World Affairs Institute

American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region

Author(s): STEPHEN BLANK
Source: World Affairs, Vol. 163, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 65-79
Published by: World Affairs Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672600
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Vol. 163No. 2

Fall 2000

American
and

65

Grand

the Transcaspian

By STEPHENBLANK
o understand
T

Strategy

U.S.

policy

toward

the Tran

scaspian region, we must realize that the

Clinton administration and much of the U.S.
elite do not distinguish between defense ofU.S.

values promoting democracy abroad and what

thatentails and more concrete interests.1Major
works on U.S. policy insist that even self-inter
ested policies must be rooted inAmerican val
ues to succeed or to command domestic or for

eign support.2 Accordingly, it is difficult and

unrewarding to distinguish in practice or in
rhetoric between U.S. policies aiming to pro
mote interests and those that seek to promote
values. Still we must attempt to do so.

This imbrication of today's liberal ideology

of globalization, democratization, and reform
with the intention of using America's and the
instruments of power
to the Transcaspian.
particularly
access, denial of a
interests,
energy
Strategic
Russian
resurgent
empire, and a values laden
international policy to promote democracy as

West's

formidable

applies

themain goal appear in both the rhetoric and

the actuality of theU.S. regional presence.3
rivalry is al
Rhetorically, geoeconomic

the classical forms of

geostrategic competition. But the intensifying
struggle over Transcaspian energy sources also
traditional rivalry
reveals a bare-knuckled
one. For Russia,
the
economic
beyond
merely
legedly supplanting

Region

around theCaspian."4 Politics, not economics,

dominates current and future decisions about
pipelines and major investment projects. As
to the CIS Stephen Sestanovich
Ambassador

acknowledges, U.S. policy begins from an

assessment of our strategic interests, not eco
nomic ones.5 Yet he simultaneously proclaims
that our highest goal is to create and sustain

democratic political
institutions.6 Earlier,
Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said
that job one was conflict resolution, which is
by no means the same thing.7

Because the entire Transcaspian area is rid

dled with intrigues and wars, this hardheaded
assessment suggests just how misplaced
the
that
of
liberal
paradigm
geoeconomics
pacific,
dominates much writing about international
affairs is. Notwithstanding its rhetoric about

win-win outcomes, the United States clearly

does not share the view tirelessly preached by
many U.S. academics and officials about the
automatic benevolence of the new world order.
The growing U.S.
caspian

region

and theUnited States, cannot

be understood or separated from more tradi
tional and competitive geostrategies aiming to
integrate the Transcaspian into a Western or

if not control, over the producer states' des

tinies.As The Economist wrote about oil firms
and governments, "They and every shark east

Russian

decades,

administration.8

have realized that over the next

the greatest of games will be played

strate

grating the area more fully into theWest in

termsof both defense and economics. The quest
for energy, the source of a new great game

between Russia

of Suez

degree,

gic, or even geopolitical, and aims to enhance

U.S. influence and not that of other states. It
combines all the traditional instruments of
power, superior economic potential, and mili
taryprowess as well as a commitment to inte

the United

States, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan,

China, and Eurasia's oil and gas producing
states, control of those energy sources and
their transportation tomarket means leverage,

involvement in the Trans

is, in the highest

ecumene. Such integration of the new

independent states into Western economic,

political, and military institutionsand practices

is the fundamental policy aim of the Clinton

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Stephen Blank isMacArthur

of Research at the

Professor

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.

Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania. The
views expressed here do not

necessarily represent those of the

U.S. Army, Department of
Defense, or the U.S. government.

Affairs
666Worl
U.S. ECONOMIC

notion fundamentally contradictsWashington's

insistence on their independence as a key poli

AND ENERGY

ENGAGEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA

AND THE TRANSCASPIAN
Besides

cy goal.'4

ideology, strategic calculations of

and accessibility
prices
through

energy
pipelines, and traditional issues of security in
Europe, the CIS, and theMiddle East drive
and politically
U.S. policy. Economically
terms
in
of
expanding investment
particularly

and trading opportunities for the new states

with theWest and devising conflict resolution
that involve European security
mechanisms
interest

organizations-U.S.

in the Transcaspi

an has risen with that area's emergence onto

Europe's security agenda since 1992. An area
thatwas essentially a strategic backwater has

suddenly become an area of vital importance

for European, Middle Eastern, American, and

Asian

security.9

NATO's

former

secretary-gen

eral Javier Solana made it clear that Europe

cannot be fully secure if theCaucasus remains

outside European security.10He also stressed

the unified vision of liberal values and interests
thatanimates U.S. and NATO regional strategy:
What

we

Atlantic,

are expanding
is a European,
indeed
include our
space. I deliberately

civil

military arrangements into this definitionof

"civic space." The postwar experience
inWest
ern Europe
and econom
suggests that political
ic progress and security integration are closely
linked. Once
their security
is taken care of,
countries

can

devote

themselves

confidence

to their long-term

responsible
democratic

military,
societies

with

evolution.

more

And

in our
firmly embedded
and under civil control, is

part and parcel of that civic space, as are the

structures that are transparent, defen
military
sive, and multinational.'

More specifically, the professed fundamental

interest in theUnited States in integrating the
key areas of the CIS fully intoWestern eco
nomic and military-political structures entails
those governments' growing democratization,
creation of law governed states accountable to
theirpublics, and development of open market
economies.12 Those objectives also call on

Consequently, the Transcaspian, including

Central Asia has become perhaps the most
important area of directWestern-Russian con
tention today. Europe put the area on its agen

da through the Organization for Security and

Cooperation inEurope (OSCE), and American
determination to prevent Russia from gaining a

sphere of influence in theTranscaspian became

public by 1995. Moreover, due to NATO's
Kosovo campaign, Russian elites expect NATO
to strike at Russian interests in the region, to
gain influence over the large energy deposits,
using the handy pretext of ethnic conflicts.15
The rivalry with Russia embraces economic
issues of pipeline routes and the like, as well as

classical issues of security, territorial integrity

of states, and defense. As the oil-producing
states are now members of the Partnership for

Peace, and Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, and Georgia

overtly seek NATO's direct participation in the
area, the contest with Russia and Iran has
assumed a more overtmilitary aspect to paral

lel the economic-political

rivalry.16 Further
the
more, given
spiraling strategic stakes here,
NATO and specifically U.S. regional engage
ment are likely to grow.

AMERICAN STRATEGIC
ENGAGEMENT
U.S.

involvement

across

caspian has accelerated

conclusively

Washington
claims

to an

energy

the

entire

Trans

since 1994-95 when

monopoly.

rejected Russia's
By

then,

inter

national financial institutionshad embraced the

consensus and were
so-called Washington
and
sizable resources
pressure
putting great
intoCentral Asian and other CIS states tomove
them toward freemarkets and democratic gov

ernaice.'?

But

the massive

interest

in Central

and its access to theWest, most promi

nently in regard to oil, gas, pipeline construc
tion, and precious metals such as Uzbek gold

Asia

Washington

to break any Russian hope of

the economic-political-military
monopolizing
life of these states.Washington will not tolerate

and copper, paralleled a growing military-polit

ical interest. Itwould be mistaken to seeWest
ern engagement in economic or strategic terms

anyone's exclusive sphere of influence there.'3

Russian domination would inevitably diminish
regional security by attempting to impose,

alone. Just as values and interests are entwined

so are these policy motives.

against determined local opposition, an exclu

sive sphere of influence, perhaps even a
restored union. Equally if not more important,
itwould mean accepting Russia's view that the
states have only a diminished sovereignty.That

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, deputy assis

tant secretary of defense forRussia, Ukraine,
and Eurasia from 1994 to 1996, observes that a
coherent Caucasus

policy began to emerge

fromWashington in 1994, earlier than had pre
viously been suspected. The Pentagon's main

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Vol. 163No. 2

67

Fall 2000

concern was the role of local armed forces, not

least Russia's efforts to subvert the new states
and intervene there. Therefore Washington
sought to supplant the primacy of bilateral ties
to Russia with other unilateral (i.e., American
and Turkish) and multilateral relationships.
Washington aimed to support democratization,
liberalmarket economies, and integrationwith
the European community of states; to remove
weapons ofmass destruction and nuclear mate
rials, and to open the area for U.S. business

the dispute on the legal regime of

energy drilling in theCaspian Sea. The United
States now insists that any new pipeline must
tomediate

bypass Russia and go from Central Asia,

underneath the Caspian Sea, throughGeorgia
and Azerbaijan,
all the way to Ceyhan on

Turkey's Mediterranean coast. And its officials

and diplomats are unrelenting in theirefforts to
achieve that goal.22 The U.S. commitment to

multiple pipelines clearly aims to exclude Rus

sia and Iran as far as possible from dominating

investment.18

In February 1995,Washington made the cru

cial decision to support pipelines running
throughTurkey, and not Russia. At the time,
State Department

sources

. . . told Newsweek

that the endorsementreflectsa major shift in

U.S.

