1.

Honasan V The Panel Of Investigating Prosecutor Of

The Department Of Justice (ARTICLE 2)

the marriage law instead article 40 of the family code in

declaring the marriage void
RULING:

Issues:
Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is
ineffective on the ground that it was not published
RULING:
No.
o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so called
letters of instructions issued by the administrative superiors
concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in performance of their duties.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal
circular between the DOJ and the office of the Ombudsman,
Outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of
the DOJ and of the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of
preliminary investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of
persons or the public, in general.
2.

Gatbonton vs NLRC (ARTICLE 2)

Issues:
Whether Mapuas Rules and Regulations is effective as of
January 11, 1999 when it was published only on February 23,
1999 (persons)
RULING
NO.
Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of general application
3. Judge Fernando Vil. Pamintuan (ARTICLE 3)
ISSUE: W/N Judge Pamintuan is guilty of Gross Ignorance of
the Law
RULING:
YES.
Judge Pamintuan should have realized that the trial court did
not rule on that point that the Golden Buddha is fake in its
May 30, 1996 Order (even in its September 2, 1996 Order)
4. People of the Philippines vs. Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236 ,
August 31, 2006 ( ARTICLE 4)
Issue: Whether the appellant can benefit from R.A. 9346 which
abolished the death penalty law.
Held: Yes. Laws which are favorable to accused are given
retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws, a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
5. JARILLO v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010 (ARTICLE
4)
ISSUE: whether or not the petitioners marriage entered into
before the effectivity of the family code can apply sec 29 of

NO. Article 40 should apply. The Court already made the

declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure,
should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the
Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have
retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights."
6. Guy v. CA ( ARTICLE 6)
Issue: Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the
inheritance the wards
RULING: No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and
parents and guardians must necessarily obtain judicial
approval. Repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's
scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not
having been authorized by the court, the release or waiver is
therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not
have waived their supposed right as they have yet to prove
their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would
be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which,
according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.
7. LLORENTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000
(ARTICLE 15)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.
RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he
divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he married
Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil
code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they
are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce
obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him
is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce
was contracted after he became an American citizen.
8. CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. v. QUINONES (ARTICLE 20 AND
21)
ISSUE:
Did the Guess employees violate Articles 20 and 21 of Civil
Code of the Philippines?
HELD:
The Court affirmed CAs decision and held that the employees
abused their rights and did not have good faith in their actions
against respondent where there was no clear evidence that
she was evading to pay for the merchandise. The petition is
thus denied for lack of merit.
9. Joyce V. Ardiente, Petitioner, vs. Sps. Javier and Ma. Theresa
Pastorfide, Cagayan de Oro Water District and Gaspar
Gonzales, Jr., Respondents
Issue: Whether or not it was proper for Ardiente together with
Cagayan De Oro Water district to cut off the water supply of
Pastorfide owing to the fact that Ardiente has already
conveyed ownership of property to Pastorfide.
Ruling: No, it was not proper. The principle of abuse of Rights
in the enshrined Article 19.It recognizes a primordial limitation
on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right,

though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as

such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage
to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible.
10. Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes
CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking
Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
HELD:
No. Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively
in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to
establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did
all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not
be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.
Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel
industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to
handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held
liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code.
11. Sps. Hing vs Choachuy
Issue:
whether there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy
Ruling: Yes. Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article
26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or
residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase prying
into the privacy of anothers residence, therefore, covers
places, locations, or even situations which an individual
considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by
society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to
privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
12. People vs Bayotas FR 102007
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability
HELD:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by death of
the convict personal liabilities are extinguished, as to
pecuniary penalties liability therefore is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
Thus the court made a ruling as follows:
1.
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon;
2.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
Aricle 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result
of the same act or omission: Law, Contracts, Quasi-contracts,
Delicts,Quasi-delicts;
3.
Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery
therefore may be pursued but only by way of separate civil
action and may be enforced either against the

executor/administrator of the estate of the accused,

depending on the source of obligation aside from delicts;
4.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended
party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
In the case at bar, the death of Bayotas extinguished his
criminal and civil liability based solely on the act of rape.
Hence, his civil liability also extinguished together with his
criminal liability upon his death.
13. G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC vs.ROGELIO S. SOLUTA,
JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA,
FLORENTINO MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION
CHAPTER, Respondents.
ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages
for violation of constitutional rights.
RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of
the Civil Code, allows so.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages: x x x x
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in
illegality. Petitioners violation of individual respondents
constitutional right against unreasonable search thus
furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32
of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the lawful occupants
of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of
the search and seizure.
14. Maccay vs Nobela
Issue: Can the trial court rule on the civil liability of the
COMPLAINANT in the criminal case where the civil action
was not reserved or filed separately?
Held: No
A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages
in favor of the accused. The task of the trial court is limited to
determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to
determine his civil liability. A criminal case is not the proper
proceedings to determine the private complainants civil
liability, if any
15. KRIZIA KATRINA TY-DE ZUZUARREGUI v. THE HON.
JOSELITO C. VILLAROSA
Rosemary Torres Ty-Rasekhi and petitioner Krizia Ty-de
Zuzuarregui filed a compromise agreement filed in court in
which it states that they are the only heirs of Bella Torres, the
mother of Rosemary.
Subsequently, Peter Ty, Catherine Ty, and Fannie Ty all claimed
to be biological children of Bella. They filed a charge against
petitioner and Rosemary of falsification and forgery for having
to alleged that they were the only heirs of Bella and for the
annulment of the compromise agreement.

The RTC found them guilty of falsification of public document

in which the CA affirmed the same. Petitioner argues that
there is a prejudicial question in the filing of the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether there is a prejudical question involved.
RULING:
Yes. The SC ruled in the affirmative and the criminal case was
suspended.
It was clear that in the petition to annul the compromise
agreement in which their names were not included, having to
adjudge the civil case would know if they are really heirs of
Bella. If not, then the criminal case against petitioners has no
basis to proceed its course.
16. PIMENTEL v. PIMENTEL G.R. No. 172060, September 13,
2010

ISSUE: W/N only one with juridical personality can die.

HELD: No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41
and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a
child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil
personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42 do not provide
at all definition of death. Life is not synonymous to civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
s/he could die. The Constitution in fact recognizes the life of
the unborn from conception.
FAMILY CODE
1.

EDWIN A. ACEBEDO v. EDDIE P. ARQUERO

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arquero should be held guilty of immorality

ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of

marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner.
RULING:
At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner
and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of
their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that
was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage.
In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally
liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still married to respondent.

HELD:
Arqueros justification fails. Being an employee of the
judiciary, Arquero ought to have known that the Kasunduan
had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the
marriage between Acebedo and Irader. Article 1 of the Family
Code provides that marriage is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is an
institution of public order or policy, governed by rules
established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the
stipulation of the parties.
2.

Espinosa v.Atty. Omana, A.C. No. 9081, October 12,

2011

17. Quirino Tomlin II vs. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II

ISSUES:
Whether or not the administrative case for the respondents
disbarment should be dismissed for violation of the rule on
non-forum shopping; and
HELD:
No. The instant petition for disbarment was not a violation of
the rule against forum shopping. Forum shopping is only
applicable to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment
proceedings. Furthermore, the main object of the seven
criminal cases of the respondents violation of BP Blg. 22 is
different from the administrative case at hand. The former
refers to the issuance of bouncing checks, while the latter
refers to the dishonesty of the respondent in the payment of
his debts.
18. Geluz vs CA
ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily
procured her abortion, could recover damages from the
physician who caused the same.
HELD:
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at
P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases of an
unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial
court and Court of Appeals predicated.
19. Continental Steel v. Montano, G.R. No. 182836, October
13, 2009

ISSUE: W/N Omaa violated the CPR in notartizing the

Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay. W/N the Kasunduaan ng
Paghihiwalay is valid.
HELD: SC has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the
conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The
Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate
the disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what
Omaa did in this case.

3.

Vda de Avenido vs Avenido

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a

marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence,
even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
xxx
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies
of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of
petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was
shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,

Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence.

Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were
clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence
testimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and

testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro
sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage
license.
5. G.R. No. 167684
July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
Issue: WON there was a marriage license issued.

2. REPUBLIC VS. ALBIOS DIGEST

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios
and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood
the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences
of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise
legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
3.

Sally Go-Bangayan vs Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and

Benjamin is bigamous.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage
license presented by Sally was not authentic as in fact, no
marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the
alleged marriage. The marriage between them was merely in
jest and never complied with the essential requisites of
marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak of.
4. Republic vs. CA and Castro
GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial
evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification
issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any
circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office
did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties.
Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by
any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition
because of the peculiar circumstances of her case.

Held:
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof
of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also
mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook
just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent
efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept
that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity
of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or
fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon
this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight.24
6. Sy vs. Court of Appeals
April 12, 2000
The Issues:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning for lack of marriage
license at the time of the ceremony?
Whether or not private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to
warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?
Held:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence
renders the marriage void ab initio. The pieces of evidence
presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly
and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage
contract also shows that the marriage license number
6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner
nor respondent ever resided in Carmona. From the documents
she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one
year after the ceremony took place.
7. Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
ISSUES:
Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the
marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they
instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at
least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only
about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife
had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma
had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.
Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

8. Republic vs. Dayot

GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid
considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the
marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started
living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before
the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme
Court.

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative

intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should
be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26
Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
12. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen G.R. No. 186571, 11
August 2010

9. Morigo vs. People

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the
nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage
in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering
that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just
merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not
need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he
contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did
not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
10. Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a
foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the
United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.
In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since
1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living
abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize
divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained
a divorce from respondent Crasus.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada RosalIyoy remains valid and subsisting.
11. Republic vs Orbecido
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26
of the Family Code.
HELD:

Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends

to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Decision:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the
second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code because the
substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino
spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second par of
Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the
Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner
of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized
Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence
of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to
aliens national law.
13. Fujiki vs Marinay
ISSUES & RULING:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10SC) is applicable.
No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void
from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can
prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
14. Republic vs. Olaybar Digest
ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the
marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may
be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
HELD: The petition for review was denied. To be sure, a petition
for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws.

