ERIA-DP-2015-49

ERIA Discussion Paper Series

Developing Domestic and Export Markets and

Levelling Up Trade
in Value-Added: Lessons Learnt

Ben SHEPHERD *
Principal, Developing Trade Consultants.
July 2015
Abstract: There is clear evidence of increased internationalisation of ASEAN value

chains, as well as industrial growth. Changes have typically been more rapid in
Central and Eastern Europe than in ASEAN, probably due to economic transition
and joining the European Union. Germany has played an important role as an
anchor economya source of final demand, and of technology-rich investmentand
ASEAN will need to continue looking to regional economies such as Japan and
Republic of Korea in this light. The emphasis in most ASEAN countries will now need
to shift towards moving up to higher value-added activities, such as research and
development, which have positive spillovers for the rest of the economy.

Keywords:
policy.

Global value chains; Trade in value added; FDI; Trade and investment

JEL Codes:

F13; F15.

The author is grateful to Marwa Abdou for excellent research assistance, and to Hal Hill, Lili Yan
Ing, and Deborah Winkler, as well as seminar participants, for helpful comments and suggestions.

Introduction
Value chain trade has become an increasingly important feature of the world

economy in recent decades. 1 The Asia-Pacific region, including Southeast Asia, is

globally recognised as a leader in many respects, particularly in sectors such as
electrical equipment, including consumer electronics. Production in these sectors relies
on complex networks of trade and investment that result in increasingly tight links
between countries.
Although the development of global and regional value chains has been
particularly striking in the Asia-Pacific, important changes have also taken place
elsewhere in the global economy. Other regions have experienced growth in value
chain trade as well, although its intensity varies considerably from one part of the
world to another. Against that background, the purpose of this chapter is to examine
the spread and performance of value-added trade in ASEAN, and to make comparisons
with other regions, particularly Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE). The emphasis in this chapter is on examining the current
reality in ASEAN compared with two other important regions, and to examine any
policy implications that might be applicable to ASEAN from the experiences of these
comparator groups.
Analysing value chains quantitatively is still a relatively recent undertaking. Most
research on value chains as such is qualitative, focusing on case studies of their
development and spread, and analysis of the way in which value-added is divided up
amongst the various actors in the chain. Although some of the qualitative literature is
primarily positive, there is a strong strand in that literature that focuses on the
implications of value-chain trade from a more normative standpoint. Although this
paper discusses some possible policy implications of its findings, it is, by contrast,
primarily quantitative and positive in approach.
The study of production networks in East Asia and elsewhere (e.g., Ando and
Kimura, 2013, and previous works by those authors) can be seen as laying the

For the purposes of this paper, a value chain is defined as the full range of activities that firms
and workers do to bring a product from its conception to its end use and beyond. This includes
activities such as design, production, marketing, distribution and support to the final consumer
(https://globalvaluechains.org/concept-tools).
1

groundwork for the quantitative work undertaken here. That literature focused on trade
in intermediate inputs, is one of the key processes underlying the spread of value chains.
However, identifying trade in intermediate inputs using traditional trade data is
difficult. The approach most commonly adopted was to designate certain products in
standard international trade classifications as intermediate inputs, to relate them to
other products designated as final, and conduct quantitative work exploiting the
distinction (e.g., Saslavsky and Shepherd, 2014).
This paper takes a different empirical approach. It exploits newly released OECDWTO data on trade-in-value-added (TiVA). Unlike traditional trade data, TiVA data
fully account for the use of intermediate goods and services in productionincluding
imports and exportsand make it possible to isolate domestic value-added that is then
exported. The TiVA data provide an ideal framework for examining trade in global
and regional value chains. This is because the business models behind these production
platforms are increasingly seen in terms of exchanges of value-added within a complex
network rather than simple shipments of goods from one point to another.
The TiVA data offer the basis for a rich exploration of value-chain trade, including
in its cross-regional comparative aspects. However, analytical tools are necessary to
make the data really talk. This paper adopts four summary measures from the recent
literature to provide an entry point into the analysis of value-added trade in ASEAN,
and to make comparisons possible with LAC and CEE. The four summary measures
constitute different ways of looking at the extent of a countrys integration into global
and regional value chains. The analysis is undertaken for all countries for which data
are available in ASEAN, LAC, and CEE. In sectoral terms, the focus is on three areas
of special interest from the point of view of value-chain analysis: electrical equipment,
transport equipment, and textiles and clothing.

Box 1: Volkswagens Automotive Value Chain

The automotive industry is globally competitive, with European, Asian, and US producers all
maintaining significant market shares. In 2007, Volkswagen set itself the goal of performing
at the level of Toyota, perceived as the market leader. Part of the strategy put in place in pursuit
of that goal was further internationalisation of the firms production processes.
Even in 2007, Volkswagens production process was already quite internationalised. Sixty-six
percent of vehicle production took place outside Germany, with 47 percent of employees
located in other countries, and 75 percent of sales occurring outside the German market.
Volkswagen was already more internationalised than Toyota, but its focus was heavily on the
European market, and the firm was conscious of the need to perform better in the US and in
the emerging markets of Latin America and especially Asia.
Volkswagen maintains 48 production facilities in 19 different countries, compared with 74
sites in 27 countries for Toyota. In Western Europe, all of Volkswagens production sites are
located in Germany (20). It also has 10 production sites in Eastern Europe: eight produce
vehicles, engines, and components, and two produce just engines and components. The key
site for Volkswagen in Eastern Europe is Bratislava in the Slovak Republic, an EU member
state. Membership of the EU means that goods, people, and capital canin principle
circulate with a very high degree of freedom not found in other regions, including ASEAN.
In contrast with production, which is relatively decentralised in the Volkswagen model,
research and development is relatively centralised in Germany. Although there are other sites
around the world for research and development, including in Eastern Europe, most work is
done in Germany. There is a clear division of labour within the value chain between these two
types of activities. Comparative advantage is surely a strong driver of this decision by the
multinational group: Germany has a highly educated workforce and well-established
credentials in engineering. However, wage costs are high, so it makes sense to outsource
simpler production tasks to neighbouring countries. This type of arrangement is typical of
value chains, and is a source of commercial success as it provides for continued product
upgrading through research and development, and simultaneous control of costs through
outsourcing.
Source: Schmid and Grosche (Undated).

Interpreting the results from the quantitative exercise and deriving policy
implications is challenging, because the measures are summary in nature, and many
factors could potentially explain any observed differences. With that in mind, the paper
also includes a selective review of the literature on value chains in the three regions.
The review focuses on recent contributions examining the growth and development of
value chains, in particular in the sectors under consideration, and the factors that have
given rise to the observed results. Combining the results from the quantitative exercise
with those from the literature review makes it possible to discuss ASEANs relative
position with greater clarity, and to assess the possible implications for Southeast Asia
of the different ways in which value chains have developed elsewhere.

Against this background, the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the
TiVA data set, and discusses the indicators to be used in the quantitative part of the
paper. Section 3 contains the comparative review, focusing first on the literature
(Section 3.1), and then on an analysis of the TiVA data (Section 3.2). The following
section, Section 4, draws out some possible policy implications of the findings in
Section 3, and Section 5 concludes.

2. Trade in Value-Added Data

2.1. Overview of the TiVA Data Set
Traditional trade data, such as those found in cross-country databases such as UN
COMTRADE, are recorded in gross value terms. For example, an iPhone shipped from
its final assembly point in China to the USA is recorded as an export from China to
the USA equal to the full landed price of the phone in the importing market. Although
historically appropriate as a first approximation, the advent of value chains has made
traditional trade data less fit for purpose in terms of understanding and analysing global
flows of goods and services. The iPhone is manufactured using a complex network of
value-chain interactions and in fact, relatively little value is added in China compared
with the high value-added of research and design services located in the USA itself,
notionally the importing market.
Taking this example further, it is clear that gross value-trade data tend to overstate
the true level of trade between countries. The reason is that intermediate inputs are
double counted. For example, the full landed price of the solid state hard drive used in
the iPhone is counted as an export from a source country, such as Thailand, to the
assembly point, China. The value of the hard drive is then incorporated again in the
price of the final product sent from China to the USA, so the same figure is included
in export data for two countries through incorporation in a final product.
Because of the double counting of intermediate inputs, traditional trade data are
not compatible with national accounts data. GDP is defined as the sum of all valueadded in the economy, i.e., production less intermediate inputs. Exports and imports
in the national accounts are, in principle, smaller than trade data recorded in

COMTRADE because they net out intermediate input use. This disconnect is the
reason why some countries have exports to GDP ratios that approach, or even
occasionally exceed, 100 percent, which is not possible in terms of true national
accounts data.
To deal with these problems, recent research has focused on the idea of measuring
trade in value-added terms, rather than gross value terms. The idea is to construct
export and import data that net out trade in intermediate inputsincluding services
and are therefore fully compatible with national accounts. A number of researchers
have moved forward in this area, such as Johnson and Noguera (2012), and Koopman
et al. (2014). Building on these efforts, OECD and WTO created a joint global database
of trade-in-value-added (TiVA). The raw TiVA data are available for 57 economies
and 11 goods sectors for the years 1995, 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009. They are
constructed using national accounts data, trade data, and input-output matrices. The
data set has figures on various dimensions of value-added trade, and is set out
bilaterally, i.e., as a matrix showing all relationships between exporters and importers.
The OECD-WTO TiVA data set is much better suited to the study of value chains
than are traditional gross value-trade data. For example, the iPhone referred to earlier
does not double count intermediate input use in the relevant export values, but instead
shows export flows from the countries like Thailand (for components such as the hard
drive) to the USA, and only records the value-added located in Chinaprimarily
assemblyas an export flow from China to the USA. As a result of changes like these,
data on openness and bilateral trade balances can be substantially different using TiVA
data and traditional trade data.
The TiVA data make it possible to examine aspects of value-chain trade that have
proved elusive in previous research. Initially, value chains were studied by focusing
on trade in intermediate inputs (e.g., Ando and Kimura, 2013). Intermediates were
identified intuitively, using standard international trade product classifications. The
TiVA approach provides a much finer and more accurate level of analysis on
intermediate input use, and importantly includes services as well as goods. Services
trade is a crucial component of value chain activity. In many ways, services such as
design, transport, and distribution are the glue that holds value chains together. The