Central

Council,

by the National
to break Russia's

toward
policy
coordinated
approach,
is designed

Asia.

The

new

Security
grip on

Washington aimed to support democratization,

liberalmarket economies, and integrationwith the
European community of states; to remove weapons
ofmass destruction and nuclear materials; and to
open

the area

for U.S.

business

investment.

CentralAsia's oil export.The objective is both

to help ensure
the survival
of independent
states in the region and to protect U.S.
corpo
rate interests.'9

By then,Washington had already intervened

in the regional energy economy by urging
Turkmenistan to send gas toUkraine in spite of
the latter's failure or inability to pay for it.

Washington also approached Kazakstan at that

time, apparently offering certain guarantees if
Moscow
"turned off the oil faucet." This was
one of the firstU.S. decisions to insert itself as
an arbiter between Russia and other CIS states
in the event of disputes between them over the
commonly used Russian pipeline system. In
May 1995, Under Secretary of Energy William

touredCentral Asia, urging the republics

to regard themselves as importantproducers of
oil and natural gas and to treatRussia and Iran
as competitors.20Also in 1995, Glen Rase, head
of theState Department's energy policy section,
bluntly rejected Russian efforts to dominate the

White

Caspian, stating that Russian talk of condo

minium therewas, "a guarantee of inaction."
He furthersaid, "The Russian position must not
be imposed on the states thatprefer amore nor
mal division of theCaspian." Washington "does
not recognize any spheres of influence."21

Since then,policy interesthas grown almost

exponentially. The only constantly functioning
inter-agencyworking group led by theNation
al Security Council monitors Transcaspian
energy deposits and trends.U.S. investors are
flooding the region with capital, searching for
has
contracts and influence. Washington
announced its readiness to use its good offices

future pipeline decisions. The United States

also offered to send peacekeepers toNagorno
Karabakh as part of an international operation
in
and leads maneuvers
under the OSCE
and theBlack Sea.23
Thus to preserve the area as "a zone of free
competition" and deny either Russia or Iran

Kazakstan

any lasting influence,Washington is becoming

the arbiter or leader on virtually every interna
tional issue in the region. These include the

Minsk process to negotiate Nagorno-Karabakh,

and the opening of a "new Silk Road" or East
West trade corridor, apart from pipeline routes
for oil and gas. And the focus on energy issues
obscures Washington's leading role in interna
tional financial institutions thatplay a large role
in channeling foreign resources toCentral Asia.
The consuming interest in pipeline routes has

also led the U.S. government to adopt public

positions on questions such as the international
status of theCaspian Sea, tomediate compet
ingAzeri-Turkmen claims, and to take the lead
in regional investmentprojects.24
First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, former
energy secretary Federico Pena, and Vice Pres
ident Albert Gore claimed that proper use of
energy resources can promote not only
stability, but even democracy, an outcome not
known to be high on Kazakh President Nursul

Kazakh

tan Nazarbayev's
agenda.25 Washington has
also toldGeorgia thatany oil shipped out of the
Caspian through its ports should go, in part, to
Ukraine to alleviate its energy dependence on

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World

68

Russia. The Defense Department has discussed

with
cooperation
strengthening military
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan and even training
Azerbaijan's army, thereby alarming Armenia
and Russia.26 The Pentagon also allocated areas
of responsibility to U.S. commands for the
Transcaspian.

The

U.S.

Command

European

received responsibility for the Caucasus

and
for Central Asia.
the Central Command
Although this is an administrative device to
supervise theongoing programs of bilateral and

Shevardnadze evidentlywants to elicit a

commitment ofAmerican military power to his
side to impose peace and supplant theRussian
forces that are now maintaining a truce on the
Abkhaz-Georgian

border.

prevalence of armed forces loyal only to per

sons and not to laws or parliaments.31
U.S.

involvement has been growing since

September 1995, when U.S. experts on Central

Asia met at NATO

headquarters and cited the

extensive U.S.
interests in Caspian
energy
deposits as a reason why Washington might
have to extend itsPersian Gulf security guaran
tees to the region.32While U.S. officials pious

ly intone visions of a win-win situation in

which everyone has shared interests in devel

oping these energy resources, they have really

aimed to deny Russia a monopoly over the
energy producing states.33 Talk of security
guarantees only reinforces the notion that this
is the trueobjective. As Blum stated,
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that

America's

Caspian
policy has been predicated
the illusion of a "unipolar moment":
the
notion
can orchestrate,
that Washington
and
a convivial
subsequently maintain
alignment of
on

international

possible

NATO military cooperation, it also represents a

major
step for contingency planning and
Moscow knows it.27All of these actions signal
an

ever-greater

U.S.

regulation

of

the region's

security agenda. Thus the potential for using

trulycoercive diplomacy in support of theWest
in the area is growing. Indeed, the fear that

NATO will encroach on the CIS is one of the

major causes for the anger with which enlarge
ment is being received inMoscow.28 Accord
ingly,most observers, and even some official
U.S.
statements, view the totality of U.S.
regional engagement as intended to further the
goal of breaking Russia's monopoly, to demon
strate theU.S. power
projection capability, to
help tie the region to theWest through thePart
nership for Peace program, to enhance local
military capabilities for self-defense, to prevent
military reliance onMoscow, to exclude Russia
from conflict resolution-its main means of
asserting its power--and cement a local pres
ence to defend our energy interests.29
In practice, energy and security have come to
dominate the agenda to the point where little
pressure is effectively being directed toward
local governments. Political
democratizing
conditions on investment, trade, and aid are fast
receding in visibility throughout the area and in
U.S. policy as well.30 Similarly, the
regional
defense establishments have proved difficult to
democratize. This

is not surprising given the

continuing authoritarianism of local govern
ments, their pervasive personalism, and the

Affairs

region

forces. The

is that it is
implication
in the Caspian
relations

to fashion
so

as

to constrain

Russian

decision

making with little or no blowback from

Moscow.34

U.S. policies for the region are also

closely
tied to NATO's enlargement and the contain
ment of Iran and Iraq. U.S. writers
increasingly
call this area and the "greaterMiddle East," of
which it is deemed to be a part, "the
"strategic
fulcrum of the future," or the
"strategic high
ground,"

because

of

its

energy

resources.35

Robert Blackwill and Michael Stuermer claim

that "no Western power has been safe without
some

measure

of

influence

or control

over

the

southern and eastern shores of theMediter

ranean."36This geographic area now includes the
Transcaspian, since the Southeastern Mediter
ranean is
and
precisely where Washington
want
the terminus of
Turkey
Transcaspian oil
and gas to be. Ambassador Matthew Nimetz

postulates the growing importance of the

Mediterranean region as a whole. Therefore a
clear U.S. commitment to remaining a
military
power here will markedly enhance regional
security.This is also true for themajor NATO
powers-France, Germany, Italy,Great Britain,
Spain, Greece, and Turkey.37To maintain region
al security,NATO must not only integrate the

entire region into theWestern economy and fos

ter the development of "pluralistic
institutions,"
itmust also grasp themilitary nettle.
The Pax NATO is the only logical regime to
maintain security in the traditionalsense. As
NATO maintains its dominant role in the

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Vol. 163No. 2

69

Fall 2000

a need for the

itmust recognize
Mediterranean,
in adja
of its stabilizing
influence
expansion
cent areas, particularly
in Southeastern
Europe,
the Black

Sea

region

(in concert,

of course,

with
the regional
Russia,
powers,
primarily
and Turkey)
and
Ukraine,
Romania,
Bulgaria,
in the Arabian/Persian
States
Gulf. The United
must

to play the major

system. The Sixth Fleet

continue

security
vehicle

role
will

in this
be

the

to

this commitment
for
implement
to come, although
that
this is something
some time down the road.38
be reviewed

years
might

views either do not count, or Russia

will blithely accept this outcome.
Russia's

MILITARY AND SECURITY

COOPERATION
The strategic rationale forAmerican involve
ment in theTranscaspian's defense and security
relations goes beyond Solana's statements quot
ed above.