15. Capili vs People

ISSUE: Whether or not a declaration of nullity of the second marriage

avoids a prosecution for bigamy.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are present. The
crime of bigamy was already consummated. It is already immaterial if
the second (or first marriage, seeMercado vs Tan) was subsequently
declared void. The outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had
no bearing to the determination of Capilis guilt or innocence in the
bigamy case because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted. He who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.

Susan Nicdao Cario vs. Susan Yee Cario

February 2, 2001
The case:
The issue:
Validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased
SPO4 Santiago S. Cario in determining the beneficiary of his
death benefits.
Held:
The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner does not validate the
second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee.
The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without
first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio. To reiterate, under article 40 of Family
Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void..
18. Manzano vs. Sanchez
AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two
contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can
contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years
under Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD:

Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no

legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both
parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their
marriage contract that they are both separated is an
impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null
and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation
with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the
tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent
Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when
he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
19. Estrellita Juliano-Llave vs Republic of the Philippines
ISSUE: Whether or not Estrellitas arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
The Muslim Code did not automatically cover all Muslim
marriages already existing at the time of its enactment.
Further, the Muslim Code finds no application to marriages
celebrated under both civil and Muslim rites. Further still, the
Muslim Code did not provide for retroactive application. It
cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already
bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Tamano and
Zorayda.
Thus, the law applicable on the marriage between Tamano and
Zorayda is the Civil Code and nowhere in the Civil Code is
divorce allowed. The declaration of Tamano that he was
divorced is therefore without effect as to the validity of his
earlier marriage with Zorayda. Hence, the ruling of the RTC
and the CA is correct the marriage between Tamano and
Estrellita in 1993 is void for being bigamous.
20. VALINO VS. ADRIANO DIGEST
G.R. No. 182894 : April 22, 2014
FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner, v. ROSARIO ADRIANO, ET AL.,
Respondents.
FACTS:
ISSUE: Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the
remains of Atty. Adriano.
HELD:
CIVIL LAW: common law relationships
From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law
simply confines the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of
ones common law partner.
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right
and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being
the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was
living separately from her husband and was in the United
States when he died has no controlling significance.
To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced,
expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is
baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements,
like any other right, will not be considered as having been
waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof
of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that
end.
Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased
should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil
Code. Valinos own testimony that it was Atty. Adrianos wish to
be buried in their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It
should be noted, however, that other than Valinos claim that
Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park,
no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim.
Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano
wished to be buried in the Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it
becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of Atty.
Adriano was unclear and undefinite.

Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the

deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his
intent. No presumption can be said to have been created in
Valinos favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship
with Atty. Adriano.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
21. Suazo v. Suazo G.R. No. 164493 : March 10, 2010
Issue: Whether or not there is basis to nullify Jocelyns
marriage with Angelito under Art. 36.
Held: No. Jocelyns testimony regarding the habitual
drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while
indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves,
show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate
difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital
obligations.
22. Halili v. Halili G.R. No. 165424 June 6, 2009
ISSUE:
Whether or not his marriage to respondent ought to be
declared null and void on the basis of his psychological
incapacity.
RULINGS:
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a
psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had
a deeply rooted cause. Based on the foregoing, it has been
shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological
incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the
essential obligations of marriage and thus the Court declared
the marriage null and void.

87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing

spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. If the
absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentees mere reappearance will not terminate such
marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead,
such presumption continues inspite of the spouses physical
reappearance. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to
nullify Bailon & Jargues marriage, Teresita is proclaimed to be
rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
25. Manuel Almelor vs RTC of Las Pias City & Leonida Trinidad
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be
declared as null and void due to fraud by reason of Manuels
concealment of his homosexuality.
HELD: The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a
ground to nullify a marriage. It is the concealment of
homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is not
proven that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower court should
not have taken the publics perception against Manuels
sexuality. His peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower
court as an indication of his homosexuality for those are not
conclusive and are not sufficient enough to prove so. Even
granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was
nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it
alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from
Leonida and that Leonidas consent had been vitiated by such.
26. Bugayong vs. Ginez
GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956
FACTS:

23. Manuel vs People of the Philippines

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 165842
November 29, 2005

ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong

and Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of the
action.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error of law when it ruled that petitioners wife cannot be
legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as
there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as
provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.

Yes. American jurisprudence: cohabitation w/ the guilty party

after the commission of the offense, w/ the knowledge or belief
on the part of the injured party of its commission
Will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation.
- A single, voluntary act of marital intercourse is sufficient to
constitute condonation; where parties live in the same house
presumption that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation

RULINGS:
The petition is denied for lack of merit. Where a spouse is
absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent
spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the
present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse
who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the
present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee
spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The
court rules against the petitioner.
24. SSS v.Jarque, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006
ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente
Bailon and respondent Teresita Jarque may terminate by mere
reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon
HELD: The second marriage contracted by a person with an
absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent
court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article

HELD:

27. Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree
in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it
also apply if the action involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are
mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims
are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during
the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming,
death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and

the expected consequential rights and claims would

necessarily remain unborn.
Ong vs Ong
The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his
reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does
not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on
his reputation then it would not be because of Lucitas decision to seek
relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court
in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be
granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides
that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given
ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the
Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year.40 As it was established that Lucita left William due to his
abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated
by the said provision.

As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is

committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic
social institution.41 The Constitution itself however does not
establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and
the family, as it remains the province of the legislature to
define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the
strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into
operation the constitutional provisions that protect the
same.42 With the enactment of the Family Code, this has
been accomplished as it defines marriage and the family,
spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as
prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation.43 As Lucita has adequately proven the
presence of a ground for legal separation, the Court has no
reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and
grant her the relief she is entitled to under the law.
29. Ilusorio vs. Bildner
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her
husband to live with her in their conjugal dwelling.
Held: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in
conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary
writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is
available where a person continuous unlawfully denied of one
or more of his constitutional freedom. It is devised as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restrainment, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus
is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.

A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right

choice may not be the subject of visitation rights against free
choice. The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded
visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda
never even prayed for such right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a
husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the
sheriffs or by any other mesne process.
De La Pena v. Avila, G.R. No. 187490, Feb. 8, 2012
FACTS: Antonia Dela Pena, who was married to Antegono Dela
Pena, obtained a loan from Aguila Sons and Co. As a security
for the payment of the said loan, Antonia executed a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage in favour of Aguila on their residential lot
in Marikina. However, Antonia also executed a Deed Of
absolute sale in favour of Gemma Avila over the same
property because of Antonias failure to pay her obligation
from Aguila. Gemma Avila also mortgaged the same property
to Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC-BPI) to secure a
loan from the bank. Antonia, together with her son Alvin John,
filed against Gemma praying for the annulment of the said
deed of sale. She claims that the said property was conjugal
property and was sold without the consent of his husband who
already died by that time. She also invokes the presumption of
Conjugality under Art. 160 of the Civil Code. The RTC ruled in
favour of Antonia and upheld the presumption of conjugality.
The CA ruled otherwise. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the said property that was sold is part of the
Conjugal Partnership
HELD: The presumption mentioned in the Art. 160 of the Civil
Code applies only for the property acquired during marriage
and does not operate when there is no showing as to when
the property was acquired. Moreover, the presumption in
favour of the conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong,
clear and convincing proof of exclusive ownership.
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under
Art. 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Penas did not even come
close to proving that the subject property was acquired during
the Marriage between Antonia and Antegono. The record is
bereft of evidence that from which the actual acquisition of
the property by Antonia was during the Marriage.
Although the title stated in its registration that it is under the
name of, Antonia Dela Pena, married to Antegono dela Pena,
such is merely a description of the civil status of the wife and
cannot mean that the husband is also a registered owner. The
reason for the inconclusiveness of the said description is that
it is possible that the property was acquired when she was
single but only registered when she got married.
Ching vs Goyanko Digest
Facts:
Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz were married. During
the marriage, they acquire a certain property in Cebu. In
1993, Joseph executed a deed of sale over the property in
favor of his common-law-wife Maria B. Ching. After Joseph's
death, his children with Epifania discovered the sale. They
thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a
complaint for recovery of property and damages against
Ching, praying for the nullification of the deed of sale and of
the TCT and the issuance of a new one in favor of their father
Goyanko.

Issue:
Was the sale made by Joseph Goyanko in favor of his commonlaw wife valid?
Held:
No. The proscription against sale of property between spouses
applies even to common law relationships.
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts
whose cause, object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy are void and
inexistent from the very beginning.
Article 1352 also provides that: Contracts without cause, or
with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause
is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from
selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions.
Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are
prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances
between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would
destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in
civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue
influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect
the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family
law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and
wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than
those in legal union.
As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in
favor of his common- law-wife, it was null and void. (Ching vs
Goyanko, Jr., G.R. No. 165879, November 10, 2006 citing
Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun, G.R. No. L-57499, June 22, 1984)

ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of

Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits
to the subject property, Miguela learned that petitioner had
already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and
that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a
boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage
constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in
nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a
Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of
Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with
Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the property in question was the
exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision
declaring the said documents null and void and further
ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property
subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff
the sum representing the value of the car which was burned,
the attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but
deleted the award for damages and attorneys fees for lack of
basis. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE
MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS COOWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.

G.R. No. 153802

2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE

PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO
DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT
OF THE FAMILY.

