Political Change in The Middle East - An Attempt To Analyze The 'Arab Spring'

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Political Change in the Middle East:

An Attempt to Analyze the Arab Spring
Martin Beck and Simone Hser
August 2012
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2145853
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PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:
AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring
Abstract
This article deals with theArab Spring as a process of deep political change in theArab
world, previously the only major world area where authoritarianism persisted unchal
lenged for decades. While in various countries of theArab world mass protests in 2011
forcedrulerstoresign,otherauthoritarianregimeshavedespitepoliticalandeconomic
pressuresofarbeenabletoremaininpower,orhaveevenbeenonlyinsignificantlyaf
fected.Thispaperappliescentralsocialscienceapproachesinordertoanalyzerecentde
velopmentsintheregionamajortaskoftheoreticallyorientedsocialsciencesinthecom
ing years. In addition to providing an overview of the existing literature on the Arab
Spring, the article examines the empirical results of political diversification in the Arab
world. A twobytwo matrix of political rule that differentiates according to the type of
ruleandthedegreeofstabilityispresentedanddiscussed.Althoughtheanalysisdraws
heavilyonrenttheory,italsoappliesfindingsfromtransitiontheoryandrevolutiontheory
toilluminatethecurrentpoliticaldynamicsintheMiddleEast.
Keywords:ArabSpring,MiddleEast,renttheory,revolutiontheory,transitiontheory,
democratization,authoritarianism,politicalandeconomicliberalization
Prof.Dr.MartinBeck
holdsachairofcontemporarymiddleeaststudiesattheUniversityofSouthernDenmark
inOdense.From2004to2012hewasaseniorresearchfellowattheGIGAInstituteofMid
dle East Studies in Hamburg, where he is now an associate research fellow. He has pub
lishedextensivelyonMiddleEasternaffairsandhastaught,researched,andworkedasa
political advisor in Germany (Tbingen, Hamburg and Bremen), the Middle East (Pales
tine,Jordan,LebanonandIraq),andtheUS(Denver,Colorado).
Contact:
<martin.beck@gigahamburg.de>,<mbeck@hist.sdu.dk>
Website:
<http://staff.en.gigahamburg.de/beck>
SimoneHser,M.A.
hasbeenaresearchfellowandprojectofficerattheKonradAdenauerStiftunginAmman
since August 2011. She holds a B.A. in political science from the University of Bremen,
GermanyandgraduatedwithamastersdegreeininternationalsecurityfromtheUniver
sityofKent,UnitedKingdom,in2011.
Contact:
<simone.hueser@kas.de>,<simone.hueser@googlemail.com>
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PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:
AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring
MartinBeckandSimoneHser
ArticleOutline
1 Introduction
2 ExplanationsfortheArabSpring
3 PoliticalDiversificationoftheArabWorldCausedbytheArabSpring
4. Conclusion
1 Introduction
Independentlyofitsoutcome,theArabSpring1canberegardedasaneventofglobalhistori
calsignificance.2Fromitsonsetinearly2011,ithasbeenunderstoodasaprocessofpolitical
change in the Middle East.3 The Arab world was the only major area where authoritarian
rulecouldbeestablishedregionwideinthetwentiethcentury,andwhereregimesmanaged
1 Fromapolicyperspective,theuseofthetermrevolutioncouldbeuseful,asitunderlinestheambitionofradi
callyturningawayfromArabauthoritarianism.Fromananalyticalpointofview,however,thetermshouldbe
avoidedbecausethetheoryladenconceptofrevolutionreferstolongprocessesofprofoundpoliticalandsocial
change.Therehaveonlybeenafewsuccessfulrevolutionsinworldhistory,andatthepresenttimeitcannotbe
determinedwhethertheArabSpringhasactuallyinitiatedrevolutions(seeSkocpol1979).Inthefollowing,the
termArabSpringisusedforpragmaticreasons:ithasbecomecommon,andthesearchforatheoreticallymore
sophisticatedconceptismeaninglessconsideringthefactthatthesubjectisstillverymuchinflux.
2 TheauthorsaregratefultoMarkusAlbertMaierand,particularly,WarrenAltounianaswellasMelissaNel
sonfortheirtremendoussupportineditingthepresentarticle.
3 Inthispaper,thetermMiddleEastisusedasasynonymforMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,andArab
worldthatis,stateswithapredominantlyArabpopulation.
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MartinBeckandSimoneHser:PoliticalChangeintheMiddleEast:AnAttempttoAnalyzetheArabSpring
to defy global trends beyond the threshold of the twentyfirst century. But in Tunisia and
Egyptin2011,internalmassprotestsforcedtheleadershiptoresignwithinweeks.Inspired
by these successes, popular movements throughout the Middle East were bolstered. They
demandedsubstantialpolitical reformand,insomecases,regimechange.Afterdecadesof
authoritarianruleandpoliticalstagnation,popularmovementswerefinallyabletodestabi
lizeoroverthrowanumberofauthoritarianregimesintheArabworld.
Inthecomingyears,oneofthemaintasksoftheoreticallyorientedsocialscienceswillbe
tocriticallyfollowandexplaintheArabSpring.Forthispurpose,suchstudiescandrawona
widerfoundationofsocialsciencethanonemightinitiallythink.ThefallofZineelAbidine
BenAli,HosniMubarak,andotherregimeleaderswasnotpredictedbysocialscience,un
lessthenotoriouslyvagueconclusionsofacademicarticleswhichstatethatduetotheun
sustainabledevelopmentoftheArabsystems,changeisinevitableareacceptedasaprog
nosis. Yet, at the same time, it should be taken into account that making predictions about
the nature and timing of social structural change is difficult for objective reasons. The re
searchsubjectsofthesocialscienceshave,incontrasttothoseofchemistryorphysics,inten
tionsandchoiceswhoseoccurrenceandeffectsaredifficulttoidentify.
Theprimaryroleofthesocialsciencesistoexplaineventsandstructures.Thus,untilthe
Arab Spring, the task of social scientists was indeed to analyze the causal and intentional
backgroundofauthoritarianstructuressustainabilityintheMiddleEast.Atthesametime,it
canhardlybeignoredthatthepotentialofnonIslamistcivicmovementsintheregionwas
underestimatedbysocialscientists.Moreover,itmustbementionedthatinreactiontothe
deviant role of theArab world some deterministic approaches and models were estab
lishedthatneglectedorevenignoredtheideathatactorsintheMiddleEasthavechoices.It
would,however,meanthrowingthebabyoutwiththebathwaterifbecauseoftheappar
entfailureofdeterministicapproachesitwereconcludedthat,ingeneral,socialscientific
approacheshavenovalueintheanalysisoftheArabSpring.Reliablesocialscienceresearch,
includinghumanitiesworkanalyzingtheMiddleEastbeforetheArabSpring,worksonthe
basisoftheceterisparibusclause:Statementsthatspecificeventsandstructuresdevelopcer
tain effects are made with the restriction that it applies only if other things are equal. The
statementsmokingkillsisnotfalsejustbecausemanysmokersdonotdiefromtheimme
diate consequences of smoking, or even because nonsmokers also die. The same applies to
socialscientificapproachestotheMiddleEasttheyarenotinvalidjustbecausetheydidnot
anticipatetheArabSpring.
Theaimofthispaperistooutlinemethodsthatusecentralsocialscientificapproachesto
analyzetheArabSpring.Thus,thepaperattemptstocontributetotheexplanationandde
scriptionofpoliticalchangeintheMiddleEastwithreferencetorelevantsocialsciencetheo
ries.Asthesubjectoftheessayisverymuchinflux,itmustbeconcededthatthepresentar
ticlehasastrongexploratorycharacter.
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Theempiricalstartingpointsoftheanalysisarethefollowingobservations:First,several
indicatorssuggestthattheArabSpringisaregionalphenomenon.InmanyMiddleEastern
countries,ithaschallengedthepoliticalpowerofthecurrentregimesinonewayoranother;
ithasalsodominatedthedomesticpoliticaldebateincountrieswheretheArabSpringhas
not gained traction.4 Second, a brief glance at the changes in the political map of theArab
worldmakesitclearthatpoliticaldiversityintheregionhasincreasedsignificantly.Untilthe
ArabSpring,differencesbetweentheMiddleEasternpoliticalsystemscouldpredominantly
befoundinthedegreeoftheirauthoritariancharacter.Butnowtherearetwocharacteristics
by which they differ substantially: authoritarian systems versus systems in transition, and
stablesystemsversusunstablesystems.
InSection2ofthepresentarticle,anoverviewoftheexistingexplanatoryliteraturefor
theArabSpringisprovided.InSection3thecoreofthearticletheempiricalresultsofthe
politicaldiversificationoftheArabworldareexaminedingreaterdetail.Theempiricalanal
ysisisbasedonrenttheory,ortherentierstateapproach.Additionally,findingsfromtransi
tiontheoryandrevolutiontheoryareappliedtoilluminatethepoliticaldynamicsintheArab
worldsparkedbytheArabSpring.Thepaperconcludeswithasummaryandoutlook.
