G.R. No. 88979.

February 7, 1992
Lydia O. Chua, petitioner, vs. The Civil Service Commission, The
National Irrigation Administration, The Department of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Facts: Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of
the benefits of the program provided in Republic Act No. 6683, being of
permanent status and having rendered 15 years of continuous service,
filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration
(NIA) which, however, denied the same.
The Early Retirement Law, R.A. No. 6683 provides for benefits for
early retirement and voluntary separation due to reorganization.
Section 2 of said act provides that the program covers all regular,
temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who
have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of
government service as of the date of separation.
The Civil Service Commission and NIA denied Chuas application
claiming that she is not qualified due to the fact that she is a coterminous employee and non-career civil servant which does not fall
under the categories of regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees, which the act covers.
Issue: Whether or not Lydia Chua is qualified to avail of the benefits
under R.A. No. 6683.
Held: Chua is qualified to avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 6683.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual
and emergency employees that are covered by the act. Following the
doctrine of implication, wherein it is said that so-called gaps in the law
develop as the law is enforced, the gap of not covering civil servants
that should logically be covered is implied in effect of this statute. The
denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioners application for
early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable,
unjustified and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for
voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to
the benefits of said law.

No. L-2207. Januray 23, 1951

Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan, Lucio Cabauatan, Maria Cabauatan,
Constancio Eusebio, Antonio Cabauatan, Primo Cabauatan, Carmen
Cabauatan, Evangelino Nuesa and Trinidad Cabauatan, plaintiffs and
apellants, vs Uy Hoo, By Siat, Siy Hong and the Register of Deeds of
the City of Manila, defendants and apellants.
Facts: Plaintiffs sold to defendants, all Chinese citizens, two parcels of
residential land. In reaction to the case of Krivenco vs Register of
Deeds wherein the Court held that a conveyance of a residential land
to aliens infringes Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, plaintiffs
demanded from the defendants to restore to them the lands on the
ground that the sale they made thereof to the defendants was null and
void, but the latter refused to do so.
Article 1306, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code provides that, when
both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what he may have
given by virtue of the contract, or enforce the performance of the
undertaking of the other party.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale executed by the plaintiffs can be
declared null and void.
Held: The deed of sale executed by the plaintiffs cannot be declared
null and void.
A party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and
ask to have his illegal objects carried out. The law will not aid either
party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.

No. L-5127. May 27, 1953

Pedro Batungbakal, plaintiff and appellee, vs. National Development
Company and Manuel Agregado, as Auditor General of the Philippines,
defendants and apellants.
Facts: Civil service employee Pedro Batungbakal was suspended and
later dismissed without cause as shown by the fact that after
investigation he was exonerated and found guiltless of the charge of
gross negligence filed against him and was even recommended for
reinstatement by the government committee that investigated him.
Hence, Batungbakal claims to be reinstated and to be paid his back
salary from the time he was suspended up to the time that he would
be reinstated.
Article XII, section 4, of the Constitution provides that no officer
or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause as provided by law. Section 694 of the Administrative Code
has a similar provision.
Issue: Whether or not Batungbakal could claim to be reinstated and to
be paid his back salary.
Held: Yes, Batungbakal could claim to be reinstated and to be paid his
back salary.
A civil service official may not be removed from office except for cause.
His suspension and removal were illegal and in violation not only of the
Administrative Code but of the Constitution itself. Hence, Batungbakal
should be reinstated and be paid his back salary to remedy the evil
and wrong committed. When a citizen after due hearing establishes his
right in court, said right is paramount and must be given effect.

Nos. 53581-83. December 19, 1980.

Mariano J. Pimentel, Benjamin R. Ramos, Amando Ambulan, Sabino
Ancheta, Jose Apolonio, Edna Cabanilla, Gaudencio Cario, Esmenio
Tacadena, Rosalinda Samoy and Delfin Vagular, Jr., petitioners, vs
Commission on Elections, Hon. Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance
of Quirino, Silverio L. Pascua, Faustino S. Tatac, Jose Cabanero, Maria
Valencia, Reynaldo Dupa, Alfredo Ladao, David Garnace, Domingo
Casia, Mateo Gervacio, and Paula Villacorta, respondents.
Facts: CFI of Quirino ordered the opening of the ballot boxes and the
counting of the votes as reflected in the ballots and not in the election
returns.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9592, which temporarily
restrained the Court of First Instance of Quirino from enforcing said
order, and to limit the counting of votes cast in favor of petitionerscontestants to those reflected in the election returns.
Petitioners allege, that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the
herein private respondents questioning an interlocutory order issued
by the CFI of Quirino, much less to restrain said court from enforcing
said order. Private respondents contend that since election cases
cognizable by CFI are appealable to the COMELEC under Sec 196 of the
1978 Election Code, said Commission, therefore, has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
involving said cases in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over the same.
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections had jurisdiction to
issue Resolution No. 9592.
Held: The Commission on Elections did not have jurisdiction to issue
Resolution No. 9592.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the

Constitution or the law. Thus, it cannot be conferred by the Rules of
Court which are neither constitutional provisions nor legislative
enactments but mere procedural rules promulgated by this Court in the
exercise of its power to prescribe rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts. It results therefore, that Resolution No.
9592 was issued by the COMELEC without authority to do so.