March 11, 2005

HELD: the petition is denied.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO,

FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on

August 8, 1967. During their marriage the spouses purchased
a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain
Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment
purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed
only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof
to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a
loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to
be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo
City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from
petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the
same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject
property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned
transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of
Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of
respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,
petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on
the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the
highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the
property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the

1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared
that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale
null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8,
1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed
the property relations between respondent and her late
husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family

Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains

already established before its effectivity unless vested rights
have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other
laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property
relations of respondent and the late Marcelino even in a
suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of
gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and
wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits
and income from their separate properties and those acquired
by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance.
Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules
on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains)
or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the
property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the
former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on
partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the
matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime,
without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino
constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property,
which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express
provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of
(court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be
void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the
share of the spouse who makes the disposition or
encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on coownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the
law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus,
both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in
declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject
property for lack of respondents consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal
partnership shall be liable for: . . .
(1)
Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the family
may have been benefited; . . . .
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a
liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil
Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and wellbeing of the family as a unit.[

property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino

Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it
alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit
of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that
the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a
party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be
permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to
do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would
also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process. A party may change his legal theory on appeal only
when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation
of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to
enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.
Pelayo vs. Perez
G.R. No. 141323
Facts: David Pelayo through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed
a deed of sale and transferred to Melki Perez two parcel of
agricultural lands. Loreza Pelayo and another one whose
signature is eligible witnesses such execution of deed.
Loreza signed only on the third page in the space provided for
witnesses, as such, Perez application was denied.
Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and should pages of the
deed of sale but she refused. He then filed a complaint for
specific performance against the Pelayo spouses.
The spouses moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
for lack of marital consent as provided by art166 of the Civil
Code.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale was null and viol for
lack of marital consent.
Held: Under Art 173, in relation to Art166, both of the NCC,
W/C was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in
question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the
disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract
viol of initio but Merely violable. Said provisions of law provide:
Art 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compass
mentis or a spedthriff, or is under civil interdiction or is
confined in a lepresarium, the husband connot alienate or
encumber any real property not the Longugal property w/o the
wifes consent. It she refuses nreasonable to give her consent,
the court may compel her to grant the same.
Art 173. The wife may during the marriage and w/in 10 years
the transaction questioned, ask the court for the annulment of
any contract of the husband w/c tends to defraud her or
impair interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should
the wife fail to exercise this right she her heir, after the
dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Agapay vs Palang
Agapay vs. Palang
GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997
FACTS:

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the
creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio
qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies,
must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of
housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his
family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade
this Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be
held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
NOTES:
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that
during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan

on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the
wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950.
The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel
attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for
good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed
alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with
19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months
earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same
place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and
Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise

agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property

consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named
Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon
Carlinas complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and
her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership
and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought
to get back the land and the house and lot located at
Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his
cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the
complaint but CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot
should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.
HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor
of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage is void
because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the
properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint
contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their
respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual
contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be
no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in
the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store.
However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually
contributed money to but the subjected riceland. When the
land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old
compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a
pensioner of the US Government. Considering his
youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed
the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to
justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence,
the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to
donate their conjugal property in favor of Herminia.
Separation of property between spouses during the marriage
shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial
conferment when there is an express stipulation in the
marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the
compromise was not specifically for separation of property
and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public
who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property
revealed the falshood of Erlindas claim that she bought such
property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer
testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase
price and directed Erlindas name alone be placed as the
vendee.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a
donation and which was clearly void and inexistent by express
provision of the law because it was made between persons
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.
Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides
that the prohibition against donation between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the
condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be
better than those in legal union.
SALAS VS. AGUILA DIGEST
G.R. No. 202370 : September 23, 2013

JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR.,Petitioner,v. EDEN VILLENA

AGUILA,Respondent.
FACTS:
In 1985, Petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. and respondent Eden
Villena Aguila were married. In 1986, Salas left their conjugal
dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila
or their daughter.
In 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The petition states that they "have no
conjugal properties whatsoever.".
In May 2007, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the nullity
of the marriage of Salas and Aguila. The RTC Decision further
provides for the "dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains, if any."
In September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and
Motionstating that she discovered properties covering TCTs
under the name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas,
found to be the common-law wife of Salas. Thereafter, Salas
filed a Manifestation with Entry of Appearancerequesting for
an Entry of Judgment of the RTC Decision since no motion for
reconsideration or appeal was filed and no conjugal property
was involved.
Salas filed an Opposition to the Manifestationalleging that
there is no conjugal property to be partitioned based on
Aguilas petition. According to Salas, Aguilas statement was a
judicial admission and was not made through palpable
mistake. Salas claimed that Aguila waived her right to the
Discovered Properties. Salas likewise enumerated properties
he allegedly waived in favor of Aguila, namely, parcels of land
in Batangas, cash amounting toP200,000.00 and motor
vehicles. Thus, Salas contended that the conjugal properties
were deemed partitioned.
The RTC ruled in favor of Aguila confirming the partition of the
properties.
The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules,even upon entry of
judgment granting the annulment of marriage, the court can
proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
conjugal partnership of gains if it has not been judicially
adjudicated upon, as in this case. The RTC found that the
Discovered Properties are among the conjugal properties to be
partitioned and distributed between Salas and Aguila.
However, the RTC held that Salas failed to prove the existence
of the Waived Properties.
Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that : (1)
she is Rubina Cortez, a widow and unmarried to Salas; (2) the
Discovered Properties are her paraphernal properties; (3)
Salas did not contribute money to purchase the Discovered
Properties as he had no permanent job in Japan; (4) the RTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over her as she was not a party in
the case; and (5) she authorized her brother to purchase the
Discovered Properties but because he was not well-versed
with legal documentation, he registered the properties in the
name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas."
The RTC further held that Salas and Rubina were at fault for
failing to correct the TCTs, if they were not married as they
claimed.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC. The CA
denied the Motion for Reconsiderationfiled by Salas. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
courts decision ordering the partition of the parcels of land.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
courts decision in not allowing Rubina C. Cortez to intervene in
this case.
HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained.
CIVIL LAW property regime
Since the original manifestation was an action for partition,
this Court cannot order a division of the property, unless it
first makes a determination as to the existence of a co-

ownership.Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., G.R. No. 165427, 21 March

2011
Salas alleged that contrary to Aguilas petition stating that
they had no conjugal property, they actually acquired the
Waived Properties during their marriage. However, the RTC
found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas failed to prove the
existence and acquisition of the Waived Properties during their
marriage.
Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, has
the presumption of regularity.
On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered
Properties were acquired by Salas during their marriage. Both
the RTC and the CA agreed that the Discovered Properties
registered in Salas name were acquired during his marriage
with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered Properties were
entered on 2 July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or during the
validity of Salas and Aguilas marriage.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal
interest in the Discovered Properties, she has no right to
intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only "a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action." Rules of Court, Rule 19,
Sec. 1.
In Di v. Di, G.R. No. 178044, 19 January 2011we held that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code,
as in this case.
Under this property regime, property acquired during the
marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through the couples joint efforts and governed by the rules on
co-ownership.Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, 328
Phil. 1289 (1996)
In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a
similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also
psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired
during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and
the CA, would be governed by co-ownership.Buenaventura v.
Court of Appeals, 494 Phil. 264 (2005).
ALVAREZ vs. RAMIREZ
GR No.143439

petition for certiorari with application for preliminary

injunction and temporary restraining order. On May 31, 2000,
the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting
aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza can testify over the
objection of her estranged husband on the ground of marital
privilege.
HELD:
Yes, Esperanza may testify over the objection of her husband.
The disqualification of a witness by reason of marriage under
Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court has its
exceptions as where the marital relations are so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved. The acts of the
petitioner stamp out all major aspects of marital life. On the
other hand, the State has an interest in punishing the guilty
and exonerating the innocent, and must have the right to offer
the testimony of Esperanza over the objection of her husband.
Martinez vs Martinez
GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005
FACTS:
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were
the owners of a parcel of land. The former executed a last will
and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3
lots bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo
(designated as administrator of the estate), and Daniel Jr. In
October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of
sale purportedly signed by his father on September 1996
where it appears that the land was sold to Manolo and his wife
Lucila and was also issued to them. Rodolfo filed a complaint
against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the
annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT.
Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the property
which the latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted
the spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for
conciliation and settlement but none was reached. It was
alleged in the position paper of the spouses that earnest
efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same
proved futile.
ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements
of Art 151 of the Family Code.

October 14, 2005

HELD:
FACTS:
Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining witness in a
criminal case or arson pending before the RTC. The accused
was petitioner Maximo Alvarez, stranged husband of
Esperanza Alvarez, sister of respondent. On June 21, 1999,
Esperanza Alvarez was called to the witness stand as the first
witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner filed a
motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him
pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending
resolution of the motion, the trial court directed the
prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other
witnesses. On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the
questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further
testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
in the other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. This
prompted respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper

unless it should appear from the verified complaint that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the
same have failed.
Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was one of the
plaintiffs in the case at bar. The petitioner is not a member of
the same family as that of her deceased husband and the
respondent. Her relationship with the respondent is not one of
those enumerated in Article 150. It should also be noted that
the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of
Article 151 because they alleged in their complaint that they
had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful
detainer in the katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with
PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable
settlement was arrived at resulting in the barangay
chairmans issuance of a certificate to file action.
GR No. 170829
PATRICIO VS. DARIO

NOVEMBER 20, 2006

FACTS:
M died intestate and was survived by his wife and two
children. The surviving heirs extrajudicially settled his estate.
One of the properties he left was the family home. A new title
for the said property was thereafter issued under the name of
the wife and the two children as co-owners. After some time,
the wife and one of the sons expressed their desire to partition
the family home and terminate the co-ownership. The other
son opposed the partition on the ground that the family home
should remain despite the death of one or both the spouses as
long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The supposed
minor beneficiary is oppositor's son, the grandchild of the
decedent.

