Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182573

April 23, 2014

RAY SHU, Petitioner,

vs.
JAIME DEE, ENRIQUETO MAGPANTAY, RAMON MIRANDA, LARRY MACILLAN, AND EDWIN
SO,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Rule 45 petit10n for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ray Shu (petitioner) seeking the
reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 19, 2007 and its resolution dated April 4,
2008. These assailed CA rulings annulled the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable
cause for falsification against the respondents.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The petitioner is the President of the 3A Apparel Corporation. He filed a complaint before the National
Bureau of Investigation (NB!) charging the respondents of falsification of two deeds of real estate
mortgage submitted to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (A4etrobank). Both deeds of real estate
mortgage were allegedly signed by the petitioner, one in his own name while the other was on behalf of
3A Apparel Corporation.
According to the petitioner, the respondents were employees of Metrobank. Respondents Jaime T. Dee
and Edwin So signed the two deeds of real estate mortgage as witnesses; respondents Ramon S.
Miranda and Enriqueto I. Magpantay notarized the deeds of real estate mortgage signed by the petitioner
in his own behalf and for the corporation, respectively. The signature of respondent Larry Macillan, on the
other hand, appeared in the deeds of real estate mortgage which he submitted to the Office of the
Registrar of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila. 2 Based on these deeds, Metrobank foreclosed the two
properties securing the 3A Apparel Corporations loan.3
After investigation, the NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati (city prosecutor) charging
the respondents of the crime of forgery and falsification of public documents. The NBI supported the
complaint with the Questioned Documents Report No. 746-1098 (questioned documents report) issued by
its Questioned Documents Division. The questioned documents report states that the signatures of the
petitioner which appear on the questioned deeds are not the same as the standard sample signatures he
submitted to the NBI.4
The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their right to due process during
the NBI investigation because the agency never required them and Metrobank to submit the standard
sample signatures of the petitioner for comparison. 5 The findings contained in the questioned documents

report only covered the sample signatures unilaterally submitted by the petitioner as compared with the
signatures appearing on the two deeds of real estate mortgage. An examination of the signatures of the
petitioner which appear in several documents in Metrobanks possession revealed that his signatures in
the questioned deeds are genuine. 6 The respondents also argued that the examination of the documents
was conducted without the original copies of the questioned deeds of real estate mortgage.
The Ruling of the City Prosecutor
In a resolution dated June 25, 1999, the city prosecutor found no probable cause against the respondents
and, consequently, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
The city prosecutor ruled that the questioned documents report is not conclusive evidence that the
respondents committed the crime charged. It only proves that the sample signatures which were
submitted solely by the petitioner are different from the signatures appearing on the questioned deeds.
The pieces of evidence presented before the city prosecutor, which were not made available to the NBI
and which the petitioner does not dispute prove that the same person executed the questioned
deeds.7 The city prosecutor found that the similarities in the sample signatures submitted by the
respondents and the signatures on the two deeds of real estate mortgage are so striking that even a
layman could see that they were written by one and the same person.
Furthermore, the documents appended to the respondents counter-affidavit show that the petitioner
availed of the credit line and benefited from its proceeds. Sufficient consideration also supported the
execution of the two deeds of mortgage. 8 The city prosecutor also concluded that the petitioner used his
passport when he executed the questioned deeds before the respondents-notaries public Magpantay and
Miranda, without informing these notaries that the passport had already been cancelled. This finding
presumed the regularity of the performance of duty of a notary public. 9
The petitioner appealed the city prosecutor resolution to the Secretary of Justice. 10
The Ruling of the Secretary of Justice
The Secretary of Justice reversed the city prosecutors findings. She ruled that the city prosecutor failed
to consider the evidentiary value of the findings of the NBI questioned documents experts. This NBI
finding is entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of proof of irregularity in the performance of the
experts duties.11
According to the Secretary, the expert evidence, the disclaimer of the petitioner that he did not sign any
promissory note, the lack of proof of receipt of the proceeds of the loan, all tended to prove that he did not
execute the subject deeds. The complainants evidence is more credible and suffices to establish
probable cause for falsification, as against the respondents questionable and flawed supporting
documents.12
In addition, the finding of the city prosecutor that the petitioners credit line with Metrobank is sufficient
consideration for the execution of the questioned deeds, even if not palpably erroneous, is still gratuitous
and conjectural.13

The Secretary of Justice denied the respondents motion for reconsideration prompting them to file a
petition for certiorari with the CA. The respondents alleged that the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution. 14
The ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA granted the petition and annulled the assailed resolution of the Secretary of Justice. 15
According to the CA, the respondents were denied their right to due process in the proceedings before
the NBI and the Secretary of Justice.16
In the proceedings before the NBI, the respondents were not furnished a copy of the complaint and were
not likewise required to file their answer or to present countervailing evidence. All the evidence at the NBI
level were solely provided by the petitioner.17
In the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice, the respondents were not furnished with the petition
for review that the petitioner filed. They were not even required to file their answer nor to comment. 18
The CA also found that the persons who had been directly and personally involved in the investigation of
the case, like the NBI investigating agent and the city prosecutor, were convinced that the evidence were
not sufficient for purposes of filing charges against the respondents. The recommendation for the filing of
the complaint came from the NBI chiefs and the Secretary of Justice who did not personally investigate
the case.19
The CA affirmed the findings of the city prosecutor as he had the opportunity to examine the documents
submitted by the parties, including the respondents evidence which the NBI did not consider. The CA
denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration; 20 hence, the present petition.
The Petitioners Position
The petitioner assigned the following errors:
First, the CA sweepingly relied on the respondents allegation that they had been denied due process in
the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice despite their active participation in the proceedings
through the filing of a motion for reconsideration. 21
Second, the CA erred in giving credence to the findings of the investigating NBI agent and the city
prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice is the ultimate authority who decides which of the conflicting theories
of the complainant and the respondents should be given weight. 22
Third, an NBI experts examination of certain contested documents at the request of a private litigant does
not necessarily nullify the examination made. Its purpose is to assist the court exercising jurisdiction over
the case in the performance of its duty to correctly settle the issue related to the documents. 23
The Respondents Position
In the respondents Comment and Memorandum, they reiterated their argument that they were prevented
from participating in the proceedings before the NBI and the Secretary of Justice, resulting in the denial of

their right to due process.24 Moreover, the questioned documents report issued by the NBI was one-sided,
thus, casting doubt on its veracity and reliability; thus, it deserves no weight and credence. 25 The
Secretary of Justice erred in giving more weight to the questioned documents report and the petitioners
self-serving denials.26
In addition, the respondents argued that there was no evidence pointing to them as the perpetrators of the
forgery, if indeed there had been any. The expert opinion, disclaimer of the petitioner and the alleged lack
of proof of receipt of the proceeds of the loan could only support a finding that the petitioner did not
execute the questioned deeds or obtain loans from the bank. Too, there was no evidence that the
respondents would gain pecuniary benefits from the commission of the crime. 27

The Courts ruling

We find the petition meritorious.
The respondents were not denied their right to due process
We find no merit in the respondents claim that they were denied due process when they were not
informed by the Secretary of Justice of the pendency of the petitioners appeal.
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient
compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is given a chance to be heard
through his motion for reconsideration.28
In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the respondents filed with the Secretary of Justice a
motion for reconsideration of her resolution. Therefore, any initial defect in due process, if any, was cured
by the remedy the respondents availed of.
On the respondents allegation that they were denied due process during the NBI investigation, we stress
that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or
quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any party. It cannot even determine
probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It
undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance
with its mandate. It also renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes in
order to prosecute the persons responsible.29
Since the NBIs findings were merely recommendatory, we find that no denial of the respondents due
process right could have taken place; the NBIs findings were still subject to the prosecutors and the
Secretary of Justices actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause.

We find it significant that the specimen signatures in the possession of Metrobank were submitted by the
respondents for the consideration of the city prosecutor and eventually of the Secretary of Justice during
the preliminary investigation proceedings. Thus, these officers had the opportunity to examine these
signatures.
The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process when the NBI issued the questioned
documents report. We note that this report merely stated that the signatures appearing on the two deeds
and in the petitioners submitted sample signatures were not written by one and the same
person.30 Notably, there was no categorical finding in the questioned documents report that the
respondents falsified the documents. This report, too, was procured during the conduct of the NBIs
investigation at the petitioners request for assistance in the investigation of the alleged crime of
falsification. The report is inconclusive and does not prevent the respondents from securing a separate
documents examination by handwriting experts based on their own evidence. On its own, the NBIs
questioned documents report does not directly point to the respondents involvement in the crime
charged. Its significance is that, taken together with the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties
during the preliminary investigation, these evidence could be sufficient for purposes of finding probable
cause the action that the Secretary of Justice undertook in the present case.
The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion
Probable cause pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to support a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. 31
It is well-settled that in order to arrive at a finding of probable cause, the elements of the crime charged
should be present. In determining these elements for purposes of preliminary investigation, only facts
sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are required, not absolute certainty. Thus,
probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less
than evidence that would justify a conviction.32
The elements of falsification of public documents are as follows: (1) the offender is a private individual or
a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) he committed any of
the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3) the falsification was committed in a
public, official or commercial document.33
In light of the discussion above, we rule that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are more in accord
with the duty to determine the existence of probable cause than the findings of the city prosecutor.
Contrary to the respondents assertions, the Secretary of Justice did not just merely give credence to the
questioned documents report and the petitioners self-serving allegations.1wphi1 The Secretary of
Justice made a holistic review of the parties submitted pieces of evidence in ruling that "the expert
evidence, the disclaimer of the petitioner that he did not sign any promissory note, the lack of proof of
receipt of the proceeds of the loan, all tend to prove that he did not execute the subject deeds. Also, the
finding in the assailed resolution that the credit line of the petitioner with Metrobank is sufficient
consideration for him to have executed the deeds is gratuitous and conjectural."
From the evidence submitted by the parties, the petitioner offered sufficient evidence showing that
falsification might have been committed and that the respondents might have been responsible therefor.
The NBIs questioned documents report states that the questioned deeds of mortgage and the sample

signatures submitted by the petitioner were not written by one and the same person. It was also shown
that the respondents Dee, So, Magpantay and Miranda signed and participated in the execution of the
two deeds of real estate mortgage and the respondent Macillan signed and submitted these documents to
the Office of the Registrar of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila. The petitioner also submitted evidence
that the passport used in notarizing the documents was a cancelled passport. Furthermore, as the
Secretary of Justice found, the respondents did not show that the petitioner received the proceeds of the
loan.
The findings of the city prosecutor are not proper in a preliminary investigation but should be threshed out
in a full-blown trial
In contrast, the city prosecutor negated the questioned documents report issued by the NBI. He
concluded that the documents submitted by the respondents showed that even a layman could see the
striking similarities of the alleged signatures of the petitioner in the questioned deeds and in the
documents submitted by the respondents. He also concluded that the petitioner misrepresented to the
respondents-notaries public Miranda and Magpantay that the passport used in notarizing the questioned
deeds was not yet cancelled.
In arriving at these conclusions, the city prosecutor already delved into the merits of the respondents
defense. This is contrary to the well-settled rule that the validity and merits of a partys defense and
accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper
than at the preliminary investigation level. 34 The allegations adduced by the prosecution will be put to test
in a full-blown trial in which evidence shall be analyzed, weighed, given credence or disproved. 35 The
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence.36 Simply put, in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances
without resorting to the rules of evidence that, as a rule, is outside his technical knowledge. 37
That the findings of the city prosecutor should be ventilated in a full-blown trial is highlighted by the reality
that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. 38 The duty to determine the
authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must conduct an independent examination of the
signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. Thus, Section 22 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed
handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine."39
Read in this light, the respondents' defense that there are striking similarities in the specimen signatures
they submitted and those of the questioned deeds is a matter of evidence whose consideration is proper
only in a full-blown trial. In that proper forum, the respondents can present evidence to prove their
defense and controvert the questioned documents report; they can raise as issue the alleged irregularities
in the conduct of the examination.
The Secretary of Justice has the power to review the findings of the city prosecutor
We also find that the CA erred in ruling that the city prosecutor's findings should be given more weight
than the findings of the Secretary of Justice.

The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first place on the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation. The prosecutor's ruling is reviewable by the
Secretary who, as the final determinative authority on the matter, has the power to reverse, modify or
affirm the prosecutor's determination.40
It is well-settled that the findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to interference by the courts,
save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; when
he grossly misapprehends facts; when he acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside
the contemplation of law.41
Contrary to the findings of the CA, we find that the Secretary of Justice did not gravely abuse the exercise
of her discretion in reversing the findings of the city prosecutor.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 19, 2007 and its resolution dated April 4, 2008.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 200103

April 23, 2014

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,

vs.
MARICELLE M. CORTES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns the validity of appointment by the Commission En Banc where the appointee is the
daughter of one of the Commissioners.
The Facts and the Case
On February 19, 2008 the Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued
Resolution A 2008-19 approving the appointment to the position of Information Officer V (IO V) of
respondent Maricelle M. Cortes. Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, father of respondent Cortes, abstained
from voting and requested the CHR to render an opinion on the legality of the respondent's appointment.
In a Memorandum dated March 31, 2008, CHR Legal Division Chief Atty. Efren Ephraim G. Lamorena
rendered an opinion that respondent Cortes' appointment is not covered by the rule on nepotism because
the appointing authority, the Commission En Banc, has a personality distinct and separate from its
members. CHR Chairperson Purificacion C. Valera Quisumbing, however, sent respondent a letter on the
same day instructing her not to assume her position because her appointment is not yet complete.
On April 4, 2008 the Civil Service Commission-NCR (CSC-NCR) Field Office informed Chairperson
Quisumbing that it will conduct an investigation on the appointment of respondent Cortes.
On April 9, 2008 Velda E. Cornelio, Director II of the CSC-NCR Field Office informed Chairperson
Quisumbing that the appointment of respondent Cortes is not valid because it is covered by the rule on
nepotism under Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions.
According to the CSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari is considered an appointing authority with respect to
respondent Cortes despite being a mere member of the Commission En Banc.
Respondent Cortes appealed the ruling of Director Cornelio but the same was denied on September 30,
2008.
Consequently, respondent Cortes filed a petition for review on November 24, 2008 before the CSC.

On March 2, 2010 the CSC issued Resolution 10-0370 where it denied the petition and affirmed the
nepotic character of respondent Cortes appointment. Respondent Cortes filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was denied in Resolution 10-1396 dated July 12, 2010.
Consequently, in a letter dated August 10, 2010, CHR Commissioner and Officer-in-Charge Ma. Victoria
V. Cardona terminated respondents services effective August 4, 2010.
On August 16, 2010, respondent Cortes filed a Petition for Review with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals (CA).
On August 11, 2011, the CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullified Resolution 10-0370
dated March 2, 2010 and 10-1396 dated July 12, 2010. The CA also ordered that Cortes be reinstated to
her position as IO V in the CHR.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
January 10, 2012.
Hence, this petition.
Issue of the Case
Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR
is not covered by the prohibition against nepotism.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is impressed with merit.
Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending authority; (3)
chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. 1 Here,
it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of
consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari.
By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a
confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.2 In the present case, however, the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR
does not fall to any of the exemptions provided by law.
In her defense, respondent Cortes merely raises the argument that the appointing authority referred to in
Section 59 of the Administrative Code is the Commission En Banc and not the individual Commissioners
who compose it.
The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the appointing and
recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative. The rule
insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by preventing that objectivity from being
in fact tested.3 Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. It is one
pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. 4

Moreover, basic rule in statutory construction is the legal maxim that "we must interpret not by the letter
that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life." To rule that the prohibition applies only to the Commission,
and not to the individual members who compose it, will render the prohibition meaningless. Apparently,
the Commission En Banc, which is a body created by fiction of law, can never have relatives to speak of.
Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not include appointments made
by a group of individuals acting as a body.1wphi1 What cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly. This principle is elementary and does not need explanation. Certainly, if acts that cannot be
legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
In the present case, respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En Banc,
where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari's abstention from
voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by
the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V created
an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution
dated January 10, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 115380 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Resolution of the Civil Service Commission dated March 2, 2010 affirming the CSC-NCR Decision
dated September 30, 2008 invalidating the appointment of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes for being
nepotistic is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 200358

April 7, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GERRY YABLE y USMAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review of this Court is the appeal filed by Gerry Yable y Usman (Gerry) assailing the 23 May 2011
Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03303. The CA affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Quezon City finding the accused guilty of violating Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.
The Antecedents
On 3 May 2005, an Information was filed against Gerry before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon
City for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A No. 9165, to wit:
That on or about the 27th day of April 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction,
one (1) sachet of white crystalline substance containing zero point fifteen (0.15) gram of
[Methamphetamine] Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 2
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
Version of the Prosecution
Acting on a tip given by a confidential informer, the Quezon City Anti-Drug Abuse Council (QC-ADAC)
assembled a team to conduct a buy-bust operation in Payatas area, where a certain Gerry Yable was
alleged to be selling illegal drugs Police Officer 1 Peggy Lynne Vargas (PO1 Vargas) who was designated
to act as poseur-buyer was given a Five Hundred Peso bill representing the buy-bust money. To mark the
buy-bust money, she placed her initials on the forehead of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. 3 It was planned
that PO1 Vargas would be introduced by the informer to Gerry as a buyer. After the exchange of money
and shabu, PO1 Vargas would scratch her forehead to indicate the consummation of the sale and as
signal for the back-up team to approach and apprehend Gerry. A pre-operation report was prepared to
coordinate the buy-bust operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). 4
At 12:00 o:clock noon of 27 April 2005, the team proceeded to the target area. PO1 Vargas and the
informant met Gerry at Lower Yasmin Street, Payatas, Quezon City. After being introduced, Gerry

allegedly asked PO1 Vargas if she will score and the latter answered "five pesos (Php 5.00) only." 5 Gerry
asked for the money and took from his pocket the plastic sachet containing shabu and handed it over to
PO1 Vargas. Thereafter, PO1 Vargas made the pre-arranged signal by scratching her forehead and the
back-up policemen approached and introduced themselves to Gerry. PO2 Joseph Ortiz (PO2 Ortiz)
searched Gerry and found in his pocket the five hundred peso (Php500.00) bill which contained the "PV"
initials.6 PO2 Ortiz apprised Gerry of his right to remain silent and his right to engage the services of a
lawyer because they would be filing a case for violation of R.A. No. 9165 against him. Gerry chose to
remain silent and the team boarded him in their vehicle. He was brought to the City Hall of Quezon City to
be turned over to the police investigator.7
Version of the Defense
Gerry denied the charges against him. He maintained that he was in a store to buy rice when the police
officers passed by while pursuing a certain "Mags." He alleged that he was approached by the policemen
and was asked where "Mags" was. When he answered in the negative, he was made to ride on a
motorcycle and was brought to Quezon City Hall. 8 He further alleged that the witnesses, however,
positively identified him as the one selling shabu at Lower Yasmin Street and was the one apprehended
by Police Officers Vargas and Ortiz.
Ruling of the RTC
On 28 March 2008, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Gerry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. The RTC found that the prosecution succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of Gerry for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165. It ruled that the evidence presented
during the trial adequately established that a valid buy-bust operation was conducted by the operatives of
the QC-ADAC, in coordination with PDEA. On the other hand, Gerry failed to present substantial evidence
to establish his defense of frame-up. The RTC ruled that frame-up, as advanced by Gerry, is generally
looked upon with disfavor on account of its aridity and the facility with which an accused could concoct the
same to suit his defense.9 With the positive identification made by the government witnesses as the
perpetrator of the crime, his self-serving denial is worthless. 10 Since there was nothing in the record to
show that the arresting team and the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motives, their
affirmative statements proving Gerrys culpability was respected by the trial court.
With caution by the court because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Like alibi, frame-up as a
defense had invariably been viewed with disfavor as it is common and standard line of defense in most
prosecutions arising from violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 11
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC, upon a finding that all of the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drug have been sufficiently established by the prosecution. It found credible the statements of
prosecution witnesses PO1Vargas and PO2 Ortiz about what transpired during and after the buy-bust
operation. Further, it ruled that the prosecution has proven as unbroken the chain of custody of evidence.
The CA likewise upheld the findings of the trial court that the buy-bust operation conducted enjoyed the
presumption of regularity, absent any showing of ill-motive on the part of the police operatives who
conducted the same.

The CA likewise found Gerrys defenses of denial and frame-up unconvincing and lacked strong
corroboration.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE
Gerry raised in his brief the following errors on the part of the appellate court, to wit:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the prosecutions failure to
establish the chain of custody of the alleged confiscated drug. 12
Our Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Gerry submits that the trial court and the CA failed to consider the procedural flaws committed by the
arresting officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II,
R.A. No. 9165.13Gerry alleges that no physical inventory or photograph was conducted at the crime scene
or in his presence. Instead, the marking of the confiscated drug was done in front of the investigator at the
police precinct. Such lapses on the part of the apprehending officers raises doubt on whether the shabu
submitted for laboratory examination and subsequently presented in court as evidence, was the same
one confiscated from Gerry.14
Relevant to Gerrys case is the procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of the seized
dangerous drugs as outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
This provision is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 9165, which states:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,

a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the aforecited rule authorizes substantial compliance with the procedure to establish a chain of
custody, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item is properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. In People v. Pringas, 15 the Court recognized that the strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under
varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of
confiscated evidence.
Here, the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses and exerted efforts to cite justifiable grounds.
During the re-direct examination of PO2 Ortiz, he testified as follows:
Q: Were there no photographs taken?
A: None, Sir.
Q: Why?
A: Because there were many people who created a commotion in the area, Sir.
Q: What commotion are you saying?
A: The people were curious at the time, Sir.
Q: And why was there no barangay official who witnessed the arrest of the accused?
A: We did not see any barangay official, Sir.
Q: Why did you not coordinate first with the barangay officials of the place?
A: We just secured permission, Sir.
Q: But under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165, you are likewise [directed] to coordinate with the
barangay officials, why did you not coordinate with them?
A: We did not do it anymore, Sir.
Q: Any reason for that?
A: Because according to the informant if we coordinate with the barangay officials, the suspect may come
to know about it, Sir.16

Moreover, the fact that the marking on the seized item was done at the police station, and not at alleged
crime scene, did not compromise the integrity of the seized evidence. As ruled by this Court in Marquez v.
People,17 the phrase "marking upon immediate confiscation" contemplates even marking at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team. What is important is that the seized item marked at the
police station is identified as the same item produced in court.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the prosecution was able to establish the integrity of corpus delicti and the
unbroken chain of custody. PO1 Vargas identified in open court the sachet of shabu that was offered in
evidence against Gerry as the same one she seized from the latter and marked immediately thereafter in
the presence of the police investigator.18
The police investigator continued the chain when he testified that he saw PO1 Vargas making the
appropriate markings on the sachet, as well as issuance of an inventory receipt as evidence of transfer of
custody.19
At the pre-trial conference, both the prosecution and defense stipulated on the findings of the chemist or
laboratory examination report. The report on the laboratory examination showed that the marking "PV-0427-05" was indicated on the seized item. Such marking, as testified by the police investigator, was made
by PO1 Vargas in his presence at the time the evidence was turned over to him. This admission of the
parties completed the chain of custody of the seized item.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that even in instances where the arresting officers failed to
take a photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural
lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. 20 What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 21 In other words, to be
admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through records or testimony, the
whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the accused by the arresting
officers; turned-over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their
composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody
remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements provided for in Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 was not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected. 22
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith,
ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Gerry bears the burden of showing that the
evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the
handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers properly discharged their
duties.23 Gerry in this case failed to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the
arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit. 24 In fact,
Gerry did not even question the credibility of the prosecution .witnesses. He anchored his appeal solely
on the alleged broken chain of the custody of the seized drugs.
On the basis of the aforesaid disquisition, we find no reason to modify or set aside the Decision of the CA.
Gerry was correctly found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5; Article II of R.A.
No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the 23 May 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R
CR-HC No. 03303 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.