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Kissinger Chapter 12

Germany emerged as the strongest nation on the continent

Hitler rose through his oratory


o

Rep. no single school of thought

His philosophy ranged from banal to fantastic and had popular repackaging of
right-wing, rad, conventional wisdom

Exploited democracies guilty conscience about Treaty of Versailles

Operated by instinct rather than analysis


o

distill emotion and frustration into single moment

Abroad, was most successful

World perceived him as pursuing normal, limited objectives

Once he abandoned pretense of rectifying injustice, credibility vanished

Designed campaign against France in 1940 and refusal to permit retreat in front of
Moscow in 1941

Hitler always seemed unfulfilled by his victories


o

only seemed to be able to realize image of himself by overcoming collapse


through sheer willpower

Demagogic skill and egomania

Felt that all his goals had to be accomplished in his lifetime b/c they were so
unique

Versailles left powerful country confronting grp of smaller unprotected states on eastern
border

At first, Hitlers true nature was obscured by his seeming ordinariness


o

neither Germ. nor West. Euro. estab. believed that he really meant to overturn
existing order

Western democracies initial reaction to his ascendancy was to accelerate commitment to


disarm.
o

Germ. govt. now headed by chancellor who had proclaimed his intention to
overthrow Versailles settlement

Democracies still saw no need for taking special precautions

France not reassured by British pronouncements

Problem still remained how to find security if Germ. rearmed and GB refused a
guarantee

Oct. 14, 1933, Germ. left Disarm. Conference forever


o

Guarantee risky and unnecessary to British


B/c Hitler afraid that Germ. demands for parity might be met

Hitler laid down challenge, yet democracies uncertain as to what he really meant
o

Hitler skillfully exploited such attitudes

Offered to limit Germ. army to 300 k and air force to half size of France

diverted attention from fact that Germ. scrapped limit of 100 k established at
Versailles

France refused offer


o

Since Germ. rearm., state of British defenses was disquieting


o

declare it would look after its own security


greater defense effort might be needed, they thought

France
o

took refuge in wishful thinking

Mil. in Berlin proclaimed disarm. as most effective way of containing Hitler

GB and France opted to let Germ. rearm. because they did not know what else to do
o

GB not yet prep. to give up on collec. security

League and France dispirited that they could not act on their own premonitions

Statesmen always face dilemma that, when scope for action is greatest, they have
minimum of knowledge

Wests obsession with Hitlers motives was misguided


o

Shouldve been clear that large and strong Germ. bordered on east by small states
was dangerous for balance of power

British leaders rejected Churchills warnings, saying that disarm. not preparedness
was key to peace

1934, Churchill urged that GB respond to Germ. rearm. by buildup in Royal Air Force,
govt. and opp. leaders united in scorn

PM Baldwin made rejection of Churchill unanimous


o

Info about Germ. air strength is difficult to obtain

France sought shelter behind accumulation of alliances


o

unilateral guarantees of Czech, Poland, and Romania of 1920s

Franco-Soviet agreement signed in 1935


o

rejected mil. staff talks with Soviet though

Last resort

France in mil. alliance with countries far too weak to help it


o

political alliance with RU but didnt want to coop. militarily

Strategic dep. on GB

Mussolini
o

Feared German annex. of Austria would lead to demand for return of South Tirol
which was ethnically German

Stresa
o

Alliance among GB, France, and ITaly seemed developing after Hitler
reintroduced conscription

GB signed naval accord with Germ

bilateral deals were what GB liked most

Stresa front collapsed


o

Mussolini adhered to RealPolitik and took it for granted that he had free hand for
the kind of colonial expansion that had been routine prior to WW1

Musso. aggression would have been accepted prior to WW1, it was now being
initiated in a world that was in thrall to collec. security and the League.

Italy hoist by engaging in what had been unprovoked aggression against member of
League
o

Abyssinia and Italy and GB

GB faced a challenge to collec. security and African colonial problem

Under British leadership, League machinery of economic sanctions was activated

Italys conquest of Abyssinia was completed by May 1936

Musso. proclaimed king of Italy

Victor Emmanuel emp. of Ethiopia

July 15 1936, League lifted all sanctions against Italy

GB and France subordinated their moral objections to their fear of Germ. by


recog. Abyssinian conquest

March 7, 1936 Hitler ordered army into demil. Rhineland, marking overthrow of last
remaining safeguard of Versailles settlement

Reoccupation of Rhineland represented bold gamble for Hitler


o

conscription had been in effect for less than year

Gb would only recognize only 1 threat to Euro. balance of power


o

Germ. army far from ready for war

violation of Frances borders

France said that once Germ. fortified Rhineland, Czech would be lost and soon after that
Gen. war unavoidable

GB once again dodged commitment to defend France


o

GB wanted to sit back and wait until Hitlers provisions seemed clearer

France implemented appeasement warily

Germ. pursued it eagerly

Dem. moral retreat by visiting Hiter

Lord Halifax praised Nazi Germany as bulwark against Bolshevism

GB had participated in wars of Spanish succession and against Napoleon in Spain


o

Each case, it had resisted most aggressive Euro. power attempt to draw Spain into
its orbit

Now it failed to perceive threat to balance of power in fascist vic. in Spain or it


perceived fascism as lesser threat than radical left-wing Spain tied to Soviet
Union

Nov. 5, 1937 Hitler called meeting of war minister, commander in chief, and foreign
minister

Hossbach memorandum

secret

Program of Mein Kampf

Conquest of large tracts of land in Eastern Euro and in SU for colonization

His generals were actually very disturbed

1938, Hitler felt his first target was Austria

Union b/w the two was critical for Hitler

Anschluss

1937 he threatened Czech on behalf of ethnic Germans

March 1939 Hitler occupied the rump of Czech

Czech portion became German protectorate

Slovakia designated a technically indep. State

German Satellite

Brit and French reaction of drawing the line made equally little sense in terms of trad. Power
politics

Hitler got Danzig in 1939

However, after Germ. Occupied Czech, Brit. Pub. Opinion would tolerate it no further

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