TiVA data therefore offer the possibility of rich insights into the operation of value
chains, and the possibility of cross-regional and through-time comparisons.
To remain concise, this analysis of the TiVA data will be limited in time and
sectoral scope. Previous work suggests that the structure of value-chain trade remains
remarkably stable over time (Shepherd and Archanskaia, 2014). Because of that, the
long term will be the focus of the analysis. The two end-points of the TiVA data, 1995
and 2009, will be compared to give a general picture of dynamic evolutions.2 Of course,
many significant economic events have taken place during that period, including
substantial liberalisation in some countries, as well as macroeconomic events such as
the Asian financial crisis. In terms of sectoral scope, the analysis will consider three
sectors in which value-chain trade is particularly important, but contrasts can be
expected amongst ASEAN, CEE, and LAC countries: electrical equipment, transport
equipment, and textiles and clothing. From an intra-ASEAN perspective, electrical
equipment is perhaps the most crucial sector, but experience differs somewhat from
country to country. In the other regions the relative importance of the three value
chains varies.
Comparing performance across regions and value chains can be informative from
a policy perspective. However, it is important to keep in mind that each value chain
represents a distinct set of business models. For instance, electronics production is
typically more integrated than other industries, so value chains can be expected to
behave differently, and be tracked differently through quantitative indicators. This
paper is therefore an attempt to map out some of the cross-regional and cross-sectoral
differences in value-chain behaviour. However, further detailed research is needed on
the ways in which particular value chains operate in the special circumstances of
individual countries and sectors.

Clearly, the 2009 data may be affected by the aftermath of the global financial crisis. However,
as of writing, no later data are available. Avoiding the effect of the crisis entirely would require
using 2005 data, which are now 10 years old. In the interests of keeping the analysis as relevant as
possible, the paper therefore uses the 2009 data, subject to the caveat that they may be influenced
to an unusual degree by broader macroeconomic and financial factors.

2.1.Indicators Based on the TiVA Data

The TiVA data set is a new source that offers real potential for new insights into
value-chain trade. However, it contains a large quantity of information. Analytical
tools are therefore needed to examine value-added trade in particular countries and
regions. The TiVA bilateral trade matrix and the tables used to produce it are raw
materials that can be manipulated and transformed to produce indicators that can
usefully be compared across regions and time periods. That is the approach adopted in
this paper, building on data work done at OECD (De Backer and Miroudot, 2013).
The first indicator to be examined is the value-added to gross exports (VAX) ratio
(Johnson and Noguera, 2012). It provides an overall indication of the intensity of
production-sharing that takes place through value chains. It is the proportion of total
exports measured in gross value terms that is accounted for by domestic value-added.
Intuitively, a lower VAX ratio means that the level of domestic content in exports is
lower, and the foreign content is therefore higher. It clearly shows the effect of netting
out intermediate input useparticularly imported intermediate inputsin valueadded trade data. Although comparisons of VAX ratios across time periods and
countries should not be over-interpreted, given that many factors are at play, the
exercise is useful in providing a first pass indication of the degree of productionsharing that is underway in particular countries and sectors.
The second indicator to be used in this paper is an index of the number of
international production stages (Antras et al., 2012). This indicator measures the length
of international value chains in a particular country and sector. The index is equal to
one if there is a single production stage involved, and takes progressively higher values
as inputs from the same or other sectors are used, according to a weighted average
formula (De Backer and Miroudot, 2013):
(1) = . (1 )1
where N is a column vector containing the indices according to country (i) and sector
(k), u is a unit vector, I is an appropriately dimensioned identity matrix, and A is the
matrix of technical coefficients from the international input-output matrix that lies
behind the TiVA data.

The last two indicators that will be analysed are the backward and forward
participation indices (Koopman et al., 2010). The first measures the value of imported
intermediate inputs in a countrys exports (backward participation). The second
measures the share of exported goods used as intermediate inputs to produce other
countries exports (forward participation). These two indicators can be summed to give
an overall picture of the level of involvement of a country in value chain trade. A
higher score is consistent with a greater degree of internationalisation.
The participation index is based on the following equations:
(2) =

(3) = (1 )1
where P is the participation index, E is gross exports, VS is an element of the vector
obtained by summing the columns of the VBE matrix (without domestic industries),
and VS1 is an element of the vector obtained by summing the rows of the VBE matrix
(again without domestic industries). For the VBE matrix, A is defined as above, E is
gross exports, and V is the diagonal of a matrix with value-added shares by country
and industry.
Each of the four indicators analysed in this paper presents a different way of
looking at a countrys degree of involvement in global and regional value chains. As
emphasised at the outset, many reasons lie behind cross-country and through-time
variations, so results need to be interpreted cautiously. Nonetheless, the indicators are
useful in providing a first picture of the degree to which internationalisation of the
value chain has taken place in the three sectors under consideration in ASEAN, LAC,
and CEE. Section 3.2 analyses the data in terms of broad trends that are evident. The
main interpretation is provided in Section 4, which combines insights from the data
analysis and the literature review to examine value-chain trade in the three regions in
comparative perspective, and in particular from the angle of lessons that could be learnt
by ASEAN from experience in other regions.

3. Comparative Review: ASEAN vs. Latin America and the

Caribbean, and Central and Eastern Europe
This section presents the analytical material that is the focus of this paper. The
first subsection presents a selective review of the available literature on global and
regional value chains in CEE and LAC, and the second undertakes a quantitative
analysis using indicators derived from the OECD-WTO TiVA data set. The
presentation here is positive in nature, not normative. Possible policy implications are
discussed in more detail in Section 4.
3.1. Literature Review
The literature review is divided into two parts. First, the discussion focuses on the
development of value chains in CEE and LAC, noting their spread, intensity, and the
type of exchanges that typify them. Next, consideration is given to the economic
impacts of value chains in the two regions, taking account of the different development
paths that have been followed. Given the large amount of literature involved, it is
necessary to be selective in terms of presentation. The approach taken is therefore to
focus on a number of key contributions that provide important insights, rather than to
attempt to cover the field.
3.1.1. Development of Value-Chain Activity in CEE and LAC
Previous work on global and regional value chains in CEE has highlighted the
important role that they have come to play in the period following economic transition,
i.e., from the 1990s onwards (e.g., Ando and Kimura, 2013). Machinery is a key sector,
with value-chain interactions based on trade and investment relations amongst
manufacturing firms.
CEEs relationship with other regions is of particular interest. Although interregional linkages, including with Asia, have grown, Western Europe remains the key
source of demand for CEE value-chain production (Ando and Kimura, 2013). This is
an expected finding, in light of factors such as physical proximity and low trade costs
due to both geography and common membership of the EU (Godart and Gorg, 2011).
Godart and Gorg (2011) identify a range of additional factors that have made CEE
countries attractive for Western European firmsespecially German oneslooking

to internationalise their value chains. Factor costs and productivity are important, but
human capital in the form of an educated workforce also plays a significant role.
The rise of value chains in CEE has coincided with restructuring of the Western
European manufacturing sector, particularly in Germany, the manufacturing centre of
Europe (Timmer et al., 2013). Following patterns established elsewhere, for instance
in North America, high value added activities have tended to stay in Germany.
However, other parts of the value chain that are more labour intensive have been
relocated to CEE, as seen in the Volkswagen example discussed above. The net result
for Germany has been a fall in the overall domestic content of manufacturing, as
reliance on intermediate goods sourced notably from CEE has increased. This process
can potentially result in efficiency and competitiveness gains due to cost savings, as
well as specialisation according to comparative advantage. However, results are
sometimes striking: for example, it has been estimated that only 30 percent of the
value-added of a Porsche Cayennenominally made in Leipzigis German. The car
is in fact mostly assembled in the Slovak Republic, a fact that gives rise to concerns in
some quarters in Germany (Sinn, 2006).
Although structural factors are important in the spread of manufacturing value
chains from Western Europe, and particularly Germany, to CEE, Godart and Gorg
(2011) also highlight the important role played by firm-specific considerations. The
decision to internationalise a value chain is a complex one that is influenced heavily
by economic variables, but issues such as management structure and competence, and
market pressures in relation to final products, also come into play. The discussion here
focuses on structural factors because of the nature of the empirical analysis conducted
in the next section, but in practice it is important to keep in mind that many substantive
issues that affect the decision whether or not to internationalise, and which functions
to internationalise where, interact in a complex way at the firm-level. One implication
is that although country- and region-level studies are useful in understanding the broad
dynamics in operation, firm-level empirical analysisboth quantitative and
qualitativestill has an important role in helping understand the particularities of
individual value chains.
Compared with CEE, the available literature seems to suggest that global and
regional value chains are relatively underdeveloped in LAC (e.g., CIDOB et al., 2014).