2 ExplanationsfortheArabSpring
2.1 DemographicChange
AfirstapproachtotheArabSpringarguesthatchangewasinevitablebecauseofthecritical
socioeconomic development in the authoritarian states of the Middle East. According to
Volker Perthes (2011: 24), the most important trigger for this change was the demographic
developmentoftheArabworld.From1970to2010,thepopulationnearlytripled,goingfrom
128 million to 359 million inhabitants (Hegasy 2011: 41).An estimated 41 percent of these
peoplelivebelowthepovertyline(UNDP2009:22),andnearly30percentofthepopulation
isbetweentheagesof20and35(Perthes2011:30).Althoughthecurrentgenerationisbetter
educatedandqualifiedthanthepreviousoneduetoastrengthenededucationsectorand
increased networking through digital technology many are unable to find employment
(ibid.:3031).Theunemploymentrateforthepopulationcohortbetweentheagesof15and
24was25.6percentin2003,thehighestintheworld(ILO2004:1,8;UNDP2009:20).Addi
tionally, the labor market offers limited opportunities for university graduates (Perthes
2011:31).Theconsequentlackofprospects,risingcostsofliving,andangeroverobviously
corruptandrepressiverulerscompelledthisgenerationriseupagainsttheauthoritarianre
gimes(ibid.:3035).
4 LebanonconstitutesasignificantexceptioninsofarasthedebateontheArabSpringhasbeen,especiallywith
regardtoSyria,ofaforeignandregionalpoliticalnature,whiletheissueofdomesticreformshasbeenofsec
ondaryimportance.
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2.2 SocialMedia
Another view, held especially by Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussain (2011), attributes
theoutbreakoftheArabSpringtotheaccesstodigitalmedia,includingsocialmediasuchas
Facebook,Twitter,YouTube,andtextmessages.Advocatesofthisapproachmakeclearthat
the dissentbetween regimes and populations already existed long before the spread of the
Internet.However,virtualcommunicationgavepeopleaninstrumentthatmadeitpossible
for them to share their resentment with likeminded people and to organize movements
againstauthoritarianrulers(ibid.:3637,41).
Evenbeforetheoutbreakoftheriots,thestrongestcriticismcamefrompoliticalbloggers:
investigativejournalismintheMiddleEasthaslongbeenthedomainofprivateactors(ibid.:
36,42).TheInternetshowedvideoswhichpresentedthecorruptrulersluxuriousstandard
of living, thereby substantiating the once abstract criticism of the regimes (ibid.: 36). Fur
thermore, digital media displayed the freedom and prosperity of people in the West and
elsewhereintheworld.EverydaymorepeopleintheArabworldwereexposedtotherestof
theworldthroughinternationalonlinenewsortheuseofprogramslikeSkypetotalkwith
friends or relatives living abroad (see Howard and Hussain 2011: 36, 42). The increasingly
multilayered access to media gave people the opportunity to question political norms and
valuesoftenleadingtoademocraticorientation.
AfterMohammadBouazizislegendaryselfimmolation,peoplecommunicatedthrough
outTunisiainvariousonlineforums,expressingtheirsolidarityaswellastheirdissatisfac
tionwiththepoliticalsituationinthecountry.Socialmediaofferedaspaceforsolidaritythat
was ultimately transferred from the virtual world to the real one and manifested in mass
protestsagainsttheauthoritarianregime(ibid.:3638).MessagesandpostsonFacebookand
Twitterorsimpletextmessagesimmediatelyinformedprotestorsaboutthenextstepofac
tionandthelocationwhereitwouldtakeplace.Withinafewweeks,guidedinstructionsfor
organizingsuccessfulprotestswerecirculatedontheInternet(ibid.:3840).Authenticvideos
and pictures taken by protesters with cameras on mobile phones inspired citizens of other
Arabstatestoorganizeprotestssomeofwhichwerethelargestindecades(ibid.:38,43).
Abroad,socialmediaplatformswereusedaschannelstosupportprotestors,toexpresssoli
darity,andtoencouragepeopleintheirchosenpath;forinstance,externalsupporterspro
grammedsoftwarethatenabledactiviststocircumventgovernmentfirewalls(ibid.:37,44).
2.3 Karama!
As diverse as the uprisings in the Arab countries may have been, all protests were directly
linked to the demands for human dignity (karama), freedom, and social justice (Asseburg
2011a:3;Perthes2011:3334).ThefirstmajormassprotestinEgypton25January2011brought
thousandsofpeopletoTahrirSquareinCairocarryingthewordsbread,freedomandhuman
dignity(HRW2012).Withsloganslikethese,peoplecalledforjuststructuresthatdidnotcon
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strainthemfromaccesstojobsbecausetheydidntbelongtoaparticularfamily;politicaland
economicsystemsnotpermeatedbyomnipresentcorruption;andastatethatwouldnotforce
themtoacceptapoorsocialandeconomicsituation(West2011:16).Thus,theassumptionheld
by many in the West that the culture and religion, or the mentality, of people in theArab
world,areincompatiblewithdemocraticvaluescanberefuted(Beck2011b).
2.4 EconomicLiberalizationwithoutPoliticalReforms
Fromapoliticaleconomicpointofview,theArabSpringwascausedbyafundamentalcrisis
oftheauthoritariansocialcontract.Thecontracthadregulatedrelationsbetweenthepeopleof
theArabworldandthepowersystemsfordecades(Harders2011).Thisauthoritarianbargain
implicitly promised the population a minimum of subsidies. In exchange, people preserved
somedegreeofpoliticalloyaltytotheregime.Ifthisminimumeconomicsafetynetguaran
teedbythestatewerenolongermaintained,theregimewouldsufferfromadeficitoflegiti
macyandtheauthoritarianbargainwouldcollapse(Desaietal.2011).However,thetimingof
theArab Spring still cannot be explained, as the crises that led to the failure of the Middle
Easternauthoritarianbargainin2011hadexistedforyears,ifnotdecades(Beck2010).
Oneresultoftheregionaloilboominthe1970swastheestablishmentoftherentbased
systemofpetrolismintheMiddleEast.Rentsareincomeswhicharenotbalancedbylabor
andcapital,andarethusatthefreedisposaloftherecipients.Inthe1970s,notonlydidthe
incomes generated by rents of the oilproducing states in the Middle East escalate, but,
through politically motivated transfers from theArab oil states to the oilpoor countries of
theregion,politicalrentierstatesalsoemerged(Beck2009).Becauseoffallingoilprices,the
systemofpetrolismfellintocrisisduringthelasttwodecadesofthetwentiethcentury.The
regimesoftheMiddleEastreactedwitharelativelycomplex,butunsustainable,attemptat
crisis management, adopting limited economic reforms mostly aimed at enforcing foreign
trade(Frtig2007;Richter2011).Atdifferentstagesmostcountriesinitiatedpoliticalliberali
zation,butthenwithdrewfromitindeliberalizationphases(Kienle2001).Thestructuralde
pendenceonrents,however,wasnotovercome.Twooftherentiersystemstypicaldefects
appeared(althoughthisstilldoesnotexplaintheexacttimingoftheArabSpring):First,the
distributionorientedstrategyoftherentiercountryeventuallymeetsitslimits.Theproduc
tivesectorsareneglectedandgovernmentspendingexpands(especiallywithhighpopula
tiongrowth),whilechancestogeneratecompensatingincomethroughtaxesarelimiteddue
to the neglected productive potential. Second, the primacy of the distributional policy is in
tendedtodepoliticizesociety.Therefore,thedevelopmentofpoliticalinstitutionsisneglected
inrentierstates.Again,thiscannotexplaintheoutbreakoftheArabSpring,butitmakesit
plausiblethatoncetheregimesintheMiddleEastwereconfrontedwithapowerfulopposi
tionmovement,theydidnothavetheappropriatemeanstodrivethosemovementsonsys
temcompatiblepaths(Beck2009,2011a).
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3 PoliticalDiversificationoftheArabWorldCausedbytheArabSpring
3.1 TheNewArabMatrixofRule
TheArab Spring disrupted the high degree of homogeneity among stable authoritarian re
gimesintheMiddleEast.Thismeans,first,thattherearesomecountrieswhereauthoritarian
structures have been shaken to the point that one can speak of transition states.A central
finding of transition theory is that transition has to be seen as an open process (Carothers
2002).WhilemosttransitionprocessesafterthecollapseofthetotalitarianregimesinEurope
were affected by the global spirit of democracy (Mahatma Gandhi), they did not always
resultintheestablishmentofdemocraticsystems.Rather,inmanycaseshybridsystemsor
newtypesofauthoritariansystemsdeveloped.RegionalexamplesfromtheMiddleEastare
theauthoritarianIslamicRepublicofIran,whichemergedfromthe1979revolution,andthe
politicalsystemofTurkey,whichdevelopedafterthefailureofKemalismin1950andwent
throughaprocessofdemocratizationoverdecades(Diamond2002:31).
Second,certainlynotallauthoritarianregimesintheArabworldhavebeendisruptedby
the Arab Spring. Although no country has escaped the regional debate about the Arab
Spring,therulinghousesofsomeregimesespeciallyintheGulfstateshavesofarknown
howtokeepthefoundationsoftheirauthoritarianruleintact.
Third,therearestrongindicationsthattworegimetypeshavebeencreatedwhichhave
more than shortterm potential. On the one hand, not all protest movements in the Arab
world have succeeded in forcing the ruling regime into transformation by peaceful means.
Someregimesstillcontrolatleasttemporarilytheleversofpowerwiththehelpoftheir
repressive apparatuses, yet they have been unable to force the newly formed opposition
movementstotheirknees.AprimeexampleisSyria.
