Mexican Popular Movements, Clientelism, and the Process of Democratization

Author(s): Judith Adler Hellman

Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 21, No. 2, Social Movements and Political Change in
Latin America: 1 (Spring, 1994), pp. 124-142
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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MexicanPopularMovements,Clientelism,
and theProcessofDemocratization
by
JudithAdlerHellman
Thestudyofnewsocialmovements
inLatinAmericahasprovenirresistiblyattractive
to manyscholars.Examiningthesemovements
allowsus to
ofnewpoliticaland
exploretheformation
ofnewidentities,
theemergence
socialactors,thecreationofnewpoliticalspace,andtheoverallexpansion
of civil society.While all or any of thesephenomenaseem sufficiently
intriguing
to claim our attention
in theirown right,the mostcommon
rationale
offered
forthestudyofnewmovements
is theirapparent
linktothe
democratization
process.Throughthelastdecade,in books,articles,and,
above all, doctoraldissertations
producedaroundtheglobe,scholarshave
in termsof thepresumed
in new social movements
justifiedtheirinterest
oftheseorganizations
intheconsolidation
ofdemocratic
importance
institutions.Most theorists
writingin thisfieldwould agreewithAlvarezand
have "a democratizing
Escobar (1991) thatthesemovements
impacton
tothedemocratization
politicalcultureanddailylife"and"contribute
process." The problemformostanalystsis thatwe do notknowenoughabout
how thistakesplace, thatis, the way in which"grassroots
democratic
intotherealmofpoliticalinstitutions
andthestate."
practices
[are]transferred
ofthe
WhenI lookatthegapbetweenthebroadertheoretical
discussions
I amtempted
toattribute
thefaith
questionandthespecificMexicanreality,
inthedemocratizing
powersofnewmovements
displayedbyotheranalysts
onthebasisofSouthAmerican
tothefactthattheyare,perhaps,
generalizing
ofthetransition
outthatitis notonlystudents
cases.Andyet,itturns
process
intheSouthern
ConeorBrazilwhoareclaimingthatnewsocialmovements
a numberof contributors
On thecontrary,
to themost
have thispotential.
inMexico(Foweraker
and
important
recentcollectionon socialmovements
Toronto.
ofsocialandpoliticalscienceat YorkUniversity,
Judith
AdlerHellmanis a professor
ofMexicoinCrisis(NewYork:HolmesandMeier,2nded. 1988)andMexican
She is theauthor
presented
atthe1991meeting
wasoriginally
Lives(NewYork:TheNewPress,1994).Thisarticle
for
DC. The authoris grateful
of the LatinAmericanStudiesAssociationin Washington,
PaulHaber,
Escobar,Lisa Fuentes,
bySoniaAlvarez,AlbertoCiria,Arturo
comments
provided
SteveHellman,David Slater,TamarDiana Wilson,andSidneyTarrow.
LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 81,Vol.21 No. 2, Spring1994 124-142
? 1994LatinAmerican
Perspectives
124

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Hellman/MEXICAN POPULAR MOVEMENTS

125

Craig,1990) depart-albeitwitha bitmorecaution-fromtheverysame

premise:thatthegrowth
ofa socialmovement
sectoris partandparcelofthe
marchtowarddemocracy.
In hiscontribution
to thisvolumeMunck(1990:
29), forexample,arguesthat"thedemandsofsocialmovement
... necessarily spilloverintothepoliticalarena,becauseaccess to power,or at least
influence
on power,giveneconomicconditions,
is neededto satisfytheir
demandfortangiblebenefits.... Fromherespringsthegreatpotential
that
theactionsof social movements
can forma partof a widerdemocratic
project."And in theintroduction
to thebook,Foweraker(1990: 3) writes,
"thebreadth
andimpetus
ofthesemovements
havecometopresent
a strong
ofpoliticalrepresentation
challengetotheexisting
system
andcontrol;
recent
events(andespeciallytheelectionsofJuly1988)havesuggested
thatpopular
movements
mightbe thewedgethatwillforcean authentically
democratic
openingwithin
thepoliticalsystemoverall."
is this"widerdemocratic
What,precisely,
Whatwoulda "demoproject?"
within
craticopening
thepoliticalsystem"looklike?Is thereanyevidence
thattheMexicanmovements
observedby thesescholarsin thelate 1980s
contributed
to theinstitutionalization
subsequently
of democratic
expression?Beforewecanaddressthesequestionsorsearchforevidenceofa direct
linkbetweenthedevelopment
ofnewsocialmovements
anddemocratization
inMexico,we needtoexaminetheclaimthattheMexicansystemis indeed
democratizing.
MEXICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
WhileI am in completesympathy
withvirtually
to developa
anyeffort
framework
forunderstanding
LatinAmerican
politicsona broadcomparative
level, the attemptto shoehornthe Mexican case into models designed
to explainthemilitary
domination
orthedemocratization
principally
ofthe
SouthernCone and Brazil has frequently
broughtMexicaniststo grief.
Mexico was neveras authoritarian
as thecountriesthatthismodel was
formulated
toanalyze(seeMiddlebrook,
originally
1986),andtheframework
in fashionforthestudyof thedemocratization
currently
processdoes not
fitfortheMexicancase. Thisis because
provideus witha verycomfortable
Mexicois notdemocratizing
as rapidlyas theslowestSouthAmerican
case,
if,indeed,itis evenlimpingalonginthatdirection.
all our
Notwithstanding
wishestothecontrary,
anddespitethegrowing
andinfluence
ofnew
presence
socialmovements,
Mexicois notmarching
towarda democratic
inexorably
dawn.'

