Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION
a. The Existence of Cyberlibel...... 3
II.
III.
IV.
CONCLUSION. 20
INTRODUCTION
A. The Existence of Cyberlibel
In the past, any written or printed word, which was offensive or caused
offensive, was easily determined as punishable either criminally or civilly. In the
Philippine jurisdiction, the publication of offensive words is punished as libel, a
criminal offense.1 However, in a modern age where freedom in a democracy is
valued highly by its citizens, many imply that maintaining libel as a criminal
offense is against the constitutional guarantee of free expression under the 1987
Philippine Constitution.2 Others, on the other hand, claim that libel as a crime in
the Philippines is contrary to our obligations under international law.3 In the
modern era of social media and technology, the question regarding libels
constitutionality is still up for debate, especially in this time where the Internet is
so prevalent, with blogs, Facebook, Twitter, and comments made online, it is
worth examining the subject matter of committing libel online, also known as
cyberlibel. 4 Especially since, in the words of one commentator, cyberlibel,
defamation claims for material posted on web-pages, in chat-rooms, or in
1
An
Act
Revising
the
Penal
Code
and
Other
Penal
Laws
[REVISED
PENAL
CODE].
Act
No.
3815,
art.
353
(1932).
2
Oral
Argument
at
44:00,
Adonis
et
al.
v.
Executive
Secretary,
et
al.,
G.R.
No.
203378,
available
at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/features/oral_arguments/cybercrime/index.php.
3
Summary
of
the
Petition
for
Certiorari
&
Prohibition
of
Adonis,
et
al.
v.
Executive
Secretary,
et
al.,
available
at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/features/oral_arguments/cybercrime/203378.php
(last
accessed
April
2,
2015)
4
The
term
cyberlibel
is
used
in
academic
circles,
by
laymen,
and
media.
See
Shaheen
Shariff
&
Leanne
Johnny,
Cyber-Libel
and
Cyber-Bullying:
Can
Schools
Protest
Student
Reputation
and
Free
Expression
in
Virtual
Environments,
16
EDUC.
&
L.J.
307,
316-17
(2007).
defaming someone through the use of Facebook. The trial court denied to hear
the case and stated that it will not prosper due to jurisdictional issues.11 Even
the Secretary of Justice, in one of its resolutions, stated that the crime of
cyberlibel is nonexistent under Philippine law.12
It is safe to presume that it is because of this lack of a statute to punish
those who commit online libel under the Philippine legal system, which pushed
Congress to make cyberlibel punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012 or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10175.13 Currently, the statute is under strict
scrutiny in the eyes of the Supreme Court as numerous petitions have been filed
in questioning its constitutionality and its applicability in the Philippines.14
However, this paper will not be focusing on the constitutional aspect of
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012; rather, what this paper will be limited
about is the study on how the courts will come with a decision on issues of
cyberlibel. With a law that poses a contravention in principles and in law, this
paper will focus on an analysis and comparison with the theories made by
Ronald Dworkin and H.LA. Hart regarding the discretionary power of the Court.
11
See
Karen
Flores,
Court
junks
PHs
first
Faebook
libel
case,
available
at
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/lifestyle/07/26/11/court-junks-phs-first-facebook-
libel-case
(last
accessed
April
2,
2015).
12
See
Bonifacio,
620
SCRA
at
273.
13
An
Act
Defining
Cybercrime,
Providing
for
the
Prevention,
Investigation,
Suppression,
and
the
Imposition
of
Penalties
Therefor
and
For
Other
Purposes.
[Cybercrime
Prevention
Act
of
2012],
Republic
Act
No.
10175.
Section
4
(4).
This
Section
provides
that
libel
is
the
unlawful
or
prohibited
acts
of
libel
as
defined
in
Article
355
of
the
Revised
Penal
Code,
as
amended,
committed
through
a
computer
system
or
any
other
similar
means,
which
may
be
devised
in
the
future.
Id.
14
See
Petitions
Challenging
Republic
Act
No.
10175,
available
at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/features/oral_arguments/cybercrime/index.php
(last
accessed
3
April
2015).
Thus, the problem this paper poses is whether or not Philippine judicial
tribunals should decide issues involving cyberlibel on a purely legal basis, not
including principle matters.