10

LAC is a large region, however, and there is considerable diversity within it. In South
America, value-chain participation is typically centred on the supply of raw materials,
in contrast to the manufacturing core of CEE value chains. In Mexico, however, there
is a greater level of manufacturing, for instance, in the well-known maquiladoras. As
a whole, however, it is fair to characterise value-chain interactions in LAC as less
intense than in CEE, and differently focused. In terms of the capture of value-added,
production is generally centred on low value-added activities, such as the production
of primary materials.
Against this background, Giuliani et al. (2005) highlight the difficulty that many
LAC countries have had in moving up the value chain to higher value-added activities.
The authors highlight structural issues as an important cause. In particular, they stress
the regions relative abundance of natural resources, and relative scarcity of labour and
capital. Of course, labour is available in large quantities, but in relative terms, free
markets tend to lead to specialisation by many LAC countries in low value-added parts
of the value chain. However, sectoral and country specificities can be important, as the
example of manufacturing in Mexico shows.
Just as Western Europe, and in particular Germany, played a key role as a source
of demand in the development of CEE value chains, the US has been an important
force in the evolution of value chains in North and Central America, particularly
Mexico (Kuwayama, 2009). As in the case of Germany, high value-added activities
tend to stay in the USA, and lower value-added activities move offshore to destinations
like Mexico. Assembly is an example of a relatively low value-added task in the
manufacturing sector. Kuwayama (2009) argues that, going forward, it will be
important for LAC countries to move up manufacturing value chains towards higher
value-added activities. This process entails renewed attention to the services sector,
including areas such as engineering, research, and design. The author argues that
policy interventions may be necessary to realise this goal.
3.1.2. Economic Impacts of Value Chain Development
The development paths taken by value chains in CEE and LAC are substantially
different, but similar issues arise, in particular concentration on relatively low value
added activities (although the level of value addition appears to be significantly higher
in CEE than in LAC). The broad pattern of specialisation is the same in both locations,

11

with the advanced anchor market (Germany or the USA) specialising in high valueadded activities, and the surrounding countries specialising in activities with lower
levels of value addition (e.g., Timmer et al., 2013).
Damijan et al. (2013) highlight the important role that internationalisation of
production has played in restructuring the CEE countries trade relations, both on the
export and import sides. In particular, there has been a notable shift towards imports
of intermediate inputs and capital goods. Associated FDI flows have been significantly
associated with export upgrading in some countries, but not all. Countries that have
been more successful in attracting FDI to technology-intensive industries have tended
to experience faster productivity growth.
Productivity gains and economic restructuring are important channels by which
value chains can influence economic outcomes. There is the potential for economic
benefits to flow even though countries specialise, at least initially, in relatively low
value-added parts of the chain. Moreover, Kuwayama (2009) points out that in the case
of LAC, where there is considerable surplus labour, low value-added activities can
have significant economic and social advantages. The mechanism at play is the
creation of employment in relatively low skill activities. Many developing countries,
including some in LAC, have dual labour markets, with significant excess supply of
low skill workers. An expansion of value-chain activity that increases demand for lowskill labour can therefore take up some of the slack in that part of the labour market,
which decreases unemployment and potentially, over time, exerts upwards pressure on
low-skill wages.

3.2. TiVA Indicator Analysis

This section provides a comparative analysis of the TiVA indicators discussed in
Section 2. The presentation is data driven, focusing on interpretation of the indicators.
Policy implications of this set of findings taken together are discussed in Section 4.
The OECD-WTO TiVA data do not cover all countries in the three regions being
compared. It is therefore necessary to use those countries included in the data set as
proxies. Indicators of regional, as opposed to national, performance are calculated by
taking the simple average across all countries for which data are available in the region.

12

Country coverage in the data set is as follows:

ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam
Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico
Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.

Coverage is reasonably good for ASEAN and CEE, but is quite weak for LAC.
Results for that region will therefore need to be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless,
much of the regions global value-chain activity is concentrated in Mexico, due its
proximity to the USA and the influence of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), so the sample can nonetheless be regarded as informative for comparative
purposes.
3.2.1. VAX Ratio
A countrys VAX ratio summarises the proportion of gross exports that is
accounted for by domestic value-added. Figures 1-3 present comparative results for
the three sectors under consideration, namely electrical goods, transport equipment,
and textiles and clothing. The lowest VAX ratio of the three sectors is in electrical
equipment (61.9 percent for the world average), followed by transport equipment (63.7
percent), and then textiles and clothing (70.1 percent). World average VAX ratios fell
in all sectors between 1995 and 2009, but the fall was much more pronounced in
relative terms in transport equipment (-7.4 percent) and electrical equipment (-6.3
percent) than in textiles and clothing (-1.9 percent). A falling VAX ratio can have a
number of economic drivers behind it, but a common interpretation is that production
chains are continuing to internationalise in all sectors, which means that the ratio of
imported intermediates to domestic value-added is higher, and thus that the VAX ratio
is falling. Under that interpretation, the biggest change in internationalisation of
production has been seen in transport equipment, followed by electrical equipment,
although the latter remains more internationalised (i.e., has a lower VAX ratio) than
the former. The level has only fallen slightly in the textiles and clothing sector.
Figures 1-3 also present comparative regional data for each sector. Those data can
be used to compare value chain internationalisation, and the dynamics behind it, across
regions. For electrical equipment, ASEANs average VAX ratio is 5 percentage points
lower than LACindicating greater internationalisationbut is 10 percentage points

13

higher than CEE, which indicates the opposite. This is an interesting result, because
electronics goods value chains are often associated with Asia, including ASEAN, but
this result suggests that the degree of internationalisation of production may actually
be higher in CEE than in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the relative rate of change is faster
in CEE than in ASEAN: the ratio fell by 12.3 percent between 1995 and 2009 in CEE,
but only by 4.5 percent in ASEAN. It will be necessary to compare these results with
more detailed indicators to see if the comparison holds.

Percent

Figure 1: VAX Ratio (Electrical Equipment)

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ASEAN

LAC
Country Group
1995

CEE

2009

Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Indicators.

For transport equipment, the same pattern of results is evident in levels (Figure 2).
Indeed, the quantitative magnitude of the differences across regions is nearly identical
to the case of electrical equipment. Again, one interpretation is that despite the
importance of transport equipment value chains in Asia, including ASEAN, the degree
of internationalisation is still not as great as in CEE, notwithstanding the lower ratio
with respect to LAC. In terms of dynamics, the pattern for electrical goods is reversed:
ASEAN is internationalising at a relatively faster pace than CEE. The formers VAX
ratio declined by 7.7 percent, compared with 5.8 percent for the latter. The rate of
change is much slower in LAC, at just -2.8 percent.

14

Percent

Figure 2: VAX Ratio (Transport Equipment)

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ASEAN

LAC
Country Group
1995

CEE

2009

Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Indicators.

Results for CEE and ASEAN are closer in the textiles and clothing sector (Figure
3), although CEE is still a couple of percentage points lower in its average VAX ratio
than ASEAN. LAC has a much higher score than either of the two other regions. In
terms of the rate of change, the percentage declines in VAX ratios for ASEAN and
CEE are quite similar: 4.1 percent and 5.9 percent respectively. The result for LAC is
closer than in the other sectors, at -2.3 percent.

Percent

Figure 3: VAX Ratio (Textiles and Clothing)

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ASEAN

LAC
Country Group
1995

Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Indicators.

15

2009

CEE

Interpreting changes in the VAX ratio is not straightforward. At a policy level,

there is clearly a mercantilist temptation to become fixated on maintaining a particular
proportion of domestic value-added in exports. However, there is strong evidence that
domestic and foreign intermediates act in part as complements, not just as substitutes:
internationalisation of the value chain is associated with rapid growth in trade,
including domestic value-addedwhich can increase even though its share in gross
exports decreases. To make the point, Figure 4 presents domestic value-added in
exports for electrical equipment in ASEAN, where VAX ratios have been falling
rapidly. As is clear, domestic value-added has in fact increased sharply in all three
regions as complementarities between domestic and imported intermediates are
exploited.

Figure 4: Domestic Value Added Embodied in Gross Exports, ASEAN,

(USD million), 19952009
Viet Nam
Thailand

Country

Singapore
Philippines
Malaysia
Indonesia
Cambodia
Brunei Darussalam
0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Million USD
2009

1995

Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Indicators.

3.2.2. Number of International Production Stages

To investigate the hypothesis that internationalisation of production is stronger in
CEE than in ASEAN, and that it is rising faster, a logical first step is to look at the
number of international production stages in each sector and region. Figures 57
present results.

16

In terms of the world average, the electrical goods sector has the most international
production stages, but results for transport equipment are very close. The textiles and
clothing sector has noticeably fewer international production stages. These results in
levels are exactly reflected in relative changes over time: the electrical goods and
transport equipment sectors have seen the largest percentage increases in the number
of international production stages (26.4 percent and 26.3 percent, respectively),
compared with a much lower rate of change of only 12.9 percent in textiles and
clothing.
Figure 5 makes it possible to compare results for electrical goods across the three
regions under consideration. Although there are more international production stages
in ASEAN than in CEEa result that seems contrary to the indications of the VAX
ratiothe rate of change in CEE is much faster. The number of production stages
increased by 33.1 percent in CEE between 1995 and 2009, compared with 26.6 percent
in ASEAN. On the other hand, ASEAN displays a different pattern from the world
average in that the number of international production stages is 24.3 percent higher
than in transport equipment; the two figures are nearly identical for CEE. LAC again
seems not to be as dynamic as the other regions, with only around half as many
international production stages as ASEAN in 2009, and a much lower rate of change
over the sample period (14.1 percent).

Number of Production Stages

(International)

Figure 5: Number of International Production Stages (Electrical Equipment)

1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
ASEAN

LAC
Country Group
1995

Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Indicators.

17

2009

CEE

Results for transport equipment are in Figure 6. In this case, CEE has considerably
more international production stages than ASEAN, the difference being 13.2 percent.
In this case, the evidence from this indicator accords well with preliminary findings
from the VAX ratio to the effect that production is more internationalised in this sector
in CEE than in ASEAN. It is not just the number of international production stages
that is higher in CEE: there is also a faster rate of change, 28.9 percent between 1995
and 2009, compared with 16.3 percent in ASEAN. Although LAC has fewer
international production stages than either of the other two regions, its growth rate is
actually higher than ASEANs at 21.9 percent.

Number of Production Stages

(International)

Figure 6: Number of International Production Stages (Transport Equipment)

1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
ASEAN

LAC
Country Group
1995

CEE

2009

Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Indicators.

The textiles and clothing sector (Figure 7) displays some similarities to the other
two sectors, despite its generally lower number of international production stages.
ASEAN has the most stages, with a score 16.3 percent higher than CEE. LAC has far
fewer international production stages: its figure is only 43.8 percent of ASEANs.
However, the picture becomes more interesting when rates of change are considered.
On this occasion, LAC has actually seen the fastest growth in the number of
international production stages (36.7 percent), compared with very similar but much
lower rates of change in the other two regions (16.5 percent in CEE and 15.0 percent

18

in ASEAN). Part of the reason for this result is undoubtedly that LAC started from a
much lower baseline in 1995, but the rate of growth is nonetheless impressive.

