; and "informacion possessoria" or "possessory information title", which would
become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title.
In the case at bar, the private respondents has not produced a single muniment
of title substantiate his claim of ownership. The Court has therefore no other recourse,
but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land under Act
496. Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the
Public land Act, private respondent's petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency
of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is
not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and
for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title. Private
respondent can only trace his own possession of subject parcel of land to the year 1949,
when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extra-judicial settlement and
partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the private respondent has
possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when
he filed his petition for the registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack
his possession to what he theorized upon as possession of the same land by his
parents. However, other than his unilateral assertion, private respondent has not
introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that his late mother
possessed the land in question even prior to 1911.
From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax
declaration covering Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the
names of the private respondent and his brother, SeverinoCario. The same was
followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued in 1969 and Tax Declaration No. 6359
issued in 1974 in the name of private respondent. It bears stressing that the tax
declaration for subject land under the names of the parents of herein private respondent
does not appear to have any sustainable basis. It shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921
for Lot No. 6 in the name of private respondent and not in the name of his parents.
The Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the CA affirming the Decision of RTC
Laguna is SET ASIDE and Lot No. 6 is declared a public land.

HILARIO RAMIREZ and VALENTINA BONIFACIO vs COURT OF APPEALS
On September 15, 1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio filed an
application for registration of a parcel of riceland in Rizal. In their application for registration, they alleged
that to the best of their knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind
whatsoever affecting said land and that they had acquired it by purchase from certain Gregoria Pascual
during the early part of the American regime but the corresponding contract of sale was lot
and no copy or record of the same was available. The Court found, however, that the applicants are
not the owners of the land sought to be registered. They were ANTICHRETIC CREDITORS- mere
holders placed in possession of the land by its owners as security for loan. The applicants were found
guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment when they declared that no other person had
any claim or interest in the said land.
Can an antichretic creditor acquire land of debtor by prescription?
RULING:
No. The petitioners are not possessors in the concept of owners, but mere HOLDERS placed
in possession of land by its owners. Thus, their possession cannot serve as a title for acquiring dominion.
The court held that the antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by prescription the land surrendered
to hum by the debtor.
The petitioners in this case did not merely omit a statement of the respondents'
interest in the land. They positively attested to the absence of any adverse claim therein.
This is clear misrepresentation. The omission and concealment, knowingly and
intentionally made, of an act or of a fact which the law requires to be performed or
recorded is fraud, when such omission or concealment secures a benefit to the prejudice
of a third person.
While there was an admission that the petitioners have been in actual
possession of the disputed land since 1938, it was made to show and prove the fact that
the petitioners are only antichretic creditors. The respondents never admitted that they
have not possessed the land at all. On the contrary, they alleged that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land since time immemorial and
that the petitioners were placed in possession of the land pursuant to a contract of
antichresis.
The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-19940

August 14, 1965
FERNANDEZ KIDPALOS vs. BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY
On August 31, 1954, petitioners sued the Baguio Gold Mining Company and the
Director of Mines in the CFI Baguio City, seeking judgment declaring said plaintiffs to be
the owners of certain parcels of land situated in sitio Binanga Barrio of Tuding,
Municipality of Itogon, Benguet, Mountain Province and to annul the declarations of
location of certain mineral claims of the Baguio Gold Mining Company, overlapping the
parcels claimed by plaintiffs.
The defendant Baguio Gold Mining Company, claiming title by virtue of valid
locations of the claims since 1925 to 1930, asked for dismissal of the action and
damages alleging that the land lay within the Cordillera Forest Reservation proclaimed
by Governor General Stimson, and that it formed part of the Public domain. That from
1927 to 1933, one George Icard and his son, Joseph, had entered and located therein
certain mining claims, subsequently sold and transferred to the Baguio Gold Mining
Company. The latter had occupied the land, worked the claims, and performed the acts
required by the mining laws to entitle it to mineral patents therefor and were validated by
Act No. 4268 of the Philippine Legislature. The Mining Company had acquired beneficial
title to the claims by its locations, although the corresponding patents were still in
process at the Bureau of Mines.
While the cases were still pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs
had filed in Court the present registration cases. Baguio Gold opposed the registration,
and moved to dismiss the applications. Proceedings were originally held in abeyance
until the appeals in the preceeding, cases were decided. The 1960 Supreme Court
resolution in L-16649-53 having become final, the oppositor Baguio Gold Mining
Company reiterated its motions to dismiss the registration cases in the Court of First
Instance. The latter dismissed the applications, and the applicants then appealed.
Whether or not the order of dismissal is correct on the basis of res judicata
RULING:
The appellants do not dispute that the subject matter in the present registration
proceedings is the same land involved in the previous litigation, or that the parties are
the same (the applicants-appellants Lampacan in Registration Case No. N-44, L.R.C.
Record No. N-11914, now G.R. No.L-19944, being the heirs and successors of the
former plaintiff IpangLebosVda.deLampacan in the preceding law suit). Neither is it
disputable that the causes of action in both cases are identical, since in both the
appellants asserted that they are the sole and exclusive owners of the land in dispute,
allegedly invaded by appellee Baguio Gold Mining Company. While the former cases
were reivindicatory in character and the ones presently before us are land registration
proceedings, such difference in forms of action are irrelevant for the purposes of res
judicata. It is a firmly established rule that a different remedy sought or a diverse form of
action does not prevent the estoppel of the former adjudication. Since there can be no
registration of land without applicant being its owner, the final judgment of the Court of
Appeals in the previous litigation declaring that the mining company's title is superior to
that of appellant's should be conclusive on the question in the present case.
The SC finds in the former judgment (that the mining claims were validly located
and that the title of the mining company is superior to that of appellants), being the basis
of the sentence of dismissal, conclude the applicants in the present case, the previous
adjudication being final and rendered on the merits, and there being identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action in all the cases. Hence, the dismissal of these land
registration proceeding, by the Court of First Instance of Baguio was in order and
conformable to law.
The appealed order of dismissal on the ground of res judicata is affirmed.
G. R No. 179905
REPUBLIC VS JAVIER
On 25 March 1999, Javier, then 75 years old, filed before the MTC an Application
for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land, with an area of 12,903.50 square
meters, situated in Sitio Tabing Ilog, Sta. Ana, Taytay, Rizal. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), filed its Notice of Appearance and Opposition to Javiers
Application for Registration, claiming among other things that neither Javier nor her
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land since 12 June 1945; and that the muniment/s of
title alleged in the Application did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
a bona fide acquisition of the subject land. The Republic further insisted that the subject
property was a portion of the public domain; hence, it was not subject to private
appropriation. On even date, the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), also filed
its Opposition to Javiers Application, claiming that the subject property was public land,
forming part of the bed of the Laguna de Bay.
Javier testified on her own behalf to establish her claim. According to Javier, she
acquired the subject property through a Deed of Donation executed by her paternal aunt,
Catalina Javier (Catalina), a childless widow, on 27 November 1956, purportedly in
consideration of Javiers caring for Catalina from the time the latter became sick until she
died. Javiers cousins, as Catalinas other heirs, questioned the execution of said Deed
of Donation in Civil Case No. 6046 before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pasig,
Rizal. The CFI, in a Decision dated 24 November 1967, declared the Deed of Donation
dated 27 November 1956 void, since, being unnotarized, it was not a public document,
thus, failing to comply with the legal requisites for a valid donation. Nevertheless, in a
Deed of Partition dated 31 December 1974, Catalinas heirs allocated the subject
property to Javier.
Javier also stated under oath that Catalina and her husband, Alejandro Ramos
(Ramos), had been in possession of the subject property since 1907, but Javier did not
know how Catalina and Ramos acquired said possession. Javier gained personal
knowledge of Catalinas ownership of the subject property when Catalina came to live
with Javier and the latters family in 1940. The subject property was being tilled by
a kasama, Arturo Sarmiento, when Javier acquired the said property, but at the time she
filed her Application for Registration, there were no more tenants on the subject property.
Neither the Republic nor the LLDA presented evidence to substantiate their Oppositions
to Javiers Application for Registration.
The MTC rendered a Decision favoring Javier and granting her Application which
was affirmed by the CA.
Whether or not the subject property is alienable
RULING:
The evidence on record likewise supports the fact that Javier, together with her
predecessor-in-interest, Catalina, occupied the subject property in the concept of an
owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Catalina declared the subject property in her name
for real property tax purposes even before 1945 - clearly, prior to 12 June
1945. Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No 71176
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS IAC
The government, in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, expropriated
property owned by Amerex Electronics, Phils. Corporation. The amount of just
compensation for such property is now the subject of this petition for review on certiorari.
The property involved consists of four (4) parcels of land with a total area of 9,650
square meters. Its previous owner, Avegon Inc., offered it for sale to the City School
Board of Manila on July 21, 1973 at P2,300,000. The school board was willing to buy at
P1,800,000 but the then Mayor of Manila intervened and volunteered to negotiate with
Avegon Inc. for a better price.
On June 3, 1974, Avegon Inc. sold the property and its improvements to Amerex
Electronics, Phils. Corporation (Amerex for brevity) for P1,800,000. Thereafter, TCT
were issued in favor of Amerex.
On August 29, 1975, the Solicitor General filed for the Department of Education
and Culture and Sports (DECS) a complaint against Amerex for the expropriation of said
property before the Court of First Instance of Manila. The complaint stated that the
property was needed by the government as a permanent site for the Manuel de la
Fuente High School; that the fair market value of the property had been declared by
Amerex as P2,435,000, and that the assessor had determined its market value as
P2,432,042 and assessed it for taxation purposes in the amount of P1,303,470. Writ of
possession was issued by the court so the plaintiff took actual possession thereof on
October 13, 1975.
Amerex filed a motion to dismiss the complaint stating the same failed to
categorically state the amount of just compensation for the property and prayed the just
compensation be fixed at P2,432,042.
Commissioner Aquino submitted their appraisal report finding that the fair market
value of the property was P2,763,400 but it is respectfully submitted that the said sum of
P2,258,018.57 be adopted for purposes of determining just compensation payable to
defendant AMEREX. The lower court rendered judgment funding the amount of
P2,258.018.57 as just compensation for the property of the defendant which was
affirmed by the CA.
Whether or not the lower courts determined the proper just compensation
RULING:
The SC holds that the lower courts made an erroneous determination of just
compensation in this case.
The just compensation prescribed herein is based on the commissioners'
recommendation which in turn is founded on the "audited" statements of Amerex that the
property is worth P2,258,018.57. While the court may accept the commissioners' report
and render judgment in accordance therewith, it may not do so without considering
whether the report is supported by evidence. The court is also duty-bound to determine
whether the commissioners had discharged the trust reposed in them according to wellestablished rules and formed their judgment upon correct legal principles for they are not
supposed to act ad libitum .
Amerex's "audited" statement on the acquisition cost, cost of painting and major
repairs, taxes, and insurance premiums which totals P2,107,479.48. Amerex's other
"audited" statement on the maintenance expenses of the property wherein it allegedly
incurred the amount of P150,539.09 contains a similar certification by the same
accounting firm specifically stating that the auditor did not make an audit of the books of
accounts of Amerex. It is clear from these certifications that the accounting firm which
issued them merely compared the figures in the schedules or "audited" statements with
those of the records and books of accounts of Amerex. As no investigation was made as
to the veracity of the figures in the account, there was no audit in the real sense of the
term. To audit is to examine an account, compare it with the vouchers, adjust the same,
and to state the balance, by persons legally authorized for the purpose. While the word
"audit" is sometimes restricted to a mere mathematical process, it generally includes
investigation, the weighing of evidence, and deciding whether items should or should not
be included in the account . Audit involves the exercise of discretion; it is a quasi-judicial

function. The accuracy of the "audited" statements herein is therefore suspect.
There is a need for the government, under these trying times, to get the best
possible price for the expropriated property considering the ceaseless and continuing
necessity for schools. So the just compensation for the property should be the price it
commanded when it was first offered for sale to the City School Board of Manila.
Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that the property is worth the lower amount of
P1,800,000. In contrast, Amerex submitted evidence consisting of the aforesaid June 5,
1975 appraisal report which fixed the fair market value of the property at P2,400,000.
The SC decided the just compensation of the property expropriated for the use of
the Manuel de la Fuente High School Don Mariano Marcos Memorial High School) is
hereby fixed at P2,400,000.00. After deducting the amount of P1,303,470.00 therefrom,
the petitioner shall pay the balance with legal interest from October 13, 1975.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DILOY

This is a petition on the denial by the court of appeals on the motion for
reconsideration of the republic in this land registration proceeding. Subject parcel of land
was possessed and declared for taxation by then Crispin Leaban evidenced by tax
certificates. He was the succeeded by his son, Eusebio who then conveyed said
property to his daughter Pacencia Leaban. Pacencia finally conveyed said parcel of
land to her daughter, Gregoria, who applied for the registration of said land, tacking in
with her the possession of her predecessors since 1951. The Republic filed their
opposition but Diloys application for registration was granted by the lower court. The
Republic went to the Court of Appeals but was denied and said appellate court affirmed
the lower courts decision.
Whether or not the applicant has acquired a registrable title
RULING:
Subject property became alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982. Prior
to its declaration as alienable land in 1982, any occupation or possession thereof could
not be considered in the counting of the 30-year possession requirement. The period of
possession by the respondent of the subject property cannot be considered to have
started in 1979, when the same was conveyed to her by her mother. Neither can her
possession of the subject property be tacked to that of her predecessors-in-interest,
even if they had occupied and were in possession of the same since 1948,
because during those periods, the subject property had not yet been classified as
alienable and disposable land capable of private appropriation. Possession of the
subject property could only start to ripen into ownership on 15 March 1982, when the
same became alienable and disposable. Any period of possession prior to the date when
the subject lot was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should
be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession can
never ripen into ownership and, unless the land has been classified as alienable and
disposable, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.The
adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an
imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. There
can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or
alienable
NEW REGENT SOURCES VS TANIUATCO

The petitioner filed a complaint on rescission/declaration of nullity of contract,
reconveyance and damages against the respondent. Petitioner allegedly authorized
Vicente Cuevas being its Chairman and President to apply on its behalf to acquire
two parcels of land by right of accretion. Cuevas applied the lot in his name and while
pending approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands he assigned his rights to
the respondent. An order from the Director of Lands was issued transferring rights from
Cuevas to Tanjuatco. During the preliminary hearing, respondent filed a motion for
demurrer of evidence after the petitioner presented their evidence. The RTC dismissed
the case for insufficiencies of evidence and ruled that respondent is an innocent
purchaser hence this petition for certiorari.
Whether or not the respondent is an innocent purchaser of the property in dispute
RULING:
The court held that to warrant a reconveyance of land where the mode of
acquiring a property is by accretion, the following requisites should be met: (1) that the
deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the
action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of rivers. It is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy
the benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must show by
preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has
notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied
the foregoing requisites. Respondent derived his title to the lands from Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. Acertification was issued confirming that said lands were verified to be
Alienable and Disposable property of the State entitling it to transfer ownership to the
respondent. Moreover, petitioners failed to establish fraudulent registration of ownership
of the title to respondent since they did not provide evidence that Cuevas is empowered
by the petitioner to apply a registration of the property in their behalf. The respondent
may safely rely on what appears on the face of the registered title hence he is a buyer in
good faith. Petitioner was not able to substantiate its claim for ownership of the property
therefore their claim for reconveyance should be denied.
GRANDE v. COURT OF APPEALS

The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by inheritance from their
deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it from her parents. In the early
1930s, the Grandes decided to have their land surveyed for registration purposes. The
land was described to have Cagayan River as the northeastern boundary, as stated in
the title.
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of the
river, and an alluvial deposit of almost 20,000 sq.m. was added to the registered area.
The Grandes filed an action for quieting of title against the Calalungs, stating that they
were in peaceful and continuous possession of the land created by the alluvial deposit
until 1948, when the Calalungs allegedly trespassed into their property. The Calalungs,
however, stated that they were the rightful owners since prior to 1933.
The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to vacate the
premises and pay for damages. Upon appeal to the CA, however, the decision was
reversed.
Whether or not the alluvium deposited land automatically belongs to the riparian owners
RULING:
Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners of the
adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure become theirs merely believing that said
land have become imprescriptible. The land of the Grandes only specifies a specific
portion, of which the alluvial deposits are not included, and are thus, subject to
acquisition by prescription. Since the Calalungs proved that they have been in
possession of the land since 1934 via two credible witnesses, as opposed to the
Grandes single witness who claims that the Calalungs only entered the land in 1948, the
Calalungs have been held to have acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits by
prescription. This is because the possession took place in 1934, when the law to be
followed was Act 190, and not the New Civil Code, which only took effect in 1950.
IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND VALERIANO

Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land (mangrove) which
he alleged he acquired by right of accretion since it adjoins a parcel of land owned by
the Ignacio. His application is opposed by the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano,
contending that said land forms part of the public domain. The Trial Court dismissed the
application holding that said land formed part of the public domain. Thus the case at bar.
Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain
RULING:
The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the present case because
it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers while this refers to action in the
Manila Bay, which is held to be part of the sea
Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands added to shores by
accretions caused by actions of the sea form part of the public domain when they are no
longer necessary for purposes of public utility, only the executive and the legislative
departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any said land
is no longer necessary for public use. Until such declaration is made by said
departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership.
REPUBLIC VS. DE PORKAN

Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog acquired Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546 from
their predecessors-interests, who in turn acquired said lots though a grant by the
government by virtue of their proven, open, exclusive and undisputed possession for
more than 30 years. An issue over said lots arose when a certain Viola Azurin obtained
from the then Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond Permit covering
portions of Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546.
Azurin filed with the Bureau of Lands a complaint for correction, amendment or
cancellation of the Homestead Patent of De Porkan over Lot no. 1546 and the Free
Patent of Macatindog over Lot No. 1099 alleging among others that the patentees
secured their patents and titles through fraud, misrepresentation and illegal
machinations.
The Solicitor General sided with Azurin; when the case was brought to the Court
of First Instance, the SG stated that the disputed portions of land were actually claimed
by Azurin and that such lands could not be disposed by the Director of Lands under the
Public Land Act. Hence, the patents and titles issued to de Porkan and Macatindog were
void insofar as the portion occupied and covered by the fishpond permit of Azurin.
After hearing however, the CFI dismissed the complaints and upheld the validity
of the titles/patents of de Porkan & Macatindog over the lands in dispute.
The SG in the present petition avers among others that the lots in dispute could
not be the subject of disposition under the Homestead and Free Patent provisions of the
Public Act since they are marshy and swampy, certified as such as more suitable for
fishpond development, disposable only thru lease under the Public Land Act.
Whether or not possession and cultivation of a land for more than 30 years will
entitle the possessor thereof of a government grant and a certificate of title
RULING:
Yes. As early as 1953, the respondents had already acquired by operation of law
not only a right to a grant over Lot No. 1099, but a grant of the Government over the
same alienable land by virtue of their proven, open, exclusive and undisputed
possession for more than 30 years, since the Spanish colonial period.
The possession of a public land identified as Lot No. 1099 dates back to the time
of the Spanish colonial period. Such possessions of the said public land has attained the
character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an express grant from the
Government. The mandate of the law itself provides that possessors shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. By legal fiction, the land ceases to be
public and thus becomes a private land.
ONG VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as duly authorized representative of
his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of
Title over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan.
They alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their
exclusive property having acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista
and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is presently unoccupied; and
that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful
possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.
Republic asserted that neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required; that applicants failed to adduce
any muniment of title to prove their claims; that the tax declaration appended to the
application does not appear genuine and merely shows pretended possession of recent
vintage; that the application was filed beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and
that the subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of private
appropriation.
The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and his brothers.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed
Decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found that the subject lot is
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, it was incumbent
upon petitioner to prove that they possessed the subject lot in the nature and for the
duration required by law.
Whether or not petitioner, together with his brother have registrable ownership
over the real property subject matter of land registration
RULING:
The petition lacks merit. Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529, as amended, provides
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of
title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. These requisites involve questions of fact
which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings of the courta
quo are generally binding on this Court except for certain recognized exceptions, as is
the case here, where the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting
findings. After a careful review of the records, we sustain the findings and conclusions of
the Court of Appeals.
BENIN VS TUASON
The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three
parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in
the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of
Caloocan, province of Rizal, that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor
Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they
and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land
openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits
harvested there from; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said parcels of land
surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of
Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the
ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes
in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World War, or
sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places,
after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon
and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was
actually served with summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by
publication in accordance with Sections 16 and 17of the Rules of Court. Only defendant
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.
RULING:
The decision of this Court, which affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili(along
with four other plaintiffs) should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias Benin against
Jose Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622and 3623,
respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the
plaintiffs do not claim a right which is different from that claimed by Elias Benin.
The plaintiffs do not claim a right different from that claimed by Pascual Pili. The
registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem operate as against the whole world and
the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands
registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also
against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear. The registration
by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims and liens of
whatever character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the certificates
of title, except those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law
(Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In addition, there
being no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance of
appellants at the registration proceedings, and very much more than one
year having elapsed from the issuance of the decree of registration in 1914, neither
revocation of such decree nor a decree of reconveyance are obtainable any more.
ROXAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Maguesun Corporation filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of
unregistered land located in Tagaytay. In support of its application for registration they
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor who
bought the property from Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas two and a half months
earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. .Notices of
the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil
andLeon Luna while Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not notified because she was
not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant. Publication was made
in the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before the RTC to set aside decree of registration in favor of
Maguesun Corporation alleging that Said Corporation committed actual fraud, alleging
that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication; that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse
claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to the
LRA, such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. RTC denied said
petition and CA also affirmed RTCs decision on the said petition and the assailed
decree of registration
Was there actual fraud on the part of Maguesun Corporation to warrant the reopening and the
setting aside of the registration decree?
RULING:
Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and possession should be
made at the appropriate time, i.e at the time of the application for registration, otherwise,
the persons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore,
miss the opportunity to present their opposition or claims A close scrutiny of the evidence
on
record
leads
the
Court
to
the
irresistible
conclusion
that
forgerywas indeed attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof of respondent
Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in the execution and preparation of
the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun
Corporation is not the "innocent purchaser for value who merits the protection of the
law. The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of SelfAdjudication are starkly different from the sample signatures in several documents
executed by Trinidad. The questioned signatures are smooth and rounded and have
none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signatures characteristic of the
penmanship of elderly persons. Theaforementioned irregularities are too glaring to have
been ignored. If Tinidad did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason why she
should state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning herself and her family
DELOS ANGELES VS SANTOS

On November 21, 1959 an application for registration of title to 12 parcels of land
in Ampid San Mateo Rizal was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Leonor de
los Angeles and seven co-applicants. Among other things it alleged that "applicants are
owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the aforesaid land."The Director of Lands filed
an opposition stating that the land "is a portion of the public domain". The Province of
Rizal also interposed an opposition on May 24, 1960, asserting "the required 3.00
meters strips of public easement" on lots along Ampid River and a creek. An order of
general default was issued except as against the Director of Lands, the Province of Rizal
and eleven private oppositors who appeared therein. The aforesaid private oppositors,
Julio Hidalgo among them, filed their written opposition claiming they "are the lawful
owners of the parcels of land in question for having acquired homestead patents over
said lots". A Report" was filed in court by the Land Registration Commissioner, stating
that the parcel of land described as Lot 11 of plan Psu-158857, applied for in the aboveentitled land registration case, is a portion of that described on plan Psu-148997,
previously patented under Patent No. 95856 in the name of Julio Hidalgo; and that Case
No. N-2671, LRC Record No. N-18332, was set for hearing on but no decision has as
yet been received by this Commissioner.
Acting thereon, the court required applicants in its order, to show cause why their
application should not be dismissed as to Lot 11 (10.6609 hectares). Applicants filed an
"opposition to motion to dismiss". But on September 18, 1961 the court issued an order
dismissing the application with respect to Lot 11 "without prejudice on the part of
applicants to pursue the corresponding remedy in any ordinary action". After a motion for
reconsideration was filed and denied, applicants appealed to this Court
Whether a land registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a
parcel of land for registration of title thereto could be divested of said jurisdiction by
a subsequent administrative act consisting in the issuance by the Director of Lands of a
homestead patent covering the same parcel of land
RULING:
To start with, it is well settled that the Director of Lands' jurisdiction,
administrative supervision and executive control extend only over lands of the public
domain and not to lands already of private ownership. Accordingly, a homestead patent
issued by him over land not of the public domain is a nullity, devoid of force and effect
against the owner . Now, in the land registration proceedings applicants contended that
as of November 21, 1959 the date they applied for registration they were already
"owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the aforesaid land". As a result, if applicants
were to successfully prove this averment, and thereby show their alleged registrable title
to the land, it could only result in the finding that when Julio Hidalgo's homestead patent
was issued over Lot 11 on June 12, 1961 said lot was no longer public. The land
registration court, in that event, would have to order a decree of title issued in applicants'
favor and declare the aforesaid homestead patent a nullity which vested no title in the
patentee as against the real owners.
MILLER VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS

A parcel of land in Tigbao, Milagros, Masbate, which, after survey, appeared to
contain 411 hectares as per plan PSU-143798 was applied for registration in the Court of
First Instance of Masbate by John M. Miller and Emilio Espinosa, Jr.
After notice and publication, initial hearing was held. The Director of Lands and
Bureau of Public Highways filed written oppositions. Thirty-five individuals appeared and
expressed verbal oppositions. All persons, ,except the abovementioned oppositors, were
declared in default.
Applicants started presenting evidence and the private oppositors were given five
days to file written opposition. Of the oppositors 28 filed written but unverified opposition.
Applicants finished adducing evidence and rested their case.
The private oppositors presented their first witness and after his crossexamination, counsel for applicants called the Courts attention to the lack of verification
in the opposition filed by the private oppositors and moved to dismiss the same.
The private oppositors offered to verify their opposition. After parties had filed
memoranda, the court issued an order dismissing the unverified opposition, without
pronouncement as to costs. Motion for reconsideration was denied. The private
oppositors have appealed from both orders.
Whether private oppositor have the capacity in raising said opposition in this case
RULING:
Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear
and file an answer on or before the return day, or within such further time as may be
allowed by the court. The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and
shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy
desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf.
Applicants failed to invoke this provision seasonably. Without objecting to the
unverified opposition, they proceeded with the trial, presented evidence and rested their
case. Only after the first witness of the private oppositors had testified and applicants
counsel had cross-examined him, was the defect of lack of verification brought up. By
that time, applicants had waived the defect. Applicants contend that the defect could not
be waived because it resulted in the private oppositors lack of standing in the case from
the start.
The written appearance with opposition presented by petitioner herein, on
November 7, 1951 (R.A.) was a valid one, and sufficient to give him legal standing in
court and would entitle him to notice, as a matter of right. The lower court erred in
choosing to ignore the written appearance with opposition, which was a substantial
compliance with the law, that requires a formal answer.
DIRECTOR OF LAND VS IAC

The land involved actually is an island known as Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf.
Situated in the Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan. The initial application for registration
was filed for Pacific Farms, Inc. under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, Act
No. 496, as amended.
The Director of Lands opposed the application alleging that the applicant, Pacific
Farms, Inc. does not possess a fee simple title to the land nor did its predecessors
possess the land for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of
application and that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the (1973)
new Philippine Constitution from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain citing
Section 11, Article 14.
The Director of Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging that the
land is within the unclassified public land and, hence, inalienable. Other private parties
also filed their oppositions, but were subsequently withdrawn.
The trial court rendered a decision adjudicating the subject property to J. Antonio
Araneta. On appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, the decision of the lower
court was affirmed.
Whether the land known as "Tambac Island" can be subject to registration
RULING:
Respondent even admitted that Tambac Island is still an unclassified public land
as of 1927 and remains to be unclassified.
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession the applicant
may have had and however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. The conversion of
subject property does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable.
In effect what the courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from
the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. We
reiterate that the classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains unclassified until released therefrom and rendered open
to disposition.
In fairness to respondent, the petitioners should seriously consider the matter of
the reclassification of the land in question. The attempt of people to have disposable
lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their name should not only be viewed
with understanding attitude, but as a matter of policy encouraged.
236 SCRA 442

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Delfina Dolor filed an application before the Regional Trial Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte for the confirmation of her title to a 908-square meter residential lot
located at the interior of Dencio Cabanela Street, Poblacion, Daet, Camarines Norte.
During the actual hearing on December 20, 1988, the publication requirement in the
Official Gazette was yet to be complied with. Although the notice of initial hearing was
included for publication in the October 17, 1988 issue of the Official Gazette, the same
was released for publication only on January 31, 1989. The actual publication of the
notice came out 67 days later after the scheduled initial hearing and/or 42 days after the
private respondent had rested her case. Petitioner concludes that the late publication did
not vest jurisdiction in the trial court.
Had the RTC been divested of its territorial jurisdiction when the actual
publication of the notice of initial hearing came out only after the trial of the case?
RULING:
Yes, by reason of the defective notice of initial hearing, all the proceedings
conducted by the trial court which culminated in its decision granting the prayer of the
respondent Dolor are declared void.
The primary legal principle against which the legality of all the proceedings
conducted by the trial court should be vested its jurisdiction. Section 23 of PD 1529
explicitly provides that before a court can act on the application for land registration, the
public shall be given notice of the initial hearing therof by means of publication, mailing,
and posting. This court ruled that in all cases where the authority of the courts to
proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is
mandatory it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. So
that there where there is a defect in the publication of petition, such defect deprives the
court of jurisdiction and when the court lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case,
the same lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects.
G.R. No. 88623 February 5, 1990

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, METRO MANILA vs. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, MALABON, METRO MANILA
On March 17, 1988, a Deed of Absolute Sale of a property in the name of
Salome Castillo in favor of Jose M. Castillo was presented to the Register of Deeds
(Atty. Francisco Romero) in Caloocan City for registration. It could not be given due
course because the original of said TCT No. R-3899 in the Registry of Deeds was
missing.
According to the petitioner, the Registry of Deeds for Malabon became
operational on April 5, 1988. As the missing title covered a parcel of land in Malabon,
Atty. Gaudencio Cena, the Register of Deeds for Malabon, filed on April 12, 1988 in the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, a verified petition for reconstitution of the original of
TCT No. R-3899 under Rep. Act No. 26. The petition was given due course on April 22,
1988. The court directed that a copy of its order giving due course to the petition and
setting it for hearing on August 17, 1988 be published in two (2) consecutive issues of
the Official Gazette as provided in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26.
At the hearing on August 17, 1988, the petitioner submitted a certification dated
August 10, 1988, of the Director of the National Printing Office certifying that the order
dated April 22, 1988 was included in Volume 84, Nos. 21 and 22, May 23 and May
30,1988 issues of the Official Gazette, the sheriffs certificate of posting and the registry
return receipts for the copies of the notices which were sent to the Director of Lands, the
Office of the Solicitor General, the National Land Title's and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA) Salome Castillo, and Jose Castillo. However, the May 23 and
May 30 issues of the Official Gazette were actually released for circulation on October 3,
1988, or forty-seven (47) days after the scheduled hearing of the petition.
Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Malabon dismissed the petition
for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of the petition was not published in the Official
Gazette "at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing" (Sec. 9, R.A. No. 26) which
had been set on August 17, 1988.
Whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the Official Gazette fortyseven (47) days after the hearing, instead of "at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of
hearing" was sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine the petition
RULING:
Evidently, it did not. The purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for
reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has
been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within
thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests
the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
In Director of Lands vs. The Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria de Bernal,
Greenfield Development Corporation, Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon
Bagatsing, 102 SCRA 370, this Court ruled that "in all cases where the authority of the
courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction
is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void."
Where there is a defect in the publication of the petition, such defect deprives the court
of jurisdiction. And when the court a quo lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case,
it lacks authority over the whole case and all its aspects.
Apart from the defective publication of the petition, another reason for its
dismissal is that the Register of Deeds for Malabon is not the proper party to file the
petition for reconstitution. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 26, which allowed the Register
of Deeds to motu proprio reconstitute a lost or destroyed certificate of title from its
corresponding owner's duplicate certificate, was expressly repealed or declared to be
"inoperative" by Section 6 of Republic Act 6732, approved on July 17, 1989. A petition for
reconstitution may now be filed only by "the registered owner his assigns, or any person
who has an interest in the property" (Section 12, Republic Act No. 26). In other respects,
the special procedure provided in Republic Act No. 26 remains unchanged and therefore
still applies (Zuiga vs. Vicencio, 153 SCRA 720).
4 SCRA 595 February 28, 1962

ELIGIO T. LEYVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCO LAIZ and MANUELA
JANDOC
Manuela Jandoc applied in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato for the
registration of three parcels of land. Eligio T. Leyva objected thereto with respect to a
portion of said land about one hectare which he already claimed to have adversely
possessed in good faith and under legal title. His wife, Eufemia L. Leyva filed another
opposition alleging that she and her husband had occupied A portion of the land in
question, which they had acquired from the defunct NARRA, and that both had
similarly occupied as owners another portion of said land with their improvements
made in good faith.
In one of these hearings, in the course of argument, the counsel for the Leyvas
admitted that the right which his clients desire to protect in the case is merely based on a
foreshore lease contract between them and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
Petitioners argue that their opposition n the main case was predicated
exclusively upon the foreshore lease contract executed in their favor by the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Can a mere foreshore lessee of a public land be an oppositor?
RULING:
No. Petitioners have admitted that the right which his clients desire to protect in
the case is merely based on a foreshore lease contract between them and the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources. In view Of his fact, it is clear that petioners
interest in a small portion of the land sought to be registered is dependent upon the
question whether or not the same forms part of the public domain and, hence upon the
success of the opposition of the Director of Lands.
Being merely that of a foreshore lessee, their interest can therefore be amply
protected by the provincial fiscal who represents the Government. This being so, their
presence in court is not indispensable. Upon the other hand, their active independent
intervention may even result in confusion of the evidence for the Government.
From the point of view of the end result of the registration proceedings, the interest of
the petitioners is likewise amply protected. If the land applied for is adjudged to be
private property, the right of the foreshore lessees either automatically terminates or
would depend entirely on the pleasure of the private party to whom the land is adjudged.
If, on the other hand, the land is ultimately declared part of the public domain, their right
as foreshore lessees would have suffered no impairment.
G.R. No. L-26093January 27, 1969

VIRGINIA L. DE CASTRO vs. HON. PIO MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City, and RUFITO AKIA
Respondent Akia sought the registration in his name of 15,922 square meters of
land situated in the City of Baguio. On July 30, 1965, petitioner Virginia L. De Castro
moved to intervene. Her interest is in the 1,000 square meters allegedly included in the
15,922 square meters of land specified in respondent Akias petition below. It appears
that petitioner Virginia de Castro filed with the Bureau of Lands Township Sales
Application covering a 1,000 square meter-parcel of land. On August 16, 1965,
petitioners motion for intervention was granted by the court below.
At the trial on the merits, petitioner de Castro, respondent Akia, and different
government agencies were duly represented. The case was submitted for decision.
Thereafter, on October 24, 1965, Akia lodged a motion to dismiss petitioners opposition
to his (Akias) petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings. Ground therefor, amongst
others, was that petitioner lacked personality to sue.
On December 4 1965, respondent judge ruled out her intervention and dismissed
her opposition to the reopening of the cadastral proceedings. He declared that mere
applicants of public land have no capacity to sue independently of the Bureau of Lands.
On January 13, 1966, de Castro moved to reconsider. She stressed the fact that
she was not a mere applicant of public land but an equitable owner thereof. Because,
she was an awardee who had paid to the government, in full, the sales value of the land
she applied for. On February 1, 1966, respondent judge refused reconsideration. The
judge based his action on a Manifestation of counsel for the Director of Lands stating
that the Director of Lands had cancelled the award in favor of petitioner.
A second motion for reconsideration was perfunctorily denied by respondent
judge. Then, on March 15, 1966, the Director of Lands came out with an order
reinstating petitioner de Castros award, for the reason that lack of water and lighting
facilities found to be true in the investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands caused
delay in the construction of petitioners house.
1. Is the reopening of the cadastral case jurisdictionally tainted by lack of publication?
2. Does petitioner Virginia L. De Castro have legal standing in the proceedings below?
RULING:
1.
Respondent Akias petition for reopening was instituted under Republic Act 931,
effective June 20, 1953, which in its Section 1 reads:
SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object
of cadastral proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the
same, but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in the proper
court during the time limit established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of
their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the public
domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding
the approval of this Act, are hereby granted the right within five years after the date on
which this Act shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings
under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-nine, as amended,
only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved,
leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the
Government, and the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition,
shall notify the Government, through the Solicitor General, and if after hearing the
parties, said court shall find that all conditions herein established have been complied
with, and that all taxes, interests and penalties thereof have been paid from the time
when land tax should have been collected until the day when the motion is presented, it
shall order said judicial proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken on such
parcels.
In sum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening a parcel of land claimed
by respondent Akia was already embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed by the
Director of Lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court already acquired jurisdiction
over the said property. The petition, the wherefore, need not be published.
2.
This brings us to the next question: Does petitioner Virginia L. De Castro have
legal standing in the proceedings below?
Petitioner Virginia de Castro here, it must be recalled, is an awardee in the public
bidding held upon her own township sales application. Of course, the award up to now
has not been fully implemented because she has not yet complied with one condition
imposed on her. But, if the award is not a permanent disposition, it is at least a
provisional one, enough to prevent reopening by respondent Akia as to the land
disputed.
We, accordingly, rule that petitioner has legal standing before the cadastral court
below.
G.R. No. L-67583