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126 LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES

isunder
transition"
Evidencethata "democratic
Why,then,theconfusion?
wayin Mexicorestslargelyon a seriesofpoliticaland,aboveall,electoral
(1970-1976)responsetothe1968
reforms
thatbeganwithLuisEcheverria's
opening"that
a "democratic
an aperturademocratica,
studentmovement:
loosened statecensorshipof the press,gave morespace to democratic
parallel,
permitted
labormovement,
tendencieswithinthestate-controlled
party
withtheofficial
unaffiliated
peasantandlabormovements
autonomous
tiesbetweenthePartido
sectorsto organizeand strike,and strengthened
Party-PRI) and
Revolutionary
(Institutional
Institutional
Revolucionario
(Shapira,1977).
theSocialistInternational
it with
efforts
to openup thepoliticalsystemandreinvest
Echeverria's
in 1976andthat
inthepoliticalreform
thatheinitiated
culminated
legitimacy
underhissuccessor,
JoseLopez Portillo(1976-1982).While
cameintoeffect
andelectoralprocessesreinforced
thefederallaw on politicalorganizations
numerical
of the
thecontinued
superiority
by guaranteeing
PRI hegemony
bodies,local,state,and federal,it gave new
officialpartyin all governing
The 1977law
opposition.
parliamentary
ofa formal
totheformation
impetus
parties"
gave"minority
ofnewopposition
parties,
facilitated
theregistration
at thepolls,providedthese
committees
therightto siton thesupervisory
of campaignexgrantsforthepayment
partieswithelectoralcommission
all registered
partiesaccess to televisionandradio
penses,and guaranteed
staff
andtheirpartypress.
fortheirparliamentary
support
timeandfinancial
The legislationalso increasedthe size of the Chamberof Deputiesand
ofitsseatstobe distributed
amongminorpartiesaccording
a quarter
reserved
theyreceivedofthetotalvote.
totheproportion
changes,as the right-wing
all of theseencouraging
Notwithstanding
Partido
deAccionNacional(NationalActionParty-PAN)gained
opposition
between1977 and 1988,theclean-upoftheelectoralprocessthat
strength
wouldbe likelytotakeplaceina morecompetitive
anticipated
manyanalysts
electoralfraud
and matureelectoralsystemdid notoccur.On thecontrary,
FederalElectoral
as ever,withthePRI-controlled
tobe as prevalent
continued
whatwere in factclear PAN
Commissiondisallowingon technicalities
thenorthern
atthestateandlocallevelsinthePAN'sareaofsupport,
victories
fromthe
and mediascrutiny
borderstates.Despitea newlevel of interest
UnitedStates(prompted
bytheReaganregime'sobsessivefocusonelections
andpoliticalhealthinCentralAmerica),
ofdemocracy
as thesingleindicator
itbeganto
the1980sto stealelections,
although
through
thePRI continued
todo so (GomezTagle,1987).Manipumethods
employmoresophisticated
ballot-boxtheftand
data largelyreplacedout-and-out
lationof computer
thelatteralso tookplace.And,after
tacticsatthepolls,although
strong-arm
aroundthe
coalitionthatformed
the1988electionsin whichthecenter-left

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Hellman/MEXICAN POPULAR MOVEMENTS

127

populist
candidacy
ofCuauhtemoc
wona plurality
Cardenasinall probability
of votesintheRepublicandunquestionably
a majority
ofvotesintheValle
de Mexico,thecrudestformsofpreelectoral
intimidation
andviolenceand
postelectoral
tampering
resumed.
Whatdoestheelectionof 1988tellus abouttheprospects
fordemocracy
in Mexico?As one analystofMexicanpoliticshas noted,itshowsthatthe
PRI is clearlydisposedto negotiate
withtheopposition
on therulesofthe
politicalgamebutnoton theresults(GomezTagle,1989: 1). Theappropriationbytherulingpartyofwhatwas mostlikelyan opposition
victory
makes
clearthattheofficialpartyis notprepared
to cede presidential
powerunder
anycircumstances.
And,in theelectionsheldsince1988,evidenceofelectobe incontrovertible.
In short,
sincecomingtopower
toralfraudcontinues
and
theSalinasregimehasemployed
harassment,
intimidation,
manipulation,
PRI
fraud
that
the
would
lost
to
outright
guarantee
regain ground.
I have reviewedthe evidenceon democratization
because we cannot
in
role
of
movements
this
analyzethepossible
popular
processwithout
first
whether
Mexicois,infact,movingtowarda moreopen,demodetermining
I wouldarguethatthesystem
cratic,ora moreclosed,authoritarian
system.
is neither
moredemocratic
normorerepressive
butmoreMexicanthanever.
ofpersuasion
andcoercionthat
BythisI meanthatthemanipulative
interplay
it fromother
has long characterized
theMexicansystem-distinguishing
tooperatetoday(Hellman,1980).HowLatinAmerican
regimes-continues
historical
thebrutalfaceofthesystemis more
ever,in thepresent
moment,
of theCardenascandidacy
oftendisplayed.This is becausetheemergence
providedan alternative
reference
pointto thekindsofpopularmovements
intheirlotwiththereformist
thatinthepastmighthavethrown
wingofthe
PRI. To theextent
thatthesemovements
remainoutsideoftheco-optivegrip
hasbeenusedmoreoftenthanco-optation
to
oftheofficial
party,
repression
imposesocialcontrol.2
Undertheselargelyunfavorable
could
circumstances,
what,conceivably,
The cases I will
be thedemocratizing
impactof thepopularmovements?
influence
ofthepopularmovements
examineindicatethatthedemocratizing
has turned
outtobe verymodestindeed.A
on theMexicanpoliticalsystem
We mightlookat the
numberofdifferent
reasonsforthiscouldbe offered.
theeconomiccrisis,theregime's
natureofthepoliticalreform
processitself,
or itsundiminished
controloverthemeansof communication,
capacityto
oftheleftagainstoneanother.
playoffelements
However,thephenomenon
to
ofthenewmovements
on whichI willfocusinthisarticleis thetendency
thathasalwaysguidedthepolitical
fallsquarelyintothelogicofclientelism
but of
and tacticsnot onlyof the officialpartyorganizations
strategies
movements
as well.
Mexicanopposition

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128 LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES

CLIENTELISM
in Mexico is the
on popularmovements
Runningthrough
thewritings
seriously
undermines
the
oftheseorganizations
insistence
thattheemergence
on whichPRI dominance
particularly
inthe
clientelist
structures
hasrested,
Foweraker
(1990: 16-17),forexample,
mostbackwardareasofthecountry.
mounta challengeto these
automatically
assertsthat"popularmovements
traditionalmechanismsof political control.... urban popular movements

ofthePRI government,
theclientelistic
andpatrimonial
controls
haveresisted
infavorofpopular
thepoliticalculture
ofpetitions
andconcessions
rejecting
Moreover,
hegoesontoclaimthat"the
projectsandpoliticalconfrontation."
initiatives
ofthepopularmovements
... haverendered
increasingly
strategic
ineffective
theuse ofclientelistic
formsofcontrol."
WhatI will attempt
to show,citingthecases of severalcontemporary
of popularmovements
is thatthedevelopment
urbanpopularmovements,
a less dramaticand significant
fromclientelism
than
departure
represents
I see thesemovements
as
Fowerakerand otheranalystshave appreciated.
fromwhichtheyescapeonlyvery
patterns
deeplyenmeshedin clientelistic
theemergence
ofa newmovement
maychallengetheold
rarely.
Although
thecontrolof
PRI-linkednetworks
basedon local caciques,it undermines
withalternative
channels
thecaciquesonlyby replacingtheold networks
in theirmodeofoperation.3
A
arealso clientelistic
that,generally
speaking,
in Mexicomayhelpus to
of independent
look at thehistory
organizations
ofthisprocess.
themechanics
understand
THE "NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS" OF OLD
Decades beforeMexicanistshad everdreamedof "new social moveofAntonioGramsci,
orporedoverthewritings
thethought
ments,"
pondered
theorists
ofTouraine(1975),Melucci(1977),andothersocialmovement
(see
theunderstand
the
used to poke aroundtrying
Tarrow,1985),researchers
thatregularly
aroseinthecitiesand,
movements
oftheindependent
workings
Forexample,inthelate1960sI studiedtwo
inthecountryside.
particularly,
MexintheLagunaregionofnorth-central
independent
peasantmovements
party-linked
ico (Adler,1970; Hellman,1988). One was theCommunist
CentralUnion,whichgrew out of the agrarianstrugglesand the land
ofthe1930s.The otherwas theAgrarian
distribution
Union,tiedto Carlos
current"
ofthe"democratic
Madrazoandotherdissidentpriistas
(forerunners
andMuiiozLedo). Together
thatwouldemergedecadeslaterunderCa6rdenas
NacionalCampesina(NationalPeaswiththeofficial
party'sConfederacion

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Hellman/MEXICAN POPULAR MOVEMENTS

129

antConfederation-CNC),
theseorganizations
competedforpeasantadherentsina sometimes
violentcontest
forcontrol
overtheLagunapeasantry
and
theinfluence
andspoilsthataccompanied
thiscontrol.
Perhapsbecausethetwoindependent
organizations
referred
tothemselves
as peasantunionsrather
thanmovements
or,morelikely,becausetheissue
was not yet on the agenda,no one expectedthesegroupsto promote
democratization
(Landsberger
and Hewitt,1970; Huizer,1968; Martinez
Saldena, 1980; Hellman,1978). Analystsof thesemovements,
like the
peasantmembers
themselves,
seemedhappyenoughiftheleadersoccasionallyconsulted(or at leastbriefed)themembership,
capablyrepresented
the
groups'interests
beforebureaucrats
and cottonmerchants
in Mexico City,
intothePRI,anddidnotstuff
resistedincorporation
theirpocketswithall of
theproceedsofejidalcottonsales.
When studentsof modernmovements
assess the impactof the new
aboutthecapacityofsuchgroups"to
organizations,
manyexpressoptimism
influencepublic policy,"promotealternative
politicalvisions,and thus
to the "erosionof the ideologicalhegemonyso long a basic
contribute
oftheregime"(Haber,1990:6, 20, 37; see also RamirezSaiz,
characteristic
in drawinga comparison
1990: 243). Therefore,
betweenold andnewit is
to notethattheAgrarian
important
Union,led byPedroGallardo,was little
morethanan alternative
patronagenetworkin whichGallardoused his
linksto Madrazoto wincreditsto opena cooperatively
clientelistic
owned
cottonginandto floathis impoverished
the
ejidatarioconstituents
through
current
season (Hellman,1983). In contrast,
however,theCentralUnion
an alternative
could be properlydescribedas articulating
visionforthe
itrepresented
andfortheLagunaregionas a whole.Bringing
into
ejidatarios
thezonehisownbattery
ofexperts
ofthefamousLiga de Agrono(veterans
who had surveyedthe
mos Socialistas[Leagueof SocialistAgronomists]
oflandin 1937),Arturo
Lagunahaciendaspriortothedistribution
Orona,the
of
leaderoftheCentralUnion,promoted
modernization
cropdiversification,
and the
network
to doublethelandavailableforagriculture,
theirrigation
of agricultural
semi-elaboration
productsgrownin theregion(thatis, a
intendedto absorbthe surplusagricultural
programof industrialization
population).
theeconomicbase of
All oftheCentralUnion'scampaignsto transform
into
foundtheirway
theLagunaeventually
publicpolicy-an accomplishwould likelytake as
mentthatanalystsof today'spopularmovements
effect
thegreatest
evidenceofitsimpacton thesystem.
Ironically,
probably
was to injectnewlifeintoLagunerocapitalofOrona'sdecadesofstruggle
theagroindustrial
oftheregion.To be sure,at
ism,reinforcing
bourgeoisie
of theCentralUnionbenefited
leastsomeof thepeasantmembers
directly