No. L-55230. November 8, 1988.

Hon. Richard J. Gordon, in his capacity as City Mayor of Olongapo,
petitioner, vs. Judge Regino T. Veridiano II and Spouses Eduardo and
Rosalina Yambao, respondents.
Facts: A joint team composed of agents from the FDA and narcotics
agents from the Philippine Constabulary conducted a test buy at San
Sebastian Drug Store and was sold 200 tablets of Valium, 10mg. worth
P 410.00 without a doctors prescription.
Olongapo City Mayor Richard J. Gordon, revoked their Mayors
Permit No. 1954 for rampant violation of R.A. 5921, otherwise known as
the Pharmacy Law and R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
San Sebastian Drug Stores was later own announced permanently
closed.
Yambao requested permission from the FDA to exchange
locations of the San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City
Drugstore for reasons of business preference. Mayor Gordon, when
informed of this action, disapproved of the transfers and suspended
Mayors Permit No. 1955 for the Olongapo City Drug Store.
Mayor Gordon traces his authority to the charter of Olongapo
City, R.A. No. 4645 which inter alia empowers the city mayor under
Section 10 thereof: to grant or refuse municipal licenses and to
revoke the same for violation of the conditions which upon they were
granted
Issue: Whether or not it was appropriate for Gordon as City Mayor of
Olongapo to revoke the Mayors permits 1954 and 1955

Held: The petitioner acted invalidly in revoking Mayors Permit No.

1954 after the FDA had authorized the resumption of operations of the
San Sebastian Drug Store following the enforcement of penalties upon
it. The power to approve a license includes by implication, even if not
expressly granted, the power to revoke it. By extension, the power to
revoke it is limited by the authority to grant the license from which it is
derived in the first place.
However, it was competent for him to suspend Mayors Permit
No. 1955 for the transfer of the Olongapo City Drug Store in violation of
the said permit. Such suspension should nevertheless be effective only
pending the return of the drugstore to its authorized original site or the
eventual approval by the mayor of the requested transfer if found to be
warranted.

No. L-6782. 25 July 1953

Dominador Jover, petitioner, vs. Juan Borra, respondent.
Facts: Dominador Jover was appointed Mayor of City of Iloilo on 26
March 1953. On 27 June 1953 Jover was relieved from his office as
mayor and Juan Borra was put in his place by the President of the
Philippines.
The President of the Philippines invokes Section 1, Article XII of
the Constitution of the Philippines stating that: Appointments in the
Civil Service, except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according
to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examination.
Issue: The legality or illegality of the removal of the petitioner and the
designation of the respondent by the President of the Philippines
through Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution.
Held: The President cannot derive from this constitutional provision the
authority to relieve or remove the petitioner from office, because his
power is merely one of general supervision over all local governments

and such supervision is to be exercised as may be provided by law.

The above-quoted constitutional provision does not say that officers
appointed under the exception are removable at pleasure.

G.R. No. 96422. February 28, 1994.

Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr., petitioner, vs Hon. Eufemio Domingo, in his
capacity as Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Estelito Salvador,
Margarita Silot, Valentina Eustaqio, Anicia Chico and Germiniano Pasco,
respondents.
Facts: Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico was appointed Chariman of the
Commission on Audit (COA) to serve a term of seven years. He was
issued an initial clearance during his tenure. All the required signatures
were present. It also bore a certification that petitioner is cleared from
money, property and/or other accountabilities by this commission.
Petitioner also obtained a second clearance, which had been signed by
all the officials, except the Chairman. Respondent Chairman Eufemio
Domingo indorsed petitioners application to the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), certifying, that petitioner was cleared of
money and property accountability.
In a letter dated December 21, 1989, respondent Chairman
informed petitioner of the approval of his application for retirement
under R.A. 1568 with an additional note that, payment of only one-

half (1/2) of the money value of the benefits due you by reason of such
retirement will be allowed.
Under Section 4, of R.A. No. 1568, the benefits granted by said
law to the Auditor General and the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or
execution.
Petitioner filed this petition praying for full payment of his
benefits.
Issue: Whether or not respondent chairman may withhold half of
petitioners retirement benefits.
Held: Respondent chairman may not withhold half of petitioners
retirement benefits.
Whatever infirmities or limitations existed in said clearances
were cured after respondent Chairman Eufemio Domingo favorably
indorsed petitioners application for retirement to the GSIS and
recommended its approval.
Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally
interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide
for the retirees sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable
of earning his livelihood. Wherefore, the petition is granted insofar as it
seeks to compel respondent Chairman of the COA to pay petitioners
retirement benefits in full and his monthly pensions.