July 31, 1987
HEIRS OF MARINA C. AND HEIRS OF ARNULFO C. REGALADO, REPRESENTED
BY AMADEO C. REGALADO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Marina Regalado (Marina) filed on July 14, 1987 an application for registration of
a parcel of land situated in Sitio Balubad, Barrio Nangka, Marikina, Metro Manila which
was surveyed and recorded. The application was published on November 14, 1988 in
the Official Gazette and on November 28, 1988 in Nueva Era, a newspaper of general
circulation.
Marina subsequently filed on January 18, 1991 a motion to withdraw the
application without prejudice to the refiling of the same. The motion to withdraw the
application was granted. On May 6, 1992, Marina filed another application for land
registration before the Pasig RTC.
Marina later filed on May 28, 1992 an Amended Application for Registration
alleging, inter alia, that she had by herself or through her predecessor-in-interest ...
Been in open, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of said land which is
alienable and disposable of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 1945 or earlier; and that she acquired the land by virtue of a Deed of Assignment
dated January 3, 1977 executed by the registered claimant Tomas Antero as Assignor in
her favor.
To the Amended Application, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed an
opposition.
Acting on the Amended Application, a Notice of Initial Hearing scheduled on
June 26, 1995 was published in the May 22, 1995 issue of the Official Gazette and in the
June 22, 1995 issue of Taliba.
During the pendency of her application or on November 29, 1995, Marina died,
hence, her surviving heirs designated Arnulfo Regalado, her eldest son, as the applicant
to pursue and litigate the land registration case in their behalf. On August 20, 1996,
Arnulfo Regalado executed a Waiver of the area covered by the NHA without prejudice
to the other land subject of the ... Petition. In the same Waiver, he ceded, transferred,
and waived 30,239 square meters of the property to the NHA.
Pasig RTC ordered the registration of the property, except the portion which was
waived in favor of the NHA, pro indiviso in the name of the heirs of Marina.
1. Whether the CA erred in entertaining the appeal of the Republic despite the
fact that it was not party in the case as it had not filed any opposition or answer against
the application for registration
2. Whether or not the applicants satisfied the requirements of the Land
Registration Act
RULING:
The failure of the Republic to file any opposition or answer to the application for
registration, despite receipt of notice thereof, did not deprive its right to appeal the RTC
decision.
Relative to the allegation that the Director of Lands or that the government did
not oppose the application of herein respondent, as in fact on December 26, 1969 an
order of general default was issued by the court against the whole world, suffice it to say
that as stated by this Court in Luciano v. Esterella, 34 SCRA 769, it is a well known and
settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government, is usually not
estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. And, in an earlier
case, Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA 211, there was an
enunciation of such a principle in this wise: Thus did the lower court, as pointed out by
the then Solicitor General, conclude that the government was bound by the mistaken
interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the auditor general. It would
consider estoppel as applicable. That is not the law. Estoppel does not lie.
Respecting the finding of the appellate court on the discrepancy in the lot size
and technical descriptions mentioned in the earlier-quoted portion of its decision, the
heirs contend that what appears, after a careful comparison of the approved survey
plan , and that republished with Taliba and the Official Gazette, were simple clerical
errors and minor discrepancies which do not substantially alter the technical description
of the subject property as published by the Land Registration Authority in the Official
Gazette and that by petitioner with the Taliba
Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act, an application for registration of
land is required to contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the
proceeding, the name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and
addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if
unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for
initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing
to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating
the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, shall be
published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the
notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the
court in land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is
constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction
over the res is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the
hearing that would enable all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests
in the property, to come forward and show to the court why the application for
registration thereof is not to be granted.
36 SCRA 476
December 28, 1970
FERNANDEZ VS. ABORATIGUE
Ana Fernandez, the owner of a parcel of land in Dipulao, Coron, Palawan, filed
suit in the Palawan Court of First Instance to have the defendants vacate a portion of
said land and cease exercising acts of ownership therein.
Defendant Feliza Aboratigue claims that her father, during his lifetime was
employed as a guard to the property and as such was allowed to plant fruit trees in a
small portion in the immediate vicinity. After her fathers death, she and her husband was
allowed to stay but they later claimed to be the owners of the sad portion through their
continuous possession and cultivation of the disputed are, by themselves and through
their predecessors-in-interest since the year 1901.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff to be the owner of the
disputed property and ordering the defendants to vacate the same, with right to
reimbursement of the value of the improvements thereon, they being builders in good
faith.
RULING:
All claims of third persons to the property must be asserted in the registration
proceedings If any claim to a portion thereof is upheld, that portion is segregated from
the property applied for, and is not included in the decree of registration and certificate of
title subsequently issued to the applicant. If it is included, the claim is deemed adversely
resolved with finality, subject only to a petition for review of the decree within one year
from its issuance on the ground of fraud, under section 38 of the Land Registration Act.
The rule is that the owner of the buildings and improvements should claim them during
the proceedings for registration and the fact of ownership, if upheld by the court, must be
noted on the face of the certificate. Inasmuch as the improvements in the disputed area
have been acknowledged by the plaintiff in her complaint as belonging to the appellants
predecessor in interest, and the lower courts decision allowing them to recover the
value of the improvements is not now in question, this right of the appellants must be
upheld. The trial court has left the determination of such value to mutual agreement
between the parties. This disposition should be modified in the sense that if they fail to
agree, the matter should be submitted to the said court for hearing and adjudication.
196 SCRA 601

MAY 6, 1991
CACHERO VS. MARZAN
The spouses Cachero were declared by the CFI of La Union as owners of the
nine hectares piece of land in an action for recovery of possession and ownership of two
adjoining parcels of land. The judgment became final and executor.
About seven year later the Cachero spouses instituted proceedings for the registration of
the said land under the Torrens act. In said case, separate oppositions were filed by Atty.
Agaton Yaranon, jr. In behalf of individuals who were the same oppositors in the former
case seven years earlier.
The Registration Court thereafter issued an Order that excepting the private
oppositors and the Bureau of Lands, a special entry of default is declared against the
whole world.
Thereafter, the Court found that the applicant spouses and their predecessors-ininterest had been in continuous and notorious possession of Lots 6859 and 6860 for
more than 60 years.
Subsequently, persons not parties to the registration proceedings filed a petition
for review of judgment. They were the Genovas and represented by the same Atty. They
alleged that, they not the Cacheros, or any of the original oppositors were the owners f
the land and that the Cacheros fraudulently omitted to give them notice of their
application for registration.
Whether or not the persons declared in default by an entry of special default may
still file a petition for review of judgment on the grounds that the decision is null and void
for want of jurisdiction.
RULING:
The Genovas were and are bound by the order of default issued in the Land
registration case, a proceeding undoubtedly in rem in character. That default order was
entered against the whole world, with the exception only of the parties who had
appeared and filed pleadings in the registration case. The Genovas were charged with
knowledge of the Cacheros application since notice of the application had been
published in accordance with law. They could and should have taken part in the case to
assert and prove their rights over the property subject thereof. The fact that they did not,
cannot operate to exclude them from the binding effects of the in rem judgment rendered
in the proceedings. Their claim that they were precluded from doing so by fraud
perpetrated by the Cacheros has not been substantiated and was not found by the Court
of Appeals to be a proper issue in their appeal, since it declared that only issues were
purely legal ones. Besides, that unsubstantiated claim of fraud does not at all explain
why they should not be bound by the published notices of the Cacheros application,
accomplished in accordance, with law and by direction of the Registration Court.
BASILISA S. ESCONDE vs. HON. SAMILO N. BARLONGAY and RAMON V. DELFIN

Private respondent Ramon V. Delfin is the applicant in the "Application for
Registration of Title" dated April 14, 1969, at the CFI of Valenzuela, Metro Manila for a
parcel of land in Bulacan. His application was granted and the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan issued an Original Certificate of Title in his name.
Prior to the decision of the trial court and the issuance of the OCT by the Registry
of Deeds if favor of the respondent, petitioner failed to file any opposition over the
application for registration in writing. Petitioner alleged current possession of the land. In
spite the prior notice delivered to the petitioner, petitioner failed to appear in court
regarding her concerns.
Petitioner filed a petition for reconveyance, motion for opposition and motion to
quash when private respondent was given a writ of possession over the land.
Whether or not to file a written opposition over the application of registration of
the property deprives the oppositor to challenge the judgment.
RULING:
Hence, it was established that when no answer in writing nor any opposition is
made to an application for registration of property in Court, all the allegations contained
in the application shall be held as confessed by reason of the absence of denial on the
part of the opponent. A person who has not challenged an application for registration of
land even if the appeal afterwards interposed is based on the right of dominion over the
same land, cannot allege damage or error against the judgment ordering the registration
inasmuch as he did not allege or pretend to have any right to such land
G.R. No. L-41278

April 15, 1988
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Bataan, Branch II, MARIA O. GARCIA, and IMPERIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
On September 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by
respondent Maria O. Garcia in the Second Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Bataan. On February 19, 1974, the Director of Lands filed an opposition to this
application, and at the same time the Solicitor General entered his appearance and
authorized the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearings of the same.
Subsequently, respondent Imperial Development Corporation, with the conformity of
respondent Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant from Maria O. Garcia to
Imperial Development Corporation without amending the boundaries and the area of the
parcels of land stated in the original application, which motion was granted by the
respondent Judge.
A Notice of Initial Hearing was sent by the respondent Judge to all parties
concerned. The same notice was likewise published in the Official Gazette and posted
by the sheriff as required by law.
On January 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his
counsel was present; an order of general default was issued by the respondent Judge
on the same date. After the reception of evidence for the applicant before the clerk of
court, the respondent Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands
in favor of the respondent corporation.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the
failure of his counsel to appear at the initial hearing was excusable, and that the decision
was contrary to the facts and to law. The motion was, however, denied.
Whether or not the petitioner may be declared in default for failure to appear
during the initial hearing
RULING:
The declaration of default against the petitioner was patently invalid because
when the same was made, he had already entered an appearance and filed his
opposition or answer. In Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation vs. Vallejos we laid
down the doctrine that appeal is not an adequate remedy where a party is illegally
declared in default. Thus, we stated:
The remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule (i.e. Sec. 2,
Rule 41) is properly, though not exclusively, available to a defendant who
has been validly declared in default. It does not preclude a defendant who
has been illegally declared in default from pursuing a more speedy and
efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the judgment by
default set aside as a nullity.
The opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds, having been

formally filed, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such
registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear
on the day set for the initial hearing. The pertinent provision of law which states: "If no
person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion
of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be
recorded ...," cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer
before it, which has long been filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than
illogical, unwarranted, and unjust. Had the law intended that failure of the oppositor to
appear on the date of the initial hearing would be a ground for default despite his having
filed an answer, it would have been so stated in unmistakable terms, considering the
serious consequences of an order of default. Especially in this case where the greater
public interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is alleged to be public land,
the respondent Judge should have received the applicant's evidence and set another
date for the reception of the oppositors evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and
petitioner herein should have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the
government's claim.
True, an amended application was submitted but it is admitted by the
respondents themselves that no significant alterations were made therein, hence, the
opposition already filed should have been considered as the answer to the amended
application as well. Parenthetically, since the amendment in the application consisted
merely in the substitution of the name of the applicant, it was not absolutely necessary to
furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the amended application, and it sufficed that
the substitution was stated in the Notice of Initial Hearing. 7
G.R. No. L-38974 March 25, 1975

OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and FREDERICK G. WEBBER
vs. JUDGE AMADOR T. VALLEJOS, ALFREDO CATOLICO, and LEONARDO ALCID
On June 1, 1973, Alfredo Catolico, then a judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, filed with said court a complaint against Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation
and Frederick G. Webber, the latter in his personal capacity and as President and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of said corporation, alleging two (2) causes of action.
The first, for the return of ten (10) certificates of stock of the corporation borrowed from
him by the defendants, and the second, for the payment of his services as legal counsel
for the corporation.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: namely
(1) improper venue and (2) lack of cause of action.
On June 16, 1973, the date set for the hearing of the motion to dismiss, neither
the parties nor their respective counsels appeared in court. But the court, noting that
there was no clear showing in the record that notice of hearing of said motion had been
served upon counsel for the plaintiff, issued on June 18, 1973 an Order postponing
consideration of the motion.
While the motion to dismiss was pending resolution by the court because
defendants had not yet presented to the court the required proof of service, plaintiff filed
a petition to declare the defendants in default and to allow him to present his evidence
ex parte. The court granted the petition and, consequently, it received ex parte the
evidence of the plaintiff and rendered judgment.
1.
Whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in declaring the defendants in default, in receiving plaintiff's
evidence ex parte and in rendering judgment thereon
2.
Whether ordinary appeal, not certiorari and prohibition, is the proper remedy
available to petitioners
RULING:
1.
With regard to the first issue, respondents contend that the motion to dismiss the
complaint is a "useless piece of paper" because the notice of hearing incorporated
therein is addressed to the Clerk of Court, not to the party concerned, that is, the plaintiff
or his counsel, as required by the rules. We do not agree. As copied verbatim above, the
notice of hearing states the time and place of hearing, and a copy thereof was sent
through registered mail seven (7) days before the date set for the hearing of the motion
but actually received by plaintiff's counsel one (1) day before said date, as per
certification of the Quezon City Post Office.
2.
The remedy of certiorari and/or prohibition cannot be resorted to. In resolving this
question, We advert to Our ruling in Matute v. Court of Appeals, supra, where We stated:
In opposing the instant petition, the plaintiff-respondent contends that the
remedy of the defendant petitioner is not a petition for certiorari but an
ordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph 3 which reads:
'A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the
judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him in accordance with Rule 38.
We do not agree. The remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule is properly,
though not exclusively, available to a defendant who has been validly declared in default.
It does not preclude a defendant who has been illegally declared in default from pursuing
a more speedy and efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the judgment
by default set aside as a nullity.
It should be emphasized that a defendant who is properly declared in default is

differently situated from one who is improvidently declared in default. The former
irreparably loses his right to participate in the trial, while the latter retains such a right
and may exercise the same after having the order of default and the subsequent
judgment by default annulled and the case remanded to the court of origin. Moreover the
former is limited to the remedy set forth in section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 41 by virtue of
which he can contest only the judgment by default on the designated ground that it is
contrary to the evidence or the law; the latter, however, has the option to avail of the
same remedy or to forthwith interpose a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of
the order of default even before the promulgation of a judgment by default, or in the
event that the latter has been rendered, to have both court decrees the order of
default and the judgment by default declared void. The defendant-petitioner's choice
of the latter course of action is correct for he controverts the judgment by default not on
the ground that it is not supported by evidence or it is contrary to law, but on the ground
that it is intrinsically void for having been rendered pursuant to a patently invalid order of
default..
G.R. No. 55152, August 19, 1986

FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO VS. HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN
On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and Honorio Valisno
purchased from the legal heirs of Agapita V. Blanco, namely, Guillermo, Guillermo, Jr.,
Manuel and Rosario, all surnamed Blanco, two parcels of land. On August 12, 1968,
private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, claiming to be the owner of the land in question
by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and one Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor on
June 30, 1967 by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, ousted Fermin Lozano from
possession of the land. He subsequently erected a six-door apartment on said land.
On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court of First Instance
of Isabela a complaint against private respondent for recovery of possession of said
parcels of land. The case was in due time resolved in favor of petitioners who were
declared owners thereof. On appeal, however the appellate court in a decision
promulgated on January 19, 1978, reversed the decision of the lower court and
dismissed the complaint of petitioners on a finding.
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed before the Court
of First Instance of Isabela an application for registration in his name of the title of the
lands in question, basing his entitlement thereto on the aforementioned deed of sale as
well as the decision of the appellate court.
On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the application. Private
respondent, however, moved for the dismissal of said opposition on the ground that the
same is barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the appellate court's decision. Despite the
opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the lower court issued the first of the
assailed orders dismissing the petitioner's opposition on the ground of res judicata.
Whether or not respondent judge erred gravely in dismissing petitioners'
opposition to respondent's application for registration of title, which is highly irregular in
land registration proceedings
RULING:
Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar
or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however,
allows the application of the rules contained therein in land registration proceedings in a
suppletory character or whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious
termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154,
sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein appellants upon a
motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the
court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be registered in
appellants' name had previously been registered in the names of the oppositors. To
have allowed the registration proceeding to run its usual course would have been a mere
exercise in futility. The same consideration applies to the case at bar.
It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a
counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a complaint,
this time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who
becomes defendant in the counterclaim may either then answer the counterclaim or be
declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same.
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar.
For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must
be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. The decision in C.A. G.R.
No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties. There is, between the registration case under
consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's coowner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a
difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in
court the interests of the co-ownership. Thus, when private respondent Cayaba
defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing so in behalf of the coownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove
ownership was the deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano in his
and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in dismissing
petitioners' opposition, such dismissal must be affirmed.
G.R. No. 64818, May 13, 1991

