Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
Revolution (see e.g. Paul Rahe, 1992. Republicanism Ancient and Modern). But the dominant influence
and lasting legacy is that of liberalism.
Throughout the West, full citizenship, which meant not only civil rights under the law but the right to vote
in elections and stand for parliament, was originally limited to a privileged minority of the population:
adult (white) males who were owners of property. Demand for the vote has been an important symbol of
equal status for working men, and for women, and provided a means for asserting their interests. But
extending citizenship to new groups has also been associated with claims for new kinds of rights, such as
social and economic rights to create greater equality for the poor. One of the best known discussions of
citizenship by T.H. Marshall (1950) defines it in terms of three distinct kinds of rights: civic rights giving
individuals equal protection of their freedoms (e.g. of speech and association) under the law; political
rights to vote and to be elected to office; and socio-economic rights, for example, for all to enjoy a good
education and have access to welfare benefits. This week, however, focuses primarily upon the history
and rationale for the first two kinds of citizens' rights. Socio-economic rights and criticisms of them will be
considered in Study Week 7.
In order to understand better the two models of republican and liberal citizenship it is helpful to know
more about the political contexts within which both have been developed: participatory democracy and
representative democracy. We will therefore first examine these two opposing forms of democracy,
before comparing historical models of republican and liberal citizenship. We will also note feminist
criticisms of both. Finally, we will consider briefly the arguments for reviving civic republicanism today,
arguments which in Australia have recently been linked to proposals for an Australian Republic.
In the final pages of Arblaster you will find some observations on these questions.
Read:A. Arblaster, 1987. Democracy, pp. 235.
If you want to think more about how different forms of direct democracy could be recreated in the world
today, see John Burnheim (1985) Is Democracy Possible? A few of these issues are raised further by
Brian Martin (1990) in Study Week 6.
The Greeks understood by democracy the direct participation by all citizens in making public policy. This
was what was meant by democracy up to the 18th century. It is the model which influenced Jean-Jacques
Rousseau in his Social Contract in which he envisages all citizens making laws for the collective good
(though he does not envisage a democratic executive). The civic republican ideal of democracy has
never been fully adapted to the realities of the nation state. Where the ideal has been maintained it has
sometimes meant promoting participatory (or 'direct') democracy at the local level - as in the cantons
(local government units) of Switzerland. Another approach is to enable citizens to initiate and vote in
popular referenda in which a particular policy question is decided by the people's vote. There are quite
frequent referenda in Switzerland on a wide range of issues including defence policy. Civic republicanism
also rejects the idea that individual voters should leave it to parliamentary representatives to make key
decisions for them, Rousseau commented that in the English parliamentary system the people were free
once in every five years, at election time. Civic republicanism stresses instead that those elected should
act as delegates of the people and should be directly answerable to them. During the French Revolution
people met frequently in the communes (districts) of Paris to debate policy which they then pressed upon
the National Assembly.
The model of participatory democracy has sometimes been reinterpreted within the context of the nation
state to suggest that government should embody the popular will. This was the interpretation developed
by radical leaders in the French Revolution, who claimed to speak for the popular will and that acting in
accordance with what the people really wanted justified overriding the elected assembly and pursuit of
terror to achieve revolutionary aims. (J.L. Talmon, 1952. The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy provides
a well known criticism of the nature and evolution of the Rousseauist model of democracy.) Liberals have
therefore viewed appeals to 'the will of the people' with alarm partly because of what happened in the
French Revolution where governments claiming to act on behalf of the popular will were seen as
threatening individual liberties.
Government was published just after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England, which in its Bill of
Rights clarified the respective powers of King and Parliament and established a division of powers
between the executive and parliament. Locke's aim was to promote a government which would respect
individuals' 'natural rights' (which we would now describe as human rights) of life, liberty and property. A
government which did so and governed in the people's interests could claim to rest on the people's
consent; if a government acted tyrannically the people had the right to rebel. A division of powers
between the legislature and executive was one method of preventing tyrannical measures. (It was
Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws who stressed the third element, an independent judiciary.)