De Mesa failed to pay the loan they secured from Acero.

Thereafter, respondents Acero and his wife Rufina (Spouses
Acero) leased the subject property to its former owners who
then defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect
the rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Spouses De Mesa.
The MTC ruled in Spouses Aceros favor.
In their defense, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to nullify TCT No. T-221755
(M) on the basis that the subject property is a family home
which is exempt from execution under the Family Code, and
thus, could have not been validly levied upon for purposes of
satisfying their unpaid loan. However, the RTC dismissed their
complaint. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs
Decision.

ISSUE:

ISSUE:

Whether the partition of the family home is proper where one

of the co-owners refuse to accede to such a partition on the
ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.

Whether or not the family home is exempted from execution

HELD:

Petition DENIED.

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must

concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated
in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family
home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the
head of the family.

Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and

is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones
lifetime. It is likewise without dispute that the family home,
from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment.
The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors
except in certain special cases. However, this right can be
waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and
prove the status of the property as a family home at the time
of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
For all intents and purposes, the negligence of Petitioners De
Mesa or their omission to assert their right within a reasonable
time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned,
waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under
Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is
incumbent upon the De Mesa to invoke and prove the same
within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs duty to
presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family
home.

As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home

are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is
the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate. The term 'descendants'
contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who
constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it
must necessarily include the grandchildren and great
grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus,
private respondent's minor son, who is also the grandchild of
the deceased satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be
actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits
derived from Art. 159. The son of private respondent and
grandson of the decedent has been living in the family home
since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent,
hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, the grandson cannot
demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has
parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for
legal support falls primarily on his parents, especially his
father, herein private respondent who is the head of his
immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal
support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the
father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on
the grandparents.
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA, et al. v. SPOUSES CLAUDIO
D. ACERO, JR., et al. G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012,
SECOND DIVISION (Reyes, J.)
FACTS:
Claudio D. Acero Jr., being the highest bidder, acquired the
ownership of a parcel of land formerly owned by petitioners
Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa (Spouses De
Mesa). The property was sold at a public auction after Spouses

HELD:

Grande vs. Antonio Digest

G.R. No. 206248 : February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE,Petitioner,v. PATRICIO T.
ANTONIO,Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio
Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived together as
husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already
married to someone else.Out of this illicit relationship, two
sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors.
The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as
his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil
Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned
sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two
children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition
for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take
Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed
of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the
City Registrar to cause the entry of the name of Antonio as the

father of the aforementioned minors in their respective

Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change
and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their
Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio; granting the
right of parental authority over the minors; granting the
primary right and immediate custody over the minors; and
ordering Grande to immediately surrender the persons and
custody of the minors to Antonio.

The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the

surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA
9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a
situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the
father.

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration.

However, her motion was denied by the trial court.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial

approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with
the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the
minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document
acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132
of the Rules of Courtis enough to establish the paternity of his
children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of
parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing

grave error on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary
to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole
custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.
The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the
Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil
Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the
surname of the minors in their respective certificates of live
birth, and record the same in the Register of Births; ordering
Antonio to deliver the custody to their mother; Antonio shall
have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are
directed to give and share in support of the minor children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal
consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio
that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with
the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause,
compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande
interposed a partial motion for reconsideration, particularly
assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change
of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was
denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to compel the
use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they

want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the
father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner)
who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and
free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says
and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation.Respondents position that the court can order
the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And
where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The
use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use
the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the
illegitimate children.
Concepcion vs CA
Concepcion vs. CA
GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005

HELD: The petition is partially granted

FACTS:
CIVIL LAW Filation
Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall
remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA
9255 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if
their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the
father has the right to institute an action before the regular
courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime
of a legitimate child.

Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte,

private respondent, were married in December 1989, and
begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The
husband filed on December 1991, a petition to have his
marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife
married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980,
whom according to the husband was still alive and living in
Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an
illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife
while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued
that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in
favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She
further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from
Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, since an
illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the
requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and
held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence,
the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.
HELD:
Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab
initio, the latter never became the formers husband and
never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child.
Theresas contention was to have his son be declared as not
the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child
with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow

a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is

not permitted by law to question the sons legitimacy. Under
Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption
of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a legitimate
child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of
Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil
Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname
to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child
is not related to him in any way.
De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon
De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon
Facts:
Jinkie and Jacqueline are the legitimate children of spouses
Danilo and Carolina. However, they were acknowledged as an
illegitimate children by Juan in a notarized document. Juan
died.
Issue:
Whether or not they are illegitimate children of Juan for the
purpose of inheriting from him.
Ruling:
No, they are not. The issue whether the petitioners are indeed
the acknowledged illegitimate children of Juan cannot be
adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to
impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo and
Carolina in a valid marriage.
CHERRYL B. DOLINA,
Vs. GLENN D. VALLECERA,
G.R. No. 182367
December 15, 2010
x x x,
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC
correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary protection
and denied her application for temporary support for her child.
The Courts Ruling
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for
her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the
case is the protection and safety of women and children who
are victims of abuse or violence.[1] Although the issuance of
a protection order against the respondent in the case can
include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child,
this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and
to legal support.

illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he

had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his
relation to him.[2] The childs remedy is to file through her
mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition.[3] If filiation is beyond question, support follows
as matter of obligation.[4] In short, illegitimate children are
entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation
must be duly proved.[5]
Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action
against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to
establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively,
she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of
compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.[6]
It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have
dismissed the entire case based solely on the lack of any
judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolinas
child since the main issue remains to be the alleged violence
committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and
whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this
matter is already water under the bridge since Dolina failed to
raise this error on review. This omission lends credence to the
conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to
obtain support from Vallecera.
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in
cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the
disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the
privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate family.[7]
Vallecera disowns Dolinas child and denies having a hand in
the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This
issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case.
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude
Lim
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married
with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were
entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the
children making it appears as if they were the parents.
Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an
American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner
decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given
under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a
child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then
25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years
and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including
Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption
executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
HELD:

Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her

and her child. But it became apparent to the RTC upon
hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim,
neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it
turned out, the true object of her action was to get financial
support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is
the father. He of course vigorously denied this.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is
not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for
support for her son is based on her claim that he is Valleceras

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed,

petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall
jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in
the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall
jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word
shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require
spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by
Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that

he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the

qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements
on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental
authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It
includes caring and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral
mental and physical character and well-being.
Case Digest: G. R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
Facts: Honorato B. Catindig, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged
that Stephanie's middle name be changed to "Garcia," her
mother's surname, and that her surname be changed to
"Catindig." the trial court granted the petition for adoption.
Petitioner then filed for clarification and/or reconsideration
praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
of her biological mother as her middle name. The trial court
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration as there is no
law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Issue: Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of
her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father.
Ruling: There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child
adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as
middle name her mother's surname. The court finds no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.
Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006,
digested
Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino
parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural
children of Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia
Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died,
the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their
biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has
2 children by her second marriage and no longer
communicates from the time she left up to the institution of
the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away,
the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her
children abroad and gave their written consent for their
adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report
recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the
biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and
after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she
voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as
witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the
adoption.
Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the
written consent of the adoptees biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the
consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is
necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal
guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological
parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship
from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure

the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in

the manner of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable
for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural
right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be
obtained before his parental rights and duties may be
terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform
the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely
permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the
care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the
requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to
have existed at the time of adoption.
Lahom vs Sibulo
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought
him up as their own. In 1972, the trial court granted the
petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change
the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in
which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her
husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname
Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and
activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No.
8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law
the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section
19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference,
ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to
file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree
of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When
Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on
adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic
Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was
provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child,
shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However
the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided
in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or
rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552,
and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopters action
prescribed.
RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of the action. The
controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it
was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed
an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972.
By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the
right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code
to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the
adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA
8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set
aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under
Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose
the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is
a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested

right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when

the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept
of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional
guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed
interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected
against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been
referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate
or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It
is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's
determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify
the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be
taken away at any time before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child,
like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may
expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable
portion of his estate.
Categories: Adoption, G.R. No. 143989, Persons and Family
Relations, Philippine Civil Code
Perla vs Baring and Perla Digest
G.R. No. I72471: November 12, 2012
ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner, v. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY
PERLA, Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio
Perla (Antonio) were allegedly neighbors. Eventually, they
became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio
allegedly assured her that he would support her. However,
Antonio started to evade her.
Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed
before the RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio.
Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to
support Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys
Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating
her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that
she and Antonio supplied the information in the said
certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to
support Randy, which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Randy is entitled for support from
Antonio.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
CIVIL LAW: support
Mirasol and Randys Complaint for support is based on Randys
alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be
entitled for support, his filiation must be established with
sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of
proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order
for x xx support may create an unwholesome situation or may
be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it
must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.
In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish
Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The Certificate of Live
Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative

value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter

had not signed the same. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a
baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it
can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the
entries with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, x xx
baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as
proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
REMEDIAL LAW: questions of fact
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the
CA, are binding on the Court. However, this rule admits of
certain exceptions such as when the finding is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures or when the
judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts. As
this case falls under these exceptions, the Court is constrained
to re-examine the factual findings of the lower courts.
Petition is GRANTED.
A.M NO. RTJ-12-2326, JANUARY 30, 2013 BECKETT VS
SARMIENTO DIGEST
Facts:
Geoffrey Beckett, an Australian was previously
married to Eltesa Densing Beckett, a Filipina and out of
marriage, Geoffrey Beckett Jr. was born.
In 2006, Eltesa filed a case against Beckett in violation of R.A
7160 followed by a suit for the declaration of nullity of
marriage. For his part, Beckett commenced criminal charges
against Eltesa, one was for adultery. Both ended in sala of
Judge Olegario Sarmiento Jr.
The couples legal battle ended when Judge Sarmiento
rendered judgment based on a compromise agreement and
categorically agreed that Beckett shall have full and
permanent custody over Geoffrey Jr, 5 years old, subject to
visitation rights of Eltesa.
Eltesa failed to return the custody of Geoffrey Jr. to Beckett
prompting him to file a case against Eltesa in violation of R.A
7160 and for the turnover of Geoffrey Jr under his custody.
After going through proceedings, Judge Sarmiento rendered a
judgment granting the custody of Geoffrey Jr to Eltesa.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law in granting the custody of Geoffrey Jr. to
Eltesa.
Ruling:
No. In disputes concerning post-separation
custody over a minor, the well-settled rule is that no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
And if already 7 years of age, the childs choice as to which
parents he prefers shall be respected, unless the parent
chosen proves to be unfit. Further, in all actions concerning
children, whether undertaken by public or private social
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a
primary consideration.
A custody agreement can never be regarded as a permanent
and unbending, such that agreement would no longer be to
the childs best interest.