Ontheotherhand,transitioncountriescandiffer,asthetransitionprocesscanberegarded
as stable or unstable. It should be noted that transition processes are sui generis dynamic,
and only in exceptional cases come to pass without retarding moments and setbacks. Al
thoughitmaybecontroversialinaparticularcase,itisstillpossibletodistinguishsystemati
callybetweentransitionsshowingatrendawayfromauthoritarianismtowardanewsystem
andcaseswheretheoldsystemisstrongenoughtoreintroduceauthoritarianism.Itmayalso
be possible that newly emerged political players favor an authoritarian regime. The conse
quences of the latter could lead to the perpetuation of the old regime, to an authoritarian
pactbetweenoldandnewauthoritarianelites,ortothetakeoverofstatepowerbynewau
thoritarianelites.
TheresultisanewtwobytwomatrixofpoliticalruleintheMiddleEast(Table1)gener
atedbytheArabSpring.SaudiArabia,Syria,Tunisia,andEgyptcomeclosetoidealtypes,
althoughtovaryingdegrees.
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Table1:MatrixofPoliticalRuleintheMiddleEast
TypeofRule
DegreeofStability
AuthoritarianRegime
TransitionState
Consolidated/stable
SaudiArabia
Tunisia
Notconsolidated/unstable
Syria
Egypt
Source:Authorscompilation.
3.2
FourTypesofPoliticalRule
3.2.1 StableAuthoritarianSystems:TheCaseofSaudiArabia
OfthosestatesintheMiddleEastwhichfallunderthecategoryofstableauthoritarian,the
KingdomofSaudiArabiaisregionallyandgloballythemostimportantregime.Todate,the
Saudi regime has succeeded in keeping its authoritarian rule stable without implementing
substantialliberalizationmeasures.WhentheArabSpringbegan,variousobserversexpected
certain change in Saudi Arabia (Lacroix 2011: 48). This view appeared plausible, as Saudi
ArabiashowssimilargrievancestothoseArabsystemsthatfacedmassiveprotests:highun
employment, especially among the young; extreme corruption; political repression; and a
widesocialgapbetweentheestablishmentandtheyoungpopulation(ibid.).
Occasionalprotestsoccurredatthebeginningof2011,particularlyintheShiiteeastofthe
country(Freitag2011:23).Buttheregimesucceededinusingitsextensivematerialresources
tostabilizethecountry(Lacroix2011:53).Therevenuesfromtheoilsectorallowedthemon
archytomaintainapolicyofsticksandcarrots:concessionshelpedtodepoliticizestrategic
sectorsofsociety,andatthesametime,rentswereusedtofinanceanallencompassingsecu
rity and intelligence directorate (see Lacroix 2011: 53). When civil unrest occurred in other
Arabstates,thegovernmentimposedanationwidebanondemonstrationsandincreasedthe
contingentofsecurityforces.KingAbdullahalsoannouncedasubsidyprogram of130bil
lionUSD(Steinberg2011).Furthermore,theroyalfamilyreceivedsupportfromtheinfluen
tialCouncil ofSeniorIslamicScholars(HaiatKibaralUlama),whichsaidthatdemonstra
tionsarenotcompatiblewithIslamandthereforedeclaredabanonproteststobereligiously
lawful(ibid.).
3.2.2 UnstableAuthoritarianSystems:TheCaseofSyria
AlthoughtheSyrianoppositionhadalreadyexpresseditsdiscontentwiththeauthoritarian
systeminthepast(forexample,theDamascusDeclarationin2005),theregimeledbyBa
sharalAssadhadsucceededonpreviousoccasionsatstiflingmajorprotestsandmaintain
ingitsstability.InthewakeoftheArabSpring,therewasmassivemobilizationbytheoppo
sition,whichtheregimetriedunsuccessfullytocontainthroughcosmeticreformsandmas
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siverepression.Atthesametime,however,theregimewasabletocontrolthestateinstitu
tions.Thus,acivilwarlikestandoffhasresulted.Atthetimeofthewriting,itisnotpredict
ablehowlongthissituationwilllast,iftheAssadregimewillmaintainstableauthoritarian
rule,oriftheconflictwillleadtoregimecollapseandaprogressivepoliticaltransformation
inSyria(BeckandHser2011).
3.2.3 StableSystemsofTransition:TheCaseofTunisia
Withinonemonth,protestorsinTunisiaoverthrewadecadesoldauthoritarianregime.After
23 years as president, BenAli was forced to resign in late January 2011. Subsequent devel
opmentscreatedapromisingpoliticalatmospherefortheConstituentAssemblyelectionin
October2011,andthenewlyelectedassemblywastaskedwithdraftinganewconstitution
and appointing a new government.Apart from protests in February 2011, which called for
thedismissalofBenAlissupportersingovernmentpositions,therehavebeennodestabiliz
ingdemonstrationsorpolicesuppression(SchraederandRedissi2011:1,1417).Compared
to other countries in the region, Tunisia has good prerequisites for democratization (Asse
burgandWerenfels2011:8);thusitcanbeconsideredastabletransformationcountry.
3.2.4 UnstableTransitionSystems:TheCaseofEgypt
Similarly to Tunisia, Egypt has been in transition since the resignation of President Hosni
MubarakinFebruary2011.Egyptstransition,however,appearstobelessconsolidatedthan
thatofTunisia.Sincethefallof2011,thecountryhasbeenshakenbymassiveriots,andthe
statesreactionshaveledtosubstantialpoliticalandeconomicinstability.Theriotshavebeen
primarily directed against the transitional military government, which has delayed or
blockedthetransitionofpowertoaciviliangovernment.Themilitaryindustrialcomplex
(Davis2011b)hassteadilyexpandeditspoliticalandeconomicroleeversinceitsemergence
in 1954. This suggests that despite the resignation of Mubarak, the regimes forces are still
strong.Manyobserversstatethatthecrucialfactorblockingademocratictransformationis
presentlynotthestrengthofIslamistgroupsbutthemilitarysinterference(Davis2011b,c).
But thereare also other assessments: In the postMubarak parliamentary elections, Islamist
partieswontwothirdsoftheseats,stokingfearsofanundemocraticIslamizationofthepo
litical system. The rising popularity of Salafism, and the possibility of a coalition between
SalafistsandtheMuslimBrotherhood,isperceivedasthreatening(Ashour2012).
3.3 AnAttemptatExplanation:ReasonsfortheDiversification
3.3.1 TheoreticalFramework
Thematrixofpoliticalruleoutlinedaboveinitiallyseemstohaveastaticcharacter.Inother
contexts such matrices are used to sharply delineate various types of political rule. Such a
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procedurewould,however,notmatchthedynamiccharacteroftheArabSpring.Inthefol
lowing it will become clear that the matrix can analytically reproduce these dynamics, but
onlyifthepremiseisnotedthatthematrixalthoughitreflectssystematicallyclearsepara
tionsdoesnotconsistentlyproduceempiricallyunambiguousclassificationswithregardto
theArabSpring.Bearingthisinmind,thematrixiscapableofenrichingtheanalysisbycap
turingthedynamiccharacterofpoliticalchangeintheArabSpring.
InthefollowingoutlineofthenewmatrixofpoliticalruleintheMiddleEast,threetheo
reticalapproachesareharnessed.Themostimportantoneappearstobetheaforementioned
rentier state approach, which was introduced by Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani
(1987).Twoothertheoreticalapproachesfromsocialscienceresearchthatshouldbeapplied
aretransitiontheoryandrevolutiontheory.
Portugals Carnation Revolution in 1974 started the third wave of democratization
(Huntington1991).Asaresult,theoriesofpoliticalsystemchange,especiallyapproachesto
transition theory, became popular: What causes the collapse of authoritarian regimes that
appearedtobestablefordecades?Whichactorsplayaroleinthetransitionprocesses(Lauth
and Wagner 2009: 126127)? Major attention is directed to the quality and efficiency of the
emergingpoliticalsystems(Carothers2002:6;LauthandWagner2009:126).Throughoutthe
history of the research, some of the main assumptions of the early approach to transition
havebeenquestioned,particularlytheteleologicalperspectiveaccordingtowhichdemocra
tization more or less inevitably leads to the establishment of consolidated democracies
(Carothers 2002: 68, 14). In addition, concepts that allow for an analytical view of the re
authoritarization of the political system or the development of hybrid regime types have
beendeveloped(Carothers2002:10;Merkel2004).
Akeyfindingoftherevolutionresearchisthatrevolutionarymovementscanonlysuc
ceedwhentherulingregimebecomessubstantiallyweakenedbothexternallyandinternally
(Skocpol1979).Therearemanymorecasesofbrokenandfailedrevolutionsinhistorythan
successfulones.Eveninsituationsofseverecrisis,rulingregimeshaveopportunitiestocome
outontopbecausetheyhaveorganizationalcapacitiessuperiortothoseoftheirchallengers.