Number of Production Stages

(International)

Figure 7: Number of International Production Stages (Textiles and Clothing)

1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
ASEAN

LAC
Country Group
1995

CEE

2009

Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Indicators.

3.2.3. Backwards and Forwards Participation

The two participation indices focus on trade in intermediate goods. The backwards
index captures the proportion of a countrys exports that is accounted for by foreign
intermediate inputs. The forwards index captures the proportion of a countrys exports
that are used as intermediate inputs for other countries exports.
Figures 8-10 present results for the backwards participation index. Changes in this
indicator, and comparisons across groups, are more striking compared with the
indicators previously discussed. In terms of the world average, electrical equipment
has by far the highest index: it is twice as high as the index for transport equipment,
and more than 3.5 times higher than the index for textiles and clothing. In terms of
dynamics since 1995, however, it is the other two sectors where the biggest changes
have taken place in terms of the world average. Transport equipment saw an increase
of 39.0 percent in its score, compared with 13.7 percent for electrical equipment. Two
possible interpretations are open: either value chains have tended to internationalise
less over the time period, thereby reducing reliance on imported intermediates, or
domestic value added as a proportion of the final goods price has on average increased.

19

Given the extensive evidence already marshalled to show that value chains have
generally become more, not less, internationalised over time, the second explanation
is the only plausible one: domestic value-added has tended to increase in relative terms,
particularly in transport equipment, and to a lesser extent in electrical equipment. By
contrast, the opposite dynamic is true for textiles and clothing: the world average score
fell by 38.3 percent during the sample period, which tends to suggest that value chains
have become more focused on lower value-added activities, such as assembly from
component parts.
Just as the world average varies considerably from one sector to another, so too
do the results for ASEAN and the two comparator regions. ASEANs highest score by
far is in electrical equipment (10.1); scores in the other two sectors are much lower
(4.3 in textiles and clothing, and 0.7 in transport equipment). The pattern of scores
across the three sectors for ASEAN is interesting because it does not reflect what has
been observed for other indicators, where there has been a reasonably stable ordering
of either electrical equipment or transport equipment at one end of the scale, and
textiles and clothing at the other. The surprising result for transport equipment is all
the more notable because of the contrast with CEE, which has a score 8.2 times higher,
despite similar relative growth rates in both cases (131.9 percent in ASEAN compared
with 120.6 percent in CEE). Although particularly stark in this case, the result for
transport equipment suggests that the value chain is not as internationalised in ASEAN
as it is in CEE, for example, and that it is less internationalised than the electrical
equipment sector. This interpretation is consistent with results for the other indicators,
discussed above.
The comparison between LAC and CEE is interesting for the case of transport
equipment. The two regions start from similar baselines in 1995 (2.5 for LAC, and 2.6
for CEE), but subsequent growth rates are very different. CEE has experienced
explosive growth of 120.6 percent in this sector, compared with only 9.6 percent for
LAC. Activity in the transport equipment sector is significant in both regions, although
it is more localised in LAC in terms of its involvement in international value chains,
being centred on Mexico.
All three regions experienced a fall in their backward participation index over the
sample period for textiles and clothing. The fall was most pronounced in CEE (-56.0

20

percent), followed by LAC (-28.5 percent) and then ASEAN (-15.7 percent). In terms
of the pattern of scores, ASEAN has the highest score in both periods, and is separated
from the other two regions by a considerable margin. One interpretation of this pattern
of results is that there is still considerable assembly activity going on in this sector in
ASEAN, although it is declining in relative terms in all regions. It is, however, more
persistent in ASEAN than elsewhere, which is reflected in a greater overall importance
of imported intermediates in producing exports.
To provide a point of contrast, forward participation indices for the three sectors
and regions appear in Figures 11-13. In terms of the world average, electrical
equipment has by far the highest score: it is over four times as high as the average
score for transport equipment, and over six times higher than the score for textiles and
clothing. Taking results for the two indices together clearly suggests that trade in
intermediate inputs is particularly important in this sector, which is in line with the
important role that value chains play in production. This pattern of results is also
reflected in an aggregate sense in a dynamic comparison of scores in 1995 and 2009:
growth in forward participation has been much faster in electrical equipment than in
transport equipment; the world average score has, by contrast, fallen noticeably in
textiles and clothing.
ASEAN has the highest forward participation index score of any of the three
regions under consideration for electrical equipment. The number has also undergone
rapid growth in recent years (162 percent between 1995 and 2009). Exports of
intermediate inputs for use in other countries exports is relatively more important in
ASEAN than in the other regions, although CEEs level of participation has only
grown at a slightly slower rate, albeit from a much lower starting point.
Transport equipment again sees the order reversed: CEE has a considerably higher
score than ASEAN, and its growth rate (180.7 percent) has been much faster than
ASEANs (47.3 percent). Whereas LAC could be considered to be relatively dormant
in terms of growth of intermediate inputs trade in the electrical equipment sector, this
form of trade has actually become relatively less important in transport equipment.
There are two possible explanations: either LAC production processes have become
relatively less internationalised, or the countries in the sample are exporting relatively
more goods for final consumption and fewer intermediate inputs. Given that there is

21

evidence of increasing internationalisation in this sector, it is more likely that the

second explanation holds.
As was the case for the backwards participation index, the forwards index for
textiles and clothing contracted in both ASEAN and CEE over the sample period; in
LAC there was slight, almost imperceptible, growth. Interestingly, CEE had a higher
index score than ASEAN in 1995, but by 2009 had a lower one. The interpretation is
that exports of intermediate inputs to be used in other countries exports have fallen in
relative importance in both regions, but the fall has been much sharper in CEE.

4. Policy Implications
The TiVA data and the literature review have disclosed substantial differences in
the ways in which global and regional value chains have developed and spread
according to sector and country. In general terms, ASEAN is a strong performer in
comparative perspective, particularly in the electrical equipment sector. Value chains
in Southeast Asia have undergone considerable internationalisation in recent years,
and this is evident in the dynamics of key indicators. The only sector in which
continuing internationalisation has been rather limited in ASEAN is textiles and
clothing. Given that that sector is relatively intensive in low-skill labour compared
with the other two sectors under considerationelectrical equipment and transport
equipmentthis finding arguably suggests that there is some movement within
ASEAN towards higher value-added activities. More broadly, ASEAN countries have
typically been quite successful in joining GVCs in the sectors considered here. The
challenge going forward is to move up within those GVCs to higher value-added
activities that can have significant economic spillovers, such as research and
development, and even to assume a leadership role in terms of strategic decisions at
the business level.
In terms of the cross-regional comparison that is the analytical focus of this paper,
one finding stands out in sharp relief: value-chain development has been very intense
in CEE, but relatively limited in LAC. This result needs to be interpreted with caution,
because the TiVA data are much more complete in their coverage of CEE than of LAC.
Based on the available data, however, it appears that internationalisation of production

22

in LAC remains considerably less than in ASEAN or CEE, and the dynamic of change
is much slower.
Another important finding that emerges from the literature review relates to the
different natures of value chains in CEE and LAC. In the CEE countries, as in ASEAN,
value-chain activity is focused on manufactured goods. Although there are also some
manufacturing value chains in LAC, particularly in countries such as Mexico, a more
typical set-up is that LAC countries supply primary commodities that are transformed
elsewhere, with corresponding high levels of domestic value added in primary sectors.
The pattern of comparative advantage is therefore perhaps more similar in CEE and
ASEAN than it is in LAC and ASEAN.
For these two reasonsgreater internationalisation and faster change, as well as
reliance on manufacturingit seems clear that the main potential source of policy
insights for ASEAN is CEE rather than LAC. A comparison of the two regions, CEE
and ASEAN, is instructive for many reasons, but the most obvious one is the different
ways in which value chains have internationalised and evolved in the two more
sophisticated sectors, namely electrical equipment and transport equipment. ASEAN
value chains are more internationalised than those in CEE in the first case, but the
opposite is true in the second case. Composition effects might be at play, but the pattern
is nonetheless interesting. Backward and forward linkages are noticeably better
developed in electrical equipment in ASEAN than they are in transport equipment, so
it is important to examine the potential reasons behind that development compared
with CEE. Part of the answer may be found in the special role played by Germany with
respect to the CEE countries, an issue that is discussed in detail below. Another part
of the answer lies in firm strategies in particular sectors: for example, in the automotive
sector, Volkswagen favours outsourcing different elements of the production process
to different countries, and having a number of assembly locations, whereas Toyota
prefers a single location assembly strategy. Advantages and disadvantages of both
approaches are possible, but they clearly give rise to differences in the nature and
extent of production internationalisation in the regions under consideration. Similarly,
differences in the way agglomeration economies work in the two sectors contribute to
the overall differences seen in the numbers. A final set of operative factors relates to
policy barriers. In electrical products, the tariff environment is relatively free thanks

23

to the WTO Information Technology Agreement, and liberalisation of air transport

markets has facilitated the emergence of value chains by reducing the cost of rapid
transport for high-value-to-weight products, such as components in this sector. In the
transport equipment sector, by contrast, many countries have used activist policies of
one sort or another to try to encourage development of domestic, rather than
international supply chains, and the numbers in ASEAN perhaps still reflect in part the
lingering effects of policy barriers.
Another striking fact that emerges from a comparison of value-chain indicators for
CEE and ASEAN is that there is some evidence that internationalisation of even the
electrical equipment value chain has been more rapid in a dynamic sense in CEE than
in ASEAN. For example, the CEE countries increased their backwards participation
index by 237.3 percent between 1995 and 2009, compared with only 18 percent in
ASEAN. The index remains higher in ASEAN than in CEE, but only because of the
huge difference in 1995 baselines.
The most likely reason for the rapid growth in internationalisation of value chains
in the CEE region is a combination of economic transition, supported by closer ties
with the EU, and eventually membership of that regional grouping. The CEE countries
have undertaken extensive trade and investment liberalisation as a result of these
overlapping processes, and those steps have undoubtedly facilitated value-chain trade.
Importantly, the CEE countries have not only liberalised trade and investment amongst
themselveswith a corresponding growth of intra-regional tradebut also with the
large, developed markets of Western Europe, particularly Germany. Germany has
played a key role as an anchor market for the CEE countries: through a restructuring
of its own production processes, Germany has acted both as a source of demand for
the CEE countries production in value-chain sectors, and as a source of investment
and technology transfer that has enabled production upgrading, particularly in core
CEE countries like Hungary. This process has taken place based on the complete
removal of restrictions to trade in goods, and movement of capital and people across
borders within the now-expanded EU.
ASEAN, by contrast, has focused on liberalisation of trade and investment flows
through the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), although ASEANs regionalism
has been more outward focused than in some other regions of the world. Discussions