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130

LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES

fromthesechanges,although-asis inevitably
thecase whenindependent
organizations
win concessionsfromthestate-mostof thepeasantswho
receivednewlandandotherbenefits
wereloyalpriistas.4
Giventhisrecord,
we canseetheCentral
Unionas anindependent
peasant
movement
whoseactivities
ultimately
transformed
a keyregionin Mexico.
In thissense,themobilization
andstruggles
ofthisgroupofindependently
hada significant
organized
ejidatarios
economicandsocialimpact(Hellman,
1981).TheCentralUnionwas alsorelatively
moredemocratically
structured
in its internalworkingsthantheCNC or Gallardo'shighlypersonalistic
in theregion,and notwithButforall thechangesit stimulated
following.
itsmoredemocratic,
no one,to myknowlstanding
responsible
leadership,
shouldorcould
edge,has arguedthatanyof theCentralUnion'sactivities
havefunctioned
to democratize
Thatwas not
theMexicanpoliticalsystem.
itsjob.
Theindependent
ofold,likethenewpopularmovements
of
organizations
withtherepresentational
today,aroseinresponsetodissatisfaction
structures
ofthestateto deliverservicesto
providedbythePRI andthedisinclination
in needofcreditoragricultural
poorMexicans,be theyejidatarios
inputsor
andpublictransport.
slumdwellerswholackedwater,electricity,
The goals
to establishthemselves
werestraightforward:
as a
of theold organizations
thenational
forcewithwhichto be reckonedon thelocal and,eventually,
sceneand thusto wrestconcessionsfromthestate.The techniques
applied
in theoldendays(i.e.,beforethegenerally
watershed
of 1968)
agreed-upon
fromthemobilization
and pressuretacticsused by
werenotso different
withall theexcitedtalkabout"newpractices"
movements
today-although
forfeelingsomeconfusion
a student
ofmovements
couldbe forgiven
onthis
and letterpoint.Demonstrations,
hungermarchesto thecapital,petitions,
writing
campaignswerethetacticstheold movements
employed.Thenas
now,groupmemberswere assembledand marchedor trucked(banners
totheZocalo,Los Pinos,ortheappropriate
flying)
government
agency.Here
totheregime-untiltheywere
theywouldremain-a publicembarrassment
whopromised
to address,ifnot
receivedby somegovernment
functionary
theirgrievances.5
redress,
like the
Whenwe examinethehistorical
recordwe findorganizations
to gainbenefits
for
oftenheroicefforts
CentralUnionengagedin tireless,
materialconcessions,sometimes
theirconstituents:
sometimes
demanding
overtheadministration
ofthestateagencies
formorepopularcontrol
fighting
(e.g., ejidatariocontrolover ejidal bank).Moreover,a largepartof the
to exposingtheinefficiency
directed
energiesof suchgroupswas typically
of government
officialsand agenciesand occasionallyand malfeasance

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Hellman/MEXICAN POPULAR MOVEMENTS

131

whena favoredopposition
candidatehad beendeniedoffice-denouncing
electoralfraud.
RamirezSaiz (1990: 235) has arguedthatthenewurbanpopularmovementsaredistinguished
bythefactthat"theyno longerpleadforfavorsso
muchas demandtheirrights."
Buta carefullookat thepastrevealsthatthe
tacticsofan independent
movement
liketheCentralUniontypically
shifted
backandforth
overtheyears,according
tothestrategic
requirements
ofthe
at timesdemanding,
moment,
at othertimespleadingfortheconcessionsit
was tryingto extractfromthe system.As I have noted,an independent
ofthissortwas thought
tobe successful
ifitmanagedto winat
organization
itsoughtforitsmembers.
leastsomeofthebenefits
And,whiletheactivities
of theseearliermovements
couldbe said,in someinstances,
to havechaland
that
the
lengedthecorruption inequality characterized Mexicansystem,
theirachievements
weregenerally
measuredbymembers
andleadersalike
intheconcessionsthattheycouldsqueezeoutoftheregimeinpower.
THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF TODAY
A lack of historicalperspective
has led some analystsof themodern
tosee thecurrent
movements
challenges
facingthesegroupsas quitenew.In
tocontrol
thedevelopfact,thetechniques
employedbySalinasinhiseffort
movements
are as old as theone-party
mentof independent
systemitself.
has
toco-optbothleadersandwholeorganizations,
thepresident
Attempting
leadersdirectly
intohisadministration.
And
incorporated
popularmovement
theindependent
fortheirmostcherished
hehasoffered
organizations
funding
accords
fortheirsignatures
on convenios
de concertacion,
projectsinreturn
thenationalprojectofthe
in whichthepopularmovements
agreeto support
in return
fora varietyof favorsfromthe
Salinasregime,"modernization,"
administration.
forPopular
In thecase of theComitede DefensaPopular(Committee
basedin thenorthern
stateof
Defense-CDP), an urbanpopularmovement
weresubstanforjoiningthepresident's
concertacio'n
Durango,therewards
in its
fortheorganization
tial.Fundingforsmallbusinessprojects,
support
Salinas'spersonal
conflictswitha hostilestategovernor,
and,eventually,
as a politicalparty
to gainregistration
weightbehindtheCDP's attempts
to support
the
thepayoffthisgroupreceivedforitswillingness
constituted
Salinas'sresponseto
president
(Haber,1990:24, 26-27,31,36). Examining
Haber(1990: 30, 3) notesthatthe
thechallengeoftheCDP's independence,
forthePRI to regainlostgroundby
sees thisas an opportunity
president

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132 LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES

withoppositionleaderswho are not

workingrelationships
encouraging
Populares
Nacionalde Organizaciones
withthe Confederaci6n
affiliated
of PopularOrganizations-CNOP),the official
(NationalConfederation
party's"popularsector.""By signingconvenioswiththeCDP, Salinasmay
andthereby
ontheCNOP to'modernize,'
alsobe abletoputeffective
pressure
effective."
tobecomemorepolitically
by encouraging
theofficialpartyorganizations
This moveto invigorate
ofindependent
groupsseemsto Haber(1990: 40) tobe one
thecompetition
"that,
oftheperplexing
qualitiesofthenewregime."Coulditbe,"he writes,
withthe
theStateis willingtoalteritsrelationship
atleastinsomeinstances,
theofficialpartyas a Stateagencymakesome
PRI and insteadof treating
thePRI to
indistancing
andforcing
itselffromthepartyapparatus
progress
Infact,thepractice
ofencouraging
thegrowth
competewiththeopposition?"
of independent
groupsthatoperateoutsideof theofficialpartychannelsis
beingused
butanotherlong-standing
techniqueof controlthatis currently
thismaneuver
servestwopurTraditionally
by theSalinasadministration.
of a rivalorganization
corruptor
maystimulate
poses. The development
PRI-linkedorganizations
to mendtheirways-and support
ineffectual
groupmay undercutthe
thrownby the presidentto some independent
thataremoregenuinely
threatofotherindependent
attraction
organizations
eningtotheregime.
Historicalexamplesof thisformof social controlabound,althoughno
tomyknowledge,
was morefecundinthe
periodinrecentMexicanhistory,
thantheregimeof
creationof state-supported
organizations
"independent"
Luis Echeverria.The especiallynastytwistpracticedby the Echeverria
ofpeasantandworkers'
that
was theinvention
organizations
administration
militant
butwereheaded
carriedthenamesofexisting
peasantorganizations
(Hellman,1988: 158-159).This
loyalto Echeverria
bypeoplepassionately
thebirth
ofnumerous
state-sponsored
peasantorganizations
periodwitnessed
ofgenuinely
militant
opposition
thatcarriedthenames,styles,andrhetoric
atthenational
level.
totheCNC (orthepresident
himself)
groupsbutreported
As a result,the Echeverriaperiodwas markedby profoundideological
whoarrived
as theoppressedpeasant(orbewildered
researcher!)
confusion
seek
from
the
Central
to
in Mexico City
CampesinoIndependiente
help
PeasantCentral-CCI) of Danzos Palominoor the Uni6n
(Independent
and
deMexico(GeneralUnionofWorkers
Generalde ObrerosyCampesinos
with
was
now
confronted
of
Jacinto
of
L6pez
Peasants Mexico-UGOCM)
andmuyluchador
autonomous
twoCCIs andtwoUGOCMs, onegenuinely
andtheotherco-optedbytheregime.
movements
facethesamechalThuswe can see thattoday'sopposition
facedwiththe
groupsofthepast.Theyareinevitably
lengesas independent

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Hellman/MEXICAN POPULAR MOVEMENTS

133

choice betweentwo uninviting

alternatives.
They may fall in withthe
regime-thatis, signsolidarity
pactsthatguaranteethekindsof material
concessionsthattheirsupporters
need. In so doing,however,theywill
theirindependence
compromise
andforeclosethepossibility
ofarticulating
a critiqueoftheregimeanditspoliciestowardthepoor.Alternatively,
they
maymaintain
a staunchindependence
fromtheregimebutrisktheloss of
thepopularsupporttheycommandbecausemembers
desperately
needthe
materialbenefits
and concessionsforwhichtheorganization
is struggling
and may not be able to affordthe luxuryof strikinga moremilitant,
stance.
oppositionist
DEMOCRATIZATION FROM WITHIN?
runthesamedangerofco-optation
Evenifthenewmovements
as theold
thattheiractivities
do notdemocratize
the
ones,andevenifwe acknowledge
aremore
systemas such,mightit notbe thecase thatthenewmovements
a schoolfordemocracy
democratic
andtherefore
constitute
for
intrinsically
little
with
unfortuwith
people
acquaintance
genuineparticipation?
Here,
therecordis mixedbutgenerally
notencouraging.
nately,
thatis as hierarchical
Haber'sstudyoftheCDP hasexposeda structure
as
"Like mostotherpopularmovevirtually
anyotherMexicanorganization.
mentsin Mexico,theCDP does notfostercollaborative
decision-making
processesas muchas it countson rank-and-file
supportforleadership
decisionsitsendsdownthrough
theorganization
forconsultation
andratifiis mostnoticeablearoundkeystrategic
cation.... The lackofparticipation
decisions-suchas politicalalliances"(1990: 14-15).In whatis surelythe
mostperceptive
partof a veryinsightful
analysis,Haber(1990: 18) points
ofdisputeamong
outthatthevalueofinternal
democracy
is,infact,a matter
and that"thereare plusesand minuses
independent
popularorganizations
atdifferent
associatedwithdifferent
degreesofinternal
pluralism
pointsina
that
is
he
notes
"internal
Most
movement's
history."
important,
democracy
the
who
are
far
notof paramount
importance
among CDP rank-and-file,"
moreconcerned
withtheorganization's
abilityto delivergoodsandextract
concessionsfromthestatethantheyarewithquestionsof internal
equality
Ina passagethatwouldserveas welltodescribe
andparticipatory
democracy.
OronaintheCentralUnionas the
ofArturo
thelong,successfulleadership
of
Haber
movements today,
(1990: 19) writes,
concessionsfromthestate,combined
The abilitytodelivergoodsandextract
andideally
withinspirational
ideologicalpositionsarticulated
bya competent

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134

LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES

charismatic
leadership,
is thewinning
combination
formostifnotall Mexican
[urbanpopularmovements].
ManyCDP members
arefirstorsecond-generation
immigrants
fromruralDurango,andmosthaveverylowincomesandlittleor
no formaleducation.Withinthe politicalcultureof the CDP, as is true
elsewherein low-income
urbanbarriosthroughout
Mexico,. . . participation
in decision-making
is simplynotvaluedas muchas thedemonstrated
ability
toextract
governmental
concessionsandservices.

These observations
go a longwaytowardexplainingthedisappointing
picturethatmeetstheeyewhenwe lookmorecloselyat themuchvaunted
roleofwomenintheseorganizations.
Although
femaleparticipants
outnumber male in all of theurbanpopularmovements,
womenare notmerely
inbutsometimes
underrepresented
totallyabsentfromtheleadership
ranks.
IntheCDP,forexample,wherewomenconstitute
theoverwhelming
majority
ofparticipants,
Haber(1990: 19) reports
thattheeffort
to effect
changesin
thestatusof womeneitherin theCDP-dominated
or in the
neighborhoods
haslargely
organization's
powerstructure
provenfutile.
Stephen's(1992: 86)
view.She notes
workon ruralmovements
providesa similarly
discouraging
thatexistofwomen'sparticipation"
inthepeasant
that"thefewdiscussions
unionsthatstruggle
forsurvivaloutsideoftheofficial
partysystem"create
a pictureof womendoinga greatdeal of workbutreceivingno formal
an activistin
recognition."
CarbajalRios (1988: 426-427,mytranslation),
Nacional"Plande Ayala"(Plande AyalaNationalCoorditheCoordinadora
nator-CNPA),notes:
When the struggleis mostintense,womenoccupyland and government
theirchildrenalong.
and sit-ins,carrying
offices,attendmarches,meetings,
thepolice,thecaciques,and thearmedguards. . . and,as a
Theyconfront
consequence,are beatenand mistreated.
They are alwaysinvolvedin the
of foodand fund
likethepreparation
"domestic"laborof theorganization,
raising... [but]rarelyaretheyrecognized.... womenareabsentindecision
andeducational
makinginlocalandregionalassembliesandtraining
meetings.
areintended
formen.
Theseactivities