Locke assumed the existence of a parliament, which in his time was elected by a property-owning
minority. Because taxation involved government demands on individual property, taxes must have
parliamentary approval. The cry 'No taxation without representation' was taken up by the American rebels
who started the American War of Independence from Britain in the late 18th century.
It was this liberal, constitutional and parliamentary framework which the designers of the American
federal constitution had in mind, though they intended to remedy the evils which they thought had
corrupted the British system since 1688. Nonetheless, those political leaders and writers who supported
the Constitution were not democrats. Not only did they reject the Greek model, they also generally
opposed all adult men having the vote (which was accepted in the French Revolution), believing that
men of property would be more responsible voters. The white colonists in America at that time did not
think of native Americans as being part of the same society and did not consider that African slaves on
the southern plantations could claim basic civic or legal, human rights, let alone political rights.
Friedrich Hayek, one of the best known 20th century writers on liberal constitutionalism and a free
market, has explained a number of these issues. This is a more difficult reading than Arblaster, but
contains important arguments which should become clearer when you think about the questions and later
check the answers provided. The reading also explains ideas such as 'federalism' and 'judicial review'
that will be referred to in later weeks.
STUDY EXERCISE 2.2
Read:F.A. Hayek, 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
pp. 17688.
Answer the following questions:
1.What do you think is meant by 'arbitrary power'?(p.178) Answer
2.(a) What was the main danger the Americans saw in British political practice;
and
(b) How did they try to prevent it in the new USA? (see pp. 1768) Answer
3. What did the Americans understand was involved in a constitution? (p. 178) Answer
4. How does Hayek respond to the claim that a constitution is 'undemocratic'? (pp. 180
2) Answer
5. What are the arguments (a) against and ( b) for a Bill of Rights? (pp. 1856)
Answer
During the 19th and 20th centuries representative democracy has come to represent a wider range of
people as the vote was extended. But the fundamental liberal principles of representative democracy
have not altered. These principles are that minority and individual rights should be safeguarded, that
freedom of speech, publication and association are essential to politics and that there should be
constitutional restraints to prevent abuse of government power, including regular elections. It is essential
that elections should be free and fairly run, so that people have a choice and that governments should be
ultimately accountable to the public. But in representative democracy members of the legislature tend to
see themselves as independent representatives, not delegates reflecting the will of their electors. A
famous case for representation rather than delegation was made by the liberal-conservative Edmund
Burke in 1774, in a speech to the electors of Bristol.
Read:E. Burke, 1774. Speech to the electors of Bristol. In D. Ravitch and A.
Thernstrom eds. 1992. The Democracy Reader. New York: Harper Collins, pp. 5051.
Because liberalism stresses individual rights, and because representative democracy tends to
discourage direct popular influence on governmental decisions, liberals think of citizenship primarily in
legal and administrative terms. That is, liberals concentrate on what legal rights citizens have and what
can they expect from their government, rather than on citizenship as an active political role. This view is
very different from the civic republican emphasis on political participation and duty.
These universal rights were thought to be held only by men. The civic republican tradition up to the end
of eighteenth century deliberately excluded women. Republicans saw citizens as men with specifically
masculine virtues. Women's role was to stay at home and be good wives and mothers. Rousseau in
particular feared feminine influence in social and political life would destroy manly republican codes of
behaviour. Women were, however, prominent in the popular agitation which marked stages of the
Revolution, and women at first had their own political clubs until the radicals (who distrusted feminist
ideas) banned them in 1793. Although a few prominent men did support women's rights, there was no
debate in the Constitutional Assembly about women being left out of the new French Constitution
(Kingdom 1990). Women at that time lacked economic independence, and were legally and personally
dependent upon their husbands. An early feminist claim to equal citizenship was staked by Olympe de
Gouges in her 1791 Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizen which adopted the same format as
the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen but elaborated on special rights required by
women.
Read:O. de Gouges, 1791. Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizen.
To sum up: civic republicans had an ideal of citizenship in which the character of individual citizens was
very important. A good citizen was active in politics, fought bravely for his country and cared for the
public good more than his private interests.