REPUBLIC VS. MARIA LEE AND IAC
Respondent filed before the RTC a registration of a parcel of land in her favor
which was opposed by the Dir. Of Lands on grounds that respondent or her
predecessor-in-interest acquired the land under any recognized mode for acquisition of
title; they have not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land
in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years prior to the filing of application and the
land in dispute is a public domain belonging to Republic of the Philippines. The court
rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Upon appeal by RP, it affirmed the lower
court decision thus this appeal to the Supreme Court.
Republic of the Phil. Contends that respondent failed to prove by conclusive
evidence that she has ownership of the land by fee simple title and her testimony as to
the ownership of her predecessor-in-interest is self serving after claiming that she
obtained her Deed of Sale of the property from Laureana Mataban and Sixto Espiritu
who obtained their title from the previous owners of the land, Urbano Diaz and Bernarda
Vinluan. From the time of filing the application of registration, the respondent was in
possession of the land for 13 years but she sought to tack her possession on the said
land from her predecessor-in-interests who were in possession of the land for 20 years.
Conditions provided by Sec. 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 where one is under a
bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership through their predecessor-in-interest or by
themselves have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the agricultural land in public domain for 30 years shall be entitled to a
certificate of title.
Whether or not the respondent was able to provide sufficient and substantial
evidence as complying with the requirements of law for confirmation of her ownership of
the land in dispute
RULING:
It was held that it is incumbent upon the respondent to prove that her
predecessors-in-interest were in adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and
possession in the concept of an owner for 20 years which she failed to provide a clear
and convincing evidence to prove. Her bare allegations, without more, do not constitute
such preponderance of evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.
G.R. No. L-47644 August 21, 1987

FELIPA S. LARAGAN, INDEPENDENCIO SIBBALUCA, AURORA C. SIBBALUCA,
and ZENAIDA S. VALDEZ, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, TEODORO LEAO, TOMAS
LEAO, FRANCISCO LEAO, and CONSOLACION LEAO
Felipa Laragan, Independencio Sibbaluca, Aurora Sibbaluca, and Zenaida
Valdez filed an application with the Court of First Instance of Isabela for the registration
of their title over a parcel of land in Sto. Tomas, Ilagan, Isabela. The applicants alleged
that they acquired said parcel of land by way of an absolute deed of sale from the
spouses Anastacio and Lucrecia Sibbaluca and that they have been in possession
thereof for more than 34 years.
On the date set for the initial hearing of the application that is, 20 May 1969,
Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Vicente Leano, Francisco Leano, and Consolacion Leano
appeared and served notice that they were opposing the application for registration.
Thereafter, the court issued an order of general default. On 7 July 1969, the
Solicitor General filed a written opposition, on behalf of the Director of Lands, alleging,
among others, that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest do not have sufficient
title to the parcel of land sought to be registered. He prayed that the land be declared
public land.
On 2 August 1969, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Vicente Leano, Francisco
Leano, and Consolacion Leano filed their opposition to the application for registration.
They claimed that they are the owners, pro indiviso, of the southern part of the land
applied for, with an area of 16 hectares, which is covered by Homestead Application No.
58202 of their deceased parents.
The trial court rendered judgment confirming the title of the applicants over the
parcel of land applied for and ordering its registration in the names of the applicants.
From said judgment, only the oppositors Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Vicente Leano,
Francisco Leano, and Consolacion Leano appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 9
November 1977, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but excluded
the southern portion of the land applied for, which is the portion covered by Homestead
Application No. 58202, the appellate court declaring such excluded portion to be public
land, and part of the public domain, in view of the failure of the applicants and oppositors
to prove registrable title over the same.
ARGUMENT:
They claim that the respondent appellate court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in declaring the parcel of land in question as public land, because the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela ordering the registration of said parcel
of land in their favor, had already become final and executory for failure of the Director of
Lands to appeal therefrom
RULING:
The argument is untenable. While it may be true that the Director of Lands did
not appeal from the decision of the trial court, his failure to so appeal did not make the
decision of the trial court final and executory, in view of the appeal interposed by the
other oppositors, Teodoro Leano, Tomas Leano, Francisco Leano, and Consolacion
Leano, who also seek the confirmation of their imperfect title over the land in question.
Neither did such failure of the Director of Lands to appeal foreclose the appellate court
from declaring the land in question to be public land, since the oppositors and the herein
petitioners are both seeking the registration of their title pursuant to the provisions of
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law where the presumption always is that the land
pertains to the state, and the occupants and possessors claim an interest in the same,
by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership for the required number of years.
Thus, in their application for registration, the petitioners alleged that they "hereby apply
to have the land hereinafter described brought under the operation of the Land
Registration Act, and to have the title thereto registered and confirmed." The petitioners
are deemed to thereby admit that, until such confirmation, the land remains public.
Besides, it is an established rule that an applicant for registration is not necessarily
entitled to have the land registered in his name simply because no one appears to
oppose his title and to oppose the registration of the land. He must show, even in the
absence of opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in
fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system,
simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any
opposition, deny registration of the land under the Torrens system, if the facts presented
do not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he seeks to
register.
G.R. No. 50260, July 29, 1992

DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT VS. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS AND TRINIDAD S. DE ARMEDILLA, IN SUBSTITUTION OF

MARIA CALANOG
Two hundred fifty-six (256) hectares of the land are within Timberland and
certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 11, 1930 as forest land. The first known
possessor of the entire tract of land was allegedly Estanislao Patricio. It was sold to
Vicente Montenegro in 1928 together with 100 heads of cattle and their offsprings, as
well as the corrals and wire enclosures. In 1938, he sold the same to Maria Calanog with
the cattle remaining on the ranch. Calanog intensified her efforts in the rearing of
livestock such that there were about 500 heads of animals grazing on the land.
On January 20, 1956, in the Court of First Instance of Masbate, Calanog filed an
application for the registration of title over the land.
The Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry filed an opposition to the
aforesaid application. There being no other oppositors to the application with the
exception of the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, the court issued on the
same day an order of general default against the whole world.
Maria Calanog died on October 30, 1958. One of her children, Trinidad S.
Armedilla , substituted her in the proceedings.
On June 26, 1962, thirty-seven (37) private individuals filed an urgent petition to
lift the order of general default alleging that they learned of said order only the day
before or on June 25, 1962; that their failure to file opposition was due to mistake,
accident and excusable negligence as they had always been under the impression that
their former counsel had filed an opposition to the application; in fact two of them had
already been issued certificates of title while some of them had applications for
homestead which had been approved or were pending approval.
The said petition was granted by the Court and the order of general default was
lifted with respect to the thirty-seven (37) private oppositors.
On August 14, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision and ordered the
registration of the title over the property in the name of Trinidad S. Armedilla.
Whether or not Trinidad Sison de Armedilla had sufficiently proved that she and
her predecessors-in-interest had, for thirty years, openly and continuously possessed
the land involved
RULING:
The private respondent may not claim open, continuous and uninterrupted
possession for thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
registration on November 20, 1962 with respect to the remaining 342 hectares of land.
As earlier mentioned, this bigger portion of the land had been occupied and possessed
by the thirty-seven private oppositors to the application as early as 1954, 1955 and
1956. As private respondent herself admitted in the agreed additional stipulation of facts,
said oppositors even showed that they have duly approved homestead applications, free
patents and two of them even possess transfer certificates of title.
It was also erroneous for the Court of Appeals to categorically rule that the
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation for thirty years cannot
be required of the applicant in view of the fact that such possession was interrupted by
force majeure or by the war years. While the applicant is at liberty to invoke said
interruption in her possession, it must be clearly established that when the war ended,
the applicant resumed possession of the land. In this case, however, the applicant could
not have resumed her alleged pre-war possession inasmuch as other occupantscultivators had settled on the land. Her claim that she had installed an overseer in the
property when she returned in 1945 rings hollow in light of the undisputed evidence
presented by the 37 oppositors.
Moreover, when the government surveyed the area in 1953-1954, private
respondent had no registerable title considering the law then applicable. What is on
record, however, is that private respondent's predecessors-in-interest commenced

possession only in 1914. Furthermore, even if private respondent be considered as in
possession of the land from that time on, as stated above, after its interruption by the
war, private respondent was no longer in open and notorious possession of the land. A
sizeable portion had been taken over by persons, who, sensing perhaps that private
respondent was no more than an absentee claimant, took the necessary legal steps to
claim for their own the lands in their respective possession.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the application for confirmation of title filed by private
respondent is DENIED.
153 SCRA 351

August 31, 1987
BUREAU OF FORESTRY VS. COURT OF APPEALS

On July 11, 1961, 4 parcels of land in Iloilo with an approximate area of 30.5943
hectares were the subject of an application for registration by Mercedes Diago. The said
lands were bought from the late Jose M. Nava who bought it from Canuto Gustillo on
June 21, 1934.
The Director of Lands opposed the application because neither Diago nor Nava
had sufficient title over the land and that they were never in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land for at least 30 years prior to the filing of the application,
certain portions of the lands applied mangrove swamps and are within a Timberland of
Buenavista, Iloilo and 11.1863 hectares are coconut lands and admittedly within the
disposable portion of the public domain.
On April 27, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo purchased the subject lands and
moved to substitute Diago, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for
Registration of Title substantially reproducing the allegations in the application of
Mercedes Diago. Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved to be
substituted in the place of petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering the registration of the 4 parcels of
land in the name of Filomeno Gallo after excluding the portion identified as the site of the
municipal hall of the Buenavista Town.
Whether or not the classification of lands of the public domain by the Executive
branch of the government can be changed or varied by the court depending upon the
evidence adduced before it
RULING:
We also held in the case of Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499, 503 that... As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable under
either the Constitution of 1935 or the Constitution of 1973.
... It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the
demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all
public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the
taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth (Section 1816 of the
Revised Administrative Code). That the area in question is a forest or timber land
is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest
Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the
category of forest land, approved by the President on March 7, 1958.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted
from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of
the government and not of the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room
for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the Government,
through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion
for the respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is
within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area
is needed for forest purposes.
Furthermore, private respondents Cannot claim to have obtained their title by
prescription inasmuch as the application filed by them necessarily implied an admission
that the portions applied for are part of the public domain which cannot be acquired by
prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a rule of law that possession of
forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Forestry vs.
Munoz, 23 SCRA 1184).
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed decision is hereby SET
ASIDE.
G.R. No. 156364

September 3, 2007
JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST vs. PR BUILDERS, INC.

Jacobus Bernhard Hulst (petitioner) and his spouse Ida Johanna Hulst-Van
Ijzeren (Ida), Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc.
(respondent), for the purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit in respondent's townhouse
project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas.
When respondent failed to complete the project by June 1995, the spouses Hulst
filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for
rescission of contract.
On April 22, 1997, HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino (HLURB Arbiter)
rendered a Decision in favor of spouses Hulst,
Meanwhile, spouses Hulst divorced. Ida assigned her rights over the purchased property
to petitioner. From then on, petitioner alone pursued the case.
In a Notice of Sale dated March 27, 2000, the Sheriff set the public auction of the levied
properties on April 28, 2000 at 10:00 a.m.
Two days before the scheduled public auction or on April 26, 2000, respondent filed an
Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy with the HLURB on the ground that the Sheriff
made an overlevy since the aggregate appraised value of the levied properties at
P6,500.00 per sq m is P83,616,000.00, based on the Appraisal Report of Henry Hunter
Bayne Co., Inc. on December 11, 1996, which is over and above the judgment award.
The Sheriff proceeded to sell the 15 parcels of land. Holly Properties Realty
Corporation was the winning bidder for all 15 parcels of land for the total amount of
P5,450,653.33. The sum of P5,313,040.00 was turned over to the petitioner in
satisfaction of the judgment award after deducting the legal fees.
At 4:15 p.m. Of the same day, while the Sheriff was at the HLURB office to remit
the legal fees relative to the auction sale and to submit the Certificates of Sale for the
signature of HLURB Director Belen G. Ceniza, he received the Order dated April 28,
2000 issued by the HLURB Arbiter to suspend the proceedings on the matter.
Four months later, or on August 28, 2000, the HLURB Arbiter and HLURB
Director issued an Order setting aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real properties.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Whether or not the petitioner and his wife, being foreign nationals, qualified under
the Constitution from owning real property in their names.
RULING:
Section 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed
only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain." The 1987
Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition, exploitation, development
and utilization of lands of the public domain for Filipino citizens or corporations at least
60 percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also
been disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Since petitioner and his wife, being Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the
Constitution from acquiring and owning real property, it is unequivocal that the Contract
to Sell entered into by petitioner together with his wife and respondent is void. Under
Article 1409 (1) and (7) of the Civil Code, all contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law or public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law
are inexistent and void from the beginning. Article 1410 of the same Code provides that
the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe. A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect. It does not
create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.
G.R. No. 171072
April 7, 2009
GOLDCREST REALTY CORPORATION vs. CYPRESS GARDENS CONDOMINIUM

CORPORATION
Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer of Cypress
Gardens, a ten-storey building located at Herrera Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. On
April 26, 1977, Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions 3 which
constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and incorporated respondent
Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to manage the condominium
project and to hold title to all the common areas. Title to the land on which the
condominium stands was transferred to Cypress. But Goldcrest retained ownership of
the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of the condominium. Goldcrest
and its directors, officers, and assigns likewise controlled the management and
administration of the Condominium until 1995.
Following the turnover of the administration and management of the
Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that certain
common areas pertaining to Cypress were being occupied and encroached upon by
Goldcrest. Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages against Goldcrest
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking to compel the
latter to vacate the common areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove the
structures it built thereon.
For its part, Goldcrest averred that it was granted the exclusive use of the roof
decks limited common area by Section 4(c) of the condominiums Master Deed. It
likewise argued that it constructed the contested doors for privacy and security
purposes, and that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied by it are unusable and
inaccessible to other condominium unit owners.
In his decision Arbiter San Vicente ruled in favor of Cypress. On review, the
HLURB Special Division modified the decision of Arbiter San Vicente. It deleted the
award for actual damages after finding that the encroached areas were not actually
measured and that there was no evidentiary basis for the rate of compensation fixed by
Arbiter San Vicente. It likewise held that Cypress has no cause of action regarding the
use of the roof decks limited common area because only Goldcrest has the right to use
the same.
I. Whether or not the appellate court erred in ruling that Goldcrest built an office
structure on a supposed encroached area in the open space of the roof deck.
II. Whether or not the appellate court erred in ruling that petitioner impaired the
easement on the portion of the roof deck designated as a limited common area.
RULING:
Anent the first issue, we rule in favor of Cypress. At this stage of the proceedings,
the failure to measure the supposed encroached areas is no longer relevant because the
award for actual damages is no longer in issue. Moreover, a perusal of the records
shows that the finding of the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest built an office structure on
the roof decks limited common area is supported by substantial evidence and
established facts, to wit: (1) the ocular inspection reports submitted by HLURB Inspector
Edwin D. Aquino; (2) the fact that the second ocular inspection of the roof deck was
intended to measure the actual area encroached upon by Goldcrest; (3) the fact that
Goldcrest had been fined for building a structure on the limited common area; and (4) the
fact that Goldcrest neither denied the structures existence nor its encroachment on the
roof decks limited common area.
Anent the second issue, the question of whether a certain act impairs an
easement is undeniably one of fact, considering that its resolution requires us to
determine the acts propriety in relation to the character and purpose of the subject
easement. In this case, we find no cogent reason to overturn the similar finding of the
HLURB, the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest has no right
to erect an office structure on the limited common area despite its exclusive right to use
the same. We note that not only did Goldcrests act impair the easement, it also illegally
altered the condominium plan, in violation of Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 957.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed
restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights
necessary for the use of the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for the
benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the easement in
any other manner than that previously established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it
which is not necessary for the use and preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot alter
or make the easement more burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient estate owner of
its intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; and (7) it should choose
the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least
convenience to the owner of the servient estate. Any violation of the above constitutes
impairment of the easement.
Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrests acts shows that it breached a number of
the aforementioned restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of
the office structure were neither necessary for the use or preservation of the roof decks
limited area. Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain on the
condominiums foundation and on the roof decks common limited area, making the
easement more burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium
unit owners. Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went beyond the
intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the approved condominium project
plan and violated Section 4 of the condominiums Declaration of Restrictions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-58867; June 22, 1984

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ANTONIO VALERIANO, GABRIELA VALERIANO VDA. DE LA CRUZ,
LETICIA A. VALERIANO and MARISSA VALERIANO DE LA ROSA
In May 10, 1976, Antonio Valeriano et al., hereinafter referred to as the
respondents, filed their application for the registration of a parcel of land, connected to a
river and which they have converted into fishponds, in the CFI of Bulacan. The Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within the
unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan and that areas within the unclassified region are
denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion
of the public domain.
After the hearing, the CFI ordered the registration of the subject land in favor of
the applicants (respondents), which the CA affirmed basing from the evidence that the
applicants predecessors-ininterest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful,
and adverse possession of the parcel of land for more than 30 years. The CA further
opined that since the subject property is entirely devoted to fishpond purposes, it cannot
not be categorized as part of forestlands, thus this case.
Whether or not the Courts can reclassify public lands.
RULING:
No. In its decision, the SC commented that the CFI and CAs approval for the
registration of the subject land in effect released such property from the unclassified
category, which is beyond the competence and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Court
further emphasized the rule stating that classification or reclassification of public lands is
an exclusive right vested to the Executive Department of the Government and not to the
Judiciary and in the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land
until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
G.R. No. 83609; October 26, 1989

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA
BISNAR
On July 20,1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar filed their joint application for the
registration of two parcels of land, located in the province of Capiz, in the CFI of Capiz.
They claimed that they inherited those parcels of land. The Director of Lands and
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the ground
that said parcels of land were part of a timberland, a public dominion, so it cannot be the
subject of the registration proceedings.
After the hearing, the CFI ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the
names of the applicants, herein private respondents after finding that the applicants and
their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and
adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership
for more than 80 years.
The CA affirmed the CFIs decision, holding that the classification of the lots as
timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said
lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing as authority
the case of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands.
Whether or not the possession of forestlands or timberlands for 80 years can
ripen to private ownership.
RULING:
No.The Court ruled that possession of forestlands, however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership. It emphasized that a positive act of the government, particularly
the Executive Department is needed to declassify land, which is classified as forest, and
to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes before
registration of which may proceed. The Court, citing various cases, stated that a parcel
of forestland is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry, an office under
the Executive Department, and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court
to register under the Torrens System.
In the present case, the two parcels of land were not declared by the Executive
Department to be alienable and disposable, thus it cannot be registered under private
ownership.
G.R. No. L-52518 ;August 13, 1991