Theseincludemilitaryandcivilianinstitutionsthroughwhichtheycanenactrepressionand
garnerlegitimacy,respectively.Butevenifrevolutionsaresuccessful,theirinitialorganizers
areoftennotthosewhoariseoutofthemasthevictors.Rather,thosegroupsthatwereex
cludedfrompoliticalpowerintheancienrgime,whichcanrelyonasuperiororganizational
capacitytothatoftherevolutionsinitiators,haveagoodchanceofsucceeding.Insituations
ofpoliticalupheaval,revolutiontheorythereforeemphasizes,ontheonehand,notunderes
timatingtheforcesoftheoldregime;ontheother,thepowerofoppositiongroupsthatdid
notplayamajorroleininitiatingtherevolutionbutmaintainhighlyorganizedbodies(inthe
MiddleEast,Islamistgroupsfallintothiscategory)aretobetakenintoaccount.
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3.3.2 PoliticalSystemsintheMiddleEastbetweenAuthoritarianismandTransition
3.3.2.1 ThePersistenceofAuthoritarianRuleintheArabWorld:TheGulfStates
TheArabSpringleftmanypartsoftheArabworldinsustainedawe.Insomecasesparticu
larly in Libya it even led to the overthrow of the regime. From a social science point of
view,thereisaneedtoexplainthereasonswhyasignificantnumberofregimesenduredthe
ArabSpringwithoutthedestabilizationofauthoritarianruleatleasttodate.Amongallthe
socialscienceapproachesusedtoanalyzetheArabregimesbeforetheArabSpring,theren
tier state approach has the least difficulty explaining this difference. With the exception of
BahrainandLibya,allcountrieswithhigheconomicrentinflowsinparticularoilstatesin
theGulfwereabletokeeptheirpowerstable.
AmongtheGulfstates,Qatarsstableauthoritarianstructureswerepossiblytheleastaf
fected by the Arab Spring. This is mainly due to the immense oil and gas reserves in the
country,measuredpercapita.TogetherwithIran,Qatarpossessesthelargestnaturalgasre
servesintheworldandwastheworldslargestexporterofnaturalgasin2006.Thesubstan
tialrentinflowscombinedwithaverysmallpopulationoflessthantwomillion (ofwhich
only220,000haveQatarinationality)providethestatewithsignificantfreedomofactionin
thedesignofitsforeignanddomesticpolicy(Ulrichsen2011).In2009,percapitaincomewas
$82,978(inpurchasingpowerparitytotheUSdollarintheUnitedSates),whichmakesitthe
statewiththesecondhighestpercapitaincomeintheworld,rankingevenbeforeLuxembourg
(UNDP2011).AccordingtotheGlobalHumanDevelopmentIndex,Qatarranks37(ibid.).The
growthrateincreasedfrom17percentin2010to19percentin2011(IMF2012a).Atthesame
time,theunemploymentrateisestimatedtobebelow1percent(IMF2012b:3).Thisextreme
prosperityhasprotectedthestatefromthesocial,political,andeconomicdiscontentthatled
totheprotestsinmostotherArabcountries(Ulrichsen2011).Massivesocialprivilegefrom
abovehasweakenedthedemandforpoliticalrightsofparticipationfrombelow(seeUl
richsen 2011). According to a study from the years 20102011, the people of Qatar valued
democratic structures the least compared to other Arab populations (Asdaa BursonMar
steller2011).
Atthesametime,theQatarirulingeliteseekstosecureitslegitimacyregionallyandin
ternationallybyactingasaresponsibleregionalplayer,adiplomaticbroker,andapolitical
mediatorastrategythatQatartookupafewyearsagoandattemptedtoreinforceduring
theArabSpring(Steinberg2012:34;Ulrichsen2011).WiththestartoftheArabSpring,the
governmentsupportedtheuprisingsintheregionwiththeexceptionofthoseintheGulf
states.InthecaseofLibya,QataradvocatedwithintheArabLeaguefortheorganizationto
approvethemilitaryinterventionofNATOandtherebydistinguisheditselfasanallyofthe
West.Simultaneously,theLibyanrebelsweresupportedwitharms,trainingandmoney.Af
ter initial reluctance, the country also supported the opposition movement in Syria espe
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cially the Muslim Brotherhood and used, as in the Libyan case, the influence it gained
throughitschairmanshipoftheArabLeague(Steinberg2012:46).
While the rentier state approach has no problem explaining the stability in Qatar and
other Gulf states, at first glance, the explanation is not as obvious for Bahrain. Bahrain has
onlyverylimitedoilreserves.Therefore,fromthepointofviewoftherentierstateapproach,
it is not surprising that the largest protests in the Gulf states during theArab Spring took
placeinBahrain.InFebruary2011,onethirdofthepopulationbelongingtovariouspolitical
affiliations took to the streets across the country to stand up for their rights (Niethammer
2011).Butwhywastheregimeabletorelativelyeasilystrikedownthemassprotests?This
canmainlybeattributedtoitsrentierneighborSaudiArabia.SincetheSaudiroyalfamily,as
ahegemonicactorintheGulfregion,fearedthatapoliticalcrisisinaGulfmonarchycould
callinto questionthegeneralmonarchicalprincipleinthissubregion oftheMiddleEast,it
supportedtheBahrainiregimeinmassivelyquellingtheriotsandevensenttroopstoBah
raininMarch(seeSteinberg2011).
Another reason for the successful repression of the Bahraini protests is the qualitative
strengthandtheconfessionalcharacterofthecountrysmilitary.Itssoldierspossesssophis
ticated modern weapons, have firstrate training, and receive high compensation for their
services.Asthecountry,duetoitsdiversifiedeconomy,providesvariouscareeropportuni
ties in the civilian sector, the monarchy also employs welltrained soldiers from abroad.
Hence,themilitaryisnotconnectedwithsociety,butratherseesitselfasaSunnicombat
unitthathasbeenraisedintheserviceoftheroyalfamilyandthecountrysSunnielite(Barany
2011:3132).
In the case of Libya, much evidence indicates that Muammar Gaddafis regime would
nothavebeenoverthrownwithouttheinterventionofNATO,asthemilitarycapabilitiesof
theoppositionweretooweaktoprevailagainsttheforcesoftheregime.Whiletheregimes
regularmilitarywasfinanciallydeprived,Gaddafiensuredthathissonscommandedexcel
lentlyequippedandtrainedmilitias.Thesefamilybondssecuredthereliablebackingofse
curityforcesinthefaceofafivemonthmilitaryoperationbyNATO(ibid.:2931).Theinterna
tional responsetoGaddafisbrutalcrackdownonprotestsbeganinFebruary2011,whenthe
UnitedNationsSecurityCounciladoptedResolution1970.Theresolutioncondemnedthevi
olencecarriedoutbytheregimeandcalledforsanctions.WhenGaddafiwasunimpressed
andonthevergeofinvadingtherebelstrongholdofBenghazi,theSecurityCounciladopted
Resolution1973,authorizingNATOtoestablishanoflyzonetoprotectcivilians.Inaddition,
someofthealliesprovidedtherebelswithweaponsandammunition.Theresultinginterna
tionalmilitaryoperationendedon31October,afterGaddafiwaskilledbyLibyanrebelsand
hislastfighterscapitulated(WesterandGoldstein2011).
Yetwhy,inthefirstplace,didtheprotestmovementinLibyabringMuammarGaddafis
regimetothebrinkofcollapsewithoutmassiveassistancefromoutside?Asinthecaseofthe
IslamicrevolutioninIran,asimpleexplanationaccordingtotherentierstateapproachdoes
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notholdtrue:bothregimeswentthroughanexistentialcrisis,andultimatelyfell,despitea
substantialincreaseinoilrevenues(seeBeck2007b).Inbothcases,theregimecollapsedbe
causeofarathercharacteristicdefectofrentierstates:Inanextremeway,Gaddafipromoted
thedepoliticizationofsocietybymeansofadistributionpolicyandthedestructionofformal
political institutions, which opposition groups could have used to exercise pressure for re
form(Vandewalle1991;Vandewalle1998:68).Atthesametime,therulingelitewassoheavily
consolidatedthatitactuallyconsistedonlyoftherulerhimselfandhisclosestfamilymem
bers(AsseburgandWerenfels2011:3).Thus,theregimehadonlyoneinstitutionthatwasin
strumental in the confrontation with the opposition: the security apparatus. Its efficacy,
however,wasblockedbytheinterventionofNATO.
The extreme depoliticization of society in the Libyan rentier state has also left a strong
legacyforthetransitionprocess.Forasocietythatdidnothaveanyciviccultureandstate
structuresoverdecades,thetransitiontowardsdemocraticstructuresappearstobeaparticu
larly difficult and longprocess in which setbacks are to be expected (Lacher 2011a, 2011b).
Fromtodaysperspective,itisanopenquestionwhethersuchatransformationwillleadtoa
democracy,anauthoritarianregime,orahybridsystem.
3.3.2.2 TheDifferencebetweenStableandUnstableAuthoritarianSystems:SyriaundAlgeria
Asexplainedintheprevioussection,thedifferencebetweenthe(sofar)stableauthoritarian
regimesoftheArabMiddleEastandcountriesthatfallintooneoftheotherthreecategories
can be explained with the help of the rentier state approach. This approach also makes an
importantcontributionindefiningthedifferencebetweenstableandunstableauthoritarian
regimes:thelatterhaveamuchlowerrentincomewithwhichtobuyoffambitionsofpoliti
cal participation in times of political crisis. This difference can be empirically explained by
comparingSyriaandAlgeria.Furthermore,thefindingsofrevolutiontheoryshouldbeuti
lizedinordertounderstandwhysomeMiddleEasternregimeshavebeenabletocontrolthe
corridorsofpowerdespitecontinuedmassivemobilizationbytheopposition.