theelaboraterhetoric
on thequestion,Haber(1990:
Thus,notwithstanding
19) can observethat"realchangeshavebeenslowincomingandlimitedin
ofwomenintheformation
outcome."Ifonlyforthisreason,theexperience
ofseamstresses
union
movement
workers'
and
the
ofthegarment
cooperative
a
because
the
union
for
us
to
is important
study
representsuniquecase ofa
for
women
run
and
movement by
(Carrillo,1990).
democratization
of
Haber(1990: 20) believesthatthe"internal
Ironically,
and
theCDP and otherpopularmovements,
parties,politicalinstitutions,
Mexican politicallife in generalis associatedwiththedegreeto which
a significant
Mexicoexperiences
political,economic,andsocialdemocrati-

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Hellman/MEXICAN POPULAR MOVEMENTS

135

ofmanynew-social-movement
zationprocess."Thus,turning
theexpectations
theorists
on theirhead,Haberanticipates
thattheCDP maybe expectedto
becomemoredemocratic
in itsinternal
ifandwhentheMexican
workings
Clearly,
thisprospect
doesnot
systemas a wholebecomesmoredemocratic!
givemuchcauseforoptimism.
If the systemis not growingmoredemocratic
underthepressureof
arefarfromparagons
movement
demands,
andifthemovements
themselves
ofparticipatory
democratic
democracy
and,indeed,onlyappearsomewhat
patterns
ofthePRI orthe
whencomparedwitheitherthestrict
hierarchical
canweseethenewmovements
mostLeninist
partiesoftheleft,
towhatextent
eitherinthelifeoftheirsupporters
as promoting
orinthelifeof,
democracy
In fact,theassumption
thatnewmovements
areautomatically
thecountry?
seemsas ill-founded
as theassumption
thattheyinevitably
moredemocratic
promote
democratization
simplybecausetheymakedemandson thesystem.
I thinkthatthelessonoffered
andcomparison
ofpastand
bya closescrutiny
movements
is that,rather
thanassume,we need
contemporary
independent
to inquirehow democraticsuch movements
are eitherin theirinternal
practicesorintheirimpacton thesystem.
THE IRON LAW OF INCORPORATION
onurbanmovements,
RamirezSaiz (1986: 208)
In hisinfluential
writings
will be abthatthemovements
weighsand thendismissesthepossibility
"tospeakofabsorption
by
sorbedintothePRI. "Itis notviable,"he asserts,
we meanincorporation
thesystem."
directly
Indeed,itis not,ifbyabsorption
intothe
intothePRI ortheCNOP.Butwe havealreadyseenthatabsorption
officialpartyoroneofitssectorsis byno meanstheonlywaythatmilitant
are demobilized.Even as theyretaintheir"autonomous"
organizations
and status,independent
maybe co-opted,curtailing
identity
organizations
for
theircriticism
of theregimeand theirpressureon thesystemin return
in power.Thisis preciselywhat
handoutsand favorsfromthegovernment
it
HabersuggestsmayhappentotheCDP as a consequenceofthetrade-offs
has workedout withSalinas,and it is also whatmanyobserversfindis
Urbanos
Nacionalde Movimientos
inthecase oftheCoordinadora
occurring
Committeeof UrbanPopularMovePopulares(NationalCoordinating
thaturbanpopular
ments-CONAMUP). In fact,RamirezSaiz's optimism
wouldresistthelureofco-optiveoffers
movements
maywellbe due to the
factthathe was writing
duringthede la Madridyears(1986: 195). In that
was to ignorethem
periodthe officialresponseto popularmovements
or to represstheiractivities.RamirezSaiz, along withmany
completely

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136 LATIN AMERICANPERSPECTIVES

others,
didnotanticipate
theformsofmanipulation
thatSalinashas chosen
to employ.For,notwithstanding
theeconomiccrisis,through
itsPrograma
Nacionalde Solidaridad(theNationalSolidarity
Program-PRONASOL)
thecurrent
regimehas assignedverysubstantial
materialrewardsto those
populargroupswillingto signpacts.Usingfundsthataccruedfromthesale
of state-owned
enterprises
to privatecapital,Salinas has channeledfood,
electricity,
potablewater,
clinics,schools,andothersocialservicestoorganized groupsofruralandurbanpoorpeoplewillingtoexpresstheir"solidarity"withtheregime.
Of course,noteverypopularmovement
hasrespondedwto
Salinas'soverthatI carriedoutin thesummerof 1990
turesin thesameway.Interviews
withleadersandmembers
oftheAsambleade Barrios(AssemblyofNeighon thepartof thatorganization
to
borhoods)revealeda consciouseffort
escape thelogic of clientelistic
politicsthatgovernsthebehaviorof other
LiketheCONAMUP,theAsambleadeBarriosis a popularurban
movements.
thatgrewoutof themobilization
theearthquake
movement
that
following
struckMexicoCityin 1985.Initiallyformed
by thoselefthomelessin the
theAsambleaoutlivedtheemergency,
disaster,
expandeditsmembership,
andbeganto organizepoorurbanpeoplearoundthedemandforaffordable
housingforslumdwellersin thecentercityand the extensionof urban
services-potablewater,sewerlines,electricity,
schools,clinics,and bus,
oftheFederalDistrict.
lines-to peoplelivingon theperiphery
Comparing
withthatoftheCONAMUP,oneAsamblea
theapproachofhisorganization
leader,FranciscoSaucedo,notes:
We have,in fact,a problemwithmovements
thataresimilartooursbutfrom
whichwe arenowtrying
to distanceourselves.Forexample,we wentto the
in 1987torequestthe
ofUrbanDevelopment
oftheFederalDistrict
Ministry
who own
of properties
thatwereabandoned.The speculators
expropriation
Thiskindofbehavior
theselandshadnotpaidthetaxesdue on theproperty.
andthisis whatwecallfor.Theseproperties
canbe punished
byexpropriation,
heldvacantforspeculativepurposesare within
thathave beenintentionally
so theyare
thecitylimitsandarealreadyservedbytheurbaninfrastructure,
forwhichwe
ofthekindofhousingdevelopments
ideal fortheconstruction
arestruggling.
is verycomplex.
andanalyzing
suchholdings
Theworkinvolvedinidentifying
andchecktheofficial
eachcase,speakwithneighbors,
We havetoinvestigate
inordertoestablishthattheyhavebeen
records,
especiallythefiscalrecords,
abandoned-sometimesfor60 yearsor more.Once we have established
butitis a
oftaxes,theproperty
can be seizedbytheauthorities,
nonpayment
difficult
job to trackall thedetails.
to expropriate
these
But,at thesametimethatwe arepressingtheauthorities
showup atthe
holdingsas providedforinthelaw,otherpopularorganizations