In relation, this paper shall: (1) introduce the concept of cyberlibel; (2)
provide an overview of libel under Philippine laws and jurisprudence; and (3)
examine cyberlibel and defamation under different foreign jurisdictions for the
sake of guidance. Thereafter, this paper shall give the analysis on the Hart v
Dworkin debate on the issue of cyberlibel in the Philippines. To summarize, it
shall provide a conclusion on the state of cyberlibel in the Philippines.
Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, libel can be committed in
the following manner:
[Article] 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed
by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph,
painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar
means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods or a fine ranging from [P200.00] to [P6,000.00], or both,
in addition to the civil action[,] which may be brought by the offended
party.19
Meanwhile, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code also includes the
following as those who can be held liable for libel, as well as the rule on venue
for filing of libel cases:
[Article] 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish,
exhibit[,] or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor or a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business
manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be
responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if
he were the author thereof.
18
GMA
Network,
Inc.
v.
Bustos,
504
SCRA
638,
650-51
(2006).
19
REVISED
PENAL
CODE,
art.
355.
20
Cybercrime
Prevention
Act
of
2012,
Sec.
4
(c)(4).
21
Id.
Section
6.
10
22
This
result
is
based
on
the
total
number
of
cases
indexed
under
the
term
libel
in
eSCRA.
See
Central
Books,
e-SCRA
Library,
available
at
http://www.central.com.ph/escra/
(last
accessed
April
3,
2015).
23
REVISED
PENAL
CODE,
art.
353.
11
The Court has likewise determined who may be held liable for libel. It is
the position of the Supreme Court that:
Not only is the person who published, exhibited[,] or caused the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing shall be responsible
for the same, all other persons who participated in its publication are
liable, including the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, who shall be equally responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
thereof.25
Thus, based on the interpretation of the Supreme Court, all those who
participated in the publication of a libel are also liable for the crime of libel.26
Such a position, when applied to the realm of cyberlibel or libel
committed online, would certainly be fraught with complications. It would mean
that anyone who participated in the publication of a libel online maybe held
liable for libel. This would then include the website, an administrator of a
website, or even those who share or like in social media sites such as Facebook
or Twitter. Such an interpretation may unduly expand libel, as applied to this day
and age, expand cyberlibels breadth, scope, and applicability.
The Court is aware, of course, of the various constitutional issues that
may apply in relation to the issue of libel. As explained earlier, it has been help
24
MVRS
Publications,
Inc,
v.
Islamic
Dawah
Council
of
the
Philippines,
Inc.,
396
SCRA
210,
218-19
(2003)
(emphasis
supplied).
25
Bautista
v.
Cuneta-Pangilinan,
G.R.
No.
189754,
Oct.
24,
2012.
26
Id.
12
by the Supreme Court that [t]he judiciary, in deciding suits for libel, must
ascertain whether or not the alleged offending words may be embraced by the
guarantees of free speech and free press.27 In another case, the Supreme Court
explained that [l]ibel stands as an exception to one of the most cherished
constitutional rights, that of free expression.28
One noted issue about libel is that of shopping for a convenient venue for
the filing of a libel case. This is what commentators would call libel tourism,
and is a prevalent issue in other jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is likewise a
most sensitive issue, so much so that the many cases reaching the Supreme
Court on libel have touched on this.
The case of Chavez has an outstanding, though lengthy, disquisition of
the issue and the current Philippine rule on venue for libel. Notably, in the case
of Bonifacio, the Court further elaborated on the venue requirements for libel, in
relation to supposedly libelous internet postings or cyberlibel. It can seen from
the pronouncements of the Court that it chose to take a more restrictive
interpretation when it comes to venue, precisely to stop the floodgates of libel
suits being filed in all locations where the supposedly libelous website could be
accessed.
Interestingly however, in other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom
(U.K.), a resident of the U.S. was allowed to file a libel suit under English law
because under such law, libel is committed where the publication takes place
27
Philippine
Commercial
&
Industrial
Bank,
105
SCRA
at
319.
28
Chavez,
514
SCRA
at
293.