Asalreadyexplained,inthecontextoftheArabSpring,Syriahasslippedintoastateof
authoritarianinstability.IntheeyesofmanySyrianstheAssadregimehascompletelylostits
legitimacy(BeckandHser2011).Thereasonitisstillabletoholdontopoweristhatitcan
relyalbeittoadwindlingextentonthesupportofelitesandalargelyintactsecurityap
paratus.Theregimesinabilitytorestorestabilitycanbeattributedtothefactthatthestate
doesnothaveadequaterentincometobuyfulllegitimacyamongthemajorityofthepopula
tion, and/or to finance a security apparatus that could immediately suppress any insurrec
tion.AlthoughSyriahasmoderateoilreserves,itisestimatedthatthecountrywillbecomea
netimporteroverthenexttenyears(EU2007:8).UnlikeBahrain,Syriaisnotunderthepro
tectionofanimmediaterentierneighborwhichcouldsupporttheregimemilitarily.Quiteto
thecontrary,SaudiArabiaandtheotherGulfstatesdonothaveanyinterestinsupporting
therepublican,quasisecularregimeinDamascus.Therefore,theycontributetoaconsider
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ableextenttotheArabfrontagainstSyria,therebyreferringtovalueswhichtheysystemat
icallyviolatethemselves(Cunningham2012;Dugulin2012).
Fromtheperspectiveofrevolutiontheory,itisunsurprisingthatstrategicgroupsinSyria
stillfearopenlyopposingtheextremelyrepressiveregimebecausetheyareafraidoflosing
theirprivileges.Moreover,Assadstillhasthefullsupportofthesecurityforces.Itisnottobe
expected that this situation could change in the near future as the regime has managed to
closelybindtheAlawiteelite.ThustheEgyptianscenariowherethemilitaryshiftedaway
fromtherulerisratherunlikely.Atthesametime,therearenostrongindicatorsforaLibyan
solution, as no external military intervention comparable to the NATO operation in Libya
seemstolieahead.Additionally,despiteincreasingexternalpressurenotonlyfromtheWest
butalsofromTurkeyandtheArabLeague,Assadstillhasthesupportofinfluentialplayers
namely, Russia and China, which have veto power in the UN Security Council; Iran; and
Hezbollah(BeckandHser2011).
IncontrasttoSyria,theAlgerianregimewasabletomaintainitsstableauthoritarianrule.
Theprotests,whichbeganinJanuary2011,weredirectedagainstthepoorlivingconditions
andrepressionbytheregime.Seventyfivepercentofthepopulationisunder30yearsold,
andtheunemploymentrateisapproximately10percent(Belakhdar2011:82;Furceri2012:18).
With a maximum of approximately 3,000 demonstrators (against a force of 30,000 police
men),politicalmobilizationinAlgeriadidnotreachthecriticalmassthatitdidinTunisiaor
Egypt,wheretheleaderswereultimatelyforcedtoresign(Belakhdar2011:8283).Thiswas
due to aside from the horrific memories from the Algerian civil war in the 1990s the
statesimmenseoilrents.In1989AlgeriaappearedtobethefirstArabcountrythatcouldbe
onthepathtowardsdemocratization.ButwhentheIslamistoppositionpartyFrontIslamique
duSalut(FIS)wonthemajorityofvotesinthe1992parliamentaryelections,thegovernment
blockeditfrompower.Inaveryshorttimethepartywasbannedandthousandsofitsmem
bersimprisonedandpersecuted.ThesubsequentcivilwarbetweensupportersoftheFISand
the states security forces dragged on into the next decade and claimed more than 200,000
lives.Themilitaryeliteandtheheadsofthesecurityservicesmanagedtoreimplementau
thoritarianismintheAlgeriangovernment,thematerialbaseofwhichwashighrentincomes
fromtheoilandgassector(ibid.:85).
Afundamentalthesisoftherentierstateapproachisthatsocioeconomicsystemsthatare
exposedtoahighinfluxofrentshaveastrongtendencytolackdiversificationwithintheir
economies(Beck2011a).ThisphenomenonisalsoevidentinAlgeria:theAlgerianeconomy
isdominatedbyhugereservesoffossilfuels,whichaccountforapproximately98percentof
exportsandapproximately40to45percentofthegrossdomesticproduct(IMF2011a).These
numbersreflecttheweaknessofAlgeriasproductivesectorsasaresultofthedominanceof
theoilsector,somethingthathasbeenaccentuatedbythestatespoliticoeconomicblunders
(Achy2009).Sincetheoilindustryisextremelycapitalintensiveandprovidesfewjobs,the
Algerianyouthpayahighpriceforthissituation:thelabormarkethardlyoffersbetterpro
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spectsthantheinformalsector(Belakhdar2011:82).Untilnow,however,theresourcesofthe
regimehavebeensufficienttokeepitsauthoritarianrulestable.PresidentAbdelazizBoute
flika inofficesince1999respondedtotherecentprotestswithamixture ofsticksand
carrots:ontheonehandmassiverepressionandontheotherlimitedpoliticalandfinancial
concessionsintheformofwageincreases,areductioninfoodprices,thedissolutionofthe
stateofemergencyinexistencesince1992andtheannouncementofpoliticalreforms(ibid.:87).
3.3.2.3 TheDifferencebetweenStableandUnstableTransitionCountries:Tunisia,Egypt,andYemen
Thedistinctionbetweentransitioncountriesthatshowpotentialforregimechangeandthose
that are at risk of falling back into old or new patterns of authoritarianism is a subject of
greatimportance.Transitionprocessesarecomplex,andthereisnoguaranteefortheestab
lishmentofaconsolidateddemocracy(Carothers2002).Atthesametime,sincethefluctua
tionsthatoccurduringtransitionsarenotoriouslygreat,theunambiguousassignmentofcer
tain cases to one of the categories in the above matrix is a difficult task. Taking a political
snapshotmorethanayearafterthebeginningoftheArabSpring(thetimeofthewritingof
thispaper)TunisiaseemstobetheArabcountrywhichismostlikelytobeonthepathto
ward genuine democratization. In contrast, it is likely that Egypts old regime is so strong
that a transition away from authoritarianism could be blocked. Yemen distinguishes itself
withanevenhigherdegreeofcomplexity.
Compared to other Arab states, Tunisia has strong potential for a successful transition
due to the political, economic, and social structures of the country. In other authoritarian
states in the Middle East, civil society organizations and political institutions are often un
derdeveloped due to depoliticization policies. Tunisia, however, has had relatively well
developedcivilsocietystructuresforalongtime;thelabormovement,stronglyrepresented
bythecountryslaborunionumbrellaorganization,theTunisianGeneralLaborUnion(Da
vis2011a),iswellestablished.Intheperiodfrom1988to2009,thenumberofcivilsocietyor
ganizationsincreasedfromnearly2,000toover9,000(Henry2011:5).Inparticular,womens
organizations have long been very active andwell organized. However, it should be noted
thatonlyasmallnumberoftheseorganizationsactedindependentlyfromtheregimeinare
assuchashumanandcivilrights.Mostorganizationslimitedtheirworktogovernmentally
acceptedandfundedareas:culture,sports,arts,economicdevelopment,andwomensrights
(ibid.).WomeninTunisiaalsoenjoyagoodlevelofeducationand,comparedtootherArab
countries,haveachievedahigherdegreeofequality.BeforetheoutbreakoftheArabSpring,
women held nearly a quarter of seats in parliament (Davis 2011a). Critical observers point
out, however, that the majority of women in politics had no decisionmaking power and
largelytookpositionsinareasthatwerecontrolledbythegovernment(Matsson2011:89).
Nevertheless,itcanbearguedthatatleasttheinstitutionalstructuresforthedevelopmentofa
freecivilsocietywereestablishedbytheancienrgimeandtherefore,unlikethecaseinLibya,
donotneedtobeestablishedanew.Inaddition,Tunisiansocietyismoreinterconnectedthan
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otherArabsocieties(Perthes2011:4142).OnethirdoftheTunisianpopulationusestheIn
ternet(SchraederandRedissi2011:11),which,evenbeforetheArabSpring,servedasafo
rum for the politically interested to discuss grievances about the political system (Howard
and Hussain 2011: 36). After Ben Alis fall, political debate intensified beyond the virtual
world.ProminentexiledTunisiansreturnedtothecountry,andamultitudeofpoliticalpar
ties arose (Schraeder and Redissi 2011: 15). With regard to confessional, ethnic, and tribal
structures, the conditions for a transition process are also relatively favorable in Tunisia as
thecountry,unlikeYemen,enjoysahighdegreeofhomogeneity(Plattner2011:7).
IntheOctober2011electionstheIslamistpartyEnnahdawon89of217seats.Although
thismadeitthestrongestparty,itstillreliesonnonreligiouscoalitionpartners(Davis2011a).
EnnahdahashithertoactedasamoderateIslamistpartythatdoesnothavethegoalofIs
lamizing Tunisian society according to the Tehran model (see Davis 2011a). Furthermore,
thepartyleadershipseemstoalsobeawareofthefactthatmanyTunisianschosetovotefor
themnotbecauseoftheirreligiousaffinities,butduetotheirroleasacounterweighttothe
Frenchspeakingeliteofthecountry(ibid.).