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Ministry
ofUrbanDevelopment
saying,"Whatwe wantis a milkstoreforour
colonia."Inthiswaytheymakeiteasyfortheauthorities
torespondbysaying,
"Since an urbanexpropriation
is verydifficult,
we will give you a lecheria
instead."
Wesaytothesecompaneros,
"Youyourselves
aredemobilizing
themovement,
becausetheexpropriation
of thespeculators'
holdingsis thekey."Butthese
othergroupsarereadytosettlefora lecheriaora tortilleria,
whichis a benefit,
tobe sure,butone thatnevercomestotheheartofthehousingproblem.
Thusyoucan see thatwe havea different
wayofoperating
fromotherurban
popularmovements.
And,as a result,we cannotbe manipulated
bydisinformationorbyanyonewhocomesalongandsaystous,"Look,I havesomeland
thatI can getforyou,andall youhavetodo is lendmeyoursupport
andback
me."Thisis thewaythatsomepoliticians
willtrytobuyyourloyalty.
Looking at thecontradictionsfaced by thosewho wantto alterthesystem
to whichtheymustapply forbenefits,Saucedo adds,
Ifwe go totheveryauthorities
thatwe characterize
as illegitimate
andaskfor
housing,
we endupreinforcing
thepresent
structures.
Wegivethegovernment
theopportunity
to resolveour problemwithhousing,butwe reinforce
its
position.
But,if we go to withotherproposalsand alternatives
and ifwe pose global
issuesthatare likelyto modifythestructure
of government,
at leastwe are
callingthesestructures
intoquestion.Andthisis whywearestruggling
tohave
a democratically
in theFederalDistrictratherthanan
electedgovernment
appointed
regent.6

CONCLUSIONS
Ifthegrowth
ofnewsocialmovements
inMexico-and, perhaps,
inother

settings-does notnecessarilycorrelatewithdemocratization,
whytheinsistence on linkingthetwo? To my mind it reflectsthe intellectualdominance
of thedemocratizationmodel developed by O'Donnell in the 1980s, which,

in turn,
also O'Donnell's,
replacedthebureaucratic-authoritarian
paradigm,

thatcommandedso muchattentionin thepreviousdecade.

I am not arguingthata democratizationprocess is not underway in the

Southern
Cone,in EasternEurope,or-one mighthope-elsewherein the
world.Muchless amI proposing
thatwe oughtnottostudythisprocessand
What
thepossiblelinkbetweenitandthegrowth
ofgrass-roots
movements.
I am suggesting
is thatpopularmovements,
whentheyarise,constitute
a
in itself.As theMexicancase indicates,
thatis significant
phenomenon
do notnecessarily
popularmovements
bringaboutanopeningofthepolitical

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138 LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES

withthe
ourstudyofthesemovements
Butwe do notneedtojustify
system.
The
democracy.
reinforce
that
responses
institutional
claimthattheypromote
new
for
the
search
the
of
civil
society,
new
expansion
of
identities,
formation
ofnewsectorsofsocietyareall
waysofdoingpolitics,andthemobilization
and
we do not need to see the
themselves,
in
developments
important
of democratic
institutionalization
fostering
the
as necessarily
movements
ourconcernwiththem.
practicesin orderto legitimate
in somelight
reasonto lookatpopularmovements
The mostcompelling
reading,
most
optimistic
evenbythe
is that,
otherthanthatofdemocratization
in
Mexicois a less
thisprocessis notunderway Mexico.On thecontrary,
inthe1990sthanatanytimeintherecentpast.The 1988
country
democratic
winners.Electoralviolenceand
electionswere stolenfromthe rightful
if
increasedsince1988.
victories
have, anything,
ofopposition
suppression
than
AndperhapstheclearestsignthatMexicois movingawayfromrather
ofthedecision
is theimplementation
opensystem
towarda moredemocratic,
of thede la Madridand Salinasregimesfirstto openup theeconomyand
deal withtheUnitedStates.These policies,
laterto negotiatea free-trade
theMexicaneconomyandculture-ifnot,ironically,
destinedto transform
consultation
whatanydemocratic
thepoliticalsystem-weremadewithout
soever.7As I have learnedin theprocessof myrecentresearchintothe
and
thesepolicieswereconceptualized
electronicsand textileindustries,
of theeconomicelites
withabsolutelyno priorconsultation
implemented
to speakoftheeconomichave-nots
wouldbe affected-not
whoseinterests
outofworkandon thestreet(Hellman,1994).
whowouldfindthemselves
ofeconomicpoliciesthatareso damagingto
The regime'simplementation
of
thecontinued
successofthemechanisms
thepopularmassesunderscores
inMexico.Thepopularmovements
socialcontrolthathavelongfunctioned
to protest
theeffects
of
thathavesignedaccordshavelosttheopportunity
model.
an alternative
on thepoor,letalonearticulate
Salinas'sprogram
Of course,it could be arguedthatit is nottherole of a mass popular
visionof society-that
to formulate
andpromotean alternative
movement
liesthesource
I believethathere,precisely,
thisis theroleofa politicalparty.
abouttheplace
andunhappiness
disillusionment,
ofmuchoftheconfusion,
in theprocessof democratization
(Hellman,
of thenew urbanmovements
coalitionandthemuch
1992). In lightoftherecentdefeatoftheCardenist
fora program
of
lefttopresseffectively
failureofa fragmented
longer-term
somehowexpectthesocialmovements
observers
democratic
transformation,
do, to
to getthejob donewherethepartiescouldnot.Andthemovements
someextent,
trytodojustthis.As FranciscoSaucedotoldme,