"The

main

reason

why

theWest

not remain complacent about Russia's

the fact thatRussia's

cases,

also

democratic

can

actions is

'near abroad' is, inmany

Europe's

near

abroad."39

This observation applies no less toCentral Asia

than to theUkraine and Transcaucasus. Howev
er, theUnited States could relatively easily be
drawn into local ethnic conflicts in a peacemak
ing or peacekeeping role. President Eduard She

vardnadze ofGeorgia has increasingly frequent

lyproclaimed his intention to pursue a "Bosnia"
or "Dayton" typeof solution to the conflictwith

the Abkhaz nationalist movement. Shevard

nadze evidentlywants to elicit a commitment of
American military power to his side to impose
peace and supplant theRussian forces that are
now maintaining a truce on theAbkhaz-Geor

gian border.40 Furthermore, during 1999 a

repeated theme of Georgian and Azeri foreign
policy has been the open invitation toNATO to
either establish a base inAzerbaijan to guard oil
supplies or to become the arbiter in local ethnic

conflicts.41Were such mediation to take the

form of the recent Kosovo campaign itwould
materialize the worst threat scenarios of the
Russian government and armed forces, with
unforeseeable consequences."
For now, Washington has wisely eschewed
the direct commitment of U.S. troops in such a
role to any of themany conflicts in the area, but
that is not a commitment of principle. There
have been reports of U.S. willingness to con
sider sending peacekeeping troops should the
OSCE Minsk process lead to a solution in the
Armenian-Azeri war over Nagorno-Karabakh.
And clearly U.S. military involvement in the
region is growing. General John Sheehan

commander in chief of the U.S.

(USMC),
Atlantic command and NATO's supreme allied
commander Atlantic, announced U.S. willing
ness to take part in regional peace support oper
ations involving Central Asian forces under UN

authorization, furtherextending theU.S. offer

of security cooperation to those states.43
NATO's increasing interest (and this applies
as well to theEU) in a southern,Mediterranean

exposure can only lead it to assume a more

prominent institutional role in conflict preven
tion, security assistance, and military-political

integration.44Certainly Solana's interest in the

region speaks for continuing and expanding
NATO engagement with it.Azerbaijan is con
stantly urging NATO to provide what it calls
"operational
security" for pipelines going
its
through
territory and F-16 planes from
Turkey although one can hardly see a use for

them in any conceivable Azeri military sce

nario.45 Georgia,
too, is now approaching
NATO members forweapons systems.46And in
summer 1999 NATO began a program to unify
and control the region's airspace, a sure sign of
interest in including the area in its operational

plans and futuremembership.47

NATO's expanding interest in the region also
reflects the fact that the entire area has entered
into theEuropean

security agenda after the col

lapse of the Soviet Union.48 Turkey's provision
of military training to Central Asian states and
Azerbaijan and its intention to organize a Cau

casian peacekeeping force and play a role as a

kind of regional gendarme are only themost
In 1998, Georgia,
prominent examples.

Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova

began discussing forming theirown peacekeep
ing force to reduce

the need

for Russian

forces.49

U.S. military analysts are quite frank in see

ing the activities of engagement and Partner
ship for Peace as essential aspects of theU.S.
strategy of "extraordinary power projection."
Our engagement programs take the form of
joint exercises, staffvisits, training, increasing
interoperability, and so forth.50These are pre
cisely activities that facilitate transition towar
and participation in its initial stages. For exam
ple, Roger Barnett writes about theNavy's per
spective, but his analysis actually could serve as
a generic one for all U.S. forces:
It is often the action and activities of these
forces thatprovide the dominant battlespace
knowledge necessary to shape regional securi
Multinational exercises, port
ty environments.
coordination-all designed
visits, staff-to-staff

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World Affairs

70
to
to increase force interoperability
and access
with intelli
facilities-along
regional military
are but a
and surveillance
gence
operations,
few
same

of how

examples

naval

forces
to other

undoubtedly

[and

applies
in an effort to set
actively
to the United
favorable
States
engagement
engage

are conducted

activities

the

service]
terms of
and

at low

its allies.

These

political

the
considering
com
of U.S.
evidence
they provide
to
to a region. And
they are designed
and

tangible
mitment
contribute

economic

costs,

to deterrence.

Deterrence is theproduct of both capability

and will

to deter

a nuclear

attack

its allies, or others

States,
security assurances.
provided
rence of other undesirable
actions

United
has

the
against
to whom
it
. . . Deter

by adver
is part and parcel
saries or potential adversaries
of everything naval forces do in the course of
. . . before,
their operations
during, and after
of combat force.
the actual application
States has invested in keep
That the United
ing these ready forces forward and engaged
delivers a signal, one that cannot be transmitted
as clearly and unequivocally
in any other way.
are
forces
backed
by those
Forward-deployed
can

and
for rapid reinforcement
can be in place
in seven to thirty days. These,
but slower
in turn, are backed
by formidable,

which

surge

can respond
forces which
deployed,
flict over a period of months."

to a con

use these
operations to prepare either for peace or for
military operations in crucial security zones.
Thus theUnited States and NATO

Such operations point to theTranscaspian's

ing profile as one of those zones.

ris

U.S. INTERESTS
The United States views three aspects of the
Transcaspian

equation

as

crucial:

increasing

the supply of energy to consumers; excluding

Iran from influencing the exploration, ship
ment, development, and marketing of energy
products; and preventing any one state (i.e.,
Russia) from obtaining a monopoly over the
local energy supply.Certain fundamental corol
laries flow from this list of objectives.52
Officially U.S. policy aims to enhance local

states' capability to produce and ship oil

abroad, to obtain equal (competitive) access for
U.S. energy firms and other businesses that
want to invest in these republics, to use U.S.
diplomatic auspices to negotiate settlements to
local wars, and to create stable, democratic
governments as an ultimate outcome of these
processes. Job one, according toTalbott, is con
flict resolution to promote all the other desir
able outcomes. This aspiration does not con
ceal, although itdoes not advertise, the fact that
themanagement of peace operations is today

the functional equivalent of the kind of control

exercised years ago through gunboat diploma
cy.53Therefore, the logic of Talbott's remarks
suggested thatU.S. forces may participate in

future peace operations, probably Nagorno

or UN authorizes it.
Karabakh, if the OSCE
Such authorization would not come unless Rus
sia approves and unless theUnited States first
tells theOSCE or UN that itwill commit the
forces. Because both of those are quite unlike

ly anytime soon, it is not clear how U.S.

rhetoric alone can achieve Talbott's "job one."
The Georgian-Abkhaz fighting of 1998 with
no resolution, the stasis in the Nagorno

and the repeated

Karabakh
negotiations,
instances of fighting in Central Asia in 1999
also suggest that peace cannot come strictly
through the actions of the local states, but will

require outside persuasion backed by force.

the aspiration to break Russia's
monopoly and the proliferation of U.S. firms
Although

making investments and obtaining government

support suggest a more traditional form of

expansion of U.S. influence-dollar diplomacy

or something close to it-without a commit
ment to use force where needed, such "diplo
macy" faces an uphill battle.

Although Washington professes that it sim

ply wishes to counter any regional monopoly, it
does not see the area as one for competition

But that profession does not

comport with the program ofmilitary exercises
through the Partnership for Peace program,
whose avowed aim is to integrate the region
firmlywith theWest in both economics and
security.But here is where the ambivalence in
U.S.
policy sets in: Because Washington
with Moscow.54

regards

Russia

as

potential,

or

even

actual,

stable democratic partner, ithas also cautioned

and presumably other
Georgia, Azerbaijan,
to
not
states,
infringe on Russia's
regional
interests.55

President Shevardnadze has publicly stated

that President Clinton has advised him not to
try to rush the withdrawal of Russian troops
fromAbkhazia. In general, Shevardnadze has
stated that the entire Caucasus, not only Abk
hazia and Georgia, should not become an area
of international competition between Russia
and the United States.56 Unfortunately, the
logic of the evolution of U.S. policy comes
close to converting the entire Transcaspian into
just such an arena. Yet even as we engage in
actions to "prepare the theater,"we are unlike
ly to deploy or sustain those forces after build
ing up expectations to the contrary.But as long

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Vol. 163No. 2

71

Fall 2090

as theTranscaspian basin is amajor energy pro

ducer, a stake of thismagnitude justifiesWash
ington's compelling interest in the Transcaspi
an. Thus U.S.

policy is impaling itself on

contradictory logic. Moreover, there is good
reason to believe that its underlying assump
tions are also untenable.

to Sestanovich,
the Clinton
According
administration rejects the concept of a sphere of
influence for Russia or anyone else. And, in
fact, officials of the local governments acknowl
edge thatU.S. interests and policies there are

much more benevolent than Russian interests

appear to be.57 Certainly we are not resorting to
support for ethnicwars or coups d'etat, let alone
outrightwar as in Chechnya. Still, our support
for democratic values and principles of liberal,

open market economies and polities is hardly

disinterested. Our energy policy and ongoing
programs of democratic assistance support our

objectives of regional cooperation, conflict res

olution, strengthening the region against efforts
to create an Iranian (and Russian) sphere of
influence,

and

democratization.58

Our

assis

tance to regional security integration and coop

eration through institutions such as theCentral

Asian Battalion

(Centrazbat) exemplifies this

policy in the security sphere.59

U.S. officials thus solemnly insist thatU.S.
policy aims not to divide theTranscaspian into
rival spheres of influence or to exclude Russia,

but ratherat a "win-win" solution for all parties.