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR.
IHVCP is a company engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of
plywood. It renewed its timber license, which was granted by the government and shall
be valid for 25 years, in early 1960. Said license authorizes the company to cut, collect
and remove timber from the portion of timber land located in certain municipalities of
Laguna, including Paete.
In 1964, the Congress enacted R.A. 3990, an Act establishing an experiment
station for UP. The said experiment station covers a portion of the timberland in Paete,
occupied by IHVCP so UP, who claims ownership of said portion of timberland,
demanded the latter to pay the forest charges to it, instead of the BIR. IHVCP rejected
the demand and it filed a suit against UP, claiming that R.A. 3990 does not empower UP
to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by it within the tract of land referred to in said
Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges prescribed by the BIR.
Whether or not UP is the owner of the portion of timberland in Paete
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that R.A. 3990 ceded and transferred in full ownership to
UP the area, which means that the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it
from the public domain. In respect to the areas covered by the timber license of IHVCP,
the said Act removed and segregated it from being a public forest.
The Court further cited Sec. 3 of R.A. 3990, which provides that, "any incidental
receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the
Philippines. The provision of the Act is clear that UP, being the owner of the land, has
the right to collect forest charges and to supervise the operations of IHVCP insofar as
the property of the UP within it is concerned.
G.R. No. 154953; June 26, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC.
In 1999, T.A.N. Properties filed in the RTC of Batangas an application for the registration
of a land, located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas and with an area of 56.4007 hectares. To
support its application, it submitted two certificates, issued by CENRO and FMS-DENR
and both certifying that the land applied for was alienable and disposable.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the
application on the ground that T.A.N. Properties did not prove that the land was alienable
and disposable.
Whether or not the applicant proved that, the land is alienable and disposable
RULING:
No. It is the burden of the applicant to prove that the land subject to registration is
alienable and disposable and for such the applicant must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable.
In the present case, T.A.N. Properties did not provide the needed proof. For the
documents provided by the company, the Court cited DENR Administrative Order No. 20
(DAO No. 20) and DAO No. 38; DAO No. 20 proves that FMS-DENR has no authority to
issue certificates, classifying lands to be alienable and disposable; and DAO No. 38
provides that CENRO can issue certificates of land classification for lands having a
maximum area of 50 hectares. The land applied for in the case has an area of 56.4007
hectares, thus CENRO has no jurisdiction over it. It is clear from the aforementioned
DAOs that the documents submitted by T.A.N. Properties did not prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
G.R. No. L-50464; January 29, 1990

SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS INC., CORAL BEACH DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATAAN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
In 1963, the Director of Lands issued a sales patent in favor of Sunbeam and on
the same year, the latter registered it with the Register of Deeds and obtained an OCT.
The patent covers parcels of land in Bataan, which were claimed to be forestlands. In
1976, the Sol.Gen. in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, instituted an action for
the reversion of the said OCT. so Sunbeam filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the CFI
granted. When appealed, the CA granted the petition filed by the Republic since the core
issue is the classification of the lands to be forestlands.
Whether or not the patent issued by the Director of Lands converted the lands to
be alienable and disposable from being forestlands
RULING:
No.
Forestlands are part of the public dominion so they cannot be the subject of land
registration cases unless they have been declassified and converted into alienable and
disposable lands. For a part of the public dominion to form part of the disposable lands,
there must be a positive act by the government, an official proclamation by the executive
department releasing the land to be alienated.
G.R. No. L-50340; December 26, 1984

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE F. SALAZAR, JESUS F.
SALAZAR, PEDRO F. SALAZAR and AURORA F. SALAZAR
In 1965, the Salazars filed an application for the registration of the 291 hectares
of land (a forestland), which they acquired from their mother Soledad. The application
was opposed by the Director of Lands (DoL) and by 25 occupants of the land. To prove
their ownership, the Salazars claimed that their predecessors-in-interest have been in
continuous, uninterrupted, open, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of
owner for more than thirty years prior to their application and the siblings further
presented tax declarations but the DoL still claimed otherwise.
In 1977, the CA denied the application but in its 1979 resolution, it reversed itself
and granted the application. The basis of the reversal was the declaration made by the
Director of Forestry in April 28, 1961, reclassifying the subject land as alienable and
disposable from being a forestland.
Whether or not the applicants proved their ownership of the land
RULING:
No.
The Court affirmed the CAs 1977 decision and acknowledged that the latter held
correctly through Justice Serrano in its decision that whatever possession of the land the
Salazars and their predecessors might have had prior to April 28, 1961 cannot be
credited to the thirty-year requirement.
In the present case, the thirty-year requirement should be reckoned from April
1961, the point when the forestland was reclassified by the Director of Forestry to be
alienable and disposable and not prior thereto since it was still a forestland, a public
dominion, thus, non-registerable.
G.R. No. 56948; September 30, 1987

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT AND THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, AND MARTINA CARANTES FOR AND IN BEHALF OF THE HEIRS OF
SALMING PIRASO
In 1968, Martina Carantes for and in behalf of the heirs of Salming Piraso filed in
the CFI of Baguio an application for the registration of the land, which the latter claimed
to be in their possession and occupation openly, continuously, exclusively, notoriously
since 1915. The Director of lands, through the Solicitor General and the Director of
Forestry, opposed the application on the ground that the said portion land is within the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve as shown in the reports and testimonies of the district
foresters.
The CFI granted the application, which was also affirmed by the CA. The
governments failure to show that the disputed land is more valuable for forest purposes
is one of the reasons for the CAs ruling. It also noted the failure to prove that trees are
thriving in the land.
Whether or not the land in dispute is alienable and disposable
RULING:
No.
The Court ruled that the petitioner clearly proved thru the reports and testimonies
of the district foresters that the land applied for registration is a part of a forestland. As to
the claim of the applicants that they have been in possession of the land since 1915, the
court cited its decision in Director of Forestry v. Munoz (23 SCRA 1184), where it stated
that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
In its decision, the Court also addressed the CAs ruling by citing its decision in
Heirs of Amunatequi v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69, 75), where it ruled, A
forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
xxxForestlands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. xxxThe
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.xxx
The Court again reiterated that there must first be a formal Government
declaration that the forestland has been re-classified into alienable and disposable
agricultural land, before private persons in accordance with the various modes of
acquiring public agricultural lands can acquire it.
G.R. No. L-56077; February 28, 1985

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
PRUDENCIO MAXINO and TARCIANA MORALES, PEDRO GONZALES, ROGELIO
AQUINO, Minor represented by his father, Manuel Aquino, and ALEJANDRO,
SOCORRO, MERCEDES, CONCHITA, REMEDIOS and FLORA, all surnamed
CONSOLACION
In 1961, the CFI of Quezon rendered a decision, ordering the registration of 885
hectares of public forestland in favor of the Maxinos. The decision became final and
executory so a decree of registration and an OCT were issued. Eight (8) years after the
decision was rendered, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the same CFI an
amended petition to annul the decision, decree, and title on the ground that they are void
because the land in question was still a part of the unclassified public forest. The
Maxinos opposed the petition.
The CFI judge denied the petition and when appealed, the same was dismissed
on the ground that the order had allegedly long become final and unappealable so the
Government was estopped thru the registration made by its agents.
Whether or not the Government was estopped in appealing the registration order
RULING:
No.
The Government sufficiently proved that the parcel of land involved in the present
case is a part of a forestland, thus non-registerable. As to the ruling of CA that the
government was estopped to appeal because the land was erroneously registered by its
own agency, the Court ruled otherwise basing on its decision in Gov't. of the U. S. vs.
Judge of 1st Inst. of Pampanga, (50 Phil. 975, 980), where it held that the Government
should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents.
G.R. No. 17967; June 8, 2011

NATIVIDAD STA. ANA VICTORIA V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
In November 2004, Victoria applied for registration of a 1,729-m2 lot in Bambang,
City of Taguig, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of that city. The OSG opposed
the application. To prove her ownership, Victoria offered the Conversion/Subdivision
Plan, which showed that the land is inside the alienable and disposable area under
Project 27-B as per L.C. Map 2623, as certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on
January 3, 1968. Victoria testified that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of the property continuously, uninterruptedly, openly, publicly, adversely,
and in the concept of owners since the early 1940s or for more than 30 years and have
been declared as owners for taxation purposes for the last 30 years. The Republic did
not present any evidence in support of its opposition.
In January 25, 2006, the MeTC rendered a decision, granting the application for
registration and finding that Victoria sufficiently established her claim and right under the
land registration law to have the subject property registered in her name. The OSG
appealed the decision and during the appeal Victoria submitted a DENR Certification,
verifying the subject property as within the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. In 2007, the CA reversed the MeTCs decision because allegedly Victoria failed
to prove that the subject lot is alienable and disposable. Furthermore, the CA ruled that it
could not take cognizance of the DENR Certification since it was not offered as evidence
during the hearing in the trial court.
Whether or not Victoria amply proved her claim of ownership of the property
RULING:
Yes.
The Court is convinced that Victoria sufficiently proved her ownership of the land.
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, an applicant
may secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable
and disposable, but the certification must show that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant
must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.
In the present case, Victoria was able to submit the DENR Certification, verifying
that the land is alienable and disposable. The only reason why the CA reversed the
lower courts decision is that the said Certificate was only submitted during the appeal
and not during trial in the lower court. To further support its ruling, the Court cited its
decision in Llanes v. Republic, where it allowed consideration of a CENRO Certification
though it was only presented during appeal to the CA to avoid a patent unfairness. The
Court also stated that the rules of procedure being mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, the Court is empowered to suspend their application to a particular
case when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice.
Therefore, it would be more prudent to recognize the DENR Certification and resolve the
matter.
G.R. No. 185683; March 16, 2011
UNION LEAF TOBACCO CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT

MR. HILARION P. UY vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
In December 1, 2004, the Corporation filed before the RTC of Agoo, La Union
four applications for land registration covering various parcels of land. The Republic
opposed the applications, citing Article XII, Section 3 of the Constitution. The corporation
presented testimonial evidence as well as documentary evidence, particularly the
Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans, which all noted that the subject lands are
"inside alienable and disposable area as per project No. 5-A, LC Map No. 2891," to
support its claim.
After the trial, the RTC granted the application of the corporation by relying on
the testimonies offered by the witnesses of the latter. On appeal by the Republic, the CA
reversed the trial courts decision, holding that the corporation presented no evidence to
show that the subject parcels of land have been reclassified by the State as alienable or
disposable to a private person. The corporation in its answer, insisted that the Advance
Plans and Consolidated Plans it presented proved that the parcels of land are alienable.
Whether or not the parcels of land are proven alienable and disposable
RULING:
No.
The Court ruled that the Advance Plans and Consolidated Plans are hardly the
competent pieces of evidence that the law requires. The notation by a geodetic engineer
on the survey plans that properties are alienable and disposable does not suffice to
prove the lands classification. Further, the Court cited the case Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. where It directs that:
x x x x The applicant for registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land
is alienable and disposable.
G.R. No. 73261; August 11, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FRANCISCO BACUS

In 1981, Bacus filed an application for the registration of a 496-m2 parcel of land
in the CFI of Misamis Occidental. The Republic through the Director of Lands opposed
the application on the ground that said land was still a part of the public domain since the
land is still part of a public forest. The CFI and CA ruled in favor of Bacus. The CA relied
on the certification of City Development Coordinator of Ozamis City, who certified that
the subject land was within the commercial-residential zone and the certification of the
Register of Deeds of Ozamis City, who certified that the lots near and surrounding the
subject land had already been registered in favor of private persons.
Whether or not the land has been converted as part of the disposable land of the
Government
RULING:
No.
The Court ruled that the certifications, which the CA relied on, are not sufficient to
change the nature of the property. The area is still considered forestland since it has not
been declassified as such by the proper authorities. The Court further stressed that
development of forestland into residential and commercial status does not alter its legal
standpoint as forestland.
G.R. Nos. 85991-94; July 03, 1991
REPUBLIC CEMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MOISES CORREA

AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN
Republic Cement Corporation filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan, for the
registration in its name of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2880 of the Cadastral
Survey of Norzagaray, Bulacan, Plan Ap-16404, located in barrio Minuyan, Norzagaray,
Bulacan, with an area of 207,996 m 2. Spouses Jose Rayo and Susana Mangahas and
one Pedro Legaspi opposed the application. The oppositor spouses claimed that they
are the owners for a period of over 60 years of the east central portion of the parcel of
land, title to which is sought to be registered by Republic Cement, covered by Plans
PSU 229592 and 227659, with a total area of 68,389m 2.Oppositor Pedro Legaspi
claims that he is the owner of the eastern portion of the same parcel of land covered by
Plan PSU-225872, with a total area of 31,887-m2. The 3 oppositors were later substituted
by private respondent Moises Correa as subsequent purchaser of the aforesaid portions
of said parcel of land.
After the trial, the CFI ordered the registration of the parcels of land bought by
Correa but Republic Cements application was dismissed. On appeal, the CA ordered
the registration of Lot No. 2880 in the name of Republic Cement but excluding portions
thereof as described in Plans PSU-229592, 227659 and 225872 which were ordered
registered in the name of private respondent Correa. Afterwhich, Republic Cement
petitioned the Supreme Court, claiming that the CA erred in ordering the registration of
the three parcels of land covered by Plans PSU-225872, 229592 and 227659 in the
name of Correa allegedly because the latter failed to prove the identity of the lands he
claims.
Whether or not Correa proved the identity of the lands he claims
RULING:
Yes.
The Court held that contrary to the claim of Republic Cement, Correa, through
his predecessors in interest, was able to establish the identity of and title to the land
sought to be registered in his name. The technical description and the survey plan duly
approved by the Director of Lands submitted in evidence by him fully describe the
meters and bounds of the parcels of land involved.
G.R. No. L-27594; November 28, 1975
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, and the ARMED

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. SALVADOR C. REYES, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch III, PARAAQUE INVESTMENT and
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ROMAN C. TAMAYO, THE COMMISIONER OF
THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
NUEVA ECIJA
In 1964, Alisunurin filed his application for the registration of a vast tract of land,
containing an area of 16,800 hectares, with the CFI of Nueva Ecija. The land was
admittedly inside the boundary of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay. During the
pendency of the case, PIDC substituted Alinsunurin since the former acquired the
ownership of the land. The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces
of the Philippines opposed the application, claiming that the applicant was without
sufficient title and that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of the military
reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under Proclamation No. 237, dated
December 10, 1955 of the President. To prove the claim, the applicants presented
blueprints of two survey plans but lack the approval of the Director of Lands.
After the trial, the CFI granted the application and ordered registration, which the
Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines
appealed to SC, where they claim that the plans presented by the applicants failed to
identify the parcel of land sought to be registered.
Whether or not the plans presented by the applicants are sufficient to prove the
identity of the land in dispute
RULING:
No.
The Court held that the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, which
must be approved by the Director of Lands, was not submitted in evidence. The
submission of such plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. Unless a
plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same
are not of much value. The blueprints of two survey plans presented had no approval of
the Director of Lands, thus these did not suffice the requirement of the law.
G.R. No. 70825; March 11, 1991
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ISIDRO ESPARTINEZ
In 1972, Espartinez filed with the CFI of Albay an application for the registration
of a parcel of land, which he bought from Llacer. The government through the Sol.Gen.
opposed the application on the ground that the applicant failed to prove his ownership
thereof. To support his claim he presented to the trial court several documents and two
of which are the survey plan of the land and a technical description thereof indicating
that the actual area of the land.
The CFI granted the application so the Sol.Gen. appealed to the IAC but the
latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Whether or not the land in dispute was sufficiently identified
RULING:
No.
One of the best ways to identify a land is the presentation of a tracing cloth plan.
In the present case, despite Espartinez claim that the tracing plan was attached with the
application he filed, there was also no proof that the same has been detached. What
was just presented to the Court was a survey plan but the latter did not recognize it
because the Director of Lands has not approved it. Generally, survey plans are accepted
as evidence in identifying a land but the law requires that the Director of Lands must duly
approve such plan. Espartinez having failed to provide what was required by the law to
be presented, conclusively failed to sufficiently identify the land, which he sought to be
registered.
G.R. No. 164687; February 12, 2009
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. vs. ANGELA V. MADAYAG, respondent.