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Hellman/MEXICAN POPULAR MOVEMENTS

139

The Asambleade Barrioshas a politicalas wellas an economic,revindicative

side.Amongotherthingsitis callingfortheFederalDistrict
tobecomea state
so thattheregent,
whois nowappointed
bythepresident,
wouldbe replaced
withan electedgovernor.
We arealso demanding
popularparticipation
at the
levelof thecolonia,thebarrio,andthedelegaci6n.We denouncerepression
andcorruption
andcallforpopularrepresentation.
Butthecentral
thrust
ofour
activities
has beenthedemandforhousing,forurbanservices,forland,and
forschools,clinics,transportation,
water,sewers,andelectricity.
I believe thata morerealisticconceptionof therole and potentialof urban
movementswould takeintoaccountthedifference
betweena groupdedicated
to theday-to-daystruggleforlife's basic necessitiesand a politicalpartythat
moreproperlybearstheburdenoftheorizingand organizingto promotebroad
societal change and the expansion of institutionalized
formsof democratic
expression.

NOTES
1. I confessthat,writing
as recently
as 1990,I was amongthosewhotooktheoptimistic
view thattheMexicansystemwas evolvingin a moredemocratic
direction
(Hellman,1990;
1991). However,thesubsequent
repression
ofopposition
electoralactivities
in all partsofthe
hasforcedmetorethink
country
mypositionas havemanyotherobservers
ofMexicanpolitics.
2. Itwouldbe usefulifwe couldknowwhether
therepression
ofopposition
underSalinas
thathas beenwell documented
by AmericasWatch,Amnesty
International,
and otherhuman
rights
groupsis greater
inanyabsoluteorrelativesensethanunderearlierregimes(particularly
thoseof Aleman[1940-1946],L6pez Mateos[1958-1964],or Diaz Ordaz [1964-1970])that
weremarkedbyharassment
andassassinations
ofpeasantandtradeunionleaders,suppression
oftherighttoassembleandtostrike,
andso on. I believethatthisquestioncannotbe answered
becauseofthelackinthepastofprecisely
thekindofsystematic
ofincidents
documentation
of
repression
thatorganizations
likeAmericasWatchwerecreatedtoprovide.
3. In a verystimulating
analysis,Jonathan
Fox (1992: 7-8) arguesthatMexiconowoffers
anexamplenotof"traditional"
or"classical"clientelism
butof"semiclientelism"
inwhich"the
on rulingpartycontrolwithmoresubtleformsof
statereplacedthetraditional
crudeinsistence
access to thesystem.... Semi-clientelistic
conditioning
powerrelationsinducecompliance
ofthewithdrawal
ofcarrots
thanbytheuse ofsticks."Although
theprocess
morebythethreat
maybe moresubtleanditmaybe a hyphenated
case,itis stillclientelism.
4. Innumerable
cases could be used to demonstrate
the patternin whichindependent
while
sow theseedsforchangethrough
oppositionorganizations
yearsofdetermined
struggle
quiescentPRI-affiliated
peasantsor urbanpoorreaptherewards.Sufficeitto citethecase of
andPeasants
theUni6nGeneraldeObrerosyCampesinos
de M6xico(GeneralUnionofWorkers
thelate
of Mexico-UGOCM), an independent
thatagitatedthroughout
peasantorganization
onillegallandholdings
inSonora,Sinaloa,Nayarit,
andColima.
1950stofocusofficial
attention
In 1957-1958thispeasantmovement
carriedout a seriesof land invasionson hugeestates
was dislodgedbyfederaltroops,andreturned
to occupy
illegallyownedby foreign
nationals,

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140 LATINAMERICANPERSPECTIVES
the land as manyas 18 times.When,however,the staterespondedby expropriating
the
million-acre
Cananeaestateof theGreenefamily,
dividingit intosevencattle-raising
ejidos,
lessthanone-third
ofthe853 peasantfamilieswhowereselectedtoformpartofthenewejidos
wereUGOCM members.
TherestwereCNC-affiliated
peasantswhohadnotparticipated
inthe
landinvasions(see Hellman,1988: 144,291 n. 51).
5. Peasantmobilizations,
landinvasions,
demonstrations,
hunger
marches,
andoccupations
ofgovernment
officeswerea constant
feature
ofruralpoliticsthroughout
the1940s,1950s,and
1960s(Hellman,1988: 143-163).
comesfroman interview
I carriedoutin MexicoCityin June1990 (see
6. Thisstatement
also Saucedo,1986;TiradoJimenez,
1990).
a free-trade
7. ThepoliticsoftheCanadiandecisiontonegotiate
agreement
withtheUnited
intheMexicancase.BrianMulroney
Stateshighlight
thelackofconsultation
andhisProgressive
Conservative
thatSalinasandthePRI havebeenspared.In 1988
partyfacedan inconvenience
hadto"gotothecountry"
forapprovalonthedealandcamewithin
theCanadianprimeminister
theLiberalsand the New
a hair'sbreadthof beingturnedout of officeby his opponents,
whotookan anti-free-trade
Democrats,
position.

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