The military class within a state plays a significant role in transition processes (Barany
2011).EvenBenAlispredecessor,HabibBourguiba,largelykeptthemilitaryoutofallpolit
icalandeconomicdecisionsduringhisthreedecadesofrule(19571987).BenAlicontinued
thispolicyandfocusedinsteadontheconstructionofastatepolicebasedontheintelligence
service,theMukhabarat.Therefore,therelativelyunderprivilegedmilitaryhadlittlereason
tofightfortheregimeaftertheoutbreakofprotests.Duetoitspoliticalandeconomicinsig
nificance,theTunisianmilitaryunlikeitsEgyptiancounterpartcontinuestoviewitsrole
as deterring external threats and does not hinder democratization (Barany 2011: 27;
SchraederandRedissi2011:56).
Finally,Tunisiaexportsonlyminoramountsofoil,andhasarelativelyadvancedanddi
versifiedeconomicsystem(Plattner2011:7).Themiddleclassis,comparedtoothercountries
in the region, large and well educated (Davis 2011a). Nevertheless, it should be noted that
thesepositivecharacteristicsareanalyzedinthecontextoftheMiddleEastasacrisisregion.
Ifglobalstandardsareapplied,theTunisianeconomymustbeviewedcritically:theunem
ploymentrateis15percent,andtheeconomysufferedheavilyduringthefinancialcrisisof
20082009becauseofitsdependenceontheWest,andastheresultofthepoliticalupheavals
of the past year. Whether Tunisia will make a fast economic recovery appears uncertain.
Thereis,however,ahighprobabilitythatthechancesofsuccessfuldemocratizationwillbe
negativelyaffectedifthereisnoeconomicupturn(ibid.).
Compared to Tunisia, the prospects for a democratic transition in Egypt appear less
promising.Asmentionedabove,thereismuchevidencethatthemajorpoliticalthreattothe
progressive political development of the country emanates from the military. Since the Su
premeCouncilofArmedForces(SCAF)seizedpoweron11February2011,ithasdelayedthe
handoverofpowertoaciviliangovernment.Inaddition,ithasnotbackedawayfromvio
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lently repressing demonstrators demanding an end to its rule. As previously mentioned,

Egypthasbeenunderthestronginfluenceofthemilitarysincethe1950s.Themilitarysector
hasbuiltabusinessempirethatcontrols,accordingtovariousestimates,15to35percentof
Egypts gross domestic product. This militaryindustrial complex includes a wide range of
businessesfrombakeriesandgasstationstofactoriesandtollroads(Davis2011c;Jacobs2011).
In addition, the country faces massive socioeconomic challenges: in 2008, 22 percent of
thepopulationlivedbelowthepovertyline(WorldBank2012);in2011theunemployment
rateroseto12percentandisprojectedtorisefurther,andeconomicgrowthfelltoapproxi
mately1percent(IMF2011b:67).Inordertobeabletoabsorballnewentrantstothelabor
market,thecountrywouldneedanannualgrowthrateof6to7percentaccordingtotheIn
ternationalMonetaryFund(IMF2010:19).
InYemen,PresidentAliAbdullahSalehresignedattheendofJanuary2012,oneyearaf
ter the outbreak of protests. Shortly thereafter, on 21 February, the former vice president,
AbedRabboMansurHadi,waselectedtoatwoyearterminofficeandwastaskedwithini
tiatingconstitutionalreform.Atfirstglance,thisappearstobeaprimeexampleofatransi
tionprocess.Acloserlookrevealsthatthecountryisindeedundergoingaprocessofpoliti
calchange;however,thisprocessgoeshandinhandwithsignificantuncertaintiesduetoa
multitudeofconflictingforces.Becauseoftheprecariouspoliticalandeconomicsituationof
thecountryYemenisthepoorestcountryintheregionandtherisksposedbyalQaeda,
manyregionalandinternationalplayersareskepticalofregimechange.Therulingelite,de
spitealltheshortcomingsofthesystemofgovernment,hassofaratleastsucceededinpre
ventingatotalcollapseofgovernmentauthority,andYemensdevolutionintoafailedstate
(Heibach2011:130131).Thepossibleconsequencesoffurtherdestabilizationaredire:sepa
ratisminthesouth,civilwar,orafurtherincreaseinthepowerofalQaeda(Steinberg2010).
Conflictbetweenthecountryspatronagenetworks,whicharepolarizedbetweentheelites
of thenorth and the south, the influence of extremist Islamist groups, and tribal structures
arethemainreasonsfortheprecarioussituation.JensHeibach(2011:132142),however,ar
guesthatduetoYemensexperiencewithpoliticalinstitutions,apoliticizedcivilsociety,and
theexistenceofacultureofdialogue,hopeforasuccessfultransitionexists.However,itis
crucialthatpoliticalchangeisaccompaniedbyaneconomicboom.
Inthecontextoftheoreticalconsiderations,therevolutionarysituationintheArabworld
has often been compared with the situation in Eastern Europe in 1989 (Howard 2011; Way
2011:17).Althoughtherearesimilarities,itshouldbenotedthattheconditionsoftransition
aremuchmoredifficultintheMiddleEast.Thisis,first,becausetheincentivesfordemocra
tizationarelow:NoArabcountryhastheprospectoffullmembershipintheEuropeanUn
ion. Second, it should be noted that the regions nationalist regimes (with some socialist
paint),establishedinthe1950s,wereanindigenousreactiontoWesternimperialismandco
lonialism, while socialism in Eastern Europe was externally imposed by the Soviet Union.
AfterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion,EasternEuropeanstateswereabletoreturntotheir
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economicandpoliticalheritage,whichtheysharedwithWesternEurope,buttheArabworld
faces the challenge of having to redefine itself politically and economically. Third, the ex
pectedeconomicgainsattheendoftheColdWarencouragedeconomicactorstoinvestin
EasternEuropeancountriesandtoadvancethereformprocess.Therelativelyuncertaindiv
idendsthatareexpectedasaresultoftheArabSpring,andconcernsaboutthefutureroleof
Islamist groups in the Middle East, however, are limiting the confidence of investors
(Marktanner2012:1314).
3.3.2.4TheDifferencebetweenStableAuthoritarianSystemsandTransitionCountries:
MoroccoandJordan
TheeffectsoftheArabSpringarenotlimitedtothosecountrieswhoserulershavebeenover
thrownorbroughttothebrinkofcollapse.Infact,allArabcountriescameunderpressureto
reform.TheonlytworemainingmonarchiesintheArabworldoutsidetheGulfregionare
underconstantpressuretoreform: MoroccoandJordan.InbothcountriestheArabSpring
resulted in recurring protests that were less spectacular than those in Tunisia, Egypt, and
Syria. However, if the political situation in the two monarchies before the Arab Spring is
compared with the situation in 2011, it becomes clear that there has been an unmistakable
qualitativeleapinthepoliticalmobilizationofsociety.Whatneedstobecriticallyexamined
is whether the reforms that have been implemented provide sufficient evidence that the
monarchiesarereallyinatransitionprocess.Therulerscouldalsohavechosenstrategies
withreasonablygoodchancesofsuccesstostabilizetheauthoritarianregimethroughlim
ited,reversibleliberalizationorevensimplecosmeticreforms.
ThedevelopmentsinJordanandMoroccoindicatetheimportanceofthecentraltheoreti
caldistinctionbetweenliberalizationanddemocratization.Liberalizationisunderstoodasan
openingupofthepoliticalsysteminordertostabilizetheauthoritariansystemunderpres
sure. In specific empirical cases it may be difficult to clearly identify whether processes of
politicalchangefitintothepatternofliberalizationorthatofdemocratization;however,
the two terms systematically refer to opposite processes. While liberalization is a survival
strategyofauthoritariansystems,andmeasuresundertakeninthiscontextcanbereversed
intimesofdiminishingpressure,democratizationcannotbecontrolledfromabove.Thedis
tinction between the two processes is becoming even more complex because liberalization
canleadtowardsdemocratization,contrarytotheintentionsofitsinitiators,aswasthecase
withperestroikaintheSovietUnion(Beck2007a).
ShortlyafterprotestsagainstthegovernmenteruptedinMoroccoinFebruary2011,King
MohammedVIaddressedhispeopleandpromisedfarreachingconstitutionalreformsthat
weresupposedtostrengthenrepresentativeinstitutions.FortheMoroccans,thesepromises
ofreformdidnotgofarenough;insteadtheydemandedanewconstitution.Theroleofthe
popular king public criticism of whom is taboo is enshrined in the constitution and is
basedonbothextensivesecularandreligiousauthority(Hoffman2011:9294).Althoughthe
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regimehadpropagateddemocratictransitiontotheoutsideworldforyears,thepoliticalsys
tem had remained mainly authoritarian (ibid.: 9698). Yet after the regime had initially re
spondedtotheprotestswithincreasedrepression,MohammedVIannouncedareferendum
onanewconstitution(Benchemsi2012:58).
Alreadybeforetheoutbreakofprotests,theyouthandthemedia,inparticular,criticized
theregimeandvocalizedtheirgrievancesinthecountry(ibid.:9798).YetonlywiththeAr
abSpringhasadiscoursedevelopedthatdoesnotbackawayfromcontestingthemonarchy
andthereligiouslegitimacyoftheking(ibid.:102103).Someobserversregardthismobiliza
tion,frombelow,asanindicatorforthepossibletransitionofMoroccointoaconstitutional
monarchyintheEuropeansense(ibid.:103).