13
and internet publications are published where they are downloaded.29 This is
contrast to Philippine jurisprudence. In any case, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that:
[w]hile libel laws ensure a modicum of responsibility in ones own speech
or expression, a prescribed legal standard that conveniences the easy
proliferation of libel suits fosters an atmosphere that inhibits the right to
speak freely. When such a prescribe standard is submitted for affirmation
before this Court, as is done in this petition, it must receive the highest
possible scrutiny, as it may interfere with the most basic of democratic
rights.30
As such, the Court is aware that allowing any legal standard that would
encourage the filing of libel cases should not be allowed, which may explain its
ruling in the Bonifacio case and in Chavez.
Thus, a review of some of the more pivotal rulings of the Court on libel,
indicates an awareness by the same of the issues surrounding libel, including its
constitutional issues, as well as issues surrounding its expansion, scope and
venue. It would seem then that the balance, when it comes to libel, remains an
uneasy one under jurisprudence.
C. Recent Events: The Existence of Cyberlibel
Prior to the resolution of the Supreme Court declaring the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 as constitutional, there were many pending cases before
the lower courts, which essentially are cyberlibel cases. The differing treatments
by various government entities, as well as different opinions by various
29
See
King
v.
Lewis,
2005
EWCA
(Civ)
1328,
2
(2005)
(Eng.).
30
Chavez,
514
SCRA
at
293.
14
31
rulings. The Office of the Prosecutor of Marikina City initially dismissed the
charges in August 2009.32 Upon appeal by the complainant to the Department of
Justice, the Department of Justice, in a resolution dated 24 March 2011,
reversed the findings of the Prosecutor and held that all the elements of libel
were present.33
Notably, this finding was made after the Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice in 2007, which opined that internet libel was non-existent.34 It must be
recalled that in the case of Bonifacio, reference was made to the Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales dated 20 June 2007 where [t]he Justice
Secretary opined that the crime of internet libe was non-existent, hence, the
accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the [Revised Penal
Code].35
Returning to the matter of JRV, an information was then filed in the
Regional Trial Court based on the 24 March 2011 Resolution of the Department
of Justice (which directly contradicted the 20 June 2007 Resolution of the
31
See
Avendao.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
See
Bonifacio,
620
SCRA
at
273.
35
Bonifacio,
620
SCRA
at
273.
15
Secretary of Justice), before the Marikin Regional Trial Court.36 In 6 May 2012,
the Marikina Trial Court then found probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest.37 This was the subject of the petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.38 The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and found it bereft of
merit.39 This, therefore, paved the way for trial on the allegedly libelous acts.40
In another case, which according to news reports, was likewise based on
online posts (on Facebook) considered by the aggrieved party as libelous, there
was also an indictment for prosecution before the Courts for libel. Thus,
probable cause was found by the Office of the Prosecutor that there existed a
case for libel committed online. However, upon reaching the court, the case was
dismissed due to jurisdictional venue issues. Interestingly, this finding of
probable cause by the prosecutorial arm of the government was also made after
the 20 June 2007 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice that no online libel
existed.41
Also notable is that the subject matter of both cases were libelous
statements made online. Yet, there were some differences in the treatment of
the two.
Another interesting consideration is this: both cases were filed and
hurdled the minimum threshold of probable cause in the prosecutorial level (in
36
See
Avendao.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
See
Bonifacio,
620
SCRA
at
273.
16
the JRV case, only after appeal to the Department of Justice) without using the
provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. Yet, the treatment of the
courts was different for each case. One proceeded due to the findings of
probable cause, while in the other, there was a dismissal based on venue or
jurisdictional issues.
This circumstance of filing of the case even without the application of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 definitely puts into question the need or
even necessity for said law42 since there seems to be an acknowledgement that
libel committed online can still be filed before the proper agencies under the
current existing law on libel, which is the Revised Penal Code.43
In fact, one commentator has stated that:
[i]nternet libel has been punishable since the Internets creation and was
not created by the Cybercrime Law. In fact, existing internet libel charges
are under the Revised Penal Code, [which was] enacted in 1930. The
Cybercrime Laws legal issues are fare more technical than the
Reproductive Health Laws, which many distill into an individuals right to
choose.44
42
See
generally
Petitions
Challenging
Republic
Act
No.