This ideal contrasted with the liberal view, to be explored below, that citizenship was primarily a legal and
administrative status. Early liberals did also restrict citizenship to men of property, but the reasons for
excluding the poor and women were somewhat different.
2878). Early liberals tended to assume that property owners were rational and industrious and that
owning property protected by the law was the most obvious way in which individuals gave their consent
to be citizens of the state. In addition individual property ownership was the basis of the market economy
with which liberalism has been closely linked.
There was therefore in the 17th and 18th centuries a gap between liberals' recognition of men's right to
be equal under the law (to have civil rights) and the fact that only men of property had political rights.
During the 19th century working men struggled to gain the vote and political representation which could
address their economic plight. Adult (white) male suffrage was generally adopted in the USA by the
1830s (subject to precise requirements which were set by individual states). But it took much longer in
Britain where votes for men were extended by stages in 1832 (to all the middle class), 1867 (to most
urban workers) 1884 (to most agricultural workers) and 1918 (when minimal property qualifications were
abolished altogether).
During the 19th century many liberals continued to resist government action which would limit the rights
of property owners, result in any redistribution of wealth or involve state intervention in the economy. But
the disruptive process of industrialisation, the extremes of poverty and appalling living conditions
endured by many workers, as well as the protests of the developing socialist movement, led some liberal
theorists to question the earlier acceptance of the benefits of a free market and to see a case for some
forms of government regulation. By the beginning of the 20th century many liberal theorists and
politicians accepted that socio-economic rights were necessary to give substance to civil and political
rights and create genuine equality of opportunity. But these rights required the state to adopt a wider role
in providing welfare and liberals believing in a limited state and a wholly free market have continued to
oppose this approach.
A well known defence of the new 'social liberalism' was provided by L.T. Hobhouse in his 1911 book
Liberalism, which came out at the time a Liberal Government was introducing a different form of
liberalism in Britain. Hobhouse also provides a good summary as what he sees as the core elements of
liberalism in chapter 2 of Liberalism, which sets out the rights necessary to secure fundamental types of
liberty. In the section on 'economic liberalism' Hobhouse recognises the historic reasons for the
association between liberalism and economic freedom, but notes the new liberal emphasis on industrial
regulation and welfare provision by government, and defends the rights of workers to associate in trade
unions.
It took longer for women to challenge successfully the contradiction between liberal declarations of the
rights of all human beings and women's total lack of both civil and political rights. Women were excluded
from public life and early liberals discussed their rights and responsibilities solely in relation to marriage
and the family. Men had a political role not only as individuals but as heads of families. Even liberals like
Locke, who advocated that women ought be educated, also believed women were only fitted for the
domestic sphere of the family. He thought that women were in general less rational than men, and
therefore less suited to exercising political rights. As early as 1700 in England Mary Astell claimed the
same rights for women that Locke had claimed for men (Mitchell 1984: 64).
If all Men are born free, how is that all Women are born slaves? As they must be if the
being subjected to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary Will of Men, be the
perfect Condition of slaves.
Mary Astell, 1700. Cited in Mitchell (1984: 64).
Mary Astell was only one of a number of women who tried to assert their rights to education and a degree
of independence in the 17th and 18th centuries. Women's citizenship rights were not, however, widely
debated until the second half of the 19th in representative democracies such as the USA and Britain, and
votes for women not achieved until the 20th century. New Zealand and Australia were in the forefront of
granting votes to women. New Zealand did so in 1893 and the new Australian Federation gave the vote
to all white women in 1902 (women in South Australia and Western Australia had achieved the vote
before Federation). Australian feminists, however, argue that this did not mean that women gained
genuine equality, or full civic, political and socio-economic rights.
Some contemporary feminist writers argue that women have still failed to achieve full citizenship
because of the assumptions built into liberal thought which is based on the idea of citizenship as
masculine, and which fails to recognise how women's domestic role prevents their genuine economic and
political equality. Feminists argue that if women are to achieve full citizenship status, they need special
rights. For example, mothers of children may need affordable child care if they are to be free to go out to
work or to be active politically. One claim often made by feminists has been that women need special
rights to control their own reproduction, for example through rights to contraception and abortion.