No. L-33052. August 31, 1981.

Angel R. Quimpo, petitioner, vs. Leoncia Mendoza, as Treasurer for the
City of Cagayan de Oro, and in his personal capacity, and Judge
Bernardo Teves, as Presiding Judge of Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental, respondents.
Facts: Angel Quimpo, as owner of a building located in Cagayan de Oro
City, pays a realty tax for the building amounting to P400.00 yearly,
payable in four equal installments. Quimpo paid on time the first three
installments, but with respect to the last installment of P100.00, which
was to be paid on or before December 31, it was only on August 27,
1970 that he tendered the amount of P124.00. The City Treasurer of

Cagayan De Oro refused the payment insisting that petitioner ought to

pay the last installment of P100.00 plus the penalty of P96.00 or a total
of P196.00.
City Treasurer insists that the penalty of 2% be based on the
original tax due whereas petitioner maintains that it should be the
amount of the installment due and not paid. While R.A. 521 among
others, provides that the real property tax is due and payable
annually on the first day of June, subsequent to that charter, R.A.
5447 declares that the same tax (including the additional tax) shall be
due and payable in four equal installments.
Issue: The basis for the computation of the tax penalty in case of
delinquency.
Held: We rule for the petitioner, following the general rule in the
interpretation of tax statutes that such statutes are construed most
strongly against the government and in favor of the tax-payer. Since
R.A. 5477 amended R.A. 521, in making the basic and additional
property tax to be due and payable in four equal installments, the
court holds that the penalty provision of R.A. 521, Sec 42 is deemed
modified by implication. Accordingly, petitioners total liability will
amount to P116.00 only.

No. L-9124. July 28, 1958.

Bernardo Hebron, petitioner, vs Eulalio D. Reyes, respondent.
Facts: Petitioner discharged the duties and functions of mayor
continuously until he was informed through a letter from the Office of
the President of the Philippines that he was suspended due to an

investigation of administrative charges against petitioner. The ViceMayor has been directed to assume the office of Acting Mayor during
the period of suspension.
The suspension of petitioner remained until his term was about
to expire so he instituted the present action for quo warranto, upon the
ground that respondent was illegally holding the Office of Mayor of
Carmona, and had unlawfully refused to surrender said office to
petitioner, who claimed to be entitled thereto.
The appropriate procedure for the removal or suspension of
municipal officers is provided in Sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
Issue: Whether a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by
the President of the Philippines, regardless of procedure set forth in
sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Held: A municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines, may NOT be removed or suspended directly by the
President of the Philippines, regardless of procedure set forth in
sections 2188 to 2199 of the Revised Administrative Code.
It is well settled that laws governing the suspension or removal
of public officers especially those chosen by the direct vote of the
people, must be strictly construed in their favor. Accordingly, when the
procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same
must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of
express or clear provision to the contrary which does not exist with
respect to municipal officers.
Under the present law, the procedure prescribed in sections 2188
to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and
removal of the municipal officers therein referred to, is mandatory; that
in the absence of a clear and explicit provision to the contrary, relative
particularly to municipal corporations and none has been cited to us
said procedure is exclusive.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the
suspension of herein petitioner was null and void, for non-compliance
with the provisions above referred to.

No. L-38728. September 30, 1982.

Conrado V. Macatangay, petitioner, vs. The Chairman of Commission

on Audit, respondent.
Facts: Petitioner filed with the Department (Ministry) of Local
Government and Community Development an application for
commutation of his alleged ten (10) months terminal leave as former
Municipal Mayor of Calaca, Batangas. Respondent Chairman of
Commission on Audit refused to allow in audit the claim of petitioner.
Petitioner contends that he, as a former municipal mayor of
Calaca, Batangas is entitled to leave privileges pursuant to Section 286
and 2187 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 12(c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by Republic Act No. 1616.
Respondent Commission on Audit, in denying petitioners claim
for commutation of his alleged terminal leave, contends that there is
no law expressly and categorically granting them leave privileges or a
commutation thereof, that the aforementioned laws invoked by
petitioner are unavailing.
Issue: Whether or not herein petitioner is entitled to leave privileges.
Held: Herein petitioner is not entitled to leave privileges.
Indeed, there is no specific provision of law authorizing leave
privileges, nor commutation thereof, for elective officials, in general,
and municipal mayors in particular, as in the instant case. No mention
is made in the laws cited by petitioner about the mayor having to apply
for leave of absence to enjoy his right to receive full salary. Neither
does this provision of law authorize accumulation of such leave. Such
pecuniary privilege would depend on the existence of a law expressly
and categorically granting them leave privileges. Any claimant must
first show undoubtedly under what provision of law he has earned and
accumulated leave before he can be entitled to the commutation
thereof.