Policy Brief

Transatlantic Security and Future of NATO Series

September 2015

Summary: This brief highlights

the challenges to an efficient
transatlantic division of security
labor and the measures that
are necessary to achieve it. The
author presents the U.S. ideal of
a geographic division of responsibilities, and discusses its
prospect in a context of transatlantic capability and strategic
shortfalls.

The German Marshall Fund

of the United States-Paris
71 Boulevard Raspail
75006 Paris
T: +33 1 47 23 47 18
E: infoparis@gmfus.org

What are the Prospects for a Transatlantic

Division of Security Responsibilities?
by Christopher Chivvis
In the last quarter-century, the United
States and its European allies have
had fairly clear security priorities. In
the first decade after the Cold War,
Europe and the United States focused
on enlarging and strengthening the
sphere of democracies to build a
Europe whole free and at peace. After
9/11, the United States embarked on a
far-reaching global campaign against
al Qaeda, which many European
nations joined.
Recently, however, the task of clarifying priorities has become much
more difficult. Europe and the United
States both face an unprecedented
array of pressing security threats that
are not easily prioritized. From a U.S.
perspective, the worlds three critical
regions Asia, the Middle East, and
Europe all pose major security
challenges. In Asia, the United States
faces a rising, nationalist China that
is at once an indispensable economic
partner and an implacable military
rival. In the Middle East, multiple
overlapping conflicts whether
Shia-Sunni, Arab-Israeli, ArabIranian, democratic-authoritarian,
or jihadist are creating chaos and
human suffering on an unprecedented
regional scale. In Europe, Russia
under President Vladimir Putin has
proven willing to use its still growing
military strength to revise the post-

Cold War settlement to conform to

its own vision of Russias historical
place and destiny, thereby creating a
renewed threat to NATO and Europes
political and economic prosperity.
Under these circumstances, the U.S.
ideal division of transatlantic labor
when it comes to security cooperation
is straightforward: Europe should take
care of its southern and eastern flank,
and leave Asia to the United States. In
this ideal, European states, drawing
on their long experience with North
Africa and the Middle East, would
develop a hard-hitting strategy that
combines diplomatic skill, political
realism, and military coercion to
set the region back on a course
away from extremism and toward
state-based order in which the rule
of law and even respect for human
rights were the norm. Simultaneously, European states would arrive
at a common analysis of the Russia
problem and join forces to manipulate the many levers of power and
influence they hold over the Kremlin,
while simultaneously bolstering the
military defenses of the EUs frontline
members in ways that reassured them
yet did not exacerbate a Kremlin
apoplectic about the eastward spread
of European democracy.

Transatlantic Security and Future of NATO Series

Policy Brief
Indeed, if Europe could cover the South and the East,
the United States could then do what it has been longing
to do for years: focus on Asia and figure out what to do
about Chinas rise. Relieved of the burden of having to
worry about the Middle East, North Africa, and conflict
in Eastern Europe, the United States would have clear
priorities. Developing a coherent national strategy would
be much less contentious. A singular focus on Asia might
even allow for fewer tradeoffs between bread and butter,
the chance to pay for things many citizens need domestically without having to raise taxes or resort to inflationary
financing.
Of course, we all know that Europes current state of division even fragmentation over the future of the European project, immigration, economics, and even the value
of liberal democracy itself will prevent it from taking on
any such responsibility. For Europe, accomplishing these
tasks would require, at a minimum, much higher levels of
military spending in addition to more adequate means of
coordinating that spending; evolution of more power to
Brussels and especially to the European External Action
Service; far greater cooperation, collaboration, and capabilities in the intelligence field; and the underlying resources
and political will to sustain this dual front war beyond the
next decade.
Despite Asias gravitational pull, then, the United States has
no choice but to work with its European allies in devising
and implementing strategies to deal with the South and the
East. If Europe is weakened by the anti-liberal, revisionist
forces of the 21st century, the United States cannot but
grow weaker too. That is a truth at the core of the transatlantic relationship.

Despite Asias gravitational

pull, the United States has
no choice but to work with its
European allies in devising and
implementing strategies to deal
with the South and the East.
2

But how much can the United States actually handle? In

Central and Eastern Europe, Washington will be hardpressed to deploy even a few brigades to reinforce the
defenses of exposed allies in the Baltics. In North Africa,
U.S. intelligence assets, refueling aircraft, and special operations ground teams may be critical enablers in dealing
with the long-standing problem posed by al Qaeda in
the Maghreb, not to mention the self-proclaimed Islamic
State group, but the United States is hardly ready to deploy
ground or air combat forces in any significant number
there.
Transatlantic burden sharing when it comes to the East and
the South is thus the only real option. To the East, Europe
will need to continue to deploy its political and economic
power in a coordinated and unified manner. It would also
help if Germany would deploy defensive forces of some
kind to Poland and the Baltic states. German leadership
on economic and political matters is helpful, but without a
demonstrated willingness to connect those forms of influence to military measures, Germany and hence Europe
may never obtain the dominance that it seeks over its
difficult Eastern neighbor. Germany should be prepared
to match any permanent or persistent U.S. deployments to
the region. For example, if the United States contributes a
brigade of combat forces to the defense of its eastern neighbors, Germany should do the same.
To the South, France has commendable ambitions to
lead, but risks major capabilities shortfalls if it is forced
to tackle the regions problems alone. The United States is
very unlikely to support any French operations that smack
of neo-imperial ambition, but in operations on the Mali
and Libya models, where U.S. interests are implicated, U.S.
logistical support can again enable a French (or EU) lead.
When it comes to Iraq and Syria, the primary challenge
today is one of strategy development and perhaps timing
more than capabilities, but this will eventually change.
Then European allies, including especially the U.K., which
is sadly poised to further reduce funding for its dilapidated
military, will need to be prepared to contribute not only
with airpower, but with special operations teams, trainers,
and other ground forces in significant numbers over a long
term. Germany, France, Italy, the Visegrad region, and
other countries must also contribute to this effort preferably through NATO, but perhaps through the EU.

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

September 2015

Transatlantic Security and Future of NATO Series

Policy Brief
In Europe itself, enhanced cooperation between U.S. and
European (and within European) intelligence agencies
is needed to combat both the rising soft influence of the
Kremlin and the rising hard threat of foreign fighters.
These measures will not themselves be adequate.
Addressing security to the East and South is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for remedying these problems
over the medium term. The European Union will ultimately need to reinvigorate its own state-building efforts
on its periphery. Only with stronger states and more just
societies can the problems that have reared their heads in
the last two years reconcile with the transatlantic project,
and tranquility or something like it be restored.

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the

views of the author alone.

About the Author

Christopher S. Chivvis has been an associate director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center and a senior political
scientist at RAND Corporation since September 2011. He has also
been an adjunct professor of European studies at the Johns Hopkins,
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) since
2008. Chivvis holds a masters in international relations and internal
economics and a Ph.D. in European studies from SAIS.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by
supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic
sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business
communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic
topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed
commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF
supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition
to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin,
Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also
has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

Contact
Dr. Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer
Director, Paris Office
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Tel: +33 1 47 23 47 18
Email: adehoopscheffer@gmfus.org

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

September 2015