24

are under way with external partners, but ASEAN lacks a free trade and investment
partner with similar characteristics to Germany, i.e., a large, developed market that can
be a source of both demand and investment. Of course, ASEAN has important links to
such markets, including Japan, the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea), and the
USA, but restrictions remain in both trade and investmentmarket freedoms are
nowhere close to being as advanced as within the EU, based on the current degree of
implementation on the ground. The CEE countries experience tends to suggest that
ASEAN could gain from undertaking substantial liberalisation of trade and investment
with a large, developed partner or partners. Historically, Japan has played an important
anchor role for ASEAN, but due to its own persistent economic malaise, it is not clear
that it currently has the potential to be ASEANs Germany. Koreas economy is more
dynamic, but its size is significantly smaller. Nonetheless, as a relatively close partner
in geographical terms, it appears to be a plausible choice.
A Free Trade Agreement between ASEAN and Korea affecting 90 percent of
products entered into force in 2009, with implementation due for 2010. Trade in
electrical equipment should therefore be freeall the more so because of the WTOs
Information Technology Agreement, which applies to a considerable part of the
sectoras should trade in transport equipment. Korea is an important global hub for
both industries.
The picture is less clear in relation to investment. Korea and ASEAN signed an
Investment Agreement in 2009, but its focus is on core obligations such as
transparency, national treatment, and most-favoured nation status. It is unclear how
much investment regimes have been liberalised in terms of the policy restrictions that
make it more difficult to invest at home than abroad. In the EU, by contrast, free
movement of capital is one of the core principles of the Single Market. From the CEE
countries point of view, this feature means that their gradual evolution into full
members of the EU entails real and substantial changes in investment openness vis-vis the developed Western European markets, such as Germany. In the context of value
chains, trade and investment both need to flow relatively freely, in particular if
production upgrading and movement up the value chain are to take place. Although
ASEAN has taken some steps in this direction with a potential anchor market like

25

Korea, it appears that there is still considerable work to be done, for example, in terms
of investment promotion and facilitation, as opposed to protection and liberalisation.
In discussing a possible anchor economy for ASEAN value chains, it is important
to address the potential role of China. China is heavily involved in global and regional
value chains in electrical equipment and transport equipment, as well as in textiles and
clothing. It is already a vital source of demand for ASEAN intermediate goods, a role
that is reinforced by the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, which liberalised 90
percent of tariff linesa major liberalisation, given Chinas size. Chinas scale also
means that it is also an important source of investment for ASEAN. There is also an
investment agreement between China and ASEAN which, unlike the Korea agreement,
includes provisions on investment promotion and facilitation, in addition to protection
and liberalisation. Again, however, the crucial question remains as to its
implementation on the ground.
Although China thus has an important role to play as a source of demand and
investment, it is not currently in a position to be ASEANs Germany, to follow the
CEE comparison. The reason is that China remains a relatively labour-abundant
country. Although it has undergone significant technology upgrading in recent decades,
its domestic economy is still arguably in a phase of technological catch up relative to
the global frontier. Germany, by contrast, is at or close to the frontier in key
manufacturing sectors. The different dynamic is seen in the value-chain tasks that are
performed in China. In electrical equipment, for example, China has become an
assembly hub, for example for Apples iPhone. However, assembly is a relatively low
value-added activity that is labour intensive. Chinas activities in the high value-added
end of the chainengineering, research, and developmentare much more limited.
The scope for Chinese investment to act as a vector of technology upgrading in
ASEAN is therefore also correspondingly limited, although it is to some extent
dependent on country baselines: for example, the CLMV countries might be more
likely to benefit from Chinese technology than the six original ASEAN members. In
any case, Chinas overall investments in Southeast Asiaof which 59 percent are in
Singaporeare only a fraction of Germanys investment stock in the CEE comparison
countries (Figure 14). Indeed, Germanys FDI stock in the Czech Republic alone is 73
percent higher than Chinas investment stock in all of the ASEAN countries analysed

26

in the data section of this paper. Moreover, Japan and Korea both have higher FDI
stocks in Southeast Asia than does China, with Japans level of investment
concentrated in Singapore and Thailandeven higher than Germanys outward FDI
stock in the CEE countries considered here. Even though Chinese outward FDI is
growing quickly in Southeast Asiaover 50 percent between 2010 and 2011it is
highly concentrated on Singapore, so its ability to act as a vector for technological
upgrading in the broader ASEAN Economic Community is not obvious. The important
point to take away is that although China is, and will remain, a vital economic partner
for ASEAN, it is important to be open to other options as far as an anchor economy
for value-chain activities in the region is concerned. The Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) is therefore an important initiative from a policy
perspective, as it would bring ASEAN countries closer to all three potential anchor
economies in terms of trade and investment relations.
Linked to the question of anchor economies is the issue of division of labour, and
specifically production activities versus headquarters activities (services). Within
ASEAN, Singapore is the primary location of headquarters functions, in particular in
terms of internationalised activities within value chains. The developed countries of
Western Europe, and particularly Germany, play that role with respect to the CEE
countries. As developing countries in ASEAN look for ways to move up in their value
chains, they will need to be attentive to ways in which they can develop competencies
in higher value-added functions more often associated with headquarters activities
broadly understood. Examples include research and development activities, as well as
business services.
Another point of interest in the comparison between ASEAN and CEE relates to
the fact that the groups are in fact relatively heterogeneous in terms of development
levels. ASEAN includes both the CLMV countries (of which two are in the TiVA data)
and Singapore, whilst the CEE region included in the data set ranges in terms of
development level from Bulgaria to Slovenia: the latters GDP per capita in PPP terms
was 78 percent higher than the formers in 2013. These kinds of differences in both
regions can have important implications for the growth and development of valuechain trade and investment. For example, the number of international production
stages for the electrical equipment sector in CEE ranges from 0.9 (Bulgaria) to 1.5

27

(Slovak Republic), compared with 0.7 (Indonesia and Brunei) to 1.7 (Viet Nam). In
this case, Viet Nam clearly stands out for its level of internationalisation: based on the
CEE experience, it might be believed that countries at lower levels of per capita income
tend to have lower levels of internationalisation, but Viet Namwhere value chain
trade is a vital part of the countrys development strategytells a different story. One
possible implication is that there is an important role for national policy in helping to
shape the evolution of value chains in the region.
The importance of within-region heterogeneity is reinforced when other indicators
are considered. The backwards linkage index, for example, ranges from 1.5 in Bulgaria
to 15.1 in Hungary in the electrical equipment sector. In transport equipment, there is
also a significant range: 0.7 in Bulgaria and Estonia to 9.4 in Hungary. These figures
again suggest a very different level and nature of value-chain involvement across
countries within the same region. The fact that Hungary and other relatively central
CEE countries, like the Slovak Republic, stand out is potentially important. These
countries are geographically close to Western Europe, and especially the German
anchor market. Their level of human capital is high, so workers are relatively welleducated. All of this facilitates internationalisation of increasingly sophisticated valuechain functions. An implication of this papers findings for ASEANdrawing on the
comparison with the most successful CEE countriesis that long-term investments in
human capital are an important factor in determining a countrys ability to move up
value chains into higher value-added activities.
To summarise, it is important to keep the potential policy implications of this
papers empirical findings in perspective. As noted previously, many factors lie behind
observed differences in value-chain indicators across time periods, regions, and
countries. Nonetheless, the combination of the literature review and the data analysis
is suggestive of some important possibilities for ASEAN, based primarily on lessons
learnt from the experience of the CEE countries. First, a liberal trade and investment
regimeboth intra- and extra-regionallyseems to be a crucial determinant of a
regions ability to grow and develop international value chains. Second, it is important
to pay particular attention to possible anchor markets, i.e., sources of both demand and
investment (including technology). ASEAN has been active in integrating goods
markets with regional partners, but it appears that work remains to be done in the area

28

of investment. Third, long-term investments in human capital will be important if

ASEAN countries are to continue moving up international value chains to higher
value-added activities. Of course, the scope to do so varies from country to country,
according to development level. But with the possible exception of Singaporewhich
is at or close to the world technological frontierthere is room for ASEAN countries
to both participate more fully in value chains, and to do so through a range of
alternative activities associated with higher levels of value addition.