Thus, Judge Sarmiento is correct in granting the custody of

Geoffrey Jr. to Eltesa.
PABLO-GUALBERTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 154994 and 156254 June 28, 2005
Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/
an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4
year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from
their conjugal home and his school when she left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente
lite, since the wife failed to appear despite notice. A house
helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care
for the child as she very often goes out of the house and even
saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after
surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian
relations.
The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous
order, and this time awarded the custody of the child to the
mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a
compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be
awarded to the mother.
Held: Article 213 of the Family Code provided: Art 213. In
case of separation of parents parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court
shall take into account all relevant consideration, especially
the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise,
This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally
or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of
their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the
Civil Code, w/c reads:
Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and
property pf children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No
mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of
age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such
measure.
Bagtas vs. Hon. Santos
NOVEMBER 27, 2009
Facts: Maryl Joy was left by her mother with Bagtas, with a
letter evidencing her relinquishment of her rights over Maryl
Joy in favor of Bagtas. Maryl Joys maternal grandparents, the
Gallardos, tried to obtain custody by filing a petition for
habeas corpus. Bagtas and the Gallardos then entered into an
agreement concerning the custody. However, the Gallardos
violated the agreement. RTC dismissed the Gallardos habeas
corpus petition for mootness, since Maryl Joy was already in
their custody. Bagtas appealed, saying that the RTC should
have dismissed the petition for the violation of the agreement
and not because of mootness. It in effect gave premium to the
act of the Gallardos of not turning over the child to Bagtas.
Likewise, it was tantamount to rewarding them for not
producing the child in court in violation of the Order. RTC and
CA held against Bagtas, ruling that the sole purpose for the
filing of the petition is to cause the production before the
Court of the person of Maryl Joy, not a determination of the
legality or illegality of custody. Also, the Gallardos had a clear
right for the custody as grandparents.
Issue: Was the sole purpose of the petition for habeas corpus
the production of Maryl Joy before the trial court and that it
would be moot upon said production?

Ruling: No.
Supreme Court remanded the case for a full blown trial to
determine what would be the best interest of Maryl Joy, since
her interest is the most important consideration and not
agreements and even the legal right of the grandparents. In
cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for habeas
corpus is not limited to the production of the child before the
court. The main purpose of the petition for habeas corpus is to
determine who has the rightful custody over the child. It is
true that Article 214 of the Civil Code states that in case of
absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Article 216 also states that in default of parents or a judicially
appointed guardian, the surviving grandparent shall exercise
substitute parental authority over the child. However, in
determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the
childs welfare is the most important consideration. The court
is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child.
Case Digest: G.R. No. 132223. June 19, 2001
Facts: Petitioner is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy
serviceman of the United States of America who died in the
said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime,
Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his
common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Petitioner commences
before the RTC a guardianship proceeding over the persons
and properties of minors Valerie, 6 years old and Vincent, 2
years old. She was appointed legal and judicial guardian over
the persons and estate of said children. The natural mother of
the minors, herein respondent, submitted an opposition to the
subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had
already filed a similar petition for guardianship. The trial court
rejected and denied Belmes motion to remove and/or to
disqualify Bonifacia as guardian. The subsequent attempt for
reconsideration was likewise dismissed. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor
Vincent should be his guardian.
Ruling: Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father
and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there
is a judicial order to the contrary. Indeed, being the natural
mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding
natural and legal right to his custody. The ruling in SagalaEslao vs. Court of Appeals is reiterated in this case that of
considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the
courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor
children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a
right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an
inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of
the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.
Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be
realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to
Article 214 of the Family Code which states that in case of
death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute
parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. The ruling in Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals is
reiterated herein that the law vests on the father and mother
joint parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the
parent present shall continue exercising parental authority.
Only in case of the parents death, absence or unsuitability
may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.

Hence, actual custody of and exercising parental authority

over minor Vincent is vested on the natural mother.
St. Mary's Academy vs Carpetanos
St. Marys Academy vs. Carpetanos
GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the
school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos
joined the campaign. Along with the other high school
students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such
jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of
the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a
reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin
died due to this accident.
ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.
HELD:
CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article
218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that
they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not
having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be
considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the
injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal
connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening
causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such
negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses
Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident
was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was
no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep
of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over
which the school has no control hence they may not be held
liable for the death resulting from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for
public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or
to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on
the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the
vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the
death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for
determination of the liability of the defendants excluding
herein petitioner.
Republic v. Granada, G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012
FACTS: Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of
Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993. In May 1994,
when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to
Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that
time, she did not receive any communication from her
husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother
testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the
latters whereabouts, to no avail. After 9 years of waiting,
Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively
dead with the RTC Lipa City. On February 7, 2005, the RTC
rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration
arguing that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to
locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief
that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG
then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA
had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her

Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article

41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in
which the judgment is immediately final and executory and,
thus, not appealable.. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
which was denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final
and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not
subject to ordinary appeal.
HELD: Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and
immediately executory. Even if the RTC erred in granting the
petition, such order can no longer be assailed.
Republic v. Cantor
G.R. No. 184621; December 10, 2013
FACTS:
Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe
Espinosa Cantor after a violent quarrel. After more than four
years of not seeing or hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe filed a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her
husband. She alleged that she conducted a diligent search for
her husband and exerted earnest efforts to find him. The RTC
granted her petition. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the OSG filed
the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead in
pursuant with Article 41 of the Family Code?
HELD:
Whether or not one has a well-founded belief that his or her
spouse is dead depends on the unique circumstance of each
case and that there is no set standard or procedure in
determining the same. Maria Fes alleged well-founded
belief arose when: 1) Jerrys relatives and friends could not
give her any information on his whereabouts; and 2) she did
not find Jerrys name in the patients directory whenever she
went to a hospital. It appears that Maria Fe did not actively
look for her husband in hospitals and it may be sensed that
her search was not intentional or planned. Her search for Jerry
was far from diligent. Were it not for the finality of the RTC
ruling, the declaration of presumptive death should have been
recalled and set aside for utter lack of factual basis.
In Re: Petition of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
Case Doctrines:
The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and
recognized illegitimate child contains a given name, a middle
name and a surname.
Before a person can be authorized to change his name
given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he
must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling
reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request
should be denied.
That the continued use of a middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from one's registered complete
name.
Facts: Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to
parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then
not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently
got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of

legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed

from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will
study together with a sister who was born in Singapore, Anna
Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court
seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered
name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of
name sought in the petition is that Julian may be
discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because
of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's
name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason
given did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The
RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a
person it cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of
the bearer of the name. The RTC said that legitimate children
have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, and there is no reason why this right should be taken
from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he
reaches majority age he could then decide whether to change
his name by dropping his middle name, added the RTC.
Issues:
Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?
Held:
Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or
filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from
others who may have the same given name and surname as
he has. When an illegitimate child is legitimated by
subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the
father in a public instrument or private handwritten
instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as his
middle name and his father's surname as his surname,
reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged
natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated
and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name,
a middle name and a surname.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals
and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change
of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person
can be authorized to change his name given him either in his
certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify
such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show
not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have
been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)
when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for
the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how

such change of name would make his integration into

Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name would
cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the
nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name
is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be
left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of
majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand
and appreciate the value of the change of his name and
granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in
his rights under our laws. (In Re: Petition for Change of Name
and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang G.R. 159966, March 30 2005, 454 SCRA
2155).
Case Digest: G.R. No. 174689. October 22, 2007
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner, vs. Republic of the
Philippines, respondent.
Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted
that he is a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a female and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast
augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on,
petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex
from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in
favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the
OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA
rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name
and sex in his birth certificate.
Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person
can change his name or surname without judicial authority
which was amended by RA 9048 Clerical Error Law which
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege,
any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true
and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that
no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of
civil status shall be governed by special laws. However, there
is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a
birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at
the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is
immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in
altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to

sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal
basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries
in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.
Republic vs. Cagandahan, GR No. 166676
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial
Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female
to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical
condition where afflicted persons possess both male and
female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate
evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon
of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the PhilippinesPhilippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The
lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor
General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the
same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil
registrar.
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of
sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the lower
court.
HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that
the petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the
local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim
any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be
stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil
registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on
December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in
the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme
Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the
provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination
of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in
view of the delicate facts present in this case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need
to elaborate the term intersexuality which is the condition or
let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing.
INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who cannot be
classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living
thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes,
genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined
to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of
both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the
highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls
for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels
that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but
this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature
itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is,
Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the
evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying
that evidence points that respondent is male. In determining
respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in