Russia and theUnited States supposedly share
a common interest in extracting the region's
mineral wealth and prospering from it. And

Washington should graciously include Russia

in itsplans to integrate the region into theWest
because its interests are above suspicion.60

though the logic of this stance is contradicted by

the logic of itsprevious military exercises there.

Thus our previous offer to provide peace

was possible
keepers to Nagorno-Karabakh
with
Russian
only
troops' participation there as

well in an international force under OSCE

trol, an obvious

Given

regional conditions and mentalities,

especially Russia's, not tomention actual U.S.
policy, the above view seems to be misplaced, if
not naive. At the same time, the professed poli
cy of not challenging Russia, as opposed to the
real one, also handicaps theUnited States vis-a
vis Russia. Dollar diplomacy in its current form
seems tomean that in theTranscaspian we will
make no trulycostly investments to obtain our
goals. Rather, we will rely on economic influ

for Russia.61

con

Like

wise, theUnited States has done little or noth

ing to criticize or penalize Russia's military
interventions in Central Asia or the wars in
Chechnya. Nor do we appear to face the conse

The United States will not definitively commit

resources

to peace

operations

in the Caucasus

or

Central Asia unless Russia approves, or so it says,

even though the logic of this stance is contradicted
by the logic of itsprevious military exercises there.

quences of our and NATO's

involvement in the area. U.S.

burgeoning
rhetoric and

proclamations remain detached from reality

even when we display an ability to airlift thou
sands of troops into the area.While undoubted
ly the capability is real, what happens if a new

crisis breaks out and there is the real prospect

of force?Will we then commit ourselves to use
this capability, and can we sustain forces in
those theaters? The

such

commitments

ambivalence with which

are

now

viewed,

for exam

ple, vis-a-vis Iraq, has continued to render the

United States unable or unwilling to do any
thing substantive to counter Russian gun run
ning and military support forArmenia, Rus
sian-backed

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

non-starter

coups

in Azerbaijan,

Russia's

or Russia's

military intervention in Georgia,

constant economic warfare against the energy
producers. Nobody should be sanguine about
our ability or will to defend energy companies
should local orRussian forces attack theirhigh
ly leveraged and expensive projects. Nor
should anyone think thatRussia will simply let
us take the lead in integrating this area into our
sphere of influence.
Our policies lead to the following situation.

ence and exercises, but avoid costly, protracted

military involvements.We do war games, not

On one hand, we are determined to use eco

nomic power to integrate the Caucasus
and
Central Asia intoWestern economic and securi

low-intensity or ethnic conflicts. The United

States will not definitively commit resources to
peace operations in the Caucasus or Central
Asia unless Russia approves, or so it says, even

ty systems and to attain geopolitical mastery

even in Russia's
self-proclaimed backyard.
Military forceswill follow in thenow-approved
guise of peacekeepers or peace enforcers, a

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World

72

sure confirmation of the fact that peace opera

tions have replaced gunboat democracy as the

main military instrumentfor the establishment

of great power spheres of influence.62 U.S.
statements have manifested thebelief that itcan
successfully and cheaply isolate both Iran and
Russia and manage those two strategic chal

lenges in the energy area, not tomention Iraq.

On the other hand, thatdelusion now lies in the
dust of theRussian solution to the Iraqi crises
of 1997-98. But the now established Caspian

We can neither secure the "peaces"

crucial

to a stable

energy

regime

that are locally

across

Eurasia,

secure oil and gas lines if they are threatened, nor

guarantee and secure access to these lines if
unfriendly elements take power locally.

a
policy will undoubtedly continue, along with
search for a way tomaintain the strategyon the
cheap, for example, by a protracted reappraisal

of policy toward Iran.63

Those pursuits will probably intensify,along
with our search for alternatives to the insecure
Middle East oil supply, even though we can
neither

secure

the

local

"peaces"

that are

cru

cial to a stable energy regime across Eurasia,

secure oil and gas lines if they are threatened,

nor guarantee access to those lines ifunfriend

ly elements take power locally.4 Neither is it
clear how stable any government in theCaspi
an basin is, including Russia. Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan already show signs of becoming
like Nigeria, hardly an inspiring or optimistic
example.65
ments
at a

We

are

overextending
our resolve,

time when

our
our

commit
intelli

gent understanding of the region, and our

resources are insufficient to bring pressure to
bear even on our allies, not to speak of our
rivals and actual enemies.
That policy's second drawback is that it dri
ves Iran and Russia to cooperate on regional
policies and Russia to sell Iran arms and tech
nology, including nuclear missile technology.
Yet because Washington will do little toRussia
or publicize Russia's official complicity with
violating key U.S. interests in energy and arms
sales we cannot discern any costs coming from
Washington that accrue toRussia from its inti
mate relationship with Iran thathas deep roots
in their strategic convergence.

Affairs

strategic failure highlights a third,

deeply embedded aspect of U.S. foreign policy
that has led to failure. As Sestanovich wrote
before his appointment, it is impossible to dis
This

cern any strategic context for the administra

tion's Russia policy, which remains astrategic or
devoid of any geopolitical contextwhatsoever.66
Or at least,we are unwilling to admit that strat

egy plays any role in our Russia policy, a failing

that inpractice amounts tomuch the same thing.

Consequently,

Moscow

has

no

reason

to accom

modate U.S. pressures against Iran and much to

lose from doing so. Nor does Russia have a suf
ficient external incentive to desist from coercive

measures

in the Transcaspian,

whether

econom

ic ormilitary. Indeed, U.S. probes only enhance

Russia's sense of regional threatand propensity

to reply in kind while not preventing it from

doing so. Russian leaders are convinced that
theymust do more to resistAmerican penetra
tion here, not support or tolerate it.67 Indeed,
one may argue that their recent successful
efforts to bolster Iraq and enhance Russia's
regional status are tied to an effort to get Iraqi

oil back on line and thus forestall, ifnot destroy,

hopes for a large-scale Caspian basin energy
economy.68

fourth failing of U.S. policy is that

Washington, for all the instruments of global
policy it possesses, remains singularly unable
to use them to obtain a comprehensive and
The

insightfulunderstanding of regional trends and

their implications throughout much of the
Third World. All of the unforeseen crises since
1990, the unexpected Iraqi attack on Kuwait,

Somalia, and the recent Iraqi crisis suggest that

this is a structural failing of U.S. policy. Infor
mation has not brought deeper understanding
or foresight.69Our burgeoning economic-polit
ical-military presence in theThirdWorld upsets
older relationships and regional structures that
we may not understand and does so in ways
thatwe do not fully comprehend.
Specifically, we could trigger renewed Rus
sian pressure in the CIS, either directly or

surrogates, that assumes a

throughMoscow's
military form.Or else we could contribute, as
in the shah's Iran, to thedestabilization of frag
ile and traumatized Transcaspian societies. It is
by no means clear that our presence and influ
ence in theTranscaspian will help local states
develop energy, policies that increase stability
and economic progress, rather than perpetuat
ing the usual pattern of misrule and miscon
ceived economic policies. Those outcomes
characterize toomany oil producing states. Past

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Vol. 163No. 2

Fall 2000

73

experience of the effects of large-scale U.S.

influence are not altogether encouraging with

regard towhether these states become Norways

or Nigerias. For if they do become like Nige
ria-and thereare already significant indicators
pointing in that direction-we have bought a
large stake in longstanding crises and thepoten
tial for failed states and perennial violence.70

REGIONAL POWER POLITICS AND

CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The regional structureof political forces does
little to encourage optimism concerning a posi
tive strategic outcome. Recently, Armenia has

to
and Azerbaijan
Ankara.71 Under those circumstances, and
given theuncertain domestic political outcomes
allied

itself to Moscow

among oil and gas producers, our ambivalence

about committing forces and the dangerous
regional situation of rival alliances create the

U.S. presence. The war inChechnya shows that

Russia is willing to do so forcefully, if neces
sary.Russia's new draftmilitary doctrine sug

gests thatMoscow will threaten even World

War III if there is Turkish intervention,yet the
new Russo-Armenian
and Azeri-Turkish
treaties suggest just such a possibility.75 Con
ceivably, the two larger states could then be

dragged in to rescue their allies from defeat.