5. Conclusion
This paper has compared value chain experiences in ASEAN, CEE, and LAC.
Three sectors have been considered: electrical equipment, transport equipment, and
textiles and clothing. The data reveal different levels of internationalisation according
to region and sector. In general, the electrical equipment and transport equipment
sectors are more internationalised than textiles and clothing. In regional terms,
ASEAN and CEE both have much more international and dynamic value chains than
LAC, although the data for LAC need to be interpreted cautiously due to a small
sample.
From a policy perspective, the comparison between ASEAN and CEE is most
instructive. The CEE countries have seen rapid internationalisation of their production
processes, in line with the economic transition and the path to membership of the EU.
They have undertaken deep trade and investment liberalisation not only amongst
themselves, but also with the large, developed markets of Western Europe. Germany
plays a particularly important role as an anchor market for the CEE countries: it is both
a vital source of demand for their value-chain production, and also a source of
investment through production outsourcing, which can act as a vector for technological
change in the host countries. A range of factors lie behind the decision of German
manufacturing firms to build productive capacity in CEE, and include the region in
international value chains, but amongst the most important are the free movement of
goods and capital, geographical proximity that reduces trade costs, differences in
factor abundance and therefore relative prices, and levels of human capital. The last

29

factor appears to be particularly important in the ability of some core CEE countries,
such as Hungary, to move up manufacturing value chains to higher value added
activities.
The experience of the CEE countries with the EU, and with Germany in particular,
has implications for ASEANs processes of intra- and extra-regional economic
integration. The AEC already represents a commitment to the free movement of goods
and capital within the region. The CEE experience suggests, however, that the
ASEAN+ initiatives may be of particular importance in terms of the regions ability
to interface with potential anchor economies. Although those agreements have made
notable progress in terms of freeing up goods trade, there is still much to be done in
terms of promoting and facilitating investment with extra-ASEAN partners. Free
movement of goods is important from the perspective of intensifying value-chain trade,
but external investment, including technology transfer, is key if ASEAN countries are
to move up manufacturing value chains to higher value-added activities.
On a macro-policy level, ASEAN will need to pay renewed attention to the
ASEAN+ initiatives from this perspective. There is a strong case to be made for
prioritising integration with a regional anchor economy. The regional dimension is
important so as to keep trade costs low, which facilitates value-chain interactions.
Although China is an important source of demand for ASEAN exportsincluding
within value chainsit is still in a process of catch up with respect to the global
technology frontier. Japan is much better placed from this perspective, but its economy
has been in considerable difficulty for an extended period of time. A potential anchor
that offers both technology and dynamism is Korea. It has the advantage of already
being a global hub in two industries that are of particular importance for ASEAN value
chains, namely electrical equipment and transport equipment.
Comparing experiences across the three regions considered in this paper, it is clear
that national and regional policies interact to provide a conducive environment to
value-chain trade. Getting the regional stance right, particular as regards investment,
is important. However, so too are national policies in areas such as human capital
formation (i.e., education and training). Movement up the value chain requires access
to an educated workforce, so investments in this area are a necessary complement to
free flows of goods and capital with key partners. The experience of the CEE

30

countrieswhich started from a relatively strong basis in human capital, and then
liberalised movements of goods, services, people, and capitalshould be highly
instructive for ASEAN going forward, as the emphasis in most countries shifts from
joining GVCs to moving up.

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32

Figures 8-14
Figure 8: Backward Participation Index (Electrical Equipment)
12

Percent

10
8
6
4
2
0
ASEAN

LAC
Country Group
1995

CEE

2009

Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Indicators.

Figure 9: Backward Participation Index (Transport Equipment)

12

Percent

10
8
6
4
2
0
ASEAN

LAC
Country Group
1995

Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Indicators.

33

2009

CEE

Figure 10: Backward Participation Index (Textiles and Clothing)

12

Percent

10
8
6
4
2
0
ASEAN

LAC
Country Group
1995

CEE

2009

Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Indicators.

Percent

Figure 11: Forward Participation Index (Electrical Equipment)

4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
ASEAN

LAC
Country Group
1995

Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Indicators.

34

2009

CEE

Percent

Figure 12: Forward Participation Index (Transport Equipment)

4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
ASEAN

LAC
Country Group
1995

CEE

2009

Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Indicators.

Percent

Figure 13: Forward Participation Index (Textiles and Clothing)

4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
ASEAN

LAC
Country Group
1995

Source: OECD-WTO TiVA Indicators.

35

2009

CEE

Figure 14: Outward FDI Stocks of China, Japan, and Korea in Southeast Asia,
and Germany
in CEE, 2011 (USD million)
120000

Million USD

100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
China in SE Asia

Japan in SE Asia

Korea in SE Asia

Germany in CEE

Region

Note: Southeast Asia is defined as elsewhere in the paper, i.e. Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Similarly, CEE is defined as
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
Source: UNCTAD Bilateral FDI Statistics.

36

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Kazunobu
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BOWEN and
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Tan LI and Larry D.

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Exporting and Firm-Level Credit Constraints Mar

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Esther Ann BLER,

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Globalization: A Womans Best Friend? Exporters Mar

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AGUSTIN and Martin
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Mar
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Hideo KOBAYASHI
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The CLMV Automobile and Auto Parts Industry

2015-22

Hideo KOBAYASHI

Mar
Current State and Issues of the Automobile and Auto
Parts Industries in ASEAN
2015

2015-21

Yoshifumi
FUKUNAGA

Mar
Assessing the Progress of ASEAN MRAs on
Professional Services
2015

2015-20

Yoshifumi
FUKUNAGA and
Hikari ISHIDO

Mar
Values and Limitations of the ASEAN Agreement
on the Movement of Natural Persons
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2015-19

Nanda NURRIDZKI

Learning from the ASEAN + 1 Model and the ACIA

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Patarapong
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Preeda
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Global Production Networks and

Industrial Upgrading: The Case
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2015-17

Rajah RASIAH and

Yap Xiao SHAN

Institutional Support, Regional Trade Linkages and Feb

Technological Capabilities in the Semiconductor
2015
Industry in Singapore

Mar
2015

Mar
2015

Mar

39

2015

Host-Site Feb
of the
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No.

Author(s)

2015-16

Rajah RASIAH and

Yap Xiao SHAN

2015-15

Xin Xin KONG, Miao

ZHANG and Santha
Chenayah RAMU

2015-14

Tin Htoo NAING and

Yap Su FEI

2015-13

2015-12

2015-11

2015-10

2015-09

2015-08

2015-07

2015-06

2015-05

2015-04

Title

Institutional Support, Regional Trade Linkages and Feb

Technological Capabilities in the Semiconductor
2015
Industry in Malaysia
Feb
Chinas Semiconductor Industry in Global Value
Chains
2015
Feb
Multinationals, Technology and Regional Linkages
in Myanmars Clothing Industry
2015

The Garment Industry in Laos: Technological

Vanthana NOLINTHA
Capabilities, Global Production Chains and
and Idris JAJRI
Competitiveness
Miao ZHANG, Xin
The Transformation of the Clothing Industry in
Xin KONG, Santha
China
Chenayah RAMU
NGUYEN Dinh Chuc,
NGUYEN Ngoc Anh, Host-site institutions, Regional Production
Linkages and Technological Upgrading: A study of
NGUYEN Ha Trang
Automotive Firms in Vietnam
and NGUYEN Ngoc
Minh
Pararapong
Intra-industry Trade, Product Fragmentation and
INTERAKUMNERD
Technological Capability Development in Thai
and Kriengkrai
Automotive Industry
TECHAKANONT
Rene E. OFRENEO
Rajah RASIAH, Rafat
Beigpoor
SHAHRIVAR,
Abdusy Syakur AMIN
Yansheng LI, Xin Xin
KONG, and Miao
ZHANG
Mukul G. ASHER and
Fauziah ZEN
Lili Yan ING, Stephen
MAGIERA, and
Anika WIDIANA
Gemma ESTRADA,
James ANGRESANO,
Jo Thori LIND, Niku
MTNEN,
William MCBRIDE,
Donghyun PARK,
Motohiro SATO, and
Karin SVANBORG-

Year

Auto and Car Parts Production: Can the Philippines

Catch Up with Asia

Feb
2015
Feb
2015
Feb
2015
Feb
2015
Feb
2015

Host-site Support, Foreign Ownership, Regional

Linkages and Technological Capabilites: Evidence
from Automotive Firms in Indonesia

Feb

Industrial Upgrading in Global Production

Networks: Te Case of the Chinese Automotive
Industry

Feb

Social Protection in ASEAN: Challenges and

Initiatives for Post-2015 Vision
Business Licensing: A Key to Investment Climate
Reform

Fiscal Policy and Equity in Advanced Economies:

Lessons for Asia

40

2015

2015
Feb
2015
Feb
2015

Jan
2015

No.

Author(s)

Title

Year

SJVALL

2015-03

2015-02

2015-01

2014-26

Erlinda M.
MEDALLA

Towards an Enabling Set of Rules of Origin for the

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

Archanun
KOHPAIBOON and
Juthathip
JONGWANICH

Use of FTAs from Thai Experience

Misa OKABE

Impact of Free Trade Agreements on Trade in East

Asia

Hikari ISHIDO

Coverage of Trade in Services under ASEAN+1

FTAs

2014-25

Junianto James
LOSARI

2014-24

Dayong ZHANG and

David C. Broadstock

2014-23

Dandan ZHANG,
Xunpeng SHI, and Yu
SHENG

2014-22

Yanrui WU

2014-21

Yanfei LI and
Youngho CHANG

Jan
2015
Jan
2015
Jan
2015
Dec
2014

Dec
Searching for an Ideal International Investment
Protection Regime for ASEAN + Dialogue Partners
2014
(RCEP): Where Do We Begin?
Nov
Impact of International Oil Price Shocks on
Consumption Expenditures in ASEAN and East
2014
Asia
Nov
Enhanced Measurement of Energy Market
Integration in East Asia: An Application of
2014
Dynamic Principal Component Analysis
Nov
Deregulation, Competition, and Market Integration
in Chinas Electricity Sector
2014
Infrastructure Investments for Power Trade and Nov
Transmission in ASEAN+2: Costs, Benefits, Long2014
Term Contracts, and Prioritised Development

Yu SHENG, Yanrui
WU, Xunpeng SHI,
Dandan ZHANG
Andindya
BHATTACHARYA
and Tania
BHATTACHARYA

Market Integration and Energy Trade Efficiency: An Nov

Application of Malmqviat Index to Analyse Multi2014
Product Trade

Olivier CADOT, Lili

Yan ING

How Restrictive Are ASEANs RoO?

2014-17

Sadayuki TAKII

July
Import Penetration, Export Orientation, and Plant
Size in Indonesian Manufacturing
2014

2014-16

Tomoko INUI, Keiko

ITO, and Daisuke
MIYAKAWA

Japanese Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises July

Export Decisions: The Role of Overseas Market
2014
Information

2014-20

2014-19

2014-18

Nov
ASEAN-India Gas Cooperation: Redifining Indias
Look East Policy with Myanmar
2014
Sep

41

2014

No.