the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held
that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the
gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court
will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing
to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a
female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo
treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of
the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to
the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In
the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent
and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who
are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme
Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondents position
and his personal judgment of being a male.
YASIN V. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT (1995)
EN BANC
(G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995)
FACTS:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District
Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of
maiden name. The respondent court ordered amendments to
the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in
accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence
of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not
properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all
the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima
filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order
alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use
of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her
marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to
another woman. The respondent court denied the motion
since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to
be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of
petitioners maiden name and surname.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or
divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, and the husband is married again to another
woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or
surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name
and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court.
RULING:
NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or
seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing
the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding
her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law
grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the
marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of
death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim
Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial
confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert
to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name
is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married
her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil
status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to

use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law

requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the
marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death
of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case
of legal separation.
The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name
filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity
and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do
so as her former husband is already married to another
woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in
accordance with Muslim laws.
Remo vs Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Case Doctrines:
A married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to
use her husbands surname upon marriage. She is not
prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because
when a woman marries, she does not change her name but
only her civil status.
Once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands
surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her
maiden name, except in cases of: (1) death of husband, (2)
divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.
The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The
law recognizes the passport applicants constitutional right to
travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and
maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and
travel documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport
remains at all times the property of the Government. The
holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is
valid.
Facts: Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen,
married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her Philippine passport,
which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed Rallonza
as her surname, Maria Virginia as her given name, and
Remo as her middle name. While her marriage was still
subsisting, she applied for the renewal of her passport with
the Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois,
U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and
surname in the replacement passport. When her request was
denied, she made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs denied the request,
holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to
use her husbands name, use of maiden name is allowed in
passport application only if the married name has not been
used in previous application. The Secretary explained that
under the implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the
Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may revert
to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage,
divorce, and death of the husband.
Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which
affirmed the Secretarys ruling. The CA also affirmed the
ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme
Court. Remo argued that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of
1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370
of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her
maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin
vs. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court [311 Phil. 696, 707
(1995)]
Issues:
Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husbands
surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her

maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the

subsistence of her marriage.
Held:
No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement
passport while her marriage subsists.
Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in
the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court
(supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation,
to use her husbands surname upon marriage. She is not
prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because
when a woman marries, she does not change her name but
only her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this
principle.
RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations,
does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden
name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman
who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden
name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her
husbands surname.
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may
either adopt her husbands surname or continuously use her
maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husbands surname
in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the
submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage
certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her
maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit
her from continuously using her maiden name.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her
husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to the
use of her maiden name, except in the following cases
enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband,
(2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since
Remos marriage to her husband subsists, she may not
resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.
Otherwise stated, a married womans reversion to the use of
her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the
marriage.
Yasin case not in point
Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin,
which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is
already married to another woman, Remos marriage remains
subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve a request to resume
ones maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition
to resume ones maiden name in view of the dissolution of
ones marriage.
Special law prevails over general law
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the
provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically
dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the
provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general
law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory
construction is that a special law prevails over a general law.
Implied repeals are disfavored
Remos theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is
the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. The apparently
conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be
harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be
effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two
laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so

repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. This,

Remo failed to establish.

been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it

is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

State is mandated to protect integrity of passport

DACANAY v. ASISTIO, JR.

Remo consciously chose to use her husbands surname in her

previous passport application. If her present request would be
allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to
revert to the use of her husbands surname. Such unjustified
changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is
considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be
countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency
in the records of passport holders will arise.
The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law
recognizes the passport applicants constitutional right to
travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and
maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and
travel documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport
remains at all times the property of the Government. The
holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is
valid. (Remo vs Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202,
March 5, 2010).
SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ VS GRACIA
FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because
the document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of
the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include
the signature of the deceased father, and because he was
born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to
his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child.
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for
injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court
held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the
unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not
contain any express recognition of paternity.

FACTS
This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city
government of Caloocan in accordance with the decision of
the RTC to evict the occupants of a flea market located in the
streets of Caloocan.
January 5, 1979 Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an
ordinance allowing the use of streets for the purpose of flea
markets subject to several conditions.
1987 Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea
markets and the stallowners filed a case against such action.
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in
questions (Heros del '96, Gozon and Gonzales) are of public
dominion, hence outside the commerce of man.
After the decision came out, there was a change in the city
administration and current mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the
action of the previous mayor and left the flea markets in the
streets as is.
Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a petition for
mandamus to remove the stalls in their street

ISSUE
May public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders
by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan
Manila Commission?

HELD: NO
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the
deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a
recognition of paternity.
RULING:
Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255,
permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her
father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his
offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private
handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there
must be a signature by the putative father in the private
handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the
signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1)
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone
piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be
strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be
signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2)
Where the private handwritten instrument is
accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have

1. A public street is property for public use hence outside the

commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it
may not be the subject of lease or other contract
2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for the
purpose they were intended to serve such as for traveling
3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the
nature of the public street because it is going to be contrary to
the general law
SPOUSES JUAN NUGUID AND ERLINDA T. NUGUID VS. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEDRO P. PECSON
G.R. No. 151815. February 23, 2005
Facts: Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot on which he
built a 4-door 2-storey apartment building. For failure to pay
realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction to Mamerto
Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it to the spouses Juan and
Erlinda Nuguid. Pecson challenged the validity of the auction
sale before the RTC of Quezon City, which upheld the spouses
title but declared that the apartment building was not
included in the auction sale. This was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals and thereafter by this Court. On June 23,
1993, by virtue of the Entry of Judgment, the Nuguids became
the uncontested owners of the 256-square meter commercial

lot. As a result, the Nuguid spouses moved for delivery of

possession of the lot and the apartment building.
The trial court, relying upon Article 546[1][7] of the Civil Code,
ruled that the Spouses Nuguid were to reimburse Pecson for
his construction cost, the spouses Nuguid were entitled to
immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the lot and
improvements. The RTC also directed Pecson to pay the same
amount of monthly rentals to the Nuguids as paid by the
tenants occupying the apartment units. Pecson duly moved for
reconsideration, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession,directing
the deputy sheriff to put the spouses Nuguid in possession of
the subject property with all the improvements thereon and to
eject all the occupants therein.Pecson then filed a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the order of payment of construction costs but
rendered the issue of possession moot on appeal.
Frustrated by this turn of events, Pecson filed a petition for
review before this Court. On May 26, 1995, the Court handed
down the decision remanding to the trial court for it to
determine the current market value of the apartment building
on the lot. The value so determined shall be forthwith paid by
Spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid] to Pedro Pecson otherwise
the petitioner shall be restored to the possession of the
apartment building until payment of the required indemnity.
On the basis of this Courts decision, Pecson filed a Motion to
Restore Possession and a Motion to Render Accounting,
praying respectively for restoration of his possession over the
subject 256-square meter commercial lot and for the spouses
Nuguid to be directed to render an accounting under oath, of
the income derived from the subject four-door apartment from
November 22, 1993 until possession of the same was restored
to him.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are liable to pay rent
over and above the current market value of the improvement
and that such increased award of rentals by the RTC was
reasonable and equitable.

petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the improvement

introduced by the respondent during said period, without
paying any amount to the latter as reimbursement for his
construction costs and expenses. They should account and
pay for such benefits.
We need not belabor now the appellate courts recognition of
herein respondents entitlement to rentals from the date of
the determination of the current market value until its full
payment. Respondent is clearly entitled to payment by virtue
of his right of retention over the said improvement.
Josefa versus San Buenaventura
2006 March 3, G.R. No. 163429
Facts:
San Buenventura is the owner of a piece of land. She entered
into a contract of lease of Josefa stipulating thereon that the
lease will be for five years and is renewable upon the consent
of the parties. Josefa introduced improvements on the
property his occupation of the same. After five years,
however, San Buenaventura demanded that Josefa vacate the
premises or otherwise pay a monthly rental of P30,ooo.oo.
Josefa, however, continued to stay and paid only P15,000.00
which was received by San Buenventura.
Issues:
1. Wether the lease contract between petitioner and
respondent contained a "renewal clause" and as such, they
had agreed to extend the period of the lease for more than
five years;
2. Whether petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for his
improvement on the leased premises.
Held:

Held: It is not disputed that the construction of the 4-door 2storey apartment, subject of this dispute, was undertaken at
the time when Pecson was still the owner of the lot. When the
Nuguids became the uncontested owner of the lot, by virtue of
entry of judgment of the Courts decision, the apartment
building was already in existence and occupied by tenants.
Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to
appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the
proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the
possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a
builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all
the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him
right of retention until full reimbursement is made. As we
earlier held, since petitioners opted to appropriate the
improvement for themselves as early as June 1993, when they
applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge that the
auction sale did not include the apartment building, they could
not benefit from the lots improvement, until they reimbursed
the improver in full, based on the current market value of the
property.
Despite the Courts recognition of Pecsons right of ownership
over the apartment building, the petitioners still insisted on
dispossessing Pecson by filing for a Writ of Possession to cover
both the lot and the building. Clearly, this resulted in a
violation of respondents right of retention. Worse, petitioners
took advantage of the situation to benefit from the highly
valued, income-yielding, four-unit apartment building by
collecting rentals thereon, before they paid for the cost of the
apartment building. It was only 4 years later that they finally
paid its full value to the respondent.
Given the circumstances of the instant case where the builder
in good faith has been clearly denied his right of retention for
almost half a decade, we find that the increased award of
rentals by the RTC was reasonable and equitable. The

1. The clause "renewable upon agreement of the parties" in

the lease contract is clear and admits of no other
interpretation: the contract is renewable only upon agreement
of the parties. Since the private respondents were not
amenable to a renewal, they cannot be compelled to execute
a new contract when the old contract terminated. As such,
petitioner has no other option but to vacate the property.
2. In this case, there is no question that petitioner was
initially a lawful possessor because his entry into the property
is by virtue of a lease contract with respondent. However as a
mere lessee whose possession after the expiration is at the
sufferance of the owner of the property cannot claim to be a
builder in good faith. Under Art.1678 of he New Civil Code
(NCC) petitioner is entitled to one half of the value of the
improvement only if respondent, as the owner, decides to
appropriate the improvement. Since respondent refused to
appropriate the improvements petitioner cannot compel her to
reimburse to him one-half of the value. The Sole right of the
petitioner under Art. 1678 is to remove the improvement
without causing anymore damage upon the property leased
than is necessary.
SARILI VS. LAGROSA G.R. No. 193517 January 15, 2014
Facts: Respondent is the owner of a certain parcel of land
which he has been religiously paying the real estate taxes for
since its acquisition. Respondent is a resident of California,
USA, and during his vacation in the Philippines, he discovered
that a new certificate of title to the subject property was
issued by the RD in the name of Victorino married to Isabel
Amparoby virtue of a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated

February 16, 1978 (February 16, 1978 deed of sale)

purportedly executed by him and his wife, Amelia U. Lagrosa.
In their answer, Sps. Sarili maintained that they are innocent
purchasers for value, having purchased the subject property
from Ramon B. Rodriguez, who possessed and presented a
Special Power of Attorney to sell/dispose of the same, and, in
such capacity, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
November 20, 1992 conveying the said property in their favor.
In this relation, they denied any participation in the
preparation of the February 16, 1978 deed of sale, which may
have been merely devised by the "fixer" they hired to
facilitate the issuance of the title in their names.
Issue: Whether there is a valid conveyance of the property?
Ruling: The strength of the buyers inquiry on the sellers
capacity or legal authority to sell depends on the proof of
capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a
special power of attorney duly notarized, mere inspection of
the face of such public document already constitutes sufficient
inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is provided or
there is one but there appears to be flaws in its notarial
acknowledgment, mere inspection of the document will not
do; the buyer must show that his investigation went beyond
the document and into the circumstances of its execution.
Settled is the rule that a defective notarization will strip the
document of its public character and reduce it to a private
instrument, and the evidentiary standard of its validity shall
be based on preponderance of evidence.
Since Sps. Sarilis claim over the subject property is based on
forged documents, no valid title had been transferred to them.

from the effect of the current became the property of the

banks owners.
REYNANTE v. CA
FACTS:
More than 50 years ago, Reynante was taken as tenant by the
late Don Cosme Carlos over a fishpond in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Reynante subsequently built a nipa hut where he and
his family lived and took care of the nipa palms which they
planted on lots 1 and 2, which was located between the
fishpond and Liputan River. Reynantes family sold the nipa
palms, and appropriated the fruits as his own, without
interference or complaint from Don Carlos.
Upon Don Carlos death, his heirs convinced Reynante to sign
an affidavit, relinquishing his rights as a caretaker of the
fishpond. Reynante, however, continued to live in the nipa hut
he had built, and he still took care of the nipa palms, which he
continued to sell.
This lead the heirs to file a complaint for forcible entry with
preliminary injunction against Reynante in the MTC. The MTC
found for Reynante, but the heirs appealed to the RTC, where
the decision was reversed. The CA merely affirmed the
decision of the RTC.

BAGAIPO vs. CA
GR# 116290, December 08, 2000
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent are both riparian owners of
lots along the Davao River. Due to the decrease in land area of
petitioners lot, allegedly due to a change in the rivers course,
petitioner claimed ownership of the abandoned river bed. She
also insisted that Lot 415-C, respondents lot, was part of her
property since she has acquired it by accretion under A. 457,
NCC. The lower courts ruled that the decrease in the land area
of petitioners property was brought by erosion and not a
change in the rivers course. They concluded this after finding
out in an ocular inspection that the banks located on
petitioners land are sharp, craggy and very much higher than
the land on the other side of the river. Additionally, the
riverbank on respondents side is lower and gently sloping.
The lower courts held that naturally, the lower land received
the alluvial soil carried by the river current. Both courts also
ruled that petitioner failed to prove that Lot 415-C neither was
within the boundaries of her titled property nor was her
private survey plan given probative value. They further held
that the corresponding expansion of respondents property
was due to the combined effect of erosion and accretion
respectively. HELD: Petitioner can not claim ownership over
the old abandoned river bed because the same is inexistent.
The riverbeds former location can not even be pinpointed
with particularity since the Davao River took place gradually
over an unspecified period of time, up to the present. The rule
is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner when
the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit is
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects
of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
These requisites were sufficiently proven in respondents
favor. In the absence of evidence that the change in the
course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through
avulsion was gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion.
As to Lot 415-C, registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the diminution of the area of his land thru
gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream.
Accretion which the banks of rivers may gradually receive

ISSUE:
Whether or not accretion automatically becomes registered
land just because the adjoining lot is registered in the Torrens
System?

HELD:
While it is true that alluvial deposits shall belong to the owner
of the lot adjoining such accretion, it does not automatically
bestow an imprescriptibility. If the owners of said land have
not registered this with the proper entity, said land will be
subject to acquisition by prescription, which was what
occurred in this case.
Since the affidavits prove that Reynante has been in
possession of these lands for more than 50 years, the SC
rightly held that the land belongs to him.
Spouses Felix Baes & Rafaela Baes v CA and Republic of the
Philippines
GR 108065
July 6, 1993
FACTS
ISSUE
WON Baes owned Lot 1-B.
HELD
Art. 461, NCC
River beds abandoned through NATURAL CHANGE ipso facto
belong to owner whose lands are occupied by the new course
in proportion to the are lost. Owners of the land adjoining the
river bed have the right to acquire by paying its value (must
not exceed value of new beds area)
If change is due to concessioners authorized by the
Government, the concession may be granted to

concessioners. No grant = land belongs to owners of land

covered by the waters. Must not prejudice tge superior rights
of third persons with sufficient title.

pass upon the ownership of the property; hence to declare the

same as common property.

If a riparian owner is entitled to compensation for damage/loss

due to natural reasons, there is no reson not to compensate
when the change was effected through artificial means.

As to Omipets appeal, SC merely affirmed the findings of the

trial court that she did not present sufficient evidence to
overcome Gapacans better right to possession. SC ultimately
ruled that CA was correct in its determination that the land in
dispute is common property and should be partitioned.

The loss was caused by a deliberate act of Government. The

Government is obliged to compensate Baes for the loss.
However, Baes has already been compensated through the
fair exchange of lots between him and the Government.
GAPACAN V. OMIPET 387 SCRA 383
FACTS:
Paicat Gapacan is the primitive possessor of an unregistered
land in Mt. Province, divided into 3 parcels of riceland and
another planted to camote and declared by him for taxation
purposes. He had two children Maria and Antonio. Antonio left
for a long while to try his luck in the mines Benguet. Maria
remained, took care of their father and eventually took over
the cultivation of the land.

Antonio Gapacan returned to and executed an Affidavit of

Transfer of Real Property showing that the property had been
transferred to him by his sister Maria Gapacan-Omipet
(Omipet) making him in effect the legal owner of the property
in question. Since then, Antonio Gapacans family (Gapacans)
had been occupying and cultivating the property.
Sometime in 1992, Omipet hired laborers to clear and
cultivate portions of the disputed property. Gapacans
prohibited them Gapacans and ordered the defendants to
vacate the land and restore possession to plaintiffs.
Omipet then filed an action to quiet title in RTC and that she
be declared the lawful owner. RTC adjudged that Gapacans
have right of possession over the land. On appeal CA,
declared that the land is common property of both Omipet and
Gapacans and ordered its partition.
Both parties appealed. Gapacans alleged that CA cannot
declare that the land is common property since it deviates
from the cause of action in the trial court. Omipets appeal is
mostly factual.

ISSUE: Whether or not property rights can be decided in an

action to quiet title?
HELD: Yes.
Art. 476 of the Civil Code provides that an action to quiet title
may be brought when there exists a cloud on the title to a real
property or any interest therein. In the case of Bautista v.
Exconde, we held that the property owner whose property
rights were being disturbed may ask a competent court for a
proper determination of the respective rights of the partyclaimants, not only to place things in their proper place, that
is, to require the one who has no right to refrain from acts
injurious to the peaceful enjoyment of the property not only of
the rightful owner but also for the benefit of both with the
view of dissipating any cloud of doubt over the property. It
goes without saying therefore that the appellate court in
resolving the present controversy is well within its authority to
adjudicate on the respective rights of the parties, that is, to

Mananquil vs Moico Digest

G.R. No. 180076 : November 20, 2012
DIONISIO MANANQUIL, LAUDENCIA MANANQUIL-VILLAMOR,
ESTANISLAO MANANQUIL, and DIANITA MANANQUIL-RABINO,
represented by OTILLO RABINO, Petitioners, v. ROBERTO
MOICO, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form part of the
land previously expropriated by the National Housing
Authority (NHA). Lots 18 and 19 were awarded to spouses
Iluminardo and Prescilla Mananquil under a Conditional
Contract to Sell.
After the death of the spouses in 1991, it turned out that
Prescilla had a child by a previous marriagenamely Eulogio
Francisco Maypa (Eulogio). Iluminardos supposed heirs
(Mananquil heirs) his brothers and sisters and herein
petitioners Dionisio and Estanislao Mananquil (Estanislao),
Laudencia Mananquil-Villamor (Laudencia), and Dianita
Mananquil-Rabino (Dianita) executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement Among Heirs and adjudicated ownership over Lots
18 and 19 in favor of Dianita. They took possession of Lots 18
and 19 and leased them out to third parties.
Sometime later, the Mananquil heirs discovered that in 1997,
Eulogio and two others, on the claim that they are surviving
heirs of Iluminardo and Prescilla, had executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale, and a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Roberto Moico (Moico). Moico
began evicting the Mananquils tenants. Thus, the Mananquils
filed a case for quieting of title.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Mananquils. On appeal, the CA
reversed the RTC.
The Mananquils argue that since they are the legal heirs of
Iluminardo Mananquil, then they possess the requisite legal or
equitable title or interest in Lots 18 and 19, which thus
permits them to file an action to quiet title; and whatever
rights Iluminardo had over the lots were transmitted to them
from the moment of his death, per Article 777 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action to quiet title should prosper?
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
CIVIL LAW: quieting of title
An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law
remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other
claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to
make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect
and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so
that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over
the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear
introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even

to abuse the property as he deems best. But for an action to

quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of the

alleged owners that they were going to donate the premises
to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at
the time the improvements were built on the premises, such
promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of
ownership that may or may not be realized. As such,
petitioner spouses cannot be said to be entitled to the value of
the improvements that they built on the said lot.

From the evidence adduced below, it appears that the

petitioners have failed to show their qualifications or right to
succeed Iluminardo in his rights under the NHA
program/project. They failed to present any title, award, grant,
document or certification from the NHA or proper government
agency which would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla have
become the registered owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots
18 and 19, or that petitioners are qualified successors or
beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project,
taking over Iluminardos rights after his death.

PAULMITAN V. CA- Co-ownership of Property

Petitioners should have shown, to the satisfaction of the

courts that under the NHA program project governing the
grant of Lots 18 and 19, they are entitled and qualified to
succeed or substitute for Iluminardo in his rights upon his
death.
Petition is DENIED.
VERONA PADA-KILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 134329, January 19, 2000.
Facts:
One Jacinto Pada died intestate leaving 6 children.
His estate included a parcel of land located at Poblacion,
Matalom, Leyte.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano
Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house on the
northern portion of subject land. When Feliciano died, his son,
Pastor, continued living in the house together with his 8
children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's
children, has been living in that house since 1960.
In 1993, private respondent Silverio Pada bought the coownership right over the subject land of one of the heirs of
Jacinto. Thereafter, he demanded that petitioner spouses
vacate the northern portion of the subject land so his family
can utilize the said area. They went through a series of
meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the
purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts toward
that end, failed. Consequently, Silverio instituted a complaint
for ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner
spouses. The petitioner spouses were eventually ordered to
remove their house at their expense unless Silverio exercises
the option of acquiring the same.
Issue:
Are the petitioner spouses Pada-Kilario builders in
good faith as to be entitled to reimbursement for
improvements made on the property?
Held:
No. Petitioner spouses explicitly admitted in their
Answer that they had been occupying the subject property
since 1960 without ever paying any rental as they only relied
on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family. Considering
that they were in possession of the subject property by sheer
tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the
premises may be terminated any time. Thus, they cannot be
considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is wellsettled that both Article 448 and Article 546, NCC which allow
full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of
the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a
possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the
belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose
occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are

When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent

from the other co-owners, only his pro indiviso share on the
property is transferred to the buyer.

FACTS:
The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were
owned by Agatona Paulmitan. She had 2 children, Pascual and
Donato. Pascuals (7) children (Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina,
Anita, Baking, Anito) are the respondents and Donato and his
daughter and son-in-law are petitioners.
Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship,
adjudicating to himself Lot 757 claiming that he is the sole
surviving heir thus the OCT of Agatona was cancelled and a
TCT was issued in his name. He executed a deed of sale of Lot
1091 in favor of his daughter, Juliana. For non-payment of
taxes, the lot was forfeited and sole at a public to the
Provincial Govt of Negros Occidental, however, Juliana was
able to redeem the property. Upon learning these, the children
of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint against petitioners to
partition the land plus damages. Petitioners defense was that
the action has already prescribed for it was filed more than 11
years after the issuance of the TCT and that Juliana has
acquired exclusive ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by
redeeming the said property.
The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and
executory. With respect to Lot 1091, the court decided in favor
of respondents. They are entitled to of Lot 1091, pro
indiviso. The redemption did not in anyway prejudice their
rights. The land was ordered to be partitioned and the
petitioners were ordered to pay the respondents their share of
the fruits and the respondents to pay their share in the
redemption of the land. The CA affirmed the decision thus the
case at bar.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Pascuals children and Donato and Juliana
were co-owners of their mothers lot
(2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by
redeeming the property

HELD:
(1) YES: When Agatona died, her estate was still
unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states that Where there are 2 or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of debts of the deceased. Since Pascual and Donato
were still alive when she died, they are co-owners of the
estate. When Pascual died, his children succeeded him in the
co-ownership of the property.

When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a coowner of the same thus he can only sell his undivided portion
of the property. Art. 493 states that each co-owner shall have
the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted
to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.
Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making
the buyer (Juliana) a co-owner.
(2) NO: When she redeemed the property, it did not end the
co-ownership. The right of repurchase may be exercised by a
co-owner w/ respect to his/her share alone as stated in Art.
1612. But she may compel them to reimburse her for half of
the repurchase price for a co-owner has the right to compel
other co-owners to contribute to the expenses for the
preservation of the thing and to taxes.
JOSE Z. CASILANG SR., ET. AL. v. ROSARIO Z. CASILANGDIZON, ET AL., G.R. No. 180269, February 20, 2013
Remedial law; Inferior courts are empowered to rule on the
question of ownership raised by the defendant in an ejectment
suit, but only to resolve the issue of possession; its
determination is not conclusive on the issue of ownership. It is
well to be reminded of the settled distinction between a
summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for
recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land. What
really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a
possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a
reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first
is limited to the question of possession de facto. Unlawful
detainer suits (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry
are the two forms of ejectment suit that may be filed to
recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary
action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to
recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or
the action to recover ownership which also includes recovery
of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially
recover possession.
Under Section 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the Summary
Procedure governs the two forms of ejectment suit, the
purpose being to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or right to possession of the property. They
are not processes to determine the actual title to an estate. If
at all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of
ownership raised by the defendant in such suits, only to
resolve the issue of possession and its determination on the
ownership issue is not conclusive.
Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz
Facts: Petitioner Isabelo Dela Cruz and his sisters/respondents
Lucila and Cornelia were co-owners of a 240-square meter
land in Las Pinas which they bought on installment from
Gatchalian Realty, Inc. Isabelo and Cornelia paid for the down
payment and religiously paid for the monthly amortizations.
Upon Lucias plea to help out a financially distressed cousin
(Corazon), the siblings agreed to make use of the lot as
collateral and security for a loan from the Philippine Veterans
Bank. In order to make this possible, Lucia paid the P8,000
outstanding balance to Gatchalian Realty and had the deed of
title registered in her name. The title was then mortgaged for
Corazons benefit. However, Corazon was not able to pay for
the loan and the mortgaged lot was then foreclosed by the
bank. The foreclosed lot was however redeemed by Lucia.

In 2002, Lucila executed an affidavit of waiver relinquishing all

her share, interest and participation to her brother Isabelo and
her niece Emelinda. Isabelo then filed an action for partition
seeking the segregation of his portion of said lot and the
corresponding title in his name. This action was, however,
contested by Lucila claiming that the waiver she executed
ceding ownership of her share to Isabelo was subject to a
condition that their family problems would be resolved. She
claims that this condition did not happen and that she had
every right to revoke the waiver. This was made evident by
the revocation she made through an affidavit dated
September 24, 2004. The RTC ruled in favor of Lucia and this
was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Lucilas
cession of the property through waiver did not have the effect
of making Isabelo part owner thereof.
Ruling: In deciding this case, the SC considered the wordings
used by Lucila in her waiver. The court noted that the phrase
used To put everything in order, I hereby waive all my share,
interest and participation means that the intention of Lucila
was to waive her right to the property, irreversibly divesting
herself of her existing right to it. It disagreed with the lower
courts interpretation that such wordings intends a
precondition of waiver for if such was the intent, the phrase
containing words such as subject to the condition that
everything is put in order would have been used. Therefore,
the SC ruled that the affidavit of waiver executed by Lucila
makes Isabelo and Emelinda co-owners of the waived share of
Lucila. Isabelo then has the right to demand partition.
Andrea Tabuso vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108558 Civil Law Property Possession
Possession by Tolerance
In 1923, Maria Montes donated an unregistered parcel of land,
11,927 sq. m. in size, to Isabel Elaba.
In 1948, Elaba sold the said land to Esteban Abad. Esteban
had since paid the taxes thereon religiously and a tax
declaration was issued in his name. Meanwhile, Esteban
allowed a certain Marcelo Tabuso to build a shanty (barongbarong) inside the said property.
In 1974, a new tax declaration was issued this time adding the
name of Nemesio Abad, one of Estebans children.
In 1981, Nemesio decided to have a portion of the land be
rented out for business. He then wrote a notice to vacate
against the occupants of the shanty, namely, Andrea Tabuso
and Renato Bismorte. Andrea was the daughter of Marcelo
Tabuso.
But Tabuso et al refused to vacate the said property as they
now claim that they were the owners of the said property; that
they inherited the property from Montes; that they have paid
the tax declarations thereon from 1944 to 1947.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tabuso can claim possession and/or
ownership over the said property.
HELD: No. The evidence presented by Nemesio Abad
outweighs that of Tabuso. Esteban Abad acquired possession
over the property in 1948. Immediately, he paid the tax
declaration for the year 1947 and has continued to do so for
more than 60 years up to the time of the filing of this case. On
the other hand, Tabusos claim that she was an heir of Maria
Montes was not substantiated. Further, the tax declarations

from 1944 to 1947 were only paid in 1981 when they received
a notice to vacate from Nemesio.

to occupy his house, rent-free, does not create a permanent

and indefeasible right of possession in the latters favor.

If at all, their stay inside the property of the Abads was merely
by tolerance. Esteban Abad merely allowed Andreas father to
build a shanty thereon until 1981 when Nemesio, Estebans
son, decided to use that portion of the property. Certainly,
Tabusos possession over the property was not in the concept
of an owner, they were merely tolerated. Such possession will
never ripen into ownership. An owners act of allowing another

Further, Tabusos house thereon was merely a shanty built on

a vast parcel of land. This fact lends support to Abads claim
that the stay of the Tabusos in the said land was merely
tolerated.