Atthesametime,criticalobservershaveraiseddoubtsaboutthegovernmentscommit
menttomakingasubstantialtransition.Thiscriticismcanbetracedbacktothereferendum
inJuly2011,inwhichthenewconstitutionwasadoptedbyanoverwhelmingmajority.Like
manyofthekingsspeeches,therevisedconstitutionappearstobeamasterpieceofdemo
cratic rhetoric. In parts,the new constitution may actually be readasaresponse tothe de
mand for the substantial limitation of royal power in favor of a democratic separation of
powers.Acloserlook,however,revealsthatmajorautocraticelementsarestillenshrinedin
the document (Benchemsi 2012: 5759). The following discussion provides examples in the
areasoftheexecutive,legislative,andjudicialbranchesthatraisedoubtsaboutwhetherthe
royalfamilyhasactuallydecidedtoinduceademocratictransition.
The new constitution still grants the king the right to convene and preside over the
CouncilofMinisters,andtodetermineitsagenda.Thiscouncilsapprovalisrequiredtoen
surethatparliamentcanbringinabill(ibid.:62);thekingappointsthegovernmentssecre
tarygeneral,whoisabletoblockanyoftheparliamentslegislation.Inaddition,Article42
givesthekingtherighttoissuelawsbyroyaldecree(ibid.).
Moroccoselectorallawanditshighlyfragmentedpoliticallandscapetherearecurrent
ly34politicalpartieshasensuredthatnopartycanwinmorethanaquarterofallseatsin
parliament, a situation which limits the prospect that the party systemcould challenge the
royal palace. Indeed, the king is obliged to appoint the prime minister (Chief of Govern
ment),whothenhastherighttorecommendthenominationofministersortoclaimdeduc
tions,fromthestrongestpartyinparliament(Benchemsi2012:6364).However,theseinitia
tivesonthepartofthe primeministerarenotbindingfor thekingsincetheconstitutional
textonlyrequeststhathemustconsulttheprimeminister(ibid.:64).
Inthewakeofthedemonstrations,thedemandforanindependentjudiciarygrewloud.
Theregimerespondedbyabsolvingtheministerofjusticefromhissupervisoryroleoverthe
SuperiorCouncilofMagistrates,whichholdstheabsoluteauthorityontheappointmentand
dismissalofjudges.Article115ofthenewconstitution,however,grantsthekingtherightto
namehalfofthemembersofthecouncilanincreaseof10percentcomparedtotheoldcon
stitution(ibid.:65).
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Jordaniansdissatisfactionwithhighunemployment,risingfoodprices,andinstitutional
corruptionweremajorfactorsintheoutbreakofprotestsintheHashemiteKingdominJanu
ary2011.Thelargestprotestsconsistedofroughly6,000demonstrators,palingincompari
sonwiththedemocraticmovementsinotherArabstates.Inaddition,violentriotsinJordan
werenearlynonexistent.DuringaprotestinMarch2011,oneprotestordiedduringclashes
betweengovernmentsupportersandtheopposition;theexactcauseofdeathisstillasource
of controversy (Hattar 2011). Measured by regional standards, Jordans participation in the
Arab Spring appears limited. However, compared to 2010, there has been a substantial in
creaseinpoliticalprotestandactivismin2011and2012.
The highly controversial parliamentary elections in November 2010, in addition to the
regional protests, contributed to the demonstrations (Bank 2011: 30). After Prime Minister
Rifaiss measures to increase government subsidies failed to appease demonstrators, King
AbdullahIIdissolvedthegovernmenton1February2011andappointedMaroufAlBakhit
prime minister. In October 2011 the king replaced Prime Minister Bakhit with Awn Al
Khasawneh in order to demonstrate his will for political change, entrusting him with the
formationofareformorientedgovernment(HamidandFreer2011:3).Khasawnehwasnot
only a consultant of King Husseins but also a judge at the United Nations International
CourtofJusticeandenjoysinternationalrecognition.ThemajorityofJordanianssupported
hisappointment,atleastinitially,andappreciatedthathewasnotpronetocorruption(Carl
strom 2011). While there are 16 new entries in Khasawnehs 29member cabinet, 13 of the
ministershavealreadyheldpositionsinpreviousgovernments(JordanTimes2011;Hamid
andFreer2011:3).
InMarch2011AbdullahrespondedtotheongoingprotestsbyconveningaNationalDia
logueCommitteetaskedwithproposingconstitutionalamendmentsandreformingthehigh
lycontroversialelectionlaw,aswellasthelawsfortheformationofpoliticalparties(Hamid
andFreer2011:3).Thecurrentelectorallawofthesinglenontransferablevotewasintro
duced in 1993 and primarily served to reduce the number of oppositional Islamists in par
liament.Theelectorallawfavorsindividualindependentcandidateswhoarechosennotbe
cause of their party affiliation but because of their tribal connections. With respect to elec
toral districts, urban areas in which the population of Palestinian origin agglomerates are
disadvantaged,whilecandidatesfromruralareaswherethetraditionalpowerbaseofthe
monarchyprimarilyresidesarefavored(BeckandCollet2010:34).Itisnotsurprisingthat
observers are skeptical about the announced reform program: Since 1989 four reform pro
grams have been announced three of them by KingAbdullah but little has changed in
howthegovernmentoperates. In2005thereformcommittee,NationalAgenda,presenteda
newlyrevisedelectionlawtothegovernmentthatwouldhaveeliminatedtheshortcomings
ofthepreviouselectorallaw,buttheproposalwasignored(Muasher2011:1115).Further
more,itmustbenotedthatanewelectorallawandthepromotionofpoliticalpartiesalone
wouldnotchangethefactthattheparliamentisaweakinstitutioninJordanspoliticalsys
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23
tem.Theseparationofpowersisheavilyweightedinfavorofunelectedinstitutionssuchas
theRoyalCourtandtheexecutivebranchingeneral(HamidandFreer2011:34;ICG2012).
Thereformprogramcontainsnomeasurestolimitthepoweroftheking,whoappointsthe
primeminister,theministers,andthedeputiesoftheSenate(MajlisalAyan).Thekingcan
alsoblockthelawsoftheHouseofDeputiesandhasthepowertodissolveparliamentuni
laterally.KingAbdullahIIhasusedthisprivilegetwicealready:In2001headopted210pro
visionallaws,andin2009heruledvirtuallyonhisownforalmostayearbeforenewelec
tionswereheld(HamidandFreer2011:4).
OnemoresubstantialdevelopmentforJordanisananticorruptioncampaignlaunchedin
the second half of 2011 that led to the arrest and indictment of individuals who once held
powerful positions. One such individual was Mohammad Dahabi, the former head of the
Dairat alMukhabarat alAmmah, the Jordanian intelligence agency. He was charged with
moneylaunderingandabuseofpower.Inaddition,theparliamentisconsideringindicting
formerprimeministerMaroufAlBakhitforcorruptioninthecaseofthefinancingofacasino.
OnereasonforthiscampaignagainstcorruptionisthatitisthetransJordanianpowerbaseof
themonarchy,ratherthanthePalestinianopposition,thathasbeenintensivelycriticizingthe
regimefortheshortfallsoftheJordaniansystem,particularlyintermsofcorruption.
InSeptember2011,however,theHouseofDeputies(MajlisalNuwwab)agreedtoadraft
lawmakingitapunishableoffensetopublishcorruptionallegationsagainstindividualsor
institutionsthatarenotbasedontoughfacts.Whatexactlyismeantbysuchfactswasnot
furtherdefined.Thedraftwaspassedontothesenate,whichcameunderpressurefromre
spectablejournaliststorejectthelaw.ThevotewaspostponedindefinitelyonSeptember29.
Criticsviewthislawnotonlyasaglaringviolationofthefreedomofpress;intheabsenceof
stronginstitutionsbasedontheruleoflaw,suchalawwouldvirtuallymakeobsoleteallef
fortstocurbcorruption(AgenceFrancePresse2011;CommitteetoProtectJournalists2011;
Hazaimeh2011).ThiscriticismisconsistentwiththeestimationsofsomeobserversthatJor
danisunderthemassiveinfluenceofanentrenchedeliteblocthatisobstructingreformpro
cessesinordertoprotectitsownprivileges(Muasher2011:1).
Todate,Jordanhasremainedinastablestateofauthoritarianism.Theregimehascreat
ed the impression of taking steps towards democratization and becoming a constitutional
monarchy,butsubstantivepoliticalreformhasyettobeseen.Intheaboveanalysis,wehave
questionedwhetherMoroccoisundergoingagenuineprocessofdemocratizationorsimply
liberalization.InJordan,however,therearestrongindicatorsthatpoliticalchangehassofar
beenlimitedtopurelycosmeticreforms.
3.3.2.5TheDifferencebetweenUnstableAuthoritarianSystemsandUnstableTransitionCountries:
EgyptandLibya
Asnotedabove,itisdebatablewhetherEgyptisundergoingaprogressivetransitionornot.