The Russo-Armenian treaty is virtually a bilat
eral military alliance against Baku. It reaffirms

Russia will neither restrain itselfnor be restrained

by any local institutionor power in itspursuit of
unilateral advantage and reintegration of theCIS.

potential forwider and protracted regional con

flicts.Those conflicts could become proxy wars
for the great powers like theThird World con

flicts of the 1980s. Azerbaijan's and Georgia's

lasting
growing efforts to secure NATO's
involvement in the region, coupled with Rus
sia's determination to exclude theWest, foster a
polarization along traditional lines.72 In con

junction with the second Russian war against

Chechnya there also appears to be a renewed

Russian

determination to assert its Transcau

casian and Central Asian prerogatives together

with China and against the United States.73
Moreover, U.S. efforts to tie energy supplies
through and toArmenia if itmakes peace with
Baku encounter strong opposition in Erevan
and Nagorno-Karabakh, both of whose forces
could easily undermine a pipeline to Turkey
through

Armenia

or

other

Transcaucasian

states. And Baku will not build a pipeline

throughArmenia even after peace.74 So peace
will not bring pipelines toArmenia or prosper
ity to Kazakstan and Turkmenistan. Nor will
there be this incentive tomake peace. So, too,
could theKurds destroy pipelines inTurkey.We
must also remember that this is a territory
with
a high incidence of powerful earthquakes. So
there are already high odds against completion
of America's
favorite project regardless of
Russian policy, which will only abet Armeno
Kurdish obstacles to energy pipelines.
Russia's warnings about U.S.
efforts to
obtain military-political-economic leverage in
elite's
the Transcaspian
and the Russian
extreme sensitivity regarding the region show
thatMoscow will resolutely contest expanded

lastingmilitary presence inArmenia,

commits Armenia not to join NATO, and could
justify furtherfighting inNagorno-Karabakh or

Russia's

furthermilitary pressure against Azerbaijan

thatwill impede energy exploration and mar
keting.76 It also reconfirmsRussia's determina
tion to resist U.S.

presence and to remain the

regional hegemon.
Thus many structuralconditions for conven
tional war or protracted ethnic conflict where
thirdparties intervene now exist in the Trans

caucasus

and Central Asia.

The outbreak of

violence by disaffected Islamic elements, the

drug trade, the Chechen wars, and the unre
solved ethnopolitical conflicts that dot the
region,

not

to mention

the undemocratic

and

unbalanced distribution of income across cor

rupt governments, provide plenty of tinder for
future fires.Many ThirdWorld conflicts gener
ated by local structural factors also have great
potential forunintended escalation. Big powers
often feel obliged to rescue their proxies and
protdg~s. One or another big power may fail to
grasp the stakes for the other side since inter
ests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence
involving the use of nuclear
or
weapons
perhaps even conventional war to
prevent defeat of a client are not well estab
lished or clear as in Europe. For instance, in
commitments

1993 Turkish noises about intervening on

behalf ofAzerbaijan induced Russian leaders to
threaten a nuclear war in that case.
Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but

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World Affairs

74
probably could not prevail in a longwar against
Russia, or if itcould, would conceivably trigger
a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibili
ty given the erratic nature of Russia's declared
nuclear strategies), the danger of major war is
higher here than almost everywhere else in the

CIS

or the "arc of crisis" from the Balkans

to

China. As Richard Betts has observed,

The

greatest

danger

lies in areas where

(1) the

potentialfor serious instabilityishigh; (2) both

superpowersperceive vital interests;(3) neither
recognizes

that the other's

perceived

interest or

commitmentis as great as its own; (4) both

have the capability to inject conventional
forces; and (5) neither has willing proxies
capable

of settling

the situation.77

Betts's analysis implies thatfor each side the

interest or area in question is a vital one. This

does not imply thatconflict between the super

powers or theirproxies is preordained. Rather
this analysis drives home the region's danger
ous structural conditions. Great power rivalry
does not necessarily impart stability to an

already troubled region, quite the contrary.

Russo-Chinese effortsat Bishkek in 1999 to tie
Central Asia to theirkite and Russia's new mil
itarydoctrine demonstrate that such rivalry also
stimulates efforts to create spheres of influence
even while providing smaller states means to
resist them.78

the disproportion between

Nevertheless,
states
Russia and the smaller Transcaspian
means that no natural equilibrium is possible

there.Russia will neither restrain itself nor be

restrained by any local institution or power in
its pursuit of unilateral advantage and the rein
tegration of the CIS.79 The only restraints it
now accepts are objective ones, such as the lim

is to be

issue,

security

someone

achieved,

else

must lend power to the smaller littoral states to

anchor that balance. The analysts who argue
against anymajor American involvement fail to
realize the tragic situation of the region.
If theTranscaspian states are to be free and

independent and have any hope of independent

future development someone from the outside
will have to help them because Russia still
refuses to accept their sovereignty and indepen
the Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson

dence. As

observed, everyone he meets in Russia confi

dently expects the CIS to rejoin Russia, and
prominent Russian statesmen such as Yevgeny

Primakov and Andrei Kokoshin have no com

punction about publishing statements concern

ing the illegitimacy of the current status quo

and the expected "augmentation" of Russia's
borders.81 These statements are hardly an aber
ration.

Russia's

national

security

concept,

lished in January 2000, states,

The

Russia's
national
ensuring
the need, under appro
to have a mil
for Russia
circumstances,

interests

security
priate

pub

of

predetermine

in certain

itary presence

strategically

important

regionsof theworld. The stationingof limited

military contingents [the same termused to
describe forces inAfghanistan] (militarybases,
naval

units)

there on a treaty basis must

ensure

Russia's readiness to fulfillitsobligations and

in forming a stable military-strategic
of forces in regions, and must enable
to react to a crisis situ
the Russian
Federation
to assist

balance
ation
policy

in its initial stage

and achieve

its foreign

goals.82

Therefore, the local states soughtWashing

ton's help as much as Washington turned its
attention to them.This fact gets lost in analyses
such as thatofAnatol Lieven thatairily dismiss

itsof its faltering economic and military power,

thatpreclude the easy attainment of its goals of
regional hegemony and compel it to pursue its
aims by more pacific and less-coercive means.
And even the perceptions of waning power are

continuingmischief making and threat

mongering throughout the region.83 But the
outside balancer must be ready to play a pro
tracted and potentially even a military role in

difficult to accept and translate into Russian

policy. Often Russia refuses to accept the limits

the region and risk the kind of conflicts

described above. That power, to retain influ
ence over the long term, cannot remain a

on its capability to achieve its vital interests.

And where it has moved from using military
coercion to economic efforts to retain its pre

detached and unmoved mover. There is little

evidence that theUnited States can or will play
this role, suggesting thatultimately itsbluff can

eminence, ithas done so as much for lack of a

viable military as from the insight that it stands
to gain more from a more purely economic

be called. For an outside regional balancer to

prevail, itmust abet the local producers' current

approach.80
Although this local disproportion inRussia's
favor hardly means thatRussia can succeed at
will across Central Asia, it does mean that if
any regional balance, on energy or othermajor

Russia's

efforts to diversify foreign investment in local

energy deposits, encourage the growth of these
states' economic and military power, promote
regional economic-military cooperation, and
stabilize them fromwithin and without. Wash
ington can achieve only part of this agenda. But

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Vol. 163No. 2

Fall 2000

75

even partial failure here will triggera reversion

to thephenomena we seek to avoid.