In 2001, Madayag filed with the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492-m 2 located in Barangay Anonas,
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey
Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the LMS-DENR, Region 1, San Fernando City. SM
opposed the application because allegedly, the lot encroached on the properties it
recently purchased from several lot owners. SM also filed with the DENR a petition for
cancellation of the survey plan. Afterwhich, SM filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proceeding in the land registration case alleging that the trial court should wait
for DENRs resolution of the petition.
After the trial, the RTC suspended the registration proceedings on the ground
that the petition for cancellation of the survey plan filed by SM with DENR is prejudicial
to the determination of the land registration case since a survey plan is one of the
mandatory requirements in such proceedings. When Madayag appealed to CA, the latter
ratiocinated that the survey plan, which was duly approved by the DENR, should be
accorded the presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and
determine all questions arising from an application for registration.
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over land registration proceedings is
affected if there is a petition filed in DENR to cancel the survey plan, one of the
mandatory requirements in such proceedings
RULING:
Yes.
The Court held that as an incident to its authority to settle all questions over the
title of the subject property, the land registration court may resolve the underlying issue
of whether the subject property overlaps the petitioners properties without necessarily
having to declare the survey plan as void. Furthermore, It stated that a land registration
court has the duty to determine whether the issuance of a new certificate of title will alter
a valid and existing certificate of title. An application for registration of an already titled
land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, which is not allowed by law.
However, the RTC need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel
the survey plan in order to determine whether the subject property is already titled or
forms part of already titled property. The court may now verify this allegation based on
the respondents survey plan vis--vis the certificates of title of the petitioner and its
predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan precisely serves to establish the
true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a
portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the
possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land.
G.R. No. 170459; February 9, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CANDIDO, DEMETILA, JESUS, ANGELITO,

and TERESITA, all surnamed VERGEL DE DIOS
Candidi filed with the RTC of Bulacan a petition for reconstitution of the burned
Original of TCT No. T-141671 and issuance of a new owners duplicate copy in lieu of
the destroyed one. Attached with his petition are the Kasulatan, Plan, Technical
Description and Tax Declaration of the land. The RTC granted the petition but the
Republic appealed the ruling to CA arguing about the sufficiency to order a reconstitution
of the lost title of those presented by Candido. The CA also held as insufficient evidence
the Kasulatan, which was executed only in 1996, long after the original TCT was burned
and the owners duplicate title was lost but it also affirmed the RTCs order regarding the
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy in lieu of the destroyed one.
Whether or not the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of the Certificate of
Title in lieu of the destroyed one is proper
RULING:
No.
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form
and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the
loss or destruction occurred. When reconstitution is ordered, this document is replaced
with a new onethe reconstituted titlethat reproduces the original. After the
reconstitution, the owner is issued a duplicate copy of the reconstituted title.
In the present case, it is clear that the CA cancelled the order of reconstitution,
which was previously granted by the lower court, thus, it should follow that no new
owners duplicate copy of certificate of title should be issued. Without the order for
reconstitution, the order to issue a new owners duplicate title had no leg to stand on.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Forest

Development and the Director of Lands vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA
CARANTES for and in behalf of the Heirs of SALMING PIRASO
Respondent Martina S. Carantes for and in behalf of the heirs of Salming Piraso
filed with the Court of the First Instance of baguio and Benguet, Land Registration
situated in Barrio of Ansagan Municipality of Tuba, Mountain Province.
Director of Lands,through the Solicitor-General,filed an opposition to the
application for registration.
After trial, a decision was rendered by the Land Registration Court as earlier
stated, adjudicating the pared of land to the applicants.
A motion for reconsideration is filed by the government and was denied ,an
appeal was made to the Court of appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the land
registration court.
ARGUMENT OF THE PETITIONER:
- The land in question is part of the public forests within the Central Cordilleras
Forests Reserve. And a ocular inspection of said property which is made by the Land
Inspector Crisogono Barlolo Jr. of the Bureau of Lands together with representatives of
the Bureau of Forestry, which he found out that the land is rolling and stay in nature and
that the land is covered with trees, bushes and grasses being also stony is not suitable
for agricultural purposes.
ARGUMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT:
- As applicants claim to have sufficiently shown by the preponderance of
evidence that the land being applied for registration had been possessed by Salming
Piraso as far as back as 1915 when he and his workers planted the arable portion of
about 15 other to rice and often products and raised cows on the other portion suited for
pasture. And that they have possessed the land for more than 30 years before they filed.
Whether or not private respondents have established registerable title over the
land in question
RULING:
The Court of Appeals finding is based on a wrong concept of what is forest land
here is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber
land as a classification of lands of the public domain.
The records positively establish that the land in question is a part of the public
forest which the executive formally proclaimed as the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
to further preserve its integrity and Salming Piraso had not acquired ownership over the
land prior to its classification as part of the Cordillera Forest reserve because there is no
evidence on record proving the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the land registration court which granted the private
respondents application for registration of the land in question is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
G.R. No. L-61462 July 31, 1984
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Director of Lands) vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

TEDITA INFANTE TAYAG
Tedita Infante-Tayag , the applicant, a resident of Quezon City, testified that the
land was first possessed by her father, Froilan Infante, who died in 1937. He was
succeeded by his three children and widow, Gertrudis M. Vda. de Infante. The four heirs
settled in 1969 his estate consisting of twenty-two parcels of agricultural and residential
lands.
That 11-hectare land was adjudicated to Soledad Infante-Yago who exchanged it
in 1975 for another parcel of coconut land with an area of 23 hectares belonging to her
sister, Mrs. Tayag, the applicant.
Mrs. Tayag filed the instant application in 1976. She possessed the land in
question for barely a year. She knows that the land is coconut land but she does not
know the number of coconut trees planted therein nor the person who planted the same.
Of the boundary owners, she knows only one, her aunt, Severa Peoso. She does not
know the actual area of the land.
The only other witness, Abraham Morandarte (56 in 1977), testified that he came
to know the land in 1935 because his father was the overseer of Froilan Infante, Mrs.
Tayag's father. He lived in the land and planted coconuts thereon some of which are 80
years old. The land has been administered by Mrs. Tayag's brother, Antonio. He and the
overseer, Solomon Buenaflor, did not testify in this case. Morandarte became the
overseer only in 1973.
The land was declared for tax purposes in 1973 by Pablo Yago, applicant's
brother-in-law . The realty taxes for 1946 to 1976 were paid only on April 23, 1976 by
Mrs. Tayag or five months before the application for registration was filed.
Whether or not the respondent Tedita Tayag can register the land as to be her
own land considering that it is part of public domain
RULING:
The applicant failed to satisfy the requirements for judicial confirmation of her
alleged title. The said land must be presumed to be still a part of the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside
and the application for registration is dismissed. No costs.
G.R. No. 159578, July 28, 2008

ROGELIA DACLAG AND ADELINO DACLAG (DECEASED) SUBSTITUTED BY
RODEL M. DACLAG AND ADRIAN M. DACLAG vs. LORENZA HABER AND BENITA
DEL ROSARIO
During their lifetime, the spouses Candido and Gregoria Macahilig were the
owners of seven parcels of land, all located in Numancia, Aklan. They had seven
children, namely: Dionesio, Emeliano, Mario, Ignacio, Eusebio, Tarcela and Maxima.
On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and Gregoria entered into a
Deed of Extra-judicial Partition with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and
Eusebio Macahilig, over the seven parcels of land. The same deed stated that Dionesio
was already deceased but was survived by his daughter, Susana Briones; Emeliano was
out of the country; Ignacio and Tarcela were also both deceased but were survived by
three children each.
On May 23, 1984, Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag
(petitioners) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
On July 17, 1984, OCT No. P-13873 was issued in the name of petitioner Rogelia
M. Daclag by virtue of her free patent application.
On December 16, 1991, Elino Macahilig, Adela Macahilig, Conrado Macahilig,
Lorenza Haber and Benita del Rosario filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan
a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership, cancellation of documents and
damages against Maxima and petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 4334.
(1) Whether or not Maxima was the previous owner of Parcel One, which
included respondents' one half northern portion, now covered by OCT No. P-13873;
(2) Whether or not petitioners could validly invoke the defense of purchasers in
good faith; and
(3) Whether or not reconveyance is the proper remedy.
RULING:
The CA ruled that since Maxima had no right to sell the land as she was not the
rightful owner thereof, nothing was conveyed to petitioners; that a person who acquired
property from one who was not the owner and had no right to dispose of the same,
obtained the property without right of title, and the real owner may recover the same
from.
him.
The CA found that since respondents were unaware of the sale, it was not a
surprise that they did not question petitioners' application for a free patent on the subject
land; that the possession by Maxima of the subject land did not vest ownership in her, as
her possession was not in the concept of an owner; and that petitioners were not
purchasers in good faith. It also found that the right to enjoy included the right to receive
the produce of the thing; that respondents as true owners of the subject land were
deprived of their property when Maxima illegally sold it to petitioners; and thus, equity
demanded that respondents be given what rightfully belonged to them under the
principle that a person cannot enrich himself at the expense of another.
We find that reconveyance of the subject land to respondents is proper. The
essence of an action for reconveyance is that the free patent and certificate of title are
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property, which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful owner
or to one with a better right.
G.R. No. 139274
October 23, 2001
QUEZON PROVINCE, represented by its Governor, WILFRIDO L. ENVERGA, and

LIWAYWAY R. LAREZA, in her capacity as Municipal Treasurer of General, Nakar,
Quezon vs. HON. ABELIO M. MARTE, in his capacity as presiding judge of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Infanta, Quezon and GREEN SQUARE
PROPERTIES CORPORATION, represented by its President, ROMEO G. ROXAS
In August 14, 1996, Green Square Properties Corporation , allegedly
acquired through deed of sale from the estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban its
rights over a tract of land with an area of FIFTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY
SEVEN (50,497) HECTARES, the major portion of which is found in General Nakar and
Infanta, Quezon; and the rest in Laguna and Rizal provinces. The land was covered by
Tax Declaration No. 09-019-0094 in the name of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
The deed of sale indicated that the land was allegedly part of the land under Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 29, 1894.
On September 17, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan confirmed the sale
in Intestate Estate Proceeding No. 312-B. Consequently, the tax declaration in the name
of Don Mariano San Pedro was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of
Green Square.
In July 1998, Green Squares tender of payment of the real estate taxes over the
subject land, pursuant to the notice of payment sent by the Office of Municipal Treasurer
of General Nakar, was refused by the same office. Thereafter, Green Square filed a
complaint for quieting of title and mandamus alleging that petitioners refusal of its tender
of payment casts doubt on its rights, interests, claim and title over the subject property.
Private respondent prayed that petitioners be compelled to accept its tender of payment.
Whether or not the parties dispute the coverage of the land under Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136
RULING:
Undeniably from the above disquistion, private respondents claim over the
subject property is made to rest on the so-called Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. At this
point, it must be stressed that a party cannot evade the application of res judicata by
simply varying the form of the action or by adopting a different mode of presenting its
case, as was done here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution of public respondent
dated March 17, 1999, denying petitioners motion to dismiss, and its order dated June
22, 1999, denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court of Infanta, Quezon, Branch 65, is hereby ordered to dismiss Civil
Case No. 329-1. Costs against private respondents.
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO,

substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all
surnamed ABISTO
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for
original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529. The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86
and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro. However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs
Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado
represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem,
were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the
petition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants through their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful
possession of the subject land since 1938.
Whether or not newspaper publication of notice of initial hearing is mandatory
RULING:
Land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have
rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
This Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room
only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration
filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the
future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I,

Nueva Vizcaya, HEIRS OF CASIANO SANDOVAL, HEIRS OF LIBERATO BAYAUA,
JOSE C. REYES, and PHILIPPINE CACAO AND FARM PRODUCTS, INC.
The spouses, Casiano Sandoval and Luz Marquez, filed an original application
for registration of a tract of land identified as Lot No. 7454 of the Cadastral Survey of
Santiago, BL Cad. 211 (July 17, 1961) and having an area of 33,950 hectares. The land
was formerly part of the Municipality of Santiago, Province of Isabela, but had been
transferred to Nueva Vizcaya in virtue of Republic Act No. 236.
Oppositions were filed by the Government, through the Director of Lands and the
Director of Forestry, and some others, including the Heirs of Liberato Bayaua. 1 In due
course, an order of general default was thereafter entered on December 11, 1961
against the whole world except the oppositors.
Judge Sofronio G. Sayo rendered on March 5, 1981 in Land Registration Case
No. N-109, LRC Record No. 20850, confirming, by virtue of a compromise agreement,
the title of the private respondents over a tract of land.
Whether or not a compromise agreement can supply the absence of evidence of
title required by the private respondents
RULING:
The compromise agreement included private persons who had not adduced any
competent evidence of their ownership over the land subject of the registration
proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were assigned to persons or entities who
had presented nothing whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land. What
was done was to consider the compromise agreement as proof of title of the parties
taking part therein, a totally unacceptable proposition. The result has been the
adjudication of lands of no little extension to persons who had not submitted any
substantiation at all of their pretensions to ownership, founded on nothing but the
agreement among themselves that they had rights and interests over the land.
It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the judgment approving it
must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void, and set aside. Considerations of
fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court so that the
private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence their
respective claims to the property.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Judge complained of is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Land Registration Case No. N-109 subject of the petition
is REMANDED to the court of origin which shall conduct further appropriate proceedings
therein, receiving the evidence of the parties and thereafter rendering judgment as such
evidence and the law may warrant. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 120747
September 21, 2000
VICENTE GOMEZ, as successor-in-interest of awardee LUISA GOMEZ vs. COURT

OF APPEALS, City of MANILA acting thru the City Tenants Security Committee
now the Urban Settlement Office, Register of Deeds of Manila
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12 parcels of land
belonged to one Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion later died and the 12 parcels of land
were inherited by Gomez et al her heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the property
among them.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the
trial court issued an order of general default. On 5 August 1981, the court rendered its
decision adjudicating the subject lots in Gomez et als favor. The decision became final
and executory hence the court directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office
to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and petitioned for its setting
aside. He discovered that the 12 parcels of land were formerly part of a titled land which
was already granted by homestead patent in 1929. Under the law, land already granted
by homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another registration. The lower
court granted Silverios recommendation.
Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land Registration Act) which
provides that after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith
issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree
of registration and certificate of title. That once the judgment becomes final and
executory under Sec 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course.
Whether or not to set aside the lower courts initial ruling on approving the
adjudication even after it had became final and executory.
RULING:
Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land
registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until
after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. The
Supreme Court has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land
Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed
from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in
the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the
court rendering it.
G.R. No. L-36637 July 14, 1978
GENEROSO MENDOZA, substituted by his wife and administratrix DIEGA DE

LEON VDA. DE MENDOZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DANIEL GOLE CRUZ and
DOLORES MENDOZA
In 1964, it was proven that a parcel of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, is
owned by Mendoza. Mendoza applied for a title. During pendency of the application
before the land registration court, Mendoza sold the land to Daniel Cruz. The contract of
sale was admitted in court in lieu of the pending application for land title. The registration
court rendered a decision in July 1965, ordering the registration of the two parcels of
land in the name of Cruz subject to the usufructuary rights of Mendoza.
The decision became final and executory. In 1968, however, upon failure of Cruz
to pay Mendoza, Mendoza petitioned that the title issued in the name of Cruz be
cancelled. The land registration court ruled in favor of Mendoza on the ground that the
court erred in its earlier decision in issuing the land title to Cruz who was not a party to
the application of title initiated by Mendoza. Cruz appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled
in favor of Cruz.
Whether or not the title can be dealt with in the name of a third party
RULING:
Yes. The Court of Appeals ruling must be sustained. First of all, it was proven that
Mendoza caused the registration in the name of Cruz pursuant to their contract of sale.
Second, Mendoza overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly
authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a registration proceeding in the
name of the buyer (Cruz) or of the person to whom the land has been conveyed by an
instrument executed during the interval of time between the filing of the application for
registration and the issuance of the decree of title.
SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree
of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the land therein described
may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of the
register of deeds at any time before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner
as if no application had been made. The interested party may, however, present such
instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the
register of deeds, together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the
application, and the court after notice to the parties, shall order such land registered
subject to the encumbrance created by a said instruments, or order the decree of
registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has
been conveyed by said instruments. . . .
A stranger or a third party may be dealt with in the land registration proceedings.
The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court
by the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation
with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the
peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements
have been complied with in this case.
G.R. No. L-52064 December 26, 1984
JULIANA CARAGAY-LAYNO, Assisted by Her Husband, BENITO LAYNO vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and SALVADOR ESTRADA as Administrator of the Estate of
the Deceased, MARIANO DE VERA
Mariano De Vera died in 1951. His widow administered his property until her
death in 1966. De Veras nephew (Salvador Estrada) took over as administrator of De
Veras estate. Prior to the widows death, she made an inventory showing that De Veras
property (located in Calasiao, Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. m (more or less). Estrada
however noticed that the Torrens title under De Vera indicated that his property
measures 8752 sq. m. He learned that the discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m. being
occupied by Juliana. Estrada sued to evict Juliana.
Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and in the concept of an owner of the land since 1921; that
theyve been paying taxes; that the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it
only took them to initiate an action in 1967 therefore laches has set in.
Whether or not the disputed portion should be adjudged in favor of De Veras
estate
RULING:
No. The inclusion of Julianas land in De Veras title was erroneously done. It was
shown that Juliana, an unlettered woman, agreed to have Mariano de Vera borrow her
title for the purposes of Mariano obtaining a loan during de Veras lifetime; that when de
Vera registered his portion of land adjoined to that of Juliana, the latters land was
erroneously included.
The error is highlighted by the fact that de Veras widow, in her inventory before
she died, attested that de Veras portion of land is only 5417 sq. m. more or less. The
discrepancy approximates the portion of land actually being occupied by Juliana. By
that, the only portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Veras estate is that which was
being claimed by the widow (in her inventory). A recalculation must however be made to
specify the exact measure of land belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained by
Juliana (portion which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m. should go to de Veras
estate.
G.R. No. L-29659, July 30, 1971
MAXIMO ROMERO SR., AND FLORENCIA DIANETA VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. FLORENDO P. AQUINO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, BRANCH I, HON. RICARDO L. CASTELO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CLERK OF COURT AND AS PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA
ECIJA, LUISA AFAN, LEONILA VALINO, GETULIO VALINO, LOURDES VALINO,
LORENZO VALINO, AND PABLO DELA CRUZ
In an amended complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (Civil
Case No. 2619), Luisa Afan, Leonila Valino, Getulio Valino, Lourdes Valino, Lorenzo
Valino, and Pablo Valino, as registered owners of Lot No. 1261 of the Talavera Cadastre,
sought recovery of possession of a part of said Lot 1261, with an area of 2.6 hectares,
from Maximo Romero, Sr. and Florencia Dianeta. The defendants, for their part, also
claimed ownership of the said portion of the lot.
The plaintiffs sought recovery from the defendants of possession of a part of Lot
1261 with an area of about 2.6 hectares; that in their answers thereto, the defendants
claimed ownership of that 2.6 hectare-area. In the body of the decision itself, it was
mentioned that even after the execution of the deed of sale, Florencia Dianeta and Jose
Romero retained possession of that portion of about 2.6 hectares "which is south of the
irrigation canal or "paligue". But it may be pointed out that in concluding that the deed of
sale did not cover the whole of Lot 1261, the court considered the fact that Ciriaca
Javate was told by Jose Romero that the portion (of Lot 1261) she was buying was "from
the 'paligue' or canal going northward". In short, what was controlling in the agreement
was the place or location of the portion excluded from the sale, not the actual area of
that portion. Thus, in the dispositive part of the decision of the lower court subject of
execution, the plaintiffs were ordered to convey to the herein petitioners an unspecified
"portion of Lot 1261, south of the irrigation canal".
.
Whether or not the petitioners owned the portion of the land about 2.6 hectares
which is south of the irrigation canal or paligue.
RULING:
Considering the well entrenched rules (a) that in the identification of land well
defined boundaries will prevail over area, and, in case of conflict, the former control the
latter[5]; and (b) that for the purpose of res judicata or execution the dispositive part of a
judgment controls expressions made in the body of the opinion[6], it is clear that the
petitioners herein can only claim whatever portion of Lot 1261 lies south of the "paligue"
or irrigation canal, whether such portion be of an area greater or lesser than 2.6
hectares.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed, and the orders of the court a
quo affirmed. Petitioners are directed to share with the plaintiffs the costs of the
subdivision and segregation of Lot 1261-A from the bigger parcel of land. Costs against
the petitioners.
G.R. No. L-49903 February 21, 1983
MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO, ISABELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA

CAUIAN, LIBRADA, VIRGINIA, FIDENCIO, ARTEMIO, PORFIRIO and REGINA, all
surnamed BAYAUA
Private respondent, Maria Cauian, is the surviving spouse of Eulalio Bayaua,
son of Liberato Bayaua, the alleged original occupant of the disputed lots. The other
private respondents are the children of the spouses. Maria Cauian passed away during
the pendency of this case and was ordered substituted by her heirs.
On May 24, 1949, Proclamation No. 131 was issued by President Elpidio
Quirino 2 releasing and excluding Lots Nos. 4976-A and 8000-A (a portion of Lot No. 1)
from the operation of Proclamation No. 427, and reserving the same as market site for
the Municipality of Santiago. Both said Proclamations were "subject to private rights if
any there be.
After the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 131 in 1949, the Municipality
filled the area of the lots in question, which were then low and swampy and constructed
the present market buildings thereon allegedly worth P595,621.13.
Those same two lots are being claimed by respondents, who allegedly
possessed said property in the concept of owners since time immemorial through their
predecessors-in-interest. They base their claim of ownership in a Spanish document.
Whether or not the private respondents had already acquired the property in
question by acquisitive prescription before the issuance of Executive Proclamation No.
427 and Presidential Proclamation No. 131 on November 7, 1931 and May 24, 1949
respectively, reserving the same for public use
RULING:
It was reversible error for respondent Court to have ruled that acquisitive
prescription had operated to vest absolute title over the lands in question in private
respondents. Contrary to that Court's finding, the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious occupation of the disputed properties for more than 30 years and even "for
close to half a century" has not been conclusively established as explained heretofore.
Moreover, the institution of cadastral proceedings had the effect of suspending the
running of the prescriptive period. Additionally, having been declared public land, Lots
8000-A and 4976-A cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both
acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State.
G.R. Nos. 85991-94 July 3, 1991
REPUBLIC CEMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MOISES CORREA

and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN
Republic Cement Corporation filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch V at Sta. Maria, for the registration in its name of a parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 2880 of the Cadastral Survey of Norzagaray, Bulacan, Plan Ap16404, located in barrio Minuyan, Norzagaray, Bulacan, with an area of 207,996 square
meters, more or less. It is alleged that said applicant purchased the parcel of land from
persons who, by themselves or through their predecessors in interest, had occupied and
cultivated it continuously since the Spanish regime to the present and had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of said parcel of land
under a bona fide claim of ownership, except against the Government, since July 26,
1894.
The application was opposed by spouses Jose Rayo and Susana Mangahas and
one Pedro Legaspi. According to the oppositor spouses, they are the owners of the east
central portion of the parcel of land, title to which is sought to be registered by petitioner,
covered by Plans PSU 229592 and 227659, with a total area of 68,389 square meters,
having been in actual, open, public, adverse, peaceful and uninterrupted possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owner for a period of over sixty (60) years and
having acquired ownership thereof by donation on the occasion of their marriage from
the parents of Jose Rayo. Oppositor Pedro Legaspi claims that he is the owner of the
eastern portion of the same parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-225872, with a total
area of 31,887 square meters.
Whether or not the petitioner has the right to register the land on its name
RULING:
Petitioner should not be allowed to register the land in its name. The deeds of
sale relied upon by petitioner do not constitute sufficient legal justification for petitioner's
claim over all of Lot No. 2880. Petitioner's title over said lot, as the successor in interest
of said heirs, is limited only to whatever rights the latter may have had therein. It is
elementary that a grantor can convey no greater estate than what he has or in which he
has an alienable title or interest.
As found by respondent Court of Appeals, the land under consideration, now
known as Lot No. 2880, was previously owned by spouses Felix and Maria Mangahas.
After the death of Felix Mangahas, one-half (1/2) of said land was adjudicated and
partitioned among his five (5) daughters, namely, Francisca, Oliva, Susana, Agatona and
Remedios, in a deed of extrajudicial partition. Later, the shares of each of said heirs was
transferred to herein petitioner by virtue of deeds of absolute sale executed either by the
heirs themselves or their successors in interest.
G.R. No. L-52491 January 29, 1990
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA CABRAL FRANCO
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the
factual finding of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte. CFI Zamboanga
del Norte held that applicant Gloria Cabral Franco has established her right of ownership
over the so-called Moroland and thus should be entitled to have it registered in her
name.
The subject land is a 104.9231 hectares of land situated at Sta. Maria, Siocon,
Zamboanga. Franco had been in open, continuous, exclusive, adverse, notorious and
public possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership from time
immemorial, personally and her predecessors-in-interest. Moreover, she had the land
surveyed, declared for taxation purposes and had introduced thereon considerable
improvements. She subsequently caused the subdivision of the land into five lots.
However, one of the subdivision plans was found to overlap the lands surveyed by F.F.
Cruz Survey of Public Lands Subdivision. Three of the lots were already patented and
eight were covered by subsisting public land applications. The Republic of the
Philippines then opposed applicants registration. Still, CFI Zamboanga del Norte ruled in
favor of applicant and invalidated the certificates of title over the Moroland.
Whether or not respondent court, in a land registration case, may invalidate
certificates of title based on homestead, free or sales patent
RULING:
The possible invalidity of the certificates should be litigated in a separate action
which the applicant could institute against the Bureau of Lands and the patentees. In this
case, there is a need for a resurvey. Portions of the Moroland appear to have been
issued patents by the Bureau of Lands which should thus be excluded from the
registration of the property in the name of the respondents. The validity of any such
existing patent should be the subject of a separate litigation between Franco and such
registered patentees.
When a homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which
entitle him to a patent for a particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest
therein, as is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof. Where the right to a patent
to land has once become vested in a purchaser of public lands, it is equivalent to a
patent actually issued. Even without a patent, a perfected homestead is a property right
in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is still in
the government. No subsequent law can deprive him of that vested right.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit,
without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-21150 December 26, 1967
AMADO CAYANAN, ET AL. vs. LEON DE LOS SANTOS and FELIX L. CAMAYA
Amado Cayanan filed a petition for review of the proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, rendered on May 30, 1958, which confirmed the title of Leon De
Los Santos to Lot No. 56 of the Porac Cadastre. Cayanan prayed for the reopening of
the decree of registration, the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title, as well as
the Transfer Certificate of Title and the adjudication of said lot in his favor. The petition
having been denied on February 9, 1959, Cayanan appealed.
The disputed decree was issued on August 8, 1958. Subsequently, a Deed of
Sale was executed in favor of Felix Camaya covering the said lot. Cayanan claimed that
the title was registered in the name of De Los Santos through actual fraud, deceit and
intentional omission of facts and that the Deed of Sale was simulated. Thus, Cayanan
filed the petition for review on December 16, 1958, about 4 months from the date of the
issuance of the decree.
Whether or not the Court of First Instance retained jurisdiction over the petition
for review for the same proceeding
RULING:
The mere mention by the law that the relief afforded by Section 38 of Act 496
may be sought in the competent Court of First Instance is no sufficient indication that
the petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance, exercising its general jurisdiction,
considering the fact that it is also the Court of First Instance that acts on land registration
cases. Upon the other hand, it has been held that the adjudication of land in a
registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and that as long as the final decree
is not issued and the period of one year within which it may be reviewed has not
elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or
decree and adjudicate the land to another.
In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of
the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496, the same are properly
cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and granted the said decree.
WHEREFORE, the order of February 9, 1959 is set aside and the case
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for a hearing on the merits of the
petition of appellants for the reopening of the decree of registration in favor of appellee
Leon de los Santos. With costs against appellees.
G.R. No. 146534 September 18, 2009
SPOUSES HU CHUAN HAI and LEONCIA LIM HU vs. SPOUSES RENATO UNICO
and MARIA AURORA J. UN
On December 13, 1978, spouses Renato and Maria Aurora Unico purchased a
800-sq. m. residential property covered by TCT No. 236631 in Fairview Park Village,
Quezon City from spouses de los Santos. Due to their tax delinquency, however, the
property was sold at public auction to spouses Hu. A year later, spouses Hu filed a
petition for consolidation of ownership and issuance of new title in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, which was granted in a decision dated September 8,
1986. Consequently, TCT No. 236631 was cancelled and TCT No. 359854 was issued in
spouses Hu's names.
Spouses Unico filed a complaint for annulment of sale and damages (Civil Case
No. Q-50553) against spouses Hu, spouses de los Santos, the City Treasurer of Quezon
City and the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City in the RTC of Quezon City assailing the
validity of the tax sale. In a decision dated May 9, 1990, finding the City Treasurer in
default in the execution of the tax sale, the RTC nullified the tax sale.
Aggrieved, spouses Hu appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA, however,
affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Hence, the recourse.
Whether or not the RTCs subsequent decision (May 9, 1990) nullifying the sale
of the land to spouses Hu should prosper despite a previous decision (September 8,
1986) already awarding the ownership of said land to them
RULING:
The decision of a land registration court in a petition for consolidation of
ownership and registration precludes another action for annulment of auction
sale. Hence, the September 8, 1986 decision of the RTC barred the institution of Civil
Case No. Q-50553. The RTC Branch 104 should have dismissed the latter on the
ground of res judicata.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The December 27, 2000
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27501 affirming the May 9, 1990
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 in Civil Case No. Q50553 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE.
New judgment is hereby entered dismissing Civil Case No. Q-50553 on the
ground of res judicata. The March 5, 1984 tax sale is hereby declared VALID.
HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS, Headed by ANTONIO MARCOS, ET AL. vs.

MARIA DE ERQUIAGA DE BANUVAR, GREGORIO PONDAL and the HON.
MARIANO V. BENEDICTO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Masbate
On March 24, 1938, the Court of First Instance of Masbate confirmed the titles of
La Urbana, Inc. over lot 5 and lot 1, Psu-56145 and ordered the registration of these lots
in La Urbanas favor. A copy of the decision was received on March 29, 1938 by Jose
Grajo, La Urbano Inc.s counsel, with the notation "Con mi excepcion." Respondent de
Banuvar, who subsequently acquired the subject lot from Santiago de Erquiaga, a
successor-of-interest of La Urbana Inc., filed a petition for the reconstitution of the
records of the said decision. Upon learning of de Banuvars action, petitioners Marcos
opposed, on a claim that they have been in actual, adverse, open and uninterrupted
possession and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of owners since time
immemorial, long before the second world war, and have introduced improvements
thereon. They likewise asserted that the decision of March 24, 1938 is not final and
executory because La Urbana, Inc. appears to have appealed from the said decision by
virtue of a notation at the foot of the last page thereof that its counsel received the same
"Con mi excepcion." They prayed that the application for the reconstitution be denied
and that the parcels of land in question be ordered registered in their names or declare
the same as public land and be subdivided to them who are landless.
After due consideration, on June 13, 1963, the CFI ordered the issuance of a
decree in favor of de Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only. On June 24, 1963, the CFI
issued another order granting a writ of possession in favor of de Banuvar and "against all
persons who have entered and occupied portions of lot 1, Psu-56145 before the
issuance of the decree." Hence, the Marcos filed a petition for certiorari of the CFIs
June 13, 1963 order.
Whether or not the March 24, 1938 decision showing that La Urbana, Inc.
excepted from the decision had the effect of an appeal, hence, is not final and executory
RULING:
The decision of March 24, 1938 had long become final and executory as no
appeal was taken therefrom. The certification of the acting provincial land officer of
Masbate, dated March 8, 1960, recites that no "appeal has been taken by the Director of
Lands or any private oppositors from the decision rendered." The notation found at the
foot of the last page of the reconstituted decision did not have the effect of perfecting an
appeal. An appeal was not perfected by the mere notation "Con mi exception." The
judgment rendered in a land registration case becomes final upon the expiration of thirty
days to be counted from the date on which the party appealing receives notice of the
decision.
The decision of March 24, 1938 having become final and executory, it devolved
on both the respondent court and the Land Registration Commission to cause the
issuance of a decree to the person adjudged entitled to registration in favor of the
applicant La Urbana, Inc., or its successor-in-interest Santiago de Erquiaga, or the
private respondent De Banuvar who substituted Santiago de Erquiaga.
ACCORDINGLY, the amended petition for certiorari is denied. No pronouncement
as to costs.
G.R. No. L-43445 January 20, 1988
EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA vs. ANGEL ALBANO et al.

On July 31, 1941, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, rendered a decision
adjudicating Lot 9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino. One of the oppositors was Ruperta
Pascual but was declared in default. For some unknown reasons, the decree of
registration was issued only on October 14, 1955 and it was only after twenty-four years
or on November 17, 1979, that an original certificate of title (No. C-2185) was issued in
Delfina Aquino's name.
On August 11, 1970, after the decree of registration had been handed down but
before title was issued, the heirs of Ruperta Pascual appellants herein filed a suit for
recovery of Lot 9821. They alleged that they had been in possession of the lot since
1941 and were the real owners thereof. They likewise prayed that Delfina Aquino's title
be cancelled and a new one be made out in their names.
Parenthetically, it appears that Delfina Aquino's title encroached upon a 4sq.m
portion of adjoining Lot 9822, belonging to Cesar Castro. So, Castro filed, with leave of
court, a complaint in intervention on February 22, 1987 for the recovery thereof.
After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered dismissing the Barroga's and
Padaca's complaint, and declaring Castro owner of the 4-square-meter portion. The writ
of possession asked by Albano was also issued, thus, Barroga and Padaca filed a
"Motion to Nullify Order to Lift Writ of Execution Issued and to Revoke Writ of
Possession Issued." Their argument was that as possessors of the lot in question, they
could not be ejected therefrom by a mere motion for writ of possession.
I.
Whether or not the writ of possession over Lot 9281 could properly issue despite
the considerable period of time that had elapsed from the date of the registration decree
II.
Whether or not the decree of registration issued in Delfina Aquinos name
became final and executor
RULING:
I.
Albano, et al. must be declared to be entitled to a writ of possession over Lot
9821 in enforcement of the decree of registration and vindication of the title despite the
lapse of many, many years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least as against
the persons who were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. The
appellants, it must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy long enough.
They should no longer be allowed to continue doing so. Moreover, the segregation of the
4-square meter portion and its restoration as integral part of Lot 9822, had no effect
whatever.
II.
The familiar doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of success
of Barroga's and Padaca's suit for recovery of title Lot 9821. Their action was clearly
barred by the prior judgment in the cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino's
ownership over the property, and in which proceeding Ruperta Pascual, had taken part
as oppositor but had been declared in default. The judgment of the cadastral court was
one against a specific thing and therefore conclusive upon the title to the thing. It was a
judgment in rem, binding generally upon the whole world, inclusive of persons not
parties thereto, and particularly upon those who had actually taken part in the
proceeding as well as their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity.
The judgment became final and executory, the appeal taken therefrom by
Barroga and Padaca having been dismissed because of their failure to file brief, and the
Court having refused to set aside that dismissal on certiorari. A decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appeal taken by appellants Eufemia Villanueva Vda. de
Barroga and Saturnina Villanueva Vda. de Padaca is DISMISSED, and the Orders of the
Court a quo dated August 8, 1975, September 22, 1975 and March 17, 1976 are
AFFIRMED, as being in accord with the facts and the law. This decision is immediately
executory, and no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration will be
entertained.
G.R. No. L-17757
May 30, 1962
MAMERTA DE LA MERCED vs. COURT OF APPEALS, EZEQUIEL M. SANTOS, and

AMPARO MACAPAGAL
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, upholding the right of ownership of
Ezequiel Santos over Lot No. 395 of the Rizal (Nueva Ecija) Cadastre.
Ezequiel Santos filed a complaint I the CFI of Nueva Ecija for the recovery of
ownership and possession of Lot No. 395 from Mamerta de la Merced. He claimed
ownership thereof by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court dated December 26,
1923, in favor of his father, Inocencio de los Santos. A decree dated December 19, 1925
was issued declaring such decision final and directing the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office to issue the certificate of title to Inocencio de los Santos. However, no
such certificate was actually issued.
De la Merced, in their answer, resisted Santos claim and asserted their
ownership over said property as evidenced by OCT No. 3462 issued to their
predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10, 1931 and their continuous possession of
the land for more than 30 years. On December 28, 1926, the cadastral court, without
reopening the case, declared the same Lot No. 395 public land. As such, Juan de la
Merced was able to obtain therefor a homestead patent and OCT No. 3462.
Whether or not the promulgation of an order directing the issuance of a certificate
of title constituted the registration of the subject lot in favor of claimants
RULING:
The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a
judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is the base of the certificate of
title. The issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office is a ministerial act. The
date of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has
taken place and all that is left to be performed is the mere formulation of technical
description.
The title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration
of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without
such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary
for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land where court
proceedings would no longer be necessary.
As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance to
Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after the decision
adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had already become final, and there
being no imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on
the said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the issuance of such judicial decree.
The land, for all intents and purposes, had become, from that time, registered property
which could not be acquired by adverse possession.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs
against petitioner Mamerta de la Merced. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-19090

