Soria vs Desierto

GR No. 153524-25, January 31, 2005

Facts:
Soria and Bista were arrested on may 13, 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the
May 14, an election day) without a warrant of arrest by the public respondents for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. Later, it was found out that Bista has
a standing warrant of arrest for violation of BP Blg. 6. Soria was detained for 22
hours while 26 days had elapsed before Bista was released.
Petitioners alleged that he could only be detained for 18 hours while Bista could
only be detained for 36 hours following the rule set forth in Art. 126 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides that:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent;
and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer
at any time with his attorney or counsel.
The public respondents for their part contended that the petitioners were timely
delivered to the proper judicial authorities and that in computing for the periods
provided in Art. 125, it should be construed as excluding Sundays, holidays and
election days.

Issue:
Whether or not public respondents gravely erred in construing Article 125 as
excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in the computation of the periods
prescribed within which public officers should deliver arrested persons to the proper
judicial authorities as the law never makes such exception.

Ruling:
No. Based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special
holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law
for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it
being a "no-office day." (Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.)
In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with
the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on
May 15, 2001 at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on May
14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by the Provincial
Prosecutor. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code to speak of.
With respect with petitioner Bista, the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period
prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his
arrest was tolled by one day (election day).Further, he has a standing warrant of
arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m.
that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however,
he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his
continuous detention. The complaints against him were seasonably filed in the court
of justice within the 36-hour period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty
of the detaining officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints.
Further action, like issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial
authority

People vs Nabong
GR No. 172324, April 4, 2007
Facts:
Nabong, Laguit, and Ladio were construction workers who were found guilty of the
complex crime of attempted rape with homicide committed against AAA, a 22 year
old accountant.
On review, Nabong faults the lower courts in not appreciating intoxication (they had
a drinking spree prior to the commission of the crime) and low degree of instruction
in his favor.

Issues:

1. Whether or not intoxication may be considered as a mitigating circumstance

in this case.
2. Whether or not the lack of instruction may be appreciated in his favor.

Ruling:
1. No. For intoxication to be considered as mitigating circumstance, it must be
shown that the intoxication impaired the will power of the accused and that he
did not know what he was doing or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of
his acts. The person pleading intoxication must prove that he took such quantity
of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his
reason. The records are bereft of any evidence that the quantity of liquor they
had taken was of such quantity as to affect their mental faculties.
2. No. Nabongs alleged lack of instruction cannot be appreciated in his favor.
Illiteracy alone will not constitute such circumstance; it must be accompanied by
lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of ones act.
Besides, one does not have to be educated or intelligent to be able to know that
it is unlawful to take the life of another person.

People vs Ampatuan
GR No. 188707, July 30, 2014

Facts:
Dujon, a detainee of PDEA volunteered to provide information on the alleged drug
activity of Ampatuan, Sarip and Tumog. The Regional Director of PDEA ordered
Dujon to contact Ampatuan to verify the formers claim. Dujon and Ampatuan
subsequently came to an agreement that the latter will deliver a jumbo sachet of
shabu worth Php 70,000.00.
Ampatuan, together with Sarip and Tumog delivered the shabu to Dujon at the
meeting place secured by the PDEA. After handing over the said shabu, the PDEA
operatives then barged in and arrested Ampatuan and her group.
Ampatuan, Sarip and Tumog now deny that a sale of an illegal drug has transpired.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a sale of an illegal drug has been established.

2. Whether or not there was an entrapment.
3. Whether or not Dujon as a principal witness is qualified and credible.

Ruling:
1. Yes. The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are
present in the case at bar. These elements are as follows:
1. the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration;
and
2. the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.
The prosecution, to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, must present in
evidence the corpus delicti of the case. In this case, the corpus delicti is the
seized illegal drugs. The Court ruled that the prosecution has sufficiently
discharged its burden to establish the elements in the illegal sale of shabu. The
prosecution was able to establish the (1) identity of accused-appellants as the
sellers, and the buyer, Dujon; and (2) the object of the transaction, which is the
jumbo sachet of shabu, weighing 46.4490 grams; and the delivery of the sold
illegal shabu to Dujon, the poseur-buyer.
2. Yes. In entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal.
Otherwise stated, the idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from the
criminal. It is elementary that entrapment and instigation are different. In
instigation, the instigator induces the would-be-defendant into committing the
offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. Further in instigation, the law
enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests the same to the
accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.
While it is true that it was Dujon who initiated the illegal sale, it does not
disprove the fact of illegal sale and habitual activity of illegal sale of shabu of
Ampatuan, Sarip and Tumog. They brought the illegal shabu all the way from
Cotabato to Davao, and handed the same to Dujon. Evidently, they voluntarily
resolved to commit the crimes as charged. Thus, what transpired in the instant
case was a legitimate buybust operation and not instigation.
3. Yes. The Court held that the qualification and credibility of Dujon as a principal
witness cannot be assailed. The law has specifically provided for the immunity of
informants from prosecution and punishment. Section 33, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 provides:

Section 33. Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of Republic Act No.
6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act of 1991, any
person who has violated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19, Article II of
this Act, who voluntarily gives information about any violation of
Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16, Article II of this Act as well as any
violation of the offenses mentioned if committed by a drug syndicate,
or any information leading to the whereabouts, identitiesand arrest of
all or any of the members thereof; and who willingly testifies against
such persons as described above, shall be exempted from prosecution
or punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her
information of testimony were given, and may plead or prove the
giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution:
Provided,That the following conditions concur:
(1) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of
the persons described above;
(2) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the
State;
(3) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material
points;
(4) the informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude, except when there is no other direct
evidence available for the State other than the information and
testimony of said informant or witness; and
(5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without
delay, any condition or undertaking, reduced into writing, lawfully
imposed by the State as further consideration for the grant of
immunity from prosecution and punishment.
Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such
informant or witness who does not appear to be most guilty for the
offense with reference to which his/her information or testimony were
given: Provided, finally, That there is no direct evidence available for
the State except for the information and testimony of the said
informant or witness.
The allegation that Dujon is engaged in illegal sale, indeed even the fact that Dujon
is a detainee charged with violation of the law is not a disqualification from
immunity since such is not equivalent to a previous "conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude."