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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (Chapter 10)

Burgos v Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800


Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search
warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon
City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We
Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that
respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City,
their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose
Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction
was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that
respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the
aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this Court without having previously sought the
quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have
filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view
of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices,
which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to
exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v.
Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were
issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6]
months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983,
more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at
first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public
funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President
Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent,
through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope
that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in
judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to
the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal
Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These
documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used
them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as
mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection, however, may properly be

considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been
conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C &
D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter
address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing
the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which
states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as
amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent
were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the
same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla
himself who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more
apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge
had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing
officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the
affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the
affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to
the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b
belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or
may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property.
Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure.
Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the
property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property.
In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C.
Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom
Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search
warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause
upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place

sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of
subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the
alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's
application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents
which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding
of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent
judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro
U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things abovedescribed were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations
such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses
of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched,
the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The
search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape
recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication,
letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization
known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being
too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general,
and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut
General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government
and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the
literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government
to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a
consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework
where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities
against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary
of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations
promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than President Marcos himself denied the request of the
military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according
to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all
materials in the premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the
court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to
the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM "
case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate
the equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared
null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all
articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Asian Surety & Insurance Co., v Herrera 54 SCRA 312
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and to command respondents to
return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness,
Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion,
against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room
200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila. The search warrant is couched in the following language:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath NBI Agent Celso J. Zoleta, Jr. and his witness Manuel
Cuaresma that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that Mr. William Li Yao or his employees has/have in his/their control in
premises No. 2nd Floor Republic Supermarket Building, in Rizal Avenue district of Sta. Cruz, Manila, property (Subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense) should be seized and brought
to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the ----- of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report including subrogation receipt and proof of
loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts, including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, check vouchers, income tax returns, and
other papers connected therewith ... for the years 1961 to 1964 to be dealt with as the law directs.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket
Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the
board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.
Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it was issued in contravention of the explicit provisions of the Constitution and the Rules
of Court, particularly Section 1, of Art. III of the 1935 Constitution, now Section 3, of Art. IV of the new Constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, hereunder quoted for convenience of reference, viz:
Sec. 3 The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnessed he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons, or things to be
seized." (Art. IV, Section 3, New Constitution)
Sec. 3 Requisites for issuing search warrant A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court)

Sec. 5 Issuance and form of search warrant If the judge or justice of the peace is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which
the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant in the form prescribed by these rules.
(Sec. 5, Rule 126)
Sec. 8 Time of making search The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the
person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the night or day. (Sec. 8,
Rule 126)
Sec. 10 Receipt for property seized. The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on
whom or in whose possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at least one witness, leave a receipt in the
place in which he found the seized property. (Sec. 10, Rule 126) .
"Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that
involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. 1 While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government (People v. Elias, 147 N.E. 472)."
I.
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance
fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense." The aforequoted provision, which is found in the last paragraph of the same section, is something new. "There is no precedent on this
amendment prohibition against the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense either in the American books on Criminal
procedure or in American decisions." 2 It was applied in the celebrated case of Harry S. Stonehill v. Secretary of Justice 3 where this Court said:
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision abovequoted to outlaw the
so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the
minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend
section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court, that a search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
II.
Petitioner likewise contests the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it authorized the search and seizures of personal properties so vaguely
described and not particularized, thereby infringing the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. It also assails the noncompliance with the above-requirement as likewise openly violative of Section 2 of Rule 126 which
provides:
SEC. 2. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:
(a) Property subject of the offense;
(b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
(c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The search warrant herein involved reads in part: "... property (Subject of the offense, stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned." The claim of respondents that by not
cancelling the description of one or two of the classes of property contained in the form when not applicable to the properties sought to be seized, the
respondent judge intended the search to apply to all the three classes of property. This is a patent impossibility because the description of the property to
be searched and seized, viz: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books
of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc. and the offenses alleged to have been committed by the corporation to
wit: estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud, render it impossible for Us to see how the above-described property can simultaneously be
contraband goods, stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of one and the same offense. What is plain and clear is the fact that the respondent
Judge made no attempt to determine whether the property he authorized to be searched and seized pertains specifically to any one of the three classes
of personal property that may be searched and seized under a search warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the Rules. The respondent Judge simply
authorized search and seizure under an omnibus description of the personal properties to be seized. Because of this all embracing description which
includes all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which if seized (as it was really seized in the case at bar), could possibly paralyze its
business, 4 petitioner in several motions, filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed
their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of
bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the general public. 5 And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was issued,
We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old. In the case of Uy Kheytin, et al., v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 896, cited with approval in the Bache
case, supra, We had occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized, to wit:

"... Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize,
to the end that "unreasonable searches and seizures" may not be made. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is
borne out by American authorities."
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued in this case.
III.
Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt
of the things seized. Going over the receipts (Annexes "B", "B-1", B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one bordereau of
reinsurance, 8 fire registers, 1 marine register, four annual statements, folders described only as Bundle gm-1 red folders; bundle 17-22 big carton
folders; folders of various sizes, etc., without stating therein the nature and kind of documents contained in the folders of which there were about a
thousand of them that were seized. In the seizure of two carloads of documents and other papers, the possibility that the respondents took away private
papers of the petitioner, in violation of his constitutional rights, is not remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day with the broad and unlimited
search warrant issued by respondent Judge as their passport.
IV.
The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule 126. 6 Annex "A" of the Petition which is the search warrant in question left blank
the "time" for making search, while actual search was conducted in the evening of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m., until the wee hours of the morning of
October 28, 1965, thus causing untold inconveniences to petitioners herein. Authorities 7 are of the view that where a search is to be made during the
night time, the authority for executing the same at that time should appear in the directive on the face of the warrant.
In their Memorandum 8 respondents, relying on the case of Moncado v. Peoples Court (80 Phil. 1), argued:
Even assuming that the search warrant in question is null and void, the illegality thereof would not render the incriminating documents
inadmissible in evidence.
This Court has reverted to the old rule and abandoned the Moncado ruling (Stonehill case, supra). Most common law jurisdictions have already given up
this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus the Supreme Court of the United States declared: 9
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense the protection of the
4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secured against such searches and seizures is of no value, and so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
Moreover, the criminal charges filed by the NBI have all been dismissed and/or dropped by the Court or by the office of the City Fiscal of Manila in 1968,
as manifested in the petition filed by petitioner dated October 24, 1972, for early resolution of this case.
V.
It has likewise been observed that the offenses alleged took place from 1961 to 1964, and the application for search warrant was made on October 27,
1965. The time of the application is so far remote in time as to make the probable cause of doubtful veracity and the warrant vitally defective. Thus Mr.
Joseph Varon, an eminent authority on Searches, Seizures and Immunities, has this to say on this point:
From the examination of the several cases touching upon this subject, the following general rules are said to apply to affidavits for search warrants:
(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and definite and must not be too remote from the time of the making of the
affidavit and issuance of the search warrant.
(3) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of observation of the offense is too remote from the time when the affidavit is made
or the search warrant issued, but, generally speaking, a lapse of time of more than three weeks will be held not to invalidate the search warrant
while a lapse of four weeks will be held to be so.
A good and practical rule of thumb to measure the nearness of time given in the affidavit as to the date of the alleged offense, and the time of
making the affidavit is thus expressed: The nearer the time at which the observation of the offense is alleged to have been made, the more
reasonable the conclusion of establishment of probable cause. [Emphasis Ours]
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and the respondents are
hereby ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without costs.

Salazar v Achacoso 183 SCRA 145


This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting
illegal recruitment.
The facts are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Horty
Salazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.
06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card
ko.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following
telegram:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA
BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT
UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D.
Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:
HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your
recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia
being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty.
Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so,
the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the
residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance
Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry
into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However,
when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a

dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion
Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her
residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof.
Among our reasons are the following:
1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates
"due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family,
and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her consent and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under
Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for shipment to
Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to
protect our client's interests.
We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint
against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are alreadyfait accompli, thereby making
prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants
of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. 2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power:
xxx xxx xxx
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has
since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest.
Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987
Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of
determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges,
this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law"
found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants
of arrest or search warrants. 4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it
cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a
magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to
secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search
warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to
that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5

Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late
President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person
engaged in illegal recruitment. 6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal
recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority
if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further
exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment
of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such
non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public
order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents,
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities
found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 8
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the
judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the
defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable
alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however,
because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11
xxx xxx xxx
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That
power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation."
Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the
public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re
McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu
Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to
extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general
warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your
recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia
being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same
code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.

13

We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void, thus:
xxx xxx xxx

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.
The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/ recording
equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and
all documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive
organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and
3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in
Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of
any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search
warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor
Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to
suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for
it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no
clear and imminent danger to state security.14
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order
arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The
respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Stonehill v Diokno 20 SCRA 383
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements
and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing
the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1)
they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually
seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches
and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation
cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null
and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2)
that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence
against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ
was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned;
but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may
not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect
the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were
the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be
raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves
the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search
and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer &
Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted
the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question,
and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the
authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural
and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by
herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision
of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for
it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace

officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by
legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3
of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of
the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether
the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever
their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration
were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search
warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure,
and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the
only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been
protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit
by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of
the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which
have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions
thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and
after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in
flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise,
then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless
and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence
as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the
amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that
as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly
adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and
Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state
or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be also
insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right
by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had
been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of
the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and
that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that
right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due
Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime
by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause,
and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would
suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the
party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which
the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological
and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had
been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of
Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and
Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include
personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing
under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and
the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the
approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached
to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now
advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned
affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied
upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to
express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3)
residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are
illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences
of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in
the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied;
and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine
(29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Soliven v Makasiar 167 SCRA 393
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were
filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the
President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines,
under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A
second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through
the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under
the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by
the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before
the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is
so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The
pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to
"other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an
accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.
In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The
procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a
finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file
suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of
immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege
as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character or the publication, the Court
reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this
stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction.
Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved
to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en
banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

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