THE NATO CONNECTION

For a stable situation to ensue, some external
factormust be permanently engaged and willing
to commit military forces, ifneed be, to ensure
stability and peace. That does not necessarily

mean a unilateral U.S. commitment; more like

ly itmeans a multilateral one, under UN or

auspices, as in the PfP program, but

actually under U.S. leadership.Without such a
it is highly unlikely
permanent presence-and
that theUnited States or its allies will choose to
make theirpresence feltother than througheco
NATO

nomic

has little reason,

investment-Russia
own
from
limits
its
the
of
power, to desist
apart
from efforts tomonopolize the energy business

and subordinate the producers to its dictates.

Sadly UN and OSCE records give few grounds
for hoping that a regional balance can emerge

on its own or by theiractions.84

Therefore, the U.S. belief that Russia will
happily accept integration and a subordinate
role on American terms thatconcede local eco

nomic hegemony to theUnited States and its

allies handicaps theUnited States and clouds its
policy. The
regarding Transcaspian
belief that suchU.S. hegemony can be achieved
at low cost through state support for foreign
vision

investment,negotiated peace to local wars, and

showing the flag is naive and
occasionally
as
insufficient policy because it allows Russia,
and/or its clients, or local actors to frustrateany
and every peace effort in Nagorno-Karabakh,

obstruct international agencies such as theUN

and theOSCE, and delay or disrupt the export
of energy. Baku already reportsArmeno-Rus
sian intelligence efforts to subvert its rule over

into Europe's energy plan for the future and

insisting on meaningful progress toward con

flict resolution.88 The obvious implication of

currentpolicy is thatNATO, under U.S. leader
ship,will now become an international police

man

in the Transcaspian and define the limits

of Russian participation in the region's expect
ed oil boom, thereby foreclosing what Russian
elites believe is the objective necessity, forboth
those states and Russia, of some form of inte
gration or even amalgamation.

Russia

will

The belief thatU.S. hegemony can be achieved at

low cost through state support for foreign
investment,

negotiated

peace

to local wars,

occasionally showing the flag is naive and

insufficientas policy.

hardly accept such a position "lying down."

And thenwhat? In truth,nobody can answer
thatquestion.

CONCLUSIONS
Undoubtedly, the new states deserve peace
ful and unencumbered development. Russian

attempts to undermine their sovereignty and

perpetuate a colonialist relationship are largely
responsible for bringing American power into
the region inways that
Washington firstrefused
to countenance.89 But now it is by no means
certain that
Washington knows where to stop, a

famous dilemma of regional hegemons in the

ThirdWorld. There is no doubt thatcheap ener
gy is immensely important to American and

itsLezgin minority.85And it justifies its turn to

NATO because of Russian support forArme
nia.86 These considerations do not even begin to
cover the domestic structural faults throughout
Central Asia and Transcaucasia thataugur long
term internal instability for these states.87

Western economies and polities. But it is

unclear if the region can provide as much as is
predicted. It also remains unclear whether
Washington can cheaply sustain an entireEuro

Nor is it certain thatNATO can play the role

assigned to it by Nimetz and others. However,
someone must help construct a lasting and

regions, let alone in all of them.The possibili

ties for conflict among local governments and
ethnicmovements are great, and there is no rea

legitimate regional order; the danger is not

cannot avoid hard choices
abating. NATO
regarding the Transcaspian's
security. Our
see
NATO allies certainly do not
the area as
important to their security in the way that
Turkey and theUnited States do. Nevertheless,
theEuropean Union and itsmembers are devis
ing plans to integrate regional energy supplies

pean, Transcaspian, and Middle Eastern order

against themultifarious threats in any of these

son to believe that the great powers could easi

ly avert indirect or even direct participation in
those struggles.
The local regimes, including Russia, rest on
personalist regimes with shaky controls over
theirmultiple militaries, and there are whole
areas where violence still reigns and where
movements plot incessantly to

opposition

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and

World Affairs

76
unseat the rulers.We

need only consider what

could have easily happened had Shevardnadze
or Aliyev or both of them been killed in early
1998 to grasp the extreme volatility of the
region. And that factor omits the poor controls
over the armed forces and the "Nigerianiza

tion" of local economic structures.

The enormous and accelerating projection of
investment and military presence into these
states represents a form of power projection

that is relatively easily accomplished in fair

weather.90 But it remains unclear whether the
U.S. and Western presence can be sustained
throughout a protracted crisis, which is as like
ly as not, and what will happen ifwe tryto sus
tain those forms of power.We are enlarging our

commitment absentmindedly, perhaps like the

British, who supposedly acquired an empire in
a "fit of absentmindedness." But we live now in
a postcolonial era in a country with no toler

Basin,"

Comparative

Abroad:

The Haves

and

Western Engagement
in
MacFarlane,
Asia
and Central
(London:
Royal
Institute of International Affairs,
1999), 1-21.
LS.

Neil

2. For example,William Bundy,A TangledWeb:

TheMaking ofForeign Policy in theNixon Presiden
cy (NewYork: Hill andWang, 1998), 291-92.
3. MacFarlane,

and summary
and
Caucasus

Western

Engagement,
passim,
on the
of the remarks to the Seminar
the Caspian

of

the Strengthening

Democratic InstitutionsProject given by Steven

Young,

director

of the State Department's

Office

of

the Caucasus and SecurityAffairs of theNewly

IndependentStates, 28 October 1996, The Caucasus

and

the Caspian

1996-1997

Seminar

vard University,

II, Har
of Govern

Series

John F. Kennedy
School
Institutions Project,
Strengthening Democratic
1997, 82.
Mass.,
Cambridge,
see Charles
4. For
of this view,
examples

ment,

Blandy, The Caspian: A Sea ofTroubles (Camberley:

Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1997), 1, 27;
Michel

Croissant,

"U.S.

Interests

in the Caspian

Pa.:

Barracks,

(Carlisle

and

Economic,

idem., Energy,

Pa.:

Strate

in Cen

Security

Institute, U.S.

Studies

Strategic

Army War

Col

lege, 1995); andmore recently,idem.,"Every Shark

East

of Suez:

Tactics

Great

Power

Central

Wars,"

Energy

and

Policies,

Interests,

in the Transcaspian

Asian Survey 18,no. 2 (1999): 149-84.

5. "Statement
of Stephen
Ambas
Sestanovich,
to the Secretary
of
sador-at-Large,
Special Adviser
State for the New
the
States, Before
Independent
House
International Relations
30 April
Committee,"

1998, / TurkistanNewsletter, 6 May

forth Sestanovich
6. Frank
Outlines

testimony).

T.

"Central

Csongos,
Policy," Radio

U.S.

1998 (hence

Asia:

Official

Free Europe/Radio

Lib

ertyNewsline, 18March 1999.

7. Deputy Secretaryof State StrobeTalbott, "A
to Flashman:

and Central

American

in the Cau
Policy
at the Johns Hop

address

Asia,"

kins School of Advanced

International Studies,

21 July 1997.
D.C.,
Washington,
8. President William
J. Clinton,
"A National
Security Strategy for a New Century," Washington,

D.C.: TheWhite House, 1997, 18, (HenceforthClin

ton, 1997); PresidentWilliam J.Clinton, "A Nation
al SecurityStrategyfor theNext Century,"
Washing
D.C.:

ton,

The

White

1998,

32-33

Harkavy,

Strate

House,

(HenceforthClinton, 1998).
9. Geoffrey

Kemp

and Robert

gic Geography and the Changing Middle East

D.C.:

(Washington,

Endowment

Carnegie

for Inter

national Peace, 1997), 3-108; Blank, "Every Shark

East

of Suez,"
Inter
idem., "Central Asia's
149-55;
in the Asian
Relations
Issues &
Context,"
"Russia
and
Studies
32, no. 5 (May 1996): 96-124;
national

Europe

in the Caucasus,"

European

(Winter 1995): 622-45.

&

the Caucasus

the Future

International

tralAsia: Russia and Its Rivals (Carlisle Barracks,

10. Solana

NOTES

Face

and

for Strategic

rity in Transcaucasia

casus

been since Alexander the Great, be the place

where empires meet the natural limits of their
power and where emperors go to die.

(1997):

U.S. ArmyWar College, 1994);

gic Studies Institute,

Farewell

black gold and dreams of liberal international

ism. But not all that glitters, including oil, is
gold. Indeed, itmay turnout to be fool's gold.
And Central Asia may once again, as it has

Studies, 1997), 7; StephenBlank, Energy and Secu

Can America cheaply forge a lasting, stable,

and legitimate order in an area that has never
known such an order except by conquest? This

tion to hegemony here remains an incomplete

ly and even poorly conceived drive blinded by

and Have-Nots

Center

(Washington:

ance for colonialist wars.

question lies at the heart of the ambivalence

noted above. The fact that the question remains
unanswered testifies to the fact thatour aspira

16, no.