At the time of completion of this paper there are already skeptics who go one step further
GIGAWorkingPapers
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24
andalreadyconsiderEgypttobemakingitswaybacktowardanArabWinter.Thus,itis
assumedthatEgyptisinthestateofanunstableauthoritariansystem(Byman2011).
ThisassumptionisprimarilybasedontheroleoftheEgyptianmilitary,whichrevealslit
tleornowillingnesstosupportatransitiontowardsdemocracy.However,todatetherehas
notbeenmuchevidenceforacompletemilitarytakeoverintheformofacoup,whichwould
lead to a confrontationwith majorparts of themobilized society and the further economic
destabilizationofthecountryandwouldjeopardizethefinancialsupportoftheUSandthe
EU.Sincethemilitaryneverthelessseemstobereluctanttogiveupitspoliticalinfluence,a
pact between the military and theFreedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood
whichforms,withapproximately47percentoftheseatsintheNationalAssembly,byfarthe
strongest party of the country might develop. An alliance with the military would also
haveadvantagesfortheMuslimBrotherhood:acompromisebetweenthetwocampscould
contributetopoliticalandeconomicstabilization,andsocioeconomicreformsthatarecrucial
topreventinganeconomiccollapsecouldbepushedforward.Additionally,unpopularfor
eign policy decisions especially with regard to relations with Israel could be left to the
military(Roll2012).
Libyas political system remains highly fragmented after the fall of the Gaddafi regime
(Lacher2011b:11).TheNationalTransitionalCouncilincludesformerofficialsoftheregime
andthepreviousopposition.Hence,thereareformerconfidantsofGaddafi,pastmembersof
thesecurityapparatus,reformers,andtechnocratsamongthenewpoliticalleadership(ibid.:
1112). The former oppositionists include Libyans from established notable families that
wereexiled,aswellasrepresentativesoftheacademicelite.Themembersofthehighlyseg
mentednewelitearestronglycommittedtotribalstructures.Controversialquestionssuchas
themodelofthefuturegovernment,thepoliticalandlegalroleofIslam,andthequestionof
the legal processing of crimes committed by the regime are likely to exacerbate rivalries
withinthecountry(ibid.:1213).GiventhehighcomplexityoftheLibyanpoliticalsceneaf
tertheoverthrowofGaddafi,thepossibilitythatLibyawilltransformfromanunstabletran
sition country to an unstable authoritarian system cannot be ruled out. Should one of the
groups or alliances succeed in controlling the oil sector, Libya could also return to a stable
authoritariansystem.
4 Conclusion
TheorybasedsocialscienceresearchontheMiddleEasthasastrongincentivetoanalyzethe
ArabSpringandthechangingempiricalrealitiesofMiddleEasternpolitics.Thispaperhas
attemptedtocontributetothisobjectivebypresentinganddiscussingpoliticalchangeinthe
MiddleEastonthebasisofatwobytwomatrixofpoliticalrulethatdifferentiatesaccording
tothetypeofruleandthedegreeofstability.Basedonadiscussionofseveralcasestudies,
thepaperhasshownontheonehandthatthismatrixhelpstoarrangetheobserveddiversi
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ficationofArabregimes.Ontheotherhand,ithasshownthatthematrixcontributestocom
prehendingthedynamicsofpoliticalchangeintheMiddleEast,aresearchtopicthatisstill
influx.
AfteranexploratorysummaryofexplanationsfortheArabSpringingeneral,thepaper
hasusedthreetheoreticalstrandsofthesocialsciencesrenttheory,transitiontheory,and
revolutiontheorytomakeanexplanatorycontributionastowhytheregimesintheArab
world have diversified, and to discuss the implications. Thereby, the rent theory approach
hasproventobeparticularlyfruitful,especiallybecauseitcanexplainthefundamentaldif
ferencebetweentheregimesshakenbytheArabSpringandthepersistentlystableregimes
intheArabworld.Transitiontheoryandrevolutiontheoryhelptodescribethecomplex,and
sometimes contradictory, developments in the Middle Eastern countries particularly in
thosethathavebeenstronglyaffectedbytheArabSpring.
ResearchontheArabSpringisbyitsnaturestillintheearlystages.Itfacesthecomplex
taskoflinkinggeneralexplanationsoftheArabSpringwiththedevelopmentofindividual
cases. It should also critically observe further developments in the Arab region. Forecasts
shouldbemadeonthebasisofscenariosuponwhichstatementsofprobableincidencecan
be made considering a theoretical background. TheArab Spring may produce four results:
(consolidated)democracies,hybridregimes,(restored)authoritarianrule,andnewformsof
authoritarian systems.Here it should be noted that thesituation in the variousArab coun
tries could develop quite differently. The diversification of theArab regimes observed one
yearaftertheArabSpringmayonlyrepresentapreview.Additionally,itisalsolikelythat
developments in key countries and subregions will have repercussions for other countries
and subregions. The Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia, inspired civic movements
throughouttheregionandhassinceshapedthepoliticaldebateacrosstheregion.
It is very unlikely that the Arab Spring will lead to consolidated democracies through
smoothdemocratization.Ifwetakeintoaccountthethreelinesofresearchinthispaper,we
seethatadevelopmentsimilartothatinEasternEuropeinthe1990sisunlikelytotakeplace.
EconomicandpoliticalrentsarelikelytocontinuetoplayacrucialroleintheMiddleEast.
AsthecaseofNorwayshows,rentbaseddemocraciesarepossible;however,rentsrepresent
amajorobstacleintheArabworldbecausetheywereavailablebeforetheestablishmentof
democraticstructures.Fromtheperspectiveoftransitiontheory,thesuccessofdemocratiza
tionprocessesdependsonmanyfactorswhosefulfillmentisquestionableintheMiddleEast,
eveninthemorepromisingcases.Thecomprehensive,decadeslongsocioeconomiccrisisin
theregionhascreatedasituationinwhichconsumptionisverydistantfromtheproduction
andproductivitylevelsintheArabworld,whileatthesametime,socialinequalityishighly
pronounced.TheArabworldwillthereforefacemajordifficultiesinachievingdemocratiza
tion processes that generate many winners and few losers. Thus, it is to be expected that
there are major gateways for undemocratic groups within the state apparatuses as well as
withinsociety.Findingsfromrevolutiontheorysuggestthatsectionsoftheformerregimes
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maybeabletopersistbecausetheyhavenotcollapsedunlikethecaseinEasternEurope
aftertheimplosionoftheSovietUnion.
It is much more likely that at least some countries will pass through lengthy transition
processes;thesewillbeinconsistentandtheresultswillbeopen.Thiscouldalsoleadtothe
emergenceofhybridregimesthatcannotbeclearlydistinguishedasconsolidateddemocracies
or autocracies for an extended period. With Tunisia, however, there is at least one country
wheresomeessentialconditionsthatdeterminesuccessfuldemocratizationexist.
The ruling houses of the Gulf states may not entirely escape the effects of the Arab
Spring.Still,theyhavethepotentialtokeeptheirauthoritarianrulestableandtoavoidtran
sitionaslongastheycanmanagetokeepupthecashflowgeneratedbyrentsandtouseit
forthedepoliticizationofsociety.SincetheauthoritarianrulersoftheGulfstatesgainedval
uable experience in dealing with the systemthreatening challenges of Nasserism in the
1950s,theirchancesofsurvivalremainhigh,pendingfurtherdevelopments.
In those countries where the Arab Spring triggered political change, it is also possible
thatnewauthoritarianregimeswillbecreated.Whetherthiswillhappeninsomeorevenall
countriesdependslargelyonwhethernewauthoritarianelitessucceedinmonopolizingeco
nomic and political rents. From the point of view of transition theory, however, there are
significanthurdlesforthisnegativescenario:Justasdemocraticforcesarelikelytohavedif
ficultiescopingwiththesocioeconomiccrisisintheMiddleEast,soareauthoritarianactors.
TheresourcesinLibyaappearsufficienttoestablishalastingandstablegovernmentfornew
authoritarianrulers,whichcouldrelegatetheArabSpringtoabriefepisodeinthecountrys
history.Inallothercases,however,giventhepoliticalpowerthatwasgeneratedbytheArab
Spring, it is expected that potential new authoritarian rulers would have to create a much
widerbaseoflegitimacythanHosniMubarakorMuammarGaddafimanagedtobuild.
ThelongtermimpactoftheArabSpringasanempiricalregionalphenomenondepends
onwhetheracriticalmassisreachedandmoderatelysuccessfuldemocratizationoccurs.In
this scenario for the third time in the postcolonial history of the Middle East regional
competition among incompatible political systems could lead to entirely new dynamics of
politicaldevelopmentintheArabworld.AsMaridiNahas(1985)shows,systemiccompeti
tionbetweenrepublicanandmonarchicalregimesoccurredaftertheEgyptianRevolutionin
1952.Then,theIranianRevolutionin1979replaceditwithcompetitionbetweenIslamistand
antiIslamistactors.ShouldEgyptexperiencesubstantialdemocratization,thiscouldleadto
systemiccompetitionbetweendemocraticandauthoritarianregimes,withCairoandRiyadh
as antagonizing poles. Yet it should be clear that such a scenario depends on many factors
whosefulfillmentcannotbepredictedatpresent.
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27
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Political Change in the Middle East:

Martin Beck and Simone Hser

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lently repressing demonstrators demanding an end to its rule. As previously mentioned,

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