Read:Carole Pateman, 1992. Citizen male. Australian Left Review 137: 303.
Since the 1960s, women in many western liberal democracies have managed to gain some special rights
which recognise their particular needs as women, for example, the right of easy access to contraception.
Feminists have also campaigned for the right to abortion on the request of the woman, but even in liberal
democratic societies such as the USA and Britain this has remained contentious because of opposition
on religious and sometimes medical grounds. The 1998 campaign to make abortion legal in Western
Australia illustrated how strong feelings are for and against abortion. Rights at work, such as maternity
leave with pay, have also been granted. But, since the 1980s, these rights have come under threat from
a new type of liberalism that stressed individual responsibility and that opposed government intervention
in the economy.
One possible compromise between civic republicanism and liberalism is provided by the concepts of civil
society and associational democracy, which recognise both the diversity of society today and the
arguments for strengthening civic responsibility and promoting some sense of community. You will be
studying these ideas in a specifically Australian context in Study Week 8. But before examining different
approaches to democracy in depth you will, in the next two weeks, gain a greater understanding of the
history of citizenship and democracy in Australia.
Review for Week 2
Before proceeding, you ought to review your understanding of this week's topic by:
(a) checking your responses to the Study Exercises against those supplied in the
Study Guide, and
(b) reading again the documents for this week and completing the related Study Tasks
in the Workbook, for which there are no answers provided.
References
Arblaster, A. 1987. Democracy. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
Aristotle. 1962. The Politics. Ed. J.A. Sinclair. Harmondsworth: Penguin
Australia's Republican Question. 1993. Australian Journal of Political Science 28. Special Issue.
Barber, B. 1984. Strong Democracy. Berkely, CA: University of California Press.
Burke, Edmund. 1774. Speech to the electors of Bristol. In D. Ravitch and A. Thernstrom eds. 1992. The
Democracy Reader. New York: Harper Collins, pp. 5051.
Burnheim, J. 1985. Is Democracy Possible? The Alternative to Electoral Politics. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Crick, B. ed. 1974. Machiavelli: The Discourses. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
de Gouges, Olympe. 1791. Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizen.
Etzioni, A. 1993. The Spirit of Community. New York: Simon and Schuster
Hamilton, A., Madison, J. and Jay, J. [17878] 1961. The Federalist Papers. Ed. C. Rossiter. New York:
New American Library.
Hayek, F.A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Hobhouse, L.T. [1911] 1964. Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 2, 'The Elements of
Liberalism', pp. 1629.
Kingdom, E. 1990. Gendering Rights. In A-J Arnaud and E. Kingdom, eds. Women's Rights and the
Rights of Man. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
Locke, J. [1698] 1988. Two Treatises of Government Edited P. Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Madison, James. 1787. On factions. Federalist Papers. Paper No 10. In D. Ravitch and A. Thernstrom
eds. 1992. The Democracy Reader. New York: Harper Collins, pp. 1247.
Marshall, T.H. 1950. Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Mitchell, J. 1984. Women: The Longest Revolution. London: Virago.
Montesquieu, Baron de. [1748] 1949. The Spirit of the Laws. New York: Hafner Press.
Oldfield, A. 1990. Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World. London:
Routledge.
Pateman, C. 1992. Citizen male. Australian Left Review 137: 303.
Pettit, P. 1993. The ideal of the republic. Eureka Street 3(7): 1517.
Pocock, J.G.A. 1992. The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times. Queens Quarterly 99: 3355.
Rahe, P. 1992. Republicanism Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American
Revolution. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Rousseau, J-J. 1973. The Social Contract and the Discourses. Ed. G.D.H. Cole. London: Dent.
Talmon, J.L. 1952. The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. London: Secker and Warburg.
Thucydides, 1954. The Peloponnesian War. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Tocqueville, A. de. [1835 and 1840] 1966. Democracy in America. Ed. J..P. Mayer and M. Lerner. New
York: Harper and Row.