Strategy

353-67; Robert Ebel, Energy Choices in theNear

is quoted

4, no. 4

Security

E. Howard,

in Glen

"NATO

the Caucasus: The Caspian Axis," NATO After

New Challenges,
New Missions,
New
Pa.:
ed., (Carlisle Barracks,
Stephen Blank,
Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College,
Strategic

Enlargement:
Forces,

1998), 152.
11. Solana is quoted inNATO and theFuture of

European

Sean

Security,

Kay

(Lanham,

Md.:

Row

man and LittlefieldPublishers Inc., 1997), 108.

12. Clinton, 1997, 18; Clinton, 1998, 32-33;
Western Engagement,
passim.
13. Blank,
"Every Shark East of Suez,"
14. Sestanovich
testimony;
Csongos,
Asia: Official Outlines U.S. Policy."

MacFarlane,

one

15. For

of many

examples,

passim.
"Central

see Moscow,

Ekspert, 19 July 1999,Foreign Broadcast Informa

tion Service,

Central

Eurasia

SOV), 2 August 1999.

(henceforth

FBIS

16. Stephen
U.S. Military
Blank,
with Transcaucasia
and Central Asia
racks, Pa:

College,
Peacekeeping

Strategic

Studies

Engagement
(Carlisle Bar
Institute, U.S. Army War

1999); R. JeffreySmith, "U.S. Leads

Drill

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in Kazakst?n,"

Washington

Post,

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15 September 1997, 17; Moscow, Nezavisimoye

VoennoyeObozreniye, 10-16 October 1997, FBIS
SOV, 11December 1997
17. MacFarlane,

Western

Engagement,

passim.,

18. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "US Policy and

the Caucasus,"

Newsletter

Caucasus

Contemporary

5, Berkeley Program inSoviet and Post-Soviet Stud

ies, University of California, Berkeley (Spring
1998): 3-4.
19. Steve

Le Vine,

"High

April 1995, 10

17

Newsweek,

and Reintegra
"Disintegration
in
and
Dynamics
Prospects,"

20. Boris

Rumer,
in Central Asia:

tion

Stakes,"

Central Asia in Transition:Dilemmas of Political

and

Economic

ed.

Development,

(Armonk, NY: M.E.

Rumer

Boris

Sharpe & Co.,

1996), 10;
in

"Transnational
Reznikova,
Corporations
in Central Asia
in Transition,
82-83
Asia,"

Oksana
Central

21. "IfWe Clash It'llBe on theCaspian," Current

Digest of thePost-SovietPress (henceforthCDPP),
21 June 1995, 21,
22.

"The

in Review,"

Fortnight

3, no.

Prism

15,

Pt. 1 (October 1997); Rachel Bronson, "NATO's

in the Caucasus

Presence

Expanding

and

Central

Asia," NATO AfterEnlargement:New Challenges,

New

New

Missions,

(Carlisle

Pa.:

Barracks,

ed.

Forces,

Blank,
Stephen
Studies
Institute,

Strategic

U.S. ArmyWar College, 1998), 229-54, andHoward,

"NATO & theCaucasus," 151-228 give fullaccounts
ofNATO's deepening involvementin thisregion.
23. ITAR-TASS, 16 April 1998, FBIS SOV, 21
April 1998; "Statementof Undersecretaryof State
Thomas Pickering to the Senate Foreign Relations
3March

Committee,"

1998,

4March 1998.

24. Bronson,"NATO's
"NATO
&
Howard,

in Johnson's

Russia

List,

MacFarlane,

Engagement,
passim.
& Azer
25. Glen E. Howard,
"NATO Expansion
Search for Security," unpublished
paper, pre
baijan's

Council,

Security

Caspian

Region EnergyDevelopment Report, 1997

27. Reuters, 17November 1997; Pipeline News,
No. 79, 10-17 November 1997; "Oil Rush," Wash
1997, 24.
ington Post, 20 November
13 September
28. Nezavisimaya
1997,
Gazeta,
Broadcast
Service, Military
Foreign
Information

Affairs (henceforthFBIS UMA), 97-259, 16 Sep

Peace
tember 1997; R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Leads
and Bruce Clark,
17; Charles Clover
keeping Drill,"
Finan
"Oil Politics Trouble Central Asian Waters,"

I. Chufrin

and Harold

H.

Saunders,

"The

Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the

Near

Abroad,"

Washington

Quarterly

20,

no.

(Autumn,1997): 40-43; Viktor Israelyan,"Russia at

the Crossroads:

Don't

Tease

a Wounded

Bear,"

Washington Quarterly 21, no. 1 (Winter 1998):

55-58.

30. Martha

Brill

Olcott,

Promise," Foreign Policy

"The

Caspian's

False

112 (Summer 1998):

101-02.

31. Stephen
New

Trends,

in the Caucasus:
Blank,
"Instability
Old Traits," Part I, Jane's
Intelligence

Back

Yard,"

33. Morgan
ence,"
1, 15.
34. Douglas

and

22

Post,

Washington

1997,Al, 15.

Ottaway,

for

"Drilling

"Sustainable

Blum,

September
Influ

Development

and theNew Oil Boom: Comparative and Competi

tive Outcomes

in the Caspian

Sea,"

on New

Program

Approaches to Russian Security,Davis Center for ^^^^^^^g^^

Russian

Ma.,

Harvard
University,
Cambridge,
Papers Series, No. 4, 1997, 21.
and Harkavy,
"Introduction,"
Strategic
xiii.

Studies,

Working
35. Kemp

Geography,
36. Robert

D.
Michael
Blackwill,
Stuermer,
Transatlantic
Poli
Allies Divided:
"Introduction,"
ed. Robert
D.
the Greater Middle
cies for
East,

Blackwill andMichael Stuermer(CambridgeMass.:

MIT UniversityPress, 1997), 2.
37. Ambassador

ranean

Security

Matthew
"Mediter
Nimetz,
after the Cold War," Mediterranean

Quarterly 8, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 29.

38. Ibid.
39. JohnRoper and PeterVan Ham, "Redefining
Role

Russia's

Russia

in Europe,"

and Europe:

The

Emerging SecurityAgenda, ed.Vladimir Baranovsky

(Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress forSIPRI, 1997),
517.

40. Dmitri

"Russian

Trenin,

Interests

Security

and Policies in theCaucasian Region," and Dmitri

ed. Bruno
Press,

VUB

(Brussels:

Coppieters
91-102,

1996),

137-152,

respec

tively;Interfax, 19 February 1997, FBIS SOV, 19

February 1997; NTV, 22 September 1997, FBIS
UMA-97-265, 2 September 1997.
41. This

offer was made

Azer

by Vafa Guluzade,

baijan's principal securityadvisor, in January 1999

and frequently repeated
since then.
with Russian
42. Conversations

political

and

analysts

and

military
in Moscow,

officials

June

1999; see also thenewDraftDoctrine of theRussian

Armed

Forces,

9 October

Zvezda,

Krasnaya

FBIS SOV, 8 October 1999.

43.

"The

Fortnight

pt. 1 (October 1997).

cial Times, 23 September 1997, 9.

29. Caspian Region EnergyDevelopment Report;

Gennady

sia's

University

sented to theCSIS Project on Russia and theCIS,

Washington,D.C., 15 July 1997.
National

32. Dmitri Vertkin,Kazakhstan Security a the

New Asian Landscape, Bailrigg Paper No. 26, Cen
tre forDefence and InternationalSecurity Studies,
Lancaster University, 1997, 17-18; Robin Morgan
and David Ottaway, "Drilling for Influence inRus

the Caucasus,

Western

26. U.S.

18-21.

"Russia's
Search for an International Man
Danilov,
Borders
in
date in Transcaucasia,"
both in Contested

Presence";

Expanding
the Caucasus";

Review (April 1998): 14-17, Part II (May 1998):

3, no.

Prism

in Review,"

44. Howard,
"NATO
Expansion
for Security," passim.

&

1999,
15,

Azerbaijan's

Search

45. Jean-ChristophPeuch, "Caspian Oil: The

Role

of Private

Corporations,"

Forum

Fletcher

of

World Affairs22, no. 2 (Summer/Fall1998): 32-33;

Zerkalo, 11April 1998,FBIS SOV, 7May 1998.
46. ITAR-TASS, 24 December 1998, FBIS-SOV,
24 December 1998.
47. Luke Hill and Brooks Tignor, "NATO Reach
es

to Caucasus,"

Defense

News,

2 August

1999,

3,

19.
48. Blank,

"Russia

and Europe

in the Caucasus."