10175.
43
See
REVISED
PENAL
CODE,
art.
355.
44
Tan,
supra
note
2.
45
See
Panela,
supra
note
7.
17
18
If the issue posed above is to be tried under English law, then yes, the
five people shall be declared guilty of online libel. In Kasckhe v. Gray,46 the
aggrieved party sought to hold the owner/provider/operator (blog provider) of
a blog liable even though the blog provider was not the one who posted the
actual libelous article.47 Another individual, who used the blog, was the one who
posted the article. This decision strongly indicated that even the blog provider
may be held liable for libel committed on the blog, even though the blog
provider was not the one who actually posted the libelous article.48
The above ruling shows a very strict application of the law involving
cyberlibel due to the level of difficulty the issue presents. Thus, for the purposes
of this paper, we shall categorize cyberlibel cases similar to those mentioned as
hard cases. With this, the question remains on how should Philippine courts
decide on hard cases involving issues on cyberlibel.
There are two ways that the court may decide regarding this matter, both
leading to a judicial decision. Yet, what will make the two decisions differ would
be the philosophy behind its creation. The first decision by a judge may follow
similarly to English law, which is a very strict application of the law. Here, we can
see the philosophy of H.L.A. Hart saying that judges should decide on cases
strictly based off the letter of the law. If in the above example, where five people
retweeted a statement, then applying Harts legal theory, they shall be held
liable for committing online libel.
46
Kaschke
v.
Gray,
1
W.L.R.
452
(2011)
(Eng.).
47
Id.
At
487.
48
Id.
At
457.
19
On the other hand, if the judge decides based on the letter and spirit of
the law, it is most likely that the decision would be different. It can possibly lead
to a judicial decision where the Court declares that the person who tweeted the
statement is the only one liable while the rest are innocent, by way of the sound
discretion of the judge around the facts of the case. This shows a stark contrast
on how cyberlibel cases can be decided by our courts in the Philippines.
H.L.A. Harts philosophy is very strict based on his legal positivist
philosophy saying that our society is composed simply of rules and that is how
we should decide hard cases through a strict application of the law. The
debate exists due to Ronald Dworkins opposing view to the matter wherein he
believes that the society is composed not just of rules, but of principles, and
that when the Court is faced with hard cases, it is important that the judge
should render a decision not simply based on the law, but also with an
application of his discretion. These philosophies are the building blocks of the
letter vs spirit of the law debate, which this paper shall not delve into deeper.
What is important to remember is that due to the complications and lack of
jurisprudence that the Philippines have involving cyberlibel, it is the courts duty
to legislate through its judicial decisions in order to fill the gaps left by our
legislators.
It is to be hoped that our Philippine Court shall decide on matters
involving cyberlibel on a manner that protects the rights of the people,
specifically that of free speech and expression, regardless of their legal
philosophy, may it be that of Hart or Dworkin.
20
CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that cyberlibel remains uncertain in the Philippine
jurisdiction, specifically in its treatment in the Courts. It is, of course, beyond the
scope of this paper to comprehensively comment on the way these cases
should be decided because there lays an absence of a definitive ruling of the
Supreme Court. It is with that idea why this paper was focused primarily on the
current state of cyberlibel in the Philippines.
Due to the lack of jurisprudence with the subject matter, the questions as
to how cyberlibel could and should be correctly and properly applied in the
Philippines, remain unanswerable. Yet, this paper offered the debate of Hart and
Dworkin on how courts may choose to decide on cyberlibel cases in the future.
Sadly, foreign jurisdictions do not offer much help in guiding Philippine
treatment of cyberlibel. They all have differing treatments, or use laws, which are
not applicable in the Philippines, as basis. In fact, as seen above, some of the
jurisdictions pay no heed to issues inherent here.
This is why the Philippines should learn and apply the principle that any
law or Supreme Court ruling that deals with cyberlibel must take notice of the
constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression.49 This is also why our
legislature should come up with a law that clarifies online crimes, specifically
cyber libel.
Until then, we must remain hopeful that despite the confusing situation
cyberlibel is in, the public should remain careful of what they do online.
49
See
generally
Chavez,
514
SCRA
at
293.