December 28, 1964
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, AMANDO JOSON, VICTORIA BALMEO, ANTONIO
BUSUEGO, and ROGELIO BUSUEGO vs. TEODORA BUSUEGO
The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija issued a decree of registration of Lot
No. 2497 of the Gapan Cadastre in favor of Teodora Busuego. Within a year from the
issuance of the said decree and pursuant to such, Amando Joson and Victorio Balmeo
filed a petition for the cancellation of the decree. Joson and Balmeo claimed that
Busuego had obtained the decree by misrepresenting himself to be the sole owner of the
lot when in truth, they, through their predecessors-in-interest, were owners of half the lot.
In a separate petition, Antonio and Rogelio Busuego, children of a deceased
brother of Teodora, also prayed for the same relief. They alleged that their father was an
undivided co-owner (with Teodora) of one-half of the lot.
By order of August 4, 1961, the cadastral court dismissed the said petitions since
it had no authority to pass upon the issues raised in the pleadings. Hence, the present
appeal by the petitioners.
Whether the cadastral court that issued the decree or the competent Court of
First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction had jurisdiction over the petition
RULING:
The adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final
and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year from entry of the final decree, and
that as long as the final decree is not issued and the period of one year within which it
may be reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may even set
aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another.
As long as the final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office in accordance with the law, and the period of one year fixed for the
review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision therein
rendered continues to be under control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
In the present case, as the petitions were filed within one year from the date of
the issuance of the decree, pursuant to Section 38 of Act 496, the same are properly
cognizable by the court that rendered the decision and granted the said decree.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and the
case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings pursuant to law. No costs.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-4935

May 28, 1954
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., represented by it Managing PARTNER, GREGORIA
ARANETA, INC. vs. QUIRINO BOLAOS
JM Tuason & Co. filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City an
action to recover possession of land situated in barrio Tatalon, Quezon City. Such land is
covered by a Torrens Title issued on 1914. Quirino Bolanos, for his part, set up
prescription and title in himself thru open, continuous, exclusive and public and notorious
possession of the land in dispute under a claim of ownership from time in-memorial. He
claimed that JM Tuason & Co. obtained title to the land thru fraud. He further prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint and for its reconveyance.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment declaring Bolanos to be without any
right to the land in question and ordering him to restore possession thereof to JM Tuason
& Co. and to pay the a monthly rent of P132.62 from January, 1940, until he vacates the
land, and also to pay the costs. Hence, Bolanos appealed.
Whether or not JM Tuasons certificate of title may be impugned years after its
issuance
HOLDING:
As the land in dispute is covered by plaintiff's Torrens certificate of title and was
registered in 1914, the decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground
of fraud, error or lack of notice to defendant, as more than one year has already elapsed
from the issuance and entry of the decree. Neither court the decree be collaterally
attacked by any person claiming title to, or interest in, the land prior to the registration
proceedings. Nor could title to that land in derogation of that of plaintiff, the registered
owner, be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Adverse, notorious and
continuous possession under claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective
against a Torrens title. And it is likewise settled that the right to secure possession under
a decree of registration does not prescribe.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
plaintiff.
G.R. No. L-67451 May 4, 1988

REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC.and MACONDRAY FARMS, INC. vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Morris Carpo filed on October 20, 1987 a Motion to Agenda before the Court and
a Motion for Reconsideration of its decision dated September 28, 1987. In said decision,
the validity of the title in the name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. was upheld and the
titles in the name of Carpo and QCDFC were declared null.
Whether or not the decision in the registration proceeding has become final
RULING:
There is no dispute that so long as a decree of registration has not been issued,
registration proceedings are still pending. In the instant case, the proceedings prior to
the order directing the issuance of the decree of registration were admittedly land
registration proceedings, which, needless to say, are proceedings in rem and hence, are
binding on the whole world.
The stage of LRC Case No. 657 where records are available is that stage in land
registration proceedings where the court has determined with finality who the rightful
owner of the property is Applying the ruling in Nacua, the parties thereto, or their
successors-in-interest, had to go back to that stage, and then continue with the case
until its finality. This is precisely what the heir of Estanislao Mayuga did.
Upon finality of judgment in land registration cases, the winning party does not
file a motion for execution as in ordinary civil actions. Instead, he files a petition with the
land registration court for the issuance of an order directing the Land Registration
Commission to issue a decree of registration, a copy of which is then sent to the
Register of Deeds for transcription in the registration book, and issuance of the original
certificate of title.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Agenda before the Court En Banc and Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. This denial is FINAL.
G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605

December 12, 2005, December 18, 2008, August 24, 2010, March 06, 2012
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, ET AL. vs. HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE,
The land in dispute in the foregoing cases is Lot 823, a part of the Piedad Estate,
a friar land acquired by the government from the Philippine Sugar Estates Development
Company Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company
Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands on December 23, 1903.
Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began to surface after a
fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall in 1988, which destroyed records stored in
the Office of the Register of Deeds, including that of Lot 823.
Sometime in 1990, a petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 372302
in the name of the Manotoks covering Lot 823 was filed by the Manotoks with the Land
Registration Authority (LRA). The same was granted, resulting in the issuance of TCT
No. RT-22481 in 1991.
In 1996, the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution
of the original of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer Barque and covering Lot 823
too. After a year, the LRA cancelled the title of the Manotoks and ordered the
reconstitution of the Barques title. After their motion for reconsideration was denied by
the agency, the Manotoks filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA eventually sustained the Manotoks in a joint resolution by two of its
divisions. While the case was pending with the CA, Felicitas Manahan moved to
intervene and sought the dismissal of the cases as she claimed ownership of the subject
property. On appeal by the Barques, the CA reconsidered its decision and ordered the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the title of the Manotoks and the LRA to
reconstitute the Barques title.
The SC, acting on a petition filed by the Manotoks, upheld the CA ruling and
even declared the Manotoks title spurious. The SC decision became final on April 19,
2006 and an entry of judgment was made on May 2, 2006. However, when the Barques
sought for the implementation of its own decision, the SC changed its mind.
In a decision promulgated on December 18, 2008, the SC recalled the entry of
judgment and ordered the remand of the cases to the CA for further proceedings. Based
on the recommendations of the CA, the SC held that the Manotoks and the Barques
failed to establish a valid claim over Lot 823. The SC cited the finding of the Forensic
Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that the result of the
chemical analysis of the Manotoks titles showed they were not really as old as they
purport to be. The NBI noted that the handwritten entries were found to be made in
ballpoint pen and sign pen inks, which were not yet commercially available in the
Philippines until 1953 and 1965. As regards the Barques title, the SC cited the admission
made by Teresita Barque-Hernandez that the certified true copy of Deed of Conveyance
Record No. 4562 with Sale Certificate No. V-321 is a fake and spurious document. The
High Court said the CA noted that on its face, the document dated May 6, 1937 is
spurious considering that while its heading Republic of the Philippines Department of
Agriculture and Commerce and the consideration for the conveyance in Japanese war
notes, it is of judicial notice that the Republic of the Philippines was established only on
July 4, 1946. The CA added that the identified owner of the Piedad Estate should be
Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas as stated in OCT 614, the SC said.
Voting 9-4 (August 24, 2010), the SC ruled that neither the Manotok clan nor the
heirs of Homer Barque own Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate. The Supreme Court (SC) has
awarded to the national government a 34-hectare parcel of land in what used to be the
town of Caloocan, Rizal, known as the Piedad Estate.
On March 6, 2012, the SC denied with finality the motions for reconsideration
filed by all parties in this case and reiterated its August 24, 2010 decision.
I.
Whether or not the LRA and the CA has authority to annul land titles
II.
Whether or not the parties have established sufficient proofs to warrant the
issuance of titles in their names
RULING:
I.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, provides that [a] certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack [and] cannot be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Clearly, the cancellation
of the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for
reconstitution of the Barques title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed
that the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate
review of the LRAs administrative proceeding.
There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to
annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its
exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P.
129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional
trial court. Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques and the
Manotoks petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the
ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the
appellate court to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of
reviewing a decision of the LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel
a Torrens title in the first place.
II.
The absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the
sale certificate and assignment of sale certificate made the sale void ab
initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or
assignment. The Manotoks reliance on the presumption of regularity in the statutorily
prescribed transmittal by the Bureau of Lands to the Register of Deeds of their deed of
conveyance is untenable. The Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the
subject lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the Government in
the first place. Section 18 of Act No. 1120 provides that no lease or sale made by Chief
of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until
approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce).
With respect to the claim of the Manahans, no copy of the alleged Sale
Certificate No. 511can be found in the records of either the DENR-NCR, LMB or National
Archives. Although the OSG submitted a certified copy of Assignment of Sale Certificate
No. 511 allegedly executed by Valentin Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there is
no competent evidence to show that the claimant Valentin Manahan or his successorsin-interest actually occupied Lot 823, declared the land for tax purposes, or paid the
taxes due thereon.
None of the parties has established a valid acquisition under the provisions of Act
No. 1120, as amended. Thus, Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate form part of the patrimonial
property of the Government.
December 12, 2005
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24,
2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents TCT
No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the
Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700
directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481,
and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents TCT No. T-210177 and
the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED.
December 18, 2008

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 12 June 2005, and the Resolutions dated 19
April and 19 June 2006 of the Courts First Division are hereby SET ASIDE, and the
Entry of Judgment recorded on 2 May 2006 is RECALLED. The Amended Decision
dated 24 February 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Amended Decision dated 7
November 2003 and the Resolution dated 12 March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700,
and the Resolutions of the Land Registration Authority dated 24 June 1998 and 14 June
1998 in Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-A[97] are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
August 24, 2010
WHEREFORE, the petitions filed by the Manotoks under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, as well as the petition-in-intervention of the
Manahans, are DENIED. The petition for reconstitution of title filed by the Barques is
likewiseDENIED. TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Severino Manotok IV, et
al., TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque and Deed of Conveyance No. V200022 issued to Felicitas B. Manahan, are all hereby declared NULL and VOID. The
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or Quezon City are hereby ordered to CANCEL
the said titles. The Court hereby DECLARES that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, Quezon
City, legally belongs to the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, without prejudice to the institution of REVERSION proceedings by the
State through the Office of the Solicitor General.
March 6, 2012
WHEREFORE, the present motions for reconsideration are all herebyDENIED
with FINALITY. The motions for oral arguments and further reception of evidence are
likewise DENIED.
*** Manotok v. Barque, the Lot No. 823, Piedad Estate Ownership Controversy
Part I : The December 12, 2005 Decision. Musings on Law. 15 May 2012.
<http://musingsonlaw.blogspot.com/2012/05/manotok-v-barque-lot-no-823-piedad.html>
*** Panesa, Edmer F. SC awards 34-hectare QC land to natl govt. 7
September 2010. <http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/275932/sc-awards-34hectare-qc-landnat-l-gov-t>.
G.R. No. 123346 December 14, 2007

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION vs. CLT REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
On 10 August 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to
recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the
possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an action filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. CLTs claim was anchored on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-177013 issued in its name, which title in turn was derived from
Estelita Hipolito by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage dated 10
December 1988. Hipolitos title emanated from Jose Dimsons TCT No. R-15169,
registered on June 8, 1978. Dimsons title appears to have been sourced from OCT No.
994 which was registered on April 19, 1917 pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in
Land Registration Case No. 4429.
In MWSS and Gonzaga case, a previous case decided by the SC involving the
same OCT No. 994, it ruled that the title of MWSS,a transfer from TCT No. 36957, was
derived from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. Manotok asserted that, based on
that ground, CLTs title is void, having derived from a spurious title.
When does a land become registered land, upon transcription of the decree in
the registration book by the register of deeds or upon entry of decree in the LRA?
RULING:
As evident on the face of OCT No. 994, the decree of registration was issued
on 19 April 1917, and actually received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3
May 1917. Interestingly, even as CLT admits that there is only one OCT No. 994, that
which the Solicitor General had presented to the Court,[33] it maintains that the OCT
should be deemed registered as of the date of issuance of the decree of registration, 19
April 1917, instead of the date it was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds
on 3 May 1917. The argument is based on the theory that it is the decree of registration
[that] produces legal effects, though it is entered before the transmittal of the same for
transcription at the Register of Deeds.[34]
With the plain language of the law as mooring, this Court in two vintage and
sound rulings made it plain that the original certificate of title is issued on the date the
decree of registration is transcribed. There is a marked distinction between the entry of
the decree and the entry of the certificate of title; the entry of the decree is made by the
chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate of title is made by the
register of deeds. Such difference is highlighted by Sec. 31 of Act No. 496 as it provides
that the certificate of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. What
stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by
the registrar of deeds in the registry.
Otherwise stated, what is actually issued by the register of deeds is the certificate
of title itself, not the decree of registration, as he is precisely the recipient from the land
registration office of the decree for transcription to the certificate as well as the
transcriber no less. Since what is now acknowledged as the authentic OCT No. 994
indicates that it was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on 3 May
1917, it is that date that is the date of registration since that was when he was able to
transcribe the decree in the registration book, such entry made in the book being the
original certificate of title. Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the
register of deeds that the certificate of title is to take effect.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, there is a
need to determine which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims of
title to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special
Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with Parts
VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.
GR 168081 October 12, 2009

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. TEOFILO P. ICOT ET AL.
On July 6, 1976, spouses Vicente and Trinidad Velasco obtained from Bank of
the Philippine Islands a P50,000 loan, secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel
of land located in Liloan, Cebu. The parcel of land was covered by TCT No. 675, issued
in the name of Vicente Velasco. Due to spouses Velascos failure to pay the loan, the
mortgaged property was foreclosed. During the auction sale held on July 6, 1979, BPI
was the highest bidder. The spouses Velasco failed to redeem the property during the
one-year redemption period; hence, BPIs ownership was consolidated, and a Definite
Deed of Sale was issued in its favor. TCT No. 675 was cancelled and a new title, TCT
No. P-1619, was issued in the name of BPI.
Meanwhile, Teofilo Icot and the Genaro and Felimon Icot (predecessors-ininterest of the other respondents) claimed to have been in quiet, open and continuous
possession of the subject real property which they allegedly acquired from their father,
Roberto Icot, through an extrajudicial settlement of estate in 1964. Upon learning of the
mortgage of the subject property, they filed cases for quieting of title against Velasco.
On 26 October 1999, BPI filed with the RTC of Mandaue City a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession. It was grated but on appeal by BPI, the Court of
Appeals reversed RTCs decision. Hence, this appeal.
Whether or not the BPI is entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession of the
subject property
RULING:
A writ of possession is generally understood to be an order whereby the sheriff is
commanded to place a person in possession of a real or personal property. A writ of
possession may be issued under the following instances: (1) land registration
proceedings under Section 17 of Act 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is
in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure
suit, had intervened; and (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under
Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118 (Act 3135). This case involves the third
instance. Under Section 7 of Act 3135, a writ of possession may be issued either (1)
within the one year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of
the redemption period, without need of a bond or of a separate and independent
action. This is founded on the purchasers right of ownership over the property which he
bought at the auction sale and his consequent right to be placed in possession
thereof. However, this rule admits of an exception, that is, Section 33 (former Section 35)
of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the possession of the
mortgaged property shall be given to the purchaser unless a third party is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.
The obligation of a court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears
that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to
that of the debtor/mortgagor. Such third person may not be dispossessed on the strength
of a mere ex parte possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his summary
ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due process.
Thus, the right of possession by a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
property is recognized only as against the judgment debtor and his successor-in-interest,
but not as against persons whose right of possession is adverse to the latter. In this
case, Icot and the other respondents are third parties in possession of the subject real
property, holding the same under a title adverse to that of the mortgagor/judgment
obligor, Velasco.
BPIs right to issuance of a writ of possession cannot be invoked against
respondents. Respondents possession of the subject real property is legally presumed
to be pursuant to a just title which petitioner may endeavor to overcome in a judicial
proceeding for recovery of property.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Court of Appeals
Decision dated 7 January 2005 and Resolution dated 3 May 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
81495.
G.R. No. L-58438 January 31, 1984

EDILBERTO BERNAS vs. PELAYO NUEVO
On February 17, 1981, the Heirs of Pascual Bellosillo and Francisca Besa,
represented by Silvestre Bellosillo filed a complaint against defendants Edilberto Bernas,
Baldonera Bulquirin and Teofilo Berano for recovery of possession of Lot 3382 of the
Panay Cadastre and for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to restore the
plaintiffs to the possession of the land in dispute. The motion for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction having been denied, the plaintiffs subsequently filed another
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. On August 28, 1981, Judge Nuevo
granted the writ of possession.
Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration on September 12, 1981, claiming
that they had been in possession of the lot since 1960 under an alleged lease contract.
Such was not acted upon. Hence, the defendants filed the petition for certiorari.
While the petition was pending before the Court, Judge Leviste, on December 8,
1981, acted on the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants and issued an
order declaring null and void the writ of possession issued by former Judge Nuevo. In a
subsequent order dated April 20, 1982, it was also ordered that the defendants be
placed in possession of the property in question, Lot 3382. Hence, a petition for certiorari
was filed, this time by the plaintiffs.
Whether or not the writ of possession was validly issued
RULING:
It is a settled ruled that when parties against whom a writ of possession is sought
have been in possession of the land for at least ten years, and they entered into
possession apparently after the issuance of the final decree, and none of them had been
a party in the registration proceedings, the writ of possession will not issue. A person
who took possession of the land after final adjudication of the same in registration
proceedings cannot be summarily ousted through a writ of possession secured by a
mere motion and that regardless of any title or lack of title of persons to hold possession
of the land in question, they cannot be ousted without giving them their day in court in
proper independent proceedings.
In the case at bar, the writ was issued after pre-trial and hearing of the motion for
the issuance of the writ only and not after final adjudication of the rights of the parties
over the lot in controversy. Therefore, it was a patent error on the part of respondent
Judge Nuevo to issue the questioned writ. The rule is "when other persons have
subsequently entered the property, claiming the right of possession, the owner of the
registered property or his successors in interest cannot dispossess such persons by
merely asking for a writ of possession. The remedy is to resort to the courts of justice
and institute a separate action for unlawful entry or detainer or for reinvidicatory action,
as the case may be." Only after judgment has been rendered can the prevailing party
secure a writ of possession to enforce his right over the disputed lot.
WHEREFORE, the order of Judge Pelayo Nuevo dated August 28, 1981, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders of Judge Oscar Leviste dated
December 8, 1981 and April 20, 1982 are also REVERSED and SET ASIDE. As matter
of right, the petitioners-defendants in G.R. No. 58438 should remain in possession of Lot
No. 3382 pending final adjudication of the respective rights of both petitioners in Civil
Case No. V-4471. No costs.

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