49. TheMonitor, 10December 1998;Umit Egin

soy, "Turkish Moves

in Region," Defense

in Caucasus,

News,

Balkans

3-9 August

Irk Rivals

1998,

12.

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World Affairs

78
Power Pro
50. Roger W. Barnett, "Extraordinary
for the U.S. Navy,"
An Operational
Concept
5-96, U.S.
Report
Development
Strategic Research
jection:

Stud
Center for Naval Warfare
War College,
R.I.,
1996, 7-8.
ies, Occasional
Papers, Newport,
51. Ibid.

Naval

52. Voice

Pena

Frederico

Energy

of Secretary of
"Testimony
to the House
International

of America,

Relations Committee," 30 April 1998; Sestanovich

of Undersecretary

"Statement
testimony;
Thomas
Pickering."

of State

53. Caspian Region EnergyDevelopment Report,

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "A
to Flashman";

Farewell

R.

Bradford

McGuinn,

"From theCaspian to theGulf: The Assertion of

U.S.

East

Middle

Power,"

(November

Insight

December 1997): 10-14.

54. "Interviewwith Bill Clinton,Presidentof the
"

United

International

States,

(1997): 5.

to Flashman";

"A Farewell

55. Talbott,

Affairs, Moscow,

no. 2

Interview

with Bill Clinton, 2-5.

56. Radio Tbilisi Network, 9 August 1998, FBIS
SOV, 19August 1997.
57. Sestanovich

testimony.

58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
of

Farewell

to Flashman";

"Remarks

State,

U.S.

Secretary

by

of a New Russia,"
address by
ning: The Emergence
Strobe Talbott,
secretary of state, Stanford
deputy

University, Stanford,Calif., 19 September 1997,

Russia

List, 23 September

1997;

"Caspian

Region Energy Development Report," 17; Floriana

"Russia:

Fossato,

The Amount

of Change

Has

Been

Extraordinary,"Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,

1997, as transcribed

12 December

in Johnson's

Rus

sia List, 12December 1997.

61.
Security

"The

and
OSCE,
Russia,
Helsinki Monitor
6, no. 3

Blank,
Stephen
in the Caucasus,"

(1995): 69-71; McGuinn, "From theCaspian to the

Gulf,"
62.

10-14.

Ibid.

63. In June 1998, Secretaryof StateAlbrightpro

claimed

an initiative

tions with
cessful

to improve and normalize

rela
Iran. It is too early to determine how suc

that move

considerations

will

be, but
a factor behind

were

energy
clearly
of
it. Secretary

StateMadeleine K. Albright remarksat 1998 Asia

Society

Waldorf-Astoria

Dinner,

17 June 1998.
64. Ibid.
65. Alec Rasizade,

Trade:

Prospects

and

Hotel,

New

York,

Olcott,

Pitfalls,"

Brown

Journal

of

"The Caspian's

False

Promise,"

For

eignPolicy 111 (Summer 1998): 95-113.

66. Stephen Sestanovich, "Why theUnited States
Has No Russia Policy," inEagle Adrift:American
Foreign Policy at theEnd of theCentury,ed. Robert
J.Lieber (NewYork: Longman, 1997), 166.
67. Blank,

68. Ibid.
69. Ephraim

that commonly
government

"Every
Karsh,

Shark East

of Suez,"

"Cold War,

passim.

Post-Cold

War:

23, no. 3 (September

Studies

a warning
accompanies
is about to break a basic
as occurred

rule," exactly
also,

that another

international

in Chechnya

in 1994.

See

Wars

and

J. Blank,

"Yugoslavia's
Wars:
Yugoslavia's

Stephen

The Prob
Security,"
European
ed. Stephen
lem From Hell,
J. Blank
(Carlisle Bar
Studies
Institute, U.S.
racks, Pa.:
Army
Strategic

War College, 1995), 123-59.

70. Rasizade, "Azerbaijan and the Oil Trade,
277-94;

01cott,"The

False

Caspian's

Promise."

71. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 13 September 1997,

FBIS SOV, 15 September 1997;Howard, "NATO &
the Caucasus,"
72.

passim.

Ibid.

73. See the joint communiqu? issued at the

Bishkek

Domestic

Xinhua

summit,

25

Service,

August 1999,FBIS SOV, 26 August 1999.

74. Interfax,10 December 1997, FBIS SOV, 10
December

1997.

75. FBIS SOV, 8 Octoberl999.

76. FBIS SOV, 15 September 1997.
"Nuclear

Betts,
Journal

Peace

and Conven
11, no.

Studies

of Strategic

(March 1988): 90-91.

78. FBIS SOV, 8 October 1999.

79. Paul

"International
D'Anieri,
Cooperation
of Bilat
Partners: The Emergence
Unequal
in the Former Soviet Union,"
International

Among
eralism

Politics 34, no. 4 (December 1998): 417-48.

80. Gerhard

Simon,

"Russia's

Identity

and

Inter

national Politics," Aussenpolitik 3 (1997): 245-56;

Tatiana

and

"Of Myths

Parkhalina,

Illusions:

Rus

sian Perceptions of NATO Enlargement," NATO

Review (May-June 1997): 14.

on Russia's
"Reflections
81. Andrei
Kokoshin,
John F. Kennedy
School
Past, Present, and Future,"
of Government,
Harvard
University,
Cambridge,
Democratic
Institutions Proj
Mass.,
Strengthening
of this perva
ect, 1998, 31, is an excellent
example
sive mentality.
minister
and
Council,

At

the time he was

soon

deputy defense
secretary of the Defense
6 November
Gazeta,
1996,

after

Rossiyskaya

FBIS SOV, 8 November 1996; "Address by Y. M.

to the OSCE

Primakov

Permanent

Council,"

Vienna,

made available by
20 September 1996, 2, transcript
theEmbassy of theRussian Federation to theUnited
States.

82. Nezavisimoye

Voyennoye

Obozreniye,

14 Jan

uary 2000, FBIS SOV, 14 January2000.

83. Anatol

"Azerbaijan and the Oil

World Affairs4, no. 2 (Summer/Fall1997): 277-94;

Martha

of International

1997): 281. On 283, he noted thatSaddam Hus

sein's buildup prior to the invasion of Kuwait in
1990 was "treated inWashington with thedisbelief

tional War,"

Madeleine K. Albright to StudentsatVilnius Univer

sity and Question and Answer Session," 13 July
1997, Vilnius, Lithuania; "The End of the Begin

Johnson's

Review

77. Richard
"A

60. Talbott,
Department

ItMake a Difference for theMiddle East?"

Does

Lieven,

"The

(Not So) Great

Game,"

National Interest 58 (Winter 1999-2000): 69-81.

Russia's public threat to Georgia and Azerbaijan
serves to show
during the current war with Chechnya
to impose
its controls over
still aspires
that Russia
those states.
84. S. Neil MacFarlane,
the Southern

Caucasus,"

the OSCE,
and
"The UN,
Crossroads
3, no.

Caspian

1 (1997): 18-22.
85. Zerkalo, 18 October
November

86. Panorama, 19March

March

1997, FBIS

SOV, 7

1997.

1999.

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1999, FBIS SOV, 19

Vol. 163No. 2

79

Fall 2000

87. Blank,
"Instability
Old Traits."

in the Caucasus:

New

Trends,

Pol
88. F. Stephen Larrabee,
"U.S. and European
Black
Basin,"
icy Toward Turkey and the Caspian

will and Stuermer,

Allies Divided, 143-73.
89. For
Economics

the earlier U.S.

and Security

view, see Blank, Energy,

in Central Asia,
30.

90. On EU programs in the region seeNezavisi

maya Gazeta, 24 June 1999, FBIS SOV, 24 June

1999; Sakartvelos Respublika, 24 June 1999, FBIS
SOV, 27 June999; Council of theEuropean Union,
22 June 1999; Foreign Broadcast InformationSer
vice, Western Europe, 22 June 1999; Radio Free
Europe/Radio LibertyNewsline, 25 June 1999, 29
June 1999, 2 July 1999; Euro-East, 22 June 1999,
Turkistan Newsletter,

30 June

1999.

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