Author(s)

2014-15

Han PHOUMIN and

Fukunari KIMURA

2014-14

Cassey LEE

Title

Year

Trade-off Relationship between Energy Intensity- June

thus energy demand- and Income Level: Empirical
Evidence and Policy Implications for ASEAN and 2014
East Asia Countries
May
The Exporting and Productivity Nexus: Does Firm
Size Matter?
2014

2014-13

Yifan ZHANG

May
Productivity Evolution of Chinese large and Small
Firms in the Era of Globalisation
2014
Offshoring and the Shortening of the Quality
Ladder:Evidence from Danish Apparel

May

2014-12

Valria SMEETS,
Sharon
TRAIBERMAN,
Frederic
WARZYNSKI

May

Inkyo CHEONG

Koreas Policy Package for Enhancing its FTA

Utilization and Implications for Koreas Policy

Sothea OUM,
Dionisius NARJOKO,
and Charles HARVIE
Christopher
PARSONS and PierreLouis Vzina
Kazunobu
HAYAKAWA and
Toshiyuki
MATSUURA

Constraints, Determinants of SME Innovation, and

the Role of Government Support

May

Migrant Networks and Trade: The Vietnamese

Boat People as a Natural Experiment

May
2014

Dynamic Tow-way Relationship between

Exporting and Importing: Evidence from Japan

May
2014

DOAN Thi Thanh Ha

and Kozo KIYOTA

Firm-level Evidence on Productivity Differentials

and Turnover in Vietnamese Manufacturing

Apr

2014-11

2014-10

2014-09

2014-08

2014-07

2014-06

2014-05

2014-04

2014-03

Multiproduct Firms, Export Product Scope, and

Larry QIU and Miaojie Trade Liberalization: The Role of Managerial
YU
Efficiency

2014

2014

2014

2014
Apr
2014

Han PHOUMIN and

Shigeru KIMURA

Analysis on Price Elasticity of Energy Demand in

East Asia: Empirical Evidence and Policy
Implications for ASEAN and East Asia

Apr

Youngho CHANG and

Yanfei LI

Non-renewable Resources in Asian Economies:

Perspectives of Availability, Applicability,
Acceptability, and Affordability

Feb

Ysuyuki SAWADA
and Fauziah ZEN

Disaster Management in ASEAN

Cassey LEE

Competition Law Enforcement in Malaysia

2014

2014
Jan
2014
Jan

2014-02

2014

42

No.
2014-01

2013-38

2013-37

2013-36

2013-35

2013-34

2013-33

2013-32

2013-31

2013-30

2013-29

2013-28

2013-27

2013-26

2013-25

Author(s)

Title

Year
Jan

Rizal SUKMA

ASEAN Beyond 2015: The Imperatives for Further

Institutional Changes

Toshihiro OKUBO,
Fukunari KIMURA,
Nozomu TESHIMA

Asian Fragmentation in the Global Financial Crisis

Xunpeng SHI and

Cecilya MALIK

Assessment of ASEAN Energy Cooperation within

the ASEAN Economic Community

Dec

Tereso S. TULLAO,
Jr. And Christopher
James CABUAY

Eduction and Human Capital Development to

Strengthen R&D Capacity in the ASEAN

Dec

Dec

Paul A. RASCHKY

Estimating the Effects of West Sumatra Public

Asset Insurance Program on Short-Term Recovery
after the September 2009 Earthquake

Nipon
POAPONSAKORN
and Pitsom
MEETHOM

Impact of the 2011 Floods, and Food Management

in Thailand

Nov

Nov

Mitsuyo ANDO

Development and Resructuring of Regional

Production/Distribution Networks in East Asia

Mitsuyo ANDO and

Fukunari KIMURA

Evolution of Machinery Production Networks:

Linkage of North America with East Asia?

Nov

Mitsuyo ANDO and

Fukunari KIMURA

What are the Opportunities and Challenges for

ASEAN?

Nov

Nov

Simon PEETMAN

Standards Harmonisation in ASEAN: Progress,

Challenges and Moving Beyond 2015

Jonathan KOH and

Andrea Feldman
MOWERMAN

Towards a Truly Seamless Single Windows and

Trade Facilitation Regime in ASEAN Beyond 2015

Nov

Nov

Rajah RASIAH

Stimulating Innovation in ASEAN Institutional

Support, R&D Activity and Intelletual Property
Rights

Maria Monica
WIHARDJA

Financial Integration Challenges in ASEAN

beyond 2015

Nov

Dec
2013

Who Disseminates Technology to Whom, How,

Tomohiro MACHIKIT
and Why: Evidence from Buyer-Seller Business
A and Yasushi UEKI
Networks
Fukunari KIMURA

2014

Reconstructing the Concept of Single Market a

Production Base for ASEAN beyond 2015

43

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013

2013
Nov
2013
Oct

No.

Author(s)

Title

Year
2013

2013-24

Olivier CADOT
Ernawati MUNADI
Lili Yan ING
Charles HARVIE,

2013-23

2013-22

Dionisius NARJOKO,
Sothea OUM
Alan Khee-Jin TAN

Streamlining NTMs in ASEAN:

Oct

The Way Forward

2013

Small and Medium Enterprises Access to Finance:

Evidence from Selected Asian Economies

Oct

Toward a Single Aviation Market in ASEAN:

Regulatory Reform and Industry Challenges

Oct

2013

2013

Hisanobu SHISHIDO,
2013-21

2013-20

2013-19

Moving MPAC Forward: Strengthening PublicShintaro SUGIYAMA,

Private Partnership, Improving Project Portfolio
Fauziah ZEN
and in Search of Practical Financing Schemes
Barry DESKER, Mely
CABALLEROANTHONY, Paul
TENG

Oct
2013

Thought/Issues Paper on ASEAN Food Security:

Towards a more Comprehensive Framework

Oct

Toshihiro KUDO,
Making Myanmar the Star Growth Performer in
Satoru KUMAGAI, So ASEAN in the Next Decade: A Proposal of Five
UMEZAKI
Growth Strategies

Sep

2013

2013

2013-18

Ruperto MAJUCA

Managing Economic Shocks and Macroeconomic Sep

Coordination in an Integrated Region: ASEAN
2013
Beyond 2015

Cassy LEE and

Yoshifumi
FUKUNAGA

Competition Policy Challenges of Single Market

and Production Base

Sep

2013-17

Growing an ASEAN Voice? : A Common Platform

in Global and Regional Governance

Sep

Simon TAY

2013-16

2013-15

2013-14

Danilo C. ISRAEL
and Roehlano M.
BRIONES

Allen Yu-Hung LAI

and Seck L. TAN

Impacts of Natural Disasters on Agriculture, Food

Security, and Natural Resources and Environment
in the Philippines

Impact of Disasters and Disaster Risk Management

in Singapore: A Case Study of Singapores
Experience in Fighting the SARS Epidemic

44

2013

2013
Aug
2013
Aug
2013

No.
2013-13

2013-12

2013-11

2013-10

Author(s)
Brent LAYTON

Mitsuyo ANDO

Le Dang TRUNG

Title

Year

Impact of Natural Disasters on Production

Networks and Urbanization in New Zealand

Aug

Impact of Recent Crises and Disasters on Regional

Production/Distribution Networks and Trade in
Japan

Aug

Economic and Welfare Impacts of Disasters in East

Asia and Policy Responses: The Case of Vietnam

Aug

Sann VATHANA,
Sothea OUM, Ponhrith Impact of Disasters and Role of Social Protection
KAN, Colas
in Natural Disaster Risk Management in Cambodia
CHERVIER

2013

2013

2013
Aug
2013

Sommarat
CHANTARAT, Krirk
PANNANGPETCH,
Nattapong
PUTTANAPONG,
Preesan RAKWATIN,
and Thanasin
TANOMPONGPHAN
DH

Index-Based Risk Financing and Development of

Natural Disaster Insurance Programs in Developing
Asian Countries

Aug

Ikumo ISONO and

Satoru KUMAGAI

Long-run Economic Impacts of Thai Flooding:

Geographical Simulation Analysis

July

2013-07

Yoshifumi
FUKUNAGA and
Hikaru ISHIDO

Assessing the Progress of Services Liberalization in May

the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA)
2013

2013-06

Ken ITAKURA,
Yoshifumi
FUKUNAGA, and
Ikumo ISONO

A CGE Study of Economic Impact of Accession of

Hong Kong to ASEAN-China Free Trade
Agreement

Misa OKABE and

Shujiro URATA

The Impact of AFTA on Intra-AFTA Trade

How Far Will Hong Kongs Accession to ACFTA
will Impact on Trade in Goods?

May

Kohei SHIINO

ASEAN Regional Cooperation on Competition

Policy

Apr

Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP:

Jan

A Mapping Study

2013

2013-09

2013-08

2013-05

2013-04

2013-03

2013-02

Cassey LEE and

Yoshifumi
FUKUNAGA
Yoshifumi
FUKUNAGA and
Ikumo ISONO

2013

2013

May
2013
May
2013

45

2013

2013

No.

Author(s)

Title

Year

2013-01

Ken ITAKURA

Impact of Liberalization and Improved

Connectivity and Facilitation in ASEAN for the
ASEAN Economic Community

Jan
2013

2012-17

Sun XUEGONG, Guo

LIYAN, Zeng
ZHENG

Market Entry Barriers for FDI and Private

Investors: Lessons from Chinas Electricity Market

Aug
2012

2012-16

Yanrui WU

Electricity Market Integration: Global Trends and

Implications for the EAS Region

Aug
2012

2012-15

Youngho CHANG,
Yanfei LI

Power Generation and Cross-border Grid Planning

for the Integrated ASEAN Electricity Market: A
Dynamic Linear Programming Model

Aug
2012

2012-14

Yanrui WU, Xunpeng

SHI

Economic Development, Energy Market

Integration and Energy Demand: Implications for
East Asia

Aug
2012

2012-13

Joshua AIZENMAN,
Minsoo LEE, and
Donghyun PARK

The Relationship between Structural Change and

Inequality: A Conceptual Overview with Special
Reference to Developing Asia

July
2012

2012-12

Hyun-Hoon LEE,
Minsoo LEE, and
Donghyun PARK

Growth Policy and Inequality in Developing Asia:

Lessons from Korea

July
2012

2012-11

Cassey LEE

Knowledge Flows, Organization and Innovation:

Firm-Level Evidence from Malaysia

June
2012

2012-10

Jacques MAIRESSE,
Pierre MOHNEN,
Yayun ZHAO, and
Feng ZHEN

Globalization, Innovation and Productivity in

Manufacturing Firms: A Study of Four Sectors of
China

June
2012

2012-09

Ari KUNCORO

Globalization and Innovation in Indonesia:

Evidence from Micro-Data on Medium and Large
Manufacturing Establishments

June
2012

2012-08

Alfons
PALANGKARAYA

The Link between Innovation and Export: Evidence June

from Australias Small and Medium Enterprises
2012

2012-07

Chin Hee HAHN and

Chang-Gyun PARK

Direction of Causality in Innovation-Exporting

Linkage: Evidence on Korean Manufacturing

June
2012

2012-06

Keiko ITO

Source of Learning-by-Exporting Effects: Does

Exporting Promote Innovation?

June
2012

2012-05

Rafaelita M.
ALDABA

Trade Reforms, Competition, and Innovation in the

Philippines

June
2012

46

No.

Author(s)

Title

Year

Toshiyuki
MATSUURA and
Kazunobu
HAYAKAWA

The Role of Trade Costs in FDI Strategy of

Heterogeneous Firms: Evidence from Japanese
Firm-level Data

June

2012-03

Kazunobu
HAYAKAWA,
Fukunari KIMURA,
and Hyun-Hoon LEE

How Does Country Risk Matter for Foreign Direct

Investment?

Feb
2012

2012-02

Ikumo ISONO, Satoru

KUMAGAI, Fukunari
KIMURA

Agglomeration and Dispersion in China and

ASEAN: A Geographical Simulation Analysis

2012-04

How Did the Japanese Exports Respond to Two

Crises in the International Production Network?:
The Global Financial Crisis and the East Japan
Earthquake
Interactive Learning-driven Innovation in
Upstream-Downstream Relations: Evidence from
Mutual Exchanges of Engineers in Developing
Economies

2012

Jan
2012

2012-01

Mitsuyo ANDO and

Fukunari KIMURA

2011-10

Tomohiro
MACHIKITA and
Yasushi UEKI

2011-09

Joseph D. ALBA,
Wai-Mun CHIA, and
Donghyun PARK

Foreign Output Shocks and Monetary Policy

Regimes in Small Open Economies: A DSGE
Evaluation of East Asia

2011-08

Tomohiro
MACHIKITA and
Yasushi UEKI

Impacts of Incoming Knowledge on Product

Innovation: Econometric Case Studies of
Technology Transfer of Auto-related Industries in
Developing Economies

2011-07

Yanrui WU

Gas Market Integration: Global Trends and

Implications for the EAS Region

Nov
2011

Philip AndrewsSPEED

Energy Market Integration in East Asia: A

Regional Public Goods Approach

Nov

2011-06

Yu SHENG,

Energy Market Integration and Economic

Convergence: Implications for East Asia

Oct
2011

2011-05
Xunpeng SHI

2011-04

Why Does Population Aging Matter So Much for

Sang-Hyop LEE,
Andrew MASON, and Asia? Population Aging, Economic Security and
Donghyun PARK
Economic Growth in Asia
Xunpeng SHI,

2011-03
Shinichi GOTO
2011-02

Hikari ISHIDO

Jan
2012

Dec
2011

Dec
2011
Nov
2011

2011

Aug
2011

Harmonizing Biodiesel Fuel Standards in East Asia:

Current Status, Challenges and the Way Forward

May
2011

Liberalization of Trade in Services under

ASEAN+n : A Mapping Exercise

May
2011

47

No.

Author(s)

Title

2011-01

Kuo-I CHANG,
Kazunobu
HAYAKAWA.
Toshiyuki
MATSUURA

2010-11

Charles HARVIE,
Firm Characteristic Determinants of SME
Dionisius NARJOKO,
Participation in Production Networks
Sothea OUM

2010-10

Mitsuyo ANDO
Fukunari KIMURA

2010-09
Ayako OBASHI

Location Choice of Multinational Enterprises in

China: Comparison between Japan and Taiwan

Year

Mar
2011

Oct
2010

Machinery Trade in East Asia, and the Global

Financial Crisis

Oct
2010

International Production Networks in Machinery

Industries: Structure and Its Evolution

Sep
2010

2010-08

Tomohiro
MACHIKITA, Shoichi Detecting Effective Knowledge Sources in Product
MIYAHARA,
Innovation: Evidence from Local Firms and
Masatsugu TSUJI, and MNCs/JVs in Southeast Asia
Yasushi UEKI

Aug
2010

2010-07

Tomohiro
MACHIKITA,
How ICTs Raise Manufacturing Performance:
Masatsugu TSUJI, and Firm-level Evidence in Southeast Asia
Yasushi UEKI

Aug
2010

2010-06

Xunpeng SHI

Carbon Footprint Labeling Activities in the East

Asia Summit Region: Spillover Effects to Less
Developed Countries

July
2010

2010-05

Kazunobu
HAYAKAWA,
Fukunari KIMURA,
and Tomohiro
MACHIKITA

Firm-level Analysis of Globalization: A Survey of

the Eight Literatures

Mar
2010

2010-04

Tomohiro
MACHIKITA and
Yasushi UEKI

The Impacts of Face-to-face and Frequent

Interactions on Innovation: Upstream-Downstream
Relations

Feb
2010

Tomohiro
MACHIKITA and
Yasushi UEKI

Innovation in Linked and Non-linked Firms:

2010-03

2010-02

Tomohiro
MACHIKITA and
Yasushi UEKI

Search-theoretic Approach to Securing New

Suppliers: Impacts of Geographic Proximity for
Importer and Non-importer

Feb
2010

2010-01

Tomohiro
MACHIKITA and
Yasushi UEKI

Spatial Architecture of the Production Networks in

Southeast Asia: Empirical Evidence from Firmlevel Data

Feb
2010

Effects of Variety of Linkages in East Asia

48

Feb
2010

No.

2009-23

Author(s)

Dionisius NARJOKO

Title
Foreign Presence Spillovers and Firms Export
Response:

Year
Nov
2009

Evidence from the Indonesian Manufacturing

2009-22

Kazunobu
HAYAKAWA,
Daisuke
HIRATSUKA, Kohei
SHIINO, and Seiya
SUKEGAWA

Who Uses Free Trade Agreements?

Nov
2009

2009-21

Ayako OBASHI

Resiliency of Production Networks in Asia:

Evidence from the Asian Crisis

Oct
2009

2009-20

Mitsuyo ANDO and

Fukunari KIMURA

Fragmentation in East Asia: Further Evidence

Oct
2009

2009-19

Xunpeng SHI

The Prospects for Coal: Global Experience and

Implications for Energy Policy

Sept
2009

2009-18

Sothea OUM

Income Distribution and Poverty in a CGE

Framework: A Proposed Methodology

Jun
2009

2009-17

Erlinda M.
MEDALLA and Jenny
BALBOA

ASEAN Rules of Origin: Lessons and

Recommendations for the Best Practice

Jun
2009

2009-16

Masami ISHIDA

Special Economic Zones and Economic Corridors

Jun
2009

2009-15

Toshihiro KUDO

Border Area Development in the GMS: Turning the May

Periphery into the Center of Growth
2009

2009-14

Claire HOLLWEG
and Marn-Heong
WONG

Measuring Regulatory Restrictions in Logistics

Services

Apr
2009

2009-13

Loreli C. De DIOS

Business View on Trade Facilitation

Apr
2009

2009-12

Patricia SOURDIN
and Richard
POMFRET

Monitoring Trade Costs in Southeast Asia

Apr
2009

Barriers to Trade in Health and Financial Services

in ASEAN

Apr
2009

Philippa DEE and

2009-11
Huong DINH
2009-10

Sayuri SHIRAI

The Impact of the US Subprime Mortgage Crisis on

Apr
the World and East Asia: Through Analyses of
2009
Cross-border Capital Movements

49

No.

Author(s)

Title

Year

Akie IRIYAMA

International Production Networks and

Export/Import Responsiveness to Exchange Rates:
The Case of Japanese Manufacturing Firms

Mar
2009

2009-08

Archanun
KOHPAIBOON

Vertical and Horizontal FDI Technology

Spillovers:Evidence from Thai Manufacturing

Mar
2009

2009-07

Kazunobu
HAYAKAWA,
Fukunari KIMURA,
and Toshiyuki
MATSUURA

Gains from Fragmentation at the Firm Level:

Evidence from Japanese Multinationals in East
Asia

Mar
2009

2009-06

Dionisius A.
NARJOKO

Plant Entry in a More

Mar
LiberalisedIndustrialisationProcess: An Experience
2009
of Indonesian Manufacturing during the 1990s

2009-05

Kazunobu
HAYAKAWA,
Fukunari KIMURA,
and Tomohiro
MACHIKITA

Firm-level Analysis of Globalization: A Survey

Mar
2009

2009-04

Chin Hee HAHN and

Chang-Gyun PARK

Learning-by-exporting in Korean Manufacturing:

A Plant-level Analysis

Mar
2009

2009-03

Ayako OBASHI

Stability of Production Networks in East Asia:

Duration and Survival of Trade

Mar
2009

2009-02

Fukunari KIMURA

The Spatial Structure of Production/Distribution

Networks and Its Implication for Technology
Transfers and Spillovers

Mar
2009

2009-01

Fukunari KIMURA
and Ayako OBASHI

International Production Networks: Comparison

between China and ASEAN

Jan
2009

2008-03

Kazunobu
HAYAKAWA and
Fukunari KIMURA

The Effect of Exchange Rate Volatility on

International Trade in East Asia

Dec
2008

2008-02

Satoru KUMAGAI,
Toshitaka GOKAN,
Ikumo ISONO, and
Souknilanh KEOLA

Predicting Long-Term Effects of Infrastructure

Development Projects in Continental South East
Asia: IDE Geographical Simulation Model

Dec
2008

2008-01

Kazunobu
HAYAKAWA,
Fukunari KIMURA,
and Tomohiro
MACHIKITA

Firm-level Analysis of Globalization: A Survey

Dec
2008

Mitsuyo ANDO

and

2009-09

50